Rule 138-A Law Student Practice

A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC

Chapters 3 and 4 (ALL CASES UNDER THESE CHAPTERS)

Mejia vs. Reyes, 4 SCRA 648

 This is a disbarment proceeding against attorney Francisco S. Reyes for malpractice.

 Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed bank attorney and notary public for the Baguio Branch
of the Philippine National Bank
 As still having the position of bank attorney and notary public, his services were engaged by Jose G. Mejia and
Emilia N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court against the Philippine National Bank and
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
o the cancellation of a mortgage on a parcel of land situated in Baguio City recorded on their certificate
of title No. 2499
 Respondent urged that the sum in Japanese war notes of P2,693.53 paid by Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera
to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank and received by the Philippines National Bank, Baguio Branch, to pay the
balance of real estate mortgage loan, be credited by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation as successor-in-
interest of the defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank
o Moved for the mortgage annotated on transfer certificate of title No. 2499 be cancelled.
 The Court of First Instance denied both motion for reconsideration
 Complainants did not follow with an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Baguio as per advice of respondent
o that thereafter for the first time they learned that the respondent was counsel and notary public of
the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that his representing them against the Philippine
National Bank, in whose Baguio Branch he was bank attorney and notary public, without revealing to
them such connection with the Bank, constitutes malpractice; and pray this Court to disbar him.
 WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF INVOLEMENT IN CONFLICTING INTERESTS TOWARDS
PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS
 YES
 Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case (Cantorne vs. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23 and In
re: De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258). The respondent's act of appearing and acting as counsel for the complainants Jose
G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him
bank attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice.
 The Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was appearing as counsel for the complainants, yet it
did not revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and notary public; that in the civil case the
respondent did not appear as counsel for the Bank which was represented by attorneys Ramon B. de los Reyes
and Nemesio P. Libunao; that no appeal was taken from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Baguio, because the complainants had chosen to pay the principal of their loan
 That the respondent was deeply devoted to his duties as counsel for the complainants and collected a very
small attorney's fees of P90, the malpractice committed by the respondent is not so serious. He is just
admonished and warned not to repeat it.
 ELEMENTS THAT FALL UNDER CONFLICTING INTEREST
 Instances when a Lawyer is Considered having Conflicting Interests
o As an employee of a corporation whose duty is to attend legal affairs, he cannot join a labor union
of employees in that corporation.
 o As a lawyer who investigated an accident as counsel for insurance, he cannot represent the injured
person.
o As a receiver of a corporation, he cannot represent the creditor.
o As a representative of the obligor, he cannot represent the obligee.
o As a lawyer representing a party in a compromise agreement, he cannot be subsequent lawyer
representing another client who seeks to nullify the agreement.

 POSSIBLE INVOLEMENT IN CONFLICTING INTERESTS TO BE DISCLOSED IMMEDIATELY TO

PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS (RULE 15.01)

San Jose vs. Cruz 57 Phil 792

 This is a complaint filed by Guadalupe San Jose against Attorney Nazario G. Cruz, charging him with malpractice.
 The facts were presented established through the investigation of the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna.
 The spouses Raymundo Isaac and Antonina Alay mortgaged to Dr. Manuel B. Calupitan three parcels of land
which they owned.
o This was to guarantee them a loan worth P1, 000 payable with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per
annum.
 Debtors-spouses were not able to pay off said loan mortgage which resulted in creditor selling all his rights to
two of the said three parcels for the sum of P1, 000 to the petitioner.
o Evidenced by the deed recorded in the registry of deeds of said province but not the deed of sale.
 The debtors-spouses now owe the petitioner in which petitioner engaged the services of the respondent
attorney who instituted civil case No. 5480 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
  The respondent did not seek to foreclose the mortgage, for the simple reason that the deed of sale executed
in his client's favor was not recorded and in the complaint he limited himself to demand payment of the
amount of P1,000 with the stipulated interest and the costs, having thus instituted a personal action.
 Respondent withdrew being the attorney of petitioner once a judgment in favor of respondent’s clients were
obtained
 After the case was remanded to the trial court, the facts, upon which the present complaint is based, arose.
 After the three parcels of land had been attached by the sheriff, the spouses Tomas Matienzo and Maria
Carcalin, relatives of the spouses Raymundo Isaac and Antonina Alay, pretending to be the owners of the real
estate in question, filed a third party claim with the sheriff, for which reason the sale was temporarily
suspended and they immediately retained the herein respondent as their attorney who instituted in the same
court.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IN THE CASE AT BAR IS GUILTY OF DOUBLE-DEALING AND TREACHERY?
 The record shows that the respondent offered his services to the Matienzo spouses knowing that the petitioner
had obtained a favorable judgment in the civil case No. 5480
 An Attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation of attorney and client has terminated and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to
defend in another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct
from, and independent of the former case.
 An attorney is not permitted, in serving a new client as against a former one, to do anything which will
injuriously affect the former client in any manner in which the attorney formerly represented him, though the
relation of attorney and client has terminated, and the new employment is in a different case; nor can the
attorney use against his former client any knowledge or information gained through their former connection.
(Malcolm on Legal Ethics, p. 143.)
 Respondent attorney deserves a reprimand for the acts committed by him and we would not have hesitated to
impose a more severe penalty were it not for the fact that, apparently, this is his first offense, and, furthermore
we are convinced that it is due principally to his inexperience in the profession. So ordered.
 TREACHERY AND DOUBLE-DEALING, CONDEMNED (RULE 15.03)

Malabed vs. Nanca, 60 SCRA 253

 This is a case of dishonesty; the SC made a declaration of the word “unprofessional misconduct” but it is not the
issue in the case
 If the client requested for the return of the money that is in the possession of the lawyer, not only that you
need to make an accounting but you must return it
 The charges of unprofessional conduct and dishonesty being filed against respondent Benedicto L. Nanca, a
member of the Philippine Bar.
 The complainant is one Andres G. Malabed, Jr., a victim of a vehicular accident, who alleged that while
confined in the National Orthopedic Hospital he was approached by respondent, then unknown to him
o Respondent solicited his legal services and asked for the amount of P400.00 presumably for the
payment of court fees the sum to which was added another P300.00.
 Complainant became suspicious as after a lapse of several months, when he was already out of the hospital,
respondent had not even informed him as to the progress of his case.
o Still no suit against the bus company was filed
 He had to have recourse then to another lawyer. It is on the basis of the above allegations that he would
hold respondent liable not only for unprofessional conduct but also for dishonesty in failing to return the
money.
 Respondent had filed an administrative complaint against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Company before the Public
Service Commission. While he took the preparatory steps to file a civil action for damages against such firm,
there were overtures for amicable settlement, thus delaying the filing thereof.
o Complainant instructed respondent to defer the filing of the civil complaint for damages.
 Respondent’s services were unceremoniously terminated. He denied that he received the additional sum of
Three Hundred Pesos and he likewise claimed that for his professional services in the criminal complaint he had
not been paid at all.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT ATTORNEY IS REQUIRED TO RETURN THE COMPLAINANT’S MONEY ONCE
DEMANDED; Whether or not the attorney’s act resulted in an unethical acts
 "It would seem, therefore, that the respondent was minded to extend his services for free and this attitude was
apparently not unknown to the complainant when the latter sent the respondent a telegram (Exh. "D") and a
written demand for the return of the P400
 There having been neither agreement for attorney's fees nor a bill for legal services rendered, respondent had
no lawful cause to retain complainant's money after its return was demanded. (Sec. 25, Rule 138, New Rules of
Court).
 The recommendation, therefore, was for dismissing the charge for unprofessional conduct and for holding
respondent accountable for the return of the full amount of Four Hundred and Forty Pesos to complainant,
although he was not to be held liable for dishonesty.
 "While we do not abet or commend the manner in which respondent's services was summarily terminated,
for his inability to institute the civil action required of him by his client, the fact remains that since the
P400.00 (and the P40.00) was given in relation to such contemplated action, his inaction or omission whether
through negligence or not calls for the return of the amounts advanced.
 His having accepted the case was more for accommodation of a friend than just an impersonal undertaking. His
reaction in retaining complainant's money clearly stemmed from a hurt feeling because of the apparent display
of ingratitude, on the part of the complainant."
 WHEREFORE, the charges of unprofessional conduct and dishonesty against respondent Benedicto L. Nanca are
dismissed, reserving to the complainant the right to file an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the sum of
Four Hundred Forty Pesos. Let a copy of this resolution be entered in the record of respondent.
 MONEY NOT USED FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE IS HELD ALSO IN TRUST AND MUST BE ACCOUNTED IMMEDIATELY
(RULE 16.01)
Aro vs. Nanawa, 27 SCRA 1090

 Services of petitioner as practicing attorney was engaged by respondents for the prosecution of their claim, as
heirs, in the estate of their deceased uncle
o Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay agreed with herein petitioner to avail of his services and entrust
the prosecution of their claim on a contingent basis as shown in the agreement, copy
o Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay were the plaintiffs and the other respondents, excepting the
respondent Judge, were the defendants
 Petition to litigate as pauper filed by herein petitioner for respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo Magtibay was
granted by the respondent Judge
 A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants and the opposition but was denied by the respondent judge.
 Counsels of both parties met for an amicable settlement of the case between the plaintiffs and the defendants
to the effect that a certain property of the spouses Lucio Magtibay (deceased) and respondent Aurelia
Martinez, worth P3,000.00, would be given to the plaintiffs in full settlement of their claim, as share in the
properties left by their deceased uncle Lucio Magtibay.
 Respondent-plaintiffs were given notice at their homes for the purpose of going to Sta. Maria, Laguna
o Sent a telegram to ex-mayor Cordova to notify of plaintiffs’ and their petitioners failure to come to the
planned meeting place
 because of the inquiries or interpellation made by respondent Judge to herein petitioner as to whether there is
a Philippine precedent which allows or directs the protection by the Court of the rights of any of its officers
(lawyer) against any collusion perpetrated by the parties in a case to defraud or cheat an attorney of his
compensation agreed upon by him and his clients, and his answer that insofar as his researches were
concerned, he could not find any
 Upon these facts, petitioner tries to make out before this Court a case of certiorari for grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Judge in dismissing the case on the basis of the compromise agreement of the
parties, entered into at the back of petitioner notwithstanding the reservation made in his favor to file an
action against both parties "with respect to his alleged attorney's fees", as well as a case of mandamus "to
order and command the said respondent judge" to take cognizance of and resolve his opposition and counter-
motion for the court to fix the compensation he should be paid. Unable to find any local precedent to support
his position
 Whether or not the lawyer may be dismissed at anytime?
 This Court, sanctions in any way the questionable practice of clients of compromising their cases at the back of
their counsel with the consequence that the stipulated contingent fees of the lawyer are either unreasonably
reduced or even completely rendered without basis, as in this case — wherein the clients waived the whole of
their rights in favor of their opponent after the latter had acknowledged, in effect, the correctness of said
clients' contention
 True it is also that "a client may, at anytime, dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place", (Sec. 26,
Rule 138) but it must be emphasized that the same provision, which is an incorporation of Republic Act 636 into
the Rules of Court, also provides that "if the contract between client and attorney had been reduced to writing
and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client
full compensation.
 In the case at bar, by entering into the compromise agreement in question and even inserting therein a prayer
to the court to dismiss their case filed by petitioner, (see footnote 6, ante) petitioner’s clients impliedly
dismissed him. (Rustia vs. the Court, etc., supra.) Such implied dismissal appears to us to have been made
without justifiable cause, none is urged anywhere in the record
  Through the services of petitioner, his clients secured, in effect, a recognition, which had been previously
denied by their aunt-in-law, that they were entitled to a 1⁄4 share in the estate left by their uncle. We hold that
under these circumstances, and since it appears that said clients have no other means to pay petitioner, since
they instituted their case as paupers, and that their aunt-in-law was aware of the terms of their contract of
professional services with petitioner', said clients had no right to waive the portion of their such acknowledged
rights in favor of their opponent to the extent that such waiver would prejudice the stipulated contingent
interest of their lawyer
 CLIENT CAN DISMISS THE LAWYER ANYTIME; CONSEQUENCES (RULE 16.03)
 LAWYERS CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF HIS ATTORNEY’S FEES THROUGH THE CLIENT’S MANEUVERS

Blaza vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 461

 The law says that in a criminal action, the "appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own
motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time
prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio."
 A notice was sent by the Appellate Court’s Clerk to petitioner’s counsel
o The notice contained the usual advise that all the evidence, both oral and documentary, was already
attached to the record (and was there available to the appellants), and counsel had 30 days from
notice within which to file brief.
 Petitioner’s counsel filed for a motion for extension which was granted
o Firstly, motion for extension alleged as ground that the brief was "now being prepared but because of
heavy pressure of work in the law office . . . counsel shall be unable to finish and file said brief within
the period still remaining."
o Secondly, averred that (a) the brief was then "undergoing final revision but the same cannot be
possibly finished and printed within the period still remaining," and, (b) moreover, counsel had to
attend the convention and second advanced course for municipal judges
o Lastly, motion for extension stated that counsel could not finish the brief because he did not have a
copy of the transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimonies and that he wishes for it to be sent to
him by the Trial Court
 The appellants' brief was never filed and three months passed, without said brief being presented.
 Court denied petitioners’ reconsideration due to the fact that the court does not consider a valid excuse of
unavailability of the transcript copies
 The petitioners have come to this Court through an application for certiorari advocating the theory that the
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in disregarding their plea that the transcripts of stenographic
notes be transmitted to the Trial Court and that thereafter they be given a 20-day extension to file their brief.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS’ LAWYER ACTED AS WHAT IS HIGHLY DEMANDED OF LAWYERS?
 The petitioners are not entitled to relief. They are bound by their counsel's acts and, unfortunately for them,
the record adequately establishes that the failure of their counsel de parte to file brief in their behalf is
inexcusable. He did not adopt "the norm of practice expected of men of good intentions."
 Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1964 Rules, invoked by the petitioners, does not justify their counsel's request that a
copy of the transcript be sent down to the lower court.
o There is no satisfactory showing that no such copy of the transcript had in truth been retained in the
lower court, as thus required by the Rules. The presumption of course is that "official duty has been
regularly performed" and nothing in the record appears to warrant its overthrow or negation.
  The fact is that petitioners' counsel had been given more than sufficient time within which to file brief. He had
been accorded no less than ninety (90) days for this purpose: the original thirty (30) days provided by Section 3
of Rule 124, and the sixty (60) days' extension prayed for in their three (3) motions.
 The filing of a brief by an attorney within the period set therefore by law is a duty not only to his client but also
to the court; the law declares that extension of time to do so are not granted except for good and sufficient
cause; and courts have broad discretion in the determination of the sufficiency of the cause given as well as the
length of time for the extension.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the resolutions of the Court of Appeals sought to be nullified and
set aside are AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.
 COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE HIGHLY DEMANDED OF LAWYERS

Ventura vs. Santos, 59 Phil 123

 This is a proceeding commenced by a complaint charging three persons with the commission of alleged acts
more or less irregular and improper to the prejudice of the complainant. The persons charged herein are
Attorney Gregorio O. Santos, his alleged agent Juan Villorente and another named Doroteo Noriel.
 The charges against Attorney Gregorio O. Santos consist in alleged negligence in the performance of his duties
as an attorney, based on the following grounds:
o After the said attorney had bound himself to represent the complainant and her husband, Mariano
Neuda, now deceased, and two others named Felipa Rus and Simeon Miguel, in the cadastral
proceedings of the municipality of Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija, for the purpose of reclaiming and
securing the title to certain lots
 He failed to appear during the hearing, as a result of which the complainant and her husband
were declared in default and the aforesaid lot No. 3533 was afterwards adjudicated to the
spouses Rufino Agaton and Maria Jarino.
 The records show that the respondent's failure to appear during the hearing of the cadastral case in connection
with the lots claimed by the complainant was due to the fact that he was then seriously ill at the Philippine
General Hospital in the City of Manila. The complainant admitted the truth of this fact.
 P100.00 was paid to respondent attorney from the result of succeeded in having all of the eleven lots, with the
exception of lot No. 3533, decided legally to his clients
 The respondent himself admits that when the thirty-day period, allowed the complainant to file her motion for
reconsideration of the judgment of the court of November 19, 1929, adjudicating the lot in question to the
spouses Rufino Agaton and Maria Jarino, had elapsed, said complainant informed him of such fact.
 However, he allowed the time to elapse without taking any further steps in connection there-with until when,
after receiving notice from the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija setting the hearing for the presentation of
evidence in connection with his motion for revision for, he sent a communication to the complainant herein
asking her whether she still wanted him to continue representing her in the said case. He called the
complainant's attention therein to the fact that he had already transferred his residence and law office of the
City of Manila.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT ATTORNEY IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE CASE AT HAND?
 It is the duty of every attorney to act with diligence in all cases, now and then urging the prosecution or
termination of the cases committed to his charge the they criminal, civil or administrative in nature, or simply
motions, without waiting for the courts to urge him to do so, if the clarification or definition of his client's rights
depend upon the decision thereof, and informing his client of the impracticability of continuing to represent
him, in order to give him an opportunity to study the new situation and work out a solution thereof.
 Were it not for the circumstance that the respondent's fees have not yet been paid to date — judging from the
respondent's letter to the complainant, of November 19, 1932, notwithstanding the said complainant's
allegation to the contrary inasmuch as all that she know, according to her own admission, is hearsay from her
husband, now deceased — we would treat his behaviour with some severity. At any rate, we cannot let it pass
without expressing our disapproval thereof inasmuch as it is neither proper nor just.
 It is needless to state herein that the said respondent should not nor could be held liable for the acts
committed by the aforesaid Juan Villorente and Doroteo Noriel, on the ground that the former never acted as
 his agent, nor was he given any share of the sums of money they had collected from her, as the complainant
herself admits. Let the respondent be informed of this resolution for his information and guidance, trusting
that he will henceforth endeavor not to have a repetition of this case in order to avoid more severe disciplinary
action.
 INSTANCES OF NEGLIGENCE OF ATTORNEYS (FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO NOTIFY CLIENTS OF THE SCHEDULED
TRIAL WHICH PREVENTED THE LATTER TO LOOK FOR ANOTHER LAWYER TO LAWYER TO REPRESENT THEM
WHILE COUNSEL WAS IN THE HOSPITAL; RULE 18.03)

Santos vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 673

 In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Santos, former President of the Mana
Mining and Development Corporation ("MMDC"), questions the resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission ("NLRC") affirming the decision of Labor Arbiter Fructuoso T. Aurellano who, having held illegal
the termination of employment of private respondent Melvin D. Millena, has ordered petitioner MMDC, as
well as its president (herein petitioner) and the executive vice-president in their personal capacities, to pay
Millena his monetary claims.
 Private respondent, was hired to be the project accountant for MMDC's mining operations
 Private respondent sent to Mr. Gil Abaño, the MMDC corporate treasurer, a memorandum calling the
latter's attention to the failure of the company to comply with the withholding tax requirements of, and to
make the corresponding monthly remittances to, the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") on account of delayed
payments of accrued salaries to the company's laborers and employees.
 Respondent was laid over and complained that he would not have resigned from the Sycip, Gorres & Velayo
accounting firm, where he was already a senior staff auditor
o Filed with the NLRC Regional Arbitration a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries, 13th month
pay, overtime pay, separation pay and incentive leave pay against MMDC and its two top officials,
namely, herein petitioner Benjamin A. Santos (the President) and Rodillano A. Velasquez (the
executive vice-president) in his complaint-affidavit.
 At the initial hearing only the complainant, Millena, appeared
o Atty. Romeo Perez, in representation of the respondents, requested for the movement or
rescheduling of the hearing
o The NLRC in Legazpi City again received a telegram from Atty. Perez sent yet another telegram seeking
a further postponement of the hearing and asking for a period until 15 January 1987 within which to
submit the position paper.
 WHETHER OR NOT A WRITTEN AGREEMENT IS SUFFICIENT FOR AN OBLIGATION TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES?
 Labor Arbiter Fructuoso T. Aurellano, finding no valid cause for terminating complainant's employment, ruled,
citing this Court's pronouncement in Construction & Development Corporation of the Philippines vs. Leogardo,
Jr. that a partial closure of an establishment due to losses was a retrenchment measure that rendered the
employer liable for unpaid salaries and other monetary claims.
 If any of such parties has appeared by an attorney or attorneys, service upon him shall be made upon his
attorneys or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one attorney
appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite
side.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is given DUE COURSE and the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
affirmed by the NLRC, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as it holds herein petitioner Benjamin Santos personally
liable with Mana Mining and Development Corporation, which portion of the questioned judgment is now SET
ASIDE. In all other respects, the questioned decision remains unaffected. No costs.
 FORMS OF EMPLOYMENT AS COUNSEL TO A CLIENT; ORAL OR EXPRESS (CONTRACTS FOR EMPLYOMENT MAY
EITHER BE ORAL OR EXPRESS; RULE 20.01)
Sesbreno vs. CA 245 SCRA 30
 Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and then Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement and
backwages.
 Petitioner replaces the employees’ former counsel Atty. Catalino Pacquiao.
 32 of the 52 employees signed the document
o Agreed to pay petitioner 30% as attorney's fees
o 20% as expenses to be taken from their back salaries
 Trial court made a decision
o Ordering the Province of Cebu to reinstate the petitioning employees and pay them back salaries.
 A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties
 10 employees filed manifestations before the trial court asserting that they agreed to pay petitioner 40% to be
taken only from their back salaries.
 the trial court fixed petitioner's attorney's fees at 40% of back salaries, terminal leave, gratuity pay and
retirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total of 60% of all monies paid to the employees.
 Private respondents' motion for reconsideration was granted
o The trial court modified the award after noting that petitioner's attorney's lien was inadvertently
placed as 60% when it should have been only 50%.
 Hence this petition for review where he claims that attorney's fees amounting to 50% of all monies awarded to
his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being consistent with prevailing case law and the contract of
professional services between the parties. He adds that since private respondents did not appeal, they are not
entitled to affirmative relief other than that granted in the regional trial court.
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney's fees awarded to
petitioner Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by private
respondents?
 It is a settled rule that what a lawyer may charge and receive as attorney's fees is always subject to judicial
control. A lawyer is primarily an officer of the court charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering
impartial justice between the parties. When he takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court
and subjects his professional fees to judicial control.
 Stipulated attorney's fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate compared to
the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client. This means to say that
the amount of the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would be sufficient to show that an
unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had been perpetrated on him.
 Courts may always ascertain, if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the
circumstances. Quantum meruit, meaning "as much as he deserves," is used as the basis for determining the
lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract.
 Considering the nature of the case, which is a labor case, the amount recovered and petitioner's participation in
the case, an award of 50% of back salaries of his 52 clients indeed strikes us as excessive. Under the
circumstances, a fee of 20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement in this case.
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision AFFIRMED.
 ATTORNEY’S FEES BASED ON QUANTUM MERUIT; CONCEPT (RULE 20.01)
Hadjula vs. Atty. Madianda, AC No. 6711 July 3, 2007
 Complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F.
Madianda.
 An AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT was filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty.
Roceles F. Madianda
o Violation of Article 209 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 Complainant and respondent used to be friends when they worked together at the Bureau of Fire Protection
o Respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and
Nursing Services.
 Complainant sought for legal advice from respondent
o In the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal
secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only
to be informed later by the respondent that respondent would refer the matter to a lawyer friend.
o It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after
she had already heard her secrets.
 Complainant then filed for a criminal and disciplinary action against the latter.
o Demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion.
 A COUNTER COMPLAINT filed by the respondent with the Ombudsman charging complainant with violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges
being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent.
o A disciplinary case was also instituted against complainant before the Professional Regulation
Commission.
 Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal
secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's legal advice.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF USING THE DISCLOSED INFORMATION FROM COMPLAINANT
SEEKING LEGAL ADVICE?
 the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came out with a Report and
Recommendation
o Information related by complainant to the respondent is "protected under the attorney-client
privilege communication."
o Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she "revealed
information given to her during a legal consultation."
o It is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing
the secrets of the complainant.
 Complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to put up with what she
considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-
client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions
circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the
lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of
consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the
consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to
memorialize the relationship.
 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF HIS CLIENT, USE INFORMATION ACQUIRED IN THE COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT, NOR SHALL HE USE THE SAME TO HIS OWN ADVANTAGE OR THAT OF A THIRD PERSON, UNLESS THE
CLIENT WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONSENTS THERETO (RULE 21.02)
 Cesario ADARNE vs. Atty. Damian ALDABA

(DISMISSED)
Adarne along with 2 others was accused of forcible entry. During a hearing of the case, the original
lawyer of the accused failed to arrive on time which prompted Adarne to prevail upon Atty. Damian
Aldaba, his 3rd-degree cousin, as counsel for them and asked for the postponement of the trial. Atty.
Aldaba moved for the dismissal of the case. The motion was granted and the case was dismissed.

Thereafter, the opposing counsel in the case against Adarbe filed a motion for reconsideration and the
case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

The respondent entered a "special appearance" for Mr. Adarne and thereafter argued that the interest
of justice would best be served if the defendants were allowed to file an action for quieting of title and
the case heard jointly with the action for forcible entry. The hearing was deferred until after the filing
of the action for quieting of title.

The court declared the defendants in default for their failure to appear at the hearing set.
Subsequently, the court rendered a decision and a writ of execution was issued. Due to this, Mr.
Adarne filed a malpractice complaint against Atty. Aldaba.

Atty. Aldaba contends that he never had any agreement with the complainant with respect to the
handling of his case except for the "special appearance" that he entered for the complainant due to
the non-availability of their actual lawyer.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Aldaba committed negligence and lack of diligence in handling the case.

RULING: It was neither gross negligence nor omission to have entertained such belief An attorney is
not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill having
reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human
being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake and will be protected as long as he acts
honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.

Note: The rule followed on matters of substitution of attorneys as laid down by this Court is that no
substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless there be filed:

1. a written application for such substitution; (2) the written consent of the client;(3) the written
consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent cannot be secured,
there must be filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the
attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules.

ATTORNEY NOT BOUND TO EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE (Rule 18.03)

 ELESIO PORMENTO, SR vs. ATTY. ELIAS PONTEVEDRA
(REMINDED, FINED and WARNED)

Mr. Pormento charged Atty. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct praying for disbarment of
Atty. Pontevedra. Mr. Pormento alleged that Atty. Pontevedra committed the following:
 Deliberately failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim despite receipt of the
order of dismissal which led to his failure to file for an appeal.
 Due to this, Pomento hired a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to
institute an action to recover the property
Utilized pieces of confidential information he obtained from him when he was still his client when
he is representing the accused in a criminal case filed by Mr. Pormento
Atty. Pontevedra's convinced him to build a small house on the property and to allow his
(complainant's) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for him to establish his
possession of the property
Atty. Pontevedra acted as counsel of the nephew in the case he filed against his nephew when he
refused to leave the property

In his comment, Atty. Pontevedra contends the following:

 he delivered the copy of the order to the complainant two days after receipt and informed him
of its contents
 he honestly believes that there exists no conflict between his present and former clients'
interests as the cases he handled are separate and distinct from each other
 he took up the cause of the accused in the criminal cases filed by the complainant for
humanitarian considerations since said accused are poor and needy and because there is a
dearth of lawyers in their community

ISSUE: WON Atty. Pontevedra committed malpractice and misconduct by representing a conflicting
interest.

RULING: the rule is settled that the prohibition against the representation of conflicting interests
applies although the attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith.
Moreover, the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not make the
prohibition inoperative. The termination of the relationship between attorney and client provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.
Respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.

Note: TEST OF CONFLICTING INTEREST --

Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if:
 The acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him
 Also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.
 The acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-
dealing in the performance thereof
Canon 19. A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION and FILEMON G. ALVAREZ v. LO BU

and COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union was able to obtain from the Court of
Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement
of the judgment in its favor. When the sheriff levied on said properties, Lo Bu filed
urgent motions to recall the writ, asserting the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations. The motions were denied. Lo Bu appealed by certiorari, but the
Supreme Court denied the same., Lo Bu filed a replevin suit covering the same
properties.
Upon receipt of the order from the Supreme Court denying certiorari, the labor union
filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint alleging the lack of cause of action, Lo
Bu being a fictitious buyer as found by the Courts of Industrial Relations and affirmed
by the Supreme Court. The lower court dismissed the complaint. When Lo Bu appealed
the dismissal to the Court of Appeals, the Labor Union prayed for certiorari and
prohibition due to the obvious character as a further delaying tactic made by Lo Bu.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Yolando Busmente has allowed his client to dictate the procedure for
handling the case.
RULING: YES. A lawyer is of course expected to defend his client’s cause with zeal,
but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor
statutes. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less
than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand boy at
the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to
keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in
the bar.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of December 19, 1974 of
respondent Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Court of Appeals being perpetually
restrained from taking any further action on such appeal, except that of dismissing it.
Triple costs.

LAWYER, NOT CLIENT CONTROLS THE PROCEDURE IN THE HANDLING OF A

CASE
Canon 22. A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate
in the circumstances.

MAXIMO BAQUIRAN, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DELFIN B. FLORES and TRINIDAD L.
AURELIO

In this case,the Court of Appeals dismissed Mr. Baquiran's application for mandamus, on the ground
that the latter’s record on appeal was filed beyond the period prescribed by law.

In his contention, Mr. Baquiran alleges that the CA erred in holding that the record on appeal was filed
beyond the period prescribed by law. That as the service of notice of the judgment rendered in the
case in question on Attorney Ranada, and on Mr. Baquiran had no force or effect, for Attorney Ranada
was then no longer counsel for the appellant and service on the latter was likewise of no force or
effect as he was represented by counsel, the period for appeal did not commence to run from either
date.

In the motion for a reconsideration of the order of the trial court declaring the case submitted for
decision, Atty. Ranada stated that, since the appellant had engaged the services of another lawyer to
handle his mandamus case in the Court of Appeals, he (Ranada) honestly believed that "he was
already relieved as counsel for the defendant,"

Baquiran, in his motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing his
appeal from the first judgment in the case rendered on the pleadings because of failure to pay in due
time the docketing fees, that he condemned the conduct observed by Atty. Ranada and "has,
therefore, separated himself from said counsel."

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ranada has properly withdrawn himself as counsel.

RULING: It is true that, under the law, an attorney may withdraw as such from the case with the
consent of the client, and the latter may dismiss his attorney at any time and counsel for the
defendant. But the withdrawal as counsel of a client in a case, which must be made with the consent
of the client, of the dismissal by the client of his counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in the
case. No such petition of withdrawal or dismissal of counsel has been accomplished in this case.
 RUPERTO MONTINOLA v. LUCRECIO HOFILENA

Lucrecion Hofileno signed a contract of agreement with Atty. Montinola on the

following:
1. That the Atty will be his counsel on several cases filed against Hofilena before the
Court of First Instance; 2. That all expenses for the court's fees, Sherrif, and printing of
exceptions and brief shall be accounted to Hofileno; 3.That Hofilena will pay Atty.
Montinola of 750 as a professional fee and 2000, in action, should the decision of the
cases be in favor of Hofilena
Hofilena upon execution of the contract paid the plaintiff P700 and Atty. Montinola
represented him in two cases. The cases were decided in favor of Hofilena and
afterwards, he paid Atty. Montinola P800.
However, alleging that the Hilofena is yet to be fully paid and in his refusal to further
pay Atty. Montinola, the latter filed an action to recover a balance of P1,200.

ISSUE: WON Atty Montinola is entitled to further payment?

RULING: Not having rendered the services contemplated therein in accordance with its
terms, it is clear that he is not entitled to recover upon the contract; and under the
provisions of section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure he is only "entitled to have and
receive from his clients reasonable compensation for the services rendered, with a view
to the importance of the subject matter in controversy, to the extent of the services
rendered, and his professional standing as a lawyer." There is no evidence in the record
on which we can base a judgment that plaintiff is entitled to compensation other than
that which he has already received, for the services actually rendered by him.

SITUATIONS WHERE COUNSEL CANNOT RECOVER FULL AMOUNT, DESPITE A WRITTEN

CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Choa vs. Chiongson, 253 SCRA 371 (take note)
 Whether or not a judge can be disqualified
 Impartiality of judges
Lourdes BUSINOS vs. Atty. Francisco RICAFORT (take note)

FACTS: In a sworn complaint for disbarment, complainant Lourdes R. Busiños charged respondent
Atty. Francisco Ricafort, a practicing lawyer in Oas, Albay with having committed the crime of estafa
by misappropriation of the sum of P32,000.00. Of this amount, P30,000.00 was entrusted to
respondent for deposit in the bank account of complainant's husband, while P2,000.00 represented
the amount respondent demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in Civil Case No. 5814,
when no such bond was required. On the third hearing of the estafa case against respondent, he
came to the court with the money and paid the complainant which made her not to pursue the estafa
case but did not withdraw the instant complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ricafort violated his lawyer’s oath

HELD: YES

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of
his duty to his client, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Here, the respondent chose to
forget that by swearing the lawyer's oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice — a vital function of
democracy, a failure of which is disastrous to society.

For dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of Section 25 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11 thereof, and
consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal
profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court
Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of law. His
name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of
their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct

Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without their
consent, and by deceiving the complainant into giving him the amount purportedly to be
used as a bond which was not required, is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice, and
gross misconduct.

 The money and property of the client must be held in trust by the attorney
 You can be disbarred from using the money or property of the client
Bautista vs. Gonzales, 182 SCRA 155 (take note)
 Canon 17
 Purchase of the lawyer of the properties of the client
 Can a lawyer purchase their client’s property? NO
o This is malpractice already

CANON 14
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and
sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de officio or
as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal
aid.
 This is for pro bono cases
 The level of services as to whether the person has the means to pay or not should not change
 Amicus curiae – friend of the court
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of
an indigent client unless:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or
competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the
prospective client or between a present client and the
prospective client.

Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to

pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of
conduct governing his relations with paying clients.

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN

ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
 This also refers to attorney-client relationship
o Privileged communiction
 Connected with the “limited practice of a law student”
 There must exist an attorney client relationship or a kind of consultancy relationship with a
prospective client
 That the client made the communication in confidence
 The legal advice must be sought in the professional capacity of the attorney
 Exception:
o If it is a crime, no amount of attorney client relationship will protect it from privilege communication
 o

Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client,

shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would
involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and
if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.

Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege

communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a
prospective client.

Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests

except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all

concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling
disputes.

Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a

candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of
the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the
prospects of the case.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able

to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.

Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance

with the laws and the principles of fairness.

Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or

occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear
to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.

CANON 20
Straightforward contract
Contingent fee – a lawyer would be paid should the case be ruled towards his/her client
Ordinary sense – a lawyer’s fee is the reasonable compensation to the attorney for his services;
belongs to the attorney
Extraordinary sense – lawyer’s fee awarded by courts in case of indemnity of the losing party to be
paid to the winning party
Actual fees different from contingent fees

CANON 16
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client's interest are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client
CANON 18
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which
he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.
However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client's request for information.

CANON 19
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate
the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.
CANON 20
Connected to quantum meruit
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining
his fees: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of
the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the
IBP chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the
client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the
client, be entitled to a division of fees in proportion to the work performed
and responsibility assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the
client, accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or
forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his
professional employment from anyone other than the client.
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.

CANON 21
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his
client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of
the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or
associates or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to
his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full
knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client,
give information from his files to an outside agency seeking such information
for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any
similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to
partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent
those whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences
or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's
affairs even with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a
particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.

CANON 22
Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following
case:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in

connection with the matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these
canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best
interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult
for him to carry out the employment effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or
fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
(g) Other similar cases.
Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a
retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the
client is entitled, and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly
transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.