Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad

Economic Analysis of the Effects of Rice Price Distortions in Pakistan: 1975-90 [with
Comments]
Author(s): Nuzhat Iqbal and M. Ghaffar Chaudhry
Source: The Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 32, No. 4, Papers and Proceedings PART II
Ninth Annual General Meeting of the Pakistan Society of Development Economists Islamabad,
January 7-10, 1993 (Winter 1993), pp. 859-872
Published by: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41259701 .
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ThePakistanDevelopment Review
32:4 PartII (Winter1993) pp. 859-872

EconomicAnalysisoftheEffectsofRice Price
Distortionsin Pakistan:1975-90
NUZH AT IQBAL

INTRODUCTION
Price distortionsinduce inefficient utilisationof resourcesby giving
incorrect signalsto producersand consumers.Since distorted pricesdo not reflect
the real value of resources,quantitiesof goods and servicesproducedmaynotbe
consistent withtheirdemand. The priceDistortions maybe causedbya numberof
different reasons. Theymay,forinstance,be caused by monopolistic tendencies,
preferential treatmentof a particularsectorof economy, establishment of diffusion
of a particularproductor an input,etc. In fact,pricedistortions occursometimes
fromdeliberateand sometimeinadvertent Government policies subsidiesand
of
pricesupportsin pursuanceofcertainsocialor economicobjectives.
Both producersand consumersmaximise their economic welfare by
allocatingtheirresourcesin responseto price signals froma fullycompetitive
market.Since movementsin commodityprices especiallyfood prices affect
producersand consumersin exactlythe oppositeway,fixationof theirprices in
developingcountries representsa policydilemma.Whilepricesofall itemsusedby
consumersand producersare important, foodpricescarrya uniquesignificance in
low incomecountries wherethemarginalpropensity toconsumeis veryhigh. Since
farmproducersare also foodconsumers, thenetimpactof a foodpricechangein
theircase will dependon theextentto whichtheyhaveemergedfroma subsistence
economy. However,if inputsare subjectto pricefixation,the impactwill be felt
morereadilyand directly. In fact,wherethereis no Government intervention,
pricesequilibrate consumer demand with theproductive capacities producers.If
of
prices are distortedby any agency, theirallocative role is seriouslydiminished.
Imperfections of both size and operationbeing prevailedultimately induce mis-
allocationof resourcesin the country. Resourceuse efficienciesincrease,if
government its roleto ensuringproperfunctioning
restricts of themarketand lets
thepricestobe determined bytheforcesofdemandand supply.

Nuzhat Iqbal is associated withthe InternationalIslamic University,Islamabad.

Author's Note: I am gratefulto Prof. Rafiq Ahmed and Prof. Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi for their
constantencouragementand valuable guidance. Thanks are due to the screeningCommitteeof the PSDE, for
givingsuch valuable comments,in the lightof whichthebetterrevisionofthepaper made possible.

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860 Nuzhatlqbal

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Marshallianeconomicsurplusframework based on partialequilibrium
constitutesthetheoretical basis fortheanalysisof theeffectof pricedistortionsin
Pakistan. The effectsare derived in both their real and pecuniaryformby
computingnominalprotectioncoefficients (NPC) on the basis of domesticand
borderor international prices. The nominalprotection thusderived
coefficients
determine the effectsof distortedpriceson thewelfareof consumers and producers,
resourceuse efficiency,growth, incomedistribution, and employment.
stability
Setting aside the reasons, why the competitiveequilibriumhas been
consideredoptimal;the conceptof economicsurplus,as has been consideredby
many,can lead us to be particularly usefulformeasuringthe welfareeffectsof
deviationsfromand optimum.
This applicationwas extendedby Marshall who used the diagramsto
representthe leadingfeaturesof the problem. If SS is the originalsupplycurve,
thentheimpositionof a perunittax (Ea = AT = SS) will vertically shiftthiscurve
to SSf. The loss in ConsumerSurplusis Ca AC; theloss to producersis GAFF and
thetax revenueis Ca EF. Thusthenetsocialloss is aAE. To see theeffect ofa per
unitsubsidy,theinitialsupplycurveis SS1.Withthepayment ofa subsidyofaE per
unitof output,the supplycurvebecomesSS1. The costto payers,RTAC, exceeds
the sum of the gain to consumersCaAC, and the gain to producers,RTaC.
Therefore thenetloss is givenbythearea of TAa in thediagram1.

Fig.1. p

C xX L /

S -^^

0 Quantity

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 EconomicAnalysisoftheEffects 86 1

To evaluatea numberof government domesticprogrammes forAgriculture,

threealternative typesof supportprogrammes. Firstthegovernment setsa support
price above the equilibrium price and purchase and destroysall theexcess; second,
thegovernment setsa supportpricein excessof theequilibrium, and theoutputis
sold on theopen market.Here thegovernment makesup thedifferences between
the supportpriceand the marketpriceby meansof a per unitsubsidy;third,the
desiredprice is achievedby directlyrestricted output. These programmesare
illustratedin Fig. 2 hereSSf represents, the marginedsocial cost of the resources
used to produce the commodity, and DD* reflectsthe marginalvalue of the
commodity to thecommunity. It is also indicatedthateach programme is designed
to achievea priceO. M. The net losses of the threeprogrammes by the areas of
ANJPC,JPE and NJI,respectively.It has also beeii pointed out that assuminga
givensupportpricethefirsttypeofprogramme will neverinvolvea lowernetsocial
loss thantheotherprogrammes. Forexamplefora givensupport price.

NLS(lll) NSL(ll)
asn

Where NSL (111) and NSL (11) are the net social losses associated with
programmes of type(111) and type(11) respectively and a n and c are theabsolute
valuesofthepriceelasticities ofdemandand supplyrespectively.
Since thereis a valid presumption thatsome how a country"gains"from
tradingwith othercountries. Therefore, the possibilityof measuringthis gain
through an obvious approach is to treatit as an economicsurplus. Economic
Surpluswhicharisesfromtheopportunity to exchangegoodswithothercountries.
Marshallsuggesteda measureof a country's 'netbenefit1 fromforeigntrade,
"theexcessofthemaximumnumberofrepresentative unitthatitwouldbe prepared
to give up forthecommodity it importsovertheamountit actuallyhandsoverat
theequilibrium rateofinterchange".Sincethescopeofourstudyleavesus withthe
•partialwelfareanalysis';therefore to definepreciselyalternativemeasuresof a
country's gain from tradea generalequilibrium approachmaybe conceptually more
useful.This conceptis basedon diagramrepresented in Fig. 3. Diagramshowsthat
in the absenceof trade,the pricewouldbe PA QA in countryA and PB QB in
country B. Equilibriumwill be establishedwhenCE, country A's importsis equal
to FG, country B's exports.The corresponding priceswill be CH in countryA and
FK in country B. Accordingto thisconceptbothcountries gain fromthetrade.In
country A, the gain to consumers, MNCPA, exceeds the loss to procedureNBEPA.
B
In country the gain to producers ofNGPBR exceeds the loss to consumersof

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862 Nuzhatlqbal

Fig.2.

M 'n S

N -J^'
L k; 'S

c-S4--'c [ '

0 ABC Quantity

Fig.3.

c/Kk N.
N
^%
Cy/jY Wl'E ^y^Zr-^"_r V^
y.JX-^-JML
J' ^J^C_>_^_§>"

|! %f '
| a K Q Quantity
|
M QA QA

NFPBR. The netgainto country A is CPAEI; thenetgainto countiyB is FGP.

thenetsociallossdefined
Therefore, as theareabetween theexcessdemandand
excesssupply
curves
byEDA andESB. Thisis maximised whenvolumeoftradeis
NZ. Thisprocedure,
accordingtotheconcept ofEconomic is equivalent
Surplus to
maximisethenetwelfaregainstoboththe countries
from trade:

MZA = EPAC and NZR = FGPB

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 EconomicAnalysisoftheEffects 863

In thiscase, if countryA imposeda prohibitive tariffon the importof the

commodity, both countries would be worse offthen under freetrade. Therefore,if
A
country imposesa perunittariff ofTT1 on theimportoftheCommodity, thenew
equilibrium will be where A's imports,CfE, equals B's exports,FG. For country A
theloss to consumersis givenbyTC CN, thegain to producers by TE1 EN and the
gain in government revengeby FCVW. The net gain to countryA is thus
VWWV (CCV + EE'W). The net loss to countryB is given by FFG'G1.
Therefore,the two countriestaken togetherloss, since FF'G'G' must exceed
VWW.
On theotherhandat thefreetradepricePf,thecountry imports Ql Q4 ofthe
commodity.Ifa tariff ofPF Pt is imposed,imports willonlybe Q2 Q3. The loss to
consumersis givenbythearea ofPt BFPf. The gain to producers bythearea ofPt
AEPf. The in
gain government revenue by ABDG. Thus the netwelfareloss from
thetariffis givenby AEC + BDF. In theliterature area AEC is referredto as the
"Production Cost". It is so becauseit representtheloss imposedbythedistortion of
Production, whichis fromtheoptimalpattern, correspond to theinternationalprice
ratio. Area BDF is referred to as the consumption cost,becauseit represents the
loss resultingfrom the consumptiondistortion,again from optimal pattern,
correspondto international priceratio(Fig. 4). Here if we supposethatPf is the
worldpriceand thepayment ofa perunitexportsubsidyis there.Therefore, PF Pt1
willresultas a netwelfareloss ofHGJ KLM.+

Fig. 4.

Price D vs
_______ /
p;...-'^6

*._-__-_f__1^__Lj
i k/(
Pi i^^i
i
c/K-j | oPKF
77'V'' MIT0
Mil Ml I
0 Oi Q2 Oh &2 Quantity

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864 Nuzhatlqbal

So farwe have discussedthe theoretical of the conceptof Net

foundations
Social Loss in Production,Consumption,etc., withinternationaltradeand in a
closed economy. The framework discussed framed the basis for empirical,to
estimatethe price distortioneffectswith regardto RICE; (Basmati and IRRI
separately).

METHODOLOGYANDECONOMICANALYSIS
The causes of price distortionsevaluated are input subsidies, output
controlledprices,concessionalcreditdisbursement, importand exporttaxes,
tariffs,
overvaluedexchange rates,etc. More specifically, the subsidiesassociatedwith
inputslike fertilizer,
irrigationwater, credit,
pesticides, etc., will be considered.
The effectsof supportand procurement price programmesare examinedwith
referenceto Rice. The data forthe periodfrom1975 to 1990 is used for the
analysis. Since NominalProtection providea measureof thedisparity
coefficients
betweendomesticprices and international prices,the derivationof the nominal
protectioncoefficientsthereforeare proceedas:

NPC = 1 + P - rP =pd

Where
P - domestic
P - worldprice(Borderprice)
r - equilibrium
exchangerate.

The basic structureof the analyticalmodel comprisesof the following

(1).
components

1. Net Social Loss in Production

=
NSLp -L.(Qw-Q)(Pw-Pi))

1
= -
*' n. v
Where
= Production
at Worldprices.
Qw
= WorldPrices
Pw

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 Economic oftheEffects
Analysis 865

= Reductionat domesticprices.
Qp
= in domesticpriceat theproducerlevel.
oftariff
Proportion
t2p
= Production prices.
Pp
= Elasticityofdomesticsupply/T.B.C.
ns
V = Value ofproduction at pricesfacedbyproducers.

2. Net Social Loss in consumption.

=
NSLC -L^-CpCCp-Wp

- ~
'< n* w
Where:
= Consumption at;WorldPrices.
Cw
= Consumption atdomestic prices.
Cp
= of
Proportionate in
tariff domestic level.
pricesattheconsumer
tc
W = Valueofconsumption atPc.
= Consumer Prices.
Pc
= ofdomestic
Elasticity demand.
nd

Gainof Producers.
3. Welfare

GainofConsumers.
4. Welfare
in
Change ForeignEarnings.
dF = -Pw (Qw - Q +• -C - Cw)

ChangeinGovernment
Revenue.
'
dG = (NSLp + NSLc) - Gp - Gc
-(1) -(2) -(3) -(4)

The analysisare argumented

byworking outeffective ratesfor
protection
Rice. The following is
procedure used in the
determining ratesof
effective
protection.

ERP - VAD = VAW

VAW

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866 Nuzhatlqbal

Where:
VAD = Value-addedat domesticprices.
VAW = Value-addedat worldprices.

The value added at world prices (VAW) has also been used to measure
domesticresourcecostsincurredas a resultofpoliciesdistortingagricultural
prices.
Domesticresourcecostsis beingestimatedwithreference to thefollowingequation:

DRC = DR
VAW
Where:
DR = Value ofdomesticresourcesemployedin particular
activity.
VAW = Value addedat worldprices.

RESULTS
Our results,'withgivensupplyelasticities,indicatethatdue to government
intervention in procedurepricesimposesignificantcoston theeconomy
distortions
separatelyin termsof foregoneoutput.As a resultthe levels of productionare
significantly low than what it is reversedwith respectto consumption.This
situationis, however,at theexpenseofthissector.

Effectson Welfare
The analysismanifest clearlythattheeconomyofPakistanincurlargeannual
welfarelosses. Generallythe losses are due to mis-allocation of resourceswhich
resultfromtheagriculture pricingpolicies.The lossescalculatedare dependingon
elasticitiesand on the size of the price distortionswhich is measuredby a
proportional tariffrate. SupplyElasticitieshave been used to calculatethe social
loss in production.Whereas uncompensated demandelasticitiesare applied.The
resultsindicatethatin comparisonwitheconomicoutput,distortions are generally
morecostly. Since the resultsare calculatedfroma partialequilibriummodel
therefore thesepresentpartialeffects.As the resultsdetermine the mostsizeable
effectsof theagricultural policiesare thewelfare between
transfers consumersand
procedures,we see, thatthe consumersgenerallygainedfrom the typeof price
intervention,we are havingin ourcountry.

Effectson GovernmentRevenue
Our resultsdifferentiate is receivingincreased
therevenueas thegovernment

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 Economic ofthe
Analysis Effects 867

revenuesfrom(heirinterventionist
policies. These resultsare based on theimplicit
assumptionthattheentire
pricedistortionis attributable
to taxes(or subsidies).

Effectson Trade
The effectson trade consist on the effectsof both, productionand
consumption.Whereas,generally, we findthatthepricingpolicieshave negative
effect
on exportswhichresultsreductionin theexports(withNPCs smallerthan1)
(Tables 1 and 2).

Effectson ForeignExchangeEarnings

Generally,the effectson foreign exchange earnings,on the level of

accordingto themagnitudes
development.Since it is thecase here,therefore, for
Basmatiand ERRIRice,foreignexchangeearningsforegone ofnon-
as a proportion
intervention
earnings are on 27
average percent and 13 percentrespectively.

Effectson Value-added
Since the analysishave also been argumented on the effectiveprotection
rates,therefore,thestudyanalysisthegovernment interventionin inputpricesalso.
For instance;fertilizersubsidyin 1984-85was equal to nearly60 percentof the
annual development expenditure Keeping in view the prevailing
in agricultural.
situationthe taskwhichhas accountedforinputsubsidiesas well as outputprice
interventions,is to accomplishwithvalue added. By calculatingvalue added,we
lookedat effective protectionrates;at domesticpricesand at borderprices,using
equilibriumexchangerates. The averageeffectsfortheperiodunderstudyare 65
percentforBasmati and 53 percentforIRRI rice. These are the proportions by
which crop value added would have been higherin the absence of directand
indirectpriceinterventions.

CONCLUSION
Priorto the 1970s, the rice tradewas in the privatesector,but the fall of
Dacca in 1971, resultedin the diversionof the rice previouslysuppliedto East
Pakistanto theinternationalmarkets. Duringthisperiodtheworldwidecommodity
boomled theexportpriceof ricemorethandoublein 1973-74comparedto 1972-
73, also. This was consideredan opportunity forgenerating government revenue,
whichdominatedtheconceptof procurement priceof rice.Therefore,to maximise
therevenue,thegovernment, byrestricting exports,createda largegap betweenthe
internationalpriceand thedomestic As
price. a riceexportsdeclinedin 1972-
result

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868 Nuzhatlqbal

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 Economic oftheEffects
Analysis 869

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870 Nuzhatlqbal

73 could notpriceup till 1975-76despitetheincreasingtrendin output.Secondly,

•RiceExportCorporation1; and theabsenceof otherbusinessopportunities, a large
numberof smalltradersrenderedunemployed.On theotherhandthegovernment
allowed the dealersto sell a quota of BasmatiRice (l/5thtotaldeliveredto the
procurement centres)in thelocal market.This,by creatingscarcityin themarket,
droppedthe procurement price,the consumerpriceswent up. The estimatesof
output,exportand foreignexchangeearningseffects of priceinterventions
indicate
thatHmaximum output losses were 32 percentfor Basmati and 25 for
percent IRRI;
exportcosts (in termsof reducedexports)were 40 percentforBasmati and 37
percentforIRRI, whereas maximumexportlosseswere65 percentforBasmatiand
68 percentfor IRRI rice; however,the intervention effectson foreignexchange
earningsas a proportionof Pakistan'stotal foreignexchangeearningswas 17
percentwas as, in thelong run,withthedirectand indirectintervention, thelosses
roseto almost 150 percent.
indicatesthatthe main
The analysisof the effectsof Rice Price distortions
factorsresultingin negativetransferstoproducers havebeenpricesupportand state
tradingfollowedby implicittaxationthroughovervaluedexchangerate. On the
otherhand, the consumershave been the consistentbeneficiaries of government
intervention.

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 Commentson
"EconomicAnalysisoftheEffectsofRice Price
Distortionsin Pakistan: 1975-90 "

The paper is a good attemptat the quantification of various effectsof

distortedriceprices. It is commendable forits elaboratetheoretical
construct and
detailedmethodology.On thebasis ofthetheoretical and theresults,the
literature
paperconcludesthatthericepricedistortions in Pakistanhavebeen responsible for
immenseloss of production whichis in excessof consumption gains and has led
ultimatelyto alarminglyhigh welfare losses throughoutthe period under
consideration from1975-76to 1989-90.
In spiteofthesequalitiesofthepaper,manylimitations and deficiencies
may
also be noted.To pursuethemsystematically, theycan be discussedunderfour
headsas follows:
First,comparedto itselaboratetheoretical thepaperremainsweak
construct,
in the applicationof the theoreticalconstructfor the quantification of results.
Whateverempiricalresultshavebeenobtained,onlya futileattempt has been made
to discussthemmeaningfully. Althoughthepaperhas generatedtime-series data
on the effectsof rice price distortions, thereis no corresponding emphasison
discussionofthetrendsofvariouseffects withthepassageoftime.Thus thecasual
attentionto discussion of results in an appropriatemanner makes things
cumbersome forthereadersofthepaper.
Second,thepaperis besetbythepoorlabellingof diagramsand tables. For
example,diagrams1 and 2 makerepeateduse ofthesamewordsto referto various
pointsofeach diagramand cause hardshipin closelycomprehending thetext. Both
tables of the paper go withoutspecification of the unitsand leave the task of
the
interpreting reported data to thereader.
Thirdly,in spiteof thefactthattherehas been a floodof literature on the
subjecton Pakistanin recentyears [Ali (1992); Chaudhryand Kayani (1991);
Dorosh and Valdes (1990); Ender (1992); Nabi, Hamid and Nasim (1990) and
Qureshi(1987)], the paper misseda large part of the latestworks. Had such
literaturebeen consulted,theanalyticalqualityand precisionof resultswouldhave
witnessedsubstantial improvements.
Finally,whileone is tempted to agreewiththeresultsand conclusionsofthe
paper, some doubts as to the precision of estimatedeffectscan be raised if one

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872 m.Ghaffar
Chaudhry

comparesthemwiththe resultsof the variousstudiesreportedabove. If this is

done, the paper seems to have been characterisedby the considerableover-
estimatingof the various effectsespeciallythe productioneffects. How this
overestimationhas crept into the paper is difficultto say withoutaccess to
unreporteddatawhichwentintothecalculationofthevariouseffects.

M. GhaffarChaudhry
PakistanInstitute
of
DevelopmentEconomics,
Islamabad.

REFERENCES

Ali, Asghar(1992) Consumerand ProducerSubsidyEquivalentsof Agricultural

Policies in Pakistan:Concept,Measurement PakistanJournal
and Implications.
ofAgricultural Economics 1: 1 1-24.
Chaudhry,M. Ghaffar,and NighatNaheed Kayani (1991) ImplicitTaxationof
Pakistan'sAgriculture:An analysisof the Commodity and InputPrices. The
PakistanDevelopment Review30:3 225-242.
Dorosh, Paul, and AlbertoValdes (1990) Effectsof ExchangeRate and Trade
Policies on Agriculturein Pakistan. Washington,D.C.: International Food
Policy Research Institute
(December).
Ender,Gary(1992) The Use of Producerand ConsumerSubsidyEquivalentsto
Measure GovernmentInterventionin Agriculture:The Case of Pakistan.
Pakistan JournalofAgricultural Economics 1:1 24-59.
Nabi, Ijaz, Naveed Hamid and AnjumNasim (1990) Trade,ExchangeRate and
Agricultural PricingPolicies in Pakistan. Washington,
D.C. : WorldBank.
Qureshi, SarfrazKhan (1987) AgriculturalPricing and Taxation in Pakistan.
Islamabad: PakistanInstitute ofDevelopment Economic.

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