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Module II
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MODULE II
Monetary Policy, the Payment System
and Financial Intermediaries, and Central
Banking: Development and Growth
INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVES
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Lesson 1
Monetary Policy
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2. Price Level Targeting – This strategy targets the Consumer Price Index
instead of inflation.
4. Fixed Exchange Rate – This is the set price, usually against other
currencies to ensure the U.S. dollar value is maintained within the
desired perimeter.
5. Gold Standard – This approach aims to keep the value of money the
same as the value of gold.
With the banks lowering the interest rates on mortgages and loans,
more business owners will be encouraged to expand their businesses
since they are more available funds to borrow with interest rates that
they can afford. On the other hand, prices of commodities will be
lowered and the buying public will have more reason to buy more
consumer goods. In the end, companies will profit while their
customers are able to afford what they need like basic commodities,
property and services.
The Federal Reserve can make use of this policy to print or create
more money which enables it to purchase government bonds from
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banks. The end result is increased cash reserves in banks and also
monetary base. This also leads to reduced interest rates and more
money for the bank to lend its borrowers.
Some economists who criticize the Federal Reserve on the policy say
that in times of recession, not all consumers will have confidence to
spend and take advantage of low interest rates. If this is the case,
then it is a disadvantage.
Others also claim that even if the banks are given lower interest
rates by the Central Bank when they borrow money, some banks
might have the funds. If this happens, there will be insufficient funds
people can borrow from them.
Opponents claim that if the Federal Reserve will impose this policy,
interest rates will increase and businesses will not be interested to
expand their operations. This can lead to less production of
manufacturers and higher prices. Consumers might not be able to
afford goods and services. Worse, it might take a long time for these
businesses to recover and eventually force them to close shop. If this
continues, workers might lose their jobs.
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Since monetary policy has only one instrument, the Bank cannot use
interest rates to target more than one variable. “Ultimately, inflation is the
sole target of the policy”. Any changes affected in the bank rate do not
produce proportional changes in the other interest rates. The result is that
the central bank of the country is unable to control the money market in an
effective manner and monetary policy fails in its operation.
Monetary Policy
Since the late 1980s, inflation targeting has emerged as the leading
framework for monetary policy. Central banks in Canada, the euro area, the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, and elsewhere have introduced an explicit
inflation target. Many low-income countries are also making a transition
from targeting a monetary aggregate (a measure of the volume of money in
circulation) to an inflation targeting framework.
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Macroprudential Policy
The global financial crisis showed that countries need to contain risks
to the financial system as a whole with dedicated financial policies. Many
central banks that also have a mandate to promote financial stability have
upgraded their financial stability functions, including by establishing
macroprudential policy frameworks. Macroprudential policy needs a strong
institutional foundation to work effectively. Central banks are well placed
to conduct macroprudential policy because they have the capacity to
analyze systemic risk. In addition, they are often relatively independent and
autonomous. In many countries, legislators have assigned the
macroprudential mandate to the central bank or to a dedicated committee
within the central bank. Regardless of the model used to implement
macroprudential policy, the institutional setup should be strong enough to
counter opposition from the financial industry and political pressures and to
establish the legitimacy and accountability of macroprudential policy. It
needs to ensure that policymakers are given clear objectives and the
necessary legal powers, and to foster cooperation on the part of other
supervisory and regulatory agencies. A dedicated policy process and is
needed to operationalize this new policy function, by mapping an analysis of
systemic vulnerabilities into macroprudential policy action.
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• The IMF has provided policy advice on how to avoid potential side
effects from the implementation of and exit from unconventional
monetary policy, and established principles for evolving monetary
policy regimes in low income countries.
• The IMF has for some time kept track of countries’ monetary policy
arrangements (AREAER), as well as central banks’ legal frameworks
(CBLD), and their monetary operations and instruments (MOID).
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LEARNING ACTIVITY
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Lesson 2
Money Supply refers to all the currency and other liquid instruments
in a country's economy on the date measured. The money supply roughly
includes both cash and deposits that can be used almost as easily as cash.
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Clearing of Checks
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Financial Intermediation
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▪ Banks
▪ Mutual savings banks
▪ Savings banks
▪ Building societies
▪ Credit unions
▪ Financial advisers or brokers
▪ Insurance companies
▪ Collective investment schemes
▪ Others
LEARNING ACTIVITY
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Lesson 3
There are three key goals of modern monetary policy. The first and
most important is price stability or stability in the value of money. Today
this means maintaining a sustained low rate of inflation. The second goal is
a stable real economy, often interpreted as high employment and high and
sustainable economic growth. Another way to put it is to say that monetary
policy is expected to smooth the business cycle and offset shocks to the
economy. The third goal is financial stability. This encompasses an efficient
and smoothly running payments system and the prevention of financial
crises.
Beginnings
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central banks issued private notes which served as currency, and they often
had a monopoly over such note issue.
While these early central banks helped fund the government’s debt,
they were also private entities that engaged in banking activities. Because
they held the deposits of other banks, they came to serve as banks for
bankers, facilitating transactions between banks or providing other banking
services. They became the repository for most banks in the banking system
because of their large reserves and extensive networks of correspondent
banks. These factors allowed them to become the lender of last resort in
the face of a financial crisis. In other words, they became willing to provide
emergency cash to their correspondents in times of financial distress.
Transition
The gold standard, which prevailed until 1914, meant that each
country defined its currency in terms of a fixed weight of gold. Central
banks held large gold reserves to ensure that their notes could be converted
into gold, as was required by their charters. When their reserves declined
because of a balance of payments deficit or adverse domestic
circumstances, they would raise their discount rates (the interest rates at
which they would lend money to the other banks). Doing so would raise
interest rates more generally, which in turn attracted foreign investment,
thereby bringing more gold into the country.
Central banks of this era also learned to act as lenders of last resort
in times of financial stress—when events like bad harvests, defaults by
railroads, or wars precipitated a scramble for liquidity (in which depositors
ran to their banks and tried to convert their deposits into cash). The lesson
began early in the nineteenth century as a consequence of the Bank of
England’s routine response to such panics. At the time, the Bank (and other
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European central banks) would often protect their own gold reserves first,
turning away their correspondents in need. Doing so precipitated major
panics in 1825, 1837, 1847, and 1857, and led to severe criticism of the
Bank. In response, the Bank adopted the “responsibility doctrine,” proposed
by the economic writer Walter Bagehot, which required the Bank to
subsume its private interest to the public interest of the banking system as a
whole. The Bank began to follow Bagehot’s rule, which was to lend freely on
the basis of any sound collateral offered—but at a penalty rate (that is,
above market rates) to prevent moral hazard. The bank learned its lesson
well. No financial crises occurred in England for nearly 150 years after 1866.
It wasn’t until August 2007 that the country experienced its next crisis.
The U.S. experience was most interesting. It had two central banks in
the early nineteenth century, the Bank of the United States (1791–1811) and
a second Bank of the United States (1816–1836). Both were set up on the
model of the Bank of England, but unlike the British, Americans bore a
deep-seated distrust of any concentration of financial power in general, and
of central banks in particular, so that in each case, the charters were not
renewed.
The crisis of 1907 was the straw that broke the camel’s back. It led to
the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, which was given the mandate
of providing a uniform and elastic currency (that is, one which would
accommodate the seasonal, cyclical, and secular movements in the
economy) and to serve as a lender of last resort.
Before 1914, central banks didn’t attach great weight to the goal of
maintaining the domestic economy’s stability. This changed after World War
I, when they began to be concerned about employment, real activity, and
the price level. The shift reflected a change in the political economy of
many countries—suffrage was expanding, labor movements were rising, and
restrictions on migration were being set. In the 1920s, the Fed began
focusing on both external stability (which meant keeping an eye on gold
reserves, because the U.S. was still on the gold standard) and internal
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The picture changed dramatically in the 1960s when the Fed began
following a more activist stabilization policy. In this decade it shifted its
priorities from low inflation toward high employment. Possible reasons
include the adoption of Keynesian ideas and the belief in the Phillips curve
trade-off between inflation and unemployment. The consequence of the
shift in policy was the build-up of inflationary pressures from the late 1960s
until the end of the 1970s. The causes of the Great Inflation are still being
debated, but the era is renowned as one of the low points in Fed history.
The restraining influence of the nominal anchor disappeared, and for
the next two decades, inflation expectations took off.
The inflation ended with Paul Volcker’s shock therapy from 1979 to
1982, which involved monetary tightening and the raising of policy interest
rates to double digits. The Volcker shock led to a sharp recession, but it was
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A key force in the history of central banking has been central bank
independence. The original central banks were private and independent.
They depended on the government to maintain their charters but were
otherwise free to choose their own tools and policies. Their goals were
constrained by gold convertibility. In the twentieth century, most of these
central banks were nationalized and completely lost their independence.
Their policies were dictated by the fiscal authorities. The Fed regained its
independence after 1951, but its independence is not absolute. It must
report to Congress, which ultimately has the power to change the Federal
Reserve Act. Other central banks had to wait until the 1990s to regain their
independence.
Financial Stability
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The key challenge I see facing central banks in the future will be to
balance their three policy goals. The primary goal of the central bank is to
provide price stability (currently viewed as low inflation over a long-run
period). This goal requires credibility to work. In other words, people need
to believe that the central bank will tighten its policy if inflation threatens.
This belief needs to be backed by actions. Such was the case in the mid-
1990s when the Fed tightened in response to an inflation scare. Such a
strategy can be greatly enhanced by good communication.
The second policy goal is stability and growth of the real economy.
Considerable evidence suggests that low inflation is associated with better
growth and overall macroeconomic performance. Nevertheless, big shocks
still occur, threatening to derail the economy from its growth path. When
such situations threaten, research also suggests that the central bank should
temporarily depart from its long-run inflation goal and ease monetary policy
to offset recessionary forces. Moreover, if market agents believe in the
long-run credibility of the central bank’s commitment to low inflation, the
cut in policy interest rates will not engender high inflation expectations.
Once the recession is avoided or has played its course, the central bank
needs to raise rates and return to its low-inflation goal.
The third policy goal is financial stability. Research has shown that it
also will be improved in an environment of low inflation, although some
economists argue that asset price booms are spawned in such an
environment. In the case of an incipient financial crisis such as that just
witnessed in August 2007, the current view is that the course of policy
should be to provide whatever liquidity is required to allay the fears of the
money market. An open discount window and the acceptance of whatever
sound collateral is offered are seen as the correct prescription. Moreover,
funds should be offered at a penalty rate. The Fed followed these rules in
September 2007, although it is unclear whether the funds were provided at
a penalty rate. Once the crisis is over, which generally is in a matter of days
or weeks, the central bank must remove the excess liquidity and return to
its inflation objective.
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A second challenge related to the first is for the central bank to keep
abreast of financial innovations, which can derail financial stability.
Innovations in the financial markets are a challenge to deal with, as they
represent attempts to circumvent regulation as well as to reduce
transactions costs and enhance leverage. The recent subprime crisis
exemplifies the danger, as many problems were caused by derivatives
created to package mortgages of dubious quality with sounder ones so the
instruments could be unloaded off the balance sheets of commercial and
investment banks. This strategy, designed to dissipate risk, may have
backfired because of the opacity of the new instruments.
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1. The Central Bank does not aim at profits but aims at national welfare.
2. The Central Bank does not compete with the member banks.
3. The Central Bank has special relationship with government and with
commercial banks.
4. The Central Bank is generally free from political influence.
5. The Central Bank is the apex body of the banking structure of the
country.
6. The Central Bank should have overall control over the financial
system.
LEARNING ACTIVITY
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a) The Central Bank does not aim at profits but aims at national
welfare.
b) The Central Bank does not compete with the member banks.
e) The Central Bank is the apex body of the banking structure of the
country.
f) The Central Bank should have overall control over the financial
system.
Lesson 4
Module II
Origin of Central Banking-Creating a
Central Bank for the Philippines/Brief
History of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
Objectives and Responsibilities of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
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15 June 1948. The bill was signed into law as Republic Act No. 265
(The Central Bank Act) by President Elpidio Quirino.
The broad policy objectives contained in RA No. 265 guided the CBP
in the implementation of its duties and responsibilities, particularly in
relation to the promotion of economic development in addition to the
maintenance of internal and external monetary stability.
3 July 1993. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), Republic Act No.
7653, the New Central Bank Act, was established to replace the Central
Bank of the Philippines as the country’s central monetary authority.
Objectives
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Responsibilities
The BSP provides policy directions in the areas of money, banking and
credit. It supervises operations of banks and exercises regulatory powers
over non-bank financial institutions with quasi-banking functions.
Under the New Central Bank Act, the BSP performs the following
functions, all of which relate to its status as the Republic’s central
monetary authority.
• Currency issue. The BSP has the exclusive power to issue the
national currency. All notes and coins issued by the BSP are fully
guaranteed by the Government and are considered legal tender for
all private and public debts.
• Lender of last resort. The BSP extends discounts, loans and advances
to banking institutions for liquidity purposes.
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CHAPTER I
ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
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SECTION 4. Place of Business. — The Bangko Sentral shall have its principal
place of business in Metro Manila, but may maintain branches, agencies and
correspondents in such other places as the proper conduct of its business
may require.
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The Bangko Sentral may acquire and hold such assets and incur such
liabilities in connection with its operations authorized by the provisions of
this Act, or as are essential to the proper conduct of such operations.
The Bangko Sentral may compromise, condone or release, in whole or in
part, any claim of or settled liability to the Bangko Sentral, regardless of
the amount involved, under such terms and conditions as may be prescribed
by the Monetary Board to protect the interests of the Bangko Sentral.
(a) the Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the
Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a
department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a
meeting of the Board, he shall designate a Deputy Governor to act as his
alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall designate
one of its members as acting Chairman;
(c) five (5) members who shall come from the private sector, all of whom
shall serve full-time: Provided, however, That of the members first
appointed under the provisions of this subsection, three (3) shall have a
term of six (6) years, and the other two (2), three (3) years.
No member of the Monetary Board may be reappointed more than once.
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economic disciplines.
SECTION 10. Removal. — The President may remove any member of the
Monetary Board for any of the following reasons:
SECTION 11. Meetings. — The Monetary Board shall meet at least once a
week. The Board may be called to a meeting by the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral or by two (2) other members of the Board.
The presence of four (4) members shall constitute a quorum: Provided, That
in all cases the Governor or his duly designated alternate shall be among the
four (4).
Unless otherwise provided in this Act, all decisions of the Monetary Board
shall require the concurrence of at least four (4) members.
The Bangko Sentral shall maintain and preserve a complete record of the
proceedings and deliberations of the Monetary Board, including the tapes
and transcripts of the stenographic notes, either in their original form or in
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microfilm.
SECTION 13. Salary. — The salary of the Governor and the members of the
Monetary Board from the private sector shall be fixed by the President of
the Philippines at a sum commensurate to the importance and responsibility
attached to the position.
(a) issue rules and regulations it considers necessary for the effective
discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the powers vested upon the
Monetary Board and the Bangko Sentral. The rules and regulations issued
shall be reported to the President and the Congress within fifteen (15) days
from the date of their issuance;
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the
selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all
personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence
at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of
management.
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(d) adopt an annual budget for and authorize such expenditures by the
Bangko Sentral as are in the interest of the effective administration and
operations of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations; and
(e) indemnify its members and other officials of the Bangko Sentral,
including personnel of the departments performing supervision and
examination functions against all costs and expenses reasonably incurred by
such persons in connection with any civil or criminal action, suit or
proceedings to which he may be, or is, made a party by reason of the
performance of his functions or duties, unless he is finally adjudged in such
action or proceeding to be liable for negligence or misconduct.
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Board or the Governor; or (2) the use of such information for personal gain
or to the detriment of the Government, the Bangko Sentral or third parties:
Provided, however, That any data or information required to be submitted
to the President and/or the Congress, or to be published under the
provisions of this Act shall not be considered confidential.
LEARNING ACTIVITY
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2. The BSP provides policy directions in the areas of money, banking and
credit. Explain
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MODULE SUMMARY
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In module II, you have learned about monetary policy, the payment
system and financial intermediaries and central banking: development and
growth
Congratulations! You have just studied Module II. now you are ready
to evaluate how much you have benefited from your reading by answering
the summative test. Good Luck!!!
SUMMATIVE TEST
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Module II