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epublic of tbe flbilippines

~upreme ([:ourt
:fflanila

FIRST DIVISION

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, i sued a

Resolution dated March 9, 2022 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 249306 (Rosalina Rica/uente v. ·riental

Construction and Electrical Supply Co., Inc.) - At the mael;trom of
this Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 are the Decision2 di ted 16
November 2018 and the Resolution3 dated 30 July 2019 of th~ Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 108754. The contested ~ ecision
sustained the Decision4 dated 12 November 2015 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 11-
125888, directing Rosalina Ricafuente (petitioner) to pay f riental
Construction and Electrical Supply Co., Inc. (respondent) the rmount
of P977,330.99 representing the value of unpaid goods, pius the
1
stipulated interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, Pl00,00b0.00 as
attorney's fees , and P5,000.00 per every court hearing on re ord as
appearance fees.

Stripped of embellishments, the prevenient facts of t , e case

unfurl as follows:

Between 29 July 2010 and 25 November 2010, petitioney, doing

business under the name and style "Michael's Electrical S pply,"5
purchased various electrical supplies and analogous items o credit I

from respondent amounting to P977,330.99 through persona phone

calls. Concomitantly, respondent prepared multiple Sales I voices

- over - ten (10) pages ...

83-A

Rollo, pp. I 0-21.

2 Id. at 22-28. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (now a retired l ember of
this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and Jhosep Y.
Lopez (now a Member of this Court).
Id. at 29-31. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and cone ed in by
Associate Justices Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) and Pablito A. Pdrez.
4 Id. at 32-38. Penned by Presiding Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos.
5 Also referred to as "Michael Electric Supply" in portions of the Rollo.
RESOLUTION 2 G.R. No. 249306
March 9, 2022

which identically prescribed that the purchase price of the m terials

was payable within thirty (30) days from delivery thereof, antj that a
one percent (1 %) monthly interest would be chargeable on all 9'verdue
invoices. Pursuant to petitioner's instructions, the goods were then
delivered to Manila United Electrical Supply (MUSES), a store owned
by her brother-in-law and situated in Quiapo, Manila. The eafter,
Meriam Madridano (Madridano), the accounting assist nt of
respondent, confirmed receipt of the supplies by petitioner oyer the
phone. Still and all, petitioner failed to pay the delivered gooqs even
after the final written demand was made by respondent on 2 ' April
2011, prompting the latter to lodge an action for sum of money
against her before the RTC. The case was docketed as Civil C se No.
11-125888. 6

Fulminating against respondent's imputations, pe 1tloner

maintained that while respondent was in truth a supplier of "M~chael's
Electrical Supply," she could not have authorized any purchfses or
received any deliveries from it during the period in quest~on on
account of the change of her office address from 160 C&eneral
Capinpin Street, Bifian City, Laguna to Malvar Street within t1f same
city as early as May 2010. Eventually, petitioner closed shop three
months after the move owing to legitimate business reverses. As a
result, she had no viable means to verify any purchases madb from
respondent. 7

In due course, the R TC rendered the Decision 8 da ed 12 1

November 2015 in favor of respondent, the decretal portion o · which

reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a judgment is hereb

issued ordering (petitioner) to pay the (respondent):

a. The sum of P977,330.99 representing the value of th

delivered but unpaid items plus 12% legal interests (sic
per annum starting May 2011 until the same is fully
paid; and

b. The sum of Pl00,000.00 attorney's fees (sic) an ,

PS,000.00 as appearance fee for every court hearing pe
record.

SO ORDERED. 9

- over -
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6 Rollo, pp. 22-23, 32-36, and 43.

7
Id at 23-24, 36, and 51.
8
Id at 32-38.
9 Id. at 38.
 RESOLUTION 3 G.R. No. 249306
March 9, 2022

The RTC ratiocinated that Madridano's testimony suf 1ciently

evinced that petitioner was liable for the unpaid materials deliv red by
respondent to MUSES which was owned by petitioner's bro her-in-
law. Madridano even confirmed the receipt by petitioner of the
supplies over the phone. By virtue of such arrangement, it was
exceedingly probable that petitioner was not the one who sig ed the
Sales Invoices issued by respondent. On the other hand, pe itioner
. h~rsel~ admitte~ that respondent was~ supplier of heryroprie~orship.
L1kew1se, her disavowal of the recept10n of the goods m question due
to the physical transfer of her enterprise in May 2010 consti~uted a
negative pregnant which could hardly carry the day for her. 10

Subsequently, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was

denied by the RTC through the Order 11 dated 2 March 2016.

Disgruntled, petitioner appealed the RTC's disposition to the

CA, avouching that the Sales Invoices adduced by responden could
not have been the source of any obligation in its favor because they
lacked her signature. In the same breath, while the Sales voicesif
disclosed that respondent transacted with "Michael's Elf ctrical
Supply," the address indicated therein was located in Manila and I
not
Laguna. Withal, the items were actually delivered to MUSjES, an
entirely different store owned by petitioner' s brother-in-law. S~e also
postulated that following Article 2209 of the Civil Cof., the
applicable interest rate would be six percent ( 6%) per annum si1 ce the
case plainly involved the payment of a sum of money, and not an
obligation arising from a loan or forbearance of money. Fina ly, she
I
insisted that the RTC erroneously awarded attorney's fees ithout
proffering any justification therefor, contravening Article 220 of the
Civil Code. 12

In the now oppugned Decision, 13 the CA affirmed the RTC's

judgment in toto. The court a quo concurred with the RTC's
observation that petitioner's testimony was a negative pregn t, and
therefore not entitled to weighty credence. Contrariwise, Maqlridano
categorically professed that the goods were transported to NIUSES
which was owned by the brother-in-law of petitioner and Iodated in
Quiapo, Manila and which was agreed upon by the parties as the
delivery point. She then confirmed receipt thereof by pe itioner
through phone call. The fact that petitioner was a valued c ient of

- over -
83-A

10
id. at 37-38.
11
Id. at 39.
12
id. at 52-54.
13
Supra at 2.
RESOLUTION 4 G.R. No. 249306
March 9, 2022

respondent who could make purchases over the phon was

significantly buttressed by her admission that respondent was one of
her suppliers. Resultantly, the absence of petitioner's signature on any
of the Sales Invoices was understandable as she was most likel not at
MUSES when respondent delivered the materials. Consideri g that
there was already a perfected contract of sale between the arties,
petitioner was undeniably obligated to pay the entire purchas pnce
for the electrical supplies provided by respondent. 14

Anent the appropriate legal rate of interest, the CA no ed that

the Sales Invoices uniformly specified that "one percent ( 1% ) nterest
per month will be charged on all overdue accounts." 15 It decr~ed that
such rate took the form of compensatory interest under Artic~e 2209
of the Civil Code, which petitioner was bound to pay since it '!"as not
unconscionable under the circumstances. Lastly, the CA justi, ed the
award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent by highlightmg the
attestation of Madridano that the unfounded refusal of petiti ner to
pay for the delivered goods constrained respondent to engage the
services of a law firm to protect its rights. 16

Petitioner's supplication for a reconsideration of the fo egoing

disquisition was denied by the CA via the repugned Resolution. 17

Through the present recourse before this Court, pe itioner

ascribes the following errors 18 to the CA in rendering the ssailed
Decision and in issuing the subsequent Resolution:

I
THE CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RTC'S DECISIO~
NOTWITHSTANDING THE WANT OF EVIDENCE Tr
SUPPORT ITS FINDINGS.

II
THE CA ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES IJ
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT.

The Petition is devoid of merit. The judgment of th CA is

affirmed with modification.

- over -
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14 Id at 25-26.
15 Id. at 26; original citations omitted.
16
Id. at 26-27.
17
Supra at 3.
18
Id. at 15.
RESOLUTION 5 G.R. No. 249306
March 9, 2022

Incipiently, it must be underscored that the errors rat ed by

petitioner were already extensively passed upon by the CA. F,Y the
same token, these issues necessitate a review of the ev·dence,
specifically the Sales Invoices and the testimony of Madridano.
However, it is axiomatic that questions of fact, which would rdquire a
re-evaluation of the evidence, are inappropriate under Rule 4~ of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as the jurisdiction of the Courr under
this particular rule is limited only to errors of law. The Court is not a
1
trier of facts and it cannot rule on questions which determine t~ e truth
or falsehood of alleged facts, the determination of which is bes left to
the courts below. While this rule not absolute, none of the rec gnized
exceptions which allow the Court to review the factual issues e ists in
the instant case. 19

Therewithal, as a matter of sound practice and proced re, the

Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts,
more so, when as here, such findings are undisturbed by the a pellate
court.20

All the same, petitioner's disputations concerning her

towards respondent fail to inspire assent.

It is a basic jurisprudential teaching that in civil cases, l~ke in a

complaint for sum of money, the burden of proof lies on the pa1t1?' who
asserts the affirmative of the issue. In such a case, the party, t hether
plaintiff or defendant, must establish his or her case by prepon1erance
of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is p sually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater we ght of
evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of truth. Simply Piut, it is
that evidence which is more convincing to the court as wo hier of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 2 1

Furthermore, preponderance of evidence is determi ed by

considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled fi om the
evidence, regardless of who actually presented it. 22

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19 See Coro v. Nasayao, G.R. No. 235361 , 16 October 2019; citing Catan v. Vinarao, 820 Phil.

20
257 (2017). I
Id.; citing Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, 750 Phil. 846, 855 (2015).
21 See Spouses Garcia v. Northern Islands, Co. , Inc., G.R. No. 226495, 5 February 2 20; citing
Evangelista v. Spouses And.along, 800 Phil. 189, I 95 (2016).
22 Id.; citing Supreme Transliner, Inc. v. Court ofAppeals, 421 Phil. 692,699 (2001).
RESOLUTION 6 G.R. No. 249306
March 9, 2022

After conscientiously sifting through the records, the Court

finds and so holds that the CA infallibly ruled that petitioner must be
impelled to settle her overdue accounts with respondent togethbr with
the corresponding legal interest.

Madridano candidly narrated that between 29 July 2010 and 25

November 2010, petitioner personally ordered electrical suppli , s from
respondent through phone calls. She then prepared several Sales
Invoices indicating that the said supplies were sold to M chael's
Electrical Supply. While the same documents reflected that thi goods
were received by MUSES which was owned by petitioner's lirother-
in-law and based in Manila, Madridano expounded that the mrterials
were delivered in accordance with the instructions of petttioner.
Thence, her signature did not appear thereon as it was highly
implausible for her to be at the place of delivery when the de iveries
transpired. Nonetheless, Madridano confirmed the receipt of th , goods
by petitioner over the phone. 23

A converso, petitioner merely denied having any m ,ans to

confirm the purchases from respondent due to a change Iin her
business address,24 but stopped short of specifically refutipg the
subsistence of the transactions themselves. Invariably, such denial is a
negative pregnant, or a form of negative expression which carries
with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind fa orable
to the adverse party,25 i.e., the purchase of electrical supplies by
petitioner from respondent. Moreover, petitioner's stance is en eebled
by her own admission that respondent was one of her suppliers. 6

Given the foregoing discourse, it is ineludible that the e idence

preponderates in favor of the existence of a perfected contract of sale
between petitioner and respondent. On this score, it bears e~ phasis
that a contract of sale is classified as a consensual contr ct. No
particular form is required for its validity. Upon perfection ther of, the
parties may reciprocally demand performance, i.e., the vendf e may
compel the transfer of ownership over the object of the sale, nd the
vendor may require the vendee to pay for the thing sold.27

- over -
83-A

23 Rollo, pp. 22-23 and 32-36.

24
Id. at 34.
25 See Republic v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 830 Phil. 423, 457 (2018); citing R public v.
Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059 (2003).
26 Rollo, pp. 25 and 3 7.
27 See Tamayao v. Lacambra, G.R. No. 244232, 3 November 2020; citing Article I 75 of the
Civil Code and Spouses Dalion v. Court ofAppeals, 26 1 Phil. I 033, 1039 (1 90).
RESOLUTION 7 G.R. No. 249306
March 9, 2022

In the case at bench, the Sales Invoices couplef with

Madridano's exposition satisfactorily demonstrate that res~ondent
already held up its end of the bargain by delivering the supJf>lies in
accordance with petitioner's instructions. Whence, petitioner's
1
obligation to pay the purchase price within 30 days from deli ery of
the goods as reflected in the Sales Invoices arose and oughf to be
demanded by respondent. Article 1475 of the Civil Code eX\Pressly
states: I
The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract
~
and upon the price.

From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand

performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing th
form of contracts.

A sensu contrario, petitioner tendered not an iota of p oof to

show that payment was already made. Indubitably, she is b und to
settle her unpaid accounts with respondent in conformity .Jlith the
terms of the Sales Invoices.

Apropos the applicable interest rate, Article 2209 of J e Civil

Code dictates that when a debtor incurs a delay in obligations tp pay a
sum of money, the indemnity for damages shall be the payment of the
interest agreed upon, 28 viz. :

If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of

money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damage~~
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment o~
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the leg 1
interest, which is six percent per annum.

Appositely, if the rate of interest is stipulated, such sti ulated

interest shall apply and not the legal interest, provided the stipulated
interest is not excessive and unconscionable. The stipulated interest
shall be applied until full payment of the obligation because th! t is the
law between the parties. The legal interest only applies in the l bsence
of stipulated interest. 29

- over -
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28 See Mojica v. Generali Pilipinas Life Assurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 2 ' 2455, 18
September 2019.
29
Id. ; original citations omitted.
RESOLUTION 8 G.R. No. 249306
March 9, 2022

Here, the Sales Invoices similarly provided that "one ercent

(1 %) per month will be charged on all overdue accounts"30 or jtwelve
percent (12%) per annum. Inevitably, petitioner is obliged to pay the
same reckoned from the time of extrajudicial demand on 21 April
2011, 31 such rate not exceeding three percent (3%) per monthJ which
is characterized as iniquitous and unconscionable.32

Incidentally, pursuant to Article 221233 of the Civil Code, the

twelve percent (12%) per annum due on the principal ~mount
accruing as of the judicial demand, i.e., the filing of the CompEaint on
15 June 2011, 34 shall also earn legal interest at the rate of twelve
percent ( 12%) per annum from the date of judicial demand on 5 June
2011 until 30 June 2013, and thereafter at the rate of six perce It (6%)
per annum from 1 July 2013 until full payment. 35

A final inflection. Upon a perspicacious evaluation of the

factual milieu of the case, this Court holds that there is plausib e basis
to delete the award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent.

It is hornbook doctrine that attorney's fees generally ca ot be

recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no p emium
should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be a arded
every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual,
legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is corppelled
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his or her
rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no su ficient
showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistenee in a
case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness O f his or
her cause.36 Corollary thereto, the court must state the award's asis in
the decision.37

- over -
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30
Rollo, p. 26.
31
Id. at 23 and 33.
32 See Isla v. Estorga, 834 Phil. 884, 891 (2018); citing Chua v. Timan, 584 Phil. 144, 148
(2008).
33 Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, alt ough the
obligation may be silent upon this point.
34 Rollo, pp. 12 and 50.
35 See Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 225433, 8 August
2019; citing Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013).
36 See Sian v. Spouses Somoso, G.R. No. 201812, 22 January 2020; citing Spouses Timado v.
Rural Banko/San Jose, Inc., 789 Phil. 453, 460 (20 16).
37 See Spouses Castro v. Spouses Esperanza, G.R. No. 248763, 11 March 2020; iting Lui
Enterprises, Inc. v. Zuellig Pharma, Corp., 729 Phil. 440, 483 (2014). II
I
I
RESOLUTION 9 G.R. No. 249306
March 9, 2022

The Decision dated 12 November 2015 of the RTC id not

contain any explication as to why respondent was entitled to attbrney's
fees. For the CA, however, the "testimony on the part of the witness of
(respondent) that the unjustified refusal of (petitioner) to ~ay her
obligation constrained (respondent) to hire the services of a law firm
to protect its right" 38 justified such award. Be that as it may, here is
no scintilla of evidence showing that petitioner was motivated by bad
faith in her persistence towards this case. .
1
In precis, except the deletion of the award for attorney(s fees,
the Court perceives no other discernible reason to reverse or styt aside
the ruling of the CA enjoining petitioner to pay respondent t e sum
she owed together with the stipulated legal interest.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certio ari is

hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 16 November 2018 ~nd the
Resolution dated 30 July 2019 of the Court of Appeals in Cf,.--G.R.
CV No. 108754, upholding the Decision dated 12 November 3015 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case , o. 11-
125888, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that-

1. Petitioner Rosalina Ricafuente is ORDERED o pay

respondent Oriental Construction and Electrical upply,
Co., Inc. the following amounts:

a. P977,330.99, representing the principal amoun,

plus stipulated interest at twelve percent (12%~
per annum to be computed from the date o
extrajudicial demand on 27 April 2011 until fu 1
payment;

b. Legal interest on the interest due on th

principal amount, accruing as of judici11
demand, at the rate of twelve percent ( 12%) per
annum from the date of judicial demand on 1j5
June 2011 until 30 June 2013, and thereafter ~t
the rate of six (6%) per annum from 1 July 201
until full payment; and

2. The awards of attorney's fees and appearance ees m

favor of respondent are DELETED.

- over -
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38 Rollo, p. 27.
RESOLUTION 10 G.R. No. 49306
March 9, 022

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Cour :

Divisi

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBll LO

Deputy Division Clerk of <Court
8 -A

Atty. Julita F. Escueta-Gonzales Court of Appeals (x)

Counsel for Petitioner Manila
216 J. Gonzales Street, San Vicente (CA-G.R. CV No. 108754)
Bifian, 4024 Laguna
Atty. George L. King
Counsel for Respondent
Suite 501, Goldhill Tower
No. 5 Annapolis Street
Greenhills, 1502 San Juan I ity

The Hon. Presiding Judge

Regional Trial Court, Bran h 47
1000 Manila I
(Civil Case No. 11-125888)

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