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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
[CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02(NCC)-1287-2011]
BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC … APPELLANT
REPUBLIC
AND
1. THAI-LAO LIGNITE CO, LTD (“TLL”), A THAI COMPANY …RESPONDENTS
2. HONGSA LIGNITE CO, LTD (“HLL”), A LAO COMPANY

(In the Matter of High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur

(Appellate and Special Powers Division)
Originating Summons No. 24 NCC (ARB)-7-2010
In the Matter of an Arbitration between Thai-
Lao Lignite Thailand Co. Ltd. And Hongsa
Lignite (Lao Pdr) Co. Ltd. And the
Government of the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic
AND
In the Matter of the Arbitration Award dated
4.11.2009 and delivered on 4.11.2009
AND
In the Matter of Section 24(2) of the
Arbitration Act 1952
AND
In the M atter of S ection 37(1), S ection
37(1)(a)(iv)(v) and 37(1)(a)(3) of the
A rbitra tion A ct 2005 and S ec tion 50 of the
A rbitra tion A ct 2005
AND
In the Matter of Orders 7, 28, and 92(4) of the
Rules of the High Court 1980
Between
Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic ... Plaintiff
And
1. Thai-Lao Lignite Co., Ltd (“TLL”), A Thai Company … Defendants)
2. Hongsa Lignite Co., Ltd (“HLL”), A Lao Company
[2011] 1 LNS 1903 Legal Network Series

QUORUM: RAMLY HJ ALI, JCA

JEFFREY TAN KOK WHA, JCA
ZAHARAH IBRAHIM, JCA

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

1. This is an appeal by the Appellant, the Government of Laos,

against the decision of the Kuala Lumpur High Court dated 15

A p r i l 2 0 11 , r e f u s i n g t o g r a n t t h e A p p e l l a n t a n e x t e n s i o n o f t i m e

to set aside an arbitral award outside the stipulated timeframe.

2. The Appellant and the Respondents were parties to an

arbitration agreement which had Malaysia as its seat. The

agreement was governed by the laws of the United States. The

arbitral award was delivered on 4 November 2009. The

Appellant sought to set aside the award pursuant to section 37

of the Arbitration Act 2005, in particular section 37(1)(a)(iv), on

the ground that the award deals with a dispute not

contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the

submission to arbitration; and section 37(1)(a)(v), on the groun d

[2011] 1 LNS 1903 Legal Network Series

that the award contained decision on matters beyond the scope

of the submission to arbitration.

3. The Appellant filed an application at the Kuala Lumpur High

Court to extend time to set aside the award and to set aside the

arbitral award on 5 October 2010, 9 months after the expiry of

the 90 da ys timeframe provided by section 37(4) of the Act.

The High Court judge dismissed the application to extend the

t i m e a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y, t h e e n t i r e a p p l i c a t i o n t o s e t a s i d e t h e

arbitral award. Hence, the present appeal.

4. The parties in the present proceedings are foreign entities. The

Appellant is the Government of Laos; the 1 st Respondent is a

company incorporated in Thailand; and the 2 nd Respondent is

also a company incorporated in Thailand and 75% owned by

the 1st Respondent and 25% by the Appellant.

5. The 1st Respondent entered into a mining contract with the

Appellant on 29 May 1992. Pursuant to the same, the 1 st

Respondent was granted a concession by the Appellant, to

mine lignite over a defined area in Hongsa, which is on the

Laos border with Thailand. The 2nd Respondent was then

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formed by the 1st Respondent and licensed by the Appellant to

perform the lignite mining work in Laos. The mining contract

was governed by the laws of Laos. Disputes under the said

contract were to be referred not to arbitration but to the Laotian

Board of Economic Conciliation or the Laotian Court or the

International Economic Dispute Settlement Organisation.

6. The Appellant then executed a Project Development

Agreement (“PDA”) with the 1st Respondent on 22 July 1994.

Pursuant to the PDA, the Appellant granted the 1 st Respondent

a concession to build a power plant at Hongsa to produce

e l e c t r i c i t y. T h e P D A w a s g o v e r n e d b y N e w Yo r k l a w, a n d i n t h e

event of disputes, arbitration was the dispute resolution

mechanism.

7. The 1st Respondent but not the 2 nd Respondent was a signatory

to the PDA. Disputes arose when the 1 st Respondent failed to

move the power plant project forward for 10 years. The

Appellant terminated the PDA and mining contract as

conditions precedent in the contract were not satisfied.

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8. The Respondents then commenced arbitration proceedings in

Kuala Lumpur on 26 June 2007 challenging the termination. As

a g r e e d t h e l a w g o v e r n i n g t h e a r b i t r a t i o n i s N e w Yo r k l a w a n d

t h e s e a t o f t h e a r b i t r a t i o n w a s K u a l a L u m p u r. T h e a r b i t r a t o r s

concluded that the Appellant had improperly and invalidly

terminated the PDA by issuing a unilateral notice of termination

and failed to follow the procedures required by Article 15.1 of

the PDA in getting a prior approval of the arbitration panel

constituted in accordance with Article 14 thereof. This, the

tribunal held, was a requirement of the termination provision in

the PDA. As a consequence, the Appellant was required to pay

the Respondents a total sum of US$56, 210,000.00 and costs

of US$1 million. The award was issued and delivered to the

Appellant on 4 November 2009.

9. The Appellant applied to set aside the award on grounds, inter

alia, that the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction by exercising

jurisdiction over the A p p e l l a n t ’s disputes with the 1 st

Respondent and the 2nd Respondent under the mining

contracts which are governed by law of Laos and in respect of

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which the arbitrators have no jurisdiction. F u r t h e r, the

arbitrators wrongly exercised jurisdiction over non parties to the

arbitration agreement, ie, the 2 nd Respondent and awarded

damages in their favour against the Appellants.

10. The application to set aside the award carried with it a prayer to

extend time to set aside the award. That prayer was disallowed

by the High Court and consequently the entire application to set

aside the award was dismissed on that basis.

11 . T h e A p p e l l a n t ’s a p p l i c a t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a n a r b i t r a l a w a r d i s

made under section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act 2005, which

provides that:

“an application to set aside an award may not be made after expiry

of ninety days from the date on which the party making the

application had received the award”.

12. Reading the grounds of judgment (particularly paragraphs 13 -

14 at page 34 of the Appeal Record), the learned High Court

judge seemed to recognize that the High Court had the

jurisdiction to grant an extension of time to set aside an arbitral

award but refused to exercise the same on the ground that the
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nine months delay was an inordinate delay and the grounds

stated by the Appellant for the delay “prima facie do not warrant

the court to condone the delay” . The learned High Court judge

a l s o a g r e e d w i t h t h e A p p e l l a n t ’s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s e c t i o n 3 7 ( 4 ) o f

t h e A r b i t r a t i o n A c t 2 0 0 5 w a s d i r e c t o r y a n d n o t m a n d a t o r y, i n a

limited sense.

13. The learned High Court judge further held that “the substantive

meri t of the applica tion to set aside the award cannot be sine

q u a n o n t o c o n s i d e r a n a p p l i c a t i o n t o c o n d o n e d e l a y re l a t i n g t o

A A 2 0 0 5 w h e re p a r t i e s h a v e a g re e d t o a r b i t r a t i o n p ro c e e d i n g s

voluntarily - submitted to the jurisdiction - re p re s e n t e d b y

c o u n s e l s a n d h a v e re c e i v e d t h e a w a rd f ro m t h e t r i b u n a l , b u t

failed to file the application within time” .

14. On the issue of jurisdiction, this court is in agreement with the

learned High Court judge, that the High Court has the

jurisdiction to grant an extension of time to set aside an arbitral

award, based on the wording of section 37(4) of the Arbitration

Act 2005. The court has an unfettered discretion to grant an

extension of time. The court may extend such period of time

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although the application is only made after the expiration of the

said period. This is supported by item 8 of the schedule to

Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which empowers the court to

enlarge or abridge the time prescribed by any written law for

doing any act or taking any proceeding, although any

application therefore is not made until after the expiration of the

time prescribed. Order 3 Rule 5(1) and (2) of the Rules of the

High Court 1980, also provides for the same power to the court.

15. Therefore, the only issue in the present appeal is whether in the

c i r c u ms t a n c e s o f t h e c a s e a n d i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e c o u r t ’s

discretion an extension of time to set aside an arbitral award

should be granted or not.

16. In an application for extension of time of this nature, the court

needs to consider the following factors:

(a) the length of the delay;

(b) the reason for the delay;

(c) the prospect of success; and

(d) the degree of prejudice to the Respondents if the

applications is granted.
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( S e e : T h e G o v e r n m e n t o f I n d i a v. C a i r n E n e r g y I n d i a P t y

Ltd & Ors [2003] 1 MLJ 348).

17. In Thiruchelvasegaram a/l Manickavasegar v. Mahadevi a/p

Nadchatiram [1998] 4 MLJ 297, the Court of Appeal held:

“Order 3 r. 5(1) and (2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the

RHC’), the court has jurisdiction to extend time even if the

application is made after the expiry period. The primary

consideration ... is whether the party can clearly demonstrate that

there was no intention to ignore or flout the order and that the

failure to obey was due to extraneous circumstances.

……

'…… Such failure to obey is not to be treated as contumelious

and therefore does not disentitle the litigant to rights which he

would otherwise have enjoyed.’ (per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkin V C,

in Re Fokai Tea Holdings Ltd p [1993] 1 All ER 630 at p 637 ).”

( S e e a l s o : F i n n e g a n v. P a r k s i d e H e a l t h A u t h o r i t y [ 1 9 9 8 ] 1

All ER 595, the Court of Appeal UK).

18. When considering an application for extension of time, the court

has the widest measure of discretion and the court shall look
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into all circumstances of the case and must recognize the

overriding principle that justice must be done.

19. An application for extension of time can be made or prayed for

in the same application seeking to set aside the award. The

applicant need not file a separate application for that. This was

m a d e c l e a r b y t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l i n P e r c o n C o r p S d n B h d v.

Ya p C h o o n L o y [ 1 9 9 8 ] 3 M L J 8 6 7 , w h e r e S i t i N o r m a Ya a k o b

JCA stated:

“The learned trial judge had misdirected himself when he held that

an application for extension of time had to be separately made and

could not be prayed for in the same originating motion seeting to

s e t a s i d e t h e a w ard ( P r o d e x p o r t S t a t e C om p an y f or F o r e i g n

Trade v. ED & F Man Ltd [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 375 - followed)”.

20. In the present case the Appellant is a foreign sovereign. This

matter involves an award made against another foreign state,

the Government of Laos in the sum of US$56 million. The main

complaint against the award is that it was made in excess of

jurisdiction against the Government of Laos; one of the

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c o n t r a c t s w as n o t c o v e r e d w i t h i n t h e a m b i t o f t h e a g r e e me n t t o

arbitrate; and one of the parties was not a party to the

a g r e e m e n t t o a r b i t r a t e . T h e H i g h C o u r t ’s d i s m i s s a l o f t h e

application to set aside the award on the basis that it was filed

out of time is tantamount to requiring the Government of Laos

to pay out sums in respect of an award which is in excess of

jurisdiction. Refusing the extension of time was tantamount to

shutting out the Government of Laos from challenging an award

in respect of a national project in excess of jurisdiction in the

only countr y competent to hear the application ie, Malaysia, the

country of the seat.

21. The Appellant in this case, is not an individual. It is a sovereign

state. A government is impersonal machinery and decisions

are taken at a slow pace. Implicit in the nature of governmental

functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making

process. The court must acknowledge that an individual may

be quick in taking decision but a state machinery works through

its officers; when the state is an applicant, various factors

including the functioning of the government which is not

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i n d i v i d u a l b u t i n s t i t u t i o n a l , i n v o l v i n g d e c i s i o n ma k i n g p r o c e s s a t

various levels, have also to be taken into consideration. (See:

S t a t e o f H a r y a n a v. C h a n d r a M a n i & O t h e r s [ 1 9 9 6 ] A I R S C

1 6 2 3 a n d G e n u i n e P a i n t s & C h e m i c a l s C o . v. U n i o n o f I n d i a

7 3 [ 1 9 9 8 ] D LT 2 9 6 , [ 1 9 9 8 ] 2 ( R a j ) 2 0 6 ( D e l ) ) .

22. I n t h e G o v e r n m e n t o f I n d i a v. C a i r n E n e r g y I n d i a P t y L t d

(supra), the applicant being a foreign state filed an application

to set aside an arbitration award out of time. The Mala ysian

Court accepted that the delay by a foreign sovereign in filing the

application was excusable. (The Court of Appeal overturned

t h e H i g h C o u r t ’s d e c i s i o n o n o t h e r g r o u n d s a n d t h e m a t t e r i s

pending in the Federal Court). The court accepted the fact that

the foreign state did not intend to flout local laws; had filed an

application for an extension of time; had good grounds to set

aside the award and no prejudice was caused to the

Respondent.

23. The Appellant averred on affidavit that the Respondents began

w o r l d w i d e p r o c e e d i n g s t o e n f o r c e t h e a w a r d i n N e w Yo r k ,

France and London. The Appellant was put to the time costs
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and effort of engaging counsel in each of such jurisdiction. It

was only after the commencement of enforcement proceedings

that the Appellant was advised by its legal advisers of the need

to set aside the award in Malaysia and the applicable

timeframes. The Appellant never intended to flout or ignore the

provisions of the Malaysian Arbitration Act 2005 and had made

an application to extend time as soon as it discovered it was out

of time.

24. The Appellant should not be prejudiced by the fact that it was

not conversant with local law requirements and did not receive

adequate advice from its legal advisors to enable the

application to set aside the award to be made within time in

Malaysia. Where there is a failure by legal advisers to advice

on timeframes, the party (the Appellant) should not be

prejudiced (see: Percon Corp Sdn Bhd v. Ya p Choon Loy

(supra)). The delay was not deliberate and not on account of

culpable negligence or on account of mala fides. (See:

T h o m a s v. B o o t y , E d w a r d s & P a r t n e r s [1964] MLJ 359 -

where the Federal Court had acknowledged that delay cannot

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be regarded as a strong feature to deprive the applicant of his

opportunity to be heard at the first instance).

25. One of the factors to be considered in an application of this

nature is whether the applicant was acting reasonably in all the

c i r c u m s t a n c e s ( S e e : A S M S h i p p i n g L t d o f I n d i a v. T T M I L t d

o f E n g l a n d ( T h e A m e r E n e rg y ) [ 2 0 0 9 ] 1 L l o y d ’s R e p 2 9 3 ) .

26. In the present case the Appellant had acted expediently to the

application as soon as it was informed by its legal advisers

about the applicable timeframes. The Appellant did not remain

idle while the time limit lapsed. The Appellant had spent time

fighting off applications to enforce the award by the

Respondents in other parts of the world which are still pending.

The Appellant filed an application for extension of time to set

aside the arbitral award as soon as it was made aware that it

had to set aside the award in Mala ysia and that there were

timeframes for compliance in this jurisdiction.

27. I n G o l d C o a s t L t d v. N a v a l G i j o n S A [ 2 0 0 6 ] 2 L l o y d ’ s R e p

4 0 0 , t here was an application by Gold Coast for an extension of

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time under section 79 of the Arbitration Act 1996 to enable

them to make an application to correct an arbitration award

under the slip rule. In that case the application was granted.

T h e c o u r t r u l e d t h a t o n t h e f a c t s , t h e b u ye r s ( t h e a p p l i c a n t s )

would suffer substantial injustice if an extension of time were

not granted. Justice Gloster said:

“In my judgment it would be a substantial injustice to the buyer if

the yard were to receive a windfall benefit and the buyer were to

lose the opportunity of putting forward what appear to be strong

arguments for the correction of the award to include interest in this

amount.”

28. The Respondents argued that they would suffer prejudice if the

application for extension of time was granted in favour of the

Appellant. On the other hand, the court is of the view that the

Appellant would obviously suffer more prejudice if the

application were to be refused. The prejudice which may be

suffered by the Respondents (if any) as a result of the delay

was not of sufficient weight to persuade the court not to

exercise its discretion in circumstances where a substantial

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injustice would be caused to the Appellant if no extension were

granted.

29. An extension of time ought to be allowed where there is a good

arguable case (see: Bulk Tr a n s p o r t Corporation v. Sissy

S t e a m s h i p C o . L t d [ 1 9 7 9 ] 2 L l o y d ’s R e p 2 8 9 ) . I n t h a t c a s e

an extension of time was allowed as the arbitrator failed to

begin the arbitration with the prima facie presumption and went

on to proceed with the question of whether the wording of a

particular clause was such as to rebut the prima facie

presumption. The English Court allowed the extension of time

but dismissed the application to set aside the award on the

ground that the decision of the arbitrator was right on the facts

of the case.

30. The learned High Court judge in the present case relied so

much on the UNCITRAL Model Law in coming to his decision

t h at the prayer for extension of time in arbitration matter ought

not to be condoned by the court. He expressed his view that “ it

is trite that the Arbitration Act 2005 has prima facie accepted

the UNCITRAL Model Law and the judicial sentiment here as

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well other countries which have adopted the same is inclined

t o w a rd s t h e j u r i s p r u d e n c e re l a t i n g t o “ m i n i m u m i n t e r v e n t i o n o f

the court” in matters governed by the Act ”.

31. Wi t h r e s p e c t , w e a r e n o t i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e l e a r n e d j u d g e o n

this point. Our view is that, even though the Malaysian

Arbitration Act 2005 had prima facie accepted the UNCITRAL

M o d e l L a w, i t d o e s n o t i n a n y w a y t a k e a w a y t h e p o w e r s o f t h e

court in dealing with any application for extension of time.

T h e r e i s n o e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n t o t h a t e f f e c t . T h e M o d e l L a w,

particularly Article 34(2) thereof, provides for the grounds under

which an arbitral award may be set aside by the court. They

relate to the substantive application to set aside the award.

There is no mention about an extension of time to file the said

application. Even section 37 of the Arbitration Act 2005 does

not expressly prohibit the powers of the court to extend time in

appropriate case.

32. Hong Kong has adopted the Model Law as part of her

Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 341). In Kwan Lee Construction

C o . L t d v. E l e v a t o r P a r t s E n g i n e e r i n g C o L t d [ 1 9 9 7 ] 1 H K C
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97, the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong allowed the extension of

time and acknowledged that the duty of the court is not to

debase the entire arbitral process and to shake parties’

confidence in arbitration.

33. I n t h a t c a s e t h e c o u r t a l s o a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t d e s p i t e t h e d e l a y,

it is vital for the court to consider the merits of the appeal. In

that case, the arbitral award was bad ex facie because it

focused purely on the payment per se and took no account of

the fact that it was expressed as having made “without

p r ej u d i c e ” a n d t h e a r b i t r a t o r, i n a w a r d i n g i n t e r e s t , d i d n o t

consider whether the sum paid was in fact due.

34. I n t h a t c a s e t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e c o u r t ’s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o g r a n t

an extension of time is as broad as can be. The proper

approach to the question whether an extension of time should

be granted is to consider what the question of law involved

might ultimately be should leave be given, as well as the

r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e l a y. I n a l l o w i n g t h e a p p e a l P a t r i c k C h a n J

gave the following reasons:

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“Since we are disagreeing with the learned judge, I should also

briefly make the following two points. First, it is unfortunate that the

learned judge seemed to have relied only on the absence of

explanation for the delay and did not express any views on the

merits of the case. One is therefore left in doubt whether he had

given proper consideration to them when he exercised his

discretion in refusing leave. Second, it is of course important to

maintain as much as possible finality in arbitral proceedings. It is,

however, equally desirable to ensure that arbitration is trusted and

respected as a means of resolving commercial disputes. The

arbitrator here did not make any specific finding on all but one of

the points raised by the parties and the only reason he gave for

making his award is, in my view, clearly questionable. In the

circumstances of this case, I think this is a matter which not only

substantially affects the rights of the parties but would also have

caused sufficient concern for the court to grant leave to appeal”.

35. In the present case the Appellant challenged the arbitral award

based on the following grounds:

a) that the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction by

e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e A p p e l l a n t ’s d i s p u t e s w i t h

the Respondents under the mining contracts which are

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governed by law of Laos and in respect of which the

arbitrators have no jurisdiction;

b) that the arbitrators wrongly exercised jurisdiction over

nonparties in respect of a dispute that was, and remained

a dispute between the Appellant and the 1 st Respondent

pursuant to Article 14 of the PDA. The arbitrators

erroneously decided that the 2 nd Respondent was a party

to the arbitration proceeding; and

c) that the arbitrators awarded investment costs against the

Appellant to be paid to non-parties of the PDA by taking

into consideration the evidence of investment costs

incurred by the 2nd Respondent, Thai-Lao Power Co. Ltd

and South East Asian Power Co. under the mining

contract; thus the award was bad ex facie as it contained

costs and damages beyond the scope of the submission

of the parties under the PDA.

36. These are good reasons to extend time as applied for bearing

in mind the cogent reasons for the challenge; the great

prejudice to the Appellant if the application is dismissed without

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considering the substantive application on its merits; the fact

that the Respondents would be compensated by the payment

of interest if the application is incorrectly entertained and the

further fact that the Respondents are well aware, from the

opposition to the enforcement applications taking place in other

jurisdictions, that the Appellant is challenging the award.

Conclusion

37. This court is of the view that this is an appropriate case for the

court to exercise its discretion in favour of the Appellant to

extend the time to enable the Appellant to file an application to

set aside the arbitration award dated 4 November 2009; and to

hold that the filing and commencement of the proceedings to

set aside the said arbitration award be considered good and in

o r d e r. I n o r d e r t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e a b o v e o r d e r, t h i s c o u r t m a k e s a

f u r t h e r o r d e r t h a t t h e A p p e l l a n t ’s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r s e r v i c e o f t h e

Originating Summons out of jurisdiction as per the originating

summons (Ex-parte) dated 19 October 2010 be heard by a

High Court judge. The matter is to be remitted to the High

Court and to be heard before a different judge. There is no

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order as to costs and the deposit is ordered to be refunded to the

Appellant.

DATED: 26 JULY 2011

RAMLY HJ ALI
Judge
Court of Appeal
Malaysia

Counsel:

For the appellant - Shanti Mogan; M/s Shearn Delamore & Co

For the respondent - Sunil Abraham (Idza Hajar Ahmad with him); M/s Zul
Rafique & Partners

Case(s) referred to:

T h e G o v e r n m e n t o f I n d i a v. C a i r n E n e r g y I n d i a P t y L t d & O r s
[2003] 1 MLJ 348

Thiruchelvasegaram a/l Manickavasegar v. Mahadevi a/p

Nadchatiram [1998] 4 MLJ 297

F i n n e g a n v. P a r k s i d e H e a l t h A u t h o r i t y [ 1 9 9 8 ] 1 A l l E R 5 9 5
[2011] 1 LNS 1903 Legal Network Series

P e r c o n C o r p S d n B h d v. Ya p C h o o n L o y [ 1 9 9 8 ] 3 M L J 8 6 7

P r o d e x p o r t S t a t e C o m p a n y f o r F o r e i g n Tr a d e v. E D & F M a n L t d
[ 1 9 7 2 ] 2 L l o y d ’s R e p 3 7 5

S t a t e o f H a r y a n a v. C h a n d r a M a n i & O t h e r s [ 1 9 9 6 ] A I R S C 1 6 2 3

G e n u i n e P a i n t s & C h e m i c a l s C o . v. U n i o n o f I n d i a 7 3 [ 1 9 9 8 ] D L T
296, [1998] 2 (Raj) 206 (Del)

T h o m a s v. B o o t y, E d w a r d s & P a r t n e r s [ 1 9 6 4 ] M L J 3 5 9

A S M S h i p p i n g L t d o f I n d i a v. T T M I L t d o f E n g l a n d ( T h e A m e r
E n e r g y ) [ 2 0 0 9 ] 1 L l o y d ’s R e p 2 9 3

G o l d C o a s t L t d v. N a v a l G i j o n S A [ 2 0 0 6 ] 2 L l o y d ’s R e p 4 0 0

B u l k Tr a n s p o r t C o r p o r a t i o n v. S i s s y S t e a m s h i p C o . L t d [ 1 9 7 9 ] 2
L l o y d ’s R e p 2 8 9

K w a n L e e C o n s t r u c t i o n C o . L t d v. E l e v a t o r P a r t s E n g i n e e r i n g C o
Ltd [1997] 1 HKC 97

Legislation referred to:

Arbitration Act 2005, s s. 37(1)(a)(iv), 37(4)

Rules of the High Court 1980, Order 3 rule 5(1) & (2)