2. Nepomuceno v.

Court of Appeals
Succession Cases: October 20, 2020 No. L-62952, October 9, 1985

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon,

Rizal. He left a last Will and
1. Gallanosa v. Arcangel
Testament where he named and appointed
petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole
G.R. No. L-29300, 21 June 1978, 83 SCRA 675 and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in
the will that the testator was legally
FACTS: married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had
two legitimate children, but since
1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully
Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when
wedded wife and had been living with
he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of and
petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on
at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived
December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo
by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed his
and the petitioner herein, Sofia, were married on
1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife
Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace.
Tecla and if she predecease him (as what
The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely,
occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the
his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his
spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is
children his entire estate and the free portion
Tecla’s son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3
thereof to herein petitioner. Subsequently,
parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.
the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of
the last will and testament of the
The said will was admitted to probate with deceased, but the legal wife of the testator Rufina
Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs and her children filed an opposition
filed an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of alleging inter alia that the execution of the will was
land. The action was dismissed on the ground of procured by undue and improper
res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the
acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will, time of the execution of the will, the
recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was testator was already very sick and that the
filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the 1939 petitioner having admitted her living in
decree of probate. concubinage with the testator, she is wanting
integrity and thus letters testamentary
ISSUE: should not be issued to her.
The lower court denied the probate of the will on
Whether or not a will which has been probated may the ground that as the testator
still be annulled. admitted in his will to cohabiting with the petitioner
because on the face of the will, the
RULING: invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
The appellate court declared the will to be
No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner
due execution of the will. Due execution means that is null and void.
the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the
time of the execution and that he was not acting ISSUE: Whether or not the donation made by the
under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. testator in favor of herein petitioner
Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the was valid.
formalities provided by law.
No. There is no question from the records about the
The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has fact of a prior existing
already expired, hence the judgment may only be marriage when Martin Jugo lived together in an
set aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or ostensible marital relationship for 22
lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment years until his death. It is also a fact that Martin
was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud Jugo and Sofia Nepomuceno contracted
(which must be filed within 4 years from the a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of
discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old
and testament. while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno contends
that she acted in good faith for 22 Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court
years in the belief that she was legally married to and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.
the testator. The records do not
sustain that she acted in good faith for 22 years in ISSUE:
the belief that she was legally
married to the testator, since the last will and Whether or not probate is necessary for Rosario to
testament itself expressly admits be able to claim her legitime as an acknowledged
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship natural daughter.
between the testator and petitioner,
the devisee.
RULING:
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil
Code is against the making of
a donation between persons who are living in In the instant case there is no showing that the
adultery or concubinage. It is the donation various legatees other than the present litigants
which becomes void. The giver cannot give even had received their respective legacies or that they
assuming that the recipient may had knowledge of the existence and of the
receive. The very wordings of the will invalidate the provisions of the will. Their right under the will
legacy because the testator cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be
admitted he was disposing the properties to a obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the
person with whom he had been living in custodian of the will to present it to the court for
concubinage. probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody

3. Guevara v. Guevara
G.R. No. L-48840, 29 December 1943, 74:479
FACTS:
It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L.
Guevara executed a will, apparently with all the
formalities of the law. On September 27, 1933, he
died. His last will and testament, however, was
never presented to the court for probate, nor has
any administration proceeding ever been instituted
for the settlement of his estate. Ever since the
death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate
son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have
possessed the land adjudicated to him in the
registration proceeding and to have disposed of
various portions thereof for the purpose of paying
the debts left by his father.
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to
have had her father’s last will and testament in her
custody, presented the will to the court, not for the
purpose of having it probated but only to prove that
the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had
acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon
that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her
share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory
or assumption that he died intestate, because the
will had not been probated, for which reason, she
asserted, the betterment therein made by the
testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M.
raises any question as to the authenticity and due
execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for
the partition of the estate in accordance with that
will without first securing its allowance or probate
by the court, first, because the law expressly
provides that “no will shall pass either real or
personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in
the proper court”; and, second, because the
probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem,
cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any
other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without
offending against public policy designed to
effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his
property by will in accordance with law and to
protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under
the will thru the means provided by law, among
which are the publication and the personal notices
to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may
the court approve and allow the will presented in
evidence in such an action for partition, which is
one in personam, any more than it could decree the
registration under the Torrens system of the land
involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or
partition.
4. De la Cerna v. Potot G.R. No. L-20234, 23
December 1964, 12 SCRA 576
FACTS:
On May 19, 1939, Spouses Bernabe de la Serna
and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and
testament where they willed that their 2 parcels of
land together with all improvements thereon be
given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece, whom they
have nutured since childhood and that while each
of the testators is yet living, she will continue to
enjoy the fruits of the two lands.
Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, and
the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said
Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. By order of Oct. 31, 1939, the
Court admitted for probate the said will but only for
the part of Bernabe.
When Gervasia died, another petition for probate
was instituted by Manuela, but because she and
her attorney failed to appear in court, the petition
was dismissed. The Court of First Instance ordered
the petition heard and declared the testament null
and void, for being executed contrary to the
prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669,
Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the
Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary
heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground
that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a
court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the
due execution of the testament.
ISSUE:
W/N the will may be probated.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and
held that once a decree of probate becomes final in
accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res
judicata. Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939
was erroneous, however, because it was probated
by a court of competent jurisdiction it has
conclusive effect and a final judgment rendered on
a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon
the whole world. There was an error on the court
but the decree has now become final.
Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the
share of Bernabe and could not include the
disposition of the share of his wife which was still
alive then, her properties were still not within the
jurisdiction of the court. Hence, joint will being
prohibited by law, the validity of the will with respect
to her, must be on her death, be re-examined and
adjudicated de novo — since a joint will is
considered a separate will of each testator.
The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon
her death to her intestate heirs and not to the
testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition of the
wife, the will cannot be given effect.
5. Austria vs. Reyes
G.R. No. L-23079 | 1970-02-27
By: Karen P. Lustica
 
Facts: Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the
CIF of Rizal  a petition for probate, ante mortem, of
her last will and testament. The probate was
opposed by the present petitioners. This opposition
was dismissed and the probate of the will was
allowed after due hearing.
 
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was
destined under the will to pass on to the
respondents all of whom had been assumed and
declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted
children.
More than two years after her will was allowed to
probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto
Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the
same court in accordance with the provisions of the
decedent’s will, notwithstanding the blocking
attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.
 
Finally, the present petitioners filed in the same
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition
alleging in substance that they are the nearest of
kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted
by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect
rendering these respondents mere strangers to the
decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
Issue: WON the institution of the heirs would retain
efficacy in the event there exists proof that the
adoption of the same heirs by the decedent was
false
 
Held: YES.
 
Ratio: Article 850 of the Civil Code which reads,
“The statement of a false cause for the institution of
an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it
appears from the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of such cause.”
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled
under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: First, the cause for the
institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, the cause must be shown to be false; and
third, it must appear from the face of the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if
he had known the falsity of the cause.
 
From the use of the terms, “sapilitang
tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs) and “sapilitang
mana” (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause
for the institution of the respondents was the
testatrix’s belief that under the law she could not do
otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the
testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not
make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware
that succession to the legitime takes place by
operation of law, independent of her own wishes,
she would not have found it convenient to name her
supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her
express adoption of the rules on legitimes should
very well indicate her complete agreement with that
statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners’
own proposition, is highly speculative of what was
in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her
will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the
decedent’s will does not state in a specific or
unequivocal manner the cause for such institution
of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of
guesswork or uncertain implications.
 
The phrases, “mga sapilitang tagapagmana” and
“sapilitang mana,” were borrowed from the
language of the law on succession and were used,
respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted
and the abstract object of the inheritance. They
offer no absolute indication that the decedent would
have willed her estate other than the way she did if
she had known that she was not bound by law to
make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the
free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which
largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the
latter’s children, and the children of the respondent
Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her
part to give to the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them.
Compare this with the relatively small devise of
land which the decedent had left for her blood
relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo
Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of
the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude
the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the
inheritance, then the petitioners and the other
nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of
the testate by intestacy — a result which would
subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
 
6. REYES vs. BARRETTO-DATU G.R. No. L-
17818 January 25, 1967 Topic: Effect of Inclusion
of Intruder in Partition
FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria
Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast
estate, consisting of real properties in Manila,
Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano died, he
left his share of these properties in a will to Salud
Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia
Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to
his two sisters Rosa and Felisa and his nephews
and nieces. Usufruct was reserved for his widow.
The widow then prepared a project of partition
which she signed in her own behalf, and as
guardian of the minor Milagros. This was approved
by CFI Manila. As a consequence, Salud Barretto
took immediate possession of her share and
secured the cancellation of the originals and the
issuance of new titles in her own name. Upon the
widow’s death, it was discovered that she had
executed two wills, in the first of which, she
instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; and, in
the second, she revoked the same and left all her
properties in favor of Milagros alone. Thus, the later
will was allowed and the first rejected. Plaintiff then
filed an action for the recovery of one-half portion of
properties left for them under Bibiano’s will. This
action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set
up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond
under litigation, but of all theother properties willed
and delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir,
and not entitled to any share in the estate of
Bibiano, thereby directly attacking thevalidity, not
only of the project of partition, but of the decision of
the court based thereon. The defendant contends
that the Project of Partition from which
Saludacquired the fishpond in question is void ab
initio. This was based on Article 1081 of the Civil
Code of 1889: “A partition in which a person was
believed to be an heir,without being so, has been
included, shall be null and void.” CFI rejected
plaintiff’s contention that since Bibiano was free to
dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old
Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud to the
extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded
that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir
of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover
from Salud, and from the latter's children and
successors, all the Properties received by her from
Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Art
1456 of the new Civil Code establishing that
property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its
acquirerin implied trust for the real owner.
ISSUE: 1. WON the partition between Salud and
Milagros in the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of Bibiano is void.
2. WON there was preterition? HELD: 1. NO The
agreement of partition was not only ratified by the
court's decree of distribution, but actually
consummated, so much so that the titles inthe
name of the deceased were cancelled, and new
certificates issued in favor of theheirs, long before
the decree was attacked. The only instance that we
can think of in which a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even
then, the better practice to secure relief isreopening
of the same case by proper motion within the
reglementary period, insteadof an independent
action the effect of which, if successful, would be,
for another courtor judge to throw out a decision or
order already final and executed and
reshuffleproperties long ago distributed and
disposed of. Art. 1081 has been misapplied. Salud
admittedly had been instituted heir in the late
Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together
with defendant Milagros; hence,the partition had
between them could not be one such had with a
party who was believed to be an heir without really
being one, and was not null and void under said
article. 2. NO. The fact that Milagros was allotted in
her father's will a share smaller than her legitime
does not invalidate the institution of Salud as heir.
There was no preterition, or total ommission of a
forced heir.
7. Aznar v. Duncan
17 SCRA 590
FACTS:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to
probate. The court declared that Helen Garcia was
a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First
Instance equally divided the properties of
the estate of Christensen between
Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized
in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the
order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was
preterited in the will thus, the institution of
Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the
properties passed to both of them as if the
deceased died intestate.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies,
should be equally divided or whether the
inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be
merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover
the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the
entire estate.
HELD:
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced
to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia
as his natural daughter and limited her share to a
legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a
forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime,
but without referring to the legatee as an heir or
even as a relative, and willed the rest of
the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask
that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely,
but only that the legitime be completed.
8. Heirs of Ureta v. Heirs of Ureta
G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011
FACTS:
Alfonso Ureta was financially well-off and owned
several properties. He begot fourteen children,
including herein petitioners and Policronio, father of
respondents. For taxation purposes, Alfonso sold,
without monetary consideration, several parcels of
land to four of his children, including Policronio.
Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the
lands and their produce. Upon his death, Liberato
acted as the administrator. The Fernandez Family
rented the portion transferred to Policronio. But
even after the fact, the tenants never turned over
the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of this
heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators
of his estate. When Policronio died, except for a
portion of one of the parcels of land, neither
Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the
subject lands. Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition,8 which included all the
lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of
sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for
taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest
son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his
co-heirs. Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving
Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the July
19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter. The Heirs of
Policronio averred that the extra-judicial partition is
void because Conrado signed the same without
written authority form his siblings.
ISSUE:
WON Conrado Ureta’s lack of capacity to give his
co-heirs’ consent to the Extra-Judicial Partition
rendered the same voidable.
RULING:
No. Article 1390 is not applicable in this case.
Article 1390 (1) contemplates the incapacity of a
party to give consent to a contract. What is involved
in the case at bench though is not Conrado’s
incapacity to give consent to the contract, but rather
his lack of authority to do so. Instead, Articles 1403
(1), 1404, and 1317 of the Civil Code find
application to the circumstances prevailing in this
case. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale
is not a voidable or an annullable contract under
Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390
renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is
incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the
contracting party’s consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority
from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition in their behalf did not result in his
incapacity to give consent so as to render the
contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the
contract valid but unenforceable against Conrado’s
co-heirs for having been entered into without their
authority.
9. Seangio v. Hon. Amor Reyes
G.R. Nos. 140371-72, 27 November 2006, 508
SCRA 177
FACTS:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed
a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
Seangio–Santos as special administrator and
guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that Segundo left a holographic will,
dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In
view of the purported holographic will, petitioners
averred that in the event the decedent is found to
have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will.
The petitioner instituted a petition for the probation
of the will. Private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on
the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code. According to private
respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son,
Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee
or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would
result to intestacy.
RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings
on the reason that there is preterition in the will.
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in dismissing the probate
proceeding.
HELD:
Yes. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of
the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause
therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by
Segundo in his document, the Court believes that
the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered
a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son,
Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come
across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose
mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make
an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of those
who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court
believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s
opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his
estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute
an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. Considering that the questioned document is
Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will
cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless
the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose
of his property may be rendered nugatory.
10. Acain v. IAC
G.R. No. 72706, 27 October 1987, 155 SCRA 100
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court
a petition for the probate of the will of his late
Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the
latter died leaving a will in which the former and his
brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After
the petition was set for hearing in the lower court,
Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally
adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased
respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal
capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion
was denied as well as the subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and
Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
which was subsequently referred to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted
Fernandez and Diongson’s petition and ordered the
trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the
will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for
reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review
on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa
Diongson have been preterited.
HELD:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before
the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does
not ascend or descend from the testator, although
she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing
cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter.
Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to
the adopted person the same rights and duties as if
he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It
cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and
preterited in the will and that both the adopted child
and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case
of preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his
brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because
the nullification of such institution of universal heirs
without any other testamentary disposition in the
will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was
written.
11. Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966;
17 SCRA 449, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on January 4, 2012
(Special Proceedings – Difference between
Preterition and Disinheritance)
Facts: Rosario died without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers
and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of
all her properties. She prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letter of administration
be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on
the ground that by the institution of Remedios as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who
are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line –
were illegally preterited and that in consequence,
the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case
of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854
does not apply in the case at bar.
Issue:  WON the institution of one of the sister of
the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited
the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes.  Where the deceased left no
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her
parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly
disinherit them but simply omits their names
altogether, the case is one of preterition of the
parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s
will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or,
through mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited”.
Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his
share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner
as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents
of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies
or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner,
by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
12. Araceli Mayuga vs Antonio Atienza
Facts:
Araceli Mayuga instituted a petition for
cancellation and recall of free patent application
and reconveyance against Antonio Atienza.
Petitioner alleged that through manipulation and
misrepresentation with intent to defraud a co-heir,
respondent Antonio L. Atienza was able to secure a
free patent. Defendant submitted an answer
stating, among others, that the free patent titles
have become indefeasible after the lapse of one
year from its issuance in 1992 and that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
public, continuous possession of the subject
property for over 30 years.
The RTC ruled in favor of Araceli. It ruled
that the application by the defendants of a free
patent is tainted with fraud because said application
was processed without plaintiff’s knowledge. When
the defendants appealed, it was granted by the CA.
According to the CA, the RTC erred in ordering the
reconveyance of 1/3 of the subject properties to the
petitioner since she failed to establish her title and
ownership over such portion.
Issue:
I. Should the petition for cancellation and recall of
free patent application and reconveyance be
granted
II. Can Araceli claim preterition?
Held:
The action for declaration of nullity of the
free patents issued in favor of the respondents and
the action for reconveyance must fail.
As correctly pointed out by the CA and
stated earlier, an action for reconveyance involving
land that is titled pursuant to a free patent is one
that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully
registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner
or to one with a better title. As such, two facts must
be alleged in the complaint and proved during the
trial, namely: (1) the plaintiff was the owner of the
land or possessed it in the concept of owner, and
(2) the defendant illegally divested him of
ownership and dispossessed him of the land.
Apparently, Araceli had taken the position
that being one of the surviving compulsory heirs of
their late father, Perfecto, she was entitled to 1/3 of
the disputed lots on the assumption that the
decedent left only three legal heirs (his children
Araceli, Benjamin, Sr. and Armando) and that the
disputed lots were part of the inheritance left by
their father when he died in 1978. Araceli, however,
overlooked the fact that Perfecto executed that
Confirmation Affidavit dated June 22, 1973 almost
five years prior to his dead on June 1, 1978. Araceli
did not even bother to provide the Court a copy
thereof so that the Court could make a
determination of its legal import. And the CA
correctly accorded the Confirmation Affidavit the
legal presumption of validity, being a duly notarized
document, where its validity could not be impugned
by mere self-serving allegations.
Assuming that Perfecto owned the disputed
lots and the Confirmation Affidavit was a deed of
partition, Perfecto could have legally partitioned his
estate during his lifetime. Under Art. 1080 of the
Civil Code, “[s]hould a person make a partition of
his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.”
Since the Civil Code allows partition inter
vivos, it is incumbent upon the compulsory heir
questioning its validity to show that his legitime is
impaired. Unfortunately, Araceli has not shown to
what extent the Confirmation Affidavit prejudiced
her legitime.
Araceli could not also claim preterition by
virtue of the Confirmation Affidavit on the
assumption that the disputed two lots pertained to
Perfecto’s inheritance, he had only three legal heirs
and he left Araceli with no share in the two lots. Art.
853 of the Civil Code partly provides: “[t]he
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.”
Although Araceli was a compulsory heir in
the direct descending line, she could not have been
preterited. Firstly, Perfecto left no will. As
contemplated in Art. 854, the presence of a will is
necessary. Secondly, before his death, Perfecto
had properties in Limon, Rizal which was almost
50 hectares, part of which was developed for
residential and agricultural purposes, and in
Odiongan. Araceli could not have been totally
excluded in the inheritance of Perfecto even if she
was not allegedly given any share in the disputed
two lots.
If Araceli’s share in the inheritance of
Perfecto as claimed by her was indeed impaired,
she could have instituted an action for partition or a
settlement of estate proceedings instead of her
complaint of free patent and reconveyance.
13. Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez
Maria Luisa Palacios v. Marcelle vda. de
Ramirez, et.al.
G.R. No. L-27952, 15 February 1982
Abad Santos, J.
FACTS
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in
Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir. His
will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch X. The administratrix of
the estate submitted a project of partition giving one
part of the estate to the widow “en pleno
dominio” in satisfaction of her legitime while the
other part of the “free portion” to his two
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez.
Furthermore, one third of the free portion is
charged with the widow’s usufruct and the
remaining two thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda Wrobleski.
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed the project of
partition, as well as the substitutions provided by
the testator as to the usufructs of the widow and of
Wanda. Nonetheless, the lower court approved the
project of partition in its order dated May 1967.
Jorge and Roberto appealed before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the usufruct over real property in
favor of Wanda violates the Constitutional
prohibition against ownership of lands by alien.
HELD
The Court upheld the validity of the usufruct given
to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law, but
also testamentary succession. Any alien would be
able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money
to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise
of a piece of land. In the present case, the usufruct
in favor of Wanda, although a real right, does not
vest title to the land in the usufructuary. It is the
vesting of title in favor of aliens which is proscribed
by the Constitution.
RULING
Estate of Eugenio Ramirez was distributed
according to the SC’s order.
14. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
v. Escolin
G.R. Nos. L-27936 and L-27937, 29 March 1974,
56 SCRA 266
FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from
Texas, made a will in 1952.
Unfortunately, she passed away in 1957 while she
was domiciled in Iloilo City.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her
husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie,
however, also stated in her will that should her
husband later die, said estate shall be turned over
to her brother and sister.
In 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also
domiciled in the Philippines).
While the probate proceeding on the will of Linnie
was pending, Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of
Charles, filed a motion before the probate court so
that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as
the administratrix of the estate. The latter was the
trusted employee of the Hodges when they were
alive.
Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a
will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’
office. Hence, in the meantime, he would like to
have Magno appointed as administratrix. The said
motion was approved by Judge Venicio Escolin.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition
for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will
basically covers the same estate, Magno, as
admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said
petition.
Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was
granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank was appointed as
administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the
estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted
Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother
and sister and since that is her will, the same must
be respected.
Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at
the time of her death (an alien testator); that under
Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are
governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas
law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of
the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the
estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter
back to Philippine laws because Linnie was
domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death
(applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE:

WON Texas Law should apply.

HELD:

The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the

lower court since both parties failed to adduce proof
as to the law of Texas.

The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas

law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be
resolved by the evidence that would be presented
in the probate court. The Supreme Court further
emphasized that Texas law is the applicable law at
the time of Linnie’s death.