1
G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch
76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes
without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.1 The referral-
complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information
was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the
crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the
respondent judge. 4
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues
that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of
the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the
offenses charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine
of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other
imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the
offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint
shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to
Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following
rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe
after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining
and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of
the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on
the ground of prescription.
PROSECTUTION: contends that the prescriptive period was
suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the
Solicitor General also invokes
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
providing as follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action
shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of
conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint
directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office.
However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that
the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all
cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling
under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
SC RULING:
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30,
1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule
110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last
paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not
subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which
plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are
subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in
the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a
statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of
the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that
among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city
ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner,
which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling
under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
2
Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. [G.R. No. 138596. October 12, 2000.]
No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, Petitioner, v.
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of HON. HILARION LAQUI, SR. HELEN
not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or JUAREZ, Respondents.
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
DECISION
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or

information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties
agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the
case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court,
whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period
shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on
any date before that.
private respondents filed a joint complaint-
affidavit for libel against petitioners before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
alleging that the latter circulated on December
21, 1993 a letter containing malicious
imputations against them.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. An information for libel then was filed before
3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," May 18, 1994.
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does. MTC - ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the
case as the same falls under the original and
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Court, and ordered that the case be forwarded
Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And
if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules to the RTC for further proceedings.
on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court,
in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, The case was forwarded to Branch 215
increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of
the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7 Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed
as Criminal Case No. 96-6870.
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe
that the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under
the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription
to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the of the offense of Libel.
prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance,
for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered
by the Rule on Summary Procedure. RTC dismissed the case but stated that the
offense had not yet prescribed, ordered the
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may City Prosecutor of Quezon City to re-file the
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the Information for Libel with the RTC.
prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the
necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules the Information for Libel was re-filed with
beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain
language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules
respondent court docketed as Criminal Case
but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be No. Q-97-70948.
corrected.
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to
the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11,
ground of prescription. The motion was denied
1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in in the assailed Resolution dated October
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by 3,1997.
the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was
done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
also denied in the other Assailed Order dated
December 4, 1997." 4
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order
dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of
Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
the trial court, herein petitioner appealed to
3
the Court of Appeals raising the issue of
"whether or not public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion or grossly erred in
holding that the offense of libel in the instant
case has not yet prescribed."
CA - upheld the contention of the trial court
that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed
and consequently, dismissed the said petition.
The appellate court likewise denied herein
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution dated May 11, 1999. 6
Petitioner’s Contention
Under the RPC, The crime of libel or other
similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The crime was committed on December 21,
1993 and an information for libel then was
filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City on May 18, 1994.
However, considering that the case was filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court, which
under the law does not have jurisdiction over
the crime of libel, the period of prescription
continued to run its course. Consequently,
petitioner concludes that when the information
for libel was finally filed with the Regional Trial
Court on April 27, 1997 the crime had already
prescribed and the State can no longer pursue
the case against her.
ISSUE: WON the filing before the court which
does not have jurisdiction over the crim
RULING:
We are not persuaded.
The filing of the complaint or information for
purposes of preliminary investigation
represents the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. This is one of the reasons
why such filing is deemed as having
interrupted the period of prescription for the
prosecution of a crime. This period of
prescription commences to run again when the
proceedings terminate without conviction or
acquittal, "if the court (or prosecutor) should
discharge the accused because no prima facie
case has been shown."
The mistake of the Office of the City
Prosecutor in filing the complaint and of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in taking cognizance of
the case was thus understandable. The error
was immediately rectified by the said court
upon realizing its mistake when it ruled it was
the Regional Trial Court which had the proper
jurisdiction over the case. This mistake should
not operate to prejudice the interest of the
state to prosecute criminal offenses and, more
importantly, the right of the offended party to
obtain grievance.
It is clear that the Appellate Court committed
no reversible error in ruling that the offense of
libel charged against petitioner had not yet
prescribed. The period of prescription for the
crime was interrupted when the complaint was
lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor
and remained tolled pending the termination of
the case against petitioner. Branch 218 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, therefore,
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case of
petitioner as the offense of libel for which she
was being charged has not yet prescribed. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
G.R. No. 152662               June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
September 16, 1997 Virginia C. Malolos filed an
affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent
issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of
Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five
Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (₱9,658,592.00) in favor
of private complainant which were dishonored upon
presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific
performance against private complainant before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997,
respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings
on the Ground of Prejudicial Question" before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as
basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with
the RTC of Valenzuela City.
4
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben
Catubay recommended the suspension of the
criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil
action respondent filed against private complainant
with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The
recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter
before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin
P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22,
both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against
respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February
2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These
cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June
2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus
Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch
31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability
has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
MeTC granted the motion in an Order dated 5
October 2000.
RTC - Reversed
CA reversed the Decision of RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos.
89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for
violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
ISSUE: whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for
estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of
prescription of such offense.
RULING:
We find merit in this petition.
We find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the
offense committed by respondent had already
prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law
applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law
reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a)
xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than
two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a
penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a fine for its
violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law. The running of
the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled
upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty
person.
As a rule, the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and thus,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed
against respondent on 16 September 1997. The
cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
February 2000 because in the meanwhile,
respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed
by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of
"prejudicial question". The matter was raised before
the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor
approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was
only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the
informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed
with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the
suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion
she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that
caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated
proceedings only in 2000.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22
against the respondent.
5
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161106               January 13, 2014
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and
CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 161266
PLANET INTERNET CORP., Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
PNP filed applications for warrants  before the RTC of
3 1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal
Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office
premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation
(WWC) The applications alleged that petitioners were
conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which
amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree
No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of
Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use
of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other
Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). 6
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a
hearing on the applications for search warrants.
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the
application for search warrants.  Accordingly, the
15
following warrants were issued against the office
premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to
seize various items
The warrants were implemented on the same day by
RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region
Police Office.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,  and Planet
21
Internet  filed their respective motions to quash the
22
search warrants
RTC - granted the motions to quash on the ground
that the warrants issued were in the nature of general
warrants.  Thus, the properties seized under the said
25
warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion
was denied  on the ground that it had failed to get
27
the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the
motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
THE CA RULING
The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC
Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid
and effective
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to
PLDT’s appeal despite the following procedural
infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public
prosecutor, had no personality to question the
quashal of the search warrants;
OUR RULING
I.
action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not
necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to
question an order quashing search warrants.
Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to
question the quashal of the search warrants without
the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue
that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the prosecutor.
The above provision states the general rule that the
public prosecutor has direction and control of the
prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information." However, a search warrant
is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an
information, but by the filing of an application
therefor.
34
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of
Appeals,  an application for a search warrant is a
35
"special criminal process," rather than a criminal
action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously
equating the application for and the obtention of a
search warrant with the institution and prosecution of
a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus
categorize what is only a special criminal process, the
6
power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as
equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which
is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence.
It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are
completely different from those for the institution of a
criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or
a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A
search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an
order in writing issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a
writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy,
drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of
a public necessity.
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is
not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have
consistently recognized the right of parties to question
orders quashing those warrants.  Accordingly, we
37
sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the
public prosecutor is not necessary before an
aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order
granting a motion to quash search warrants.
G.R. No. 196842               October 9, 2013
ALFREDO ROMULO A. BUSUEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN MINDANAO and
ROSA S. BUSUEGO, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a
complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article 334 of
the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act
No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of
the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the
Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo, with
designation Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional
Hospital, Apokon, Tagum City.
In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosa’s
failure to implead Sia and de Leon as respondents
cropped up. Alfredo insisted that Rosa’s complaint
ought to be dismissed for failure to implead his
alleged concubines as respondents.
Rosa was apprised of the need to implead the two
alleged mistresses in the complaint for Concubinage
pursuant to Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 24 June 2008, the Ombudsman issued a Joint
Order4 impleading Sia and de Leon as party-
respondents in the complaint for Concubinage and
directing them to submit their respective counter-
affidavits within a period of time. Copies of the Joint
Order were mailed to Sia’s and de Leon’s last known
addresses, as provided by Rosa to the Ombudsman.
Alfredo filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration
excepting to the Ombudsman’s ruling on the
automatic inclusion of Sia as respondent in the
complaint and their indictment for the crime of
Concubinage. Alfredo is adamant that Rosa’s
complaint should have, at the outset, impleaded his
alleged concubines. Failing such, the Ombudsman
cannot resort to automatic inclusion of party-
respondents, erroneously finding him and Sia prima
facie culpable for Concubinage. For good measure,
Alfredo pointed out that from Rosa’s own allegations,
she had condoned or pardoned Alfredo’s supposed
concubinage. Alfredo likewise submitted Liza S.
Diambangan’s affidavit, recanting her previous
affidavit corroborating Rosa’s charges.
Alfredo now comes to us on petition for certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion in the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict
him and Sia for Concubinage. Alfredo’s badges of
grave abuse of discretion are the following:
RULING:
The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in
the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation.10 This is the reason why
judicial review of the resolution of the Ombudsman in
the exercise of its power and duty to investigate and
prosecute felonies and/or offenses of public officers is
limited to a determination of whether there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to substitute
their judgment for that of the Ombudsman. 11
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction.12 The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.13 In this regard, petitioner failed to
demonstrate the Ombudsman's abuse, much less
grave abuse, of discretion.
First. Alfredo insists that the Ombudsman’s automatic
inclusion, over his vehement objections of Sia and de
Leon as party-respondents, violates Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, which respectively provide:
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and
7
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule
complaint filed by the offended spouse. 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to
the following provisions:
The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if a) x x x
they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders. b) After such affidavits have been
secured, the investigating officer shall
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. – xxx. issue an order, attaching thereto a
copy of the affidavits and other
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be supporting documents, directing the
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the respondents to submit, within ten (10)
offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute days from receipt thereof, his counter-
criminal prosecution without including the guilty affidavits and controverting evidence
parties, if both are alive, nor, in any case, if the with proof of service thereof on the
offended party has consented to the offense or complainant. The complainant may
pardoned the offenders. file reply affidavits within ten (10) days
after service of the counter-affidavits.
We do not agree.
c) If the respondents does not file a
The submission of Alfredo is belied by the fact that counter-affidavit, the investigating
the Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its officer may consider the comment
Rules of Procedure. Thus: filed by him, if any, as his answer to
the complaint. In any event, the
respondent shall have access to the
Rule II
evidence on record.
PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES
d) No motion to dismiss shall be
xxxx
allowed except for lack of jurisdiction.
Section 2. Evaluation – Upon
Neither may a motion for a bill of
evaluating the complaint, the
particulars be entertained.
investigating officer shall recommend
whether it may be:
If respondent desires any matter in
the complainant’s affidavit to be
a) dismissed outright for want of
clarified, the particularization thereof
palpable merit;
may be done at the time of the
clarificatory questioning in the manner
b) referred to respondent for provided in paragraph (f) of this
comment; section.

c) indorsed to the proper government e) If the respondents cannot be

office or agency which has jurisdiction served with the order mentioned in
over the case; paragraph 6 hereof, or having been
served, does not comply therewith,
d) forwarded to the appropriate office the complaint shall be deemed
or official for fact-finding investigation; submitted for resolution on the basis
of the evidence on the record.
e) referred for administrative
adjudication; or f) If, after the filing of the requisite
affidavits and their supporting
f) subjected to a preliminary evidences, there are facts material to
investigation. the case which the investigating
officer may need to be clarified on, he
xxxx may conduct a clarificatory hearing
during which the parties shall be
Section 4. Procedure – The afforded the opportunity to be present
preliminary investigation of cases but without the right to examine or
falling under the jurisdiction of the cross-examine the witness being
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial questioned. Where the appearance of
Courts shall be conducted in the the parties or witnesses is
8
impracticable, the clarificatory
questioning may be conducted in
writing, whereby the questions desired
to be asked by the investigating officer
or a party shall be reduced into writing
and served on the witness concerned
who shall be required to answer the
same in writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the
preliminary investigation, the
investigating officer shall forward the
records of the case together with his
resolution to the designated
authorities for their appropriate action
thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be
dismissed without the written authority or approval of
the ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbyan, or of the proper Deputy
Ombudsman in all other cases. (Emphasis supplied).
Notably, Rosa’s complaint contained not just the
Concubinage charge, but other charges: violation of
Republic Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats. Upon the
Ombudsman’s perusal, the complaint was supported
by affidavits corroborating Rosa’s accusations. Thus,
at that stage, the Ombudsman properly referred the
complaint to Alfredo for comment. Nonetheless, while
the Ombudsman found no reason for outright
dismissal, it deemed it fit to hold a clarificatory
hearing to discuss the applicability of Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code, the issue having been
insisted upon by Alfredo.
Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the
complaint to respondent for comment and thereafter
the holding of a clarificatory hearing is provided for in
paragraph b, Section 2 and paragraphs d and f,
Section 4 of Rule II, which we have at the outset
underscored. Thus did the Ombudsman rule:
In order to clarify some matters, including the said
issue, with the parties, the clarificatory hearing was
conducted. It was explained in the said hearing the
need to implead the alleged concubines in this case
pursuant to Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
and to obviate the proceedings, Rosa was directed to
submit the addresses of the alleged concubines.
Busuego’s position that the said short cut procedure
would delay the proceedings is misplaced. If the case
will be dismissed based on procedural infirmity, Rosa
could still amend her complaint and re-file this case
since the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in the
preliminary investigation stage of the proceedings. 14
The Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment of
the complaint to cure the defect pointed out by
Alfredo. We agree with the Ombudsman that it would
be superfluous to dismiss the complaint when
amendment thereof is allowed by its Rules of
Procedure15 and the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 178607 : December 5, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as
President and representative of UNLAD
SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. EDWIN
SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES
ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL,
MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS A
VGOUSTIS, Respondents.
BRION, J.:
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a
complaint-affidavit4  with the Office of the City
ςrνll
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the
respondents for syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment.
PROSECTUTOR - Inititally recommended the
filing of an information but subsequently, filed
a motion with the RTC to withdraw the
information.
RTC - denied the motion to withdraw
information as it found the existence of
probable cause to hold the respondents for
trial.12  Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of
ςrνll
warrants of arrest against the respondents.
However, it later on dismissed the case
PETITIONERS: elevated the case before the CA
CA - dismissed outright the petitioners Rule 65
petition for lack of legal personality to file the
petition on behalf of the People of the
Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal
personality to represent the People,
The Issue
9
The case presents to us the issue of whether
the CA committed a reversible error in
dismissing outright the petitioners Rule 65
petition for certiorari for lack of legal
personality to file the petition on behalf of the
People of the Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioner has no legal personality to
assail the dismissal of the criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest," "who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by
the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."33  Interest means material interest or an
ςrνll
interest in issue to be affected by the decree
or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved. 34  By
real interest is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.35  When
the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party
in interest, the suit is dismissible.36
Procedural law basically mandates that "all
criminal actions commenced by complaint
or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor."37   Ï‚rνll
In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and
before this Court, the OSG is the appellate
counsel of the People, pursuant to Section
35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code. This section
explicitly provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of
the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services
of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following
specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and
its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special proceedings in which
the
Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party. (emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a
criminal case and only the OSG can represent
the People in criminal proceedings pending in
the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been
repeatedly stressed in several cases38  and Ï‚rνll
continues to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the
offended party may be allowed to pursue the
criminal action on his own behalf 39  (as when Ï‚rνll
there is a denial of due process), this
exceptional circumstance does not apply in the
present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal
personality to assail the dismissal of the
ςrνll criminal case since the main issue raised by
the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of
the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause.
The petitioner did not appeal to protect his
ςrνll alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party
of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of
ςrνll the criminal action against the respondents.
This involves the right to prosecute which
pertains exclusively to the People, as
represented by the OSG.40 ςrνll
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to
the RTCs jurisdiction
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. Filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of
one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.41 ςrνll
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC
seeking the dismissal of the criminal case,
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is
not required for the adjudication of reliefs
other than an application for bail.42 ςrνll
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The
twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
ςrαlαωlιbrαr
SO ORDERED.
10
G.R. No. 163797             April 24, 2007
WILSON CHUA, RENITA CHUA, THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE and THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF
LUCENA CITY, Petitioners,
vs.
RODRIGO PADILLO and MARIETTA
PADILLO, Respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was
conducted. It was found that Marissa was engaged in
illegal activities. Some of the borrowers whose loan
applications she recommended for approval were
fictitious and their signatures on the checks were
spurious.
The Padillos then filed complaints against petitioners
and several others with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in Lucena City. In turn, the NBI
forwarded their complaints to the Office of the City
Prosecutor, same city, for preliminary investigation,
docketed as I.S. Nos. 98-1487, 98-1621, 98-1629,
and 98-1605.
Prosecutor: let an Information be filed against
Marissa et al for a case of Estafa Thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents
SOJ: The City Prosecution Office of Lucena City is
hereby directed to file the Information of the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents defined and penalized under Article 315
par. 1(b) in relation to Articles 171 and 172 (58
counts) against respondent Marissa Padillo-Chua
and to cause the withdrawal of the Information
of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents against respondents Wilson Chua and
Renita Chua. Report to us the action taken within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
The Padillo’s then filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, They prayed that the Court of
Appeals order the Lucena City Prosecutor to withdraw
the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-182 and
instead, file several Informations against petitioners.
CA - Initially dismissed the petition but later on
GRANTED the Padillo’s prayer and ordered the SOJ
to include Wilson and Renita in the information
Wilson Chua and Renita Chua filed their motion for
reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but the
Court of Appeals denied the same on May 28, 2004.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners contend that
the Court of Appeals erred in compelling the
Secretary of Justice to include in the Information
Wilson and Renita.
RULING:
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, partly provides that "All
criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of a public prosecutor." The rationale for
this rule is that since a criminal offense is an outrage
to the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows
that a representative of the State shall direct and
control the prosecution thereof.
Prosecuting officer:
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense a servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.
Having been vested by law with the control of the
prosecution of criminal cases, the public prosecutor,
in the exercise of his functions, has the power and
discretion to: (a) determine whether a prima
facie case exists;5 (b) decide which of the conflicting
testimonies should be believed free from the
interference or control of the offended party; 6 and (c)
subject only to the right against self-incrimination,
determine which witnesses to present in court. 7 Given
his discretionary powers, a public prosecutor cannot
be compelled to file an Information where he is not
convinced that the evidence before him would warrant
the filing of an action in court. For while he is bound
by his oath of office to prosecute persons who,
according to complainant’s evidence, are shown to be
11
guilty of a crime, he is likewise duty-bound to protect
innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious
prosecution.8
We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor’s
exercise of his discretionary powers is not absolute.
First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is
subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who,
under the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended,
exercises control and supervision over the
investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of
Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the
ruling of said prosecutor." In special cases, the public
prosecutor’s decision may even be reversed or
modified by the Office of the President. 9
Second, the Court of Appeals may review the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, on the ground that he
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. 10
Here, we note that the Court of Appeals, on motion
for reconsideration by respondents, ruled that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion in resolving that only Marissa should be
charged.
We agree.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.11 We have carefully examined the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated January
3, 2000 wherein he ruled that there was no probable
cause to hold Wilson Chua and Renita Chua
for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents. As found by the Court of Appeals, the
Secretary of Justice either overlooked or patently
ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissa’s
practice of depositing checks, with altered names of
payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson and
Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa are
husband and wife makes it difficult to believe that one
has no idea of the transactions entered into by the
other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated
November 26, 1998 confirming that Wilson had
knowledge of Marissa’s illegal activities.
Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in directing the
City Prosecutor of Lucena City to include Wilson and
Renita Chua in the Information for the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM
the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 62401. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PINOTE V AYCO 
On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto
L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense
in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, 'People v. Vice
Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al., for violation
of Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1866, to present evidence consisting of the
testimony of two witnesses, even in the
absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B.
Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13
and 20, 2004 undergoing medical treatment
at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon
City, hence, his absence during the
proceedings on the said dates.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of
the criminal case on August 27, October 1,
15 and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote
refused to cross-examine the two defense
witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge
Ayco, he maintaining that the proceedings
conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his
absence were void.
State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a
Manifestation on November 12, 2004 before
the trial court, he restating why he was not
present on August 13 and 20, 2004, and
reiterating his position that Judge Ayco's act
of allowing the defense to present evidence
in his absence was erroneous and highly
irregular. He thus prayed that he should not
be 'coerced to cross-examine those two
defense witnesses and that their testimonies
be stricken off the record.
OCA - citing Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds
respondent to have breached said rule and
accordingly recommends that he be
reprimanded therefor, with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
12
 Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure reads:
 
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute
criminal actions. - All criminal
actions commenced by a peace of the people.  [2]
complaint or information shall
be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the
prosecutor. In case of heavy
work schedule or in the event of
lack of public prosecutors, the
private prosecutor may be
authorized in writing by the Chief
of the Prosecution Office or the
Regional State Prosecution Office
to prosecute the case subject to
the approval of the Court. Once
so authorized to prosecute the
criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to
prosecute the case up to the end
of the trial even in the absence of
a public prosecutor, unless the
authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
 
 
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the control and
direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does
not permit, however, or in case there are no
public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may
be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecution Office to prosecute the case,
subject to the approval of the court. Once so
authorized, the private prosecutor shall
continue to prosecute the case until the
termination of the trial even in the absence
of a public prosecutor, unless the authority
is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
 Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the
People of the Philippines as a whole and not
merely to the person directly prejudiced, he
being merely the complaining witness.  [1] It
is on this account that the presence of a
public prosecutor in the trial of criminal
cases is necessary to protect vital state
interests, foremost of which is its interest to
vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of
Respondent's act of allowing the
presentation of the defense witnesses in the
absence of complainant public prosecutor or
a private prosecutor designated for the
purpose is thus a clear transgression of the
Rules which could not be rectified by
subsequently giving the prosecution a
chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
Respondent's intention to uphold the right of
the accused to a speedy disposition of the
case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot
justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused
is entitled to due process, so is the State.
Respondent's lament about complainant's
failure to inform the court of his inability to
attend the August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings
or to file a motion for postponement thereof
or to subsequently file a motion for
reconsideration of his Orders allowing the
defense to present its two witnesses on said
dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve
respondent of his utter disregard of the
Rules.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L.
Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
Respecting the counter-complaint against
complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B.
Pinote, respondent is advised that the same
should be lodged before the Secretary of
Justice.
 SO ORDERED.
13
of their marriage and that they had been
living apart since April 1982.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action

for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on

January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to the petitioner.

More than five months after the issuance of

the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging that while still married to
to Imelda, the latter had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL,

petitioner,
Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside
vs. the cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her arraignment and to suspend further
capacity as Presiding Judge of the proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch issued a resolution directing to move for the
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his dismissal of the complaints against
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and petitioner.
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents. Issue:

Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Whether or not private respondent Geiling

Filipino citizen married private respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national
on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of
Germany. They lived together in Malate,
Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling.
can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the
ground of adultery even though they are no
longer husband and wife as decree of
divorce was already issued.
Held:

Unfortunately, after about three and a half The law provides that in prosecution for
years of marriage such connubial adultery and concubinage, the person who
disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating can legally file the complaint should be the
divorce proceeding against Imelda in offended spouse and nobody else. In this
Germany. He claimed that there was failure case, it appeared that private respondent is
the offended spouse, the latter obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal
14
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
Thus, under the same consideration and
rationale, private respondent is no longer
the husband of the petitioner and has no
legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
G.R. No. 193681               August 6, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and
HELEN Y. DEE, Private Complainants-Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIP PICCIO, MIA GATMAYTAN, MA.
ANNABELLA RELOVA SANTOS, JOHN JOSEPH
GUTIERREZ, JOCELYN UPANO, JOSE DIZON,
ROLANDO PAREJA, WONINA BONIFACIO,
ELVIRA CRUZ, CORNELIO ZAFRA, VICENTE
ORTUOSTE, VICTORIA GOMEZ JACINTO,
JUVENCIO PERECHE, JR., RICARDO LORAYES,
PETER SUCHIANCO, and TRENNIE
MONSOD, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
On October 18, 2005, Jessie John P. Gimenez,
President of the Philippine Integrated Advertising
Agency – the advertising arm of the Yuchengco
Group of Companies, to which Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. is a corporate member – filed a
Complaint-Affidavit for libel before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City against a group called
the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI)
for posting on the website www.pepcoalition.com on
August 25,2005 an article entitled "Back to the
Trenches: A Call to Arms, AY/HELEN Chose the War
Dance with Coalition." As alleged in the complaint,
such publication was highly defamatory and libelous
against the Yuchengco family and the Yuchengco
Group of Companies, particularly petitioners Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. and Helen Y. Dee (petitioners). 7
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City  found
8
probable cause to indict respondents.
The criminal information in I.S. No. 1-11-11995 was
soon after raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 139 (RTC) and was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-875.
RTC - Quashed the information Upon motion of
respondents holding that the criminal information
failed to allege where the article was printed and first
published or where the offended parties reside
On February 29, 2008, the People of the Philippines
(People), through the private prosecutors, and with
the conformity of public prosecutor Benjamin S.
Vermug, Jr., filed a Notice of Appeal.  Soon after,
13
petitioners filed the Brief for the Private
Complainants-Appellants  as directed by the CA.
14
The OSG, for its part, however, sought suspension of
the period to file the required brief pending
information and endorsement from the Department of
Justice (DOJ) on whether it is the People or the
private complainant that should file the
same.  Subsequently, the OSG filed a Manifestation
15
and Motion  dated October 20, 2008 stating that it
16
had received an advisory from the DOJ that the latter
had no information about the case and, thus, prayed
that it be excused from filing the appellant’s brief.
CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the OSG
had notgiven its conformity to the said appeal. 23
ISSUE: The sole issue in this case is whether or not
petitioners, being mere private complainants, may
appeal an order of the trial court dismissing a criminal
case even without the OSG’s conformity. The Court’s
Ruling
RULING:
The CA correctly dismissed the notice of appeal
interposed by petitioners against the May 23, 2007
Order of the RTC because they, being mere private
complainants, lacked the legal personality to appeal
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 06-875 (resulting
from the quashal of the information therein on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction).
To expound, it is well-settled that the authority to
represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
15
before the Court and the CA is vested solely in the
OSG  which is the law office of the Government
26
whose specific powers and functions include that of
representing the Republic and/or the people before
any court in any action which affects the welfare of
the people as the ends of justice may
require.  Explicitly, Section 35(1),Chapter 12, Title III,
27
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code  provides
that:
SECTION 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of
the Solicitor General shall represent the Government
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation ormatter requiring the
services of lawyers. x x x. It shall have the following
specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Governmentin the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof inhis official capacity is a party. (Emphases
supplied)
of respondents for libel. Being an obvious attempt to
meddle intothe criminal aspect of the case without the
conformity of the OSG, their recourse, in view of the
abovediscussed principles, must necessarily fail. To
repeat, the right to prosecute criminal cases pertains
exclusively tothe People, which is therefore the
proper party to bring the appeal through the
28
representation of the OSG.
Petitioners have no personality or legal stanqing to
interpose an appeal in a criminal proceeding. Since
the OSG had expressly withheld its conformity and
endorsemen! in the instant case, the CA, therefore,
correctly dismissed the appeal. It rnust, however, be
clarified. that the aforesaid dismissal is without
prejudice to their filing of the appropriate action to
preserve their interests but only with respect to the
civil aspect of the libel case following the parameters
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Resolutions dated September 15, 2009 and
September 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CR No. 31549 dismissing petitioners' appeal
from the dismissal of the criminal case for libel are
hereby AFFIRMED.

Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a SO ORDERED.

dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG
that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect
representing the People.  The rationale therefor
29

isrooted in the principle that the party affected by the

dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not
the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses.
For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as
the realparties in interest in the criminal case and,
therefore, only the OSG can represent them in
criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this
Court.  In view of the corollary principle that every
30

action must be prosecuted or defended in the name

of the real party-in-interest who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by
the party entitled to the avails of the suit,  an appeal
31

of the criminal case not filed by the People as

represented by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The
private complainant or the offended party may,
however, file an appeal withoutthe intervention of the
OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned.  He may also file a special
32

civil action for certiorarieven without the intervention

of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his
interest in the civil aspect of the case. 33

Here, it is clear that petitioners did not file their appeal

merely to preserve their interest in the civil aspect of
the case.  Rather, by seeking the reversal of the
1âwphi1

RTC’s quashal of the information in Criminal Case

No. 06-875 and thereby seeking that the said court be
directed to set the case for arraignment and to
proceed with trial,  it is sufficiently clear that they
34

sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution