ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The Facts
 On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165

 Authorities NARCOTIS and PO3s were patrolling the area

 Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of
about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla7 (Dasilla)
- standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and
approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, PO3 Calag
introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2)
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later
confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.8redarclaw

 RTC convicted petitioner Comerciante

 RTC Ruling found Comerciante guilty

 CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. It held that PO3 Calag had probable cause to effect the
warrantless arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was committing a crime in flagrante delicto;
and that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic sachets with Dasilla. According to the CA,
this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion that those sachets might be shabu, and thus, PO3
Calag had every reason to inquire on the matter right then and there.15redarclaw

 Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration16 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution17 dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition.18redarclaw

The Issue Before the Court

The core Issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed
Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

COMERCIANTE: that PO3 Carag did not effect a valid warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the
evidence gathered as a result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets
containing shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.19redarclaw

OSG on behalf of respondent People of the Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest
was validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule, especially considering that he was caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.20redarclaw

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

GENERAL RULE, Section 2, Article III21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule,
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.

fruit of a poisonous tree. evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.23redarclaw

EXCEPTION: is a search incident to a lawful arrest.24 In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, as follows:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
law

ELEMENTS

Section 5 (a):
(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Section 5 (b):
(a) that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed; and
(b) the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed
it.28redarclaw
w
In the instant case reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on
Comerciante.

1. OVERT ACT: "improper and unpleasant movements," the acts of standing around with a companion
and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.

2. IN THE PRESENCE OR WITHIN THE VIEW the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag,
even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy especially
from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30
kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic
sachets held by Comerciante.

In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of
the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 20, 2011 and the
Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.
IN RE: SALIBO v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX

 On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao
suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang (one fo the accused of the Maguindanao Massacre)

 Salibo presented himself before the police officers there, he explained that he was not Butukan S.
Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre
because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time (evidence: passport)

 however, the police officers apprehended Salibo

 Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus16 questioning the
legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not the accused
Butukan S. Malang.18

 RTC found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"29 under any resolution, information, or
amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court
did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as
there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo.
Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.30

 Court of Appeals On appeal37 by the Warden, REVERSED and set aside the trial court's
Decision.38 Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus.

found that Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and
Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in
the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of trial
must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be
invoked[.]"40 According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.41

 PETITION SALIBO

Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang. Thus, contrary to the Court of
Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is being illegally
deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.47

SUPREME COURT:
IN THE CASE OF Petitioner Salibo, he was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of
an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was
illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the RTC in People of the Philippines v.
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang
Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.

Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5
of the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear
his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the
presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting
to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.

The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They
deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus
may be issued.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from detention.

The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby NOTED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

*BONUS DISCUSSION*

It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived
of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has
become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.

In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas
corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly course
of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.

Motion To Quash - assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him [or her]
for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information.

This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.
At any time before a plea is entered, the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or information
based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:ch
SEC. 3. Grounds. —The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;.

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
(f)
prescribed by law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
(i)
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD
MUNOZ, Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PE

 Altercation ensued between Pestilos and Atty. Moreno Generoso

 Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, authorities arrived at the scene of the crime less than one
hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
 Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers
to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the
police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately
survived the attack.
 In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly
committed
 the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that they had not
been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had
no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just
"invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13
 RTC - DENIED
 CA - DISMISSED

The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a
command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty.
Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest
proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.

The Court's Ruling

Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the present case.

ELEMENTS 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

1. Probable cause - The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the
arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later.

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused
is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on
actual facts

2. The crime has just been committed/personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it - ELEMENT OF IMMEDIACY that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have
no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
HERE, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged
mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty.
Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the
petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners
were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso,
although they narrated a different version of what transpired.87

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time
of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GLORIA
NEPOMUCENO Y PEDRAZA, Accused-Appellant.

On August 11, 2003, two Informations charging Gloria Nepomuceno y Pedraza (appellant) with
violation of Sections 5 (Sale of Dangerous Drugs) and 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, were filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 64. The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-2917
charged appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in the

Rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals - CONVICTED AND AFFIRMED

NEPOMOCENO insists that the warrantless arrest, search and seizure carried out by the police
officers against her were illegal since they merely suspected that she committed a crime.

Our Ruling

Appellant’s contention that her warrantless arrest was unlawful does not deserve credence. The
facts on record do not substantiate her claim that she was apprehended merely on suspicion of
committing a crime. On the contrary, appellant was arrested after committing a criminal offense
that resulted from a successful buy-bust operation. Having been apprehended in flagrante delicto,
the police officers were not only authorized but were even duty-bound to arrest her even without
a warrant.

PO2 Barrameda, the police officer who acted as buyer, testified on the buy-bust operation against
appellant and positively identified her as the seller of the seized shabu that was sold to him for
P100.00.

WHEREFORE, the August 25, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02318 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Gloria Nepomuceno y Pedraza
shall not be eligible for parole.

SO ORDERED.
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

 RTC and CA found Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165)
 In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest
effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that
followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly seized
from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.

SUPREME COURT

At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of
his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case,
jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby
curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person.18 Petitioner’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.

However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether
or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a
warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.19 Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality,
as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as
well.

Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show the contents of
his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of the barangay captain. On their way
there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag
and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the barangay captain’s house.

Even casting aside petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this case on the general thrust of the
prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioner’s arrest stands out just the same.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a person may be
arrested without a warrant: (in flagrante delicto, Just committed, Escapee)

Here, petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in,
was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified
that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.

Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as
sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest.26 If at all, the search
most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay
any suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioner’s behavior.

NOTE: a stop-and-frisk situation, must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s outer clothing,
and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly
taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a warrantless
search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.

 On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Doria and Gadao were charged with violation of Section 4, in
relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Regional Trial Court convicted the accused-
appellants.
 accused-appellant Doria and Gadao assigns two errors:

(1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria;

Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense.16 Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards.17

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accused-
appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as
the buyer of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance
payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and
handed the brick of marijuana to P03 Manlangit.

We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing
an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police
are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

(2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and
house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without
such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule is, however, not absolute. Search
and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and
seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her
arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. In fact, she was going about her daily
chores when the policemen pounced on her. Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by her co-accused when PO3 Manlangit asked Doria where the marked money was.

Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person
and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident
to her arrest.
 ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU LAMBINO, Petitioners, v. THE
HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, Respondents.

 Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a
rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994.

 attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the
Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two
suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity
and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.

 Petitioners, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them.

 Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. 1 However, criminal
charges were filed later against the two student suspects. 2

 Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners
Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P.
Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, 3 which makes it unlawful for anyone to
obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be
validly made without a warrant. Respondents contend that the NBI agents had
personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of their investigation
indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the
crime.

Generally, no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge Exceptions
when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure

There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting
officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students fugitives
from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement.

The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed and the
NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were probably
guilty.

The NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the
commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that
the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a
warrant by the NBI.

Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the
crime. When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter
were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that
they were doing anything illegal.

To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to
supplant the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be
arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or
even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have
just committed a crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.

Villareal was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal possession of dangerous drugs
in an Information

that on the date and time of the incident, he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th Avenue
when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant approached the person, who
turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked him, and took his wallet which contained
₱1,000.00.12

SUPREME COURT

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless
arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person

For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.19

On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it.20

Also, Villareal walking along 5th avenue is not an overt act of committing any offense.

there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest. the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with
his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to
10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery
substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected
numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in
appellant’s hands was indeed shabu.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the offense charged and
ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other
cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.
 CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of

Crispin B. Beltran members of the House of Representatives representing various party-list groups.2 Petitioners
in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 are private individuals. Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in
relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.

Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he
was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for
Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly
gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA
Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been
present at the rally. The inquest prosecutor4 indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding Information with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC).5

The Issues

1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b)
whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petitions meritorious. On the Beltran Petition

The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.14 Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when such warrantless arrest may
be effected

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.

The joint affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers15 states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for
Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted – as he did
conduct – an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors
subjected Beltran to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the
second inquest void. None of Beltran’s arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime
of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just
committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What
these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly
seditious speech on 24 February 2006.17

For the failure of Beltran’s panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to Section
5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltran’s inquest void.19 Beltran would have been entitled to a
preliminary investigation had he not asked the trial court to make a judicial determination of probable cause,
which effectively took the place of such proceeding.

There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion.

by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a
political end.24
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARLITO EREÑO Y AYSON, Accused-
Appellant.

Accused Carlito A. Ereño appeals from the decision1 dated October 27, 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court, finding him guilty of the crime of murder

Accused-appellant appeals his conviction citing as lone error that THAT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT

We find no merit in the appeal.

Accused-appellant assails his conviction as improper and illegal asserting that the court a
quo never acquired jurisdiction over his person because he was arrested without a warrant and
that his warrantless arrest was not done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Even granting that indeed there had been an irregularity attendant to the arrest of
accused-appellant, it should, not having been raised at the opportune time, be deemed
cured by his voluntarily submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Not only
did accused-appellant enter his plea during arraignment but also waived pre-trial and
actively participated at the trial which constituted a waiver of any supposed irregularity
in his arrest.5

The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure
in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before
he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.6 We have also ruled that an
accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the
quashing of the information against him before his arraignment.7 And since the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the
arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the trial court8 as was done by the accused-appellant in the instant case.

However, after a review of the entire records, we find that the trial court erred in finding accused
Carlito Ereño y Ayson guilty of murder as charged. The crime committed is homicide.

Details: warrantless arrest of accused-appellant by SPO1 Benjamin Bacunata at about 9:45 p.m. of
June 21, 1995 shortly after the stabbing incident of Rosanna Honrubia was justified under Section
5 (b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Based on the report made to the Navotas
Police Station by eyewitness Hector Domingo, which was shown to arresting officer SPO1
Benjamin Bacunata, the latter, in effect, was vested with personal knowledge of the facts
surrounding the stabbing of Rosanna Honrubia a few hours before the arrest on June 21, 1995 of
accused-appellant. Hence, SPO I Benjamin Bacunata and the other arresting officers with him,
were validly compelled, in the performance of their official duties, to arrest accused-appellant
without a warrant. Besides, even if the warrantless arrest was unlawful and the evidence obtained
(i.e., an improvised bladed weapon) inadmissible, the conviction of accused-appellant would still
be in accordance with law and the evidence because eyewitness Arminggol Teofe positively
identified him as the assailant of Rosanna Honrubia, and also identified the bladed weapon
recovered in another place as the one used by accused-appellant in stabbing Rosanna.
G.R. No. 110569 December 9, 1996

DIOSDADO MALLARI, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Sometime on December 27, 1990, at around 2:30 p.m., Pat. Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra, who were both then
assigned at the Capas Police Station, received reliable information that appellant Diosdado Mallari, who
has a standing warrant of arrest in connection with Criminal Case No. 471 for Homicide in 1989, was seen at
Sitio 14, Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac (tsn, April 18, 1991, pp. 3-4; June 27, 1991, p. 3).

Said Police officers went to Tarlac and arrested him and told him to remain stationary. Thereupon, the
arresting officers searched him and found a homemade gun (paltik) with one M-16 live ammunition (tsn, April 18,
1991, pp. 5-6, 8; June 27, 1991, pp. 3-5, 7).

PETITIONER: Petitioner posits that the absence of the requisite warrant is fatal and renders the search
and seizure unlawful. Corrolarily, the hand gun and ammunition seized from him are inadmissible in evidence.

WON The arrest was VALID

At this juncture, the Court would like to stress that this is not a case of a warrantless arrest but merely an
instance of an arrest effected by the police authorities without having the warrant in their possession at that
precise moment. Finding as it does, this Court deems it unnecessary to delve into the applicability of Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and on the merits of both the petitioner's and the Office of the Solicitor General's
arguments with respect thereto. The applicable provision is not Section 5, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests, but Section 7, Rule 113 which provides as follows:

Sec. 8. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant — When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant the
officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been
issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him
or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his at
the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown
to him as soon as practicable." [Emphasis supplied]

The abovequoted rule clearly allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the
time of the arrest. Thus, appellant's arrest being lawful, the search and seizure made incidental thereto is
likewise valid, albeit conducted without a warrant.