W16394

JABONG: BALANCING THE DEMANDS OF CUSTOMERS AND

SUPPLIERS

Jaydeep Mukherjee and Punit Bhardwaj wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to
illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other
identifying information to protect confidentiality.

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Copyright © 2016, Management Development Institute Gurgaon and Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2016-06-30

Rishi Patnaik, director of sports apparel at Jade eServices Pvt. Limited (Jabong), an e-retailer of fashion
products in India, regularly faced the challenge of balancing conflicts between the expectations of supplier
brands and customers. However, Patnaik was worried when Puma SE (Puma), an international sports shoe
brand, communicated its decision to stop discounting 25 per cent of its product lines, effective October 1,
2014. Puma accounted for more than 20 per cent of Jabong’s footwear sales in the first half of 2014. The
models included in Puma’s proposed “no discount” list contributed to 70 per cent of Jabong’s Puma sales.
Additionally, many Puma buyers subsequently purchased other products from Jabong, which contributed
to the company’s gross margin. Patnaik was responsible for ensuring growth in both gross sales and net
income in the footwear category, and was unlikely to meet his targets without discount support from Puma.
Patnaik had just closed Q2 sales for FY2014/15,1 but Puma’s decision now posed serious difficulties for
Jabong’s annual footwear sales objectives in the future.

The most common challenge for fashion e-retailers in India was that suppliers wanted brand salience, premium
price, and exclusivity, while customers wanted assortment and discounts on premium brands. Between 2011
and 2014, exponential growth of e-retail in India had forced many premium fashion brands to sell through this
emerging channel.2 However, the discounts that e-retailers had to offer to their customers to generate high
sales volumes resulted in brand dilution, which compelled these same brands to avoid the online channel. The
problem was more critical when the brand commanded a premium and had significant offline presence.

Patnaik knew that sales were key to premium brands. Access to online customers and high sales volumes,
which Jabong delivered to supplier brands, had always helped Patnaik tilt the negotiations in favour of
deeper discounts for customers and Jabong. Still, intense competition and diversity strained the profitability
of the footwear category, which was the most significant component of the sports apparel business.

1
The accounting year in India was from April 1 to March 31.
2
Anusha Soni, “Sustainability Issue with E-tail Discounts,” Business Standard, August 12, 2014, accessed May 19, 2016,
www.business-standard.com/article/companies/sustainability-issue-with-e-tail-discounts-114081100762_1.html.

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Patnaik knew he could not renegotiate Puma’s all-India discount policy; it was Puma’s internal decision.
Thus, he had to find his own way to preserve Jabong’s sales and financials. Puma still offered discounts on
some specially manufactured units and old season stock. Yet Patnaik needed hard data before deciding what
Puma’s product portfolio should be with Jabong. Therefore, Patnaik waited two months to assess the
business impact of Puma’s new “no discount” policy.

The “no discount” policy went into effect on October 1, 2014. Results from October to November 2014
showed that Puma sales were down significantly, while the rest of the footwear category grew as expected.
Puma was still the most searched keyword on Jabong’s website and the search for Puma’s products was an
important source of new customers. Patnaik had insufficient data, but he had to take immediate action; any
further delay would mean that he would not be able to achieve his business results for FY2014/15.

BACKGROUND

Jabong was a fashion and lifestyle e-commerce portal (see Exhibit 1). The company was headquartered in
Gurgaon, National Capital Region, India. It was co-founded by Arun Chandra Mohan, Praveen Sinha, and
Lakshmi Potluri. Mohan and Sinha were directly involved with business operations, and took an active part
in key decisions.

Jabong’s goal was to provide the highest level of customer satisfaction. To achieve this objective, Jabong
relied on a cutting-edge e-commerce platform, a highly experienced buying team, agile warehouse systems,
and a state-of-the art customer care centre. The company’s value proposition to its customers was a broad
selection of products, a superior buying experience, timely delivery, competitive prices, and a quick
resolution of problems. Jabong also provided cash-on-delivery services to reduce customers’ anxiety about
the risks and uncertainties involved in online shopping.

In FY2012/13, Jabong’s first year of operations, the company recorded gross sales of more than US$100
million.3 By March 2013, Jabong was shipping 6,000 to 7,000 orders a day, which increased to 14,000 by
September 2013. In October 2013, it began adding top international brands, such as U.K. high-street fashion
brands Dorothy Perkins, Miss Selfridge, and River Island, along with Spanish brand Mango. In November
2013, Jabong entered into a partnership with Jack & Jones to sell merchandise for a music group, Above &
Beyond. In January 2014, the company partnered with Stylista, a collaborative fashion platform, which
included famous Indian designers such as Wendell Rodricks, Priyadarshini Rao, and Nishka Lulla, and an
exclusive collection from Rohit Bal. In March 2014, Jabong launched in-house brands in apparel, shoes,
and accessories. Industry watchers believed that Jabong was set to enter the $1 billion club in FY2015/16.4

Jabong followed an inventory model for high turnover products, and a marketplace model for the rest of its
products. In the inventory model, the company purchased products from brands, stored them in Jabong’s
warehouses, and shipped the products to consumers as they ordered. The monthly inventory carrying costs
were almost 2 per cent of the product cost, in addition to the risks of obsolescence. In the marketplace
model, Jabong provided marketing, logistics, and delivery support (for a fee) for suppliers to do business
with its customers, but Jabong did not take ownership of the products.

The company had been active on digital media from its beginnings. Among e-retailers, Jabong was the first
to use costly television campaigns (introduced in March 2012). In November 2013, Jabong introduced the

3
All currencies are in US$ unless otherwise stated; ₹1=US$53.3041 on March 31, 2013.
4
Digbijay Mishra, “Jabong Set to Enter $1-billion Club,” Business Standard, January 23, 2015, accessed May 19, 2016,
www.business-standard.com/article/companies/jabong-set-to-enter-1-billion-club-115012201239_1.html.

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digital fitness campaign “Gear Up Buddy” in association with Puma, which featured Bollywood actors.5 In
a bid to position itself as an online fashion destination, Jabong joined with Lakme Fashion Week’s6 annual
event from 2014 to 2017. It also signed up with well-known designer Rohit Balfor an exclusive collection.
In Apri, 2014, Jabong launched the India Online Fashion Week and a monthly fashion magazine called The
Juice. The magazine covered topics pertaining to fashion, beauty, people, trends, travel, and pop culture.

Jabong converted approximately 1 per cent of new visitors to its website into paying customers; however,
these new customers had considerable impact on Jabong’s order book (see Exhibit 3). Thus, acquiring new
customers was critical for Jabong. To meet this objective, the company needed to partner with brands and
websites that could drive customer traffic, and invest heavily in marketing, irrespective of sales outcome.

To increase its customer base, Jabong added partners such as Tripda, Foodpanda, FabFurnish, Printvenue,
PricePanda, and CupoNation. It regularly partnered with well-publicized Bollywood projects, showcasing
the fashion apparel used in the movies and developing collections inspired by the movies. The company
also sourced the fashion products used by the movie stars, and offered these products to its customers. In
total, Jabong offered its customers more than 100,000 products from more than 1,000 brands.

With respect to customer service, Jabong invested in warehouse capacity, and could deliver goods to over
630 cities. It had created its own logistics arm (“JaVAS”) to ensure customers had a good experience with
delivery services. (Though Jabong sold JaVAS in early 2014.) Jabong’s sales were 37 per cent in Tier 17
Indian cities, 35 per cent in Tier 2 cities, and 28 per cent in Tier 3 cities. Hence, the firm could provide
good distribution reach for brands that were not very widely distributed across India. In addition to
maintaining its delivery infrastructure, Jabong had to continuously upgrade its technology, marketing, and
logistics to keep pace with the competition. This required considerable financial resources.

Jabong attempted to improve its overall profitability by increasing the share of private label products,
increasing its scale of operations, and negotiating better pricing and promotional support offered by
partners. However, despite earning significant operating profits in all product lines, Jabong posted a net
loss during FY2013/14. In June 2014, Jabong received a $5.5 million investment from Rocket Internet,
which owned a 21.4 per cent stake in the company. Overall, Jabong had raised $240.7 million, and the
company was valued at over $500 million.

E-RETAIL INDUSTRY OUTLOOK

Jabong and one of its competitors, Myntra, had been the biggest fashion e-retailers in India since 2012.
They consistently recorded very high sales and were growing exponentially. Their success signalled a
tipping point in consumer behaviour: shopping online for fashion was the new trend.

Jabong and Myntra’s combined turnover reached $154 million for FY2013/14. In that same year, Jabong’s
sales jumped to $82 million, up from a mere $800,000 in FY2011/12. Similarly, Myntra’s sales grew from
$11 million to $72 million during the same period. The growth of these fashion e-retailers outperformed
that of brick-and-mortar fashion majors such as Zara, Levi Strauss, and Marks & Spencer—brands that had
been in business in India for five to 10 years. Growth in the larger brick and-mortar chains, such as Shoppers
Stop and Future Lifestyle Fashion, was insignificant when compared to e-commerce.
5
Bollywood was one of the largest film producers located in Mumbai, India. The films were typically in Hindi, the national
language of India, and were popular across India.
6
A prestigious and popular fashion event in India that was attended by people from the fashion and film industries.
7
Tier 1 cities had populations above 100,000, Tier 2 cities had populations of 50,000–100,000, and Tier 3 cities had
populations of 20,000–50,000.

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Consumers gravitated to e-retail because they enjoyed the convenience of browsing through thousands of
big label options from the comfort of their homes or offices, as well as the ability to easily return clothes
that did not fit. An online shopper and director at retail consultancy Élargir Solutions, Ruchi Sally,
commented:

Where will I get international brands, such as Dorothy Perkins and Mango, and not-so-high-priced
[brands like] Harpa and Femella all in one place? I won’t ever get to browse 5,000 designs at stores
and I can’t go there every day braving the traffic. But I can go to the virtual store every single day,
and if I don't like what I have [purchased], I can just return it, all from the comfort of my chair.8

According to Sinha, co-founder of Jabong:

Apart from the acceptance of e-commerce at a macro-level, we have, over time, built our reputation
through customer experience. This will now translate into higher sales [because] we laid a strong
foundation. There has been a lot of focus on branding and investment to build fashion properties
and technology, which will help in the long run even though it impacts profitability now.9

The Indian online retail market was estimated to grow to $8 billion by FY2015/16, as a result of rapid
expansion of e-commerce in the country.10 The market size of the online retail sector was estimated at $5
billion in FY2013/14. In 2014, Indian e-commerce companies secured over $4 billion in investments from
venture capital, private equity, and internal funding. Many leading international e-retail companies were
planning to invest in the Indian growth.

Fashion products were poised to become some of the top sellers in the e-retail business in the near future.
Business consultancy firm RNCOS predicted that while online sales accounted for nearly 4 per cent of the
overall apparel market (compared to 15 per cent for smart phones, and 5 to 10 per cent for flat panel
televisions, digital cameras, and personal care gadgets), the hierarchy was set to change.11

Myntra and Jabong were similar in their approaches to business and consumers. Only their product
portfolios were different. Myntra focused on fashion and lifestyle products, while Jabong catered mostly to
customers of premium and international fashion brands that were established in India. Both were receiving
similar net prices from their suppliers, and both also offered similar discounts and prices to consumers.

THE BUSINESS WITH PUMA

Puma was a German multinational corporation headquartered in Bavaria, Germany. It produced athletic and
casual footwear, as well as sportswear. Puma had been late to the Indian market, entering in 2009. The
company used Reebok’s downfall in India to rapidly notch up its own sales. Puma was aggressive in using e-
retail to rapidly increase sales and gain market share (see Exhibit 4). In India, it partnered with all of the major

8
Sagar Malviya, “Fashion E-tailers Like Jabong and Myntra Clock up Impressive Numbers,” The Economic Times,
December 11, 2014, accessed May 19, 2016, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-12-
11/news/56955397_1_jabong-fashion-e-tailers-online-fashion-retailers.
9
Ambika Choudhary Mahajan, “Skyrocketing Sales of Jabong and Myntra: Is Indian Fashion E-tail Industry Finally Coming
of Age?” Dazeinfo Inc., December 19, 2014, accessed May 19, 2016, http://dazeinfo.com/2014/12/19/skyrocketing-sales-
jabong-myntra-indian-fashion-e-tail-industry-finally-coming-age/.
10
CRISIL Opinion: E-tail Eats into Retail (Mumbai: CRISIL Research, February 2014), accessed May 15, 2015,
www.crisil.com/pdf/research/CRISIL-Research-Article-Online-Retail-Feb14.pdf.
11
RNCOS Business Consultancy Services, Booming Online Retail Market Outlook 2017 (Noida: RNCOS, November 2013),
accessed May 15, 2015, www.rncos.com/Report/IM643.htm.

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e-commerce companies: Flipkart, Snapdeal, Koovs, Amazon, be Stylish, Yebhi, Junglee, eBay, and
HomeShop18 (see Exhibit 5). However, Myntra and Jabong were Puma’s key strategic e-commerce partners.

Jabong dealt with Puma using the inventory model. Jabong bought the items from Puma, and paid Puma
irrespective of actual sales. Hence, Jabong was careful to stock only the high-selling items. Jabong’s
consumer analytics web tool was sophisticated: it could optimize the product portfolio precisely, allowing
Jabong to stock only what it classified as “core items.” Jabong was able to generate a significant gross
margin from sales of Puma products; however, the customer acquisition costs were high, even though some
of those costs were shared with Puma.

To maintain aggressive growth in e-retail, Puma offered extra margins as special support to the online
companies. E-retailers helped Puma’s sales efforts, and provided better visibility of Puma’s products to
consumers, but the e-retailers also passed on Puma’s extra discounts to attract new customers. Initially,
online business was insignificant; Puma’s brand team and conventional retailers did not experience any
major problems as a result of online sales. However, by early 2014, the e-retail business was strongly
affecting the market share of conventional retailers and distributors. All major footwear brands—and Puma
in particular—were facing objections from the well-established sales channels. It was also unacceptable for
brand management to be giving regular discounts on products sold through e-retail, while selling the same
products at maximum retail price (MRP) in conventional channels.

Because e-retailers experienced intense competition for new customers, they were not willing to stop
discounting products, even if they were not earning anything on the sales. To attract new investments from
investors and promoters, some e-retailers focused on increasing gross sales and tried to maximize their
turnover, which lead to a price war among the e-retailers.

Puma’s management had decided to reign in the discounts offered throughout the entire e-commerce
channel in India. Therefore, management framed brand guidelines that Puma’s sales teams had to
incorporate in agreements with all existing and new e-retail partners, effective October 1, 2014. The
guidelines were as follows:

 Puma would provide a list of styles called “core articles” that channel partners could not discount or
pair with promotional coupons or similar campaigns. This list would be comprised of premium products
that built Puma’s brand image, or products that were economically priced, sales-volume-generating
products. This list would not represent more than 25 per cent of Puma’s line.
 Puma would offer specially manufactured units (SMUs) to all e-retailers. Accepting to keep these
products was at the discretion of the retailer.
 There would be an exclusive range of products that would be offered only to some key online channel
partners. The terms for these products would be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
 Old season merchandise could be sold at discounted prices at the discretion of the retailers.

The guidelines also made it clear that there would be no exceptions. If any infringement was observed,
Puma would immediately stop its product supply without notice.

IMPACT OF PUMA’S DECISION ON JABONG

Jabong sold an average of 8,000 pairs of shoes per month between July and September 2014; approximately
1,600 pairs were Puma products. Sales of mainline Puma products declined sharply in October and
November 2014, as a result of the lack of discounts. The overall footwear category grew 50 per cent as

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compared to the same period in the previous year; however, Puma sales declined 20 per cent. The data
analytics team reported that customers were still looking at the portfolio of high-selling Puma products, but
many were no longer buying, leading to a significant shortfall of Puma products against planned sales.

Patnaik was certain that discounts on premium Puma products helped Jabong acquire new customers; on
average, 30 per cent of Puma sales had been to new customers. Puma products also helped Jabong convert
more site visitors into buyers. At the same time, Patnaik also realized that Puma’s brand guidelines would
increase Puma’s aspiration value with customers, which could help Jabong improve its profitability and
customer profile.

Online consumers needed special incentives to buy a product. Puma’s SMU option was problematic because
these products were made for discounts and had a high markup in order to give a better margin to the
channel. Yet the shoes ultimately became a loss for the retailers because the product was less acceptable to
customers, and therefore had to be sold at very high discounts. In addition, these discounted products were
available at all other online channels but discounted as each e-retailer chose, creating confusion for
customers and harming Jabong’s brand equity. Further, minimum order quantity requirements were
imposed for exclusive SMUs, which had an adverse impact on retailers’ cash flows.

OPTIONS FOR PATNAIK

Patnaik needed to finalize his plans in consultation with Sinha. As part of his preparations, Patnaik tried to
clarify all of his options. He realized that there was no real possibility of dropping Puma altogether, because
one of Jabong’s value propositions for customers was a wide range of brands. Puma and Jabong were
associated in the e-retail customer’s mind, and Puma was still an important brand for customer acquisition
at Jabong. The top 10 per cent of customers acquired through Puma sales purchased about six times a year
(not necessarily footwear), with an average purchase of $40 per order and a gross margin of 20 per cent.
Another 40 per cent of customers acquired through Puma sales were average shoppers: they purchased
twice a year with an average purchase of $30 per order and a gross margin of 25 per cent. The remaining
customers acquired through Puma were insignificant to Jabong insofar as cross selling was concerned. Data
provided by the analytics team suggested that the top 10 per cent of customers were likely to purchase from
Jabong a total of 10 to 14 times, and average consumers purchased only six to eight times.

Knowing that he had to incorporate the new brand guidelines from Puma, Patnaik considered three options:

1. Continue with only the “core articles” from Puma’s product portfolio, which Jabong sold before the
new brand guidelines came into force.
2. Continue with the core articles and add select SMUs according to consumers’ choices, which could be
determined by pre-tests in Jabong’s e-commerce platform.
3. Ask Puma for an exclusive SMU range for Jabong in addition to the core articles. However, Patnaik
knew that Puma would limit the maximum discounts and require a minimum order quantity for an
exclusive range.

Patnaik needed to understand the impact of his decision on the gross margins made in the footwear category,
as well as on Jabong’s overall profit and loss (see Exhibits 6 and 7). He was not sure how the e-retail
competitors would respond to Puma, but he knew that Puma was likely to give the best commercial offer to
Jabong initially. Patnaik also knew that this advantage would last only until Jabong gave high sales to Puma.

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He evaluated the market sentiment using focus group studies. Sales performance in October and November
2014 indicated that there was a serious drop in Puma sales, falling to almost 40 per cent of the original
price. Yet the gross margin improved to 120 per cent of normal. Customer acquisition through Puma was
down to only 30 per cent of original.

Patnaik built alternative scenarios based on his experience. If he opted for a product portfolio of core articles
plus select SMUs, Jabong would face serious competition from the other e-retailers selling the same SMUs. The
resultant aggressive pricing of SMUs would also cannibalize the sales of the core articles. Patnaik expected that
the final unit sales would be unchanged, but the proportion of core articles would drop to 20 to 30 per cent of
what it was before October 2014. He was expecting that the gross margin of the SMUs would be about 30 to 50
per cent of what Jabong made from the core articles as of October 2014. The average selling price would be 80
per cent of the October 2014 figure, but new customer acquisition would remain the same.

If Patnaik opted for a product portfolio of core articles plus an exclusive SMU range for Jabong, Jabong
would still face indirect competition in the SMU segment from other e-retailers. Patnaik was sure that he
would have to adopt aggressive pricing for the exclusive SMU range to get sales. Such pricing would also
cannibalize the sales of core articles. He was expecting the final unit sales to be about 120 per cent of
original, with the sale of core articles dropping to 10 to 20 per cent of pre-October 2014 sales. Similarly,
he was expecting the gross margin of the exclusive SMU to be about 40 to 60 per cent of what Jabong made
from the core articles now, but there would be an increase in the average inventory of Puma products from
30 days sales to 60 days sales. The average selling price would be 75 per cent of current, but new customer
acquisition patterns were unlikely to change.

Another option that Patnaik had not considered was to move the Puma business from the inventory model
to the marketplace model. In the marketplace model, consumers of Jabong who wanted to explore Puma
products would be transferred to a Puma website specially designed to maintain the Jabong experience for
the consumer. The sales and delivery would be managed by Puma, and a fee of 15 per cent of the sale’s
value would be credited to Jabong for directing the consumer. This arrangement would enable Puma to
maintain its own terms when dealing with customers coming through the Jabong website. Jabong would
still make approximately a 15 per cent gross margin, while saving on operating overheads. The potential
benefit from cross-selling to these customers would remain. This option also had another advantage: Jabong
could extend its own promotional offers to potential Puma customers, which could be lucrative enough to
persuade customers to buy from Jabong. However, the disadvantage would be that Puma could become
disinterested, which would hamper Jabong’s negotiating power with other footwear brands. Alternatively,
Jabong’s arrangement with Puma's could make other e-retailers choose this option as well.

Whatever Jabong did would likely play a significant role in shaping the future of the e-retail footwear
market in India. Patnaik knew that Sinha would have his own thoughts about that, and it was important to
factor in those considerations as well. Whereas Patnaik worried about consumers and suppliers, Sinha also
needed to consider investors.

This was the biggest challenge that Patnaik had faced in his career. The stakes were high and there was substantial
risk involved. However, he felt that the learning opportunity was tremendous, irrespective of the outcome.

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EXHIBIT 1: JABONG’S REVENUE BY CATEGORY

Category % of revenue

Men’s Apparel 18
Accessories 20
Women's Apparel 23
Men’s Footwear 22
Women's Footwear 6
Children’s Apparel 5
Others 6
Total 100

Source: Company files.

EXHIBIT 2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEW CUSTOMERS AND JABONG’S SALES

% Increase in % Increase in Number

Customers over Last of Orders Placed over
Quarter Last Quarter

Q2 FY2013/14 12.33 18.61

Q3 FY2013/14 22.85 32.55
Q4 FY2013/14 30.43 56.89
Q1 FY2014/15 1.3 9.8

Source: Company files.

EXHIBIT 3: JABONG’S CUSTOMER GROWTH

Existing New Total Number of Number of Orders

Customers Customers Number of Customers Orders from
Customers Who Existing
Placed an Customers
Order (%)
Q1 FY2013/14 749,000 300,000 1,049,000 328,200 720,000 36
Q2 FY2013/14 1,049,000 337,000 1,386,000 401,230 854,000 37
Q3 FY2013/14 1,386,000 414,000 1,800,000 521,240 1,132,000 43
Q4 FY2013/14 1,800,000 540,000 2,340,000 712,120 1,776,000 47
Q1 FY2014/15 2,340,000 547,000 2,887,000 794,940 1,950,000 51

Source: Company files.

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EXHIBIT 4: BRAND SHARE CHANGES IN THE INDIAN SHOE MARKET

2006 2010 2013

Brand Share (%) Brand Share (%) Brand Share (%)
Reebok 50 Reebok 40 Adidas 23
Adidas 15 Adidas 20 Nike 15
Nike 5 Nike 10 Puma 20
Others 30 Puma 10 Reebok 15
Others 20 Others 27

Source: RNCOS Business Consultancy Services, Indian Footwear Market Forecast 2014 (Noida: RNCOS, May 2012),
accessed February 22, 2016, www.rncos.com/Report/IM310.htm.

EXHIBIT 5: CHANNEL SALES SPILT FOR PUMA FOR FY2013/14

Revenue in Growth over

$ millions last year (%)
Total 100 45
Retail 64 25
Distribution 20 25
E-retail 16 100

Source: Company files.

EXHIBIT 6: ECONOMICS OF SHOE RETAILING (FIGURES IN US$ PER SINGLE PAIR)

Jabong Myntra* Offline Store*

Nike Puma** Nike Puma Nike Puma
Airmax FAAS Airmax FAAS Airmax FAAS
MRP 246 64 246 64 246 64

NLC 141 35 141 35 164 38

Sales in Pairs (monthly) 300 1,000 250 750 20 50

Variable Cost 10 8 7 7 3 3
Customer Acquisition/ 25 20 33 16 1 1
Marketing (fixed cost)
Selling Price 213 46 213 46 213 52

Contribution 72 11 72 11 49 14

Notes: *Estimated figure; **Puma FAAS was representative of the entire Puma range; NLC = Net Landed Cost: The cost to
seller after deducting all discounts from the supplier; Contribution = Selling Price − NLC = Gross Margin.
Source: Company files and projections.

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EXHIBIT 7: JABONG’S KEY FINANCIAL INDICATORS

Indicator FY2012/13 FY2013/14

Net Revenue ($ millions) 56.44 133.02
Gross Profit ($ millions) −5.26 26.16
Gross Margin (%) −9.3 19.7
EBITDA ($ millions) −40.34 −75.06
Net Margin (%) −71.5 −56.4
Capex 2.09 6.4
Balance Sheet Figures
Net Working Capital ($ millions) 5.2 13.3
Cash Position ($ millions) 139.9 47.4
Key Performance Indicators
Gross Merchandise Value ($ millions) 83.8 216.5
Number of Orders (millions) 2.6 5.9
Number of Transactions (millions) 3.4 8.7

Source: Company files.

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