The AAA Cotton Plow-Up Campaign in Arkansas

Author(s): Keith J. Volanto

Source: The Arkansas Historical Quarterly , Winter, 2000, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Winter, 2000),
pp. 388-406
Published by: Arkansas Historical Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40023191

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 The AAA Cotton Plow-Up
Campaign in Arkansas
Keith J. Volanto

On March 4, 1933, Franklin Roosevelt assumed the presidency a

thus responsibility for leading the nation through its darkest econo
hour. The country was entering the fourth year of a severe depression th
devastated all major sectors of the U.S. economy. Cotton farmers in
kansas and elsewhere in the South had faced hard times for over ten y
beset by the post- World War One slump in prices and natural disasters. B
bad went to worse after 1929. These farmers saw their incomes plum
as cotton prices fell from 18 cents per pound in April 1929 to 6.1 cent
April 1932. Continuing production of large amounts of cotton, a dr
drop in domestic and foreign consumption, and an ever-increasing ca
over of unconsumed cotton combined to produce the great price declin
The situation looked to get even worse as 1933 wore on. All availa
evidence pointed to a bumper crop that would drive cotton prices to r
lows, leading very possibly to vast farm foreclosures and tenant and s
cropper displacement. Not only cotton growers would be affected by
calamity. All those individuals who were tied into the trade through the f
nancing, ginning, shipping, and marketing of the crop would also b
great financial trouble if the cotton market collapsed. In the early 19
this meant a significant portion of the population of Arkansas and ot
southern agricultural states.

^ete Daniel, Breaking the Land: The Transformation of Cotton, Tobacco, and R
Cultures since 1880 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 18-22; Henry I. R
ards, Cotton under the Agricultural Adjustment Act: Developments up to July 1
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1934), 4.

Keith J. Volanto, Ph.D., is a lecturer in the Department of History at Texas A&M University. He
like to thank the staff of the National Archives, Southwest Region in Fort Worth, Texas for al
help in researching this project. The article is based on a paper delivered at "The Southwest: A R
in Transition," an interdisciplinary conference in Fort Worth, Texas, February 17, 2000. The a
would like to acknowledge the panel and audience at the conference for their feedback and sug
tions.

THE ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. LIX, NO. 4, WINTER 2000

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 21

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 390 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

The response that Franklin Roosevelt's administration eventually d

veloped to this crisis would epitomize the improvisational nature and c
plex legacy of the New Deal. The policies initiated with the 1933 plow
of the crop would aid many Arkansas cotton growers but slighted and
timately displaced large numbers of the state's tenant farmers and sh
croppers. In the three years preceding Roosevelt's inauguration, Her
Hoover's administration had attempted to aid America's sluggish agric
tural sector through the creation of so-called "stabilization corporatio
directed by the Federal Farm Board. These corporations were set up to pur
chase surpluses of various farm commodities in order to temporarily
move them from the market in hopes of stabilizing prices. The Farm Boar
eventually purchased some 3.4 million bales of cotton before its appro
ations ran out. The Board's actions, however, succeeded only in temp
rarily holding prices. In the end, the Farm Board failed because no ef
was made to control production beyond pleas for voluntary reduction
acreage. When the Farm Board began to liquidate some of its holdings
put more cotton back on the market prices declined even further.2
During the "First Hundred Days" of his presidency, Frankli
Roosevelt's administration pushed through Congress a farm bill that
cluded a provision creating the Agricultural Adjustment Administra
(AAA)-a new government agency placed within the Department of Ag
culture. The AAA was charged with the responsibility of boosting f
prices by subsidizing decreased production.3
The AAA's chief weapon would be the "Voluntary Domestic All
ment Plan" perfected by Montana State College agricultural economi
professor Milburn Lincoln "M. L." Wilson. According to Wilson's plan
the government would enter into voluntary contracts with producers of n
merous agricultural commodities to reduce production by decreasing a
age in cultivation. As an incentive to join the program, the governm
would compensate all cooperating producers who agreed to decrease th
output.4
The AAA needed to act hurriedly to aid American farmers. Because
Roosevelt was not inaugurated until early March, and Congress then took

2David E. Hamilton, From New Day to New Deal: American Farm Policy from
Hoover to Roosevelt, 1928-1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991),
95.

3Henry I. Richards, Cotton and the AAA (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1936),
1; Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), May 13, 1933; Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 13,
1933.

For a comprehensive look at M. L. Wilson's development of the Voluntary Domes-

tic Allotment Plan, see William D. Rowley, M. L. Wilson and the Campaign for the
Domestic Allotment (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).

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 AAA COTTON PLOW-UP 39 1

two long months to debate various details of the farm

not sign the Agricultural Adjustment Act until May
added burden on the AAA to quickly fill its bureauc
develop a workable cotton reduction program for th
the region's crop had already been planted.5
AAA officials soon determined that the governm
induce cotton producers to destroy a portion of th
the 1933 season. But, because the AAA was tied up
matters in its formative weeks, the new Secretary
A. Wallace, did not present the government's prop
19. On that day Wallace announced that there woul
up campaign to reduce the size of the 1933 cotton
agreed to reduce their cotton acreage by a minimu
not more than 40 percent (soon raised to 50 per
government check drawing on a fund collected thr
tic processing of cotton. Any land that was taken
tion under the program could still be utilized for th
improvement crops not sold on the open market. T
converted to the raising of food and feed crops fo
Growers wishing to participate in the governme
choose between two payment plans. One was a "
offered farmers payments based on a sliding scale
average yield of their acreage during the previous
ments would range from $7 per acre (for land aver
acre) to $20 per acre (for land with an average yiel
above per acre.)7 Under the second "cash and op
could also receive a cash payment, but for a lesser
the cash-only plan (ranging from $6 per acre to $1
also receive an "option contract" allowing him
quantity of prime government-owned Farm Board
the amount he had plowed for six cents per poun

5For coverage of the congressional debate over the farm bill,

sis in Agriculture: The Agricultural Adjustment Administrati
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 36-78.
The full text of Wallace's announcement appears in the New
1933. See also the Arkansas Gazette, June 20, 1933, and t
Appeal, June 20, 1933.
The AAA Cotton Section decided against accepting contracts
age yield of less than 100 pounds per acre.

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392 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

would agree to sell the option cotton at any time designated by the p
ducer, should the price rose above six cents per pound.8
Because Secretary Wallace issued a July 8 deadline for the South' s
million cotton acres to be pledged before he would authorize the plow
farmers needed to be signed up very quickly. After the sign-up, farms wo
then have to be inspected, yields estimated, and portions of fields selected
plowing. Once the plow-up had taken place, farms would have to be re
spected to ensure compliance before the AAA would approve the payments
The AAA assigned each state a cotton acreage quota, based on a
percent reduction from 1931 production figures, which for Arkansas mean
1,002,300 of the 3,341,000 acres planted in cotton that year. These qu
were to serve as a working guide during the sign-up.10 All pledges were ir
revocable until July 3 1 . After that date, if the government had not yet
formed growers that their pledges had been accepted, the farmers co
cancel their offers to plow up their cotton.11
To oversee the implementation of the plow-up, AAA officials decid
to use the Agricultural Extension Service. The AAA had to act quickly
educate farmers about the benefits of the plan, and the Extension Ser
already had agents in place in a majority of southern counties. Cully C
the head of the AAA's Cotton Division and himself a former Mississ
state extension official, strongly desired that the AAA utilize the Extensio
Service because there was simply no time to organize, train, and pla
new field force from scratch. With Roosevelt's approval, Wallace draf
the Extension Service to oversee AAA work in the localities.12

8The Cotton Section favored equal acceptance of the two plans by cotton farmers
AAA Cotton Section head Cully Cobb wired state Agricultural Extension Service direc
"Desirable that we obtain equal number of contracts for both plan number one and plan n
ber two. We believe limitations and element of risk surrounding option on cotton will
the all cash plan number two more attractive to the smaller producers than plan number
Neither plan should be sold at the expense of the other." Cobb to state extension direc
June 26, 1933, Cotton-Blanket Wires file, Box 24, Subject Correspondence Files 1
1935, Records of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Record Group 145, Nat
Archives II, College Park, Maryland [hereafter cited as SCF, AAA, NARG 145].
Press release of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (cited hereafter as A
P.R.) 140-33, Box 1, Entry 6, AAA, NARG 145.
As Cully Cobb reminded all state extension directors, the quotas were "merely f
guidance and ... in no way to limit the campaign" to any minimum or maximum figu
He stated further that the campaign had to continue until every farmer had the opportu
to pledge reduction of acreage. Cobb to state extension directors, June 27, 1933, Cot
Blanket Wires file, Box 24, SCF, AAA, NARG 145.
UAAA P.R. 1421-33, Box 1, Entry 6, AAA, NARG 145.
12Roy V. Scott and J. G. Shoalmire, The Public Life of Cully A. Cobb (Jackson: U
versity and College Press of Mississippi, 1973), 211-212. The Extension Service, e
lished in 1914 under the Smith-Lever Act, was responsible for disseminating rese
information from the various land-grant colleges to the farm population.

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 AAA COTTON PLOW-UP 393

The Extension Service, in turn, benefited from an

allotment plan-a provision authorizing the use of f
mittees to help administer the programs. These com
sion Service supervision, would monitor complian
the legislation and eliminate the need for a large n
local level.
This use of farmer and citizen committees was an essential part of the
domestic allotment plan. Their inclusion reflected M. L. Wilson's belief in
what historian Ellis Hawley has labeled "associationalism." Adherents of
associationalism (which had many supporters, including Herbert Hoover)
generally feared the rise of big government bureaucracies as a solution to
the problems arising of the industrial age. But, rather than supporting the
view of laissez-faire conservatives who often shunned any government ac-
tion to address national problems, believers in the associative state felt that
the government could still play a positive role. It could advance the com-
mon good by fostering partnerships between the public and private sectors
to tackle individual problems.13
The extension agents began their part in the campaign when they se-
lected members for their so-called "county committees"-people who
shared county-wide responsibility for carrying out the provisions of the
program. Cully Cobb instructed southern state extension leaders to tell
their agents to appoint "men of outstanding ability and integrity and in full
sympathy with the program" as county committeemen. Cobb expected
them to be well-known leaders in their counties, and strongly desired that
agents place bankers and merchants as well as large farmers on the com-
mittees. It would be the main task of these county committees to oversee
the various community or "local" committees, typically consisting of three
fanners, one for every 100 producers in a given township area.14
Following Cobb's wishes, the vast majority of the men who served as
county and local committeemen were individuals that possessed large
holdings in wealth and property. What historian Jeannie Whayne found re-
garding the makeup of the county and local committees in Poinsett County,

13 On associationalism in general, see Ellis W. Hawley, The Great War and the
Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions,
191 7-1933 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979). For the clearest explanation of how Wil-
son's views on associationalism influenced his domestic allotment plan, see the work of
Hawley student David E. Hamilton in From New Day to New Deal, especially ch. 9.
14Cobb to T. Roy Reid, June 17, 1933, Cotton-A.R. (Acreage Reduction) file, Box
20, SCF, AAA, NARG 145; Richards, Cotton under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 18.

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394 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Arkansas, was typical of the state as a whole and the entire South: the larg
est landholders tended to predominate.15
On June 22 a statewide meeting of county agents and county comm
teemen was held at the Federal Building in Little Rock. Dan T. Gray,
dean of the College of Agriculture at the University of Arkansas, and
Roy Reid, the director of the Arkansas Extension Service, led the proc
ings. The two men explained the upcoming campaign to the agents a
committeemen, detailing how the AAA expected the agents and coun
committeemen to go back to their counties, form their local commit
and lead local educational meetings for the farmers. The local commit
were to perform the basic tasks of enrolling farmers, inspecting pled
acreage, making yield estimations, and checking compliance with
plow-up agreements. The extension agents and county committee
were to verify that local committees made reasonable estimates of the
ducers' average yield, insure that all paperwork was completed correc
and investigate and settle complaints. Reid announced that the AAA w
provide counties that lacked regular extension agents with temporar
"emergency agricultural assistants" to assist with the campaign. The A
also pledged funding for temporary assistant county agents to help out re
ular agents in heavy cotton-producing counties. Following the Little R
meeting, the extension agents and county committeemen returned to t
respective counties and formed local committees. In most cases the ag
followed protocol and appointed farmers to the posts, but in at least
county (Hot Springs) the emergency agricultural assistant later repor
"At each community meeting we set up the qualifications for local c
mitteemen and let the farmers select them. This seemed more satisfac
than appointing them."16
The county agents and committeemen had from June 26 to July 8
sign up enough farmers to meet the state's acreage quota. With the he
the statewide and local press, extension agents and committeemen eng
in a massive publicity barrage to kick off "Cotton Week," as the AAA
beled the first week of the campaign. Roy Reid and the Arkansas Ext

15Jeannie M. Whayne, A New Plantation South: Land, Labor, and Federal Favo
Twentieth-Century Arkansas (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996), 160
Arkansas Gazette, June 22, 23, 1933; Memphis Commercial Appeal June 22-2
1933; annual narrative report of Phillip Anderson, emergency agricultural assistan
Hot Spring County, Box 0078, Federal Extension Service-Arkansas Annual Rep
1917-1970, National Archives and Records Administration-Southwest Region,
Worth, TX [hereafter cited as 1933 Arkansas Extension Agent Reports, NA-SWR] (qu
tion). The AAA implored the Extension Service to keep the estimated average yield
the counties in 1933 within each county's five-year average for the 1928-1932 period
compiled by the USDA Division of Crop and Livestock Estimates. See, for exam
Cobb to Reid, June 27, 1933, Cotton-A.R. file, Box 20, SCF, AAA, NARG 145.

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 AAA COTTON PLOW-UP 395

sion Service's agricultural editor hosted a fifteen-m

program every day on KARK in Little Rock to spre
paign throughout the state. Newspapers render
publicizing the program, often carrying front-pag
plan and running frequent editorials supporting it.
for Dallas County later noted: "Both of the Dallas
pers were very liberal with the space they devoted to
ing announcements, explaining the provisions of
information as to the progress the campaign was m
should have much credit for keeping the program bef
was successfully finished."17
Throughout the sign-up papers periodically reporte
the campaign in the state, printed letters to the edito
up, and occasionally carried stories about vigilantis
cotton producers, typically dubbed "slackers" (in a
bilization), who did not go along with the program
The focus of the acreage reduction program's e
the series of farmer meetings held in communities
cotton counties. At these meetings, producers (bot
ants) learned about the government's plan firsthan
the extension agents and committeemen. Large numbe
terested citizens attended these meetings througho
nessmen often lent their influence by voicing ap
farmers spoke publicly against it. As occurred els
many meetings ended with the adoption of resolut
gram in principle.19
The meetings helped to disseminate informatio
publicized the acreage reduction plan, and aided in
vorable public opinion toward it. The local commi
sign up farmers. They set up places to meet, hop
pear. Later on in the sign-up, the committeemen
ual farms and invited growers to pledge acreage t
sign-up turned into a great challenge as the comm

17Annual narrative report of H. K. Sager, emergency agr

County, Box 0075, 1933 Arkansas Extension Agent Reports,
ples of extension agents' comments on the value of the press
annual reports of agents from Baxter, Craighead, Howard,
Mississippi, Phillips, Sharp, and south Sebastian Countie
Arkansas Extension Agent Reports, NA-SWR.
18 Annual narrative report of Kenneth B. Roy, agricultura
Extension Service, Box 0072, ibid. For press references to
Gazette and Memphis Commercial Appeal from June 26-July
19AAA P.R. 1403-33, Box 1, Entry 6, AAA, NARG 145.

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396 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

unforeseen obstacles, delays, and farmer reluctance while trying

convince enough growers to participate in the program to ensure
success.

One of the most frequent problems cited in the ex

annual reports was a chronic shortage of government
"blanks" needed by the farmers to sign up. Agents fr
to extension headquarters that they had scores of will
to participate, but they had no forms to sign them u
in Washington: "Need contract blanks immediatel
greatly retarded by shortage of blanks. Please rush s
later, Reid reported another slowdown to Cobb, then
that the "committeemen could finish this week if bl
able." To such pleas, Cobb could only explain that
Printing Office was operating day and night to get t
printed and shipped off. As he explained to Direct
gigantic task requiring literally carloads of paper and
sible is being done. Encourage your people to be patie
Some agents went to neighboring counties to borr
agents there, while others improvised by telling their
get pledges from farmers on any type of "suitable
later about making the pledges legal by getting
forms.21 The delays caused some farmers to believe t
not possibly work if the government could not even
for the farmers to sign in the first place.22
Committeemen found many farmers eager to sign u
who had to be further convinced of the plan's effica
extension agent stated that many farmers were initia
by the proposal and needed much persuasion before t
plan. Some agents later reported that they experienc
growers who simply distrusted the government and
some sort of trick. One farmer told the emergency ag

20Reid to Cobb, July 3, 5, 1933, Arkansas University-T. Roy R

and second quotation), and Cobb to Gray, July 4, 1933, Arkansas U
file, Box 44 (third quotation), all in correspondence arranged alph
ter as AC], 1933-1935, AAA, NARG 145. For extension agents' de
in their counties, see 1933 Arkansas Extension Agent reports, NA
See annual narrative reports of agents from Baxter, Nevada
Boxes 0077-0078, ibid.
Annual narrative report of John L. Faulkner, emergency agri
Craighead and Lawrence Counties, Box 0077, 1933 Arkansas Ext
NA-SWR.

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 AAA COTTON PLOW-UP 397

for Columbia County: "I am capable of running m

plan is a trap."23
Many other Arkansas farmers wished to sign up
plan but changed their minds after disagreeing with
the estimated yield of the acreage that they offered
times, the growers were upset because a neighbor
a better deal for what was, in their judgment, th
worse. Though some newspaper editors castigated
over differences in estimating their five-year aver
ply would not go along with the plan if they felt the
shake.24 As one Newark farmer wrote to Secretar
about his neighbor getting a better estimate: "My cot
the acre than his. I want to do what is right. Don't th
opposed to the plan. For I was one of the first sign
treated [right]. I am willing for any one from any
my cotton but I am not willing to let it stand like it
Another Arkansas farmer, writing to Cobb fro
after the sign-up was over, tried to explain to the
the grower and his brother refused to join the pro
men who inspected their cotton "showed parti
against some farmers in the community (certainly a
Wilson's associative committees). "There was a ma
farmer wrote, "who had cotton near my cotton an
a hundred percent better cotton, the men valued m
$7.00 per acre. That is why we failed to cooperate
Another major obstacle that committeemen en
sign-up was a large speculative rise in cotton price
only six cents per pound, but by June the price had
per pound on many spot markets in anticipation o
going into operation. Many farmers throughout th
that it would be best for them to maintain full prod
efits of the elevated prices. If southern growers d
number and the quota was not reached, however,

23 Annual narrative reports of W. A. Owens, County Agent

(first quotation) and Jeff D. McDuffie, emergency agricultur
Clark Counties, Box 0078 (second quotation), both in ibid
Cleburne and Jefferson Counties, Boxes 0076-0077, ibid.
For examples of newspaper editorial pressure, see th
Appeal, June 25, July 3, 6, 1933.
25W. H. Dauson to Wallace, July 17, 1933, Cotton-A.R
NARG 145.
26 Joe and Jeff Pennington to Cobb, August 26, 1933, ibid. See also Jess Dunlap to
Wallace, July 18, 1933, and C. W. Rowan to Wallace, July 12, 1933, both in ibid.

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398 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

nate the program and the speculation would come to nothing. The A
extension agents, committeemen, and the cooperating press had to wo
doubly hard to convince farmers that the artificially-inflated prices broug
about by speculation would disintegrate if enough farmers held out.
Roy Reid told reporters in a July 8 interview:

The farmers generally seem to realize the need of the success of

the plan, but sufficient numbers of them have not yet shown their
faith in it by signing the contract offers. Some have been deluded
by the speculative price rise in the cotton market which has taken
place since the plan was announced. Those who understand the
real situation must know there is no foundation, with present and
prospective supplies of cotton, for any price which will give the
grower a return for his labor.

. . . the only way that any appreciable price for cotton this year
or in the immediate future years can be expected is for some of the
growing crop to be removed.

... It is the patriotic duty of every citizen to help the govern-

ment in carrying out this plan which has been proposed and which
offers so much promise for relieving the distress of Southern cot-
ton farmers.27

Despite such obstacles, the campaign continued. At the end of eve

day, local committeemen delivered the contracts to the extension agen
and the county committeemen. Into the late hours these individuals a
lyzed the completed forms, checking for errors, and telephoned Arkan
state extension headquarters to report the number of farmers who
signed up along with their proposed reduced acreage. By July 7, AA
headquarters in Washington received word that Arkansas farmers ha
signed up only 454,108 acres for plowing up and that southern grower
a whole had only pledged 5,566,169 acres of cotton for destruction.
matters stood, the July 8 deadline for ten million pledged acres would
be met. Secretary Wallace decided to extend the deadline to July 12, ci
the delay in providing needed forms and the desire to reach all farmers be
fore making a final decision.28

21 Arkansas Gazette, July 9, 1933 (quotation). See also another interview with Reid
Arkansas Gazette, July 12, 1933. For more information on the speculative rise in cot
during this period, see Perkins, Crisis in Agriculture, 101-103.
AAA, P.R. 36-34, Box 1, Entry 6, and Cobb to state extension directors, July
1933, Cotton-A.R. file, Box 20, SCF 1933-1935, both in AAA, NARG 145.

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 AAA COTTON PLOW-UP 399

After the second deadline had passed Cobb sent

porting that southern farmers had pledged to plo
and that the Cotton Section expected a final total
recommended that the plow-up be implemented. O
nounced that the cotton acreage reduction plan fo
Ultimately, almost 97,000 Arkansas farmers pledg
struction, or 26.1 percent of their total cotton acreag
Farmers were instructed that they would receiv
of their contracts and that they should not plow u
time. When mix-ups at the Government Printing
ing of the individual acceptance forms, however
cided on July 29 to issue a blanket acceptance of al
extension agents and county committeemen and au
gin plowing up their cotton. After receiving word fr
Arkansas cotton farmers began to destroy the se
pledged in their sign-up contracts. Cobb announce
be the deadline for growers to complete the crop d
Most farmers had no trouble burying their cott
were encountered. Heavy rainstorms hit some de
greatly hindering the plow-up. One agent from Missi
ported that so much rain inundated his county that m
out into the fields and actually pull the cotton up by
There were scattered instances where farmers w
stroy their cotton decided not carry out their agreem
zette reported an instance in which the Pulaski Co
one of its local committees to the farm of Ozzia F
who had refused to destroy his crop after signing a c
mittee plowed up seven of his twenty-five acres of c
paper Flemming was one of only two farmers in
fused to comply with their contract). Another su
preacher- farmer in Lee County who refused to
county agent and a local committeeman personally

29Memo: "Recommendations for Carrying Out the 1933 C

Program," Cobb to Wallace, n.d., Cotton-A.R. file, Box 20,
directors, July 14, 1933, Cotton-Blanket Wires file, Box 2
145; AAA P.R. 80-34, Entry 6, AAA, NARG 145; Arkansas
phis Commercial Appeal, July 15, 1933; New York Times, Ju
figures, see Arkansas Gazette, July 17, 1933; Richards, Co
Adjustment Act, 36-37.
Richards, Cotton under the Agricultural Adjustment Act
Agriculture, 109; AAA P.R. 353-334, 401-434, both in Box
3 Annual narrative report of J. E. Critz, extension agent f
sissippi County, Box 0077, 1933 Arkansas Extension Agent

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400 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

could not convince him to plow. The agent wired state headquarters
the Washington office for instructions. Cobb wired back for the agen
do what he instructed all such inquirers to do: destroy the cotton for
farmer and deduct the cost from his check.32
There were undoubtedly instances in Arkansas as there were else
where in the South where mules flatly refused to trample over the pl
for fear of reprisal. Many of them had often been trained at the whip no
do what their owners were now asking of them: to pull the plows o
growing crops.33
After the plow-up deadline passed local committeemen went back
the fields to inspect how well growers had adhered to their pledges. T
committeemen typically found that the growers had done a good job in
stroying the crop the first time around, but, as the emergency agent for
Spring County reported, "it was necessary for some local committeem
to make three trips . . . before the Performance and Certification sheet [s
nifying compliance] could be approved." In Jefferson County, the em
gency agricultural agent recalled some of the difficulties encounter
while trying to ensure compliance: "In many cases farmers plowed up
tle more than was pledged although when we started measuring land
found that most every one was from ten to twenty-five percent sho
what they thought they had in cotton. This caused our local committe
to have to go back the second and third time to many places before
acreage pledged was destroyed."34
Committeemen also investigated farmer complaints against ot
growers, especially accusations that producers had not plowed up their
share of the crop. In one instance, an Independence County farmer
caught after someone leaked word to the county committee that the farm
actually picked cotton he claimed to have plowed up. The committee
viewed his contract and told him, for openers, it appeared that his co

37 Arkansas Gazette, August 25, September 12, 1933; annual narrative report of W
Owens, extension agent for Lee County, Box 0076, 1933 Arkansas Extension A
Reports, NA-SWR; Cobb to state extension directors, August 22, 1933, Cotton-A.R
Box 21, SCF, and AAA P.R. 401-435, Box 1, Entry 6, both in AAA, NARG 145.
33There is no mention of any incidents involving "balky mules" in any of the Ar
sas extension agent reports or in the Arkansas Gazette or Memphis Commercial A
but they most likely did occur to some extent. For some examples of reports of relu
mules during the plow-up in other southern states, see: New York Times, August 10,
Dallas Morning News, August 27, 1933, Houston Post, August 27, 1933, and Mich
Holmes, New Deal in Georgia: An Administrative History (Westport, CT: Greenw
Press, 1975), 219.
Annual narrative reports of Philip Anderson, emergency agricultural assistant
Hot Spring County (first quotation), and W. D. Ezell, emergency agricultural assistan
Jefferson County (second quotation), both in Box 0078, 1933 Arkansas Extension A
Reports, NA-SWR; see also reports from agents in Clark and Miller Counties, ibid.

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 AAA COTTON PLOW-UP 40 1

yield had been overestimated. The farmer brazenly

ability as a salesman. Apparently this remark did n
committee: they ordered him to plow up the rest of hi
to bring back the amount of cotton picked off the
ground, and plow it under. Only then did he receive a c
for which he had originally contracted.35
Upon the approval of the local committeemen, gr
pliance sheet that was given to the county agent and
be checked over, signed, and forwarded to Washing
had to sit and wait for word from the agents that thei
This would be a longer wait than most farmers had
The extension agents reported different dates for
government checks in their counties. Many agents repo
checks at the beginning of September, but many other
any checks until the end of that month. In all Arkansa
came in very sporadically, which upset farmers wh
money well before they did.36
In an October 10 report sent to Cully Cobb, Roy
tailed breakdown by county of how many checks ha
second week of October. In urging the AAA to spe
Reid reported that only one-third of the farmers of
their checks. The county-by-county breakdown sho
disbursements. For example, two-thirds of north M
1,727 contract-signers had received their checks, bu
farmers in Prairie County had received theirs.37
These long delays in payment, due to the sheer v
(over one million nationwide) flooding Washington
ated great anxiety and anger among farmers, and
"feelings of being misled." The farmers were not re
ous in demanding their checks. They had been told
the campaign that they would receive payment pr
Dallas County reported that the delay in payments
unfavorable comments than any other phase" of the
most common complaint of the extension agents in
the length of time it took the government to send t
the fact that the agents were having to take the he

35 Annual narrative report of G. B. Spencer, extension

County, Box 0077, ibid.
See various 1933 Arkansas Extension Agent Reports, NA-
3/Reid to Cobb, October 10, 1933, Arkansas University-T
AC,AAA,NARG145.

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402 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

agents reported that on December 1, the day their reports were due, t
were still many farmers (on average about 5 percent of the county to
who had not yet been paid.38
Despite their burdens, most county agents viewed their added AA
responsibilities positively. Though they worked long hours, often g
ing up their weekends and holidays to do work for which they were
trained, a great many of the agents actually saw their AAA duti
something that could benefit their normal extension work. Numero
agents reported that the cotton reduction campaign gave them acces
farmers who were formerly hard to reach, allowing them to spread
formation about regular extension programs. They were confident t
the campaign would greatly benefit the Extension Service in the futu
As the Crittenden County agent reported: "This program . . . broug
the agent in contact with many farmers throughout the County that
ular extension work had never been able to reach, and as a result
same, other extension programs in the future will be much easier to
into effect because of the confidence gained in extension work due
the manner in which all details were handled in the cotton acreage
duction program." The Phillips County agent agreed:

The outlook for Extension work in Phillips County is very

much better at this time than it has been in several years past.
With the added responsibilities that the Federal Government has
placed on the Extension Service and with the satisfactory man-
ner, to the farmer, with which these have been performed the
farmer has come to rely more and more on the County Agent

While the work this year has been more strenuous than ever
before we feel that Extension work has proven itself and that
we are in [a] better position to render real services to the people
than ever before.39

38Annual narrative report of W. D. Ezell, emergency agricultural assistant for Jef

son County (first quotation), and H. K. Sager, emergency agricultural assistant for D
County (second quotation), both in Box 0076, 1933 Arkansas Extension Agent Rep
NA-SWR. See other agent reports for further complaints over check delays.
Annual narrative reports for F. D. Chastain, county agent for Crittenden Cou
(first quotation), and A. M. Rogers, county agent for Phillips County (second quotati
both in Box 0077, 1933 Arkansas Extension Agent Reports, NA-SWR; see also the rep
of extension agents for Arkansas, Lee, and Pulaski Counties, Boxes 0075-0077, ibid

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 AAA COTTON PLOW-UP 403

Though they suffered the blame for delays, th

the AAA's decision to have them dispense the
when they finally arrived. Most agents simply ma
ers upon arrival of their checks and instructed t
come into the agent's office or meet the agent at
somewhere on a given day. But some agents, such
ricultural agent for Little River County, actually
farm to personally deliver the checks.40
The plow-up program succeeded in maintaining
at ten cents per pound by the end of 1933, almos
was selling for at the beginning of the season. Ar
further benefited by receiving $10.8 million in ca
cotton and 348,000 bales of government option co
would receive the difference between 6 cents per
price at the time it was sold).41 If it did not ge
nomic recovery, the plow-up money did much to
lief for tens of thousands of Arkansas growers. T
in turn, aided local shopkeepers and others who w
ton trade. For the first time in years, many farm
debts, pay back taxes, and purchase numerous
that had been denied them since the Depressio
helped Arkansas growers not only economically
as well. The county agent for Poinsett County, f
the morale of the farmers in his county was highe
the fall of 1929. The plow-up certainly inspired g
rural people in Arkansas-many began to believe t
Administration could actually improve the situatio
ers and thus improve the overall Arkansas econom
program's effects in his area, the Dallas County a
ering the whole program, it has met with favor
town people. It has increased the average farmer'
in his Government. It has made him know that hi

40 Annual narrative report of Ben E. Rice, emergency agric

River County, Box 0078, ibid.
Annual narrative report of E. H. Reed, extension economist
Extension Agent Reports; USDA, AAA, Agricultural Adjustmen
tural Adjustment Administration, May 1933 to February 193
ment Printing Office, 1934), 316. In Arkansas, 50 percent of t
"cash-and-option" plan. Richards, Cotton under the Agricultural

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404 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

has the power, but also has the disposition to put the farmer in a bet
position than he has been in for a number of years."42
Many Arkansans had reason to be unhappy, however. Tenant farm
and sharecroppers protested to government officials that they failed to re
ceive fair treatment under the cotton program. In their complaints to
AAA and USDA, many stated that even though they supported the gov
ment's plan, they could not sign up because their landlord forbade the
do so. As one tenant from Dell wrote to Cobb: "Dear Sear I thought
write you conserning the plowing up of the cotton in this sexion. I v
the semment of my peoples, we all wants to plow up a poshion of o
crope. But the lanlord wont let us. He is plowing up 2 or 3 hundred a
[of his own land] an leaving all the teners crop stan. An we dont think it
fair I dont Believe that you are gonto let them treet us that way. If o
teners have a write to plow up theirs we have a wright too."43
Under the law, landowners were to divide government payments w
their tenants and sharecroppers, but many tenants and croppers would
participate when planters demanded a larger portion of the governm
benefit checks than the normal division of the crop. Still others who
participate in the plow up were denied their checks when unscrupul
landlords simply pocketed the money that was due them.44
In these situations, there was little that tenants and croppers could
This was one of the glaring limitations of M. L. Wilson's "association
citizen committees. When complaints arose, AAA officials in Washing
simply directed them back to the county agents and committees to be
tled at the local level. Because a majority of the committee members
landlords themselves, committees resolved most tenant matters in fav
the planters. Most county agents were no help to tenants and cropper

42 Annual narrative reports of A. Raybon Sullivant, county agent for Poinsett Cou
and H. K. Sager, county agent for Dallas County (quotation), both in Box 0076,
Arkansas Extension Agent Reports, NA-SWR; see numerous other county agent re
for comments on the improved attitude of the people toward the government, and li
general, as a result of the plow-up campaign. Cotton farmers also benefited from
Roosevelt Administration's efforts to maintain cotton prices at or above the ten-cent
level through price-support loans administered by the Commodity Credit Corpor
(CCC) and by inflationary monetary policies. Despite these added efforts, withou
plow-up, the additional supplies of cotton, when added to the record carryover, woul
tainly have prevented the favorable price increase enjoyed by southern cotton farm
1933. For a discussion on the drop in cotton prices after mid- July 1933 and the creat
the CCC, see Perkins, Crisis in Agriculture, 168-174.
43 Will Jones to Cobb, July 28, 1933; see also William Barrington to Wallace, July
1933, both in Cotton-A.R. file, Box 21, SCF, AAA, NARG 145.
See, for example, E. D. Hartsell to Wallace, n.d., J. R. Roophard to Wallace, J
13, 1933, John T. Spikes to U.S. Department of Agriculture, July 24, 1933, and John
to Wallace, July 24, 1933, all in ibid.

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 AAA COTTON PLOW-UP 405

ther since they were most often beholden to t

their counties for their jobs.
In at least one instance occurring in Poinset
tenant who complained against the system alm
a Mr. Pugh, along with other tenants renting lan
to the AAA to complain that their landlord ha
funds for land on which he had never planted
Extension Director Reid to have the Poinsett
Sullivant, investigate the charges. According t
the matter was resolved when a public meetin
supposedly admitted that the charges were m
written to Cobb and signed by individuals who we
told quite a different story. They stated that
the meeting it was not known that the landlord w
asked Pugh in front of his landlord if he woul
that the charges made in his letter to Cobb we
would. At that point, Oliver called Pugh a "lo
threatened to kill him. The landlord's foreman and four others then rushed
Pugh and severely beat him while Oliver held off all other parties at bay
with his pistol. Those who endorsed this version of the meeting further re-
ported that Oliver evicted all the tenants whose names were on the original
letter to Cobb. The landlord obviously acquired the names on the letter
from Agent Sullivant. As this incident shows, the AAA's decentralized ad-
ministrative structure simply provided no effective means for smaller
farmers, especially tenants and sharecroppers, to receive justice if it was
being denied them.45 The failure to provide tenants and sharecroppers their
fair share of AAA benefits-as well as the evictions that followed upon
acreage reduction-would lead ultimately to the formation in Arkansas of
the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union and greater national attention to "the
plight of the sharecropper."46
The AAA plow-up campaign in Arkansas is a classic case study of the
early New Deal. In very little time, the Roosevelt Administration had to
tackle a serious national problem and chose to do so with an entirely ex-
perimental program that had no guarantee of success. Rather than dictating

45See Cobb to J. O. Green, October 19, 1933, A. Raybon Sullivant to T. Roy Reid,
December 15, 1933, Reid to Cobb, December 21, 1933, Mr. L. Hainks and twenty others
to Cobb, January 4, 1934, and E. A. Miller to Reid, January 22, 1934, all in Arkansas Uni-
versity-T. Roy Reid file, Box 45, AC, AAA, NARG 145.
Donald Grubbs, Cry from the Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmers ' Union and the
New Deal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971); Howard Kester, Revolt
Among the Sharecroppers (New York: Covici-Friede, 1936); Whayne, A New Plantation
South, 184-218.

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406 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

a plan and enforcing it with a new cadre of government workers, the A

worked with leading citizens in the localities to help implement its p
posed solution. In hindsight, this approach had pluses and minuses fo
southern producers. The program directly benefited a majority of Arka
sas 's almost 100,000 cotton growers, and indirectly aided large numb
of non-producers linked to the cotton trade. It must not be forgotten, how
ever, that an indeterminate number of ill-treated Arkansas tenant farm
and sharecroppers were effectively excluded from the program. Their s
uation was no better than before the plow-up began, and, in many case
worse.

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