[ANALYSIS] The Arbitral Award: Not just a piece of paper

JUL 17, 2022 1:00 PM PHT

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

For Filipino officials to parrot that the Arbitral Award is just a piece of paper is to accept
that the Arbitral Award is null and void, a position that is contrary to Philippine national
interest

Editor’s Note: Remarks delivered by retired justice Antonio T. Carpio on July 16, 2022
at the webinar, “Six Years after the Arbitral Award: Developments in the South China
Sea,” sponsored by the National Youth Movement for the West Philippine Sea .

When the Arbitral Tribunal at the Hague handed down its Award on July 12, 2016,
China belittled the Arbitral Award as “just a piece of paper.” Most of the rest of the
world, however, hailed the Arbitral Award as a landmark ruling affirming the rules-
based international order governing the South China Sea.

Unfortunately, some Philippine government officials, past and present, have parroted
the Chinese propaganda that the Arbitral Award is just a piece of paper. These
Philippine government officials act against Philippine national interest, giving aid and
comfort to China that is clearly intent on seizing vast areas of Philippine maritime zones
in the West Philippine Sea. Calling the Arbitral Award as just a piece of paper is
dangerously naïve.

First, prior to the Arbitral Award, there was a legal question as to which country owned
the natural resources, including the oil and gas, in the West Philippine Sea enclosed by
China’s nine-dash line. Both China and the Philippines claimed ownership of these
resources.

Many foreign service contractors wanted legal clarity before spending millions of dollars
exploring for oil and gas in the West Philippine Sea. The Arbitral Award provides for that
final and definitive legal clarity. Now, a service contractor knows that if it extracts oil
and gas for China in the West Philippine Sea, the Philippines can sue the service
contractor in third countries where it has assets for stealing the oil and gas belonging to
the Philippines.  

Second, the US, UK, France, Japan, Australia, Canada, and other countries have been
exercising freedom of navigation, including naval drills, in the South China Sea, invoking
the Arbitral Award which affirmed the application of UNCLOS in the South China Sea
unimpaired by China’s nine-dash line. Every time the navies of these countries conduct
naval drills in the West Philippine Sea, they affirm that there is an EEZ in the West
Philippine Sea unimpaired by China’s nine-dash line. Of course, the only coastal state
that can claim an EEZ in the West Philippine Sea is the Philippines. These freedom of
navigation operations of the naval powers are, in fact, the most tangible and the most
robust enforcement of the Arbitral Award so far.

Third, ASEAN coastal states, as well as a growing number of coastal states worldwide,
have in one form or another invoked the Arbitral Award. Indonesia invoked the Arbitral
Award when it adopted the name North Natuna Sea to designate its maritime zone
facing the South China Sea off the coast of the Natuna Islands. In various international
fora, the Arbitral Award is routinely invoked to debunk China’s nine-dash line. 

Indeed, the Arbitral Award is the most definitive and the most authoritative document
declaring that China’s nine-dash line has no basis in fact and in law.  Due to the Arbitral
Award, China’s nine-dash line has been ridiculed by legal scholars all over the world as
a gigantic fraud on the international community.

Fourth, China calls the Arbitral Award just a piece of paper because China considers the
arbitral proceedings null and void since China did not participate in the arbitration.
Thus, for Filipino officials to parrot that the Arbitral Award is just a piece of paper is to
accept that the Arbitral Award is null and void, a position that is contrary to Philippine
national interest. This position of China has been thoroughly debunked as erroneous by
the Arbitral Tribunal. 

Article 9, Annex VII of UNCLOS on Compulsory Arbitration provides: “If one of the
parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its
case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make
its award. Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute
a bar to the proceedings.” When China ratified UNCLOS, China bound itself to this
provision.

Clearly, the refusal of China to participate in the arbitral proceedings did not divest the
Arbitral Tribunal of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. To repeat, it is against
Philippine national interest for Filipino officials to parrot China’s propaganda that the
Arbitral Award is just a piece of paper. After all, the Arbitral Award affirms what is
stated in our Constitution: “The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its xxx
exclusive economic zone and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.”

Fifth, to assert or enforce the Arbitral Award, the Philippines does not need the consent
or permission of China. The Arbitral Award, by itself, affirms that under UNCLOS the
Philippines can exclusively exploit the natural resources, including the oil and gas, in the
Philippine exclusive economic zone in the West Philippine Sea without interference from
any other coastal state. To repeat, the Philippines does not need China’s consent or
permission to assert or enforce the Arbitral Award. For Filipino officials to say that the
Philippines cannot exploit the oil and gas in its exclusive economic zone in the West
Philippine Sea unless China recognizes the Arbitral Award is to baselessly grant China a
veto power over the exploitation of the Philippine exclusive economic zone in the West
Philippine Sea. No country in the world exercises such veto power. 

Of course, we know China will never recognize the Arbitral Award – thus waiting for
recognition from China is like waiting for Godot. Again, to assert or enforce the Arbitral
Award, the Philippines does not need to wait for China to recognize the Arbitral Award.

Last May 2020, Malaysia sent its Petronas-commissioned survey ship West Capella to
explore in its exclusive economic zone off the coast of Borneo in an area falling within
China’s nine-dash line. China warned Malaysia not to proceed with the exploration.
Chinese Coast Guard vessels shadowed the Malaysian survey ship West Capella.
Malaysian Coast Guard and Navy vessels, however, accompanied the West Capella and
protected it until it completed its exploration work. Interestingly, three US warships and
an Australian frigate conducted naval drills near the area to lend moral support to the
Malaysians.  Thus, Malaysia, even without an Arbitral Award and without a Mutual
Defense Treaty with a nuclear-armed power, asserted successfully its sovereign rights
in its EEZ despite threats and bullying from China.

Last October-November 2021, Malaysia sent its drilling ship to the same area off the
coast of Borneo. China warned Malaysia not to proceed with the drilling. Chinese Coast
guard vessels harassed the Malaysian drilling ship almost every day. But with the
Malaysian Coast Guard and Navy ships protecting its drilling ship, the drilling was
completed. China, despite its threats of war and harassment, again failed to stop
Malaysia from asserting its sovereign rights in Malaysian EEZ.

In mid-2021, Indonesia sent its drilling ship to drill test wells in its EEZ off the coast of
the Natuna Islands facing the South China Sea, within the area encompassed by China’s
nine-dash line. China told Indonesia to stop the drilling, and a four-month stand-off
ensued between Indonesian Coast guard and Navy ships and Chinese Coast guard
vessels. The Indonesians, declaring that they were drilling in an area where they have
sovereign rights, proceeded with, and completed their drilling. China failed to stop the
Indonesians.  Interestingly, the US also sent its aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan near the
drilling site to lend moral support to the Indonesians.

Thus, two coastal states, Malaysia and Indonesia, whose EEZs are encroached by
China’s nine-dash line, asserted their sovereign rights in their EEZs despite threats of
war from China and harassment from Chinese Coast guard vessels.  Malaysia and
Indonesia successfully asserted their sovereign rights even without an Arbitral Award or
a Mutual Defense Treaty with a nuclear-armed state.    

In contrast, in April 2022, when China “whispered” to former president Duterte not to
cross China’s redline, Duterte slavishly ordered Forum Energy, the Service Contractor in
Reed Bank, not to send its survey ship to Reed Bank, which the Arbitral Tribunal had
ruled is within Philippine EEZ. Malampaya, which supplies 40% of the energy
requirement of Luzon, will run out of gas in 3-5 years. The only possible replacement is
Reed Bank. Without Reed Bank, the Philippines will have to import LNG – Liquified
Natural Gas – to feed its gas-fired power plants in Luzon. This will send our energy
costs, already the highest in Asia, soaring through the roof, burdening the consuming
public and driving away potential investors.

Obviously, if we want to keep our energy costs within reasonable levels, and if we want
to unburden our people from exorbitant energy costs, we must follow the example of
Malaysia and Indonesia in asserting our sovereign rights in our EEZ. This requires
political will, which the Duterte administration was in severe deficit of, when dealing
with China. 

Hopefully, the new Marcos administration will find the courage to exercise the much-
needed political will, otherwise Filipinos will be condemned to suffer even higher energy
costs than what they are already experiencing today. – Rappler.com

Understanding the arbitral award

By: Artemio V. Panganiban - @inquirerdotnet
Philippine Daily Inquirer / 05:20 AM August 04, 2019

The arbitral award or judgment, dated July 12, 2016, was issued unanimously by the five
members of the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (that is how the tribunal called itself). Alleging the
tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction, China refused to participate in the proceedings and does not
recognize the award. To help readers understand the lengthy 501-page award, I will try
to summarize it into three parts.

First, it rejected China’s “nine-dash line” and its claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over
almost the entire South China Sea (SCS) for contravening the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (Unclos). Consequently, the SCS is open to freedom of navigation
by all countries.

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Second, it upheld our maritime claims over the rocks, islets and other features in the
Spratlys and declared unlawful the Chinese incursions into the UN-recognized baseline
entitlements of our “archipelagic state,” namely, our 12-nautical-mile (NM) territorial sea,
24-NM contiguous zone, 200-NM exclusive economic zone and 350-NM extended
continental shelf. This entire sea area along the west side of our country from Aparri to
Sulu is collectively referred to as the West Philippine Sea (WPS).

Third, it held that none of the disputed maritime features is an “island” and, therefore,
even if China occupies and has built structures on these features, it has no maritime
rights over the WPS. It also ruled that Scarborough Shoal, located 124 NM west of
Zambales, is a high-tide elevation with a protruding rock that generates only a 12-NM
territorial sea. Though declared a traditional fishing area for Filipino, Chinese and
Vietnamese fisherfolk, it was seized and is now occupied by China.

Note, however, that the Philippines did not ask for, and the tribunal did not award, any
rights over the land areas, given that the arbitration was about maritime rights only, and
did not include land occupations, reclamations and constructions.

Although they were not parties to the arbitration won by the Philippines, the great
powers of the world now freely enjoy and enforce the first part of the award. American,
Australian, British and Japanese warships, submarines and warplanes openly roam the
SCS, ignoring Chinese warnings that they are violating China’s air space and maritime
territory.

But they are not enforcing the second and third parts, which are left to our care. Neither
are these two parts enforced by sheriffs and policemen. While we have defense pacts
with the United States and other countries, there is no certainty that these powers will
enforce the award unless, like us, they too are benefited.

True indeed is the teaching of Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple) of Great Britain that
in international relations, there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only
permanent interests.

Verily, during World War II, Japan and Germany were the enemies of the United States
while China and Russia were its allies. Now, their national interests have changed and no
longer intersect; so have their status as friends and enemies. Their enemies yesterday
are their friends today. And vice versa. Ditto for China. Its rhetoric and acts are always
calculated to promote its interests.
By itself, the award cannot be used by the Philippines to prevent (much less oust) China
from occupying the rocks above water at high tide in the SCS and from reclaiming land,
constructing airports, seaports and other installations thereon, because, as I said, it
covered only rights over water, not over land.

Unlike the great powers, the Philippines does not have the military capability to watch
over and protect Filipinos who fish or exploit the natural resources in the WPS. True, it
has concluded mutual defense pacts with the great powers like the United States.

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Sadly, however, these treaties have no express provisions that obligate them to protect
our maritime rights in the WPS. They will do so only if their national interests impel them
to. After all, the American people pay taxes to protect their interests, not those of aliens.
“America First” is their slogan.

How then can we enforce our maritime rights in the WPS? Ah, that’s a good topic for
another column.

Comments to chiefjusticepanganiban@hotmail.com

Pitfalls of enforcing foreign arbitral awards in the Philippines

24 January 2019

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL arbitration is a relatively new area of

practice in the Philippines. While the Philippines became a signatory to the
UN Convention on the Recognition and the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1958 (the New York Convention) as early as 10 June 1958, no
laws were enacted prescribing the mechanics for the conduct of international
arbitration, or for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the
Philippines, for almost 50 years. All we had back then was Republic Act 876 –
a law for domestic arbitration.

Enrique dela Cruz

Senior Partner at
Divina Law in Manila
Tel: (632) 822 0808 local 290
Cell: + (63) 917 5329093
Email: enrique.delacruz@divinalaw.com
Since there was no law enacted in the Philippines providing a specific procedure for the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, Philippine courts treated these awards as
foreign judgments. Thus, foreign arbitral awards have sometimes been deemed only
presumptively valid, rather than conclusively valid, as required by the New York
Convention. It was only in 2004 that the Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act (RA)
9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004).

In 2008 the Philippine Supreme Court issued the Special Rules of Court on Alternative
Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules) to provide guidance on the interpretation of
some provisions of RA 9285.

Section 44 of RA 9285 states that a foreign arbitral award is not a foreign judgment.
For the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, the applicable rule is
section 48, rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which requires only proof of fact of the said
judgment, and that once proven, the said foreign judgment enjoys a disputable
presumption of validity (BPI Securities Corp v Guevara, 2015).

A petition for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award is a special
proceeding. Under rule 13.3 of the Special ADR Rules, the petition shall, at the
petitioner’s option, be filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC): (1) where the assets to
be attached or levied upon is located; (2) where the act to be enjoined is being
performed; (3) in the principal place of business in the Philippines of any of the parties;
(4) if any of the parties is an individual, where any of the individuals reside: or (5) in
the national capital judicial region.

Rule 1.4 of the Special ADR Rules requires that the petition be verified and
accompanied by a Certification Against Forum Shopping.

Rule 13.5 of the Special ADR Rules further requires that the petitioner plead in the
petition: (1) the addresses of the parties to arbitration; (2) the country where the
arbitral award was made, and whether that country is a signatory to the New York
Convention; and (3) the relief sought. The petitioner is likewise required to attach to
the petition: (1) an authentic copy of the arbitration agreement; and (2) an authentic
copy of the arbitral award.

An action for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is incapable of

pecuniary estimation (Mijares v Ranada, 2005). Hence, under rule 20.1 of the Special
ADR Rules, only a minimal filing fee is required.

Under rule 13.6 of the Special ADR Rules, upon receipt of the petition, the court shall
initially determine whether it is sufficient in form and in substance, after which the court
shall cause the service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent.

Under rules 13.6 and 13.7, the court sends a notice to the respondent to file a verified
opposition within 30 days from receipt of the notice and petition. This 30-day period is
non-extendible since a motion for extension is a prohibited pleading under rule 1.6.
Under rule 1.9, the court “acquires authority to act on the petition or motion upon proof
of jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the respondent was furnished with a copy of the petition
and the notice of hearing”. The burden of proof lies with the petitioner.

The hearing referred to in rule 1.9 is the initial hearing to prove the jurisdictional facts.
The notice of initial hearing contains a directive for the respondent to file an opposition
to the petition for recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award. A
respondent’s failure to submit an opposition shall not be cause for a declaration of
default, as this is also a prohibited pleading under rule 1.6 (g).

Once the respondent has filed its opposition, the court determines whether the issue
between the parties is one of law or fact. Under rule 13.8 of the Special ADR Rules, if
the issue is mainly one of law, the court will require the submission of a brief of legal
arguments not more than 30 days from receipt of the order.

On the other hand, if there are issues of fact, the court in accordance with rule 13.8
shall, motu proprio, or upon the request of a party, require the parties to
simultaneously submit the affidavits of their respective witnesses within a period of not
less than 15 days nor more than 30 days from receipt of the order.

Under section 45 of the ADR Act, and under Rule 13.4 of the Special ADR Rules, the
RTC shall refuse recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award only upon
proof that:

(1) A party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity, or the agreement
is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it, or, failing any
indication, under the law of the country where the award was made; or

(2) The party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of
an arbitrator or of arbitral proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present their case;
or
(3) The award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award
that contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or

(4) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where arbitration took place; or

(5) The award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or
suspended by a court of the country in which that award was made.

Rule 13.4(b) further provides that the foreign arbitral award may be refused recognition
and enforcement by the court if it finds that:

(1) The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement or resolution by
arbitration under Philippine law; or

(2) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy.

Although the RTC can deny recognition and enforcement, it has no power to vacate or
set aside a foreign arbitral award (rule 19.11, Special ADR Rules).

An appeal from a final order of the RTC may be taken to the Court of Appeals via
petition for review under rule 19.12 of the Special ADR Rules within 15 days from notice
of the RTC decision. The decision of the RTC is immediately executory (rule 13.11 of
the Special ADR Rules). Rule 19.22 of the Special ADR Rules categorically states that:
“The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed unless the Court of Appeals directs otherwise upon such terms as it may deem
just.”

How the Philippines Can Enforce Its Arbitral Award without Going to War with China
4 Replies

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By Marcial Bonifacio

August 31, 2020

My friends and countrymen, as we observe National Heroes’ Day on August 31, 2020, it
is most appropriate to contemplate our country’s sovereignty, which includes maritime
rights.  Throughout his term, President Rodrigo Duterte has repeatedly expressed the
false notion that China is “in possession” of the West Philippine Sea (WPS) and that the
Philippines is powerless to assert its sovereign rights therein, short of waging war with
China, the latest declaration having been made in his last State of the Nation Address
on July 27.  Consequently, every time he does so, his critics persistently rebut him,
particularly the astute Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio, who was instrumental in
the favorable 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the WPS.

In my “Open Letter to President Duterte” and “Why Filipinos Should Give a Damn about
Panatag Shoal,” I have presented some of Carpio’s advice on how the Philippines can,
indeed, enforce its arbitral award without waging war with China, some of which I have
likewise enumerated below.  Some of them are Carpio’s direct response to Duterte upon
publicly asking him what action to undertake, as in the following dialogue:

“Xi Jinping [said] there will be trouble,” stated Duterte, “so answer me, Justice, give me
the formula and I’ll do it.”

“My response is yes, Mr. President, there is a formula,” replied Carpio, “and not only
one but many ways of enforcing the arbitral award without going to war with China,
using only the rule of law.”

Without further ado, I present those options which Carpio stated should be
implemented “together to fortify the award part by part, brick by brick, until the award
is fully enforced.”

 The Philippines can join a convention with Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Brunei regarding the South China Sea.  The convention can declare that no
geologic feature in the Spratly Islands generates an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) and that there are only territorial seas from the geologic features that are
above water at high tide, as ruled by the PCA.  According to Carpio, China will be
“isolated” as the only country claiming EEZs from the Spratly Islands.  Countries
that assert freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea are also
expected to follow such a convention, he added.
 The Philippines can invite Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei to conduct
joint FONOPs in respective EEZs facing the West Philippine Sea.  “This will be a
 common assertion by 5 coastal states that each of them have their own
respective EEZs in South China Sea thereby enforcing the arbitral award that
China’s 9-dash line has no legal effect and cannot serve as basis to claim the
waters of the South China Sea,” Carpio said.  By conducting joint FONOPs, it will
also affirm the EEZ of the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea.  Carpio said that
while the Philippines should welcome and join these operations, it has instead
distanced the country from them, saying the Philippines “does not take sides” in
disputes between China and other countries in the area, a seemingly treacherous
gesture vis-à-vis the oldest and most loyal ally, the U.S.
 The Philippines can welcome and encourage the freedom of navigation and
overflight operations (FONOPs) of the U.S., U.K., France, Australia, Japan, India
and Canada in the South China Sea, including the West Philippine Sea. The naval
and aerial operations of these naval powers, which are in conformity with
UNCLOS and customary international law, have increased in frequency since the
2016 PCA award, and are what Carpio describes as the “most robust
enforcement” of the arbitral award, bridging the gap between the rule of law and
the rule of justice.
 The Philippines can persuade the U.S. to declare Panatag Shoal as part of
Philippine territory, which would protect it under the 1951 Philippine-U.S. Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT).  Such action would add clarity for legal ramifications,
since the shoal was known to be under Philippine jurisdiction as early as the
American colonial period and even under Spanish rule.  The Japanese did
precisely that with their Senkaku islands, which the U.S. declared as part of
Japan’s territory for purposes of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty.
 The Philippines could send the Philippine Navy to patrol Panatag Shoal.  “As the
South China Sea is part of the Pacific,” stated U.S. State Sec. Mike Pompeo, “any
armed attack on any Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South
China Sea will trigger mutual defense treaty obligations under Article 4 of our
Mutual Defense Treaty.”  Of course, that would prompt the U.S. Navy to
intervene.
 The Philippines can resume joint naval patrols with the U.S. in the West
Philippine Sea in order to project military might, which could deter China from
continuing its island-building activity on Panatag Shoal.
 The Philippine Coast Guard can send its ten 44-meter multi-role response vessels
that were donated by Japan to patrol the West Philippine Sea.  These vessels,
Carpio said, are ideal for patrolling and catching poachers in the Philippines’ EEZ
in the West Philippine Sea. Doing so will also assert the country’s sovereign
rights in the maritime area.
 Congress can enact legislation to make permanent the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). 
Indeed, the MDT would be rendered obsolete without either of them as
elucidated by Foreign Affairs Sec. Teodoro Locsin:
The Mutual Defense Treaty without the VFA and EDCA may be compared to a deflated
balloon. For all practical purposes, it becomes an extra large rubber for an Asian. Far
more elastic than he can ever need for its purpose and far more suitable as a shower
cap than a prophylactic against foreign aggression.

Aside from the two treaties giving teeth to the MDT, making them permanent would
revitalize and fortify America’s alliance with the Philippines while deterring China and
other potential aggressors, as well as quelling terrorist threats.

 The Philippines can emulate America’s foreign policy of imposing visa restrictions
on all persons and business entities which Pompeo characterizes as “responsible
for, or complicit in, either the large-scale reclamation, construction, or
militarization of disputed outposts in the South China Sea, or [the People’s
Republic of China’s] use of coercion against Southeast Asian claimants to inhibit
their access to offshore resources.”
 The Philippines can terminate contracts with Chinese firms which are, in any
way, involved in reclamation and militarization activities in the WPS.  In fact,
Locsin has already publicly said he would make such a recommendation to the
appropriate agencies.
 The Philippines can file an extended continental shelf claim in the West Philippine
Sea beyond the 200-nautical mile EEZ off the coast of Luzon, where China is the
only opposite coastal state. The Philippines can file this unilaterally with the UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. China cannot invoke historic
rights under its nine-dash line claim which has already been ruled without legal
effect by the PCA. China’s own extended continental shelf does not overlap with
the extended continental shelf of the Philippines in this maritime area.
 The Philippines can “bring China’s threat of war to another United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) arbitral tribunal, to secure an order
directing China to comply with the ruling of the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal that
declared the Reed Bank part of Philippine EEZ.”  He added that the “Philippines
can also ask for damages for every day of delay that the Philippines is prevented
by China from exploiting Philippine EEZ.”
 The Philippines can facilitate efforts of active citizens to enforce the arbitral
award.  Carpio referred to the case filed by former Foreign Affairs Secretary
Albert del Rosario and former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales against
Chinese President Xi Jinping before the International Criminal Court. The
complaint accused Xi of crimes against humanity over environmental damage in
the South China Sea.
 According to Senator Richard Gordon, the National Security Council can regularly
convene and collaborate with a think tank paneled by foreign policy and defense
experts.  Such regular meetings could keep the Philippines prepared for various
contingencies.  “Alam naman natin na there is always contention in that area,”
stated Gordon, “kaya dapat nakahanda tayo kung ano ang mangyayari diyan.”
  The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) can and should immediately issue a
clarification that China is in fact not in possession, and legally can never be in
possession, of the WPS.  According to Carpio, the international law doctrine of
unilateral declarations can bind the Philippines to Duterte’s statement about
China’s alleged possession of the WPS, whereby China can claim the Philippines
has forfeited its sovereign rights.  Hence, clarification from the DFA is essential.
 The Senate and the House of Representatives can pass resolutions declaring that
China is not in possession of the WPS.
 All professional, civic, social, political, student, and alumni organizations, and all
Filipino citizens, can and should overwhelm Malacañang with statements and text
messages: China is not, and will never be, in possession of the WPS.

In conclusion, my friends and countrymen, lest the Philippines becomes “a province of

China,” we can and must assert our sovereign rights in the WPS, regardless of Duterte’s
rhetoric.  In the authoritative words of Carpio, “The Filipino people should not be
intimidated by national leaders who peddle a false option that either we go to war with
China or submit to China. This false option should be discredited once and for all. . . We
cannot adopt a defeatist attitude and just sit idly by and let China seize what
international law has declared to be our own Exclusive Economic Zone. . . This is the
moment for all Filipinos to unite in defense of Philippine sovereign rights in the WPS.”

Mabuhay ang Pilipinas!