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GREAT BRITAIN

1. MILITARY

 Britain’s global retreat on the world’s military stage is not a recent development but is
showing every sign of accelerating.
2010-15: 10% budget cut with an additional 10% predicted for 2015-20
Britain’s number of soldiers is at its lowest point since the 1770s
 The UK has fallen behind in the past decade in terms of equipment
Air force capability no longer up to date
 This may compromise Britain being the US’s favoured military partner and what remains of
the so-called “special relationship”
The US’s defense secretary warned that Britain could be supplanted by France
This comes in a context of unprecedented pressure piled by D. Trump for NATO partners to take on a
greater share of the alliance’s collective spending while the UK only spends 1/12 th of the US’s military
budget
 But the key question remains: Is Britain’s military capability today still aligned with the real
threats of the day.
+ Trident = major submarine-based nuclear deterrence system operating since 1980s, the program has
been renewed in 2016 allowing the operations to continue until about 2060  debating point : is it
consistent/coherent with the spirit of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty + can the UK afford to be a
nuclear power on its own + but discontinuing the program equals a loss of valuable expertise
+ New aircraft carriers
hardware expenses needed for the top military status (“Tier 1” equipment) to the detriment of
much needed capabilities in cyberwarfare and antiterrorism defense

2. SOFT POWER

 Soft power is by its nature hard to measure but the UK has scored highly in a number of
rankings in recent past, including first place in 2018

a) Relationship to partner and beyond

 Diplomacy
 UK has a reputation for constructive/positive engagement on global issues like climate
change and free trade
 But in recent years, their diplomacy has shown signs of fragility
Indeed, while the US is disintegrating under Donald Trump, Germany and France are
picking up the slack, with limited input from the UK.
two major trends can be account for this evolution:
+ Preoccupation with the Brexit process since 2016 is creating confusion as to what direction Britain’s
foreign policy is going to take in the future + it is taking up valuable Parliamentary time + the regime
appears to be instable, a consequence of their inability to decide on a Brexit deal, therefore the country
seems to be an insecure investment while it needs to engage in new markets + Britain’s withdrawal
from the EU is seen as a rejection of European identity by a country whose engagement in European
project has always been lukewarm/reluctant + added to the ambiguities with which the Brexit
negotiations has been carried out and the fact that the status of EU nationals living there is still to be
decided  it may take years of soft power effort to build new bridges
+ Gradual retrenchment of Government spendings since 2010 has resulted in :
+ 24% cuts in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) budget, causing : the need of Britain to sell
some of its ambassies (for instance in Bangkok, Thailand)
+ 10% cut in British Council branches between 2013 and 2018, while China and Russia expand their
cultural relation institutions – but the British Council is still represented in over 100 countries building
connections throught cultural programmes and language classes
 UK shows a focus on the developing world, both as a way to target new potential partners
and to counter Russian and Chinese initiatives in key areas like Sub-Saharan Africa (at the
expense of a loss of influence with historical European partners)
BBC World Service broadcasts news to over 300m viewers worldwide, it is set to benefit from a bit less
than 300m £ in order to expand its audience to 500m and its range of programmes to Africa and
Russia’s neighbours

 Commonwealth
 The commonwealth allows for privileged trader partnerships between member nations
(Britain’s former empire)
 The organisation has limited funding + it has an ambiguous status in today’s world since it is
considered as a neo-colonial institution and an extension of colonialism.
 We may also wonder whether former colonies need British leadership through the
commonwealth.
+ Indeed, some of them like Singapore have surpassed Britain in per capita income and growth
+ some like India might be keener to strike deals with the EU than indulge a post Brexit-United
Kingdom on the rebound and desperately scrambling for new partners.
+ Canada fears that with Britain’s departure from the UE, they are losing their best advocate in Europe
 Despite appearances of Britain still leading the game (shown by the choice of Prince Charles
as next head of the Commonwealth currently held by Queen Elizabeth 2), it might face
multiple obstacles in trying to replace EU trade with long neglected partners, especially since
Eurosceptic politicians (now at the wheel) have not always been the most vocal supporters in
recent decades of developing countries.

b) Image and attractiveness

 Contributions to international developments and value promotion


 While the Foreign Office is being stripped down of its assets and budget, Britain’s
international development budget has been consistently increased over the past years
making UK’s government the world’s fifth biggest donor relative to GDP.
Major programs to combat Ebola in West Africa or to promote the rights of women and girls are
essential to the UK’s influence in the world thought public organizations.
 Although these initiatives are laudable, fears have been voices that pouring money into ill-
defined development initiatives diminishes essential funding from the FCO (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office) and therefore might not be the best way in the end to promote
British interest.
Some programs, like the Magna Carta Fund, depend on the FCO funding => it led to calls to consolidate
the Foreign Office department which would absorb the current foreign aid unit -> Boris Johnson asked
for a multibillion cut to UK aid budget + This kind of approach might be necessary if the Foreign Office
is to ensure true leadership in the post-Brexit period
 Britain’s efforts to promote human rights and a rules-based order around the world is in
contradiction with its relationship with authoritarian regimes such as Saudi-Arabia and China
in recent years and even more since the Brexit withdrawal process started. While potentially
beneficial at the moment, it might on the long term undermine Britain’s status in
international institutions.

 Educational and research assets


 While it has been for a very long time the second most attractive country for students, the
UK has been recently knocked down to third place by Australia => a result of tightening visa
regulations but also an uncertain Brexit outcome, which makes foreign students reluctant to
migrate, a grey future for schemes like Erasmus, as well as a perceived climate of distrust
towards foreigners.
+World leading universities like Oxford, Cambridge, or Imperial College are worried that their status
might be threatened by their inability to attract top researchers from around the world
+ a no-deal Brexit would threaten scientific collaboration networks across Europe, jeopardize the
situation of thousands of European academics in the UK, cut off access to valuable European funding
and ultimately undermine British research and innovation
==> a decline is already visible as two third of UK’s top universities have slipped in international league
tables in 2019
+ The ability of Britain’s urban tech hubs to innovate and compete on the world stage is being
compromised, these hubs boast/offer top locations (close to the City) for innovative entrepreneurship
and business => Brexit presents a challenge as European Investment Fund are drying up, and the
banking status of the City itself is uncertain

c) The paradox of soft power: the UK’s feet of clay?

 Feet of clay (pied d’argile) means while it appears powerful, it is in fact weak
 Since soft power is no longer limited to an elitist group of foreign affair diplomats, it is by no
means certain that a diminution in the capabilities of the FO irrevocably spells the doom of
Britain’s influence abroad. Whatever the changes ahead to come are, the UK has already
scored consistently high in a number of academic rankings for soft power in recent years => it
begs the question: how long will historical trends sustain Britain’s soft power predominance
without proper resource allocation from government, at a time of gradual shift towards
eastern powers and as EU funding for universities is set to dry up?

3. BREXIT

a) Major dates

 March 29th, 2017 new Prime Minister Theresa May handed in Britain’s exit letter despite
pressure from some groups to wait, kicking off a two-year negotiating period
 March 29th, 2019 was official Brexit day. By then, the UK’s position towards the EU should
have been final whether an agreement had been reached or not. However, the EU granted a
last minute extension to October 31 st
 May 2019 Parliament turned down the Brexit deal negotiated between prime minister
Theresa May and Brussels for the 3rd time. She resigned in June
 October 27th Brexit was postponed to 31st January despite the worlds of Boris who said he’d
rather die in a ditch than delay Brexit
 What should happen on the official Brexit day:
+ If the prime minister manages to get a deal from Brussels and get it through parliament, a
21-month transition period will follow, allowing to smooth out post-Brexit relationships with
the EU, and bring the UK to strike up new trade deals
+ If not, the UK may simply decide to walk away without a deal: the no-deal scenario which
would have far reaching consequences on both sides. However, it would probably not spell
the end of the UK’s talks with Europe, as it would have to go back to the negotiating table
sooner or later if it wants to keep trading with the EU.

b) What does Britain want?

 The results of the original referendum were extremely close and it is difficult to assess how
much opinion may have shifted or not since. Weariness and division are settling in; people
have started to resent/dislike not only the Brexit representatives but also the millions of
people they consider being in the wrong
 Part of the arguments of the Leave campaign (getting back control from Brussels, striking
deals with the Commonwealth) still ring true despite being criticized far and wide and
exposed as impractical(unrealistic). Some 30%, would still be willing to crash out without a
deal, and embrace the kind of national grit (graine) which helped vanquish enemies in the
two world wars and run an empire.
 Repeated failure in Parliament have made it clear that no simple single option (deal, no deal,
remain) commands a strong enough majority. As of today, it is not clear whether there is a
majority in Parliament for any deal at all, whether soft or hard.

c) Where does the opposition fit in all this?

 The Labour Party has been stuck in a crisis on its own since Jeremy Corbyn was elected as its
leader, reviving a dispute between “Old Labour” and “New Labour”. While these issues
predate the Brexit decision, they undermine the ability of Labour to mount a coherent
opposition. The leadership of the party refuses to take a strong position on Brexit as part of
the upcoming election, promising at best a second referendum. A possible reason may be
the fact that they don’t want to go against the will of people as expressed in the
referendum, especially in northern regions. But his economic and social program includes a
number of measures which cannot be achieved within the current EU pro-competition.

d) Would Brexit offer a net benefit for the UK?

4. MORE INFORMATION

 Assessing the UK government’s leadership and strategy

 In many areas the UK is expected to assert its historical power – but fails to:
+ fight against ISIS (Etat Islamique) in Iraq and Afghanistan reduced to bare minimum

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