Comprendre Les Attributions Des Irresponsabilites Sociales Des Entreprises

UNDERSTANDING ATTRIBUTIONS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY
Author(s): DONALD LANGE and NATHAN T. WASHBURN

Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 300-326
Published by: Academy of Management
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© Academy of Management Review
2012, Vol. 37. No. 2, 300-326.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2010.0522
UNDERSTANDING ATTRIBUTIONS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY
DONALD LANGE
Arizona State University
NATHAN T. WASHBURN
Thunderbird School of Global Management
Notwithstanding the significance to organizations of external reactions to bad behav

ior, the corporate social responsibility literature tends to focus on the meaning of and
expectations for responsible behavior, rather than on the meaning of irresponsible
behavior. Here we develop a theoretical perspective that explicitly focuses on irre
sponsibility and that particularly helps explain attributions of social irresponsibility
in the minds of the firm's observers. In contrast to approaches in the corporate social
responsibility literature that tend to deemphasize the role of the individual perceiver
of firm behavior in favor of emphasizing such broader social structures as value
systems, institutions, and stakeholder relations, our focus is on how the social reality
of external expectations for social responsibility is rooted in the perceptions of the
beholder. We draw on attribution theory to describe how attributions of irresponsibil
ity stem from the observer's subjective assessments of effect undesirability, corporate
culpability, and affected party noncomplicity. We describe how those assessments
affect each other and how they are influenced by the observer's perceptions of effect
and firm characteristics and by the observer's social identification with the affected
party or the implicated corporation. We conclude by describing the important role of
frames on irresponsibility attributions.
Widespread external perceptions that a firm loss, or other costs associated with a negative
has acted in a socially irresponsible manner reputation (e.g., Baucus & Baucus, 1997; David
can have negative consequences for a firm, son, Worrell, & Cheng, 1994; Haunschild, Sulli
since an organization's success—indeed its sur van, & Page, 2006; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2008;
vival—depends, in part, on satisfying normativeStrachan, Smith, & Beedles, 1983).
expectations from its environment (Pfeffer & In spite of the demonstrated significance to
Salancik, 1978; Scott, 2008). When organizationalorganizations of reactions to bad behavior, the
action seems controversial to observers and corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature
constituents, the firm risks losing current and tends to focus on the meaning of and expecta
potential members, as well as outside endorse tions for responsible behavior, rather than on
ment and support, and it risks providing "am the meaning of irresponsible behavior. Irre
munition for adversaries" (Elsbach & Sutton, sponsibility, distinct from responsibility, is
often not discussed explicitly in the CSR litera
1992: 712). An organization that is seen as a bad
actor in society can have a hard time attracting
ture,1 but the implication is that irresponsibility
customers, investors, and employees (Fombrun, is simply the opposite side of the responsibility
1996). Indeed, ample evidence from empirical coin—that is, the failure to act responsibly. Here
research shows that counternormative behavior we develop a theoretical perspective that ex
can lead to such consequences for the firm as focuses on irresponsibility and that par
plicitly
lawsuits, financial losses through settlementsticularly helps explain attributions of social ir
and sales declines, increases in the cost ofresponsibility
cap in the minds of the firm's
observers.
ital, market share deterioration, network partner
1 A number of counterexamples to this tendency include

We are grateful to former associate editor Jean-Philippe
Bonardi and the three anonymous reviewers for providing
Mattingly and Berman (2006); Strike, Gao, and Bansal (2006);
Doh, Howton, Howton, and Siegel (2010); and Muller and
challenging and insightful feedback throughout the review
process. Kraussl (2011).
300
Copyright of the Academy of Management, all rights reserved. Contents may not be copied, emailed, posted to a listserv, or otherwise transmitted without the copyright
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2012 Lange and Washburn 301
One reason that perceptions of social irre behavior as a fairly stable social reality. This
sponsibility are of particular interest is that they approach is useful in many ways, but it risks
have a greater capacity to arouse the firm's ob confusing expectations for social responsibility
servers. Research on human perception shows as universal law and ignores the role of the
that there is significant asymmetry between the human observer in evaluating the firm's behav
cognitive processing that observers do in re ior in light of socially constructed expectations
sponse to negative (adverse or threatening) (cf. Berger & Luckman, 1967: 187). In contrast to
events and the cognitive processing they do in the prevailing approach to environmental ex
response to positive events (Baumeister, Brat pectations found in the CSR literature—an ap
slavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Fiske & Tay proach that deemphasizes the role of the indi
lor, 2008; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). When con vidual perceiver of firm behavior in favor of
fronted with negative behavior, people will emphasizing such broader social structures as
spend more time thinking about it than positive value systems, institutions, and stakeholder re
or neutral behavior, they will search more ex lations—our focus here is on how the social
tensively for causal information, and their re reality of firm irresponsibility has its roots in the
sulting judgments, allegations, and actions will perceptions of the beholder.
be more extreme (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Shaver,
1985; Taylor, 1991). As Shaver observes, "People ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND PERCEPTIONS
are never blamed for doing good" (1985: 3). Con OF CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY
sequently, perceptions of social irresponsibility
are likely to generate stronger observer reac In this article we consider how subjective un
tions and ultimately loom much larger for the derstandings and interpretations of firm behav
firm than perceptions of social responsibility ior can add up to perceptions of corporate social
(Frooman, 1997; McGuire, Dow, & Argheyd, 2003; irresponsibility. The subjective nature of those
Muller & Kraussl, 2011; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rin understandings and interpretations might un
dova, 2010; Rao & Hamilton, 1996). derlie, for example, the greater degree of public
Moreover—and owing to the heightened cog disdain directed at BP in the United States in the
nitive activity and intensified causal search as wake of its 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill relative
sociated with negative behavior—attributions to the public disdain directed at Royal Dutch
of social irresponsibility are of particular inter Shell—in spite of Shell's association with mas
est because they lend themselves to a focus on sive amounts of oil spilled over the past
the individual's perceptions. Thus, they provide fifty years, causing tremendous environmental
a context for considering how social under destruction in the Niger Delta (Nossiter, 2010).
standings of firm behavior in terms of appropri Similarly, the subjective nature of observer un
ateness and responsibility ultimately are rooted derstandings and interpretations might under
in the interpretations and knowledge held by lie the higher level of public scorn directed at
individual observers of the firm (cf. Bitektine, Ford Motor Company in the 1970s for its Pinto
2011). This is important because, as a driver of model relative to that directed at its competitors
consequences for the firm, especially in terms of with their own compact cars. The Ford Pinto
the firm's relationship with its environment, cor became known as a deathtrap and one of the
porate behavior is socially irresponsible only toworst cars ever made (Dowie, 1977), even though
the extent that observers perceive it as such. Yetother compact cars on the market at the time
in the CSR literature researchers have paid rel (e.g., Chevrolet Vega, AMC Gremlin, Toyota Co
atively little attention to the question of howrolla, Volkswagen Beetle) shared many of the
such perceptions of firm irresponsibility come toPinto's design flaws and had similar track re
be. A commonality among different lines of CSR cords in terms of occupant deaths per million
research, whether from the stakeholder (e.g., cars in operation (Schwartz, 1991). Ford execu
Barnett, 2007), economic (e.g., Margolis & Walsh, tives were characterized as having "deliber
2003), reputation (e.g., Bertels & Peloza, 2008), ately and intentionally made a high-level cor
social contract (e.g., Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999),porate decision which they knew would kill or
or institutional (e.g., Campbell, 2007) perspec maim a known and finite number of people"
tive, is that each, in its own way, models envi (Schwartz, 1991: 1036), while other carmakers es
ronmental expectations for socially responsiblecaped this attribution.
302 Academy of Management Review April
Certainly, as with most

perceptions of the
of corporate countless
social irresponsibility. exam
ples where one firmor firm
Attribution action
theory—which is, in is widely
reality, a collec se
as more socially irresponsible than another, tion of theories and theoretical perspectives
there are identifiable characteristics of the BP (Kelley & Michela, 1980)—was developed in so
and Pinto situations that lend themselves to cial psychology and extended to organization
subjective perceptions of irresponsibility. With
studies (Martinko, 2004) and is devoted to the
respect to BP, the Gulf spill was relatively con
nature, causes, and consequences of attribu
centrated in time, especially compared tions to incre
(e.g., Hamilton, 1980; Heider, 1958; Kelley,
mental spills occurring over many years, andKelley
1973; it & Michela, 1980; Lord & Smith, 1983;
followed a dramatic oil platform explosion that 2004). At the level of the observer, the
Martinko,
killed oil workers. From the perspective of idea of corporate social irresponsibility is a cog
United States observers, the BP spill was geo nitive structure, or schema, meaning that it is an
graphically proximate, and it had an immediate element of the observer's abstract expectations
negative economic impact. All of these charac about how the world operates (Fiske & Taylor,
teristics distinguished BP's profile in the Gulf oil 1991). We draw on arguments central to attribu
spill situation from Shell's profile in the Niger tion theory, especially about how observers form
Delta oil spill situation. With respect to Ford, the
causal inferences (Heider, 1958; Kelley & Mi
Pinto was associated, in lawsuits and press re chela, 1980) and moral judgments (Brewin &
ports, not just with the debilitating injuries and
Antaki, 1987; Hamilton, 1980; Jones & Davis, 1965;
deaths of its occupants, including children, but
Kanouse & Hanson, 1972), to help explain the
also with automobile fires and explosions.
factors that may lead observers to categorize
Moreover, Ford was associated in the press
observations of firm behavior as fitting the so
accurately or not—with callous and heartless
cial irresponsibility schema.
corporate decision making, including a putative
While the firm and situation being observed
internal and secretive cost-benefit analysis in
which the financial cost to Ford of the human have specific qualities that exist independent of
lives predicted to be lost in Pintos was com an observer, in this article we explore the theo
retical mechanisms that influence an observer's
pared to the cost of making the Pinto safer
(Gioia, 1992). All of these characteristics distin attention to and interpretation of those qualities.
guished Ford's profile in the Pinto situation fromCorporate social irresponsibility attributions
its competitors' profiles. are rationally derived as the observer considers
the evidence about the firm's behavior and sit
Our objective is to achieve a better under
uation, but because those attributions are de
standing of these kinds of effects, whereby char
acteristics within given situations predictably pendent upon the individual's attention and in
skew subjective perceptions and, in particular, terpretation, they are highly subjective. As Fiske
an observer's perception that a firm is socially and Taylor write, attribution is "far from logical
irresponsible. Understanding these effects is and thorough" (1991: 553).
valuable not only for researchers but also for The primary theoretical mechanisms affecting
practitioners, since subjective perceptions helpobserver attention and interpretation, and ther
constitute the external environment within fore underpinning our model of corporate socia
which the firm must exist and with which the irresponsibility attributions, involve (1) observe
firm must interact. As Wry notes with respect torational judgment and inference, (2) observer b
how external observers react to a firm and its ases and perceptual limitations that skew pe
behavior, "Individuals act based on perceptions,ceptions of the firm and situation, and (3) the
not objective reality" (2009: 156). An observer's
sensitivity of observer assessments to the ways
that others have filtered and framed information
belief that a firm has the quality of social irre
about the firm and situation. As we describe in
sponsibility is, in effect, an attribution—a term
that we use from attribution theory to describe our model development below, observer rational
an observer's explanations of the firm's behavjudgment and inference include considerations
iors and outcomes in terms of firm and situa of evidence about the firm's intent with respect
tional characteristics. Indeed, attribution theory
to a negative social effect, about the affected
provides the theoretical foundation in this party's power and foresight with respect to the
article as we develop our descriptive model of effect, and about characteristics of the firm and
situation that provide

attributions clues
(Sherman & Percy, 2010; Yzerbyt, Ro a
firm was indeed causal. gier, & Fiske, 1998). A social group will be per
Playing a large role in our model development ceived analogously to an individual for the pur
are the theoretical mechanisms of observer bi poses of attribution when it is perceived as
ases and perceptual limitations. We describe having a high degree of entitativity, meaning
how observer attributions are shaped by ten that the group is seen as a coherent, unified, and
dencies toward self and ingroup protection. meaningful entity (Campbell, 1958; Lickel et al.,
These observer tendencies produce biases 2000; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997;
that can result in selective attention, skewed Yzerbyt et al., 1998). "The difference between
interpretation, and gap filling in response toperceptions of individuals and groups virtually
missing or ambiguous evidence (Fiske & Tay disappears when a group is high in perceived
lor, 2008). We also describe how observer bi entitativity" (Sherman & Percy, 2010: 149). This
ases and perceptual limitations help explain would be the case for corporations, which are
how attention and interpretation can be influ perceived by outsiders as coherent, unified, and
enced by specific qualities of the effect— meaningful entities. As Sherman and Percy
including negativity, seriousness, unexpect write, "Despite the fact that corporations consti
edness, and concentration in time and space— tute groups of people rather than individuals,
and by specific qualities of the implicated the entitativity of such groups leads them to be
firm—including size and prominence. Addi viewed much like cohesive individuals" (2010:
tionally, observer attention and interpretation 168). Accordingly, the model we develop in this
can be influenced by the observer's possible article positions the corporation as the target
preexisting categorization of the firm as fitting of perceiver attributions, under the assump
the schema of social irresponsibility. tion that perceivers view the corporation as if
Moreover, we describe how the observer's it were a cohesive individual to be held re
judgments and inferences are sensitive to the
sponsible for its behaviors and outcomes.
accounts and apologies offered by the firm, as
well as to the way that third parties have fil
tered and framed the information about the firm,
THREE PRIMARY FACTORS UNDERLYING
effect, and affected party (Snow & Benford, 1988; CORPORATE SOCIAL
Wood & Mitchell, 1981). Such accounts, apolo IRRESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS
gies, and frames are commonly available to the
firm's observers, predominantly emanating from To model corporate social irresponsibility at
or transmitted by the media. Because of the fre tributions, we start by assuming a knowledge
quent association of corporations with ill effects, able and reasonable observer, albeit subject to
and because corporations are such an omni typical human cognitive limitations, biases, and
present, socially significant, and influential fea spontaneous reactions. We suggest that when
ture of modern life, it is likely that the general such an observer makes an attribution of social
observer is quite accustomed and attentive to irresponsibility, he or she not only is judging
narratives from the firm or from third parties that the corporation effected some social harm
that attempt to disassociate or associate the but also is concluding that the corporation has a
firm with bad behavior. Such narratives reso moral responsibility and should be held in con
nate in the context of widespread cultural temptconfor the harm. In this way an attribution of
cerns about organizations in general. Those corporate
cul social irresponsibility is relevant to
tural concerns derive from the ubiquity of the two lines of thought in attribution theory
organizations and their reach into all aspects of identified by Hamilton (1980). In the first line of
social life, combined with pervasive suspicions thought, the perceiver is conceptualized as an
that as firms prioritize profits over social inter "intuitive psychologist" (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977:
ests, they may act in ways that are exploitive 174) conducting "explanatory inquiry" (Hamil
and immoral (Korten, 2001; Scott, 2003). ton, 1980: 769). Here the perceiver is seen as
Attribution theory most often conceptualizes continually engaging in causal analysis—
the targets of attributions as individual actors, spontaneously making inferences to explain the
but the same theoretical explanations can be behavior and outcomes of others (Heider, 1958;
relevant when a social group is the target of Kelley, 1967, 1973). A key distinction for the ob
server when developing causal FIGURE 1 inferences

The Core as
tween causes understood Modelemanating
of Corporate Social from
actor and causes understood as emanating from Irresponsibility Attributions
the situation the actor is in (Heider, 1958). In the
second line of thought, the perceiver is concep
Observer
tualized as an "intuitive lawyer" conducting assessments of
"sanctioning inquiry" (Hamilton, 1980: 767). Here effect undesirability^
based on
the perceiver is seen as assigning responsibility threat avoidance,
or blame for harm. The emphasis is not strictly moral impulses, and/
norms lor
on determining cause and effect but, rather, on . moral behavior.
. P2+
concluding who is worthy of sanction (Alicke,
2000; Hamilton, 1980). Indeed, sanctioning in (Pla and Plb)
Observer
assessments of
quiry may transcend careful analysis of cause Observer corporate culpability '
attributions based on
and effect (Hamilton, 1980). Thus, in this line of of inferences of causality)
thought in the attribution theory literature, corporate social and judgments of
moral
attribution entails moral evaluation (Brewin & .irresponsibilityy
responsibility
Antaki, 1987; Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Mar
P3+
tinko, 1995). Observer
assessments of
We integrate both of these lines of thought affected party
from attribution theory to develop our core noncomplicity
based on
model of corporate social irresponsibility attri judgments of power j
butions. Thus, we build on the central idea that to prevent effect
and of foresight.
the observer's attributions entail both causal in
ferences and moral judgments. Causal infer
ences imply that the observer arrives at social
irresponsibility attributions in part by trying to
Effect Undesirability
explain a social harm in terms of distinguishing
between causes emanating from within the firm Crucial to the perceiver's categorization of the
and causes emanating from outside the firm. corporation as socially irresponsible are percep
Especially relevant with respect to the latter are tions that there has been a negative social effect
perceptions of the affected party's complicity in (i.e., an observed social outcome perceived as
the negative effect. Moral judgments imply that undesirable and ostensibly associated with the
the observer arrives at social irresponsibility corporation). Distinguishing beneficial or neu
attributions in part by trying to vest moral retral effects from negative effects is a normative
calculation that can differ depending on the val
sponsibility for a social harm—that is, trying to
ues and perspectives of different perceivers
determine if the firm implicated in the harm
(Crouch, 2006). However, existing theory sug
should be held in contempt. Here the perceived
gests that part of that calculation is rooted in
nature and magnitude of the harm, as well as
perceptions that the social effects may be per
the firm's perceived ability to have avoided the
sonally threatening, may trigger moral im
harm, are key considerations, as is—again—the
pulses, and/or may violate strong norms for cor
perceived complicity in the negative effect of the
porate outcomes (cf. Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999;
affected party. Therefore, based on their role in Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Jones & Davis, 1965).
both causal inference and moral judgment, we The idea that individuals make judgments of
model three primary factors as underlying cor negativity based on what is personally threat
porate social irresponsibility attributions: (1) asening—that is, in terms of self-preservation—is
sessments of effect undesirability, (2) assess consistent with a premise that runs through dif
ments of corporate culpability for the effect, and ferent strains of modern psychological theory—
(3) assessments that the affected party has a low namely, that the human brain is engaged in a
level of complicity in the effect. We illustrate the constant evaluative process in which environ
core model in Figure 1 and describe the three mental stimuli are immediately and intuitively
factors next. sorted in terms of approach-avoid or good-bad
(for a reviewdependent see Haidt

on the &
values, perspectives, Bjor
and in
kind of sorting is adaptive, since being at terpretations of the perceiver and likely will be
tuned to self-threatening effects promotes selfrooted in the individual's perceptions of threat,
preservation (Pratto & John, 1991). Extending thismoral impulses, and strong norms for corporate
idea further, researchers have argued that peroutcomes.
ceptions of undesirability may be rooted in
moral reflexive judgment (Haidt & Bjorklund,
Corporate Culpability
2008), pertaining to '"flashes' of approbation or
disapprobation" about an actor's behavior (Ap When a perceiver associates a corporation
piah, 2009: 128). In other words, organizational with an undesirable social outcome, the corpo
actions might be perceived as negative in a ration becomes the target of the perceiver's at
moral sense if they fall into categories of stimuli tributional activity. In other words, the perceiver
that evoke deep-seated negative moral reac considers the corporation's culpability with re
tions. Such categories of stimuli might include spect to the negative effect. Again drawing on
perceptions of suffering, unfairness, violations Hamilton's (1980) analogy, such a consideration
of ingroup/outgroup boundaries, disrespect, andpositions the perceiver both as intuitive psy
impurity (Appiah, 2009). chologist—judging the firm's causality—and as
Providing a further context for judgments of intuitive lawyer—judging the firm's moral re
effect undesirability are the strong global norms sponsibility. In essence, judgments of causality
for human behavior that exist across cultures. and moral responsibility are the product of a
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) call these global rational knowledge-seeking process in which
standards "hypernorms" and describe them the perceiver
as considers the available evidence.
entailing "principles so fundamental to With human respect to causality, the perceiver develops
existence that they serve as a guide in evaluat lay theories—commonsense explanations—
ing lower level moral norms" (Donaldson about & Dun why or how effects have occurred (Heider,
fee, 1994: 265). Along with local standards of 1958; Jones & Nisbet, 1972; Kelley & Michela,
corporate social obligation, including legal 1980). When the firm is the target of the perceiv
standards and industry norms—which may er's attributional activity, the critical causal
themselves be shaped by hypernorms—hyper question to be resolved is to what extent the
norms are important standards that observers source of the negative effect is internal rather
use to assess the desirability of firm behavior.than external to the firm (Green & Mitchell, 1979;
Of course, norms and moral impulses may be Heider, 1958; Mitchell & Wood, 1980). Evidence
understood and expressed differently among supporting external explanations would include
different individuals, even leading to conflictingthe cognitive availability of plausible alterna
interpretations of the undesirability of the eftive causal agents or explanations for the effect
fects of firm action. For example, in the early (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kelley, 1972, 1973).
1990s Dayton Hudson Corporation stopped its As an example of plausible alternative causal
long tradition of contributing to Planned Parentagents, consider how BP's recent lawsuits citing
hood after the corporation came under harsh its business partners' negligence as leading to
external criticism for the undesirable effect of its the Gulf oil spill disaster (Burdeau & Weber,
donations, particularly in terms of financing 2011) may suggest to observers that those busi
abortion. Not long thereafter the firm retreated ness partners were indeed at least partially
to its old policy and resumed its contributions to causal. As an example of plausible alternative
Planned Parenthood. Again Dayton Hudson was causal explanations, consider how evidence of a
responding to harsh external criticism for the victim's family history of illness might weaken
undesirable effects of its actions—this time from the explanation that the victim's sickness was
those who argued that, by terminating its dona caused by a corporation's product. When alter
tions, the firm was limiting choice and access to native causal agents or explanations are read
legal abortion for women (Jennings, 2006). ily available, they can discount or completely
In sum, perceptions that there has been a neg replace the explanation that the corporation
ative effect feed into the perceiver's overall cog caused a negative effect (Einhorn & Hogarth,
nitive schema of corporate social irresponsibil1986). Discounting causality in the face of alter
ity. Assessments of effect undesirability will be native causal explanations may help explain
306 Academy oi Management Review April
why automobile manufacturers generally or sanction with respect to the negative effect
are not strongly causally linked to the tens of (Hamilton, 1980; Jones & Davis, 1965). The cogni
thousands of annual automobile-related fatali tive processing rule that Hamilton (1980: 768)
ties. The many complex and interactive per applies in this regard concerns whether the per
ceived causes of those fatalities include car de ceiver judges that the target "could have done
sign, but they also include such factors as road otherwise." Moral responsibility judgments are
and weather conditions, driver skill and atten therefore associated with beliefs that the firm
tiveness, and alcohol use. Then again, if infor
had reasonable foresight of the negative out
comes and was not coerced into the action or
mation surfaces highlighting the role of design
flaws in a series of automobile accidents, the driven by strong moral justifications (Fincham &
discounting effect of alternative causal expla Jaspars, 1980; Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Heider, 1958;
nations may weaken. Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Shaver, 1985; Shaver
Observers exercise their reason not only as & Drown, 1986).
they consider alternative causal agents or ex These beliefs, then, are about the firm's moral
planations but also as they consider other read cognizance, deriving from perceptions of both
ily perceivable evidence that hints at causality the firm's awareness of the harm it was causing
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). Such evidence in and its free will in continuing the harmful
cludes covariation (i.e., the degree to which firm course of action. If the observer believes that the
action and negative effect are perceived to occur firm's moral responsibility is low, even high
together; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kelley, 1967; causality perceptions will not result in strong
Kelley & Michela, 1980), temporal order (i.e., assessments of culpability. For example, ob
whether the firm's action is perceived to precede servers may perceive the firm as morally dis
the negative effect; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kel tanced from its own bad behavior, perhaps
ley & Michela, 1980), and size congruence be because it identified and fired employees asso
tween cause and effect (i.e., observers will see ciated with that behavior. In that case, even
as more plausible a large firm causing a large
though observers judge the firm as having a
effect than a small firm causing a large effect;
causal relationship with the effect, they may
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Kelley & Michela, deem
1980; the firm's moral responsibility as low,
Shultz & Ravinsky, 1977). Further evidence which
hint would not support strong assessments of
ing at corporate causality includes the percep
corporate culpability.
tion that other corporations do not generallyIn
dosum, the perceiver's categorization of the
what the focal corporation is perceived to have
corporation as socially irresponsible depends
done (i.e., a low degree of "consensus" between on judgments that the corporation was both
this firm's behavior and other firms' behavior in causal and morally responsible with respect to
similar situations) and that the focal corporationthe undesirable effect. The perceiver assesses
appears to have a tendency to act in this way causality by considering available alternative
over time (i.e., a high degree of "consistency"explanations
of and causal agents, as well as
this firm's behavior in similar situations) and other evidence providing cues to causality. The
across contexts (i.e., a low degree of "distinctiveperceiver assesses moral responsibility in terms
ness" of this firm's behavior when the situation of whether the firm was both aware of the neg
changes; Kelley, 1967; Kelley & Michela, 1980:ative effect and was exercising intent and free
462). (Below we return to the concepts of con will in pursuing the harmful course of action.
sistency and distinctiveness when we explore
the role of the firm's perceived disposition for
Affected Party Noncomplicity
social irresponsibility in social irresponsibility
attributions.) Implied by the existence of a firm's action
Even when such "cues to causality" (Einhornleading& to an undesirable social effect is a party
Hogarth, 1986: 6) are strong, the case for corpo who is the recipient of that effect. Affected par
rate culpability is not complete. Ultimately, ties so could range from specific identifiable indi
cial irresponsibility attributions require thatviduals—such
a as the drivers and passengers
corporation be perceived not only as causal but who died in Pinto fires—to more generalized
also as morally responsible. In other words, the affected groups—such as citizens of the Gulf of
perceiver judges the firm as deserving contempt Mexico region who suffered economic hardship
following the 2010

as common perceptions oil spill.
have gradually
tive effect changed from
and a the view of chronic drunkenness
culpable cor
primary factor as a consequence
underlying
of the user's free will and c
sponsibility moral failing to the view of alcoholism as a is
attributions an
ceived as a victim. In other words, those attribu disease (Schneider, 1978), the degree to which
tions depend, in part, on an affected party whothe user is perceived as in control of and com
is perceived as being low in complicity (or non plicit in the negative effect has decreased.
complicit) in the negative outcome. The second characteristic pertains to the per
As attribution researchers who study blame ception that without foresight of consequences,
point out, affected parties who are perceived toeven a powerful victim cannot take the action
have more control over a negative effect are, innecessary to avoid a negative effect. Alterna
turn, perceived to be more blameworthy and tively, when an affected party is perceived as
therefore are less likely to elicit sympathy from having full information about possible deleteri
observers (Alicke, 2000; Weiner, Graham, & ous effects of corporate action, he or she is more
Chandler, 1982; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, likely to be seen as able to avoid those effects.
1988). Alternatively, when affected parties Thus,
are as public awareness of smoking health
hazards has increased, smokers increasingly
perceived to have less control over a negative
are perceived as being knowledgeable about
effect, observers are less likely to blame them
the
for the situation. For example, in an experimen negative effects of the product, and they are
tal setting Weiner et al. found that therefore less likely to be perceived as innocent
victims. Given that perceptions of the affected
the physically based stigma of blindness was
perceived as uncontrollable, [and] the blind indi party's power and foresight to prevent the effect
vidual was liked and pitied while eliciting little underlie judgments of the affected party's com
anger.... Conversely, individuals with mental plicity, it is not surprising that certain types of
behavioral stigmas were perceived as being re affected parties will be more readily judged as
sponsible for their condition, were rated rela being low in complicity. In particular, more
tively low on liking, [and] evoked little pity and
relatively high anger (1988: 741). physically or mentally vulnerable affected
parties are more likely to elicit perceptions of
Likewise, parties apparently negatively af victim innocence, which would include the
fected by some corporate action will be per young, the very old, and defenseless-seeming
ceived as more or less in control of the outcome
animals. Consider, for example, that children
and will receive respectively more or less symwho take up the habit of smoking are much
pathy from observers as a result. Perceiver con
less likely than adults to be seen as complicit in
cern for a victim will be consistent with the the negative effect, since they are seen as hav
perceiver's cognitive schema of corporateing social
a more limited capacity for sophisticated
irresponsibility. In contrast, the perceiver's cat foresight.
egorization of the firm as socially irresponsible In sum, perceptions of affected party noncom
will be diminished when his or her perception is plicity in the negative effect feed into the per
that an affected party was in some way in con ceiver's categorization of the corporation as so
trol of the negative effect. And, as we discuss cially irresponsible. The perceiver assesses
below, perceptions that the affected party is affected party complicity by considering how
complicit in the negative effect will have direct much power the affected party had to prevent
implications for reducing how much the firm the negative outcome, as well as by considering
itself is perceived as culpable for the effect. how much knowledge or foresight the affected
Two perceived characteristics of the affected party had of the negative effect.
party can influence whether the party is thought
to be in control of, and therefore complicit in, the
The Core Model of Corporate Social
negative effect: (1) the power to act to prevent
Irresponsibility Attributions
the effect and (2) knowledge or foresight of the
effect (Shaver, 1985). The first characteristic A baseline premise of our core model, as
pertains to whether the observer concludes shown in Figure 1, is that corporate social irre
that the affected party could have done some sponsibility attributions depend on the com
thing to avoid the negative effect. For example. bined presence of the three factors we described
above. In other words, When perceivers

those see the effect as at least
attributions
on perceptions that there
somewhat negative, thehas been
corporation a nega
as at least
effect, that there somewhat is a culpable,
culpable corporatio
and the affected party as at
that the affected party least somewhat is not then
noncomplicit, fully
the perceivcomp
the effect. If an observer sees the effect as neu ers can form attributions of corporate social ir
tral or beneficial, the firm as not culpable, responsibility. If all three factors are present to
and/or the affected party as highly complicit in some degree, then a higher level of any one of
the outcome, the observer's corporate social ir those factors will result in a higher level of cor
responsibility attributions are apt to be low or porate social irresponsibility attributions.
nonexistent. Consider, for example, Hoffman
and Ocasio's (2001) contrast of two events—Love Proposition la: Obseivei attributions
Canal (buried toxic waste) and Cuyahoga River of corporate social irresponsibility de
(fire on a polluted waterway). A perceiver would pend on the combined presence of
three components: observer assess
be likely to see each event as entailing a harm
ments that the effect is at least some
ful effect as well as a victim group noncomplicit
in the outcome. However, in the case of Love what undesirable, observer assess
Canal, a firm was readily identifiable as re ments that the corporation is at least
sponsible—"From the start, the event had a somewhat culpable, and observer as
clear villain who was assessed blame—the sessments that the affected party is at
company which had created the buried toxic least somewhat noncomplicit.
waste, the Hooker Chemical Company" (Hoff Proposition lb: If all three components
man & Ocasio, 2001: 421)—whereas in the case of are present to some degree, then attri
Cuyahoga River, where industrial waste caused butions of corporate social irresponsi
the fire, no specific firm was easily identifiable bility are positively related to higher
as responsible. Thus, absent a firm perceived as levels of any of the three.
culpable, corporate social irresponsibility attri
butions will fail to develop. Attribution theory suggests that perceivers
Importantly, the argument that corporate so consider the characteristics of the target and the
cial irresponsibility attributions depend on as target's situation in concert when making attri
sessments of corporate culpability requires a butions for the cause of and responsibility for an
clear distinction between those two constructs. effect, and therefore that perceivers' perceptions
That distinction is evident when of the situation's characteristics can influence
considering
that culpability alone is not sufficient for corpo their perceptions of the target's characteristics
rate social irresponsibility attributions; instead,respect to the attribution, and vice versa
with
a negative effect and a noncomplicit affected (Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Mitchell & Wood, 1980). As
party are also required. If Love Canal had not applied to our core model of corporate social
been perceived as having such an undesirable irresponsibility attributions, the implication
effect (an effect that, in fact, included health from attribution theory, then, is that the three
hazards to residents and the long-term evacua primary factors we have identified may influ
tion of a residential neighborhood), or if the Loveence each other. In particular, as we explain
Canal residents had been perceived as somenext, perceptions of effect undesirability can in
how highly responsible for their own fate, attri fluence perceptions of corporate culpability, and
butions of corporate social irresponsibilityperceptions of corporate culpability and af
would have been much less likely, even if the fected party noncomplicity can influence
firm was perceived as culpable—that is, as each other.
sessed as causal in the effect and morally re Consider that when an observer is contem
sponsible for its actions. Thus, casino compa plating the negativity of effects, attribution the
nies could be perceived as culpable—causal ory suggests that the observer will search more
and morally responsible—for the harmful social extensively for their causal associations (Alicke,
effects of gambling, but at the same time corpo 2000; Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Shaver, 1985; Taylor,
rate social irresponsibility attributions could be 1991). Indeed, Mitchell and Wood (1980) demon
weak because gamblers are seen as highly com strated in lab studies that the seriousness of an
plicit in their fate. effect positively influenced the degree to which
targets were makes perceived

a strong case that the effect was asout of res
ative effect. the Thecontrol of the affected party, can helpdesir
strong
and responsibility could bias observer percep countermand correspondence bias (Gilbert &
tions of a firm already linked in the observer's Malone, 1995), or the natural tendency of an
mind with the effect. As we argued above, per observer to "view people rather than the envi
ceptions of a greater degree of victim suffering ronment as the prepotent controlling forces
are likely to elicit observer sympathy and con behind harmful events" (Alicke, 2000: 568). For
cern (Weiner et al., 1982; Weiner et al., 1988). instance, a cigarette smoker may be thought
Observers may then enter "blame-validation by observers to be responsible for his or her
mode," in which they actively seek explanations own negative health outcomes associated
for the negative effect and lower their typical with smoking. However, some of that onus may
standards for establishing corporate causality have transferred to the tobacco companies in
(Alicke, 2000: 558). In this mode, even if cues to the mid 1990s when company internal docu
causality are ambiguous, sympathy for the vic ments were divulged indicating full knowl
tim and a desire to assign causality and respon edge of the harmful and addictive effects of
sibility may lead observers to assess the link the product and revealing the conscious mar
age between the effect and the implicated firm keting of tobacco products to children (Hurt &
"in a biased manner by exaggerating the [firm's] Robertson, 1998; Segal, 1997). It is possible that
volitional or causal control, by lowering their when observers learned that tobacco compa
evidential standards for blame, or by seeking nies were perhaps secretly plotting against
information to support their blame attributions" their own customers, observer perceptions of
(Alicke, 2000: 558). customers' complicity in tobacco-related
For example, the horrible suffering associated health problems decreased, at least some
with victims of Ford Pinto crashes could have what. That decrease in perceived affected
increased the plausibility for observers party that complicity would be consistent with ar
Ford's internal cost-benefit analysis, which guments and findings in the attribution theory
emerged in the press at the time, was evidence literature suggesting that observers become
that Ford executives were morally cognizant as angry at perpetrators and sympathetic with
they made decisions that posed great potential victims when perpetrators are perceived as
harm to Pinto drivers and passengers—even being in control of negative outcomes (Weiner,
though Ford officials adamantly denied that the 1993; Weiner et al., 1982).
cost-benefit analysis factored into their decision When the observer is contemplating the af
making. As an effect is perceived as more neg fected party's complicity in the negative effect
ative, a firm associated with that effect can eas and perceives that complicity as high—that is,
ily seem more culpable to observers. Such per perceives the affected party as having foresight
ceived culpability would entail a judgment of and control with respect to the effect—that per
moral responsibility consonant with deep ception may constitute exactly the kind of evi
seated cultural suspicions surrounding busi dence that would effectively discount the expla
ness firms—in particular, suspicions that, in nation that the firm is the morally responsible
their drive for profits, firms can be oblivious to agent. Indeed, correspondence bias would lead
public welfare (Korten, 2001). observers to favor a plausible explanation that
the affected party is responsible for its negative
Proposition 2: Assessments of effect outcomes (Alicke, 2000). Thus, ever since manda
undesirability are positively related to
tory health warnings have appeared on ciga
subsequent assessments of corporate
rette packages, as they have in the United States
culpability.
since 1966, observers may have a greater ten
When the observer is contemplating the cor dency to perceive cigarette smokers as being
poration's culpability for a negative effect and forewarned and therefore at least somewhat
perceives that culpability as high, the ob complicit in the negative health outcomes they
server has a ready explanation that can help may suffer from smoking. If so, those observers
discount perceptions that the affected party may conclude that tobacco companies are only
had the power and foresight to prevent or partially responsible for the negative outcomes,
avoid the effect. That explanation, because it or perhaps that they are not responsible at all.
Together, undesirability, corporate

these arguments lead culpability,
us to and afpredict
assessments of highfectedcorporate
party noncomplicity—andculpability
we considered
duce assessments of affected
how those party
factors can be influenced by each comp
and, in a complementary
other. In this section fashion,
we delve further into thethat as
ments of high affected party
observer's complicity
subjective construction can
of corporate
assessments of corporate culpability.
social irresponsibility attributions. To do so we
Proposition continue with
3: Assessments of attribution theory corpo
as our theoreti
cal foundation, and we consider how observer
rate culpability are positively re
lated to assessments of affected cognitive bias, attention, and social identifica
party noncomplicity. tion may influence the observer's attributions.
We illustrate the expanded model of corporate
social irresponsibility attributions in Figure 2.
FURTHER INFLUENCES ON THE CORE MODEL
Above we argued that assessments of effect
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
undesirability are rooted in perceptions that the
IRRESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS
effect is threatening, is a trigger of moral im
In the prior section we described the three
pulses, or is a violation of strong norms. How
primary factors underlying corporate social irre
ever, perceptual filtering and interpretive bi
sponsibility attributions—assessments of effect
ases can influence whether an observer
FIGURE 2
The Expanded Model of Corporate Social Irresponsibility Attributions"
Frames
Observer
Effect assessments of positioning firm
Observer
as causal and
characteristics, effect undesirability attributions of
based on morally
including
corporate responsible for
unexpectedness threat avoidance,
social
harming innocent
and concentration moral impulses, and
irresponsibility victims
in time and space norms tor
moral behavior
P6a+ P6b Observer

assessments of
Observer social Observer social corporate culpability
identification identification based on
with the affected with the
inferences of causality
party implicated firm and judgments oi
moral
P8b
responsibility
P5a+ and P5b+
Firm
characteristics,
including
perceived disposition for
irresponsible behavior, size,
and prominence
a The dotted lines indicate the relationships illustrated and labeled in Figure 1.
perceives an server's background. Theas

effect exception
ais when
threat
impulses, or some unexpected feature of a particular car ac nor
a violation of
observer could cident draws beit out of presented
the background—for ex
ostensibly equivalent
ample, the unexpectedly low speed at inwhich term
standard of Ford harm—and
Pintos in rear end collisions were failingyet
jective distinctions between the two effects catastrophically, and the unexpected nature of
might lead him or her to judge one of the effects the way in which Ford Pinto accident victims
as of much greater undesirability than the other. were reportedly dying (namely, by fiery explo
Consider that by objective moral standards, and sion; Schwartz, 1991). When effects are unusual
all else being equal, an outcome of harm to or unexpected, they become figural and salient
thousands of people should stimulate harsher because they do not easily fit into existing cat
assessments of undesirability than an outcome egories of understanding. In such cases observ
of harm to a handful of individuals. Yet, at times, ers must process and modify their existing un
the event of smaller impact may prompt greaterderstandings to either expand a cognitive
alarm because, for one reason or another, it at category or create a new one (Einhorn & Hog
tracts attention, foments emotions, and inspires arth, 1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977). If an effect
intense reaction (cf. Nordgren & Morris McDon can potentially be seen by the observer as
nell, 2011). threatening, as a trigger of moral impulses, or
Here we propose two effect characteristics as a violation of norms, the enhanced cognitive
that will prompt observer attention to and con processing and categorization activity induced
sideration of the undesirability of the effect: (1) by unexpectedness is likely to center on and
unexpectedness and (2) concentration in time intensify the sense of threat, moral violation,
and space. Both characteristics lead the effects and/or norm infringement. Consequently, unex
to be perceptually figural for observers, mean pectedness can lead an effect to be perceived by
ing that they cognitively stand out against the the observer as even more undesirable.
background—that is, they are more salient Concentration of the effect in time and space
(McArthur & Ginsberg, 1981; McArthur & Post, also leads to salience that can influence ob
1977). Both characteristics make the effects cog server subjective assessments of effect undesir
nitively available to perceivers, and cognitive ability. Human perceptual capabilities are opti
availability amplifies the perceived importance mized to perceive imminent dangers rather than
of the event, which can then bias further percep subtle insidious effects (Gattig & Hendrickx,
tions as the perceiver easily brings the event to 2007). When effects are dispersed over time or
mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Indeed, attri geographic space, the complete effect may sim
bution theorists point out that salience can in ply be less visible and salient to the observer.
fluence the attributions that observers make An observation at any point in time or space will
(Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Smith & Miller, 1979). In be only part of the complete effect and therefore
particular, salient stimuli are seen by observers may appear trivial, causing the total impact of
as more causal (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). When un the effect to be less perceptible (Gattig, 2002)
desirable effects are salient to observers, they For example, the temporally and geographically
are likely to prompt observer search for causal dispersed motor vehicle-related fatalities in the
ity and responsibility (Alicke, 2000; Fiske & Tay United States may escape widespread notice,
lor, 2008; Shaver, 1985; Taylor, 1991). even though they number in the tens of thou
Unexpectedness leads to salience since ob sands annually, but the concentrated tragedy of
servers will have their attention drawn to and a U.S. airline accident killing hundreds of peo
focused on strange and novel effects (Fiskeple & would draw immediate U.S. public alarm. As
Taylor, 2008; McArthur, 1981). When effects are another example, consider that global deforest
expected, they are understood as normal ation and as the result of industrial activities is
are easily categorized. Because they are com likely to be judged undesirable once it has hap
monplace, they fade into the background. Con pened, but because it occurs slowly and is
sider how the regularity with which traffic acci spread out over a large geographic area, observ
dents occur has desensitized observers. In ers are less likely to react during the process.
general, automobile accidents (involving Thus, negative effects that accumulate over time
people
the observer does not know) remain in the ob or space—in which the threats, moral violations,
or norm infringements
pression of theare only
firm" (Klein & Dawar,incremen
2004: 215).
evident—will be lessWhen an salient
observer believes and alarming
that the firm has
negative effects that
exhibitedare a highavailable
degree of consistency for exa
in its
tion immediately andbehavior in their
over time entirety.
in similar situations and a
low degree of distinctiveness in its behavior,
Proposition 4: When an effect has the
even when the context changes, the observer is
potential to be seen by an obseivei as
likely to attribute the cause of the behavior as
threatening, as a trigger of moral im
internal to the firm (Kelley, 1967; Kelley & Mi
pulses, or as a violation of norms, its
chela, 1980).
unexpectedness and/or concentration
An observer's perceptions that a firm has a
in time and space will be positively
related to observer assessments of ef disposition for socially irresponsible behavior
represent a kind of existing implicit theory
fect undesirability.
about the firm that can shape the observer's
Previously, we argued that observers will inferences and judgments about the firm's cur
base their assessments of a corporation's culpa rent behavior (Jones & Davis, 1965; Lord & Smith,
bility on inferences of causality and judgments 1983). The firm's perceived disposition serves as
of moral responsibility. As with the other per a cognitive anchor, biasing the observer as he or
ceiver assessments in our model, these assess she makes adjustments from the anchor to reach
ments of corporate culpability are subjective an interpretation of the meaning of new firm
constructions—influenced by human processes action (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For exam
of interpretation and perception. An observer ple, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Target Corpora
could therefore see two corporations as different
tion have very similar profiles in terms of wages
in their culpability even if, objectively, there and other employee benefits. However, because
was no difference. Here we propose threeoffirm a history of bad relations with organized la
characteristics that can influence subjective bor,asWal-Mart is seen as a "pariah to U.S. labor
sessments of corporate culpability: perceived unions and urban activists" (Bustillo & Zimmer
disposition, size, and prominence. man, 2010: 1). The company has to fight labor
First, with respect to perceived disposition, unions and other groups in order to expand its
consider that a firm's observers are attuned not urban footprint, because these groups fear that
just to the firm's most recent actions but also toWal-Mart will drive down wages. Target, whose
its prior actions and, therefore, that attributionsperceived disposition is more favorable, is held
are an interaction of the observer's prior beliefs to a different standard by activists (Bustillo &
and current observations (Folkes, 1988; Klein & Zimmerman, 2010) and has expanded with com
Dawar, 2004). Klein and Dawar (2004) demon paratively little opposition from labor groups.
strated the strength of these kinds of prior Both be firms' stores are likely to have similar eco
liefs in an experimental setting exploring con nomic effects on a community, but Wal-Mart po
sumer attributions when a company has a crisis tentially is seen as more culpable for negative
involving a well-publicized defective or danger effects than is Target.
ous product. The authors argued that a consum A firm's perceived favorable disposition also
er's prior perceptions of the company as socially may bias an observer's interpretation of new
responsible create a halo or spillover effect, firm behaviors such that the expectation of con
leading to a bias about whether the company is tinued reliability tends to be confirmed (Darley
or is not responsible for the product-harm crisis. & Fazio, 1980). A firm with the perceived dispo
Indeed, Klein and Dawar found that consumers sition of high social responsibility may get the
who had existing negative perceptions of a com benefit of the doubt among observers, who will
pany's CSR disposition blamed the company discount the possibility of both causality and
more for the product-harm incident than did conmoral responsibility when the firm is newly as
sumers who had positive perceptions of thesociated with a negative effect. This would es
company's CSR disposition. Their results pecially be the case if other cues to causality
showed that a "negative CSR image" led to "un and moral responsibility were minimal. How
flattering attributions and blame while a posi ever, and in accordance with reactance theory
tive image led to attributions similar to those (Brehm & Brehm, 1981), it is possible that very
made by control subjects who had no prior positive im prior expectations may lead, paradoxi
cally, to ble outside claims that the

especially firm not only is as
negative o
to firm behavior sociated with violating
but also is culpable for a negative
thos
Klein & Dawar, 2004; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006). effect. (We talk more about outside claims below
Taken together, these arguments suggest that when we address the role of "frames" in social
although a firm's perceived disposition for so irresponsibility attributions.) The firm's salience
cial responsibility could bias observer assess helps take attention off issue advocates as pos
ments of corporate culpability, the direction of sible inventors or exaggerators of a problem.
that bias is unclear. In contrast, a firm's per Consequently, large, prominent firms are often
ceived unfavorable disposition is not subject to targeted by issue advocates. Developing a story
reactance effects, and its predicted effect on as that portrays them as morally responsible
sessments of corporate culpability is more causal agents may be an easy sell. For example,
straightforward. labor advocates found it easy to strongly asso
ciate the well-known firm Nike in the public
Pioposition 5a: The implicated corpo mind with labor abuses in Asia (Rushford, 1997).
ration's perceived disposition for so
cial irresponsibility is positively re Proposition 5b: The implicated corpo
lated to observer assessments of ration's size and prominence are pos
corporate culpability. itively related to observer assessments
of corporate culpability.
Along with a firm's perceived disposition for
social irresponsibility, its size and prominence Next, we further elaborate the model of corpo
are also likely to influence observer assess rate social irresponsibility attributions by con
ments of corporate culpability. A firm's size may sidering how the degree to which observers so
provide the observer with cues to causality, ascially identify with the affected party or with the
well as cues about moral responsibility. In par implicated corporation may affect subjective as
ticular, this may be the case when the comparsessments of effect undesirability, corporate cul
ison is between very large and small firms. Peopability, and affected party noncomplicity. Our
ple generally regard large firms "as purposive overriding argument is that social identifica
entities that use structured analyses to guide tion, by putting the observer in the shoes of
their actions and protect their interests" (Lange,either the affected party or the firm, influences
Boivie, & Henderson, 2009: 184; Meyer & Rowan,social irresponsibility attributions because the
1977). In other words, people think larger firmsobserver has a vested interest in the attribution
have the capacity to conduct sophisticated anal(Ashforth & Mael, 1989). This argument is consis
yses of their options in decision situations, andtent with Jones and Davis's (1965) idea of "hedo
therefore have the ability to predict and avoidnic relevance," whereby the perceiver's attribu
harmful side effects to others. People are also tional activity is biased when the event under
likely to perceive larger firms as having more consideration has implications for the perceiv
financial slack and strategic flexibility. Thus, er's own welfare. In other words, attributions are
firm size, because of the perceptions that size isinfluenced because "the perceiver's motivation,
associated with abundant options for action andelicited by the action's consequences for him, is
enhanced capacity to scrutinize those optionsthought to affect the processing of information
and their possible harmful side effects, may about the action" (Kelley & Michela, 1980: 461).
lead to observer impressions that the firm Social identity theory and the related self
caused the negative effect, that it had foresight categorization theory (see review by Haslam &
of the consequences of its behavior, and that it Ellemers, 2005) start from the observation that
had no moral justification for its actions. humans have a natural tendency to organize
In addition to its size, a firm's prominence— their worlds into social categories, and these
that is, how well known it is—helps make the theories then describe how individuals derive
firm salient to observers. As demonstrated in their self-concepts in part from the categories
attribution theory research, what is salient inwith which they see their personal identities
the observer's perceptual field with respect to overlapping (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995; Tajfel &
the effect is likely to be perceived as causalTurner, 1979). People have complex motivations
(Smith & Miller, 1979; Taylor & Fiske, 1975, 1978).for orienting themselves in relation to society
The firm's salience will also make more plausiaccording to social categories, including satis
fying the fundamental avoidance, moral impulses,

human and strong needs
norms fo
tion and belonging (Baumeister
for corporate outcomes. When the negative ef & Leary
maintaining or enhancing their
fect is perceived to be happening own self
to a group
(Brewer, 1979); seeking self-definition
with which the observer strongly identifies— t
assimilation and individuation, aligning with meaning that the observer distinguishes little
some social categories to help define who they between his or her interests and those of the
are and distancing from other social categories affected party—by definition, the observer will
to help define who they are not (Baumeister & find the effect to be personally threatening and
Leary, 1995; Brewer, 1991); reducing uncertainty undesirable. Social identification therefore not
(Hogg & Terry, 2000); and confirming and verify only draws the observer's attention to the effect
ing their own self-view (Polzer, Milton, & Swann,
but also prompts consideration of its personal
2002). Any of these motivations can lead an in
impact. The personalized nature of the effect
dividual to see him or herself as part of a social
may also enhance the observer's negative moral
category. An individual who identifies strongly
impulses and perceptions of norm violations. As
with a social group or category is someone who
such, the death of thousands and the lingering
draws critical self-concept-relevant informa
health complications of many thousands more
tion, value, and feelings from his or her percep
tions that he or she is a member of the social following the 1984 Union Carbide gas leak in
group or category (Hogg et al., 1995; Tajfel & Bhopal, India, may have seemed less severe to
Turner, 1979). In the context of our model, some U.S. observers than it did to observers in India,
observers may socially identify with the group who more strongly socially identify with the vic
tims. Had the same accident occurred in the
they see as affected by the undesirable effect. Of
course, as organizational identification re United States, social identification of U.S. ob
searchers have demonstrated, the concept of servers
so with the victims would likely have been
much
cial group can also easily include the firm such deeper and public assessments of the suf
that individuals (both insiders and outsiders) fering much greater, even controlling for the
can socially identify with a particular firm (Has
greater attention a U.S.-based accident would
lam & Ellemers, 2005; Pratt, 1998). In the context have received in the United States.
of our model, some observers may socially iden A contrasting result may occur when the ob
tify with the firm that is implicated in the neg server identifies with the implicated firm. In that
ative effect.
case the observer is likely to find confusing and
Because of the overlap of personal and socialincongruous the implication that the firm would
identities that identification implies, the be associated with behavior contrary to his or
strength of observer identification with the af her values and normative expectations. If so, the
fected party will be positively related to the de more strongly the observer identifies with the
gree to which the observer will tend to distin
firm, the more likely he or she is to discount the
guish less between his or her own interests and
seriousness or negativity of the effect. This dis
outcomes and those of the affected party. Simi
counting would be consistent with self-serving
larly, the strength of observer identification with
attributional biases (see review by Fiske & Tay
the implicated firm will be positively related to
lor, 2008), in which information inconsistent with
the degree to which the observer sees his or her
ego protection might be overlooked. For exam
own interests and outcomes as aligned with the
firm's (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Haslam & Elle ple, consider a fan who identifies strongly with
mers, 2005). As we describe in more detail below, the National Football League (NFL) and, conse
if the observer socially identifies with the af quently, has a strong affinity with the NFL's
fected party or the firm, that social identificationgoals, processes, and routines. Upon learning of
is likely to influence the observer's assessmentsthe high incidence of concussions and other
of effect undesirability, corporate culpability,head injuries among the league's players
and affected party noncomplicity, thereby con(Sokolove, 2010), this fan may overlook the mag
tributing to the subjective construction of corpo nitude and severity of these injuries. Discount
rate social irresponsibility attributions. ing the negative effect is ego protective for a fan
Above we argued that perceptions of effect who would not want to view him or herself as
undesirability are likely to be rooted in threatactively contributing to the suffering of others.
Proposition Pioposition
6a: 7: Observer social identifisocia
Observer
cation with
fication with the the implicated corporation
affected party
is negatively related
itively related to assessments of to assessments of
the corporation's culpability.
undesirability.
Proposition 6b: An observer's identification with the impli
Observer socia
fication with catedthe
firm or, alternatively,
implicated with the affected f
negatively related party could also influence to assessm
the observer's assess
effect undesirability. ments of the affected party's complicity in the
negative effect. Self-serving attributional bias
In addition to diminishing observer assess
would lead an observer with a higher level of
ments of effect undesirability, observer social
identification with the implicated firm to search
identification with the implicated corporation is
for and attend to plausible alternative explana
likely to lead the observer to assess the corpo
tions that relieve the firm—and, by extension,
ration as less culpable. As we argued above,
the observer him/herself—of culpability (Fiske
inferences of causality and judgments of moral
& Taylor, 2008). This deflection of responsibility
responsibility (including foresight and inten
would be consistent with the observer's deep
tionally) underlie an assessment of corporate
seated desire to avoid being blameworthy for
culpability. When observer identification with
the situation (Shaver, 1970, 1985).
the implicated firm is higher, the observer is
The search for plausible alternative explana
more likely to be skeptical of evidence suggest
tions is apt to include consideration that the
ing the firm's causality, more likely to search for
affected party was not totally innocent with re
and find plausible alternative explanations that
challenge the firm's causality, and less likely to spect to the effect. Any suppositions by the ob
server that the affected party had some power to
accept third-party claims that position the firm
as causal. In addition, an observer who has a prevent the effect, or had some reasonable fore
sight of the effect, will therefore be amplified by
higher level of identification with the firm is less
the observer's identification with the firm. In
likely to see it as morally responsible with re
spect to the negative effect. That observeraddition
is to being consistent with self-serving
attributional bias, efforts by observers who
more likely to accept accounts from the firm and
its advocates that contend the organization'sidentify with the implicated firm to find the af
processes and intents adhere to normative fected
ex party complicit in the negative effect are
consistent with a fundamental human motiva
pectations, that proclaim the firm's innocence,
tion to see victims as responsible for their own
or that justify the firm's association with the
negative outcomes. That motivation stems from
negative effects, as well as accounts and apol
observers' need to believe in a just world (Lemer
ogies that decouple the firm from negative in
& Matthews, 1967; Lemer & Miller, 1978). Conse
tent (Elsbach, 1994; Wood & Mitchell, 1981).
quently, the football fan who identifies strongly
Again, this discounting of causality and moral
responsibility is consistent with self-servingwith
at the NFL may be especially open to argu
tributional biases, since self-serving bias ex ments that the players are well aware of the
tends to groups with which the observer identi possibility of injury, that they choose to play
voluntarily,
fies (i.e., "group-serving bias"), leading ingroup and that they are well compensated
for the risk.
members to attribute negative ingroup behavior
to external causes (Fiske & Taylor, 2008: 80). In turn, when it is with the affected party that
Consequently, the football fan who identifies observer identifies, these same needs and
an
strongly with the NFL may be very amenabledesires to will diminish rather than bolster the de
gree to which the observer assesses the affected
justifications that hard hits are an inherent part
of the physical game of professional football. party as complicit. The need to believe in a just
That fan would be less likely than observersworld and the desire to deflect blame are both
who do not socially identify with the NFL to aimed
see at ego protection. When the affected
the NFL as highly culpable with respect to party is clearly an outgroup, threats to self can
player injuries, even as the problem of head be reduced by perceiving the affected party as
complicit
injuries in football receives increasing public in the negative effect. However, when
attention (e.g., Sokolove, 2010). an observer identifies with the affected party
316 Academy oi Management Review April
such that the observer's

sized, deemphasized,self-identity
or distorted), can substan is
tially affect observer inferences
twined with the identity of the and judgments
affecte
threats to the affected
that underlie corporate
party social irresponsibility
may be p
as personal threats. In this case threats to self attributions. For example, attribution theorists
can be reduced by deflecting perceptions of have considered how putative causal agents (or
blame away from the affected party—and, by interested third parties) may attempt to use ac
extension, away from the self (Fiske & Tay counts or apologies to influence observers' attri
lor, 2008). butions (Wood & Mitchell, 1981). Accounts may
Consistent with the argument that observer influence attributions by emphasizing how cer
social identification with the affected party will tain personal or situational factors led to the
influence assessments of affected party com observed outcome. Accounts comprise both ex
plicity is Shaver's observation that "perceivers cuses—whereby the actor is defended on the
can be wholly rational judges of another's re grounds that the behavior was out of his or her
sponsibility for producing a negative outcome control—and justifications—whereby the be
only if they can be confident that they will never havior is defended on the grounds that its value
be in similar circumstances" (1985: 134). When outweighs its negative consequences (Wood &
observers see themselves as similar to the af Mitchell, 1981). Whereas accounts may influence
fected party, they lose that confidence. It then
both inferences of causality and judgments of
becomes harder to hold the belief that the neg
moral responsibility, apologies actively ac
ative outcome is justified either as the natural knowledge the actor's causality. Apologies
consequence of some behavioral error on the therefore are directed more at attempting to in
part of the victim or as retribution for some char fluence judgments of moral responsibility, and
acter flaw of the victim (Lerner & Miller, 1978; they do so in part by attempting to decouple the
Shaver, 1985). When one socially identifies with actor from the intent behind the action. Apolo
the victim, the belief that the negative effect is gies, including expressions of remorse, can in
justified or deserved could be tantamount to be dicate that the actor believes in the rule that
lieving oneself to deserve consequences or ret was violated and is motivated to achieve the
ribution, and such a belief could be contradic required standards going forward (Wood &
tory to ego protection. Mitchell, 1981). The actor's self-castigation can
reduce the degree to which an observer holds
Proposition 8a: Observer social identi
the actor in contempt (Wood & Mitchell, 1981).
fication with the affected party is pos
Accordingly, an implicated corporation in our
itively related to assessments of the
model could offer up alternative causal expla
affected party's noncomplicity in the
nations or moral justifications for its behavior,
negative effect.
claim a lack of moral cognizance, or attempt to
Proposition 8b: Observer social identi distance itself from the moral intent underlying
fication with the implicated corporation its behavior by expressing remorse, all of which
is negatively related to assessments of could affect observer inferences of causality
the affected party's noncomplicity in and/or judgments of moral responsibility. These
the negative effect. attempts at impression management, because
they represent the deliberate shaping, packag
CORPORATE SOCIAL ing, and presentation of information in such a
IRRESPONSIBILITY FRAMES way as to influence perceptions of that informa
tion, fall into the broader category of frames
Earlier we touched on the idea that an observ (Benford & Snow, 2000; Goffman, 1974). Frames in
er's information about and interpretation of our ef model would include not only the accounts
fect, corporation, and affected party can beand in apologies offered by the firm and its advo
fluenced by parties who filter and frame thecates but also third-party (e.g., media, politi
information. Here we consider that idea in more cians, social issue stakeholders) story lines or
depth, because the information that parties sup narratives about the issue (Gamson, Croteau,
ply to the observer, as well as the way the infor
Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992).
mation is presented (e.g., how the specific A frame relevant to social irresponsibility at
pieces of information are assembled, emphatributions would include the core elements of
our model: aceleration

culpable organi
(Heinrich, 2010). In other words, in the
able effect, absence and of evidence
a of noncompl
causality, the frame con
Snow and Benford call this "diagnostic fram stituted this evidence. Subsequent investiga
ing," meaning that the frame involves the "iden tions suggested that perhaps there was no Audi
tification of a problem and the attribution of product defect resulting in unintended acceler
causality and blame" (1988: 200). Depending on ation, but the damage to Audi's sales and repu
the information presented in the frame, the ef tation had been done (Heinrich, 2010). In this
fect may appear more or less negative, the firm case the influence of the media's frame on cor
more or less culpable, and the affected party porate social irresponsibility attributions was
more or less complicit. For example, an observer dramatic.
might read a press report alleging that a firm, Frames can also support observer perceptions
"Privacy Matters 123," was "draining the bank of effect undesirability. Above we described
account" needed to pay medical bills for an how unexpectedness and concentration in time
eighteen-year old cancer patient (Sandoval, and space can bring attention to a negative ef
2009). This press report constitutes a frame in fect and emphasize for observers the threat,
volving a culpable firm (Privacy Matters 123), a moral violation, or norm infringement implied
negative effect (draining the bank account), and by the effect. Frames provided by parties such
a noncomplicit affected party (eighteen-year-oldas issue advocates, scientists, and media repre
cancer patient). This frame will be likely to sup sentatives can also make the effect salient for
port corporate social irresponsibility attribu observers and emphasize the effect's undesir
tions, since it emphasizes each of the three coreable features (Callon, 1998). As a result, frames
factors underlying such attributions. can bring to the foreground effects that are
Frames can be especially influential on social seemingly commonplace (not unexpected), and
irresponsibility attributions when information they can cognitively aggregate effects that are
regarding the firm's culpability is ambiguous or dispersed (not concentrated in time and space).
difficult to perceive. Culpability is determined Consider how the deleterious effects of smoking
in part by judgments of causality, but causalityon human health are not readily observable be
often is not obvious. Effective frames can make cause they tend to develop only after long expo
it seem more so. Consider that some negative sure to the tobacco product. However, starting in
the 1950s, a series of studies linking smoking to
effects, given their nature, are difficult to link
back to a particular causal agent. In situations lung cancer helped to cognitively compile the
where there are few cues to causality, issue effects of smoking so that they were more imme
advocates may attempt to frame the available diately evident to the public (e.g., Doll & Hill,
information in such a way as to overcome the 1950). In this case frames based on scientific
paucity of such cues (Shultz, 1982). Such a frame research brought attention and meaning to to
would provide a credible cause-and-effect rela bacco's negative health effects.
tionship in which well-known parties (i.e., the By emphasizing different aspects of the effect,
firm and its leaders) were identified as culpable characteristics of the firm, and even observers'
(Spector & Kitsuse, 2001). identification with the affected party or the firm,
This kind of frame is evident in the way Audi frames can exert an influence on any given el
AG was associated with accident fatalities in ement affecting corporate social irresponsibility
attributions
high-profile media reports. In particular, in 1986 in our model. For example, we de
scribed earlier how a firm's perceived disposi
the CBS program 60 Minutes aired an emotional
testimonial from a mother who had run over and tion for social irresponsibility can enhance ob
killed her six-year-old child. Even though she server assessments of corporate culpability.
had earlier reported to police that her foot hadShortly after BP's 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill,
slipped off the brake onto the gas pedal, the TVpress reports emphasized BP's prior accidents—
program presented the mother as claiming that including a 2005 refinery explosion that killed
the accident was caused by unintended accel fifteen workers. The frame of BP as having a
eration and that the car was to blame for the disposition for bad behavior may very well have
death of her son. This causal claim was sup supported perceptions of BP's culpability with
ported by the TV program's simulation ofrespect an to the Gulf spill. As another example,
alleged Audi defect underlying unintended consider
ac how frames can emphasize affected
party characteristics each otherin a they

and how way that
are further incre
influenced
observer identification with
by the observer's the
perceptions affected
of effect and firm
Rather than just providing characteristics, as well statistics
as by the observer's so on th
ber of individuals cial harmed,
identification with themedia
affected party orreport
with
provide personal details aboutWethe
the implicated corporation. concludedvictims
by de
cause observers to see similarities between the scribing how frames play an important role in
affected party and themselves, thus fostering the corporate social irresponsibility attribu
social identification and eliciting sympathy tion model.
(Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Nordgren & Morris McDon The theory we presented here, although fo
nell, 2011). Or, as was the case with the BP oil cused on attributions related to the dark side of
spill, media accounts sometimes emphasize theorganizational behavior, contributes to the
non-U.S. nationality of the implicated corporalarger body of research on the concept of CSR—
tion, thus possibly fostering disidentification of
the idea of voluntary firm behavior, not driven
U.S. observers for the company and supporting by the firm's explicit transactional interests and
stronger assessments of corporate culpability. legal/regulatory obligations, which has some in
In sum, frames can directly influence observer tentional positive social effect (Godfrey, Merrill,
assessments of the three primary factors in our & Hansen, 2009; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; McWil
model (effect undesirability, corporate culpabil liams & Siegel, 2001). Much CSR research is
ity, and affected party noncomplicity). Frames rooted in the broader research tradition attempt
can also influence those factors by affecting theing to understand both the firm's adaptation to
way observers perceive effect and firm charac its environment and environmental responses to
teristics, as well as by affecting observer social
firm action. In that vein, studies seeking to con
identification with the affected party or implifirm a link between socially responsible behav
cated corporation. Further, frames can appeal to ior and firm performance often investigate mar
an observer's cognitive schema of corporate soket reactions or accounting performance
cial irresponsibility by providing a story linechanges hypothesized to occur because socially
that links a culpable corporation with an underesponsible actions satisfy expectations in the
sirable effect as inflicted on innocent victims. firm's environment, thereby giving the firm re
Although these arguments suggest multiple source and institutional advantages (for a re
propositions regarding the influence of frames view see Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Similarly,
on each aspect of the model, for the sake of studies that look at social responsibility as a
parsimony, we offer one general proposition firm-level outcome variable often consider envi
about the ultimate effect of frames. ronmental antecedents, such as the specific de
mands of external stakeholders, rewards avail
Proposition 9: Observer awareness of
able owing to enhanced corporate reputation,
frames that position the corporation and various mechanisms of institutional diffu
as causal and morally responsible
sion (for reviews see Basu & Palazzo, 2008, and
with respect to a harmful effect on
Campbell, 2007). A commonality of the majority
noncomplicit victims is positively re
of CSR studies is that their approach to environ
lated to corporate social irresponsibil
ity attributions.
mental expectations for CSR emphasizes broad
social structures, such as value systems, institu
tions, and stakeholder relations. In contrast, the
DISCUSSION model we presented here suggests that respon
sibility and irresponsibility are social construc
In this article we used attribution theory tions to
with their roots in the knowledge, interpre
describe how corporate social irresponsibility tations, and perceptions of the firm's observers.
attributions are rooted in an array of subjective Our focus on individual-level knowledge, in
assessments made by the individual observer— terpretation, and perception is consistent with
assessments that the effect was undesirable, theories in the organization literature that high
that the corporation was culpable for the unde light individual agency within social construc
sirable effect, and that the affected party hadtivist
a frameworks. For instance, our approach is
low level of complicity in the undesirable effect.
compatible with the view not only that institu
We described how those assessments can affect tions or social structures constrain and enable
human behavior but also that they are pro for that identity (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley,
duced, reproduced, and changed as a result of 2008). An observer's abstracted understanding of
the knowledgeable behavior of human agents the affected party or firm develops and changes
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Battilana, 2006; Emir over time. Affinity with that identify will ebb
bayer & Mische, 1998; Giddens, 1984). Our ap and flow. Therefore, identification is a state that
proach is also compatible with the view that can strengthen and weaken with experience.
individuals simultaneously react to and shape Even societal changes that increasingly empha
the environments they perceive as constituting size the interconnectedness of observers with
social reality (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Weick, victims of undesirable effects might cause ob
1979). Basu and Palazzo (2008) recently employed servers to expand their self-definition to include
this view to explore how organization decision others. As observer perceptions of ingroup and
makers go about making sense of the organiza outgroup boundaries evolve, assessments of af
tion's relationship with its stakeholders and fected party complicity and corporate culpabil
with the world at large, thereby constructing ity with respect to a negative effect are likely to
and defining the organization's CSR character. be influenced accordingly.
We join Basu and Palazzo in challenging the Our focus in this article has been on subjec
idea that environmental pressures on the firm tive understandings of firm behavior in terms of
for socially responsible behavior are best under appropriateness and responsibility as those un
stood as objective facts. However, our emphasis derstandings form at the level of the individual
is on the attributions made by the firm's observ perceiver. An implication for the firm is that
ers, rather than on the sensemaking of firm those individual-level perceptions, including at
insiders. tributions of corporate social irresponsibility,
An important implication of our model, which constitute the real-world environment in which
should be relevant both to researchers and prac the firm exists and with which the firm must
titioners, is that expectations and evaluations interact. This suggests that individual-level
for social responsibility do not exist as an objec knowledge, interpretations, and perceptions ag
tive reality in the firm's environment but, rather, gregate across individuals in ways that become
are subjective and changeable, being the prod visible to organizations and relevant to organi
uct of a confluence of influences affecting indi zational outcomes. A subject for future research
vidual perceptions. Consider, for example, that is to consider theoretically and explore empiri
perceptions of effect undesirability are subject cally how individual-level attributions for social
to developments in measurement techniques responsibility or irresponsibility that correlate
and emerging causal theories. As was the case across individuals may underlie the structural
historically with cigarettes and the developing influences often studied in CSR research, in
science linking them with cancer, new methods cluding institutional and stakeholder pressures
of measurement emerge that bring effects to ob on the firm.
servers' attention and consideration. As nega Another subject for future research is the em
tive effects become evident, the search for pirical examination of our model of corporate
causal agents intensifies, and associated firms social irresponsibility attributions. In spite of
appear increasingly culpable. Yet as the haz containing a wide array of predicted influences
ards of smoking have become widely known on social irresponsibility attributions, and there
and smoking is seen as an active choice, smok fore an apparent complexity that would seem to
ers' perceived complicity in their fate may make preclude straightforward empirical testing, the
the associated firms appear less culpable. model in fact lends itself well to testing. The
Indeed, observer assessments of affected model entails individual-level perceptions and
party complicity and corporate culpability does withnot encompass process in terms of se
respect to a negative effect are also not static. or interactions of influences over time.
quence
For example, as we argued earlier, each will Combined
be with these aspects, the important role
sensitive to the degree to which the observer of frames in the model suggests an avenue for
identifies with the affected party or the firm. empirical exploration in an experimental set
Identification entails an abstracted understand ting. Because frames can be highly influential
ing of what the affected party or firm is—that on is,
each of the elements in the corporate social
its identity—along with the observer's affinity irresponsibility attribution model, various parts
of the model could be manipulated in a lab way the observer assesses effect undesirability,
study using scenarios as frames. The researchercorporate culpability, and affected party non
could devise different versions of a scenario in complicity. Chief among those sources of vari
volving a fictional firm and event to make ancethe likely will be the individual's shared inter
effect appear more or less negative, the firm ests with other observers—shared interests that
more or less culpable, the affected party more may or not necessarily relate to the individual's
less complicit, and the affected party or firm identification
social as with the firm or affected
easier or harder for the experimental subject party. to One way of understanding such shared
socially identify with. The researcher could then is in terms of whether and how the
interests
measure perceptions among experimental sub individual is a stakeholder of the focal organi
jects to check the manipulations of those factors. zation (Freeman, 1984). Different types of stake
For example, one version of the scenario could holders, by virtue of their different types of rela
include descriptive information about the af tionships with the firm, will have different sets
fected party that emphasizes lack of foresight or of interests, making stakeholder analysis a po
power, whereas a different version could omit tentially useful avenue for extending the theo
this information. In this way the researcher retical model presented here. We would expect
would be able to assess the impact of percep that an analysis of stakeholder interests, be
tions of affected party power and foresight on cause those interests may naturally diverge and
observer assessments of affected party noncom can even compete among different stakeholder
plicity. The researcher could then test the de groups, would add a layer of complexity that
gree to which factors such as the subject's as would complement and deepen the understand
sessment of affected party noncomplicity ing of individual-level corporate social irrespon
contribute to a measure of the subject's attribu sibility attributions we have introduced.
tions of corporate social irresponsibility for the Future research could also extend the model
focal firm. Because real-world attributions of provided here by considering nuances among
corporate social irresponsibility are oftenevents. influ We modeled events as primarily differ
enced by the reading or hearing of a storying about
in terms of the subjective perceptions of dif
a firm and a negative event, having experimen ferent observers. This approach helps explain
tal subjects read, listen to, or watch a scenario how two events apparently representing similar
about a company would be a very natural way levels of social harm can differentially contrib
for observers to form corporate social irrespon ute to corporate social irresponsibility attribu
sibility attributions. We therefore expect that a tions. However, there may be important differ
scenario-based lab study would provide rich in ences among events that facilitate or impede
formation regarding the formation of these attri those attributions. For instance, it would be
butions in a manner that would allow for high valuable to explore how events may differ in
external validity. terms of the dimensions of the firm's legitimacy
A possible limitation of the model presented (e.g., "pragmatic," "moral," or "cognitive" legiti
in this article is that it simplifies some of the macy, as per Suchman, 1995: 571) that the events
real-world nuances in terms of individual differ potentially undermine. Events that differ in the
ences among observers, among events, among way they harm the firm's legitimacy might also
corporations, and among frames. The explora differ in the way they contribute to observer
tion of those nuances represents an opportunity perceptions of corporate culpability. We would
for future theoretical development and empiri expect that, relative to other types of legitimacy
cal research. Consider, for instance, the individ damage, moral legitimacy damage would be
ual observer differences that we modeled with most consistent with observer assessments of
respect to perceptions of threat, moral impulses,
corporate culpability for undesirable social
and interpretations of norms and the degree to
outcomes.
which the observer socially identifies with theAnother potential avenue of exploration is
implicated firm or affected party. These differ
how events differ in terms of ambiguity, which
ences help explain how perceptions of corporate
Frisch and Baron describe as "the subjective
social irresponsibility might vary across observ
experience of missing information relevant to a
ers. Future research can explore other sources of
prediction" (1988: 152). We would expect that,
variance in observer perceptions that affect across
the observers, events higher in ambiguity
would have higher

especially effective when variance
they are simple yet i
irresponsibility attributions,
dramatic, are marketed in such a way as to
influences on attributions modeled here would maximum novelty and minimize oversaturation,
be more operative. appeal to widely accepted cultural concerns, are
In this article we modeled differences among consistent with powerful economic and political
corporations primarily in terms of size,interests, promi and fully specify parties to blame as
nence, and perceived disposition, but there well are
as potential remedies for the problem (Hil
other differences among corporations that gartner future & Bosk, 1988; Spector & Kitsuse, 2001).
research could explore as potentially influenc The model presented here would be enhanced
ing corporate social irresponsibility attribu by further exploration into how these kinds of
tions. For example, it would be valuable to con nuances in the accounts and apologies offered
sider how stigma—meaning that the firm is by the firm and in the frames offered by third
widely perceived as possessing a "fundamental, parties will influence not only the observer's
deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and dis attention to the effect, corporation, and affected
credits the organization" (Devers, Dewett, party but also how the observer will interpret and
Mishina, & Belsito, 2009: 157)—would contribute explain those elements potentially underlying
to attributions of irresponsibility. Attributions of corporate social irresponsibility attributions.
corporate social irresponsibility, as we have
presented them in this article, are individuating
in that they are unique assessments about a CONCLUSION
particular firm, but we expect that they would be
sensitive to the inherently deindividuating na Even though much consideration has been
ture of stigmatization. given in various streams of the organizational
Another potential avenue of exploration is literature to the causes and consequences of
how firms differ in terms of their perceived as bad behavior by firms, little attention has been
sociation with other firms, including network given to how observers subjectively understand
and industry memberships. For instance, illegit firm behavior as bad or irresponsible. The the
imacy, negative reputation, and stigma spill ory offered here provides insight into how cor
over from associated firms (e.g., Jonsson, Greve, porate social irresponsibility attributions arise
at the level of the individual observer of the firm.
& Fujiwara-Greve, 2009; King, Lenox, & Barnett,
2002; Paetzold, Dipboye, & Elsbach, 2008) could Since those subjectively constructed under
easily influence an observer's assessments of standings help constitute the real-world envi
ronment in which the firm exists and with which
the focal firm's culpability for an undesirable
effect. the firm must interact, it is important to consider
Finally, our treatment of frames as a fairly how those understandings come to be. With our
homogenous construct is another area in which focus on attributions of irresponsible rather than
the model presented in this article could be responsible behavior, we join a nascent stream
elaborated in future research. There is quite a of research laying the foundation for further
bit of existing research on how certain charac study of how perceptions that the firm has acted
teristics of accounts and apologies can make in a socially harmful way may be particularly
those accounts and apologies more or less effec relevant to the firm's ability to draw support and
resources from its environment. Attributions of
tive (e.g., Benoit, 1995; Elsbach, 1994; Higgins &
Snyder, 1989; Wood & Mitchell, 1981). For exam irresponsibility may generate stronger external
ple, Elsbach (1994) described how organizational reactions than perceptions of responsibility and,
audiences are more forbearing when the firm ultimately, have a much greater impact on the
firm's relationship with its environment.
acknowledges rather than denies a controversy
and when the firm's accounts of the controversy
signal attention to firm legitimacy rather than to
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Donald Lange (don.lange@asu.edu) is an assistant professor of management in the

W. P. Carey School of Business at Arizona State University. He received his Ph.D. from
the University of Texas at Austin. His research interests include reputation, legiti
macy, and prestige in organizational and industry settings; controversial organiza
tional action; and organizational corruption.
Nathan T. Washburn (nathan.washburn@thunderbird.edu) is an assistant professor of

management at Thunderbird School of Global Management. He received his Ph.D.
from Arizona State University. His research interests include the role of values in
executive decision making and leadership, corporate social responsibility, and global
strategy topics.

Comprendre Les Attributions Des Irresponsabilites Sociales Des Entreprises

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UNDERSTANDING ATTRIBUTIONS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

Author(s): DONALD LANGE and NATHAN T. WASHBURN

Notwithstanding the significance to organizations of external reactions to bad behav

1 A number of counterexamples to this tendency include

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Ashforth, B. E., Harrison, S.

Elsbach, K. D., &Hamilton,

Paetzold, R. L., Dipboye, R. L., & Elsbach, K. D. 2008. A new

Donald Lange (don.lange@asu.edu) is an assistant professor of management in the

Nathan T. Washburn (nathan.washburn@thunderbird.edu) is an assistant professor of

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