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Analytic Philosophy of Education and Children's Rights

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2 An analytic perspective on
education and children's
rights
lVbite
Jobn Wbite and Patricia

The analytic tradition in British philosophy of education

How and why each of r_rs in this book apprroaches philosophy of edutrtion as
we clo is bound to have a 1ot to do with the tradition of philosophising in
wl-rich we have been brought r,4r. In the case of the present co-ar-rthors, this is
the so-called 'analytic' tradition of post-war British philosophy, partly influ-
enced as it was by the work of the iater $Tittgenstein (Hacker I')c)6). British
philosophy of educlrtion in its present fbrm was Propagatecl from this parcnt
stock wl-ien the analytic schooi of thought was in its full flowering, that is to
say in the early 1!60s. The person responsibLe for this creation was Rirhard
Peters, who turned his energies towards philosophical issues in educati6n
upcrn his appointment ,n 1c152 to the chair of Philosophy of Education et
the University of London Institute of Education. This followecl a distin-
guished earlier career in the Pl'rilosophy Department of Birkbeck College,
lJniversity of London, where he specialisecl in philosophy of psychology,
ethics and social pl-rilosophy. The present co-authots were both pupils of his
berween l9(r0 and 7966 and in the mid-1960s joined him as coileagurs in
tl-re Philosophy of Education Department of the Institr-rre of Education.
.Vhat clo we mean by the 'trnalytic' tradition of post-war British philosophy?
In the next two sections we arglle ti'rzrt the term 'analytic' needs careful clelin-
eation, so as not to confuse the prhilosophical trzrdition we have in mind with,
first, an earlier 'zrnalytic' movement, to which the later was partly a reaction;
ancl, secondly, certain stereotypes zrnd misr-rnclerstanclings of this later move-
ment. These stereotypes and misunderstanclings have produced a misleading
picture not only o[ 'analytic' (or 'oxford') philosopl'ry in general, brrr also of
analytic philosophy of education in particular. Even toclay, forty years sincc
Richard Peters crossed the roacl from Birkbeck College to the Institure uf
Eclucation, the olcl misconceptions of the kincl of work we do stil1 exist.

Post-.uar anallttic pbilosophlt in Britain

The post-war 'zrnalytic' school - largely based at Oxford - clid not shirre the
preoccr-rpations of the 'antrlvtic' movement of the flrst half of the twentieth
 14 John Vbite and Patricia'tVbite
century - largely based at cambridge - against which it reacted and of downplaying of consciousnesr
which the leading figures were Russell and the \ilTittgenstein of the was given to the 'logical gq
Trdctatus. Although an interest in language was a common thread, the later instance, the connections betr
school did not seek a logically perfect language from which the inadequacies tion and belief, between belir
of the language we have would be absent. Neither did it understand the and between emorion and s
'analysis' of language as a reduction to atomic elements. Nor did it see its
example of this kind of wor*
work on language as leading to discoveries about the strucrure of reality (cf. eadier period, is Anthony l(eu
N7ittgenstein's picture theory of meaning). This work in the philosop\
Although there were many differences in the philosophies of the posr-war seen as a non-scientific eaterp
analysts - e.g., Gilbert Ryle, John Austin, Peter Strawson and closer aim at discovery of hirhemo ru
followers of the later \Tittgenstein like Elizabeth Anscombe, peter Geach
N7e will come back to the rck
and Peter \7inch - these philosophers and others together built up a distinc- in a later section.) philosophy
tive form of philosophising of which the following were the leading fearures discipline, making clearer wh
(not all equally prominent in all contributors). philosophy is an exploration I7e have a common-sense unil
of conceptual schemes embedded in the language we know and use. It does things, angry d things, proud,
not reject this in favour of some more adequate language. The analysis in a preliminary ro a more profun
which it engages is not reductive, but 'connective': it investigates how one general are directed to obfems (
concept is connected - often in complex and ragged-ended ways in a web
-
of other conceprs with which it is logically related. This type of analytic
claim by reference to such aIrF
depression. Seeing that rhe m
philosophy does not seek to discover new trurhs about the world: philosophy mental as in other areas are r
is not, as for instance Russell believed, part of the same enrerprise as science. -
extent what we as individrral
It gets to work on what we already understand, albeit often inchoately, including philosophy of mind lr
I
aiming at claity in place of obscurity and confusion. A large part of this knowledge.
confusion stems from misleading accounts of how or. .orr..pti are to be This brief accounr of .analyti
understood, emanating from earlier, influential writings in philosophy. and the British school of philosoph
elsewhere. one task of philosophy - for some philosophers the major task this mode of philosophising h
is therefore therapeutic, to free one's thinking from the mentar cramps
-
something of irs relevance shoul
which these erroneous theories have inflicted on it. The work of the later abour the philosophy of mind,
NTittgenstein, culminating in his Pbilosophical Inaestigations (1953), was a about the mental concepts in an
powerful force in this reconceptualisation of the discipline, although the tive analysis', which we have il
independent contribution of the oxford philosophers should not be over- many other areas of philosophy
looked (Hacker 1996: ch.6). able to harness to their prr"*
As an illustration of the points made in the last paragraph, we can take and political philosophy. It is in
work in the area of the philosophy of mind during this period. This was philosophy, that philosophers I
conceived as connective analysis of mental conceprs
- e.g., mind itself,
consciousness, inrenrionality, dispositions and abilities, concepts, thought,
general, including irs connecit
law, morality, liberry, welfare, p
imagination. sensarion, percepcion, memory, belief, agency, desire, morive, section we will go into more deu
intention, emotion. The aim was as perspicuous as possible an under- on issues of children's rights-
standing of the web of mental conceprs in all its complexity, doing justice to
its resistance ro systemisation beyond certain points and exposing
misleading pictures of how the mind operates. Ryle's Tbe Concept ,i tWra Misconceptions of analyt;c pffi
(I94, criticised the Cartesian notion of the mind as a non-physical Post-war' analytic' philosoph6
substance attached to a body and replaced it with a laryely dispositional tion, has often been reprcs
account of intelligence, imagination, emorion and other conceprs. Critics of sometimes by philosophers wu
Ryle questioned the emphasis on overr behaviour in his anarysis and the trivial pursuit concerned with
 An anal1,tis perspectiue 15

downpiaying of consciousness. In the 1950s and 1960s cletailed arrenrion

given to the 'iogical geography' of the mental conceprs, discussing, for
n'zrs
instance, the connections between sensation and perception, b"ror"..,
percep-
rion and belief, berween beiief and motive, b"t"r""n motive and emotion,
and between emotion and sensarion. An excellent and more up-to-date
example of this kind of work, which draws, however, on writings of
rhis
earlier period, is Anthony Kenny's The Aletapbysics of Mincl (19g9).
This work in the philosophy of mind, as in other areas of philosophy, was
seen as a non-scientific enterprise. UnLke empirical psychoiogy,
it did not
aim at discovery of hirherto unknown facts about the way tt"...'ir-,a works.
(we will come back to the relationship between philosopiry
and psychorogy
in a later section.) Philosophy of mind was conceived as a ,seiond-order'
cliscipline, making clearer whar we already dimly or implicitiy understand.
\we have a common-sense
understanding, for insrance, at-ru, *. are afraid, of
things, aflgry.tt things, proud o/rhings, erc. N7hat philosophy does h"re, us
a preliminary ro a more profound analysis, is ro hypolhesise^thar
emotions in
general are directed to objecrs (i.e.,'intentional'objects); and then
tests that
claim by reference to such apparent counterexamples as objectless anxiery
or
depression. Seeing that the conceprual schemes we use in rhe area
- of the
mental as in other areas - are so cenfral to our lives, constituting to a large
extent what we as individual persons are, thts type of analytic p},itoropiy,
including philosophy of mind nor reast, becomes closery urro.io,.i with serf-
knowledge.
This brief accounr of'analytic' philosophy presenrs the recent ancestry of
the British school of philosophy of education. s7e will describe later how
this mode of philosophising has been appried to educarional issues, bur
something of irs relevance should aheady be evident from what we have said
about the philosophy of mind, given the indispensabirity of ciear rhoughr
about the mental conceprs in any overali account of educarion. The 'connec-
tive analysis', which we have iilustrared in rhis area, was also pursued in
many other areas of philosophy which philosophers of education have been
able to harness to their purposes, including epistemorogy, aestherics
and polirical philosophy. It is in this rast area,",hi.r,
and in ihe relureJarea of legal
philosophy, that philosophers have invesrigated the concept of righrs in
general, including its connecrions with other concepr, ,rr.h as obligation,
Iaw, morality, liberty, welfare, personal auronomy and liberalism. In
a later
section we will go into more detail about these links and about their bearing
on issues of children's rights.

Mi s concept ion s of ana ly t ic p h i losop hy

Post-war 'analytic' philosophy, including analytic philosophy of educa-

tion, has often been represenred, both by non_philosophers and
somerimes by philosophers working in other traditions, as a somewhar
trivial pursuit concerned with spelling out the meaning of words. \we
 16 John Wbite a.nd Parricia Vhite

were recently at a committee meeting whose members were worrying over

.
I.t is truerhat posr-\i j:
how to define 'a book' in the cause of recording staff research output in philosophy', br-rr thrs ne; -
the field of education. \Mould something less than 80 pages counti') Could cialiry. The eariier analr::-
a book have just two chapters? Etc. etc. '\7e can't get much further with Tra(lttl//r can also br callr: .

this one'someone said.'This is clearly a problem for the philosophers.' perfecr language and in r:. .

Fortunately we were ready with an answer. '\We'cl like to help', one of us later analytic school u,as .:-
replied, 'but not yet awl-rile. You see, we're still working on the concept cally differenr fashion..,. -
of the slate.' perfect language in far-our , :'
Not only those outside the discipline see analytic philosophers as poor one can understand, e\rn :
relations of dictionary compilers. Thke Bertrand Russell, for instance, on the language philosophy', n.hi::-.
later tJTittgenstein:'I have not found in tJTittgenstein's Iaaestigationt however if rhoLrght to im1...
anything that seemed to me interesting and I do not understand why a acrions are fair philosophrc"_
whole school finds important wisdom in its pages...if it is true, philosophy concepr ofa book. The iocu.
is, at best, a slight help to iexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-table u//1. itttltortant iun;rptj. on .:
amlrsement' (Hacker LC)96: l3c)). and wirltin Ianguage aq J \\
Philosophers of education outside the analytic school have had similar 'usage' in tl.re more paroch:.-
reactions to analytic philosophy of education, conveniently labelled 'APE' sively concerned with rh.
by Australian colleagues working within Marxist or Quinean frameworks. language' is raken as ro be ci :
Other critics, who equally deride the superficiality and parochiality of APE, is rrrre. much of irs tim. *.,
have found greater profunclity in 'continental' phiiosophy, like that of knowledge, belief, ougl-rr. :
Heidegger, Gadamer or Merleau-Ponty. They would do wel1, though, to esoteric terms like 'entailme:
heed Bernard \Tilliams' comment on the allegeci contrast between 'analytic' $7e hope rhis does enou::
and 'continental' philosophy: 'This classification always involved a <1uite nature of analyric philosophr
bizate conflation of the methodological and the topographicai, as though tion.It is time, in any cas:.
one classified cars into front-wheel drive and Japanese' (Williams 199): pursuit of our main objectir...
66. sophically speaking, in discr_Ls,
How sound is tl-re charge of lexicographical triviality? \Work in the
analytic tradition has often been labelled 'ordinary language philosophy'. It
Analytic philosophy of ed
has been conceivecl as an exploration of the minutiae of word usage,
including, for example, the carefui separation of the different ways in which In the 1960s and earlv 19r().
the same worcl is used in different contexts, and the laying out of minute direction applied unulyti.: .,.,..
differences in the meanings of closely cognate words. If analytic philosophy interconnections between cor..
were just this, it would indeed be parochial, for it would be bounded by the the purview of general philos,
iinguistic horizons of a single language - English in the case of 'Oxford' especially Ryle touched on rh
philosophy, although equally parochial philosophy could be done within, rJur'arion, reaching. rrainin_.
say, the Dutch language or Japanese. (see,for example, peters 196-
It is true that among the different strands which made up post-war philos- confusions and philosophica-.
ophy at Oxford, the approach of J. L. Austin did look in some detail at subtle educational rheories, e.g., rhe
idioma"tic distinctions, but (1) few of l'ris colleagues followed him down this time (see, for example, DearC.
roacl, and (2) Austin himself did not see this approach as rEe pl-rilosophical certain concepts explored in r
method, but only as ()tte method which might be fruitful in illuminating clarification of relerunr
-.n,"
;ertain ph|rosophical issues, e.g., to clo with responsibility (Hacker 1996: ch. concerns about the developn-r.:
6). As this last remark implies, exploration of linguistic usa1le was not an end emotions. Explorations of jnre:
in itself, bttt ane means to a more impsl1np1 end, the understanding of philo- ancl evidence were harnessed :
sophically interesting concepts and their interrelationships. curriculum. In the erhical area.

fit- 3-.l.t^IIrD---l(IrI-'
 An analytic per:pectitte 7l
It is true that post-war analytic philosophy can be called 'linguisric
-:nilosophy', br-rt this need not carry with it any
connorarions of superfi-
--rrliry. The earlier analytic school of Russell and rhe \wittgenstein of the
T;'tctatus can also be called by the same name, given its interest in a logically
-:trf-ect language and in its basic propositions as a reflecrion of reality. The
,arer analytic school was equally preoccupied with language, but in a radi-
,al1y different fashion, as indicated earlier. It rejected rhe idea of a logically
:erfect lang*age in favour of the language we ordinarily use. For this reason,
one can understand, even if one does nor accepr, the appellation 'ordinary
language philosophy', which became attached to it. The term is misleading
however if thought to imply that any of the words we use in everyday trans-
actions are fair philosophical game. No philosopher would be riveted by the
concept of a book. The fbcus was on rhe investigation of the ase ol pbitwopbi-
;al/f iruportant clnce])ts, on rheir function within wider conceptual schemes
and within language as a whole. 'Use' in this sense is a world away from
'usage' in the more parochial
sense. Neither was analytic philosophy exclu-
sively concerned with the use of non-technical concepts, if 'ordinary
language' is taken as ro be contrasred with 'rechnical language'. Although, it
is true, much of its time was taken r-rp with notions in everyday use like
knowledge, belief, ought, pain, cause, acrion. erc., ir also puzzled over
esoteric terms like 'entailment' or 'existential quantifier'.
r7e hope this does enough ro remove familiar misconceprions about rhe
nature of analytic philosophy and therewith of analytic philosophy of educa-
tion. It is time, in any case, rhat we looked more closely at the latter in
pursuit of our main objective, that of showing'where we come from', philo-
sophically speaking, in discussions of children's rights.

Analytic philosophy of education

In the 1960s and early 1910s British philosophy of education under peters'
direction applied analytic methodology in three ways. Firstiy, it investigated
interconnections between conceprs peculiar to education, which lay outside
the purview of generai philosophy, although rhe work of $Tittgenstein and
especially Ryle touched on them in places. These included the concepts of
education, teaching, training, learning, develop:,menr and indoctrination
(see, for example, Peters 1967). Secondly, it sought to untangle conceptual
confirsions and philosophically dubious claims embeclded in influential
educational theories, e.g., the developmentaiist child-cenrred theory of the
time (see, for example, Dearden 1968). Thirdly, ir applied investigations of
certain conceprs explored in general philosophy to educational issues. The
clarification of relevant mental conceprs, for instance, illuminated practical
concerns about the developmenr of the imaginarion or the education of the
emotions. Explorations of interconnections betrveen knowledge, belief, truth
and evidence were harnessed to classroom-level issues of learning and the
curriculum. In the ethical area, work - by Perers himself, 21mong others on
-
18 Vhite
Jobn Vbite artd Patricia
was applied to matters of
tive analysis as its central m
the meaning and justification of moral principles interested as other philosophcn
moraleducationandtouit'ut'dtonceptionsofeducationmoregenerally knowledge, belief, moraliry rt
(see, for example, Peters 1966, 1981)' tion, democracy and equality-
had to connect with the
The fact thrt unulytit pniftttpf'y of education general philosophers in cmcl
gave it from.the start a prac-
concerns of teachers urrd oth., educationalisrs personal identity, since thm cn
branches of philosophy - even
tical orientation nor g.n.rully found in other educational objectives, policf t
a second-order discipline
ethics, which at that r;;. ;, almost exclusively tion have a more practical inu
like ought' right and
focusing on the ,rr. o?-"t'y gtttt"l moral ,concepts those also working in applied 1
ethics broadened out to embrace more
;;;. ft.- the late tgzo''o'i*utds' to issues like war and peace'
clarification and in the eqru
practical concerns: its-insights were applied their own sake but because of d
abortion, the environ-ttl; u"d the- iange
of concepts it investigated cies and practices and - ultim
concepts of the virtues and. concepts
extended to 'thicker' ;;;ttptt like the areas that this illumination cr
along with its earlier
related to personal wetl-be^ing' Ethics now.included' the field, see \7hite 199t.)
orientations' The interest of
meta-ethical ina"r.ra,,^t'J'-u-'ive and applied There is no one way of pt
is concerned' is: (1) that
this shift, as far as *,fyiit pnifosophy of td"t"tion stretches between two poles: a
concrete direction from the
this disciplin. *u, ,f,tlJy to"mj in this more at the other, educational lnlicy
and can .iui- to huit b"tt" in fact' one
of the first areas of
mid-1950s in schools' former to bear on the lameq h
'applied philosophy' iP;;*' 0966) discussions of punishment more philosophical than prrti
for democracy are good
equality of educationi crppc,l'"tity and.education but there are dangers if the bel
examples of early -ork'of this sort);
and (2) that the growth of journal articles are virtually pfo
of education closer' since
normative/appll.d .tf,it' h" brooght philosophers education is hard to see; othen
the 1980s, to the concerns ofother philosophers' little philosophical interest- Il
general has expanded its
A related way in *ttitn analytii philosophy in colleagues in our discipline cn
horizons since the 1980s is the greater
aitention now paid' especially in
want to, or put together polic
the human sciences' to the
political philosophy,;;hitt ut'd piilo'ophy of walk a difficult tightrope berr
cultural frameworks .r*rri.r, .on."p* ofien betong. The work of chades practical pay off for educarim-
Taylor (198r, 1989);; to"ttpts of sell human agency and liberty' of always done this.
'nt vjrtues and of Bernard \rilliams on
Alasdair Maclntyre <f g81, on the inoral
(\Tilliams 198)) and shame and guilt
the notions of *orutlti'"ti tUflg"i"n
d education
(\flilliams 1993) are prominent recent examples' -Philosotlt the analytic Analytic pbilosopby of edacati
has been profoundly irin".*.a by
this widening of focus within Before we look at childrenb ri
paradigm, *hi.h hus bten reflecied in its
own work' Its approach to chil-
tion: what is the specific conrri
by an awareness of the links
dren's rights, as we ;hJ;t;, is now informed to educational studies, as comp
oi the meaning and value of
between this notion and contested perceptions As stated earlier, like odc
liberal culture' about the discovery of hithen
has work in philosophy of
In only one of the three areas mentlonecI above conceptual connections, indrd
education contractd rl"l.,fr. 1960s. Much less attention is now paid to the ethical values. 1a, .sn1ml rasl( i
specifically .arl."rio*i- concepts, like education' teaching' learning and
field of education, its aims, pm
indoctrinatio.r. ff,i' t"uy ""d nt because
the main articulations of these
its non-empirical nature ftoru
so that there is little more to
;;.;p.; were well tn"tta in those early days' not go deep and their possible
parts of educational disciplirs
say about them. In Jtrn"l"t', they
perhaps do
education. At certain poinrs
not interesting philosophical
ramifications with other concepts do
generate
however. The history of edrs
to"tti" of. knowledge' truth or mind)' This may
puzzles (unlike, d;; instance, the curriculum, or i
the other concepts mentioned'
apply less ao at . .o*tpt of leurning than to sophical understanding of rhel
firmly bound to connec-
In sum, u.,utyti. pf;ltosophy of*education is still

?ffi
 An analytic PersPectiue 19

": its central methoclology' Philosophers of education are

as
analysis as
:rrestei as other philosophers in becoming clearer about such concepts as
.: .or,,,ledge, belief, morality, well-being, aesthetic experience' mind'
motiva-
. ,t. d.io.racy and equality' They-like tend to be less interested than many
negation' sensation' entailment or
-:aeral philosophers i., .o.t..pt'
^::sonal identity, since these tot"tpt' ure less directly relevant to matters of
: - -rcational obiectives, policy or ptdogogy'
Analytic philosophers of educa-
r have a more pru.tr.ul intent than many general philosophers - except
They are intelesler] in conceptual
, ,se also working in ufplie.l philosophy' theories, not for
. -.litlcation and in ,rr.'""por"r" of confused or unfounded
:irownsakebutb".u.rr.oftheilluminationtheycastoneducationalpoli-
improvements in these
:S afld practices and - ultimately - because of the
to bring about. (For a recent survey of
.,:..is rhar this illuminatior, .un n.tp
tield, see \7hite 199t.)
=
T}.rere is no one *uy of pursuing analytic phiiosophy
of education' It
:=rches between ,*o iol.'''ut ot" Jnd, its parent
discipline.of philosophy'
practice' Its general aim.is to bring the
. :he other, edrcutionul policy and
' ::rer to bear on the lutter; but, naiurally enough' some of its writings are
-' ,re philosophical than practical, and vice versa' There is no harm in that'
way or the other' Some
--: there are dangers if the balance tilts
too far one
philosophy, whose applicability to
_-rnai articles are virtually pieces of pure
and of
:*r.ation is harcl to see; *htt' u'" tlo" to policy recommendations
than 'phiiosopher of education'
.:ie philosophicai interest' In other roles
general philosophy if they
.,eagues in our a;r.iftint can, of course' write
..,.:rr to, or put tog..h.. policy documents' In their own role they need to
philosophical depth and
-. -.,.k a difficult tightr-ofe'bet*.".r th. demands of
-:...-tical pay off fcrr The leading exponents of the discipline have
"docution'
. .,'eYs done this.

\talytic philosopblt of eclucation and educational studies

on- the ques-
::rcre we look at children's rights in particular' a few words
philosophy of education
r: what is the specific contrif,ution olthis type of
studies, as compared with other sub-disciplines?
=clucational
As stated earlier, iik. oth., branches of analytic philosophy.
it is not
r )'rt the cliscovery of hitherto unknown facts' but about understanding
between concepts of
eceptual connections, including in this connections
-: licalvalr-res.ltscentraltaskistoachieveconfusion-freemapsofthewhole
.lclofeclucation,itsuims,processes'culturalhorizons,etc.Itisdifferentin
-.non-empiricalnaturefromthehistoryofeducationandtheempirical of
iit.ipri"tt like psychology of educa-tion and sociology
..::s of educational
:--iciltion. A, ...tui.t 1-'oi'-"' it touches ull tht"t of these
other fields'
' \\.ever. The historf of edtttational ideas - about vocational education' for
'.:::rnce. the curriculum, or intelligence testing - is enhanced by a philo-
, :rhical unclerstanding of these issues, and vice versa'
'20
Jobn Vbite and Patricia Wbite
Recent philosophical interest in the cultriral horizons of our conceprs scene. Some see it as introdu
brings philosophy of eclucarion closer both to general history ancl to soci- could, and should, be a more
ology, inclucling sociology of edr,rcarion. The work of a general sociologisr light can a philosophical perq
like Anthony Gicldens also overlaps ar many p:,oints with work in the philos- also the meta-issue of the appro
ophy of social science: it would be good ro see rhis overlap reflected in
eclucational studies, where, in Britain ar leasr, philosophers and sociologists
of education herve tended to keep their acrivitics in scparatc compsrtmenrs. Rigbts and rigbts talk
There are similar overlaps with the work of conceprually and hermeneuti- \We talked at the end
of our g
cally orientzrted psychologists and to a small exrenr psychologists of philosophy of its mapping hrncl
edr-rcation. But links between our area and theirs are, again, pirifuliy few, both rights and rights talk in our m
in general and in the field of education. This has much to do with the Most familiariy, rights are r
attempts that have been made since the ninereenth cenrlrry to free psychology employees, house buyers and g
from the ch-rtches of philosophy and to pLLr ir on an inclepenclent, scientific particular legal system we have
footing. There are serious qllesrions philosophiczrl questions zrboi-rt how I-ar rights poses no philosophical pn
a science of the mind is conceprually possible. Philosophers of eclucation who they are, the procedures by whic
raise such issues are not always popular among psychologists of education of a changed.
more scientific bent. In onr virw, it is a piry that the two clisciplines do not So far, so good. But wh:r eb
work more closely rogerher. No one shor-rld welcome confr-rsecl ideas. If exist under a legal system? Did
philosophers ancl philosophers of eclucation can sort our conceprual confu- the introduction of women's srd
sions, as we believe they do, in, for instance, the theories of Freud, Piaget, of campaigners is that rhere is a
Chomsky ancl Skinner, or theories abour artiflcial intelligence or rhe IQ, a legal right. Indeed it can
psychologists should be the first to welcome this. Tb judge by the eclectic and enshrined in laq like the righr t
uncierconceptr-ralised narure of standard rexrbooks in eclucational psychology, What is involved, then, in ta
that discipline would also benefit by cooperation with philosophers of educa- understood as legitimate claim*
tion in a mapping of the mental conceprs so as to provide a more aclequate that P has a right to do X is .trz
framework within which empirical str-rdies can find their place. P from doing X, that this durr
So much for some of the relationships, actual and ideal, between anzrlytic
1

feel no embarrassment abour insi

philosophy of education and other eclr-rcational disciplines. As a mal.ping approach co poliricai marrers- E
subject, it also has a special contribution to make ro a conceprual overview common good in a given comrnl
of educational studies as a whole (see Hirsr 1983; Eiiiott lL)87). and needy, but on the rights t
claims. A qualification is called I
Children's rights the demand for communir-, rjt
against majority communiries- l
The topic of cl'rilclren's rigirts touches on rhe one hand issues of practical the rights of the individual ageio
eclucational policy and on rhe other fr-rndamental issues at rhe hearr of polit- cations, particularly in relarion rc
ical philosophy. At the policy encl there is public concern ancl c'lebate about :r Looking at lour objecrions to;
number of cluestions raising issr-res of children's rights. Anxiety about child will both further clailfy rhe nai
abuse involves, very basically, the chilcl's right not to be harmed. Discussions the kind of jusrification *.hich c
of national curricula, common cr-rrricula, black str-rc'lies ancl women's studies world.
raise c1-restions abor-rt rhe kind of ech-rcarion ro which cl-rildren l.rave a nght
and the n2lture of that right. Connecreclly, who sl-roulcl hzrve the right t<_r 1 It has been argued rhar
determine the child's eclucarion, particlllarly jn areas like religiolrs education fir well with the develol
ancl sex eclucation, is vigorously clebatecl and rhe claims of parer-rts, the state, responsibilities to orhers
eclucational experts ancl children themselves are sr-rbjecr to searching 2rssess- above analysis ofrighrs i
ment. 'Rights rzrlk' is a ihmiliar feature of tl-re conremporary edr-rcatior-iai ative. More than thar- v
 An ana\tic per.rpectite 21

scene. Some see it as introclucing a strident, conflictful ethos into what

coulcl, and should, be a more harmonious resolution of differences. \7hat
light can a philosophical perspective throw on the substantive issr-res and
aiso the meta-issue of the appropriateness of rights talk?

Rigbts and rigbts talk

We talkecl at the end of our section on the history ancl nature of analytic
philosophy of its mapping function. tWe need now to try to map the place of
r:ights and rights talk in our moral and politicai life.
Most familiarly, rights are a part of our legal vocabulary. As citizens,
empioyees, house buyers and sellers, tenants and landlorcls iiving under a
l,articular legal system we have rights. The nature and legitimacy of tl-rese
nghts poses no philosophical problems. The relevant documents tel1 us what
they are, the procedures by which they were established and how they can be
cl'ranged.
So far, so good. But what abor-rt the case where particlrlar rights do not
rxist under a legal system? Did women not have the right to a vote before
rhe introduction of women's sr-rffrageT In this and other siruarions, the claim
of campaigners is that there is a moral right, which neec'ls to be recognised as
.r legal right. Indeed it can be argued that, underlying many rights
-nshrinecl in 1trw, like the right to a fair trial, are fundamental moral rights.
\)7hat is involvecl, then, in talking of morai rights? Rights here are to be
r-rnderstood as legitimate claims. tJThat is being asserted when it is claimecl
rhnt P has a right to do X is that others have a dut1, (at least) not to prevent
P fiom cloing X, that rhis duty protects an interest of P's ancl that P should
ie1 no embarrassment about insisting on the duty. Further, in a rights-based
.rpproach to political matters? the focus is not on what might be for the
.ommon good in a given community or otr, say, the duties owed to the poor
rnd needy, but on the rights of the indivicL-ral understood as legitimrrte
cl:rims. A clualificarion is callecl fbr here though. Recently there has emerged
:h. demand [or communiry righrs. i.r.. righrs o[ minority commttnities
.rgirinst majority communities. This clemand is formally similzrr to that of
-;l ihe rights of the individual aSJainst state authority, though there zrre compli-
_:- -arions, particr-rlarly in relation to education (see Callan 1,997).
: .:. Looking at four objections to zr rights-based approach to political matters
- -.1 n'ill both further clarify the notion of a right ancl point the way forwarcl to
ai :1.re kinci of justilication wl-rich can be offered fbr this feature of our moral
-; -\
u'or1ci.
::l t
tt) I It l-ras been argued that rights is an egotistical notion which cloes not
. a)n flt rvell with the clcvelopment olt communal r,alues ancl a sense of ttur
responsibilities to others. However, this is misconceived because, zrs the
:!-i- above analysis of rights indicates, rights and responsibilities are correl-
:,-ll ative. More than thzrt, virtrrally all moral rights are reciprocal so that
22 Jobn lVhite and Panicia'Vhite

P's right (e.g., not to be molested), which imposes a duty on Q, is also 4 Linked particularly ro ob
Q's right, which imposes a similar duty on P (though for a discussion of peremprory and lirigious
exceptions, see Hart 1984: 8l-82). Thus, there is an intedocking tone for a moral co,n,nu
network of rights and duties (cf. Houston 1992: 152_153). dangers of being too quid
In a particularly compellir
Similarly,it has been argued that the moral focus should be on basic that rights are 'a mosr !.q
needs rather than rights, bur again this is misconceived. Rights can and 15 1) outlines Nowheresril
do protect basic human needs (Raz 1985). There can after all be rights and a general attitude of
to food and shelter. This is however a conrroversial position. Some anorher much as they do
would argue that the only legitimate rights are the so-called 'liberty' desert, though people .r'r,
rights attached to citizenship, i.e., rights to religious toleration, they fail to get their jusr d
freedom from arbitrary arresr, free speech, the right ro vote and so on. all duties are owed ro a sot
Rights which require forbearance on rhe part of others rather than posi- duties I am blameworrhv L
tive action and were conceived to protecr individuals from the power of sovereign but I have na
an oppressive state. By contrast, it is argued that socio-economic rights, lJ7hat Nowheresville
lacls r

or 'welfare' rights as they are somerimes called, are overdemanding and it irredeemably flawed:
perhaps even impossible to realise since they violate the principle 'ought
implies can' (see, e.g., Cransron 1967: t}-lr. Having rights enables us r
Three points can be made about the second objection. the eye, and to feel in sm
(a) The distinction between liberty and welfare rights is nor as clear cut think of oneself as the hold
as is being suggested. Liberty rights too require considerable proud. to have that minirn
resources and positive action to keep them in place. of the love and esteem of
(b) It can be convincingly argued that welfare rights are necessary ro simply be respect for tbei
the realisation of liberty rights. More forcefully, it can be argued without the other; and wh
that socio-economic needs are as important as any civil or political the recognizable capaciry m
liberties and disease and malnutrition should be as much matters of
concern as free speech if the point of rights is that they protect
important interests of the person. This, in Feinberg's vieq ir
(c) Finally, in the charge that welfare rights are overdemanding and that importance. It is also what lir
in some cases, nationally or globally, we cannot satisft them, STaldron cratic stare. For the political r
identifies the assumption that the existing distribution of resources is which embody a concern for tl
to remain undisturbed. Thus, as he puts it, 'the "ought" of human animated in his or her politi
rights is being frustrated less by the "can't" of impracticability, than freedom. The manifold compl
the "won't" of selfishness and greed' (rWaldron 1995: 580). and notions of democracy cau
Harrison I99r. Our earlier" br
Another objection focuses on valuable feelings and attitudes, like love and liberty and welfare righrs indi
trust, which seem to be eroded by rights. Marital happiness, for instance, tionship to broader and narro
is hardly secured when husband and wife insist on their rights. Also, however, at the centre of any
granting people enforceable rights seems to make trust redundant when citizen whose life is governed
perhaps trust is essential to social life. HoweveE we are not faced with an decision making and for whom
either/or situation. Love and rrust can exist in situations in which the were to be subordinate to the
parties also have rights but do not need to asseff rhem. And, importantly, and this is what the basic demr
if love and trust break down at least the parties are left with justice (see acter of the democratic poliq
combination, are seen as basic
Houston 1992: l5O; Kymlicka L99O:167;Wolff 1996:219. -
and in what mix.
 An analytic persPectice 2)

- Linked parriculafly to objections 1 and 2 above is the view that the

peremprory and litigious narure of rights talk is not the appropriate
ion. fo. a moral community. However several writers warn of the
dangers of being too quick ro ovefrhrow the language of self-assertion.
In a particularly compelling example, designed to convince the reader
thut iight. are 'a mosr useful sort of moral furniture', Feinberg (1980:
1)1) outlines Nowheresville, a society in which there is a morai code
and a Eleneral attitude of benevolence so thar people act towards one
another much as they do in our society. There is a notion of personal
desert, though people cannot (i'e., they have no right to) complain if
they fail ro ger their iust deserts, and there is a notion ofduty, although
all duties are owed to a sovereign or god. Thr-rs if I fail to carry out my
duties I am blameworthy because I have failed to respect the will of the
sovereign but I have not commitred an offence against my fellows.
.i7hat Nowheresvilie lacks is a notion of rights. For Feinberg that makes
it irredeemably flawed:

Having rights enables us ro 'stand up like men' [rld, to look others in

the eye, and to feel in some fundamenral way the equal of anyone. To
think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduiy but properly
proud, to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be worthy
of at-r. love and esreem of others. Indeed, respect for persons ... may
simply be respect for their rigl'rts, so that there cannot be the one
*itho..t the other; and what is called 'human dignity' may simply be
the recognizable capacity ro asserr claims.
(Feinberg i990: 151)

This, in Feinberg's view, is what gives rights their supreme moral

rnportance. It is also what links rights to the idea of the liberal demo-
.r"ii..ru,.. For the political setting for such rights requires institutions
.,,hich embody a concern for the individual as a responsible moral agent
:nimated in hrs or her political conduct by principles of iustice and
::eedom. The manifold complexities of the relationship between rights
-.nd notions of clemocracy can, however, only be gestured at here (cf.
i'larrison 199r. Our earlier, brief discussion of the different attitudes to
:berty and welfare rights indicares something of this complicated rela-
:ionship to broader and narrowef conceptions of democracy. Certainly,
-,,,rr.rr.., at the centre of any conception of democracy is the idea of a
-irizen whose life is governed by his or her own tl-rinking, feeling and
:ecision making und ior whom it would be intolerable if his or her life
.\ ere to be subordinate ro the shaping of the state of any other pefson,

_.td this is what che basic democratic rights safeguard. The precise char-
..:ter of the democratic polity will depend on what rights, in what
-'itmbination, are seen as basic - which liberty rights and/or welfare rights
.:d in what mix.
24 .John Vhite and Patricia
Whire
$Vhat follows from this for th
Cbilclren's rigbts, citizensbip and education
on this, some arguing for sm
their piace in or-rr moral and polit-
So, given tl-ris broad sketch of rights and cally defined age for citizeo st
there to be said about children's rights? for'all ream
ical"world, what is citizenship status
recently H' L' A'
The great philosopher of liberalism, Mill' and more have simply highlighted a crrl1
children and those
Hart woulcl l-rave saici: not much. Mill famously excluded and cannot do justice to thesk
their own
below the age of legal majority from the right to
control argument. These issues have hi
.over
affairs (Mill lrleZ,li). Similurli Hart, who regards
it as distinctive of rights they are highly relevant to *e,
would not extend
that they can be ciaimed, ot"tttd, waived or forgone' (Hart
the UK.
,tl.- .o yo.,rlg children since they are unable to do any of these things
of children'
1L)84: 82). Neither, of course, would sanction
the ill-treatment
Mill, would not want to claim that children l-rad a Cbildren's rigbts, pa.rentf riJ
U*, H".,, and probably
right not to be harmed. One major area o{ analydc m
-pu..ly
in the wake of the 'chilclren's liberation' movements of the iate and political problems poood
1960s and early 1!70s, this denial of rights
to children provoked consider- community. This is paralleled I
1970s and 1980s (see, e.g.,
able debate in philosophy of education in the who should have the right m r
Crittenden 1988; Hariis 1982; Kleinig 1976; Scarre l9B0; Schrag L977; education. Should it be the str
\flringe1981).Kleinig(IL)|6:10)suggeststhattheargumentaboutchil- story in two ways. Firstln as u
dren ieing unable t.-o claim, waive, etc' rights
is not a particlrlarly having a welfare right to edrrc
infirm or disabled)
."."p.ff i"i one, as thrs mighr apply to other (perhaps position to determine what rhi
Perhaps more central to the
citizens to whom *. *n'li not deny rights' a contested claim), who shqfi
iclea of a right is the notion of the piotection
of important interests' These their right to education is rs
(e'g , those involved in not
children celtainly do have urr.l mu,ly of them point a child's right not to be I
being harmed) aie shared with adults' Thus'
Kleinig concludes' for the most protectors, whether politicel r
and there is no
p"r.',rr. welfare of chiidren is iclentical witl-r that of adults whoever. \7e examine some oft
..o.n^whytheyshouldnotbecandidatesfbrthepossessionofrights. Amy Gutmann (1987) od
ThereishoweverasignificantexcePtionwhichexercisesKleinigandthe education is in the hands of,th
othercontributorstorhisdebate.Thisisthebasicrighttoliberty,non-
,wrirers babies and
Plato's Republic, the state lm
trre agreed that
interference *ith
on"ls plans and proiects. zens. The family state, hot
not self-determined persons and so
very young chilclren ,,".y ob'iot"ly are satisfactorily establish what fr
do not qualify for the liberty iights which the status
of being self-
it can't convincingly do this, r
this'
from
determined brings with it, but differ on what foliows promising, then it is in rlangc
ability to be self-determining provide part of
Does this.r.ry tu.k oithe which, according to their owtr
thegroundsforarighttoaneducation'whichdevelopsthisabilitysoneces-and to have rhe moral authority E
sary to flourishing in a democratic society?
If so' what kind of education cure.
right (Haydon Snook and
how much is required to meet thrs }911; In what Gutmann terms frr
to education' this gives
Lankshear l91L): 29tf.)? If chiidren do have a right form and content of childreu's
adults' 'J(/e take up this idea
them a welfare right not normally possessed by of parents to determine rheir d
ofa right to education again in th€ next section' sary to the realisation of the
Another line of thoJght has been: even if vefy
young children clo not
1

puts it: 'The right to form me

sl'rareadultrightstolib-ertyandotlrerassociatedcivicrights,:itdoesnot right to lavish attentlot ea tlr
followthatallchil<lrenc]onotsharethese.Inthisconnectionmuchinkand be interfered with in doing &
energyhasbeenexpendedontheadult/childdistinction(Harrisl982;Scarreor is however, we run into potend
between the two
1980; Schrag l()11).Is there some kind of watershed should the autonomy of the 1n
more gradual process? Are some
,h" p"rrug. Trom childhood to adulthood a perhaps parents' rights can h
than some adults?'
children more mat; and capable of being self-directed
 An analytic Per.rPectit'e 2t

\\il-rat follows from this for the granting of citizenship rights? \Triters vary
rn this, some arguing for something iike the status quo with a chronologi-
the idea of
-ally defined ugl foi.i,iren srarlrs (Scl-rrag), others arguing for twe
'all reasonably competent language-users' (Harris).
--,rizenship ,toJ.,, fnr
r;rve simply highlighted a couple of tl-re ideas in this once hotly debated area
..n.1 .u^.or do justice ro the skill and subtlety of the argument
and counter-
,.rlllrment. Tl-rese issues have lain dormant for a while but it seems to us that
,1.,.y u." highly relevanr to the cuffent debate about citizenship education in
:he UK.

Chilclren's rigbts, parents' rights and education

One major area of analytic work, then, has focused on the complex ethical
,.,,ci political problems posed by the status of children in the political
focus: the issue of
-ommunity. Th;s is paralieled by another connected maior
r.ho shoulcl have the right to cletermine the form and content of children's
..lucarion. Should it be the state? Parents? children's rights come into this
.rory in two ways. F'irstly, as we saw earlier, some would argue for children's
r,rving a *elfare right to education. Insofar as they afe not themselves in a
.ositiin to determine what this education should consist in (and this itself is
. cor-rtest"d claim), who should protect their interests here and ensure that
:heir right to education is realised? Secondly, some would -invoke at this
,,,rint u-child's right not to be fbrmed into a mould prescribed by its alleged
:rorecrofs, *l.r"tl-r"r political authorities, families, educational expefts, or
*'hoever. \(/e examine some of these issues below'
AmyGutmann(19tJ7)outlinesthecaseinwhichtherigl-rttocontrol
'family state', like
.J.,cutior-, is in the hands of the state. In what she terms a
Plato,s Republic, the stare knows and establishes the good life for all its citi-
-:ns.Thefamilyscate,however,willhavetodemonstratethatitcan
is for all its citizens' If
.,rrisfactorily .r.ilirh what the objectively good life
r: can'r convincingly do this, and the philosophical track record here is not
-romising, then it is in clanger of imposing a life on some people at least'
.r hich, according ro their own morul view, is wronll. Thus the state's
claim
:,t have the moral aurhoriry to determine its citizens' education looks inse-
'-l re.
In what Gutmann tefms rhe'state of families" the right to determine the
trm and content of children's education would rest with parents' The right
: parents to determine their children's education is often defended as neces-
:,1n.to the realisation of the parents'autonomy. As Cl-rarles_Fried bluntly
.-,i, it: 'The right t. frrrm o.e;s chilci's values, one's child's life plan and the
,:-<ltt ro lavish atrention on rhe child are extensions of the basic right not to
.:. rnterfered with in doing these things for oneself'(Fried 1978: 112).Here, tyhy
:-..wever, we run into poiential conflict with the child's a,tonomy.
.:.roulcl the autonomy uf the pafent be privileged over that.of
the child? Yet,
:erhaps parents' rights can-be more adec|-rately clefended in a way'
which

r
26 lVbite
John White and Patricia

focuses on the child's good. The expression in /oco parentis, for instance, now largely abated. ds we seil
seems to make the assumption that parents are normally best placed to children's liberation moyerx
determine what is in their children's interests. They know their chilclren thinking in this arrz., e.g_,
and, apart from exceptional cases, tirey have their children's welfire at heart between children and adultg
in the way that no public body could. Even so t}rough, the question still the traditional negative rr.k d
arises as to whether what rhe pafent judges to be in the child's best interesrs tual confusions. Once these
really is so. satisfaction, they disappeard I
\7e seem to have reached an impasse. Can it be avoided by the appeal to a topic of childrent righrs is u
child's right not to be moulded, mentioned above? There is little support dren have a ilght to educatio
these days for the kind of child-centred ideology that has been used to back ceasing, about what thar edrn
this. On this view, it is nature, not social institutions like families and right to determine its conrfr.
states, which provides the direction to a child's education' Education is traditional mainsrream prc(xr
conceived as a process of development, with teachers as faciiitarors in on children' rights seen as a El
nature's kindergarten rather than imposers of socially approved values. As we well points we made eadier ab
mentioned in the earlier section on analytic philosophy of education in tion. rilZe have made it clear h
general, the conceptual confusions in developmentalist doctrine have long with such conceprs as laq ru
since been fully exposed. So no way out of the impasse here. Investigating childreni right n
Another possible way forward is to re-examine the notion of the state. If investigation into this same E
we have in mind, rather than Plato's Republic, a democratic state, is ir so discussion of educational aim
clear that we can dismiss the claims of the state to determine education? In a Thus much contemporary wdt
pluralist democratic state citizens will have Particulaf moral beliefs and may tion of autonomy, its connecti
well weight them differently from others, perhaps because of their allegiance with moral education, the natu
to minority religious or ethnic groups. As citizens, however, they subscribe to within it, the norions of lihq
the basic democratic principles of freedom and justice and to the institutions pluralism, communitarianisrn I
which embody them, as well as being committed to refining and adapting also find their place in this rr
them to fit changing circumstances. Thus perhaps it can be argued that, do with the cultivation of kmr
simply to preserve the political order which protects citizens' rights to deter- and preparution for work. Uod
mine how they want to iive, the state has a right to determine the education related togerher in differear r
of its youngest citizens so that they grow up to understand these principles contemporary philosophy of e&
and their institutionalisation and are committed to live according to them. of the routes into this compla-
Ciearly this does not solve all the problems of the rights of parents from child's right to education.
ethnic and religious groups who have reasons to determine the education of
their children. At the very least, however, it establishes a framework in Bibliography
which those claims and rights can be discussed and weighed in public
debate. This is exemplified by recent writers in this tradition (see' e.g., Archard, D. (1993) Cbitdrn: Rigfi
Callan 1981; Mclaughlin 1984, 1985; Gardner 1988) who debate the Callan, E. (198t)'Mclaughlin o
justice of the claims for separate educational provision for diflerent groups 19 (1): 111-118.

with careful attention to the fine detail of the cases advanced.

(1997) Creating Citizmt,M
M. (1967)'Human Rig
-Cranston,
Political Theory and the Rigbfi {,
Conclusion Crittenden, B. (1988) Paretts. d
Melbourne University press.
How well does the topic of cl-riidren's rights exemplify the points made Dearden, R. F. (1968) Tbe pbrla
towards the beginning of this chapter abor-rt the methodology of analytic Kegan Paul.
philosophy of education? From one point of view, it belongs with issues which DfEE (Department for Educatin
wefe once topical in educational circles as a whole, but in which interest has London: HMSO.
 An analytic PersPectitte 21

:rtrv largeiy abated. As we said, the heyday of children's rights occurred

in the
,hildren's liberation movements of the late 1960s and 1970s' Muddled
:hinking in this afea, e.g., to do with overlooking relevant differences
..,*."n" chiidren and adu[s, engaged analytic philosophers of education in
concep-
:he traclitional negative task of their brand of philosophy, of exposing
:-Lal confusions. Once these problems wefe cleared up to most people's
..rrisfaction, they disappeared fiom the agenda. But this is not to say
that the
:opic of .hildr.r-r', rigtts i, moribund. As we have seen, the claim that chil-
.r.n hurr. a right to-ed.rcutio., has led to discussions, which show no signs of
who have the
:tasing, obo,-,t.-*hut that education should consist in and should
,,gh, Io determine irs content. In other words, the weight now falls on these
than
:i:rdirional mainsrream preoccupations of philosophy of education rather
bring out vefy
rn children' rights seen as a topic on its own. These discussions
;r,ell points we"made earlier about the role of connected analysis in our tradi-
,,on.^w. have made it clear how rhe concept of rights in general is connected
:,ith such conceprs as law, morality, obligation, welfare, liberty, liberalism.
Irr.estigating.hil.lr"n's right to education in particular leads one into a closer
,,rr'.rtilutiof into this ,ulr. .o.rg. of concepts, but now in the context of a
.,scusslon of educational aims, as well as into other aims-related concepts'
Thus much conremporary writing revolves around the notions of the
promo-
:ion of autonomy, its connection with welfare or well-being' its connecrions
.;ith moral education, the natr-rre of morality and the place of rules and virtues
:r.irhin it, the norions of liberal democracy, citizenship, the state, cultural
which
:1,-rralism, communitarianism and nationality' Among other notions'
aims to
,lso find their place in this web of interconnections, are educational
:o with the cultivation of knowiedge, skills, abilities, aesthetic responsiveness

...nci preparation for work. UndersLnding how these and

other ideas can be
,:lot.d ,og"th", in different ways forms a large part of the substance of
,.on,"Inpor"u.y philosophy of education in the British analytical tradition.
one
; rhe routes into this complex - and untidy - network is via reflection on
the
lrild's right to educarion.

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