University Institute Of Legal Studies

PROJECT REPORT ON

Interpretation of Statutes: Noscitur a sociis, Contemporanea Exposition,

and Case Commentary on M/S Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjot
Ahluwalia

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

Dr. Nancy Sharma Disha Pathak
197/18 Section D
B. Com LL.B. (6th Sem)
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all the concerned people

who have directly or indirectly contributed towards the completion of this
project. I extend my sincere gratitude towards Dr. Nancy Sharma, faculty of
UILS, Panjab University for providing the opportunity to work on this
project and whose insight encouraged me to go beyond the scope of
this project hence broadening my learning.
 CERTIFICATE OF ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that the work done in this file is done under my
supervision and guidance. It is further certified that work done is
completely original and up to my level of satisfaction.

SIGNATURE
 INDEX
S.NO Particulars Page no.

1. Noscitur a sociis 5-6

2. Contemporanea Expositio 7-8

3. Case Analysis: 9-12

M/S Soring Meadows and
Anr. v. Harjot Ahluwalia
4. Conclusion 12

5. Bibliography 13
 NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

The rule of construction noscitur a sociis as explained by Lord Macmillan means:

"The meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps".

As stated by the Privy Council: It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of
Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. It is a rule wider than
the rule of ejusdem generis; rather the latter rule is only an application of the former.

The rule has been lucidly explained by Gajendragadkar J, in the following words:

This rule, according to Maxwell, means that when two or more words which are susceptible of
analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They
take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous
to a less general. The same rule is thus interpreted in Words and Phrases."

Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the
philosophy of which is that the meaning of the doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the
meaning of words associated with it.

It must be borne in mind that noscitur a sociis, is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in
cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of
the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the Legislature in associating
wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that the present
rule of construction can be usefully applied.
The rule was applied in construing the word "luxuries" in Entry 62 of List II of the Constitution which
is a term of wide denotation not free from ambiguity. Further, the rule cannot be used to make one of
the associated words wholly redundant.

Section 4(1) which provides an exception to the offence under section 2 of the Obscene Publications
Act, 1959, and which corresponds to exception (a)(i) to section 292(2) of the Penal Code enables the
accused to prove that "publication of the article in question is justified as being for the public good on
the ground that it is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or of other objects of general
concern". It was held by the House of Lords that the general words "other objects of general concern"
operated in the same area which was covered by the words science, literature, art or learning and that
these words did not fall in a totally different area of sexual behaviour and could not enable the accused
to prove that the articles seized, which were hard pornography, had some psychotherapeutic value for
various categories of persons e.g., for persons of heterosexual taste and perverts to relieve their sexual
tensions.

In construing Article 194(3) of the Constitution which refers to Powers, Privileges and Immunities of a
House of the Legislature of a State, the Supreme Court said that the word "Powers" must take its
colour from words in immediate connection with it and that it should be construed to refer not to
legislative powers but to powers of a House which are necessary for the conduct of its business.

When some articles are grouped together in an entry in the schedules of Sales Tax and Excise statutes,
each word in the entry draws colour from the other words therein on the principle of noscitur a sociis.
Thus, in Entry 16 of Schedule A to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 which reads "cosmetics,
perfumery and toilet goods, excluding tooth paste, tooth powder, kumkum and soap, the word
"perfumery" was construed to mean such articles as are used as cosmetics and toilet goods and are
upon the person, and it was held that the word had no application to dhoop and aggarbatti.
 CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO

Contemporanea Expositio means “Contemporaneous Exposition” meaning explanation of something

(here statute) existing in same time period. It is one of the best and the strongest way of external aids
of interpretation. As time passes by words used in the statute will undergo changes in their meaning
but when it is interpreted the word should bear its original and same meaning as the statute intended
when it was passed.

The meaning of the law should be interpreted in the context when the law was formulated. Old statutes
must be interpreted in such a way where that defines its purpose of introducing it. This maxim has
been confirmed by the Apex Court in Desh Bandhu Gupta vs. Delhi Stock Exchange Asson. Ltd.1

If the word is wrongly interpreted for all these years those kinds of words will not be eligible for
interpretation. The words can only be interpreted by the court when the title of the property may be
affected or when everyday transactions have been affected.

The maxim Contemporanea expositio as laid down by Lord Coke was applied to construing ancient
statutes, but usually not applied to interpreting Acts or statutes which are comparatively modern.
Usages and practice developed under a statute are indicative of the meaning ascribed to its words by
contemporary opinion and in the case of an ancient statute, such reference to usage and practice is
admissible.

Applicability

The maxim contemporanea exposito is applicable in construing ancient statutes, but not to interpreting
acts which are comparatively modern. In a modern progressive society, it would be unreasonable to

1
AIR 1979 SC 1049, 1054.
confine the intention of a legislature to the meaning attributable to the words used at the time the law
was made. Lord Watson stated that the maxim is of no value in construing a British statute of the year
1858, when there is ambiguous statement in an act passed two centuries ago.

In India, the Supreme Court has refused to apply the principle of contemporanea exposito to the
Telegraph Act 1885, and the Evidence Act 1872, but the principle was applied in construing the
Bombay Muncipal Corporation Act 1888.

In the case of N Suresh Nathan and another v Union of India2, the question of law arose was about
promotion to the post of Assistant engineers in PWD, junior engineers having degree in civil
engineering with three years’service in the grade are eligible for promotion as assistant engineers.
Diploma holder junior engineers obtaining degree while in service were not entitled to count their
service prior to obtaining the degree for computing the period of three years for the purpose of
promotion. The administrative tribunal gave judgement against the diploma holders and later Supreme
court reversed the decision. Here the principle laid was, construction is in consonance with long
standing practice prevailing in the concerned department to be preferred.

Limitations

• Useful only for ancient Acts, and cannot be used for modern Acts.
• It cannot be applied in case of broken usages and practices. If any usages or practices are
broken or interrupted, such broken usages or practices cannot be considered as an aid to
interpretation. Due to the breakage such usage and practices loses its value.
• Custom is given more value and priority than the act of the parties

2
1992 1 SCC 584
 CASE ANALYSIS

M/S Spring Meadows Hospital & Anr. v. Harjot Ahluwalia

Citation: JT 1998 (2) SC 620, p 629: AIR 1998 SC 1801: (1998) 4 SCC 39.

Bench: S. Saghir Ahmad, G.B. Pattanaik

Act: Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Facts of the Case:

1. That the child, Harjot Ahluwalia was admitted to the appellant hospital as in-patient with diagnosis
of typhoid. The nurse asked the child's father to purchase the injection Inj. Lariago recommended
by the Senor Paediatrician to be administered intravenously. When the nurse administered the
injection, the child collapsed immediately. It was alleged that the nurse had not done any test
before administering the same.
2. The resident doctor found that the child had. suffered cardiac arrest and he attempted to resuscitate
the child by manual pumping. After half an hour, the Anaesthetist also reached the scene and
started the procedure of manual respiration and the Senior Paediatrician also followed but here was
no improvement in the child' s condition.
3. On advice of Anaesthetist, the child was shifted to the All-India Institute of Medical. sciences
(AIlMS) on 3rd January, 1994. The doctors at the AIIMS informed the parents that the child was in
a critical condition and he would live only in a vegetative state having suffered irreparable damage
to the brain. He was admitted till 24th January, 1994
4. The child was discharged and then later was again admitted to the appellant hospital. Based on the
evidence, the commission concluded that the child had suffered cardiac arrest because of
intravenous injection of an excessive dose of the injection and that due to considerable delay in
measures to revive the heart, the child's brain had been damaged.

Issue Raised:

1. The minor child being the patient who was admitted into the hospital for treatment can the parents
of the child be held to be consumers so as to claim compensation under the provisions of
the Consumer Protection Act?
2. Is the commission under the Act entitled to award compensation to the parents for mental agony in
view of the powers of the commission under Section 14 of the Act?
3. Even if the child as well as the parents of the child would come under definition of the 'consumer'
under Section 2(1)(d)3 of the Act whether compensation can be awarded in favour of both the
consumers or compensation can be awarded only to the beneficiary of the services rendered, who
in the present case would be child who was admitted into the hospital?

Judgement:

1. Consumerism has been a movement in which the trader and the consumer find each other as
adversaries. Till last two decades in many developed and developing countries powerful consumer
organisations have come into existence and such organisations have instrumental in dealing with
the consumer protection laws and in expansion of the horizon of such laws. In our country the

3 “consumer” means any person who, —

(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for
consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such use
is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any
commercial purpose; or
(ii) 12 [hires or avails of] any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly
promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person
who 12 [hires or avails of] the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person 13 [but does
not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purpose];
 legislation is of recent origin and its efficacy has not been critically evaluated which has to be done
on the basis of experience. Undoubtedly the Act creates a framework for speedy disposal of
consumer disputes and an attempt has been made to remove the existing evils of the ordinary court
system. The Act gives a comprehensive definition of consumer who is the principal beneficiary of
the legislation but at the same time in view of the comprehensive definition of the term 'consumer'
even a member of the family cannot be denied the status of consumer under the Act.

In recent days there has been increasing pressure on hospital facilities, falling standard of professional
competence and in addition to all, the ever-increasing complexity of therapeutic and diagnostic
methods and all this together are responsible for the medical negligence. That apart there has been a
growing awareness in the public mind to bring the negligence of such professional doctors to light.

2. Commission would be entitled to award compensation under clause (d) to a consumer for any loss
or injury suffered by such consumer due to the negligence of the opposite party. If the parents of
the child having hired the services of the hospital are consumer within the meaning of Section
2(1)(d)(ii) and the child also is consumer being a beneficiary of such services hired by his parents
in the inclusive definition in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act, the Commission will be fully justified in
awarding compensation to both of them for the injury each one of them has sustained. In the case
in hand the Commission has awarded compensation in favour of the minor child taking into
account the cost of equipment and the recurring expenses that would be necessary for the said
minor child who is merely having a vegetative life. The compensation awarded in favour of the
parents of the minor child is for their acute mental agony and the lifelong care and attention which
the parents would have to bestow on the minor child.
3. In the present case, we are concerned with clause (ii) of Section 2(1)(d). In the said clause, a
consumer would mean a person who hires or avails of the services and includes any beneficiary of
such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services. When a young child is taken
to a hospital by his parents and the child is treated by the doctor, the parents would come within the
definition of consumer having hired the services and the young child would also become a
consumer under the inclusive definition being a beneficiary of such services. The definition clause
being wide enough to include not only the person who hires the services but also the beneficiary of
such services which beneficiary is other than the person who hires the services, the conclusion is
 irresistible that both the parents of the child as well as the child would be consumer within the
meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act and as such can claim compensation under the Act.

Case Analysis

The following case interpreted the meaning of “consumer” under the ambit of the Consumer Protection
Act, 1986. In interpreting section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the same Act, it has been held that parents who hire the
services of a hospital and their child for whom the services are hired are both consumers and can
independently claim damages. This case comes under the “liberal construction of remedial statutes”.
Such statutes are interpreted and broadly construed for the social benefit. The above definition of
consumer was interpreted to include the parents of the child as beneficiaries so that they are
compensated for the mental agony they have to go through.

CONCLUSION

It is not necessary that the words used in a statute are always clear, explicit and unambiguous and thus,
in such cases it is very essential for courts to determine a clear and explicit meaning of the words or
phrases used by the legislature and at the same time remove all the doubts if any.

In the noscitur a sociis, contemporanea exposition, and the case law discussed above shed light on the
importance of interpretation and how it is dependent on the usage, period of time, facts of the case, and
the relevance of the modern scenario. Moreover, it is to the best reasonable ability of the Courts to
interpret and determine the most suitable meaning of the statutes and to the benefit of the general
public.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Singh G.P., Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edition, Lexis Nexis.

2. M/S. Spring Meadows Hospital & Anr vs Harjol Ahluwalia Through, K.S. ... on 25 March, 1998
(indiankanoon.org)
3. Statute Interpretation : Everything important to know about it (ipleaders.in)
4. contemporanea exposito est optima et fortissinia in lege (legalservicesindia.com)