Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

EN BANC People v.
Patalin
July 27, 1999
[G.R. No. 132601. January 19, 1999.] crime was committed
on August 11, 1984
LEO ECHEGARAY , petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET
AL., respondents.
Death penalty is PROSPECTIVE
Atty. Theodore O. Te for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
This is the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto
of the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 4, 1999 temporarily
restraining the execution of the death convict Leo Echegaray by lethal injection.
It is the main submission of public respondents that the Decision of the case
having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive authority. caHASI
The Court ruled that the power to control the execution of its decision is
an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be
sure, the most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the
process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the
rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
conformable to law and justice. For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides
that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may
be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these
rules, any suitable process or mode of proceedings may be adopted which
appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that
what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to
give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. CHIEDS
Moreover, the temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its
desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed
to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor
General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that
Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. In light of these
developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal
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and humanitarian purpose.
The instant motion is GRANTED. IaAHCE
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; RULE ON FINALITY OF JUDGMENT;

CANNOT DIVEST COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION. — The rule on finality of
judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the
same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well
established jurisprudence on this issue as follows: . . . "the finality of a
judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case . By
the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court
retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between
the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the
judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the
latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. . . . For after the judgment
has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the
execution unjust or impossible.
2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; FINALITY OF DECISION IN CRIMINAL CASES;
PARTICULAR OF EXECUTION ITSELF STILL UNDER CONTROL OF JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY. — In criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and
the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or
alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of
appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the
event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in
issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions
on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always
included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely
under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power
over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty
and to pardon. (Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, 26 Phil. 267
[1915])
3 ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION OF SENTENCE; GROUNDS
FOR POSTPONEMENT. — Notwithstanding the order of execution and the
executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law
this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King;
(2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that
assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail
the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the
need for postponement. IDTcHa

4. ID.; ACTIONS; JURISDICTION; POWER TO CONTROL EXECUTION OF
DECISION, AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT THEREOF. — The power to control the
execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of
judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. To be sure, the most important part of a litigation, whether
civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening
events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is
because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and
orders to make them conformable to law and justice.
5. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT DOES NOT
DEPEND ON CONVENIENCE OF LITIGANTS. — The same motion to compel Judge
Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by
his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's
right to due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General,
as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the
ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of
Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice
and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998.
There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are
now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant
said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of
litigants.
6. ID.; ID.; POWER TO SUSPEND EXECUTION OF CONVICTS DOES NOT
VIOLATE CO-EQUAL AND COORDINATE POWERS OF BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT. — The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the
interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It
also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision,
however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has
been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these
rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict
who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a
state of insanity. As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that
due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." The
suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial
power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
effect is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death
convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time
amend R. A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment.
The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But
by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary
power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President
to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to
life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been
enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts
and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe
upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents
therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; R.A. NO. 7659, UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — Let

me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No.
7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set
forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the Court, who hold
similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court
of death sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts. Until the exacting
standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I
will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who
continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act. No. 7659 to be in accord
with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant and inextricably
linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant
petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.HAaDTI
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WITH JURISDICTION TO ISSUE

"TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER" ON EXECUTION OF DEATH PENALTY. — In
its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-
numbered petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because, among
other things, of what had been stated to be indications that Congress would re-
examine the death penalty law. The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by
issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or
recall the imposition of the death penalty . The doctrine has almost invariably
been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is further
done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise
would be to put no end to litigations. The rule notwithstanding, the Court
retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken
cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the
State to carry out the death sentence. In fine, the authority of the Court to see
to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the President to
grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to
repeal or modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not
essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible and may
each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay
of execution issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from
exercising his pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may
be advantageous to the adjudged offender.
3. ID.; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL AND EXECUTORY

JUDGMENTS; EXCEPTIONS. — In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule
of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled exceptions.
Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final
judgment when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it. Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be
denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue
at stake.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; R.A. NO. 7659 (DEATH PENALTY LAW),
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — R.A. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional
insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with
the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling reasons" prescribed by the
Constitution of the Philippines.
2. ID.; R.A. NO. 8177 (LETHAL INJECTION LAW), UNCONSTITUTIONAL. —

R.A. 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it merely
prescribes the manner in which R.A. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is to be
implemented. DTAaCE
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J : p
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1999
temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion
to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public
respondents that: cdasia
"(1) The Decision in this case having become final and executory,
its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the
executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed
as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
(2) The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates

dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation
because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a
law.
(3) Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death

penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised
on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the
6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all
probability been fully debated upon . . ..
(4) Under the time honored maxim lex futuro , judex praeterito, the
law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the
Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of
judicial review.
(5) At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events

transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law
imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will

veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous
crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are

against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law

only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel."
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public

respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House
of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which
provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representatives on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all
means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The
Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressmen.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order
. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on
executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this
Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not
lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the
petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's
jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment
will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all
the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions
concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death
penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by
this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601,
where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its
implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this
reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the
Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999
and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she
has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that
the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public
respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and
hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously,
public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer
be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there
should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To
start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is
appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision
of this Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled
out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz: LLjur
"ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in
the above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
'WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner

seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as
unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of
the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic A ct No. 8177
are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a)
Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section
19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection
Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the
manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties
including the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are
hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act
No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 81 77 are
appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance
with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.'
and that the same has, on November 6, 1998 become final and
executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippines.
Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office"

The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of
Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21,
1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On
October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing
the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and
Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that
the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable
mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections
17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are
invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until
sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177
are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a
whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General,
the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired
Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on
this issue as follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
"the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has
lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment,
what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its
judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. The former continues even after the judgment has
become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment;
the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . .
. For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances
may transpire which can render the execution unjust or
impossible. 5
In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has long been rejected
by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this
Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge
of First Instance, 6 viz:
"This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various
decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in
criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period
for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter
its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of
appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in
the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a
ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow
from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with
reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority
terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive.
The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always
included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the
executive has no power over the person of the convict except to
provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
cdasia
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,

which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted
as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-
known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution
and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the
proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in
sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can
be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by
discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render
impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has
once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of
the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that
even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has
performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . .
and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that
ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty
to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement.
Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the
execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under
investigation and as to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation."
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect

of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the
most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the
process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make
them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of
Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to
carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable
process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that
what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to
give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public
respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of
petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the
implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the
jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned
jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of
judgments. These rules are all predicated on the assumption that
courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control
and supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39
governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule
120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was
granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its
independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without
independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to
the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted
but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was
subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement.
Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on

its surface. In In re Cunanan 10 Congress in the exercise of its power to
amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of
law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to
August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno
held that ". . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a
judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that
only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." 12 The
venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusivelyto this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone
of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. cdasia
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the

1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of
this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented
by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its
Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and

procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may
be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened

the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to
promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13
T h e 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making
power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court."
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the
first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the
manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence
of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court
has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a
power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial. LLphil
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail

the jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of
its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and
executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6,
1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice
recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and
Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A.
Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true
copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the
designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to
reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date
fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions
of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice
beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's

Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the instant
Manifestation and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-
disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital
information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well
as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the
people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask this
Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein

respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power
of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in
relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rul es and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 81 77 is concerned and for
the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative
to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the

information about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by
the President of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides
that the death sentence shall be carried out 'without prejudice to the
exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all
times." (Underscoring supplied) For instance, the President cannot
grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day
certain (People v. Vera , 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a
precise date to reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at
this time, might even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat
the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the
date of execution set by the President would be earlier than that
designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information

about the date of execution to herein respondent and the public
violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which read:
SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on

matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by

law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
9. The 'right to information' provision is self-executing. It

supplies 'the rules by means of which the right to information may be
enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167
[1972]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id., at
p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must,
of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art.
II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever
limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty
under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue
of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En
Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission , 150 SCRA 530, 534-535
[1987]."
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution
of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on
December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the
public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public
respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that
this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of
Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of
Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15,
1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and
they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its
jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend
on the convenience of litigants. cdtai
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the
"decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department
. . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted
reprieve which is an executive function. " 14 Public respondents cite as
their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution
which reads:
"Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress."
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation
suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source
of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons
and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also
provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision,
however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused
who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral
rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For
instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction
cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau,
"today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the
government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane
at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the
presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same — the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot
be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing
the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment
is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination
can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final
sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have
even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend
execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over
arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant
reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction
is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously
distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts.
Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December
28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his
execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that
members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or
review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that
Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to
the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred
by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and
Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review
of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought the repeal
of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and
thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its
traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even
then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on
January 4, 1999 17 at 10 a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent
Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as
he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult
problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in
Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations
or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court
should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations
and surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a
pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and broadcast
media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new
Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new
members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed.
The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted
the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No.
8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations
lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's
allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress
was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the
Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious
stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The
suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the
constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it
sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is
going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was
compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not
stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further
relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court
refused to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The
Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not
change the circumstance of petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was
believed that law and equitable considerations demand no less before
allowing the State to take the life of one of its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its
desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is
disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the
Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the
possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He
names these supervening events as follows: cda
xxx xxx xxx
"a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto

any law repealing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are

against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only
bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel." 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the

Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman
Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided
for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and
the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on
this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was
signed by 113 congressmen as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session
yesterday that extended up to 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of
Representatives with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez
resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the
sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review
Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not
request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in view of the prevalence of
heinous crimes in the country. In light of these developments, the Court's
TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian
purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . .
the question of capital punishment has been the subject of endless
discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe
in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to
be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital
punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the
unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and
righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no
more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when
the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that
wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny,
it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds
us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of
Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of
temporary political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better
hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice
will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be
blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law
cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is
the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice
is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can
be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A.
Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the
date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable
provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay. cdasia
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., please see separate opinion.
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J.:
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that

Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some
of my brethren on the Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed
this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by
Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the
above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO") because,
among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that Congress
would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect
and comity to a co-equal branch of the government, i.e., to
reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated
the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the
purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO,
thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the
imposition of the death penalty. cdtai
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes
final and executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its
compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to
litigations. The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case
until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established
legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the petition
assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the
death sentence. In any event, jurisprudence teaches that the rule of
immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled
exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the
execution of a final judgment when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. 1
Certainly, this extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever
might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at stake. The
pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, 2
should be instructive. Thus —
"This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various
decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in
criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period
for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change or alter
its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo,
according to the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review
the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that
the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in
issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation
of functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by
having then passed completely to the executive. The
particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not
always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any
event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority,
while the executive has no power over the person of the
convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty and to
pardon.
"Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,
which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as
a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There
can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that,
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory
nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under
the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1)
By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and
(3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the
common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not
reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for
postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is
acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has
been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the
Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution, functus est officio suo , and its part is
ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay
the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement . . ."
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final
judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon, commutation or
reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the law that
could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one
another nor constitutionally incompatible and may each be exercised within
their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by
the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his
pardoning power or Congress from enacting a measure that may be
advantageous to the adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even
before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the duration of
the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes
certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be
made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain
circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that the
repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . ."
If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely 3 re-
examination by Congress of the death penalty law, then I can appreciate why
the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift
the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear
to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of the
law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second
look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the
imposition of the death penalty. In People vs. Masalihit, 4 in urging, with all
due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the death
penalty law, I have said:
"The determination of when to prescribe the death
penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the law-making
authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the
conditions that the Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1)
That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital
offense must involve a heinous crime. It appears that the
fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of
the death penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in
the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just because of it. The
term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must
first be a marked change in the milieu from that which has
prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on
the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the
statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand,
that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the re-
imposition of the death penalty. Most importantly, the
circumstances that would characterize the 'heinous nature' of
the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to warrant
the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the
l a w , albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from
exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances
of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would
become 'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to
exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and
excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is
callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The
indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty could somehow
constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to,
stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might
normally be required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in
undue exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims and
society."
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of
the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will have to
disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who continue
to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with
the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental, constant and inextricably
linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like the instant
petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of
the Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be held
bound by the ruling of the majority.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has
jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I write only to
explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not
repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on June 15,
1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or
amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now.
However, my objections to the imposition of the death penalty transcend the
TRO and permeate its juridical essence. cdasia

I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is
unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital penalty
fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling
reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have
repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinions in various death cases decided
by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter on
January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent
promulgated on February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift the TRO, because to do so
would mean the upholding and enforcement of a law (or the relevant
portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and
therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA
8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise unconstitutional since it merely
prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is to be
implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and
will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are
constitutional and that the death penalty should, by majority vote, be
implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion
for Reconsideration.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y
PILO, accused-appellant.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22,
1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first
time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the
law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and
(original) Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3 this
transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by
this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death. 4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 19.(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty
be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua." (Underscoring
supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and
had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom
Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and
reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion perpetua. The
provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the
penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the
lesser penalty of imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did
not merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact
completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation
or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the
effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction of
an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in
our penal laws and thus may no longer be carried out. This is the clear intent
of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas exclaimed, 6 "(t)he
majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished
Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7
"It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the
non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total
abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This
became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the
provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a
premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional
mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it
must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
people. 8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the
death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized Congress to
restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to re-impose it
on condition that it (Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous
crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10
): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is
strictly limited:
(1) by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution
became effective; and
(2) to crimes which Congress should identify or define or

characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of

determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what
crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to
restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress,
by law; prescribes the death penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their
decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7 6 5 9 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain
provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article
therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes
stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the penalty
more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was
cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more severe
sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually for each of
them. LLjur
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which

the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987, when the
Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital
offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating
circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed
the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More legally put: In
reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion
or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art.
III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of Congress to
prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not define or
characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already
stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it
prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a
characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness
of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its
constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph
in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
"WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society."
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an

insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It simply
and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately
justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and
unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness can be
determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a
substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the description
"inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity."
Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and
renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely
an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of
rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation,
much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative
source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to
prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court
appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16
There's nothing really new that Congress did which it could not have
otherwise done had such provision not been included in our fundamental
law. cdt
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which

were already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17
no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death
under said law were already so punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and
by special laws. In short, Sec. 19, Article III of the Constitution did not have
any impact upon the legislative action. It was effectively ignored by
Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659,
Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19
"So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President, and from existing special laws which, before abolition of the
death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty."
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes

which were already penalized with death prior to the charter's effectivity,
Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional
duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to
prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have written Sec.
19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did.
Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws
and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent
conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also
from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod. In
explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose
Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20
Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say "murder" but
organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While
the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available
information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the
Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already existing
and already penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause
requires that:
1) the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of

which have an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity,
depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
2) even existing crimes, provided some new element or
essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to
show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or

old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme
violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate
its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of
circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner that
the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for
which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the
Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons" for the
revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement.
But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should be
remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe
that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot
be done wholesale but must be shown for each and every crime, individually
and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because,
in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future, circumstances may arise
which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the
situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might
change for very specific reasons" requiring the return of the constitutionally-
abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA
7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by
Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23
"MR. LAGMAN:
So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.).
The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker.
That is one.
MR. LAGMAN.
So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to
justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the
reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening peace
and order situation. The Gentleman claims that that is one of the
compelling reasons. But before we dissect this particular
"compelling reason," may we know what are the other
compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.)
Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman
kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling
reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the Constitution
abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a
supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in
an organized society governed by law, justice demands that
crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be
commensurate with the offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN.
The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution
speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of
death penalty, it refers to reasons which would supervene or
come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he
submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate
penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987
when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the
people ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions,
because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at
this time, justice demands that the appropriate penalty must be
meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of

"worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I submit that
these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-
decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-
existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show that the crime
volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did
not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when the
Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted.
Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and
Lagman:
"MR. LAGMAN.
Very good, Mr. Speaker. Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman
from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.
MR. LAGMAN.
So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman
inform us the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988.
Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the
abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18
percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
That is correct, Mr. Speaker . Those are the statistics supplied by the
PC.
MR. LAGMAN.
Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the
death penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman
the volume of robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.
MR. LAGMAN.
No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN.
This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty.
Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in
1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN.
Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me, Mr. Speaker that the
volume of robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime
rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of 29 percent. Would
the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
This is what the statistics say. I understand we are reading now from
the same document.
MR. LAGMAN.
Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of
22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19
percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I
would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the
document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN.
But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.).
The document speaks for itself."
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some
figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-related offenses
in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
"Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug
Board.
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062,
and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988. cdtai
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this

report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit

to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased
again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the
drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward
trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991."
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the

death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective
deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no
sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with
any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the death
penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof.
This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that
another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of
immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his
witnesses — can be argued indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the
academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the
constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness"
and "compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death
penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any other
guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any
exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to persons accused
of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained
at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to
enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated
by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-
human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights, 32 expressly
prohibits any form of torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than
death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life
of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and
establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education.
35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property,

for people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence augurs
well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of
death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its
perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free
speech, assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most important
of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their
enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching
fact that the death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless and the
marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free
Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:
"(1) Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons

37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of 1994, there were
24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to
90; an average of seven (7) convicts per month; double the
monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From
January to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts
reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per month, almost double
the monthly average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.
(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one

percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; while
approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000
to P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 monthly are
exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to
P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999,
seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those
earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent
(4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%) .
Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all , while
approximately two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with
another five percent (5%) earning variable income.
Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they
earn in a month. llibris
(3) T h u s , approximately two-thirds of the convicts,

about 112 of them, earn below the government-mandated
minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn
below the official poverty line set by government. Twenty six
(26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,000.00 monthly, indicating they
belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30,000.00 monthly.
Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or
allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their
monthly income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all .
(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one

percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in animal
husbandry; of these, thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are
farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and
construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or
workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty
seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire
man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen
percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries, with
fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette
or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians,
security guards, shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers,
radio technicians) and four (4) clerks, (janitors, MERALCO employee
and clerk). About four percent (4%) are government workers ,
with six (6) persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and
even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and
executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent
(9%) are unemployed.
(5) None of the DRC's use English as their medium of

communication. About forty four percent (44%), or slightly less
than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent
(26%), or about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano . The
rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan,
Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and
speaks and understand Niponggo.
(6) Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from

college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished varying levels
of elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from
elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58)
convicts, finished varying levels of high school , with more than half
of them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts finished
vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all."
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic
situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against the
poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the legal
services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation,
investigation, research and presentation are required. The best example to
show the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial
issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial
court and even before this Court until the Free Legal Assistance Group
belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex
and written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still, judicial
proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net
effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon
the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense —
unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance
of the scales of justice. cdtai
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments,

and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense prone to
be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs,
the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or
discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it
in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would
still be complex and written in a strange and incomprehensible language,
and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole
controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that
there will always be a certain class or classes of people in our society who,
by reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment
opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in
less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly
situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently more prone to be
involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from
that perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor
worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be
said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much
stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences
that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely because
the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater
degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and
from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be
empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic
postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately
wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to
any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people and
nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction.
Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate
punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater
majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so
irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better.
This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our
statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitutional
right against the death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.
(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused because such a statute
denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny
equal justice to the underprivileged. liblex
(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should

never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
(5) Congressional power to prescribe death is severely limited by
two concurrent requirements:
(a) First, Congress must provide a set of attendant

circumstances which the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of
the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and
how these circumstances define or characterize the
crime as "heinous".
(b) Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear
and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of
the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It
bears repeating that these requirements are
inseparable. They must both be present in view of the
specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes." The compelling
reason must flow from the heinous nature of the
offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and
compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and not just
for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is a fundamental commandment to all Christians,
as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in
Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our
people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the
death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A
Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided
upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in
cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible
otherwise to defend society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-
existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the
Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-
life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even
the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him.
The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for "compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it
only for reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme
gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in enacting
RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of proving the existence
of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous"
crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive
portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH, as
provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text. cdasia
Footnotes
1.Stoll v. Gottlieb , 305 US 165, 172; 59 S. Ct. 134, 138; 83 L. ed. 104 [1938].
2.Philippine Courts and their Jurisdiction, p. 13, 1998 ed.

3.Citing Miranda v. Tiangco , 96 Phil. 526; Santos v. Acuna , 100 Phil. 230; American
Insurance Co. v. US Lines Co ., 63 SCRA 325; Republic v. Reyes , 71 SCRA 426;
Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Reyes , 71 SCRA 655; Agricultural and Industrial
Marketing Inc. v. CA , 118 SCRA 49; Vasco v. CA , 81 SCRA 712; Mindanao
Portland Cement Corp. v. Laquihan, 120 SCRA 930.
4.Ibid. at pp. 12-14 citing Miranda v. Tiangco , 96 Phil. 526; Santos v. Acu na, 63
O.G. 358; Gabaya v. Hon. R. Mendoza , 113 SCRA 400; Bueno Industrial and
Development Corp v. Enage, 104 SCRA 388.
5.Ibid., pp. 14-15 citing Molina v. dela Riva , 8 Phil. 569; Behn Meyer & Co. v.
McMicking, 11 Phil. 276; Warmer Barnes & Co. v. Jaucian , 13 Phil. 4; Espiritu
v. Crossfield , 14 Phil. 588; Mata v. Lichauco , 36 Phil. 809; De la Costa v.
Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686; Omar v. Jose , 77 Phil. 703; City of Butuan v. Ortiz, 113
Phil. 636; De los Santos v. Rodriguez , 22 SCRA 551; City of Cebu v. Mendoza,
66 SCRA 174.
6.29 Phil. 267 (1915), p. 270.
7.Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
8.Section 5(f), Rule 135.
9.Philippine Political Law, p. 225, 1993 ed.

10.94 Phil. 534 (1954), pp. 550, 555.
11.R.A. No. 372.
12.94 Phil. 550, p. 551.

13.See In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22.
14.See pp. 3-4 of Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
15.See Article 79 of the Revised Penal Code.

16.Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. 409, 1969 ed., citing Caritativo v.
California, 357 US 549, 21 L ed. 2d 1531, 78 S. Ct. 1263 [1958].
17.December 30 and 31, 1998 were declared holidays. January 1, 1999 was an
official holiday. January 2 was a Saturday and January 3 was a Sunday.
18.Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of public respondents, p. 8.
19.Darrow, Crime: Its Cause and Treatment, p. 166 (1922).

20.Eisler, A Justice For All, p. 268.
21."Where personal liberty is involved, a democratic society employs a different
arithmetic and insists that it is less important to reach an unshakable
decision than to do justice." Pollack, Proposals to Curtail Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ. 66 Yale LJ 50, 65 (1956).
VITUG, J.:
1.Candelaria vs. Cañizares, 4 SCRA 738; Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 645; Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal, 154
SCRA 257; Lee vs. De Guzman, 187 SCRA 276; Bachrach Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128349, 25 September 1998.
2.29 Phil. 267.
3.At least for Mr. Echegaray.
4.G.R. No. 124329, 14 December 1998.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
*I have further explained my unflinching position on this matter in my recent book
Battles in the Supreme Court, particularly on pages 58 to 84.
SEPARATE OPINION:
1.It is called "Supplemental" because there was a (main) Motion for

Reconsideration filed by the previous counsel of the accused, which this
Court already denied.
2.The Anti Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group — Pablito
V. Sanidad, Jose Manuel I. Diokno, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren Moncupa, Eduardo
R. Abaya and Ma. Victoria I. Diokno — filed its Notice of Appearance dated
August 22, 1996 only on August 23, 1996, after the Per Curiam Decision of
this Court was promulgated on June 25, 1996.
3.Atty. Julian R. Vitug, Jr. cdtai
4.The bulk of jurisprudence precludes raising an issue for the first time only on
appeal. See, for instance, Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
249 SCRA 303, October 13, 1995; Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 245 SCRA 715, July 11, 1995; Securities and Exchange Commission
vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 738, July 21, 1995. However, the Court
resolved to tackle the question of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 in
this case, anticipating that the same question would be raised anyway in
many other subsequent instances. The Court resolved to determine and
dispose of the issue once and for all, at the first opportunity. To let the issue
pass unresolved just because it was raised after the promulgation of the
decision affirming conviction may result in grave injustice.
5.I n People vs . Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107, February 9, 1989; the Court, prior to the
enactment and effectivity of RA 7659, ruled by a vote of 9-6 ( J . Cruz,
ponente, C .J . Fernan, J J . Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, concurring) that the death penalty was not
abolished but only prohibited from being imposed. But see also the
persuasive Dissenting Opinion of Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
(joined by J J . Narvasa, Paras, Sarmiento, Cortes and Regalado) who
contended that the Constitution totally abolished the death penalty and
removed it from the statute books. People vs . Muñoz reversed the earlier
"abolition" doctrine uniformly held in People vs . Gavarra, 155 SCRA 327,
October 30, 1987, (per C .J . Yap); People vs . Masangkay, 155 SCRA 113,
October 27, 1987, (per J . Melencio-Herrera) and People vs . Atencio, 156
SCRA 242, December 10, 1987 (per C .J . Narvasa). It is time that these cases
are revisited by this Court.
6.This quote is taken from I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 676 (July
17, 1986) as follows:
"Fr. Bernas:
xxx xxx xxx
"My recollection on this is that there was a division in the Committee
not on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on
whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution — in which case it
cannot be restored by the legislature — or left to the legislature. The
majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the
reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family
who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is
no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life
should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved.
Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous for
any man. The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there
from time immemorial should not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is
more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve human life. So
basically, this is the summary of the reasons which were presented in
support of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. (underscoring
supplied)
7.Dissenting Opinion in People vs. Muñoz, supra, p. 129.
8.Thus in People vs . Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, September 4, 1986, we held that a
statute which allows an exception to a constitutional right (against
warrantless arrests) should be strictly construed.
9.In his scholarly Memorandum, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. as amicus curiae in
People vs . Pedro V. Malabago (G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996),
vigorously argues that RA 7659 has validly restored the death penalty which
may now be imposed provided that the prosecution proves, and the court is
convinced, that (a) the accused is guilty of a crime designated by RA 7659 as
capital, (b) whose commission is accompanied by aggravating circumstances
as defined by Arts. 14 and 15 of the Revised Penal Code, (c) the
accompanying aggravating circumstance must be one which can be
characterized by the court as making the crime "heinous", and (d) that the
execution of the offender is demanded by "compelling reasons" related to
the offense. In other words, according to him, it is the courts — not Congress
— that have the responsibility of determining the heinousness of a crime and
the compelling reason for its imposition upon a particular offender,
depending on the facts of each case. I cannot however subscribe to this view.
The Constitution clearly identifies Congress as the sovereign entity which is
given the onus of fulfilling these two constitutional limitations.
10.People vs. Muñoz, supra, p. 121.
11.Which became effective on December 31, 1993, per People vs . Burgos, 234
SCRA 555, 569, July 29, 1994; People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, December 6,
1995; People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136, December 11, 1995.
12.Art. 114 — Treason; Art. 123 — Qualified Piracy; Art. 246 — Parricide; Art. 248
— Murder; Art. 255 — Infanticide; Art. 267 — Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention; Art. 294 — Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons; Art. 320 — Destructive Arson; Art. 335 — Rape.
13.Art. 211-A on Qualified Bribery.
14.Section 2, RA 7080 — Plunder; Secs. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II of RA 6425 —
Prohibited Drugs; Secs. 14, 14-A and 15 of Article III of said RA 6425 —
Carnapping.
15.A preamble is not an essential part of a statute. (Agpalo, Statutory Construction,
Second Edition 1990; Martin, Statutory Construction, Sixth Edition, 1984).
The function of the preamble is to supply reasons and explanation and not to
confer power or determine rights. Hence it cannot be given the effect of
enlarging the scope or effect of a statute. (C. Dallas Sands, Statutes and
Statutory Construction, Fourth Edition, Volume IA, Â§ 20.03).
16.Under Sec. 11, RA 7659, it appears that death is the mandatory penalty for
rape, regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, "(w)hen by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide
is committed," or when it is "committed with any of the attendant
circumstances enumerated" in said section.
17.While plunder and qualified bribery are "new" capital offenses, RA 7659
nonetheless fails to justify why they are considered heinous. In addition, the
specific compelling reasons for the prescribed penalty of death are not laid
out by the statute.
18.In the case of rape, RA 7659 provided certain attendant circumstances which
the prosecution must prove before courts can impose the extreme penalty.
Just the same however, the law did not explain why said circumstances
would make the crimes heinous. Neither did it set forth the compelling
reasons therefor.
19.Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to March 11, 1993,
Volume III, No. 48, January 25, 1993, p. 122.
20.I Record of the Constitutional Commission, July 18, 1986, pp. 742-743:
"MR. SUAREZ.The Gentleman advisedly used the words 'heinous crimes',
whatever is the pronunciation. Will the Gentleman give examples of 'heinous
crimes'? For example, would the head of an organized syndicate in dope
distribution or dope smuggling fall within the qualification of a heinous
offender such as to preclude the application of the principle of abolition of
death penalty?
MR. MONSOD.Yes, Madam President. That is one of the possible crimes that
would qualify for a heinous crime. Another would be organized murder. In
other words, yesterday there were many arguments for and against, and
they all had merit. But in the contemporary society, we recognize the
sacredness of human life and — I think it was Honorable Laurel who said this
yesterday — it is only God who gives and takes life. However, the voice of
the people is also the voice of God, and we cannot presume to have the
wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in the future that
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today. We know that
this is very difficult question. The fact that the arguments yesterday were
quite impassioned and meritorious merely tell us that this is far from a well-
settled issue. At least in my personal opinion, we would like the death
penalty to be abolished. However, in the future we should allow the National
Assembly, in its wisdom and as representatives of the people, to still impose
the death penalty for the common good, in specific cases.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you.
I would like to pursue some more the Gentleman's definition of 'heinous

crimes.' Would the brutal murder of a rape victim be considered as falling
within that classification?
MR. MONSOD.Madam President, yes, particularly, if it is a person in authority.

He would, therefore, add as an aggravating circumstance to the crime the
abuse of his position in authority.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you."
21.Some examples of this may be taken by Congress from Richmond vs. Lewis,
506 US 40, like "gratuitous violence" or "needless mutilation" of the victim.
22.Paragraph 3 & 4 of the preamble reads:
"WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not
only in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property but has
also affected the nation's efforts towards sustainable economic development
and prosperity while at the same time has undermined the people's faith in
the Government and the latter's ability to maintain peace and order in the
country;
WHEREAS, the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and the rule of
law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for
heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for
said crimes;"
23.Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993,

Volume IV, February 10, 1993, p. 674, underscoring supplied.
24.Record of the House of Representatives, First Regular Session, 1992-1993, Vol.
III, November 10, 1992, p. 448; underscoring supplied.
25.Record of the Senate, First Regular Session, January 18 to March 11, 1993,
Volume III, No. 50, January 27, 1993, pp. 176-177.
26.See "Sponsorship Remarks" of Rep. Manuel Sanchez, Record of the House of
Representatives, November 9, 1992, pp. 40-42.
27.Witness, for instance, this interesting exchange between Commissioners Joaquin

Bernas and Napoleon Rama (I Record of the Constitutional Commission, p.
678):
FR. BERNAS.When some experts appeared before us and we asked them if

there was evidence to show that the death penalty had deterred the
commission of deadly crimes, none of them was able to say that there was
evidence, conclusive evidence, for that.
MR. RAMA.I am curious. Who are these experts then — social scientist or
penologists or what?
FR. BERNAS.Penologists.
MR. RAMA.Of course, we are aware that there is also another school of thought
here, another set of experts, who would swear that the death penalty
discourages crimes or criminality. Of course, Commissioner Bernas knows
that never in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime. I say
that criminality was at its zenith during the last decade.
FR. BERNAS.Correct, in spite of the existence of the death penalty.
MR. RAMA.Yes, but not necessarily in spite of the existence of the death
penalty. At any rate, does the sponsor think that in removing the death
penalty, it would not affect, one way or another, the crime rate of the
country?
FR. BERNAS.The position taken by the majority of those who voted in favor of
this provision is that means other than the death penalty should be used for
the prevention of crime."
28.Cf . Report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prosecution and Control,
United Nations Social Affairs Division, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Branch, Vienna, 1988, p. 110.
29.Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his book The Bill of Rights, (Second
Edition, 1972, p. 4) states: "A regime of constitutionalism is thus unthinkable
without an assurance of the primacy of a bill of rights. Precisely a constitution
exists to assure that in the discharge of the governmental functions, the
dignity that is the birthright of every human being is duly safeguarded. . . ."
In the context of the role of a bill of rights the vast powers of government are
clearly to be exercised within the limits set by the Constitution, particularly
the bill of rights. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City Mayor of
Manila, (L-24693, July 31, 1967), it was held that the exercise of police
power, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is
subject to judicial inquiry. The guarantee in Sec. 1 of Article III of the
Constitution embraces life, liberty and property. In the words of Justice
Roberto Concepcion in People vs. Hernandez, (99 Phil. 515, 551-2 [1956]), " .
. . individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a
republican state, like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and
abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is
such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with
guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the
Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5),
(6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said
section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom. . . ." These
guarantees are preserved in the 1987 Constitution, according to Fr. Bernas.
30.See, for instance, People vs . Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554, 571, October 25, 1995,
and People vs. Pidia, 249 SCRA 687, 702-703, November 10, 1995.
31.Art. III, Sec. 1.

32.Art. III, Sec. 11.
33.Art. II, Sec. 12(2).
34.Art. II, Sec. 12.

35.Art. II, Secs. 15, 16 & 17.
36.For details, see Annex A of the Memorandum for the Accused-Appellant dated
September 26, 1996 filed by the Free Legal Assistance Group in People vs .
Malabago, G.R. No. 115686, December 2, 1996.
37.The FLAG-submitted Profile states that 186 have been sentenced to death by
trial courts since the effectivity of RA 7659. The Philippine Star issue of
December 9, 1996, page 17, however reports that, quoting Sen. Ernesto
Herrera, the total number of death row inmates has gone up to 267, as of
November, 1996, of whom more than one half (139) are rape convicts. Some
major dailies (Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Manila Standard) in
their February 3, 1997 issue up the death row figure to 300, as of the end of
January 1997, with 450 as the probable number at the end of 1997.
38.The preamble of the Constitution is theistic. It declares the "sovereign Filipino
people's" imploration of the "aid of Almighty God".
39.Catechism of the Catholic Church, p. 512, Word and Life Publications:

"2266.Preserving the common good of society requires rendering the
aggressor unable to inflict harm. For this reason the traditional teaching of
the Church has acknowledged as well-founded the right and duty of
legitimate public authority to punish malefactors by means of penalties
commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases of
extreme gravity, the death penalty. For analogous reasons those holding
authority have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the
community in their charge.
40.Evangelium Vitae, item nos. 55 and 56, states:
"55.This should not cause surprise: to kill a human being, in whom the
image of God is present, is a particularly serious sin. Only God is the master
of life! Yet from the beginning, faced with the many and often tragic cases
which occur in the life of individuals and society, Christian reflection has
sought a fuller and deeper understanding of what God's commandment
prohibits and prescribes. There are, in fact, situations in which values
proposed by God's Law seem to involve a genuine paradox. This happens
for example in the case of legitimate defence, in which the right to protect
one's own life and the duty not to harm someone else's life are difficult to
reconcile in practice. Certainly, the intrinsic value of life and the duty to
love oneself no less than others are the basis of a true right to self-defence .
The demanding commandment of love of neighbor, set forth in the Old
Testament and confirmed by Jesus, itself presupposes love of oneself as the
basis of comparison: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself " (Mk 12:31).
Consequently, no one can renounce the right to self-defence out of lack of
love for life or for self. This can only be done in virtue of a heroic love which
deepens and transfigures the love of self into a radical self-offering,
according to the spirit of the Gospel Beatitudes (cf. Mt. 5:38-40). The
sublime example of this self-offering is the Lord Jesus himself.
Moreover, 'legitimate defence can be not only a right but a grave duty for
someone responsible for another's life, the common good of the family or of
the State.' Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor
incapable of causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case,
the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it
about, even though he may not be morally responsible because of a lack of
the use of reason.
56.This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty.
On this matter there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil
society, to demand that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it
be abolished completely. The problem must be viewed in the context of a
system of penal justice even more in line with human dignity and thus, in
the end, with God's plan for man and society. The primary purpose of the
punishment which society inflicts is "to redress the disorder caused by the
offence." Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social
rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime,
as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom.
In this way authority also fulfills the purpose of defending public order and
ensuring people's safety, while at the same time offering the offender an
incentive and help to change his or her behavior and be rehabilitated.
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of
the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought
not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute
necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to
defend society. Today however, as a result of steady improvements in the
organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically
non-existent.

In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic
Church remains valid: "If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human
lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of
persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they
better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are
more in conformity to the dignity of the human person."

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

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Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

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EN BANC People v.

The instant motion is GRANTED. IaAHCE

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; RULE ON FINALITY OF JUDGMENT;

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; R.A. NO. 7659, UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — Let

2. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WITH JURISDICTION TO ISSUE

3. ID.; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL AND EXECUTORY

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:

2. ID.; R.A. NO. 8177 (LETHAL INJECTION LAW), UNCONSTITUTIONAL. —

For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for

(2) The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates

(3) Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death

(5) At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will

b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are

c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public

'WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner

Judicial Records Office"

Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar,

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail

5. Instead of ﬁling a comment on Judge Ponferrada's

6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein

7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the

8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information

SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on

SEC. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by

9. The 'right to information' provision is self-executing. It

xxx xxx xxx

"a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto

b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the

Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that

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The Constitution Strictly Limits

(2) to crimes which Congress should identify or deﬁne or

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes

1) the crimes should be entirely new oﬀenses, the elements of

3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justiﬁcations of

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property,

"(1) Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons

(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one

(3) T h u s , approximately two-thirds of the convicts,

(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one

(5) None of the DRC's use English as their medium of