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Stereotypes and prejudice
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Stereotypes and Prejudice
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology

David Marx and Sei Jin Ko
Subject: Social Psychology Online Publication Date: May 2019
DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.307
Summary and Keywords
Stereotypes are widely held generalized beliefs about the behaviors and attributes pos
sessed by individuals from certain social groups (e.g., race/ethnicity, sex, age, socioeco
nomic status, sexual orientation). They are often unchanging even in the face of contra
dicting information; however, they are fluid in the sense that stereotypic beliefs do not al
ways come to mind or are expressed unless a situation activates the stereotype. Stereo
types generally serve as an underlying justification for prejudice, which is the accompa
nying feeling (typically negative) toward individuals from a certain social group (e.g., the
elderly, Asians, transgender individuals). Many contemporary social issues are rooted in
stereotypes and prejudice; thus research in this area has primarily focused on the an
tecedents and consequences of stereotype and prejudice as well as the ways to minimize
the reliance on stereotypes when making social judgments.
Keywords: stereotypes, prejudice, stereotype activation, implicit bias, prejudice reduction, implicit measures, ex
plicit measures, stereotype maintenance
A Brief Overview of Stereotypes and Prejudice

The first use of the term “stereotype” was in the late 1700s. At that time, it referred to a
printing process in which metal plates were used to create reproductions of images and
prints. It was not until the early 1920s that the term became common parlance when
journalist Walter Lippmann likened stereotypes to “pictures in the head,” or mental re
productions of reality. Since then the term has evolved into its current usage—cognitive
schemas or beliefs used by people to process information about or guide behavior toward
individuals or social groups.
The term “prejudice” has had a somewhat shorter history. Prejudice was not widely used
in the research literature until the early 1930s when researchers linked stereotypes with
attitudes and prejudice (Katz & Braly, 1933). They further associated the negative aspect
of stereotypes to prejudice. In the following years, however, the term “stereotype” was of
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ten used erroneously to represent prejudice. In light of this common conflation it is im
portant to point out the distinction between these terms.
Stereotypes refer to both positive and negative overgeneralizations or beliefs about the
attributes and behaviors of individuals and/or groups. For instance, stereotypes about
women include both negative (e.g., overly emotional, unassertive) and positive (e.g., nur
turing, empathetic) attributes. Prejudice typically refers to the negative aspects of the
stereotype. In this case, associating women with the attributes overly emotional and
unassertive would be considered prejudice. Prejudice is also captured by the negative af
fective reactions one feels toward a group in the absence of any concrete thoughts or be
liefs about that group, such as a generalized fear or dislike of Muslims. In other words,
prejudice can be just a “bad feeling” that arises without the need for any associated
thoughts or beliefs.
Early conceptions of stereotypes and prejudice were that they were fixed and rigid. More
modern conceptions allow for more fluidity, in that they may ebb and flow as more infor
mation, exposure, and familiarity with a social group is acquired. For instance, one may
initially hold strong prejudices about a group that may fade over time as personal ten
sions with that group lessen or as the number of positive encounters with that group in
creases. Situational influences may also alter the expression or endorsement of a stereo
type. That is in the presence of less stereotypic—or even counter-stereotypic—individuals
may call to mind a different set of stereotypes than when in the presence of more stereo
typic individuals. Hence, exposure to these counter-stereotypic individuals may weaken
the stereotype over time, particularly if exposure occurs across multiple situations with
multiple individuals. The section “Reducing Stereotypes and Prejudice” provides a discus
sion of the many approaches used to weaken stereotypes and prejudice.
Stereotypes are not fundamentally harmful or even inaccurate in some cases (e.g., the
Dutch are tall, Germans make good cars, Canadians are polite); they are often considered
part of a normal cognitive process that allows for the preservation of scarce cognitive re
sources (e.g., Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Stereotypes simply occur through the act of
categorization. It is how individuals act on those stereotypes that can make them “harm
ful.”
Prejudice and stereotyping often go together, yet it is possible to have one without the
other. On the one hand, a person may be aware of the stereotypes about a group but not
endorse or act upon those stereotypes. On the other hand, choosing not to sit next to a
Muslim woman wearing a hijab, or following a young African American male around a
clothing store without offering to assist him could be viewed as acting in a prejudicial
manner. However, the person enacting these behaviors may not necessarily be thinking
about or even be aware of the stereotypes associated with Muslims (e.g., anti-Western) or
African Americans (e.g., criminal).
There is a general consensus among researchers that stereotypes and prejudice operate
at both automatic and controlled levels. How one responds to them is due to triggers in
the social situation as well as the beliefs and knowledge one has about the social group in
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question. Discussing or having stereotypes come to mind when in the presence of individ
uals from a certain group is not the problem—in fact, this is a common occurrence due to
how omnipresent cultural stereotypes are in society. The problem lies in the use of the
stereotype to justify unfair or biased treatment toward members of a group. This point al
so highlights an important focus in contemporary research on stereotyping and prejudice,
namely the distinction between personal stereotypes (i.e., endorsement of the stereotype)
and cultural stereotypes (i.e., simply knowing the stereotypes associated with certain
groups). The section “A Research History on Stereotypes and Prejudice” provides addi
tional discussion of this distinction.
The Origin of Stereotypes and Prejudice
Researchers typically agree that there are three theoretical perspectives on the origin
and persistence of stereotypes and prejudice: cognitive, motivational, and competitive.
Cognitive Perspective
This perspective maintains that upon encountering an individual we effortlessly and auto
matically categorize that individual as one of “us” or one of “them,” usually on the basis
of easily recognizable physical features (e.g., race, age, and sex). It is this act of catego
rization that brings to mind the attributes often associated with members of that group
(e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Macrae, Milne, & Boden
hausen, 1994). Our subsequent behaviors toward those individuals are then, to some ex
tent, based on whether or not we endorse the stereotypic attributes elicited from their
physical features.
Motivational Perspective
This perspective is couched, in part, on theories of social identity. It is based on the no
tion that we are motivated to think well of and derive self-worth from the groups to which
we belong. Consequently, we value our ingroups more than outgroups and thus bestow
more favorable impressions on our own group. In order to maintain positive group regard
we are motivated to bolster the worth of our group when it is seen in an unfavorable
light. This is often achieved by disparaging members of an outgroup (e.g., Fein &
Spencer, 1997).
Competitive Perspective
This perspective is grounded in theories of intergroup relations: when groups vie for the
same scarce resources, tensions between the competing groups often arise (i.e., Realistic
Group Conflict Theory; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Interestingly, the basic premise of this
theory does not require actual competition; rather the simple perception of competition is
sufficient to give rise to conflict and the ensuing stereotypes and prejudice directed to
ward the competing group. Long-term tensions between groups typically result in feel
ings of ethnocentrism, denigration of the other group, and elevation of one’s own group.
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Summary
It should be clear that these three perspectives are complementary. They also offer com
prehensive insight into the origin and persistence of stereotypes and prejudice. Further
more, these perspectives may influence one another. The same event, for instance, can be
influenced by competition (“they” are getting something “we” want), cognitions (“they”
are different from “us”), and motivation (“we” are better than “they” are). Nevertheless,
these distinctions are useful for organizing and thinking about the complex causes of
stereotypes and prejudice in addition to helping determine the methods that can help
defuse them.
A Research History on Stereotypes and Preju

dice
The focus on prejudice as a distinct research area first emerged in the 1920s and was
based upon prevailing beliefs about race that attempted to prove white superiority over
other racial groups. These efforts resulted in the rather simplistic assertion that whites
were superior intellectually and morally and that prejudice was a natural response to in
ferior races. This perspective changed in the 1930s and 1940s with progress in civil
rights and growing concerns about anti-Semitism resulting from disbelief surrounding the
Holocaust. The events of World War II sparked many theories attempting to demonstrate
that a certain type of person harbors these prejudicial beliefs. There was a general belief
that to commit the atrocities of the Holocaust one had to be sadistic, maladjusted, or
pathological. In other words, prejudice was inextricably linked to the individual and that
good people would be unable to commit such horrific acts. In light of this, some re
searchers attempted to identify the personality factors that may underlie prejudice. For
instance, Adorno proposed the idea of an authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). The authoritarian personality was considered to
be emblematic of rigid thinking and strict obedience to authority and adherence to social
rules and hierarchies endorsed by those in power without regard for the outcome of such
rules or hierarchies.
Although the notion of an authoritarian personality has fallen out of favor among re
searchers, vestiges of this personality-based theory of prejudice remain in contemporary
work, such as work on social dominance orientation (SDO; Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, & Pratto,
1994) and system justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994). For instance, SDO holds
that people who view the social world hierarchically are more likely to hold prejudices to
ward low-status groups. This is especially true of people who want their own group to
dominate other groups. Many studies on SDO have linked it to anti-black and anti-Arab
prejudice, sexism, nationalism, opposition to gay rights, and other attitudes concerning
social hierarchies. Similar to SDO, SJT proposes that people not only want to hold favor
able attitudes about their group but also want to hold favorable attitudes about the gener
al social order and their group’s place in it. A consequence of SJT is that the existing so
cial structure is preferred and that modifications to this structure are criticized and dis
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couraged, particularly by those groups higher in the social hierarchy. Research on SJT
has shown that even those lower in the social hierarchy occasionally support the existing
hierarchy to some degree, often at a cost to themselves and their group (e.g., Haines &
Jost, 2000; O’Brien, Major, & Gilbert, 2012; Rodriguez-Bailon, Bratanova, Willis, Lopez-
Rodriguez, Sturrock, & Loughnan, 2017): In some sense, it may be easier to justify rather
than protest the existing social hierarchy.
The 1950s through early 1990s saw a cognitive revolution in which the dominant perspec
tive was that stereotypes were cognitive-saving devices—they were considered mental
shortcuts used to make quick judgments or evaluations of social groups—that manifest
simply via the act of categorizing individuals into groups (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman,
1994). Accordingly, researchers began looking “inside the head” rather than relying on
behaviors or responses that could be open to social desirability or strategic response
strategies. Researchers thus attempted to infer what people were thinking rather than di
rectly asking about their thoughts. The section “The Rise of Implicit or Indirect Mea
sures” discusses various methods used to infer people’s stereotypic thoughts or prejudi
cial feelings.
During this cognitive revolution dominant theories of stereotyping and prejudice began to
incorporate ideas from cognitive psychology, which proposed that cognitive processes are
either automatic or controlled (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
These dual-process theories then became de rigueur in research on stereotyping and prej
udice (e.g., Devine, 1989) and were used to articulate the unconscious (automatic) and
conscious (controlled) components of the stereotyping process. Dual-process theories
hold that people are more or less equally knowledgeable about cultural stereotypes and
that these stereotypes are accessible and automatically activated in the presence of cer
tain social groups (the automatic component). What separates high-prejudice individuals
from low-prejudice individuals is not the automatic component but the controlled compo
nent—whether they use the activated stereotype to guide judgments or behavior. Further
more, it is proposed that low-prejudice individuals are motivated to inhibit the influences
of the automatically activated stereotype on their behavior, whereas high-prejudice indi
viduals are less motivated to inhibit the influence of the stereotype (Monteith & Mark,
2009).
More recently, researchers have expanded on dual process theories to include four dis
tinct processes that shape stereotypic responses (e.g., Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski,
Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005). These quad models propose that responses on implicit
stereotyping measures can be influenced by (1) whether a certain stimulus automatically
activates (stereotypic) associations, (2) whether respondents are able to control their re
sponses—that is, they may be able to infer what type of response will avoid making them
appear “prejudiced or biased,” (3) whether respondents can inhibit the influence of the
automatically activated stereotype in their responses, and (4) whether in the absence of
other (stereotypic or counter-stereotypic) information, respondents will simply make a
guess.
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New Perspectives and Trends in Research on

Traditional theories have proposed that stereotyping is purely a category-based phenome
non. In other words, people’s perceptions of social groups (particularly outgroups) are ho
mogenized to the point that any member of a given outgroup can be perceived as inter
changeable with any other member of that group, as exemplified by perceptions such as:
“all Latinos are lazy” or “all Asians are good at math.” This also means that the stereo
types of an outgroup could be applied to the same degree to any member of that group.
Within the stereotyping literature the outgroup homogeneity perspective was the prevail
ing perspective until the late 1990s, when researchers began to explore how subtle fea
ture-based variations between individuals within the same social group also impact
stereotypic perceptions (e.g., Hugenberg & Sacco, 2008; Zebrowitz, 1996). This newer
perspective is known as within-category stereotyping.
Within-Category Stereotyping
Within-category stereotyping maintains that some members within a group may appear
more representative or prototypic of the group than other members. As a consequence,
different stereotypes or expectations may be applied to individual group members de
pending on how prototypical of the group they are. Below is a discussion of three streams
of research focused on how within-category variations affect the stereotyping process.
Racial Phenotypicality
Research on racial phenotypicality has found that individuals with more Afrocentric fea
tures (e.g., coarse hair, full lips) were seen as possessing attributes stereotypic of African
Americans more so than individuals with fewer Afrocentric features (Blair, Judd, Sadler, &
Jenkins, 2002). This effect transcended racial category membership. In other words, after
controlling for whether the individual was African American or white, Afrocentric cues
still influenced stereotypic judgments of individuals.
Skin-Tone Bias
Researchers have argued that skin tone is an additional feature-based cue that can shape
stereotypic perceptions (Maddox, 2004; Maddox & Gray, 2002; Norwood, 2014). The basic
finding to emerge from this line of work is that darker-skinned African Americans are de
scribed using more negative stereotypic traits (e.g., criminal, poor), and lighter-skinned
African Americans are described using more positive, counter-stereotypic traits (e.g.,
wealthy, educated).
Vocal Femininity
In a third line of work, researchers have begun examining what may be a more subtle
within-category feature influencing stereotypic perceptions—namely perceived vocal fem
ininity (Ko, Judd, & Blair, 2006). To illustrate, consider three women: Bella, Sarah, and
Jan. Although they are from the same gender category, their voices can still vary in how
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feminine they sound: Bella’s voice is the most feminine, Sarah’s voice is the least femi
nine, and Jan’s voice is somewhere in between. This variation in within-category “vocal
femininity” itself elicits different gender stereotypic inferences, such that speakers with
more feminine-sounding voices are more strongly associated with female (e.g., warm,
nurturing) than male (e.g., assertive, leaderlike) stereotypes, just as speakers with less
feminine-sounding voices are more strongly associated with male than female stereo
types. And this effect holds regardless of the speaker’s gender (Ko et al., 2006).
Summary
The work on racial phenotypicality, skin-tone bias, and vocal femininity hint at a process
relationship involving between-category and within-category feature-based stereotyping.
Both between- and within-category features have the capacity to affect stereotypic infer
ences, but the former seems to be easier to control than the latter (Bodenhausen &
Macrae, 1998; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). In other words, it may be easier to control re
sponses based on race or gender than it is to control responses based on subtle feature-
based variations within race or gender. Indeed, given current societal pressures to curb
between-category stereotyping (e.g., biased judgments of African American vs. white indi
viduals), people seem to have become well practiced at suppressing such biases. Ironical
ly, suppressing category-based biases may lead respondents to rely more on within-cate
gory features as a basis for biased judgments or prejudicial behavior. For instance, re
searchers have shown that the more respondents suppress their between-category judg
ments, the more within-category variation in features may be used as a basis for biased
judgments (e.g., Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004; Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, &
Johnson, 2006; Ko, Mueller, Judd, & Stapel, 2008). In sum, societal norms that censor the
acknowledgment of any differences between categories can end up backfiring: it can
make people more susceptible to the subtle features that vary within a category, which
may be harder to control: consequently, stereotypes “leak out” in other ways.
Real-World Implications of Within-Category Stereotyping

In modern-day criminal sentencing there no longer seems to be a strong relationship be
tween the racial category (e.g., African American versus white) of offenders and sentence
length, as was the case in the past. However, the stronger the within-category Afrocentric
features of the offender, the longer the offender’s sentence, regardless of the offender’s
racial category. For instance, white offenders with more Afrocentric features were given
longer sentences than white offenders with fewer Afrocentric features (Blair et al., 2004).
Work on within-category vocal stereotyping has also shown that voices vary on how pow
erful they sound and by extension how powerful a person may appear (Ko, Galinsky, &
Sadler, 2015). This point is evident in the story of Margaret Thatcher, who went through
extensive voice coaching to help her sound more powerful and persuasive after she be
came the prime minister of the United Kingdom.
Page 7 of 25

Intersecting Social Identities
A research focus related to within-category stereotyping is the work on intersecting so

cial identities (e.g., sex, race, age). The basic idea behind this line of research is that
everyone has intersecting identities and that different stereotypic perceptions may
emerge as a function of the specific type of identity intersection (Kang & Bodenhausen,
2015). For instance, both Juan and Gabriela are Latino, but the stereotypes that may be
applied to Juan and Gabriela may differ depending on their respective genders (Ghavami
& Peplau, 2013; Liang, Knauer-Turner, Molenaar, & Price, 2017). In Juan’s case, it is more
likely that the stereotypic attributes, macho or uneducated, would be applied to him,
whereas in Gabriela’s case, loud or hot-tempered would be applied to her. Findings from
intersectionality research suggest that the uniform application of stereotypes to all mem
bers of a group may be outdated and that consideration of intersectional differences may
yield a more nuanced understanding of stereotypic perceptions.
Common Methods for Studying Stereotypes

and Prejudice
Part and parcel of the history and theories of stereotypes and prejudice are the methods
and measures used to study them. Accordingly, this section provides an overview of some
of the more common methods for studying stereotypes and prejudice, starting roughly
from the oldest (explicit) methods to some of the more contemporary (neuroscience)
methods.
Explicit Methods
Historically, the study of stereotypes and prejudice was done at the explicit level, using
self-reporting or survey-type measures. In this case, respondents were simply asked to in
dicate how they felt or what they thought about certain social groups. One of the more
common explicit methods for studying stereotypes and prejudice was the adjective check
list, first used in the early 1930s (Katz & Braly, 1933). In this method, respondents are
given a list of trait adjectives and then asked to indicate how typical each adjective is of a
particular social group (e.g., Asians, Arabs, Latinos). The stereotypes of each group are
then defined by the set of adjectives most commonly assigned to that group.
Concerns surrounding deliberate attempts to conceal one’s biases (what is known as “so
cially desirable responding”) have now pushed the use of the adjective checklist to the
wayside. Yet it could be argued that this approach served researchers well in the past.
This is because the social climate was one where endorsement of stereotypes and preju
dice was more accepted. Consequently, respondents may have just been more willing to
express such biased beliefs. It should be noted, however, that the endorsements of the
traits usually matched those often portrayed via popular media, raising the issue of
whether these endorsements truly reflected respondents’ personal beliefs or simply their
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knowledge of cultural stereotypes. This is still a relevant issue but one that may be side
stepped to some extent by the use of implicit or indirect measures.
The Rise of Implicit or Indirect Measures
In contemporary social psychology the use of implicit or indirect measures of stereotypes

and prejudice is common. The assumption underlying implicit measures is that they are
capable of assessing a respondent’s true beliefs because they purportedly measure
stereotypes or prejudice at a more uncontrollable and automatic level and could even re
flect beliefs of which a respondent is unaware. The rise in interest and use of implicit
measures have been largely commensurate with advancements in personal computing.
With recent technological advancements, researchers now have flexible and powerful
ways to study stereotypes that were once hidden from view. Below is a discussion of some
of the common implicit measures used to assess stereotypes and prejudice followed by a
brief discussion of the relationship between implicit measures and behavior.
Word-Fragment Completions
Although this task involves having respondents explicitly state their responses, it is never
theless implicit (or at least indirect) in the sense that respondents may be unaware of
how their responses reflect stereotype activation. For instance, respondents who are in
an experimental setting where they have just been exposed to an Asian person and then
are asked, in a second unrelated task, to complete word fragments may not make the con
nection that completing word fragments, such as R I __E with R I C E (instead of R I T E
or R I L E) or S __ O R T with S H O R T (instead of S P O R T or S N O R T), could be used
as an indication of stereotype activation about Asians (see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).
The Bona Fide Pipeline (BFP)

This task was developed in response to the concerns that many of the implicit measures
used to assess group-based biases did so by priming the stereotype rather than merely
the social group (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). As a result, it was unclear
whether responses were driven by personal or cultural stereotypes. To get around this
concern, the BFP used faces to activate the racial group and then measured responses to
trait adjectives that were presented immediately after the face prime. The logic of this
method is that if respondents are prejudiced toward a racial group then they should show
speeded responses to negative trait adjectives and slower responses to the positive trait
adjectives. Thus, by using faces instead of stereotypic traits it should be possible to con
clude that faster responses were due to prejudice and personal stereotypes about the
racial group (and not simply knowledge of the stereotype), since stereotype content is not
necessarily associated with activation of the racial group.
Lexical-Decision Tasks (LDT)

The basic procedure when using an LDT is for respondents to be primed with a stimulus
(words or pictures usually below conscious recognition) and then presented with a mix
ture of letter strings that form a word or a non-word (e.g., Neely, 1977). The stimulus
prime is anything that represents the category of interest (e.g., Latino names, African
Page 9 of 25

American faces). Respondents then indicate, as fast as possible (usually with a button
press), whether the letter string is a word or not. A selection of the presented words
would be stereotypic of the group (e.g., lazy, criminal). The idea is that the stronger the
respondents’ stereotypic beliefs about a group, the faster they will respond to stereotypic
as compared to other “neutral” words and/or non-words. For instance, when subliminally
primed with the group label “Latino,” respondents who hold strong stereotypic beliefs
may show a faster response to the word “lazy” than to the word “kitchen” or to non-word
letter strings “shload.” Similar to the BFP, the logic behind the LDT is that the group la
bels activate knowledge structures that then guide the subsequent lexical decision. More
over, if the responses are faster to negative (e.g., lazy) relative to positive stereotypic
words (e.g., religious), then it could be inferred that respondents are prejudiced.
Implicit Association Test (IAT)

The IAT is arguably the most popular method to measure stereotypes and prejudice. At
the most basic level the IAT assesses the strength of an association between a social
group and a stereotypic attribute by measuring the speed at which respondents can press
one of two response keys that have been assigned a dual meaning. For example, consider
a gender IAT. The respondent’s task is first to categorize stimuli (e.g., words or pictures)
representative of a particular gender by pressing one of two response keys. The response
keys, in this case, would be labeled men or women. Next, the respondent would catego
rize stimuli that are considered stereotypic or counter-stereotypic (i.e., nurturing or ag
gressive) of the gender group in question. Here, the response keys would be labeled
“good” or “bad.” After this training phase, respondents would then be presented with
both types of stimuli simultaneously, such that they would be asked to determine whether
stimuli pairings that are consistent with the prevailing stereotype (e.g., women/nurtur
ing) would lead to faster responding than stimuli pairings that are inconsistent with the
prevailing stereotype (e.g., women/aggressive). Gender bias is assessed by subtracting
the average response time for the consistent pairings from the inconsistent pairings. A
positive value (i.e., faster response times to the consistent relative to the inconsistent
pairings) would indicate bias toward the gender group in question.
Despite its popularity, the IAT is not without its detractors. For instance, some re
searchers have argued that it suffers from the same concerns that plague more explicit
stereotyping measures in that it may not measure personal beliefs but rather culturally
shared knowledge regarding social groups (e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio,
2004). Others have argued that IAT scores are biased by arbitrary scoring metrics (Blan
ton, Jaccard, Strauts, Mitchell, & Tetlock, 2015). The evidence is also mixed regarding
whether respondents’ IAT scores predict their behavior toward particular social groups
(Blanton, Jaccard, Klick, Mellers, Mitchell, & Tetlock, 2009; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; but
see McConnell & Leibold, 2001).
First-Person Shooter Task

This task is a first-person-shooter videogame that presents a series of young men set
against realistic backgrounds who are either armed or unarmed (Correll, Park, Judd, &
Page 10 of 25

Wittenbrink, 2002). This task is thus used to investigate whether decisions to “shoot” a
potentially hostile (i.e., armed) target is influenced by that target’s race. Respondents are
instructed to shoot any armed target and not to shoot any unarmed one. Half of the tar
gets are African American, and half are white. The basic finding is that respondents shoot
an armed target more quickly and more often when that target is African American,
rather than white. However, respondents decide not to shoot an unarmed target more
quickly and more often when the target is white, rather than African American. Evidence
of racial bias is assessed via the speed of responding as well as by response errors. A
variation of this task is the weapon misidentification procedure in which respondents are
asked to indicate as quickly as possible whether an object flashed immediately after an
African American or white face prime is a weapon or a tool (Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby,
2002). Racial bias is again assessed via the speed of responding as well as by response
errors.
Implicit Measures and Their Relation to Behavior

There is a growing body of evidence demonstrating that responses on implicit measures
of prejudice can predict behavior toward members of stereotyped groups (e.g., Fazio &
Olson, 2003). For instance, researchers have found that among a representative sample of
American adults implicit prejudice predicted voting behaviors toward Barack Obama in
the 2008 presidential election, such that those with high implicit prejudice scores were
less likely to vote for Obama (Payne et al., 2010). Other researchers have found that
stronger implicit prejudice toward African Americans (versus whites), as assessed using a
race-based IAT, predicted subsequent biased behavior toward an African American experi
menter (McConnell & Leibold, 2001). Researchers have also investigated the role of vari
ous individual difference variables as moderators of the implicit measure and behavior re
lationship (e.g., Conner, Perugini, O’Gorman, Ayres, & Prestwich, 2007). In sum, the many
implicit measures developed to date have proven effective at identifying respondents’
stereotype and prejudices before such beliefs materialize in consciousness. As such, it
may make it easier for researchers to interrupt the downstream influence of stereotypes
and prejudice on behavior.
Studying the Neural Basis of Stereotypes and Prejudice
Since the early 2000s there has been a rapid rise in the research area of social neuro
science. Much of this research has been dedicated to understanding the neural basis of
stereotypes and prejudice (see Amodio, 2014). Neuroscience methodology provides re
searchers with an opportunity to link social problems such as stereotypes and prejudice
with the neural structures through which these biases form: This methodology also shows
how these are regulated and shape behavior. In this section some of the more common
approaches for studying the neural basis of stereotypes and prejudice are discussed.
Startle Eye Blink

This method uses the magnitude of a startle eye blink as a measure of affective reactivity
to stimuli. The startle response is a primitive, defensive reflex to a brief, intense stimulus.
Page 11 of 25

Previous studies have demonstrated that the startle response is increased or potentiated
by stimuli that evoke a negative emotional response. Using this logic researchers have
begun to use the startle eye blink as a means to assess affective reactions to particular
social groups, such as racial groups (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003). The idea is
that the magnitude of a startle eye blink will be larger the more prejudiced the respon
dent is to the social group in question.
Event-Related Potentials (ERPs)

This method involves measuring small voltages generated in the brain in response to the
presentation of stimuli. ERPs can be divided into two waves: early and late waves. Early
waves, peaking somewhere between 100 and 200 milliseconds after stimulus onset, are
termed “sensory” ERPs as they depend largely on the physical parameters of the stimulus
(think categorization). Late waves, peaking roughly after 200 milliseconds after stimulus
onset, are termed “cognitive” ERPs as they examine information processing (think stereo
types). Consequently, researchers interested in the neural basis of stereotypes have used
ERPs to assess the stereotyping process by examining differences in ERP responsivity at
these key points within each wave as a function of stimuli type (Ito, Thompson, & Caciop
po, 2004).
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)

Like ERPs, researchers using fMRI to assess stereotypes are examining the brain’s reac
tion to different stimuli, but instead of measuring voltages this method assesses blood
flow to specific brain regions. The logic is that specific brain regions are responsible for
different aspects of information processing such as facial recognition, affective reactions,
and so on. Researchers then assess, via measurement of blood flow, what part of the
brain is most active when presented with social stimuli. For instance, if a respondent’s
amygdala shows a higher level of reactivity after being shown an African American face
as compared with a white male face, it may be possible to infer that the respondent is
prejudiced toward members of this racial group, given that amygdala reactivity is also as
sociated with threats to the self (Chekroud, Everett, Bridge, & Hewstone, 2014).
The Effects of Stereotypes and Prejudice On

the Self and Behavior
In the Nature of Prejudice (1954), Gordon Allport wrote that “one’s reputation, whether
false or true, cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered, into one’s head without doing
something to one’s character” (p. 142). Many have assumed that Allport is referring to
how other people’s beliefs may adversely influence a person’s psychology, well-being, and
behavior. This assumption is certainly reasonable and may be rooted in the idea of a self-
fulfilling prophecy: that is, stereotyped individuals internalize the negative perceptions of
their group through the “hammering” exposure of these negative perceptions and then
“self-fulfill” those internalized perceptions as one would self-fulfill any type of expectancy.
Page 12 of 25

Another way, however, that negative perceptions of a person’s group might affect their
behavior is based on situational influences. Aside from whatever effects stereotypes may
have on self-expectancies, the situation may also have effects that are directly triggered
from an acute situational pressure. For example, Allport writes that the mere prospect of
being stereotyped may cause a state of “obsessive concern” about how one will be per
ceived. He continues by noting that it is unlikely that an African American enters “a store,
restaurant, movie . . . to say nothing of a white person’s home, without wondering uneasi
ly whether he will suffer insult and humiliation” (p. 140). This leads to a state of uncer
tainty whereby individuals from negatively stereotyped groups, struggle with the concern
about whether others’ perceptions of them are due to their race or to them personally.
This notion is captured by two prominent theories focused on how the stereotypes about
one’s group affect self-perceptions and the behaviors that follow: attributional ambiguity
(Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991) and stereotype threat (Steele, 1997; Steele &
Aronson, 1995).
Attributional Ambiguity
In many cases it is clear when certain social groups are treated in a prejudicial manner.
Although, in other cases, there may be marked uncertainty about the cause of the seem
ingly prejudicial treatment. Everyone feels some uncertainty about how they are treated,
but this uncertainty may be particularly pernicious for certain social groups, due to the
stereotypes associated with their group. Both positive and negative outcomes may be at
tributionally ambiguous, because the outcomes could just as easily be due to poor perfor
mance, lack of ability, or other shortcomings related to the prejudice directed toward
them (Crocker et al., 1991). The downside is that members of these devalued social
groups may ignore or discount valuable (valid) feedback that could be beneficial. Con
versely, there may be an upside: members of stereotyped groups (e.g., Latinos) can at
tribute negative treatment to prejudice, thus preserving their self-esteem, something that
members of other social groups (e.g., whites) may be unable to do (Crocker & Major,
1989).
Stereotype Threat
The theory of stereotype threat has become one of the most widely used explanations for
the academic disadvantage of many social groups, such as students of color in higher ed
ucation and women in STEM fields (Steele, 1997). According to this theory, the concern
about confirming or being judged in terms of the negative ability-based stereotype (belief
in the stereotype’s validity is not necessary) usurps cognitive resources and drains emo
tional reserves for those individuals targeted by the negative stereotypes (Spencer,
Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Hence, it is the situation and the cues in
that situation that orient stereotyped individuals toward how they may be viewed if they
falter. These factors then pose a psychological burden that undermines their performance
(Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008).
Page 13 of 25

A critical aspect of this theory is that those individuals who care the most and have the
skills, desires, and motivation to succeed are the ones most afflicted by stereotype threat
(Steele, 1997; Steinberg, Okun, & Aiken, 2012; Walton & Spencer, 2009). For these indi
viduals, being seen as incapable or faltering in a domain that greatly interests them
makes the threat of the negative stereotype even more impactful, relative to those indi
viduals for whom the domain is of less interest. One downstream consequence is that re
peated experiences with stereotype threat may lead to greater attrition among individu
als who are targeted by the stereotype. The constant threat in the air in this case be
comes too burdensome to bear and pushes many individuals out of certain academic do
mains in an attempt to minimize and/or avoid such threats (Woodcock, Hernandez, Estra
da, & Schultz, 2012).
Stereotype Priming and its Effect on the Self and Behavior
Stereotype priming finds its roots in the theory of ideomotor action (James, 1890), and is
often captured by the common phrase, “thinking is for doing.” In other words, when a
thought enters our heads, behaviors related to those thoughts are more likely to be enact
ed. And this process tends to hold whether we are aware of those thoughts or not. Not on
ly does priming a thought lead to thought-consistent behavior, it can also make other
thought-consistent words accessible. Imagine being presented with the word peanut but
ter. Beyond making our stomachs rumble, words like jelly rather than octopus will be
more accessible because of the longtime association between peanut butter and jelly.
Hence, in the context of stereotypes and prejudice when respondents associate certain
social groups with negative attributes or traits, then this is taken as evidence for preju
dice (e.g., Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).
Researchers argue that reactions to stereotype primes are based on experience and re
peated associations between a group and the negative reactions to this group, and can
occur despite being unaware of harboring such prejudice or bias (Banaji, Hardin, & Roth
man, 1993; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). However, it is also possible that ef
fects can occur in the absence of personal experiences, provided that the group and asso
ciated attributes or traits are well known. For instance, consider what is arguably the
first study to assess the prime-to-behavior link. In this study college-age participants
were subtly primed with the elderly group identity and then asked to walk down a hall
way to a second unrelated part of the study. Even though participants were young stu
dents, those who were subtly primed with the elderly group identity walked slower—they
behaved in accordance with the stereotype that the elderly walk slowly—than did those
participants not primed with the elderly identity (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). The
publication of this study not only sparked a wave of research examining the prime-to-be
havior link, it has also featured prominently in the controversy surrounding the replica
tion of priming effects (e.g., Kahneman, 2011). Indeed, Bargh and colleagues’ study and
many others like it have not been replicated, calling into question the robustness and reli
ability of priming effects (e.g., Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Si
monsohn, 2011); yet others argue that caution needs to be taken when drawing conclu
Page 14 of 25

sions about the reliability of priming effects based on failed replication attempts (e.g., Ce
sario, 2014; Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015).
Maintaining and Reducing Stereotypes and

Prejudice
Alongside the work dedicated to understanding how stereotypes and prejudice operate is
a large body of research dedicated to understanding why it is so difficult to change and/or
reduce the application of stereotypes. This section describes some of the more prominent
perspectives and approaches aimed at the maintenance and reduction of stereotypes and
prejudice.
Maintaining Stereotypes and Prejudice
Subtyping
Stereotypes and prejudice are notoriously difficult to abolish. One reason may be that
people simply choose to interpret an individual’s behavior through the lens of a stereo
type or ignore those behaviors that conflict with existing stereotypes (von Hippel,
Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995; Sherman, Stroessner, Conrey, & Azam, 2005). Another
reason may be that people instead view an individual, who behaves in a counter-stereo
typic manner or who does not conform to the stereotype (e.g., a wealthy Latino, an as
sertive woman), as an exception to the rule. In other words, people view that individual as
atypical (a subtype). Hence, people can still maintain general stereotypes even in the face
of counter-stereotypic information (Kunda & Oleson, 1995). Subtyping is more likely
when those atypical individuals also share some other attribute that makes it easier to
view them as atypical. If, for instance, all of the assertive women a person encounters al
so dress or behave in a manner that violates gender stereotypes, then it makes it easier to
view these women as unrepresentative of women as a whole. In sum, subtyping is often
an active attempt to maintain stereotypes so that people can justify the social hierarchy
and their own prejudices and superiority to individuals from other groups (Allport, 1954).
Reducing Stereotypes and Prejudice
Contact Hypothesis
This perspective is based on the notion that stereotypes and prejudice occur because
there is insufficient contact between groups to break down misconceptions (Allport, 1954,
Amir, 1969). Essentially, it is an attempt to eliminate the “fear of the unknown.” This per
spective also came about at approximately the same time as the civil rights movement in
America. Hence, it reinforced the notion that eliminating the separate but equal policy
would also tear down racial barriers. Although an attractive idea, contact in its simplest
form, did not reduce racial bias. If anything, it reinforced it due to contact often being
forced, overly formal, unsanctioned, etcetera. Nevertheless, contact is effective for reduc
Page 15 of 25

ing stereotypes and prejudice when certain optimal conditions and personality factors are
met (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).
Optimal Contact Conditions

When contact is accessible and varied, then contact may promote empathy, breed under
standing, and reduce prejudice toward outgroups, especially when the contact is made in
many different settings. If contact occurs between individuals of equal status, regardless
of whether they are high or low status within their respective groups, then contact can
reduce prejudice. It also depends on whether the status is situation dependent. It is not
about relative status, but whether in that situation the individuals are of equal status
(think soldiers in an army platoon). More intimate contact is shown to be better at reduc
ing prejudice than formal contact. Intimate contact is defined as contact where individu
als have more opportunities for self-disclosure, to have a chance to get to know each oth
er. This intimacy creates bonds and promotes reciprocity in sharing—and by doing so
prejudice is diminished. When the contact is supported or endorsed by a respected insti
tution, contact is more effective. Similar to institutional support endorsement from a le
gitimate authority (such as a platoon leader or coach) will also be effective. Working to
gether builds mutual trust and respect, provided that the cooperation leads to successful
outcomes and it is clear that both ingroup and outgroup members contributed to the suc
cess (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961).
Personality Factors
The effectiveness of these optimal contact conditions may also depend on one’s personali
ty. For instance, contact may be ineffectual for insecure individuals because they will lose
a scapegoat: a victim to blame when things go wrong. Thus, for these insecure individu
als, contact will not reduce stereotypes or prejudice no matter how cooperative, intimate,
and equal the contact is. This aspect of the contact hypothesis jibes with the conception
of an authoritarian personality: it, too, allows for a form of rigid categorical thinking as
one of the underlying forces behind the use and maintenance of stereotypes.
Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM)

This perspective finds its roots in social identity theory. In essence, the CIIM (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989) proposes that when members
of an outgroup (“them”) are re-categorized as ingroup members (“we”) intergroup ten
sions may be reduced. To illustrate, imagine a psychology department composed of two
research groups: the applied and experimental groups. Tension among these groups, such
as disputes over space or amount of committee work, may be reduced when they see
themselves as part of a singular ingroup (psychology faculty). When this occurs, those in
dividuals who were formally part of the outgroup will be afforded the same favorable
treatment as those individuals who were originally part of the ingroup. It is important to
note that the CIIM does not require groups to forsake their original identity in order for
the CIIM to “work.” Instead, as long as the individuals can embrace both their original
identity (e.g., applied group) and their new identity (i.e., psychology faculty) then ten
sions are reduced, and intergroup relations become more harmonious.
Page 16 of 25

Personal Experience with Prejudice

This is an experiential approach to prejudice reduction, in which individuals directly expe
rience prejudice for a short period. The point is that on experiencing the same unpleasant
treatment that members of negatively stereotyped groups undergo every day, individuals
should develop more empathy and understanding for the negative treatment of stereo
typed groups.
The most well-known example of this approach is depicted in the 1970s film The Eye of
the Storm. This film details Jane Elliot’s exercise in which young students were treated
differently based on their eye color. The brown-eyed children ruled the classroom one day,
and on the next day the blue-eyed children had their turn. Years later these same stu
dents were interviewed about their experiences, and all noted how the exercise profound
ly and positively shaped their lives and their perceptions of members of negatively stereo
typed groups.
This simple exercise remains a powerful reminder of how quickly we can devalue and
turn on each other when provided with a clear social hierarchy where we find ourselves
on top (e.g., Jost, 2001). It is these types of empathy-creating experiences that may ulti
mately lessen the stereotypes and ensuing prejudice that currently exist. Because of the
profound impact of Jane Elliot’s brown-eye/blue-eye exercise, similar exercises have been
incorporated into diversity training for public officials such as police officers and prison
guards.
Multicultural Ideology
Rather than ignoring differences and promoting what is often called a color-blind ideolo
gy (also known as egalitarianism), a multicultural ideology recognizes and embraces the
differences between groups (Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). The multicultural
ideology is best represented by the notion that America is a salad bowl in which all racial
differences are mixed together in a complementary way. The basic logic underlying the
notion of multiculturalism is that it promotes the respect of others and embraces differ
ences between groups (value diversity) as a way to enhance between-group harmony.
Individuation
Because stereotypes are inherently group-based, it has been suggested that stereotype
activation can be reduced when seeing a person as an individual and not simply as a
generic member of a certain social group (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Sherman et al., 2005).
Similar to the idea of promoting a multicultural ideology, the idea of individuation seeks
to view individuals as unique members of their social group with their own set of attribut
es, likes and dislikes, and interests. The act of individuation consequently makes it diffi
cult to apply the associated group-relevant stereotypes to any particular individual. For
instance, if one gets to know Cooper and learns that he is a good listener, enjoys taking
walks on the beach, cooking for friends, and watching romantic comedies, then it may be
hard to apply the typical male gender stereotypes (e.g., macho, aggressive, insensitive) to
him.
Page 17 of 25

Stereotype Retraining
If stereotypes can be learned, then they can also be unlearned. Hence, if a respondent is
motivated to inhibit stereotype activation then, what was once difficult to control can be
come automated through practice. This is the logic underlying the methods used to re
train participants not to stereotype. For instance, extensively training respondents to
“just say no” when seeing stereotypic traits paired with the associated group (e.g., violent
or hateful with skinhead) over time reduced their automatic stereotype activation of that
group (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000). Other approaches involve
motivating low prejudice respondents to reduce their group-based biases when they be
come aware of inadvertently acting in a biased manner. With practice and conscious
recognition of their egalitarian values they may learn to spot and ultimately reject their
biased way of responding (Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). Note that this procedure
has only proved effective among those respondents who are already low in prejudice or
who hold egalitarian values in the first place.
Conclusion
This chapter presents an overview of theories, research, and methods dedicated to the
study of stereotypes and prejudice. For over 100 years, research on stereotypes and prej
udice has sat center stage in mainstream social psychological research and not without
good reason. The implications of stereotype and prejudice are far reaching, detrimental,
and long lasting, both to the targets as well as the perpetrators of stereotype and preju
dice. It is no surprise then that considerable research attention has been paid to studying
the antecedents and consequences of stereotypes and prejudice as well as the ways in
which stereotypic responding can be lessened. This research area is also not without con
troversies and debates in the literature ranging from issues around replication (or lack
thereof) of stereotype priming effects to whether implicit measures are truly able to cap
ture personal beliefs absent any influence of cultural knowledge. Research on stereotypes
and prejudice is a lively and productive area that is sure to remain that way for years to
come.
Further Reading
Ashmore, R. D., & Del Boca, F. K. (1981). Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and
stereotyping. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup
behavior (pp. 1–35). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Clark, K. B., & Clark, M. P. (1947). Racial identification and preference in Negro children.
In T. M. Newcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology (pp. 169–178).
New York, NY: Henry Holt.
Dovidio, J., Evans, N., & Tyler, R. (1986). Racial stereotypes: The contents of their cogni
tive representations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 22–37.
Hewstone, M., & Brown, R. (1986). Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters. Oxford,
UK: Blackwell.
Page 18 of 25

Inzlicht, M., & Schmader, T. (2012). Stereotype threat: Theory, process, and application.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 65–
85.
Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S. (1979). Role of category accessibility in the interpretation of in
formation about persons—some determinants and implications. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 37, 1660–1672.
Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American, 223, 96–

102.
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David Marx
San Diego State University, Department of Psychology
Sei Jin Ko
San Diego State University, Department of Psychology
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Stereotypes and prejudice

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Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology

Summary and Keywords

A Brief Overview of Stereotypes and Prejudice

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The Origin of Stereotypes and Prejudice

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A Research History on Stereotypes and Preju­

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New Perspectives and Trends in Research on

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Real-World Implications of Within-Category Stereotyping

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Intersecting Social Identities

A research focus related to within-category stereotyping is the work on intersecting so­

Common Methods for Studying Stereotypes

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The Rise of Implicit or Indirect Measures

In contemporary social psychology the use of implicit or indirect measures of stereotypes

The Bona Fide Pipeline (BFP)

Lexical-Decision Tasks (LDT)

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Implicit Association Test (IAT)

First-Person Shooter Task

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Implicit Measures and Their Relation to Behavior

Studying the Neural Basis of Stereotypes and Prejudice

Startle Eye Blink

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Event-Related Potentials (ERPs)

Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)

The Effects of Stereotypes and Prejudice On

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Stereotype Priming and its Effect on the Self and Behavior

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Maintaining and Reducing Stereotypes and

Maintaining Stereotypes and Prejudice

Reducing Stereotypes and Prejudice

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Optimal Contact Conditions

Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM)

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Personal Experience with Prejudice

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Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientific American, 223, 96–

Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Amodio, D. M. (2014). The neuroscience of prejudice and stereotyping. Nature Reviews

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Bodenhausen, G. V., & Macrae, C. N. (1998). Stereotype activation and inhibition. In J. R.

Brewer, M. B. (1986). The role of ethnocentrism in intergroup conflict. In S. Worchel & W.

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James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York, NY: Holt.

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content. In G. Moskowitz (Ed.), Cognitive social psychology: The Princeton symposium on

Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking categorically

Macrae, C. N., Milne, A. B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (1994). Stereotypes as energy-saving

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A Research History on Stereotypes and Preju

A research focus related to within-category stereotyping is the work on intersecting so