On Aspasia in Plato's Menexenus

Author(s): Jan Maximilian Robitzsch

Source: Phoenix , Vol. 71, No. 3/4 (Fall-Winter/automne-hiver 2017), pp. 288-300
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7834/phoenix.71.3-4.0288

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 ON ASPASIA IN PLATO’S MENEXENUS

Jan Maximilian Robitzsch

W hen it comes to the presentation of Aspasia in Plato’s Menexenus,

one could take one of the following three views.1 First, in what might be
termed the traditional reading, one could see Aspasia as a laughing stock and
as someone devoid of any serious merit.2 Such a reading is consistent with the
interpretation of the dialogue as a parody. Second, in what might be termed the
feminist reading, one could see Aspasia as a person of considerable intellectual
prowess, but also as the target of misogynistic attacks and so as the victim of
her femininity, which cause her achievements to be elided from the history of
rhetoric and philosophy. Such a reading corresponds to the serious reading of the
Menexenus.3 Finally, one could take a middle position in which the presentation
of Aspasia is neither fully serious nor completely ironic but “playful.” This
reading is consistent with a reading of the dialogue as a whole as playful, that
is, neither wholly serious nor completely ironic.4
What is striking about all these three readings of the presentation of Aspasia
in the Menexenus is how little their respective proponents examine the few
passages of the text in which Aspasia is actually mentioned. Instead, scholars
tend to turn immediately to the evidence on Aspasia in other sources such as
Plutarch or Aeschines. They then conclude the matter one way or another on
the basis of this evidence. I think that such an approach to understanding the
presentation of Aspasia in Plato’s Menexenus is flawed. Certainly, texts do not
exist in a vacuum; I too will also extensively draw on other texts to make sense
of the Menexenus. However, rather than starting with intertexts such as the
writings of Plutarch or Aeschines, it is prudent and methodologically sound to
take the passages in the Menexenus as the starting point for an investigation into
an understanding of Aspasia in the Menexenus. This is what I will do in this
paper.5

The author wishes to thank Andreas Avgousti and Étienne Helmer for their comments on earlier
versions of this paper. Thanks are due also to the editor and two anonymous referees of Phoenix
for their suggestions on how to improve the overall argument.
1
An excellent overview of the different ways the Menexenus has been read is found in Clavaud
1980: 17–77.
2
See, for instance, Pohlenz 1913: 261–262; Henry 1995: 33–36; and Trudeau 1999: 85–86.
3
See, for instance, Bloedow 1975: 44–47; Pallas 1989: 30; Glenn 1995: 37–39; Hasan 2012;
and Pappas and Zelcer 2015: 31–37. For feminist readings on Plato, see below, 292, n. 18.
4
For such a reading of the dialogue as a whole, see, for instance, Salkever 1993; Collins and
Stauffer 1999; Long 2003; and Trivigno 2008. Étienne Helmer explictly defends such a view of
Aspasia in his forthcoming French edition and commentary on the dialogue.
5
In doing so, I will largely set aside the content of the funeral oration itself. The reason for
this is that the conclusions obtained from looking at the interplay between the oration and its frame
are speculative at best.

288
PHOENIX, VOL. 71 (2017) 3–4.

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 ASPASIA IN PLATO’S MENEXENUS 289

By taking this approach I aim to demonstrate that Aspasia receives a complex

and nuanced evaluation in the Menexenus. In fact, despite assertions by vari-
ous readers that she is definitely presented in one way or another, I will argue
that the text is ambiguous and can plausibly be read in different ways. The
ambiguity is first and foremost, in my view, due to the fact that the Menexenus
is a dialogue, a genre in which characters make claims about other characters.
These claims then can be taken in different ways, depending on one’s prefer-
ences on how the pronouncements of the characters should be evaluated, that
is, whether the views of one, another, or all characters are considered decisive
in ascribing a meaning to the text as a whole and whether certain pronounce-
ments are considered to be ironic.6 I will further argue that there is a lack of
guidance in the text about how the remarks about Aspasia should be under-
stood. While some comments, for instance, could be considered misogynistic,
a more charitable reading does not require them to be understood in such a
way. As a result, it is unclear whether the joke of the Menexenus (if there is
one) is on Aspasia or on the reader who is tricked into laughing at something
he or she should not laugh at, exposing his or her views on women. In short,
I will be arguing for a version of the third view of how Aspasia is presented,
namely, that the presentation of Aspasia is neither wholly serious nor wholly
ironic.
The Menexenus consists of a funeral oration (236d–249c) that is embedded
in a frame dialogue (234a–236d, 249d–e). Aspasia is mentioned only in the
frame; she does not appear as a character herself, but is merely the object
of discussion between the two interlocutors of the dialogue: Menexenus and
Socrates.7 Aspasia is first mentioned at the beginning, at 235e–236c, where
Socrates claims that she was his teacher in rhetoric and more specifically that
she originally taught him the funeral oration that Socrates will recite in the main
part of the dialogue. Second, she is mentioned at the very end of the text in
the concluding conversation between Socrates and Menexenus at 249d–e. Here
Aspasia is again mentioned as the author of the funeral oration that Socrates
recites. In what follows I will focus on seven claims made about Aspasia by
Socrates or Menexenus in these passages. I will show that each of these claims
can plausibly be read both as dismissive and as not dismissive of Aspasia, which
6
The literary character of Platonic texts, which I will emphasize throughout this paper, is also
stressed, for instance, in Kahn 1996 and Blondell 2002. For an overview of different ways of reading
Platonic dialogues, see Nails 1995, as well as the essays in Griswold 1988 and Klagge and Smith
1992. The question of who speaks for Plato is discussed in detail in Press 2000; most authors
in this collection argue against the so-called mouth-piece theory, that is, the view that Socrates’
claims can be directly ascribed to Plato. I am also skeptical of the mouth-piece theory, but aware
of the fact that its rejection creates further interpretive problems in regard to how the comments by
different characters should be weighted. Some of these issues will become clear in my evaluation of
Menexenus’ comments below (295–298).
7
Accordingly, the Menexenus is like the Symposium, in which Socrates becomes the ventriloquist
for Diotima’s speech on eros, but in which Diotima herself does not make an appearance indepen-
dently of Socrates. In fact, there is no Platonic dialogue in which a woman is a speaker.

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290 PHOENIX

will allow me to conclude that the text is ambiguous in its presentation of

her.

the opening conversation (235e–236c)

At 235e, Socrates boasts that he should be selected by the council as the
speaker of the funeral oration. He reasons that he would be a very capable
speaker because he had an experienced teacher:
And, Menexenus, it would not be anything wonderful for me, who has had no mean
teacher of oratory, to be capable of speaking. She indeed brought forth many other
and good orators, but also one different from the [other] Greeks, Pericles, the son of
Xanthippus (235e).8
When first introducing Aspasia in this passage, Socrates does not directly
reveal her name. This adds some suspense to the description. Yet the lines just
quoted make it clear that Socrates’ teacher is female and, furthermore, that his
teacher educated Pericles in rhetoric. To the ears of an Athenian audience, this
latter comment may have implied that Socrates’ teacher was especially successful.
After all, she brought forth one of Athens’ greatest public speakers and states-
men. The clues taken together may have predisposed an ancient audience to
think directly of Aspasia of Miletus.9 Aspasia was a public figure, and we know
from other sources that she was a teacher of rhetoric and possessed intellectual
prowess.10 Whatever the audience may have thought, Menexenus quickly voices
his hunch that Aspasia is the woman referred to in this description and, in
response, Socrates offers confirmation (235e).
In assessing the presentation of Aspasia at 235e, we have to evaluate two
claims: (1) that Aspasia was Pericles’ teacher and (2) that she taught Socrates.
These claims are often taken to be means to ridicule or to dismiss Aspasia,11 but
I do not think that this conclusion is necessary. Let me discuss them in order.

(1) Aspasia was Pericles’ teacher

For historical reasons, there is something odd about the claim that Aspasia
was Pericles’ teacher. Aspasia was probably twenty to twenty-five years younger
than Pericles, and by the time she came to Athens in around 450 b.c.e., Pericles
8
Ka“ \mo“ mŽn ge, ã MenŽjene, o[dn yaumast˜n o¨~ t' eånai e€pe”n, > tugx‡nei did‡skalow
o{sa o[ p‡nu faœlh per“ ]htorik÷w, úll' ³per ka“ Ällouw pollow ka“ úgayow pepo’hke
]}toraw, £na d ka“ diafŽronta t™n ^Ell}nvn, PeriklŽa t˜n Jany’ppou. All translations are my
own.
9
On the historical Aspasia, see Henry 1995 and Jouanna 2005 (with references to older
literature).
10
Accordingly, Plutarch reports that it is a matter of historical fact (tosoāt—n g' ´stor’aw Ánestin)
that Aspasia was a teacher of rhetoric and that some people claim that Aspasia was wise (sof}n) and
skilled in politics (politik}n), although Plutarch modifies this comment by adding the suspicion
that Pericles’ interest in Aspasia was erotic rather than intellectual; Plut. Per. 24.3–5.
11
See, for instance, Pohlenz 1913: 261–262; Henry 1995: 33–36; and Trudeau 1999: 85–86.

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 ASPASIA IN PLATO’S MENEXENUS 291

was already an established figure in Athenian politics. It seems rather unlikely

that at this stage of his career Pericles would have needed someone to teach
him rhetoric, if by this we mean the basic rhetorical skills that would be taught
by the Sophists or later as part of the medieval trivium. A successful politician
like Pericles will already have mastered such skills. Nevertheless, it seems prima
facie possible that Pericles may have needed advisors and that Aspasia was part
of Pericles’ inner intellectual circle.12 Yet even if Aspasia were Pericles’ teacher
in the sense of an advisor, it is difficult to gauge the exact level of influence
Aspasia had on Pericles’ speeches and thinking.13 The Menexenus is our only
source for the claim that Aspasia “taught” Pericles. This evidence is not strong
enough on its own to establish such a claim firmly. In fact, while Plutarch
recognizes Aspasia’s intellectual capabilities, he also claims that Pericles’ interest
in Aspasia is mainly sexual.14 As a result, it is unclear whether the observation
that Aspasia was Pericles’ teacher is really true, even if we take teacher to mean
advisor. In the absence of further, independent evidence, it would be wishful
thinking to accord a large intellectual role to Aspasia on the basis of this text
alone. Yet, it would also be a mistake to suppose that just because Aspasia was
a woman, she could not have had an influence on Pericles and on his circle.
Accordingly, maybe Plutarch’s comments need to be mistrusted. While women
were often the target of misogyny and in many ways unequal to men in daily
life in antiquity, it is unclear whether this is also true of Aspasia, who could
have been a truly exceptional woman.
These historical speculations aside, the claim that Aspasia was Socrates’
teacher can be read in two equally plausible ways. First, Socrates could be
taken to be making a grotesque statement about Aspasia and Pericles because
one may think that Pericles’ reputation is blemished by the connection to Aspa-
sia. The precedent for such a reading is the treatment of Aspasia in comedy.15
The Menexenus could thus be said to play on sexist stereotypes: Aspasia and
her teachings emasculate Pericles. Such a reading would amount to a criticism
of Pericles at Aspasia’s expense. Alternatively, however, the claim that Aspasia
was Pericles’ teacher could be read as a dismissal of rhetoric more generally.
According to this second reading, the text is itself agnostic about Aspasia as a
person.16 The absurdity of the situation stems from Aspasia qua teacher, not
from Aspasia qua woman. Aspasia was undoubtedly known for a certain sort of

12
See Glenn 1995: 38–39 and Bloedow 1975: 47–48.
13
See also Wider 1986: 44.
14
This claim needs to be qualified insofar as “sexual” necessarily includes the familial in this case:
Pericles recognized the son Aspasia bore him as his own, although there was no need to do this
under Athenian law. Regardless, it is not entirely clear what the exact nature of Pericles’ interest in
Aspasia was.
15
See, for instance, Henry 1995: 19–28. The ancient sources on Aspasia are collected in Dueso
1994.
16
See, for instance, Blair 1996: 337.

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292 PHOENIX

rhetorical skill, which is perhaps most prominently associated with Gorgias.17

The joke, then, is not on Aspasia, but on the reader for whom the text has set
a trap to expose his (or her) misogynistic prejudices. Further support for such
a reading comes from the idea that while Plato was not a proto-feminist in his
writings, his stance on women is more nuanced and complicated than that of
someone who is directly and openly misogynistic.18 This may incline a reader
towards a charitable reading of the Menexenus. After all, it is not clear which of
these two views of the claim that Aspasia taught Pericles the reader is to adopt,
or how Aspasia is really being presented here.

(2) Aspasia was Socrates’ teacher

According to the second claim identified above, Aspasia taught Socrates.
This claim may hint at a historical possibility insofar as Aspasia and Socrates
may have actually met in Athens.19 Xenophon and Cicero offer excerpts from
what is believed to be Antisthenes’ lost dialogue Aspasia, in which Aspasia and
Socrates are both characters.20 Even if these dialogues do not describe authentic
meetings, the evidence suggests that a meeting between Aspasia and Socrates at
least has some plausibility if we do not assume that Socrates meeting Aspasia was
a common literary trope. However, just as in the case of Aspasia being Pericles’
teacher, it is unclear what it means that Aspasia “taught” Socrates. Did Aspasia
literally “teach” Socrates certain ideas? Even if the two met and Aspasia “taught”
Socrates on some occasions, it is certainly historically impossible that Aspasia
“taught” Socrates the funeral oration of the Menexenus. Aspasia could not have
dictated Socrates the content of the speech, as Socrates himself suggests in the
Menexenus. After all, the oration recounts events until the Peace of Antalcidas
in 387 b.c.e., by which time Socrates had already been dead for twelve years and
Aspasia herself may also have been deceased. What sense do we then make of
the claim that Aspasia “taught” Socrates? As in the case of Pericles, the claim
may have been a way to discredit Socrates by associating him with Aspasia.

17
Plato discusses rhetoric in many of his writings: in the Menexenus, most certainly, but also in
the Gorgias.
18
For recent general discussions of Plato’s feminism (with references to older literature), see
Tuana 1994; Buchan 1999; Swearington 1999; Kochin 2002; and Blair 2012. Blair offers some
helpful comments in classifying certain texts in Plato’s oeuvre as feminist. In particular, she argues
that the depiction of Aspasia does not tell us much about Plato’s view on women. This is a case
of what Blair calls dramatical and rhetorical views of women in the Platonic corpus rather than
genuinely philosophical ones.
19
On the historical likelihood that Aspasia and Socrates could have met, see Pappas and Zelcer
2015: 24–25.
20
See Xen. Oec. 3.14–16 and Cic. Inv. Rhet. 1.51–52. On Aeschines’ dialogue and the attempt
to reconstruct its content, see especially Dittmar 1912: 1-59; Ehlers 1966; and Kahn 1994: 94–106;
cf. Kahn 1996: 23–29. Antisthenes is also said to have written a dialogue entitled Aspasia, but we
have so few traces of it that it is difficult to say much about its content. Cf. Susemihl 1900 and
Henry 1995: 30–32.

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 ASPASIA IN PLATO’S MENEXENUS 293

But again the same comment could also be read as a dismissal of the type of
rhetoric that Aspasia “taught” rather than a judgment on Aspasia’s character.
Which of these interpretations a reader is to adopt is unclear. Indeed, I have
already mentioned the complex relationship with women that other Platonic
texts exhibit in the previous section (292).

(3) Antiphon and Lamprus were worse teachers than Aspasia and Connus
After claiming that Aspasia was both his and Pericles’ teacher, Socrates re-
marks on the reputation of his teachers Aspasia and Connus:
I indeed mean [Aspasia], and Connus, the son of Metrobius, because these two were my
teachers, he in mousikē, she in rhetoric. It is not surprising then that a man raised in
this way is skilled in [public] speaking, but even he who was educated in a worse way
than I was, educated in mousikē by Lamprus and in rhetoric by Antiphon of Rhamnus,
would nevertheless be able to gain repute when praising Athenians among Athenians
(235e–236a).21

In this passage, Socrates claims that besides the rhetorical training he received
from Aspasia, he also received training in mousikē (that is, the arts more broadly
understood) by Connus. Furthermore, Socrates draws a comparison between the
training he received by Aspasia and Connus and a supposedly worse (k‡kion)
education he would have received if he had studied with Antiphon and Lamprus.
It is easy to read this passage as ironic and so as a stab against Antiphon and
Lamprus, two of the foremost representatives of their respective arts at the time
of Socrates, of whom Plato may have thought little.22 Surely, the comment
is absurd insofar as Socrates treats Aspasia and Connus—contrary to fact or
at least contrary to the perceived opinion of the ancient audience—as better
teachers than Antiphon and Lamprus. This means, however, that Antiphon
and Lamprus are the ones being dismissed by the comment, not Aspasia and
Connus. Take a parallel case: the claim “even if someone had studied at Yale and
Harvard and so at worse institutions than the community colleges in Wichita
and Boise, this person would nevertheless be able to write a five-paragraph
essay.” This claim is functionally equivalent to the claim “even if someone had
studied with Antiphon and Lamprus, that is, with worse teachers than Aspasia

21
LŽgv g‡r, ka“ K—nnon ge t˜n Mhtrob’ou: oûtoi g‡r moi dœo e€s“n did‡skaloi, ` mn
mousik÷w, = d ]htorik÷w. o¹tv mn o{n tref—menon Ändra o[dn yaumast˜n dein˜n \”nai lŽgein:
úllˆ ka“ Ðstiw \moā k‡kion \paideœyh, mousik|n mn ¿p˜ L‡mprou paideuye’w, ]htorik|n d ¿p'
&Antif™ntow toā &Ramnous’ou, Ðmvw k©n oûtow o<—w t' eæh &Ayhna’ouw ge \n &Ayhna’oiw \pain™n
e[dokime”n.
22
On Connus, Lamprus, and Antiphon, see Tsitsiridis 1998: 165–171 and, briefly, Helmer
forthcoming. While we have some sources and writings by Antiphon, we are rather poorly informed
about the lives and works of Connus and Aspasia. Huby (1957: 109–110, n. 4) briefly discusses an
ancient testimonium, according to which Antiphon was Thucydides’ teacher. If this testimonium
is true, then mentioning Antiphon at this point in the speech could be said to serve the further
function of discrediting Thucydides’ funeral oration. See also Pappas and Zelcer 2015: 39–40.

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294 PHOENIX

and Connus, this person would nevertheless be able to praise Athenians among
Athenians.” Just as the parallel claim does not mean that the community colleges
in Wichita and Boise are bad institutions, but rather that Harvard and Yale are
overrated as colleges, the original claim does not mean that Aspasia and Connus
are bad teachers per se, but rather that Antiphon and Lamprus are overrated as
teachers. To draw the inference that Aspasia is in fact a bad teacher, the text
would need to make a more direct claim. However, it does not do so. And since
a more straightforward argument that Aspasia and Connus are bad teachers can
be easily thought of as well, a careful reading of this passage does not force
us to conclude that Aspasia was a bad teacher and so is dismissed as a person.
Certainly, it does not follow that Aspasia is in any way praised in the passage,
but the important point is that she is also not directly ridiculed, either. The
text is ambiguous when it comes to the presentation of Aspasia.

(4) Aspasia was the author of both the funeral oration of the Menexenus and of Pericles’
funeral oration
After establishing the credentials of Aspasia as a teacher, the discussion moves
to consider Aspasia as the author of the specific funeral oration that Socrates is
about to recite. Asked what he would say, were he elected to deliver the funeral
oration, Socrates explains:
I, by myself, would perhaps say nothing, but yesterday I heard Aspasia recite a funeral
oration about the same people. I indeed heard what you told me—that the Athenians
are about to choose a speaker. Then Aspasia improvised one part of the speech for me
on the spot, what it would be necessary to say [on this occasion]. She had prepared the
other part of the speech in advance, when, I think, she put together the funeral oration
that Pericles held, gluing together some leftovers from that speech (236a–b).23

The passage specifies that Aspasia was not only Socrates’ and Pericles’ teacher
in general, but that she taught both Pericles and Socrates their respective fu-
neral orations. On the one hand, she supposedly used the standard tropes char-
acteristic of an epitaphios logos (o<a dŽoi lŽgein, “what it would be necessary to
say”) and, on the other, the leftovers (perile’mmata) that did not make it into
Pericles’ oration. This is a strange claim: to suppose a common origin of both
Pericles’ and Socrates’ speech in Aspasia’s teaching is hardly credible. The claim
certainly lacks any historical coherence. Furthermore, the idea that an orator
can merely glue together (sugkoll‡v) a speech without any noticeable loss to
the final product makes this passage even stranger.24 However, the question to

23
A[t˜w mn paß \mautoā æsvw o[dŽn, &Aspas’aw d ka“ xyw ÒkroQmhn perainoœshw \pit‡fion
l—gon per“ a[t™n toœtvn. ¾kouse gˆr §per s lŽgeiw, Ðti mŽlloien &Ayhna”oi a´re”syai t˜n
\roānta: Ápeita tˆ mn \k toā paraxr÷m‡ moi di}=ei, o<a dŽoi lŽgein, tˆ d pr—teron \skemmŽnh,
Ðte moi doke” sunet’yei t˜n \pit‡fion l—gon −n Perikl÷w eåpen, perile’mmat' Ätta \j \ke’nou
sugkoll™sa.
24
On sugkoll‡v, see especially the comments in Labriola 2010.

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 ASPASIA IN PLATO’S MENEXENUS 295

be examined in this paper is whether such statements also amount to a dismissal

of Aspasia as a person, and, again, I think such a conclusion is not necessary.
The claim that a skilled orator can glue together a speech at a moment’s notice
is consistent with Plato’s dismissive comments on rhetoric elsewhere. A histori-
cally inaccurate claim need not be employed as a means to criticize Aspasia, but
could also be employed as a means to criticize the type of rhetoric for which
Aspasia stands. If this is so, then Aspasia may still be a decent representative of
the type “orator.” However, because Socrates dismisses oratory as a whole, he
also dismisses the oratory that is associated with Aspasia. Certainly, depending
on what presumptions about women one brings to the text, the lines quoted
above may also be a criticism of Aspasia as particularly bad because she is a
woman, but again, I think that the text is more nuanced, which creates space
for a reading of the text not rooted in misogyny.
The conclusion of my analysis up to this point is that the four claims that I
examined (that Aspasia was Pericles’ teacher, that Aspasia was Socrates’ teacher,
that Antiphon and Lamprus were worse teachers than Aspasia and Connus,
and that Aspasia was the author of the funeral oration of the Menexenus and
of Pericles’ funeral oration) can plausibly be read in different ways in regard to
what they have to say about Aspasia. Importantly, though, the Menexenus is a
dialogue, and Socrates advances all the four claims I examined in detail. Next, I
will therefore turn to what the other main character of the dialogue, Menexenus,
has to say, showing that his three comments on Aspasia are consistent with
what I argued, namely, that the presentation of Aspasia in the Menexenus is
ambiguous.

(5) Aspasia or whosoever else composed the speech

At 236c, Menexenus asks Socrates, who is acting coy, to recite the speech
Socrates had just attributed to Aspasia:
Speak, and make me a great pleasure, whether you would like to recite Aspasia’s oration
or whosoever else’s, but only speak.25

On a first reading, Menexenus openly questions that Aspasia is the author

of the speech in these lines—against Socrates’ explicit assertion that she is—
and adds the possibility that the speech could be by “whosoever else” (`touoān).
Interestingly, this comment is gendered in Greek because `touoān is a masculine
genitive pronoun. Put differently, one could think that Menexenus is not merely
imagining that some other woman composed the speech (i.e., Çstinow), but that
some man did. On this reading, the passage discredits Aspasia as a woman and
so dismisses her on misogynistic grounds.26

25
e€pŽ, ka“ p‡nu moi xari_, eæte &Aspas’aw boœlei lŽgein eæte `touoān: úllˆ m—non e€pŽ.
26
In fact, Menexenus makes the same comment at the end of the dialogue, claiming that “I am
indeed, Socrates, very thankful to her [Aspasia] for this speech or to whomever told it to you” (Ka“

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296 PHOENIX

However, again, an alternative reading is readily available. The context of

these lines is that Menexenus has become impatient to hear Socrates’ speech. As
a result, one could read these lines as an expression of Menexenus’ impatience
rather than as a gendered comment. “Whosoever” (`touoān), on this reading,
just means “whosoever,” regardless of whether this person is male or female. The
emphasis of Menexenus’ remark is on his desire that Socrates should recount
his speech, not on the gender of the speaker.27 In short, then, none of the five
claims in the conversation at the beginning of the Menexenus that I analyzed
can be used to say anything definitive about the evaluation of Aspasia. Instead,
the passages examined suggest that Aspasia appears as a kind of blank screen
on which a reader or listener can project his or her attitude towards women.
At worst, this will call forth well-known stereotypes about women. At best,
however, it will invite critical reflection on gender roles and the treatment of
women in a truly Socratic spirit. Let us next turn to the concluding conversation
between Menexenus and Socrates and see how this section of the text confirms
such a reading of the presentation of Aspasia.

the concluding conversation (249d–e)

The concluding conversation is much shorter than the introduction of the
dialogue. Naturally, then, the passages relevant for an understanding of how
Aspasia is presented are also much shorter. In this part of the Menexenus, we
find two additional claims by Menexenus that might be taken as an indication
of how he values Aspasia. Just as the claims of the previous section, I discuss
them in order.

(1) Aspasia qua woman is capable of composing a speech like the one in the Menexenus
After rehearsing the funeral oration, Socrates again ascribes the speech to
Aspasia in the concluding conversation and Menexenus shows his surprise:
Socrates: Here you have the speech of Aspasia of Miletus, Menexenus.
Menexenus: By Zeus, Socrates, you can call Aspasia blessed, if she is able of composing
such speeches, although she is a woman (249d).28

On a first reading of this passage, Menexenus seems to dismiss Aspasia

as a woman: he is surprised that Aspasia is able to compose an epitaphios

poll}n ge, ã SQkratew, \gW x‡rin Áxv toœtou toā l—gou \ke’n+ É \ke’n~ Ðstiw soi ` e€pQn \stin
a[t—n, 249d–e). By analogy, the comments on 236c also apply to 249d–e: again, Menexenus is
impatient and just wants to move on after Socrates has held his funeral oration for him. In regard to
249d–e, Labarbe (1991: 98–100) suggests to athetise “or to whomever told it to you (É \ke’n~ Ðstiw
soi ` e€pQn \stin a[t—n).” This suggestion is convincingly refuted by Tsitsiridis (1998: 414–415)
and Helmer (2006).
27
Tsitsiridis 1998: 175.
28
Svkr‡thw: Oût—w soi ` l—gow, ã MenŽjene, &Aspas’aw t÷w Milhs’aw \st’n. MenŽjenow: N|
D’a, ã SQkratew, makar’an ge lŽgeiw t|n &Aspas’an, e€ gun| o{sa toioœtouw l—gouw o¨a t' \st“
suntiyŽnai.

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 ASPASIA IN PLATO’S MENEXENUS 297

logos such as the one that Socrates just presented. Yet even if one reads the
passage in this way, it does not follow that the dialogue as a whole dismisses
women, but rather that a single character of the dialogue does.29 However, on
an alternative reading, one might also say that Menexenus is genuinely surprised
about Aspasia’s ability at this point, given what he believes women to be capable
of. On this reading, Menexenus has just learned something about women and
we could even understand that Aspasia is being mildly praised here. It is thus
unclear how Menexenus’ comment on Aspasia in this passage is to be evaluated.

(2) “I know what Aspasia is like”

Menexenus’ last comment is also characterized by the same kind of ambiguity
as the other passages that were discussed up to this point. Immediately after
the passage just analyzed, Socrates tells Menexenus that if Menexenus does not
believe him in regard to Aspasia’s capabilities, he should accompany him to meet
Aspasia. In response to this, Menexenus declines the invitation: “I myself have
met Aspasia many times, Socrates, and I know what she is like” (Poll‡kiw, ã
SQkratew, \gW \ntetœxhka &Aspas’Ù, ka“ oåda o¨a \st’n, 249d).30
On a first reading, this comment may be taken to be dismissive of Aspasia.
Menexenus rejects the possibility of meeting Aspasia in person to find out for
himself whether she is capable of composing such an epitaphios logos. He is
firmly set on the idea that Aspasia could never have composed a speech such
as the one that Socrates just recited to him. In Menexenus’ view, Aspasia’s
reputation is enough to establish that she could not possibly have composed
the speech that Socrates credits her with. Furthermore, there is also a salacious
dimension to Menexenus’ comment. While the main meaning of \ntugx‡nv is
“to meet with,” it can also mean “to have sexual intercourse with.” Accordingly,
what Aspasia “is like” may also refer to her physical attributes.
Again, even if Menexenus’ comment were dismissive, the same problem that
I already raised above would apply: can a misogynistic comment made by one
character impute misogyny to the other interlocutor as well, and what (if any-
thing) does it imply for the Menexenus as a whole?31 Moreover, an alternative
29
It is indeed a difficult matter of interpretation whether any character in a Platonic text is or
can be Plato’s mouth-piece, but, arguably, Socrates seems to be a more natural candidate for such an
honor (at least on a non-esoteric reading) than Menexenus. For discussion, see, for instance, Press
2000. Even if one does not ascribe to the mouth-piece theory of reading Platonic dialogues, it is
still difficult to discern whether Menexenus’ view is representative of the dialogue as a whole and so
of the view of Aspasia that the reader should take home. Again, this depends on what interpretative
assumptions one brings to the text. For different ways of understanding Platonic dialogues, see
above, 289, n. 6.
30
On this sentence and the first reading, see especially Henry 1995: 35–36. As should be evident
from the following, I disagree with her account insofar as she claims that Menexenus “knows what
she’s like, but what she’s like is not specified—it does not need to be” (35). Kerch (2008: 106) rightly
recognizes that the Menexenus’ comment is “ambiguous,” but he does not explore the ambiguity
any further.
31
While I do not think this reading is right, especially in light of Plutarch’s comments on the
opening of the Menexenus (Per. 24.7), Gutscher, for instance, does not detect any irony at the end

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298 PHOENIX

reading is also available. Just as at 236c, where I argued that Menexenus is

impatient, the comment at 249d can plausibly be understood as Menexenus’ at-
tempt to get away from Socrates: he wants to end the conversation quickly after
Socrates’ has delivered on his promise to recite the speech. If so, the comment
is first and foremost an instance of Menexenus’ impatience, not an instance of
misogyny. On this reading, then, Aspasia is not being dismissed in this passage
of the Menexenus.

conclusion
I have suggested in this paper that it is difficult to pin down precisely how
Aspasia is presented in the Menexenus. The passages in the text that mention
her are ambiguous: they do not allow us to determine with certainty whether
Aspasia is depicted as a model representative of a certain rhetorical genre (of
which Plato happens to disapprove) or whether she is an object of ridicule as a
woman. In the end, then, it is up to the reader either to opt for a misogynistic
reading of the text or to resist it. Rather than understanding this ambiguity as a
deficit, however, I think that it makes the Menexenus a more sophisticated piece
of philosophical writing. After all, the literary nature of the Menexenus as a
dialogue at this point can be understood as a source of superadded philosophical
meaning. The comments on Aspasia could be interpreted as an invitation to
philosophize about the role of women, precisely because this role is not spelled
out in the text.
In showing how the presentation of Aspasia is ambiguous, I have also offered
some evidence in support of the view that the dichotomy between a serious and
ironic reading of the text might be too simple an interpretation, at least insofar
as the presentation of Aspasia can be used to support either of these readings.
By contrast, I am very sympathetic to the middle position, the one that claims
that the Menexenus is to be read in a playful manner, that is, as neither wholly
serious nor ironic. This seems to me to be a more appropriate reading of the
text. Of course, this paper can only be the first step for a fuller exploration of
such a reading. Finally, in discussing the passages of the Menexenus that deal
with Aspasia, I have sought to cast light on why the Menexenus is such a difficult
text and, perhaps, also something of a hidden gem in the Platonic corpus.
Sungkyunkwan University
25-2 Sungkyunkwan-ro
Jongno-gu, Seoul 03060
Korea robitzsch@skku.edu

of the dialogue. Accordingly, he (1864: 10) summarizes the ending as follows: “Menexenos preist
und bewundert Aspasia, weil sie solche Reden zu verfertigen im Stande sei, und dankt Sokrates,
dass er ihm die Rede mitgetheilt habe, worauf ihm dieser noch viele schöne politische Reden von
ihr unter der Bedingung, dass er ihn nicht verrathe, mitzutheilen verspricht, was Menexenos auch
gelobt.”

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 ASPASIA IN PLATO’S MENEXENUS 299

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