Article

India and the International Studies

47(2–4) 373–386
European Union: © 2010 JNU
SAGE Publications
From Engagement to Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Strategic Partnership Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/002088171104700419
http://isq.sagepub.com

Ummu Salma Bava

Abstract
Relations between India and the European Union (EU) have evolved over a long
period. Beginning in the early 1960s, with diplomatic relations being established
between India and the European Economic Community (EEC), it has expanded
and subsequently been transformed because both India and the EU (since 1992)
have assumed a growing significance in post-Cold War international politics.
However, this partnership has not been able to achieve its potential partly be-
cause of the low political visibility of the EU and strong bilateral relations between
India and major European powers. The India–EU relationship in the context of
the strategic partnership launched in 2004 has witnessed a dramatic expansion
of engagement from the economic to the political and security realms, although
the strategic partnership does not mean absence of differences and difficulties.
There is, however, a perception that India’s closeness to the US has impacted the
development of partnerships with both the EU and major individual countries.

Keywords
India–European Union relations, European security strategy, strategic partnership,
multi-lateralism, normative values

Introduction
India and the European Economic Community1 (EEC) established political rela-
tions in 1963 and this constituted another set of relations to the existing bilateral
relationships that India had with individual countries of the EEC, in particular the

Ummu Salma Bava is Professor, Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi, and Associate Fellow, Asia Society, New York.
E-mail: usbava@gmail.com
The author wishes to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.

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374 Ummu Salma Bava

West European countries. India was also one of the first developing countries to
engage with this new entity that represented an organized attempt at regional inte-
gration. The major elements of India–EEC relations from the outset focused on
trade and commerce. Apart from this, India also received the highest amount of
development aid among all Asian and Latin American countries from the European
Community (EC).
Incremental steps that, over the years, have elevated the relationship from
commercial and trade relations to political cooperation marked India’s relations
with the EC. In 1971, the EEC introduced the general tariff preferences for ninety-
one developing countries, including India, under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) scheme. This was followed by India and the EEC signing the
Commercial Cooperation Agreement in 1973. In 1981, India and the EEC signed
a five-year Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement. Further visibility
was gained by the EEC in 1983 when the EC Delegation was established at
New Delhi.
The EU for a long time was India’s largest economic partner. In 1984, Indian
imports from the EC represented 23 per cent of its total imports, as compared to
10 per cent from the US, 7 per cent from Japan and 6 per cent from the former
Soviet Union. Indian exports also were marked by the same trend with 20 per cent
being accounted for by the EC, 24 per cent by the US, 10 per cent by Japan and
12 per cent by the former Soviet Union (European Commission 1986: 7). Although
the 1980s witnessed enhanced trade and commercial relations, it was the end of
the Cold War that provided the impetus to moving India–EC relations forward.
Relations with the EC were in tandem with India’s relations with some of the
key countries of Western Europe—United Kingdom, France and West Germany.
With the UK in particular, India has had a multi-faceted bilateral relationship that
evolved into a new political engagement after Indian independence in 1947.
France and West Germany, also called the ‘motors of European Integration’,
engaged India differently and the political outcome was consequently more dis-
tinctive. Indo-French relations were far more formal and lacked much political
warmth until the end of the Cold War (Gupta 2009). Despite being the third largest
weapons supplier to India in this period, the political equation was restrained by
the ambivalent French attitude towards Pakistan. West Germany, on the other
hand, has a more intense relationship with India.
Indo-German relations were even more influenced by the Cold War. While India
adopted non-alignment and West Germany got integrated into the NATO; their
ideological differences limited the relationship to the areas of trade, development
assistance and education. A noted West German scholar described the German
political engagement with India as a policy of ‘benign neglect’ (Rothermund
1995: 474). In other words, the political aspect of the relationship could not de-
velop beyond these issues until 1990, when German unification took place lead-
ing to the end of the Cold War.

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India and the European Union 375

Changing Global Geopolitics and Its Impact on India

and Europe
With the end of the Cold War, patterns of order and familiarity of structures have
given way to uncertainty, challenges and opportunities for all states. The shifting
international political and economic landscape and globalization have contributed
to a restructuring of relations between states.
In the case of India, it is no longer contained in South Asia by the Cold War
rubric (Mohan 2003). The economic crisis of the early 1990s that led to India’s
economic liberalization has also paid political dividends. The Indian nuclear tests
in 1998 and a steadily performing economy have changed not only India’s percep-
tion of itself but the world’s perception of India (Bava 2007: 2). At a speech on
‘India’s Strategic Perspective’ at Harvard University, Boston, on 25 September
2006, Pranab Mukherjee, then Defence Minister, said, ‘India’s strategic perspec-
tives have been shaped by its long civilizational history, its geography, its culture
and geopolitical realities.’ There is no denying that, since the nuclear tests, there
has been a new assertiveness in Indian foreign policy. Thus, not only is there a
new power hierarchy emerging globally but it has also transformed India’s politi-
cal, economic and security requirements. The shift in economic policy can be seen
as a watershed moment in India’s development trajectory; it also set a new course
to its political growth as an emerging power (Bava 2010: 231).
European integration, on the other hand, is a process that involves more than
just economics. The process of political and economic integration is about organ-
izing Europe in ways that the great conflicts of the past do not recur in the future.
What has emerged over a period of time, and especially over the last twenty-five
years, is an internal transformation of the EC. A process of incrementalism driven
by a political will to cooperate has led to the major achievements—the Single
European Act of 1986, the Treaty for European Union 1992, the Treaties of
Amsterdam 1994 and Nice 2000 and the Lisbon Treaty 2008. In part, the transfor-
mation of the EC in the 1990s was also a response to the shift in geopolitics after
the end of the Cold War. The rapid unification of Germany also raised issues not
only on the new boundaries of Western Europe, but more significantly, on the
enhanced power of Germany and the need for the EC to adapt to the new political
reality.
The 1992 Treaty transformed the EC into more of an economic and political
entity called the European Union (EU). It not only strengthened its institutions but
also acquired a greater ‘actorness’ in the process. As the EU itself is an ongoing
process of development, its actorness is also constantly evolving. Democracy, rule
of law, market economy and multilateralism are the values that it espouses. The
EC’s transformation into the EU shows the dynamic internal process of respond-
ing to internal and external political developments. Because the EU is constantly
evolving, it is often argued that ‘the EU is a challenge to how we conceptualize
democracy, authority and legitimacy in contemporary politics’ (Laffan 1999: 330).

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376 Ummu Salma Bava

These broad political and economic developments at the global level provided
both India and the EU with new opportunities for engagement. The first official
New Asia Strategy of the EU was adopted in 1994 and subsequently revised in
2001. As the document states, it was a first attempt to take an integrated and bal-
anced view of the relations between the EU and its Asian partners. The changing
economic balance of power was the major reason for the EU to focus its attention
on Asia as a region and accord it high priority, although it had bilateral relations
with many countries of Asia. The 1994 Asia Strategy was aimed primarily at
Southeast Asia and it resulted in the launch of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
in 1996. The economic rise of East Asia brought it far greater political visibility
as well. ‘The increasing strategic value of East Asia provided a timely and wel-
come additional impetus to intensified EU approach towards East Asia’ (Park and
Heungchong 2008: 73).
As India had just launched its economic liberalization at this time, there was a
time lag before the EU extended recognition to India as a critical partner. What is
significant is that the EU’s focus on Southeast Asia coincided with India’s launch
of its own Look East policy in 1991. An economically vibrant and emerging
Southeast Asia attracted both the EU’s and India’s attention. In addition, there
were many factors driving both to engage the region, but what distinctly stood out
was the rapid economic growth of Southeast Asia, the rise of the Asian tigers and
growing influence of China, which was transforming the region. It was not until a
decade later, that India came to be regarded by the EU as having the potential to
be engaged as a different actor.

India and the EU: The Post-Cold War Relationship

In examining the India–EU strategic partnership, one needs to pay attention to
two important elements—the shift in global politics and the transformation of
both India and the EU that culminated in the new relationship. Undoubtedly, ‘the
cornerstone of the EU-India relationship lies in trade and investment’. This state-
ment by Pascal Lamy, the European Union Trade Commissioner, in 2003 under-
scored the nature of the relationship. The 1990s still registered high trade with the
EU, accounting for 24 to 26 per cent of India’s total trade (see Table 1).
The per capita income in India doubled during the period 1990–2005 as a result
of the economic growth. Consequently, India’s trade with other countries (other
than the EU) also grew significantly and this diversification impacted India–EU
trade even as their political engagement was being transformed in the new millen-
nium. During the same period, India’s trade with the US and China registered a
faster growth trend than with any other region.
However, with the push given by the upgradation of political relations in 2004,
India–EU trade doubled from €28.6 billion in 2003 to over €55 billion in 2007.
The EU investment in India has tripled since 2003, from €759 million to €2.4 bil-
lion in 2006 and trade in commercial services has also increased from €5.2 billion

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Table 1. Percentage Share of India’s Trade with EU-27 during 1996–2000

Year Percentage of Total Indian Trade

1996–97 26.48
1997–98 27.21
1998–99 26.57
1999–2000 24.04
2000–01 22.47
2001–02 21.84
2002–03 21.65
2003–04 20.84
2004–05 19.25
2005–06 19.51
2006–07 18.14
2007–08 17.59
Source: Sachdeva (2008: 348).

in 2002 to €12.2 billion in 2006 (European Commission 2011). In the recent years,
the global financial crisis led to decline in trade, which has recovered since
2010.
The step-by-step upgrading of the India–EU political and economic relation-
ship to the summit level in June 2000 in Lisbon could be viewed as a signal by the
EU of its intentions to enhance its political and economic relations with India. But
the enhancing of this summit-level relationship to a strategic partnership in 2004
was driven largely by other factors that influenced the EU to define its own strate-
gic concept. One can read the EU’s intentions about the region in its Asia strategy.
The EU had set for itself the task to ‘follow a forward-looking policy of engage-
ment with Asia, both in the region and globally’ (European Commission 2001).
The strategy identified six objectives: contributing to peace and security, promot-
ing mutual trade and investment flows, protecting human rights, building global
partnerships and enhancing the awareness of Europe in Asia and vice versa.
In 2001, the EC set out a strategy for cooperation with Asia entitled ‘Europe
and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership’. A first review of the
Commission’s strategic framework for action in Asia took place in May 2007.
Subsequently, the Commission set up a Regional Programming for Asia Strategy
Document 2007–2013 and identified three priority areas: support for regional
integration, policy and know-how based cooperation in environment, energy and
climate change and support for uprooted people.
Although the 2001 document laid the blueprint for a more enhanced engage-
ment with Asia, other factors contributed to this policy shift within the EU. A
major trigger for the shift in the EU’s engagement with different countries was the
September 2001 attacks on the US. There is no denying that 9/11 proved to be
another dividing line in international politics and in particular for the transatlantic
relationship. Although the US-initiated war on terror (named Operation Enduring
Freedom) in Afghanistan found support in Europe, its subsequent invasion of
Iraq in 2003 left the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) totally in

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disarray. The EU could not speak in one voice and lacked a cohesive approach to
the problem. The special relationship of the United Kingdom with the US was
soon evident with the UK ardently supporting the pre-emptive war America
planned against Iraq. However, Germany and France were strongly opposed to it
and did not support such an action. Interestingly, some of the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe, which had recently joined NATO, such as Poland, partici-
pated in the war. This drew the comment from the then US Secretary of Defence,
Donald Rumsfeld that France and Germany was ‘old Europe’. This eagerness of
Poland to engage was more starkly offset by the French and German refusal to
support such an action that resulted in the NATO ambassadors turning down the
American request for advance military planning. The EU’s response at best could
be described as incoherent—while France and Germany sought legitimacy within
a UN mandate, Italy and Spain favoured a US strike, and Britain stood resolutely
in support of the US. The much-proclaimed CFSP launched a decade earlier in
1992 remained shattered.
It was this that led to soul-searching within the EU on its CFSP and the EU’s
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana,
presented a strategy paper in June 2003 that served as the basis for a new European
Security Strategy (ESS) to be adopted by the European Council in December that
year. Titled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, the ESS was indeed a remark-
able document put out by the EU as roadmap for collective action that identified
five security threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, re-
gional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. It also emphasized that the EU
would have to think globally but act locally. Although emphasizing the building
of security in its neighbourhood, the EU, for the first time, also enunciated the
need for an international order that was based on ‘effective multilateralism’.
In order to realize these security objectives, the EU proposed an approach that
envisaged developing key partnerships, working, in particular, with the US that
continues to anchor transatlantic relations with Russia, Japan, China, Canada and
India (Council of the European Union 2003). It is this that propelled the EU to
engage India in a strategic partnership since 2004.

Building a Strategic Partnership

In retrospect, one can say that the launch of the India–EU Strategic Partnership in
2004 was the recognition by the EU of India as a regional power that was gradu-
ally exerting a growing influence on many international issues. Internationally,
recognizing India’s importance has led to a new rationale for engagement and
building up the partnership with it. Emerging or rising India’s potential has
endorsed it as a likely partner in providing stability and order not merely in South
Asia but to Asia as a whole. Four years after the launch of the annual summits
between India and the EU, at The Hague Summit in 2004, it was decided to

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upgrade the India–EU relationship to a strategic partnership. In the following

year, at New Delhi, both sides adopted a detailed Joint Action Plan (JAP). The
Joint Action Plan committed itself to the following issues (Council of the European
Union 2005):

z Strengthening dialogue and consultation mechanisms;

z Deepening political dialogue and cooperation;
z Bringing together people and cultures;
z Enhancing economic policy dialogue and cooperation;
z Developing trade and investment.

In 2006, at the Helsinki Summit, both sides endorsed a proposal to negotiate a free
trade agreement (FTA), negotiations for which are still under way. India’s grow-
ing economic performance has enabled it to take a tough stand on trade-related
matters.
The JAP was reviewed at the 2008 summit held in Marseille, France, which
focused on promoting four areas: peace and comprehensive security, sustainable
development, research and technology, and people-to-people and cultural ex-
changes. The JAP is an ambitious agenda and emphasizes a strong political, eco-
nomic and civil society engagement. It ‘offers a roadmap for future bilateral
relations’ (Wagner 2008: 103).
In terms of the objectives laid out in the JAP, political cooperation with respect
to security and defence between India and the EU has grown extensively in the
aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in 2008. There has been a steady increase in the
dialogue on terrorism at all levels. The 2005 India–EU Joint Action Plan had
identified counter-terrorism as an area of cooperation. This was reiterated in the
2009 EU–India Summit Declaration. However, there is a need to revitalize and
restructure the cooperation which has so far been bilateral rather than multilateral.
This point was also reiterated by the EU–India Forum on Effective Multilateralism
in October 2009 in New Delhi. It said in its recommendations that ‘there is a need
to establish an India-EU Joint Working Group on counter terrorism to develop a
common understanding of issues related to terrorism and response mechanisms’
(ICWA 2009).
On the economic front, since 2007, India and the EU have been negotiating a
FTA, which covers trade in goods and services, investments, intellectual property
rights and government procurement. Supporters on both sides speak of the over-
whelming positive impact it will have on trade between India and the EU.
The delay in concluding the FTA points to problems in some key areas. One
area is the liberalization of trade and investment in banking services. The EU is
seeking a larger market access for its banks; in particular, this is being pursued
aggressively by the UK and Germany. Undoubtedly, the profitability of the Indian
economy attracts foreign banks to India. Most foreign banks in India are reporting
high profits. As on March 2010, there were nine EU-based banks operating in
India and they are keen to concentrate on niche marketing in the metros rather

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than on social and developmental banking in rural areas. India will need to tread
with caution in the light of the last financial crisis that also enveloped European
banks. In the absence of adequate regulations, the EU’s desire for an unrestricted
investment environment in India could cause major repercussions for the econ-
omy (Singh 2011).
Another key area of discord between India and the EU pertains to intellectual
property rights in the field of medicine. The EU would like to include data exclu-
sivity, which would impact the production of generic drugs in India. In fact, the
EU is supported by leading pharmaceutical companies in Europe, which would
like this provision to be incorporated in the FTA. Such generic drugs are exported
to Africa and other poor regions to combat endemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria. Given that generic drugs are cheaper than patented
drugs, these have played an important role in fight against these diseases. Interest-
ingly, there is protest within the EU civil society itself against this issue. The
CEO, a watchdog group on the European industries’ influence on the EU’s invest-
ment and trade relations with the developing world, accused the EC ‘of discrimi-
nating in favour of corporate lobby groups and of violating the EU’s transparency
rules’ (Godoy 2011).
Emphasis on common interests and common values notwithstanding, the need
to identify deliverable cooperation has become more important. In comparison
with the EU, India’s relations with the US witnessed a major political shift: the US
has recognized the valid claims of India’s national interest and has acted to en-
hance and strengthen India’s military, economic and technological capabilities,
while endorsing ‘common values’ (Bava 2008: 108). India–US relations have
been a game changer—bringing deliverables to the table that no other country has
been able to. It has had the impact of single-handedly transforming not only bilat-
eral ties but has had significant multilateral consequences as well. The civil
nuclear agreement between the two countries has enabled global civil nuclear
commerce and trade.
Although some of India’s interests converge with those of the EU, the differ-
ence in global aspirations would be a hindrance to a strategic convergence between
the two sides. While India is the only non-Western democracy in South Asia and
ideationally the closest to the Western democratic normative structure, its demo-
cratic practice did not get the recognition of the West for a long time.
While India and the EU have shared values based on democracy and human
rights, there had been a tendency in the past for the EU to lecture India on its
human rights practice. In stark contrast, the EU has actively engaged China
although it is not a democracy. This reiterates the fact that despite the emphasis on
normative values, the EU is driven by realistic considerations of trade (Bava 2008:
109). Although the EU is an undisputed global economic actor, it does not yet
have commensurate political or military strength. Its inability to articulate a com-
mon foreign policy position, once again evidenced by the deep divisions over the
engagement in the wake of the unrest in Libya and the strong bilateral positions

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articulated by individual member states, has also diminished its credibility as a

critical security player.
The undercutting of India–EU relations is partially due to the remarkable de-
velopment in India’s bilateral relationships with many European countries. The
distinct feature of the strategic partnership has been the growing significance of
India not only as an economic but also a political partner for the EU. EU’s self-
representation at the global level is replete with references to a foreign policy
guided by values and principles. Ascribing higher normative values to EU action
abroad and purely national interest to India assumes that the EU has no national/
collective interest, which is clearly not the case if one were to read the 2003 ESS
that highlights the challenges confronted by the EU and the proposed action. The
ambiguity with which the EU appears to treat the two Asian emerging powers,
China and India, only emphasizes the need for a serious strategic dialogue with
India that goes beyond the enumeration of normative principles to concrete action
that acknowledges India’s real and nascent potential as a major global actor.
Europe, as the ‘norm entrepreneur’, is a satiated power, whereas India is trying to
become a norm setter, seeking to change the status quo in matters of global gov-
ernance (Bava 2008: 112). The fact that the US and the EU engage a rising Asia
in different ways, underscores who shapes what aspect of global politics (Bava
2008: 113).
The emphasis on multilateralism has facilitated a shift in foreign policy discus-
sions from substantive policy framework to a focus on ‘co-ordination’, ‘coher-
ence’, ‘comprehensiveness’ and ‘joined-up policymaking’ (Chandler 2007). This
interplay of factors has meant that the capacity of the different actors in the global
framework has also been transformed. Both India and the EU have emerged as
significant actors since the end of the Cold War. While the EU has evolved beyond
being an economic super power, India is being engaged not only for what it stands
for but for the inherent potential that it holds for future alignments. Undoubtedly,
there has been an upgradation of the relationship but there is an information and
perception deficit on both sides.

India’s Bilateral Strategic Partnerships

The effort to build a strategic partnership with the EU has not meant an end to
bilateralism in India’s engagement with Europe. New Delhi has engaged major
players—London, Paris and Berlin—as it found them receptive. The rotating
presidency of the EU, which was in force till 2009, meant that smaller countries
also could lead the EU, but this had a rather negative impact on India–EU rela-
tions as they were seen as keen to lecture India on issues of human rights and
nuclear proliferation.
What cannot be overlooked is that India has over twenty strategic partner-
ships. What is the basis for this upturn in relations? Economics dominates all

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382 Ummu Salma Bava

these relationships. But what is significant is the transformation of this economic

relationship—from a situation in which India was perceived as an aid recipient
developing country to a development marked by European firms’ interest in
investing in India (given its new growth profile) and Indian firms acquiring assets
in the West. As a new growth hub, there has been a repositioning of the Indian
image in the West. This move by the EU to upgrade its relations with India was
also reflected in the bilateral relations that India had with the UK, France and
Germany.
The UK upgraded its relations with India to the level of a strategic partnership
in 2004. Building on the existing institutional structure, it sought to engage India
further. In February 2010, India and the UK signed a civil nuclear cooperation
agreement. Although the large Indian diaspora is important to local politics in the
UK, it does not have the kind of transformative power and influence as is the case
in the US, where the diaspora has remained at the forefront of changing the per-
ception of India. The visit of Prime Minister, David Cameron to India in July 2010
saw the relationship elevated to ‘Enhanced Partnership for the Future’ with a
focus on enhancing trade and investments.
The bilateral relationship with France underwent a transformation after India
conducted its nuclear tests in 1998. It was one of the few nations that did not criti-
cize India’s nuclear tests; nor did it impose any economic sanctions. Although
France has supported India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC, according to
some Europe watchers, there has been lack of boldness in Indo-French relations.
India and France signed a ‘Framework Agreement for Civil Nuclear Cooperation’
in January 2008 during French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to India, and the
visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in September 2008 led to the establish-
ment of Indo-French trade in nuclear technology.
Germany is India’s most important trade partner within the EU and the empha-
sis is on skills, goods and technology. It ranks eighth in terms of foreign direct
investment and over 1,000 companies with differing market shares are present in
India in different capacities. It is no surprise that German companies have a high
brand visibility and are valued for their quality products. Total Indian investment
in Germany after unification has amounted to €4.125 billion. Liberalization and a
decade of growth have led to new trends in the economic sector, with Indian
investments heading to Europe. There are numerous success stories of Indian
firms successfully competing and acquiring European companies, ranging from
the Mittals’ acquisition of Arcelor to the Tata group buying Land Rover.
The foreign ministers of India and Germany in May 2000 adopted the ‘Agenda
for German-Indian Partnership in the 21st Century’. This ten-point agreement
effectively launched a ‘strategic partnership’ and has become the basis for renewed
and enhanced relations between India and Germany. Going beyond economics
and trade, it enhanced political relations by institutionalizing meetings at the for-
eign ministers’ level and reiterated the intention of both countries to work on
security issues and disarmament. Even more significant is the fact that they agreed
to address the issue of reform of the United Nations.

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India and the European Union 383

Defence cooperation has emerged as a means of upgrading and boosting mili-

tary and strategic ties between the countries. India’s military modernization,
which involves the purchase of weapons, aircraft and other systems, is one of the
largest military purchases globally, and it plans to spend an estimated $80 billion
on military modernization programmes by 2015. What is also significant in this
new political–security engagement is that these relationships are moving beyond
the buyer–seller model to one that emphasizes trust and long-term investment as
the new agreements focus on technology transfer leading to joint development
and co-production in India.
Figure 1 shows the dominant role of the former USSR and Russia as arms sup-
pliers to India not only during the Cold War period but later too. It has enabled
Russia to still exercise a reasonable level of leverage even though its own global
influence has waned. A major push factor in expanding the defence suppliers
group has been the difficulties in getting Russian supplies and spares. If the Cold
War provided a restricted arms market to India, today there has been an expansion
of defence procurement from other suppliers—noticeably Israel and the US. As
India modernizes its defence forces, the large price tag associated with it has
brought in many countries vying to get a part of the deal. The recent visit of the
German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, in May 2011 focused on whether the EADS
(a European consortium including Germany, France, the UK and Spain) would
bag the enviable contract for the US$10 billion Medium Range-Multi Role
Combat Aircraft (M-MRCA).
The issue of who are India’s partners in the current global configuration tells
a story of changing power equations. Increasing political complexities at the

Figure 1. Major Suppliers of Arms to India, 1985–2008

Source: Gallenkamp (2009: 7). This figure is based on the Trend Indicator Values (TIV), provided by
the SIPRI database on arms transfers. Available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/
at_db.html

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384 Ummu Salma Bava

global level require more interaction and engagement. There is growing interest
in Britain, France and Germany to enhance their relations with India and benefit
from its economic growth. Transforming the relationship indicates the recognition
of India as a significant actor in global politics. Making India a strategic partner is
something one finds in common across the three countries.
There is, however, a perception among European analysts that India’s close-
ness to the US has impacted the development of such partnerships with the UK,
France, Germany and the EU. In part, this feeling is strengthened by the fact that
none of these countries can individually or together facilitate a shift in the rules of
the global order the way America can—the civil nuclear deal is a notable example
in this context.

Conclusion
Given the difference in the capability of states at the normative and material level,
there is inherent asymmetry in strategic partnerships, which often signify that
relationships are about power and interdependence (Grevi 2008: 145). The decla-
ration of strategic partnership does not indicate the absence of differences between
the concerned parties. This point is demonstrated amply in the case of India and
the EU as well. Recognition of India’s potential as a leading global actor by the
West has been late. ‘As India’s concerns about certain global challenges get shared
with other countries, it also draws India into a larger orbit of collective action’
(Bava 2010: 120).
The EU suffers at two levels. First, ‘it suffers from a deficit of recognition as a
political actor enjoying the full array of traditional attributes of power’ (de
Vasconcelos 2008: 17). Second, the lack of political consensus within the EU on
foreign policy issues prevents New Delhi from considering Brussels as an import-
ant political actor. Despite a considerable ideational convergence between India
and the EU, it does not automatically translate into cooperation. Things in the past
happened more by chance and less by intent. Undoubtedly, there has been a shift
in the focus of relations, by changing the political equation and taking it beyond
rhetoric. India’s foreign policy today is a pragmatic blend of security and eco-
nomic imperatives. ‘As the relative capabilities of India have grown, the assess-
ment of other countries about India has also slowly shifted’ (Bava 2010: 125).
In the global context, as Joseph Nye has indicated, there are two visible simul-
taneous trends viz. power in transition and the diffusion of power (Nye 2011). In
this context, strategic partnerships stand between interdependence and power pol-
itics (Grevi 2008: 145). The significant question is whether ideational proximity
can be converted into interest convergence. In effect, the challenge for the India–
EU strategic partnership is to balance norms and realism (Bava 2008: 113). As the
EU tries to shape a universal concept of multilateralism and effectively tries to
multi-lateralize the multi-polarity, it seeks to develop partnerships with leading
and emerging global actors so that it can play a defining role alongside.

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India and the European Union 385

Note
1. The European Economic Community is also called or referred to as the European Com-
munity (EC) and since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, it is called the
European Union (EU). These different nomenclatures appear in the article in pertinence
to the specific period or year under reference.

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