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Applied Legal Theory S2E8
Applied Legal Theory S2E8
Essay must be analysis of what you understand of the class material —> don’t go out of
bounds of what was taught
• Courts should not have policy in mind to decide cases —> SOP, No sneaky new rules
• Justice Keen in Speluncean case
• Their jurisdiction is limited merely to rules and principles
• Rules are highly rigid, do not invite discretion
• Principles are broader standards that invite discretion —> include considerations of
fairness, justice and morality
• Judges must weight both and decide which one is most congruent with the historical
values of the society
Hard Cases
• Where rules in questions are unclear as to their applicability; or
• No applicable rule
• Chess player example:
• Behaviour of a chess player who unnerves players by smiling
• Uncertainty as to whether any disqualification or sanction should be imposed
Rights As Trumps
• Prevent cost-benefit analyses to take away fundamental freedoms and rights
• Dworkin criticises postivists for their utilitarian calculus
• Rights as an anchor/buttress against encroachment by state authorities —> very
strongly based on a vision of liberalism
• Rights have a threshold weight that take precedence over social and communitarian
goals in general circumstances
• Courts should not be able to override rights on policy grounds —> courts should not be
concerning themselves with policy in the first place
• Should parliament be allowed to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms on policy
grounds
• Can, but have limits —> there are constitutional limitations placed on hate speech
hand such
• But they should not be allowed to take away rights based purely on utilitarian
grounds
• Emergency or catastrophic circumstances may entail exceptional measures
So far: balancing act of rights —> not actual trumps, but only emphasis on individual
rights to be remembered
Criticisms of Dworkin
• Does Dworkin offer too idealistic a picture of the judicial role?
• Hercules J is in reality a myth (haha) and a fraud —> no way you will find a judge that
lives up to the Herculean standard —> not the most realistic standard to which judges
should be held
• Legal problems require a common sensical approach
• Too idealistic to suggest pure application of principles
• Judges are human, inherent bias, imperfections
• Does Dworkin’s theory have universal application to all types of legal systems?
• Dworkin as an idealist/utopian
• Noble dreamer?
• Not as applicable in a non-liberal jurisdiction (societies in which the rule of law is less
prevalent)
• Is it true/realistic to describe judges as making decisions purely on principle and not
policy
• Could judges dress up policy as principle?
• e.g. neighbour principle? Creation or interpretation
• Is there even a clear distinction between principle and policy? Are these standards
malleable? Are they subject to the expression and articulation of judges (language
influencing thought)
• Do we see judges routinely and habitually making references to policy? (FUCK
YEAH)
• There may be more than one correct answer to a case (or difference in reasoning)
• Question of justification of reasoning
• Realists will make the argument that law is not like a chain novel, because some judges
like to create their own narrative (groundbreaking precedent)
• Finnis has criticised the “right answer” thesis by comparing it to “the most romantic
English novel” —> there is no real criteria
• Gaps and rules are not capable of precise, semantic measurement
American Realism
• Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935)
• Karl Llewellyn (1893-1962)
• Jerome Frank (1889-1957)
Holmes
• Life of the law: Not logic but experience
• Question of observation: Perhaps certain judges decide certain cases in certain ways?
—> may be able to predict with higher accuracy the actual outcome of the case that
cannot be gleaned from legislature
• Knowledge can be gained through practice
• Thus we may gain enough experience to predict the outcome of a case (inner
simulation)
• Anti-Dworkinian —> that there may be more than one correct answer, or more than
one way of reasoning to the correct answer
•