TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK

Author(s): EUGEN ZELEŇÁK

Source: History and Theory , MAY 2015, Vol. 54, No. 2 (MAY 2015), pp. 209-225
Published by: Wiley for Wesleyan University

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24543100

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Wiley and are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to History and
Theory

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 U76 12:34:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
History and Theory 54 (May 2015), 209-225 © Wesleyan University 2015 ISSN: 0018-2656
DOI: 10.11 ll/hith.10754

Forum: After Narrativism

TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST

VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK

EUGEN ZELENAK1

ABSTRACT

Narrativist philosophy of history popularized a constructivist view arguing that histo

cal works are not simple depictions of the past but rather are complicated constructions
According to narrativists, historians engage in a creative activity of proposing poin
of view, interpretations, or theses on the past that do not straightforwardly reflect pa
events. Although this is a broad constructivist view behind the theorizing of a number
authors, it is possible to distinguish within this line of thinking at least two general prop
als about how to understand historical works. The first, defended for instance by Frank
Ankersmit, maintains that historical works are representations of the past. Nevertheles
these representations are not descriptions of past events—they represent in a special wa
that could be characterized via a certain complexity, indirectness, holism, and a retrospe
tive approach. The second proposal, presented in the work of Paul Roth and Jouni-Matti
Kuukkanen, discards the epistemic framework of representation and understands historic
works as the outcome of specific practices. In this article, I focus on these two construc
tivist versions, which could be called representationalism and non-representationalism
analyze their crucial features, discuss their differences, and dispute the accusation that t
latter view formulates an extreme theory of history. I argue that non-representationalis
does not erase the notion of the past from its account of history; it merely attributes t
the past a function different from the one it has within the representationalist paradigm

Keywords', narrativism, constructivism, representationalism, non-representationalism

historical representation, paradigm change in history, the past

I. INTRODUCTION

For several decades narrativist philosophy of history has been one of the dom
nant views of history as a discipline. In the 1970s and 1980s, it came up with
several original, shocking, and revolutionary points concerning the nature of
historical texts, the role of historians, and the notions of truth and objectivity
history. Increasingly, this position became the subject of intense scrutiny and t
focal point of heated discussions in the philosophy of history. Although nowa
days various other research programs and topics are also vigorously debated in
the leading journals of the discipline, and many of the narrativist contentions a

1. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the first INTH conference in Ghent and
conferences in Ruzomberok and Prague. I benefited from comments received at these conferenc
but I would especially like to thank Paul Roth for helpful discussions, and Milos Taliga and Zolt
Boldizsâr Simon for their useful comments and help with the final preparation of the text. This doe
not mean, however, that they agree with my views. Funding was provided by the VEGA grant no.
1/0830/15.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 210 EUGEN ZELENAK

not so shocking anymore, the argumen

fairly influential.
Of course, narrativism is hardly a ho
by a rigid list of key tenets. It is, rathe
cellaneous claims and opinions of vario
ally viewed as leading narrativists (ma
or their supporters, but also authors lo
spite of certain heterogeneity, it is pos
1
rativist points. Narrativists, for exam
understood as pure factual reports draw
2
emphasize the creativity of historians a
3
that is, they underline that to understa
pay close attention to either their liter
4
they maintain that it is possible to hav
of the same past events.
From the perspective of this article, h
5
of narrativism is its articulation, inves
view of historical work. I take it that b
and by developing an alternative const
attention in the right direction with r
They made us aware of several salient f
examine them in closer detail. In this a
and examine two particular variants of
tory. The first version might be called
that the notion of historical representa
is the key to historical theory. The seco
tationalism, because it argues that in o
should abandon the framework of repr
terms.2 In what follows, I first briefly
of history; then I analyze both of the
clude by correcting a misunderstandin
may, at first sight, appear to be an extr

II. CREATING HISTORY: ON CONSTRUCTIVISM

What should we understand by a constructivist view of history? Briefly, i

a position claiming that historical works are not straightforward depiction

2. I borrow these labels from Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, who employs them in the context o
philosophy of history. See his "Representationalism and Non-representationalism in Histor
phy," Journal of the Philosophy of History 7, no. 3 (2013), 453-479. These labels usually fe
in philosophical discussions about language and knowledge. For instance, Huw Price charact
non-representationalism as a position that "plays down the theoretical significance of the ide
a function of (a large part of) language is to 'describe' or 'represent' reality," and, with referen
John Dewey and Richard Rorty, he notes that "non-representationalism is a major theme of twen
century pragmatism." See Huw Price, "Immodesty without Mirrors: Making Sense of Wittgenst
Linguistic Pluralism," in Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance, ed. Max Kölbel and Bernhard
(London: Routledge, 2004), 180,187.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK 211

the past but are, rather, complicated and sophisticated constructions. Yet before
providing a more informative account of what this means, it would be helpful
to introduce the alternative view against which constructivists usually formulate
their own theses.

According to a naive-realist view of historical work, the aim of history is to

provide a truthful and objective depiction of past events. In order to achieve
such a goal, historians allegedly should dismiss their subjective influences or
prejudices and concentrate on what the sources have to tell them about the events
they are trying to describe and explain. Ad fontes! Sources are going to lead to
disinterested reconstruction of the past, and the outcome of the diligent effort of
historians should be that historical works eventually tell us what happened. In this
view, historical works give us faithful accounts of past events such as the French
Revolution, the emancipation of the Slovaks in the nineteenth century, or World
War I, and terms such as "French Revolution," "Slovaks," or "World War I" are
supposed to refer to real, existing entities inhabiting past reality. According to the
picture theory of language adopted by this realist view, texts written by historians
should depict the preexisting order of things. They should neither distort it nor
add anything to it that did not exist in the past. Therefore, the assumption is that
the language of historical works is a transparent medium of description or depic
tion. The leading metaphor of this realist view is finding rather than inventing
or creating: there existed such things as the French Revolution, the Slovaks, or
World War I in the past, and the role of historians is to find and communicate the
facts about them. Historians are neither scholars creating these labels (or entities)
nor are they inventing the stories told about them.
These are some of the core assumptions lurking behind realist or more tradi
tional approaches to history. Of course, actual articulations of particular authors
may be less crude and more nuanced, yet similar pronouncements about the need
for disinterested representation, for following only the lead of the sources, for
getting the facts right, for using the language to faithfully depict past events,
can be found in the works of Geoffrey R. Elton, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Richard
Evans, and others.3
The constructivist position could be defined as a view opposing these realist
tenets. According to constructivists, there is no disinterested approach to past
events and no straightforward depiction of preexisting realities. Historians are
viewed as authors who contribute in a fundamental way to our understanding of
the past. They decisively influence both the content and the form of historical
works: they devise the tools used for talking about past reality, they propose the
notions and theories illuminating the processes they write about, and they shape
the final outcomes presented to readers. Therefore, the primary metaphors of
this view are those of construction, creation, invention, or imposition. Rather
than simply describing the past, historians construct original theses or create

3. See Geoffrey R. Elton, Return to Essentials: Some Reflections on the Present State of Histori
cal Study (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Gertrude Himmelfarb, "Telling It as
You Like It: Postmodernist History and the Flight from Fact," in The Postmodern History Reader, ed.
K. Jenkins (New York: Routledge, 1997), 158-174; Richard Evans, In Defence of History (London:
Granta Books, 1997).

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 212 EUGEN ZELEN AK

points of view in order to account for past

facts, historians invent specific notions an
sources. Rather than copying a preexisting
narrative or other organizational structure
of past human action. When historians w
Slovaks, or World War I, constructivists in
for dealing with the past, or as historian
minate chaotic information about past eve
is that in the past there existed a preform
historians simply name it. In general, thi
historical texts. Constructivists do not und
tive mirrors or approximate maps of the p
proposed by historians to account for wha
Various conceptions fit this general c
proponents of this view emphasize certain
historical works, but some authors tend t
sion—or, to be more precise, these authors
point that writing historical works and w
primera
distinción larities—whereas others prefer to analyze
cates in the first group study the kinds of
They examine the formal literary tools u
texts and literary fictions share certain co
Danto, White
to some extent, have similar goals. The
more general issues of the world-langua
examination of what the expressions that h
Ricoeur, Carr
and what their truth conditions are. There
as contributing to what is sometimes calle
as contributing to a linguistic turn; or, us
may be divided into authors pursuing a rh
a philosophical approach.4 But, of course,
guish between various types of constructiv
Here I make a distinction between what
rigorous version of the constructivist view
ism and non-representationalism. Both of

4. The latter distinction is made in Frank Ankersm

ion to the Philosophy of History and Historiograph
2009), 199-208. Examples of works falling into the
The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century
Press, 1973), and Alun Munslow, Narrative and Hi
examples fitting the second group are Ankersmit,
Philosophy of History 4, no. 3-4 (2010), 375-409, and
Historical Representation (Leuven: Leuven Universi
ally about the linguistic turn also with regard to Hay
Frank Ankersmit, and Jeff Malpas, underline a more
guistic turn in the philosophy of history. See Herma
Reinterpretation of Tropology in Hayden White," Jo
Archaeology 1, no. 2 (2004), 1-19; Frank Ankersmit a
History (and History to Language)?," Journal of the

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK 213

the above-mentioned naive-realist view of history. But although the proponents

este es el of representationalism consider most realist tenets to be implausible, they retain
quiebre the idea of representation, which is often the backbone of a realist approach,
as something still essential for understanding historical work. Nevertheless,
they also claim that it must be analyzed in a more innovative fashion. In other
words, the idea of representation—the idea that historical texts represent the
past—should not be rejected along with realism, but rather adopted and modified
within a constructivist framework. But non-representationalists reject the idea of
representation as a useless or even harmful remnant of the naive-picture view of
language and correspondence epistemology. Thus, they recommend abandoning
the whole idea of representation and propose to account for the nature of history
in other terms. It may seem, however, that such a position borders on an extreme
view claiming that since the function of history is not to represent the past, the
past has no role to play in history. One of the goals of this article, besides ana
lyzing both representationalism and non-representationalism, is to show that the
latter version of constructivism is not as radical as it may appear to be. It does
not reject the idea of the past; it simply assigns to it a role different from the one
that features in realist conceptions of history, or even in some other species of a
constructivist view.

III. "CLASSY" REPRESENTATION: ON REPRESENTATIONALISM

While introducing the crucial points of this view, it is useful to contrast them
the alternative claims of naïve realism. The proponents of representationa
emphasize that the key to understanding history is to analyze historical wor
historical representations. However, one has to bear in mind that historica
resentations should not be associated with mere copying, mirroring, or map
Therefore, proponents of representationalism reject a simplistic realist vie
representation and take the notion of historical representation to be an intr
one. In their view, it should be characterized by what I call complexity, ind
ness, holism, and a retrospective approach.5 First, I outline these defining fea
in general. Then, to provide a more concrete idea about these features and t
them to actual philosophers, I make use of particular examples from the wor
those who inspire or defend representationalism.
When criticizing a naïve view of history, advocates of representationalis
argue that there is a certain complexity in history. They believe that hist
representations should not be conceived of in terms of what might be call
two-level account. This simplistic view overlooks that there is not just a tex
past reality, but also an item connecting them, which plays a crucial role
tory. As several authors point out, historical representations put forward th
interpretations, or proposals on how to view past events; they express point

5. This is not a comprehensive list of the features of historical representation as it is conceiv

representationalism. Also, one should note that I do not argue for the view that these are the fe
characteristic only of historical representations. It is possible to investigate the nature of hist
focusing on features of historical representations, which may be common to other types of repr
tions, too.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 214 EUGEN 7,F.I .F.N AK

view or perspectives in approaching the past

constitute a third item (although one should n
stood as some kind of thing), which is some
history. Therefore, on this constructivist acco
is always a historical text, a part of the past r
the text: a two-level picture is replaced by a
of history. It is possible to characterize the th
prefer to be quite minimalist (deflationist) abo
for instance, in epistemic terms as some kind
ing events represented in a historical work. O
item and argue that it is basically a part of r

importante
that the relation between historical represent
ity) is taken to be more complex than the naï
The complexity of historical representation
rectness, or, actually, the latter appears to be
According to the two-level view, a historical
it provides a straightforward description of a
less, as soon as the complexity discussed abov
the account of history. The historical text n
between them is now more complicated an
level account, a certain gap between the text
item. Depending on the particular author, it is
view expressed by the given text, or a differ
between a historical text and the past. The fa
tions enables us to realize that historical wor
but there is an important indirectness charac
obvious the source of the debates among hist
ticular past events.
Moreover, there seems to be a link between
on the one hand and a holistic understanding
other. According to the naive view, it may ap
historical works depict particular past occurr
that there are always exclusive connections be
chunks of reality (established by evidence). F
War I began on July 28, 1914" depicts the act
war. So it may seem that this event alone ma
other events or chunks of reality determine
historical work. This atomistic approach cont
representationalism. According to the latter,
one founded on an evidential basis is mistake
misleading, bottom-up view of history (realit
top textual level) should be replaced by a top
pfff a los
account for past happenings), acknowledging
científicos
no les gusta esto es that constitute historical representations a
No single sentence is derived simply from sh
is no given evidence that translates itself into

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK 215

in a top-down manner, a particular sentence should always be perceived in the

light of the whole historical account of the given topic, which attempts to explain
accessible evidence. To understand the given sentence, it is also necessary to take
into consideration theoretical presuppositions and other sentences that constitute
the representation and the meanings attached to the terms historians use. Such a
seemingly uncomplicated sentence as "World War I began on July 28, 1914" is
necessarily located in a certain framework and makes sense only within a context
DANTO of a certain chronology and classification of conflicts (for instance, categoriza
tion into wars, battles, clashes, and so on). Moreover, it is linked to a view about
what it means to begin something, to having knowledge about other wars, and to
several other things. Sentences expressing knowledge are never encountered in
isolation; they are always to be taken as parts of larger wholes of various "empiri
cal" and "conceptual" hypotheses.6
Finally, historical representations could be characterized by their retrospec
tive approach. Historical understanding achieved in representations is always in
hindsight. When particular events are presented in historical works, historians are
already aware of many things that occurred not only before but also after those
events. They are familiar with some direct consequences of the events, with the
function they had in a larger context, and with how historical agents and other
historians perceived them. Therefore, whenever events are represented in histori
cal works, all these aspects may and usually do play an important role. It is pos
sible to say that past events are never depicted merely from the perspective of a
witness, but are always portrayed in terms of what happened later. This observa
tion, of course, is closely linked to the indirectness in historical representation. As
I noted above, historical works do not directly reflect the past. On the contrary,
they provide interpretations of the past, which are enriched with hindsight, with
historians' capacity to take into account what happened next.
Now let me turn to three particular authors whose views on history imply these
four features of historical representations. The first two inspire the crucial tenets
of a constructivist approach to history, and the third is a current leading proponent
of representationalism. For the purposes of my analysis, I focus specifically on
Arthur Danto's discussion of narrative sentences, Louis O. Mink's observations
about historical narrative, and Frank Ankersmit's examination of historical rep
resentation.

In chapter 8 of his Analytical Philosophy of History (later republished as part

of his Narration and Knowledge) Danto presents an ingenious thought experi
ment and introduces the concept of narrative sentences in order to deal with a
version of skepticism about historical knowledge. Danto imagines a hypothetical
witness, the Ideal Chronicler, who is able to observe everything at the moment
of its occurrence. Moreover, this perfect observer assembles the Ideal Chronicle
containing reports about everything that is happening from the perspective of
a witness. It may seem that the Ideal Chronicler and the Ideal Chronicle are
paradigmatic examples of an ideal historian and an ideal historical work. Danto
argues, however, that this is not the case. The problem with the Ideal Chronicle

6. This is not to be read as necessarily implying that there are pure "conceptual" or pure "empiri
cal" hypotheses.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 216 EUGEN ZELENAK

is that it cannot contain some types of se

works, such as causal claims or narrative
able to describe the events merely from t
of the past cannot include narrative sent
"Their most general characteristic is that
events though they only describe (are onl
refer."7 Danto's example of a narrative s
in 1618," which refers to the beginning a
beginning of the war.8 Clearly, a witness
this is also a relatively controversial even
tence, because at that time it was not kno
Narrative sentences make us realize that
terms of what happened later, or more g
the light of something else. Yet the cruc
historical significance to past events and
similar types of "transcending" descripti
This short examination of narrative sen
able features of historical representation
the most obvious is the retrospective app
the fact that when historians describe ce
they make use of their knowledge of the
significance of the events they write abo
doxically, "temporal distance is not a pr
condition that makes it possible,"9 and th
retrospective knowledge. In addition, the
of historical knowledge. Narrative senten
historians implicitly or explicitly make
tions. In a sense, they cannot even descr
of the ideal witness seems to be misguid
would be able to ignore all related know
suppositions, and simply report the data
Furthermore, the fact that in narrative
terms of later happenings implies that a
involved.10 There is no plain reporting; r
a certain point of view. There is never ju
is also a particular perspective, which is
grasp the event.
Unlike Danto, who concentrates on a pa
torical texts, Mink's subject of inquiry i
take the form of a narrative. Mink asks

7. ArthurC. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (Ne

8. Ibid., 152.
9. Mark Day, "Our Relations with the Past," Philosophia 36, no. 4 (2008), 424.
10. Danto writes about similar indirectness in his philosophy of art: "philosophy is concerned au
fond with what I metaphorically speak of as 'the space between language and the world'." Danto,
The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981), 79.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK 217

being narrative. While dealing with this issue, he makes several noteworthy
points about the narrative and, thus, also about historical representations and
historical understanding. One of the most significant conclusions he reaches con
cerns the holistic nature of narratives. He notes that despite the fact that historical
narratives consist of statements, they cannot be reduced to simple conjunctions
of statements. Even though narratives tell us stories about what happened, they
cannot be viewed as simple chronologies presenting one event after another.
Narratives provide us with a sui generis grasp of the past that cannot be equated
with a mere temporal ordering. This uniqueness of historical narratives is mani
fested in several aspects. For instance, Mink points out that "narratives cannot
be merely additively combined"11 or that "a narrative cannot be summarized, or
restated as an inventory of conclusions or 'findings'."12 All this indicates that
a "narrative must have a unity of its own."13 The goal of the narrative is not to
provide us with a chronological list of past events, but rather to create a complex
account that makes sense of the past. As Mink puts it: "The cognitive function of
narrative form, then, is not just to relate a succession of events but to body forth
an ensemble of interrelationships of many different kinds as a single whole."14
Mink believes that narrative form is a cognitive instrument. It helps us to
achieve a special type of understanding he sometimes calls the configurational
mode of comprehension. This type of comprehension is based on perceiving the
object in a web of relations. It overcomes an isolationist view and represents
an object within a larger whole. Mink likens this type of comprehension to an
understanding that results from an aerial view of a river. When we look at the
river from a plane, we are able to see not merely one part of the river but the
river in a larger perspective, "upstream and downstream [is] seen in a single
survey."15 Narrative form enables us to approach events in an analogous way. It
locates them within the story that has a beginning, middle, and end. In a narrative
we embrace past events within the whole of interrelated occurrences—bearing
in mind what preceded and what followed them—which brings configurational
comprehension.
This examination of narrative and the resulting points about configurational
comprehension might be read as revealing once again important features of
historical representations and historical understanding. We are reminded that
representations in history are holistic and retrospective, because historians situ
ate events within larger wholes (stories) and they take advantage of the fact that
they are retrospectively able to link events to what happened earlier and later.
Moreover, this implies that a certain complexity and indirectness is involved.
In history, there is never merely a text that depicts events, but there are events

11. Louis 0. Mink, "Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument," in Historical Understanding, ed.
Brian Fay, Eugene O. Golob, and Richard T. Vann (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 197.
12. Ibid., 198. For an interesting use of Mink's point about ingredient conclusions, see also Chiel
van den Akker, "The Exemplification Theory of History: Narrativist Philosophy and the Autonomy
of History," Journal of the Philosophy of History 6, no. 2 (2012), 245-247.
13. Mink, "Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument," 197.
14. Ibid., 198.
15. Mink, "History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension," New Literary History I, no. 3
(1970), 555.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 218 EUGEN ZELENAK

approached from a certain perspective

story "configuring" the given events.
Finally, Ankersmit provides probably
works in terms of representation. In h
and defends a theory of representation
indirectness. In his early book Narrati
shows that whole historical works sho
straightforward fashion. Here he emph
propose theses about the past, to const
the past.16 Later, in his Historical Rep
of historical representation that is diff
He claims that there is a "logical space
(language) and the past (world), and that
representations to fill this gap.17 It is pr
enables one to adopt a more complex an
tion. Finally, Ankersmit also argues for
that historical representation is not a t
(in fact, he uses the term "operator"):
(2) in terms of which the world (3) is
(2) and (3).'"8 This means that, accordin
simply attached to past reality (that w
place relation), but in fact historical te
we are invited to perceive the past. Here
nature of this something located betwee
that Ankersmit believes there is someth

IV. NO PAST IN HISTORY? ON NON-REPRESENTATIONALISM

Although the refined view of historical work provided by representationalism

will in general seem appealing to many authors with constructivist leanings, not
everybody has to be convinced that this is the best account of history. Critics
might welcome such features as a holistic and retrospective approach, and they
might share certain intuitions motivating complexity and indirectness, but they do
not have to accept the whole framework of representationalism. So why would an
advocate of constructivism want to look for an alternative? Let me sketch three

problems of representationalism, which challenge the viability of this view and

point in the direction of non-representationalism.
First, it seems that the broad framework of representationalism is somewhat
close to the naïve approach to history. Recall that the naive view presupposes
the picture theory of language claiming that a historical text should depict past
events. Clearly, representationalism offers a more nuanced account; nevertheless,

16. F. R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 2, 3, 169.
17. F. R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 41,58.
18. F. R. Ankersmit, Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation (Leuven: Leu
ven University Press, 2012), 72.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK 219

it keeps the basic frame of its alternative: on the one hand there is a historical
text, on the other hand there is the past, and the point of doing history is for
the text to represent the past. Representationalism, indeed, inserts a third item
between the text and the past, but it still shares the idea that doing history is
basically capturing the past, however complex and indirect it may be. Of course,
the proponents of representationalism try to draw a strict dividing line between
a naïve "capturing," which they dismiss on the level of the whole texts, and a
sophisticated "capturing." For instance, Ankersmit makes a principled distinc
tion between description and representation: whereas the first operation gives us
a faithful image of reality, the second one offers original proposals for how to
perceive it.19 In spite of this, one may point out that the second operation is mod
eled partly after its naïve alternative, only in a more complicated way. Therefore,
representationalism could be interpreted as not being radical enough. It contains
remnants of the naïve view, which are, to put it metaphorically, buried in the
unconscious foundations of representationalism. Its central notion of representa
tion does not allow it to cut all ties with the naïve view. Hence, a proponent of
a scrupulous constructivism may argue that in order to definitively cut ties with
the naïve view, we should reject the whole paradigm of "capturing"; we should
dismiss the notion of representation as the key to understanding history and we
should offer an account of history relying on a different framework.20
Second, since representationalism introduces some kind of third item into the
structure of representation, one inevitably faces the question of its nature. Apart
from the historical text and the past, there is also, to put it vaguely, a third item,
that is to say, some kind of proxy proposed by the text that helps to link the text
and the past. It is interesting and telling at the same time that in the literature, one
comes across various terms used for this third item. To mention just the few most
common candidates, authors talk about interpretations, points of view, perspec
tives, theses, or, more recently, about aspects. This variety of terms indicates that
there is no unanimous opinion in the literature on the nature of the item. What
is more, even within the work of one author who is a leading narrativist, one
may find several terms when it comes to the third item. In his Narrative Logic,
Ankersmit uses the terms "image" and "picture," which, however, should not be
understood in a naive way,21 but more often he uses the terms "thesis" and "point
of view."22 Mainly the latter expressions seem to suggest that we should not reify
this third item, but rather conceive of it in an epistemic way. Later, in his "Six
Theses on Narrativist Philosophy of History," Ankersmit prefers to talk about
(narrative or historical) "interpretation," a term also often used in other areas of
inquiry within the humanities, yet in the end he connects interpretation again with
the less palpable "point of view."23 Finally, in his most recent works he explicitly

19. Ankersmit, Historical Representation, 39-48.

20. Similar observations can be found in Kuukkanen, "Representationalism and Non-representa
tionalism in Historiography," 466-467.
21. See Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 204.
22. See, for instance, ibid., 2, 12.
23. F. R. Ankersmit, "Six Theses on Narrativist Philosophy of History," in History and Tropology:
the Rise and Fall of Metaphor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), § 3.3,4.2.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 220 EUGEN ZELENAK

characterizes the third item as an aspe

"part of the world itself."25 Such a re
understanding of the third item suggest
a trivial issue. The authors in general se
in a more cognitive fashion or attempt to
worldly, or rather stop somewhere betw
be misunderstood or considered myster
into one's account of history does not n
overcome, it definitely complicates th
Razor would advise us to think twice b
item—and it asks for a clarification reg
Finally, representationalism may be c
considered a rather unfortunate dualistic framework. The four features discussed

above may be taken to highlight the ways historical texts deal with the past. To
simplify, if we divide historical representation into its how and what, the four
features appear to be about the former aspect. Furthermore, the way in which
these features are usually introduced, or generally the way the nature of historical
work is analyzed within representationalism, seems to presuppose some kind of a
divide between the form and the content. Think, for example, about the introduc
tory part of White's Metahistory. It may be interpreted as making a distinction
between the iorm and the content or historical works and consequently rocusing
on such elements as the explanatory strategies and the determining metahistori
cal basis, which are responsible for the structuring or shaping that takes place in
history.27 Now, the form/content or the how/what division may be didactically
useful, but at the same time, if one takes it very seriously and reads too much into
it, it may lead to an essentially dualistic view that entails several notorious philo
sophical puzzles. If there is a form/content divide, does it mean there is some sort
of formless content? What is the nature of such a Ding an sichl Could any form
be imposed upon any content? Certainly, if one explicitly subscribes to a dualistic
framework, one must be prepared to face similar questions and reservations.28
This sketchy formulation of the three problems is not meant as a decisive dis
missal of representationalism.29 It might be the case that ingenious changes and

24. Ankersmit, "Representation and Reference."

25. Ankersmit, Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation, 76, 105.
26. For further discussion of these issues, see also Eugen Zelenâk, "Semantics of Historical Rep
resentation in Terms of Aspects," Journal of the Philosophy of History 7, no. 2 (2013), 244-256, and
Kuukkanen, "Representationalism and Non-representationalism in Historiography."
27. White, Metahistory.
28. A classic critique of a form/scheme-content/reality dualism is Donald Davidson, "On the Very
Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Associa
tion 47 (1973-1974), 5-20.
29. As Zoltân Boldizsâr Simon points out to me, some interpreters may reject my understanding of
representationalism. They may contend that what I call representationalism is in fact non- or anti-rep
resentationalism and, therefore, some of my objections miss the target. Indeed, Ankersmit's notion of
representation is not a naïve one, and some of his claims from his earlier works suggest that he wants
to offer a view of history with an anti-representational motivation. Thus, if one draws exclusively on
such concepts as narrative substance and disregards his other claims, one may end up interpreting
Ankersmit as an ally of anti-representationalism. Ankersmit, however, also makes several important
points about representation (for instance, regarding the notion of being about or representation viewed
as a three-place relation), which fit into representationalist account. See also note 42 below.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK 221

modifications would be able to help with some of these problems. However, these
difficulties undoubtedly challenge the viability of representationalism and moti
vate thinking about a different constructivist approach to history. Bearing these
problems in mind, one may dismiss the framework of representation and change
the whole paradigm. To shed light on non-representationalism as an alternative
constructivist account of history, let me briefly introduce two concrete proposals
regarding the nature of historical knowledge and history, namely, the views of
Paul Roth and Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen. Subsequently, I will also provide a more
general characterization of non-representationalism.30
Paul Roth offers an exciting and, I would even say, paradigm-changing view
of history, mainly in his articles about the indeterminacy of the past.31 Drawing
on the points made by Nelson Goodman, Ian Hacking, or Leon J. Goldstein, Roth
argues that we should alter our conservative approach to historical knowledge,
and basically to all empirical knowledge, which presupposes that in order to
acquire knowledge we need to follow what the world dictates. To undermine this
foundationalist view, he puts forward several negative theses and supplements
them with certain positive insights. The most important negative claim seems
to be his insistence that there are no metaphysical essences determining our tax
onomies or prescribing what predicates we should use. Bearing this in mind, it is
possible to summarize his argument as follows. With reference to Hacking, Roth
emphasizes that our knowledge assumes certain kinds; they are "at the heart of
all knowledge."32 In other words, we categorize all the time, and our knowledge
claims are full of predicates such as "occupation," "withdrawal," "skirmishes,"
"war," "nation," "minority," "immigration," and many others, resulting from
our classifications. But here comes the crucial question: How do we use these
predicates and what guides us in creating our taxonomies? Remember that Roth
rejects "the dictate" of the world: "Such taxonomies, including taxonomic clas
sifications of behaviors into actions, have no joints at which to carve."33 Hence,
this appears to leave us in a difficult situation. We do use the predicates, yet they
are not derived from the world. Does this mean that we should not use them
after all? Roth utilizes Goodman's new riddle of induction to arrive at a differ

ent conclusion: "Goodman's riddle challenges the belief that the categories and
classifications employed to name events also specify metaphysical essences.
It suggests that identifying events proves no more fixed than current habits of
classification."34 Thus, the traditional picture with the key role played by the
preexisting organization of reality is replaced with a novel dictum: "Training,
feedback, and group reinforcement anchor words to the world."35

30.1 want to note that I do not take "non-representationalism" as a label denoting one particular
conception of history of a specific author, but I understand it as a version of constructivism covering
a number of particular conceptions.
31. Paul A. Roth, "Ways of Pastmaking," History of the Human Sciences 15, no. 4 (2002), 125-143
and "The Pasts," History and Theory 51, no. 3 (2012), 313-339.
32. See Roth, "Ways of Pastmaking," 135. The quote is from Ian Hacking, "Working in a New
World: The Taxonomic Solution," in World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, ed.
P. Horwich (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 275-310.
33. Roth, "Ways of Pastmaking," 135.
34. Roth, "The Pasts," 330.
35. Ibid., 327-328.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 222 EUGEN ZELENAK

What are the implications of all this f

advises us to rethink the whole process
he advocates a paradigm shift: we shou
evidence) fixes our categories, which, o
we should become more sensitive to the fact that stabilization comes from a dif

ferent direction. If we realize this, it will change our approach to history. We will
cease to explain history in terms of correspondence or representation and attempt
to provide an account that focuses much more on "interpersonal coordination,"36
past habits, and "community-sanctioned practices of projection."37
Another interesting constructivist view of history is outlined in a recent
article by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen.38 After expressing and exploring his doubts
about representationalism, Kuukkanen suggests that there is a better alternative.
According to him, when it comes to theses expressed by historical works or to
colligatory expressions (organizing expressions such as "the Renaissance" or
"the Cold War"), we should give up our inclinations to take them as referring to
clear-cut events. He claims, "it is possible to accept that works of history contain
meaningful theses or messages, but that these theses or messages do not refer
anywhere."39 But if we dismiss the realist attitude, assuming that historical works
have to correspond to the past, what alternative is left for us? Kuukkanen argues
for a view that history is a discursive practice with the aim of presenting argu
ments. "In brief, the non-representationalist suggestion is that historiography is
about argumentation and the main contribution of a work of history is to provide
an argument for or against a given thesis."40 The same proposal is developed in
his book, Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography. He emphasizes that his
torical works should be viewed in terms of presentation rather than representation
and, more specifically, he adopts a version of non-representationalism stressing
that history is about presenting arguments: "My view is that we can give up on
the assumption that there has to be an object that makes a 'presentation' of history
true or false, or an object to which a presentation 'refers' to, or 'is about.' His
torical writing contains arguments, or, to say it somewhat differently, a historical
presentation in total amounts to an argumentative intervention."41
So what is the general idea behind non-representationalism in philosophy of
history? According to this version of constructivism, the framework of repre
sentation is misleading for the purposes of illuminating the nature of historical
works and historical knowledge. Historical works are not vehicles for represent
ing past events, and past events are not to be seen as determining their own

36. Ibid., 326.

37. Roth, "Ways of Pastmaking135.
38. Kuukkanen, "Representationalism and Non-representationalism in Historiography." See also
Kuukkanen, Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography (London and New Y ork: Palgrave Macmil
lan.2015).
39. Kuukkanen, "Representationalism and Non-representationalism in Historiography," 474.
40. Ibid., 474-475. It seems Kuukkanen understands by non-representationalism his specific view
of history. Recall, however, that in this article I take this label more generally. On my interpreta
tion, his view of history is just one concrete form of non-representationalism underlining the role
of argumentation and suggesting arguments as outcomes of historical works. Other forms of non
representationalism may emphasize different things.
41. Kuukkanen, Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography, 67.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK 223

representations. Of course, advanced forms of constructivism and realism do

not necessarily subscribe to the idea that the past strictly determines what his
torians are going to write. They tend to assign a crucial role to the creativity of
historians, and they are often inclined to interpret historical works as original
proposals about how to capture the past. Nevertheless, they are firmly attached
to the framework of representation and they maintain that past events play the
role of items that historical works are about.42 Non-representationalism, on the
other hand, relaxes this scheme. It encourages us to conceive of historians as
even less constrained by epistemology of correspondence and it urges us to take
historical works as even more creative outcomes of their intellect.

A non-representationalist framework subverts in at least two substantial ways

the postulate that historical works represent the past. First, historical works are
understood as simply presenting interpretations, proposals, original theses, or
arguments. They are not viewed as taking a further epistemic step that should
enable them to "hook onto"43 the past. At the same time, this means that particular
interpretations, proposals, and the rest have a more respected status. They are not
reduced to mere proxies or tools whose role is to get us as close to the past as
possible. Second, historical works are no longer understood as being related to
the past in this way. A realist but also representationalist framework assumes that
historical works are epistemically related to the past.44 They either correspond
to it (in case of realism) or indirectly represent it. In both cases there is an idea,
or its remnant in the background, that the point of historical works is to reflect
the past or simply cognitively capture it somehow. Clearly, this idea is absent
from non-representationalism. However, the absence of a relation rooted in the
epistemology of correspondence does not necessarily mean that there is no past,
or that the past has no role to play in this unorthodox paradigm. But before I
develop this point a bit further, let me introduce an objection according to which
non-representationalism is an extreme position not worthy of serious interest. In
response to this criticism, I wish to indicate what function non-representational
ism ascribes to the past.

42. But is it not the case that according to representationalists the key point of doing history is
to propose interpretations, theses, or points of view? Hence, is it not misleading to ascribe to them
the view that historical works represent the past or are about the past? Although representationalists
promote the idea that historical works propose interpretations and they definitely reject direct cor
respondence or straightforward representation, they still adopt the view that historical works are in
some sense about the past or they indirectly represent the past. This reading could be supported, for
instance, by pointing to Ankersmit's notion of being about (historical works are about the past) or to
his analysis of historical representation as a three-place relation (the three terms being historical work,
the presented, and the past reality). See his Historical Representation, 41, and Meaning, Truth, and
Reference in Historical Representation, 72.
43. See Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979), 211.
44. Not everybody has to agree that what I call representationalism is connected with epistemol
ogy. Some authors emphasize that the point of the linguistic turn in philosophy of history is precisely
to dissociate historical representations as wholes from epistemology. "Not counting some minority
reports, a consensus emerged around a solution which . . . maintains that epistemology has no role
to play on the level of the whole text." Zoltân Boldizsâr Simon, "Experience as the Invisible Drive of
Historical Writing," Journal of the Philosophy of History 7, no. 2 (2013), 186-187.

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
224 EUGEN ZELENAK

The objection may be formulated as fol

behind the whole historical theory that h
What if this presupposition is abandoned
is no need for any idea of the past. If ther
no past to be represented. Indeed, it may
to the annihilation of the idea of the pa
the venerable scheme 'historical works -
Although this may appear to be a natura
tationalism, in fact this criticism is based
non-representationalism dismisses the vie
of epistemic foundation for historical wo
historical works is to capture their putat
non sequitur to infer from this that ther
of non-representationalism reveals that i
is supposed to play in historical represen
that the past has no function whatsoever
Authors like Roth and Kuukkanen shou
there is no past, but rather as saying tha
notion of representation forces it to play
tion that the past is some kind of an object
endeavors, but their view of history allo
Roth emphasizes that our past habits and
ries we use, which means they also influ
Elaborating on this would require a mor
enters the processes by which we fix our
for our purposes it suffices to say that t
past (via historical sources, the evidence
cises its influence over historical works.
historians present their arguments, it d
up in a vacuum. Although the argument
or in the sources, they are devised with
what I imply above when I argue that, ac
past is not related to historical works in
representation. It means that, on the on
tionalism simply envisage the past as hav
of historical representation suggests, but
to the "No past in history!" conclusion.

V. CONCLUSION

I believe that narrativism should be appreciated for investigating and promoting

constructivism, because during the decades devoted to analyzing historical works
from this perspective, a number of authors presented various interesting and
stimulating insights about the nature of history. Constructivism, however, is not
a homogeneous position, but a view of history, which could be exercised in vari
ous forms. In this article I explored two of them—the relatively dominant view

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TWO VERSIONS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF HISTORICAL WORK 225

of representationalism, and the seemingly marginal view of non-representational

ism. As I have showed, both versions of constructivism oppose a naive realism in
history, but the first one adheres to the notion of representation, which is also dear
to realists, while the second one rejects regarding historical works as representa
tions. Of course, proponents of representationalism, in contrast to naïve realists,
defend a much more refined view of representation, which could be characterized
in terms of complexity, indirectness, holism, and a retrospective approach. More
over, some of these features and the intuitions behind them also look appealing
to other constructivists. However, the main point of non-representationalism is
that we should significantly change the framework used for exploring historical
works and, most important, we should get rid of the remains of the mirroring
epistemology encoded in the notion of representation. Does this mean, however,
that we have to throw out the past with the notion of representation? Although
non-representationalism may look like an extreme position that results in erasing
the past, I argue that this is not the case, for it merely assigns to the past a role
different from the one it plays in the representationalist paradigm.

Catholic University in Ruzomberok, Slovakia

This content downloaded from

132.248.184.4 on Tue, 18 Oct 2022 18:37:27 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms