The Place of Rhetoric in 'New' Film Historiography: The Discourse of Corrective

Revisionism
Author(s): Jeffrey F. Klenotic
Source: Film History , Spring, 1994, Vol. 6, No. 1, Philosophy of Film History (Spring,
1994), pp. 45-58
Published by: Indiana University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3815007

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 Film History, Volume 6, pp. 45-58, 1994. Copyright ? John Libbey & Company
ISSN: 0892-2160. Printed in Great Britain

The place of
rhetoric in 'new'
film historiography:
the discourse of
corrective
revisionism

Jeffrey F. Klenotic
Our world is a creature and a texture of rhetorics:
able resistance of a rhetorica
to such
founding stories and sales talks, anecdotes
pertains and of historica
to the domain
statistics, images and rhythms;
andof tales told
relatively in of
little thesuch work ex
nursery, pledges of allegianceof
or revenge,
film symbols
historical inquiry specifically
of success and failure, archetypes of action
The absence of aand
rhetorical com
character. Ours is a world of persuasive definitions,
historiography is somewhat bafflin
expressive explanations, and institutional
particularly narratives.
given the strong influe
It is replete with figures of truth, models
ralist of reality,
thought on the shape of co
studies,
tropes of argument, and metaphors and the current
of experience. In interest
our world, scholarship is rhetorical.
historiography as a central mode o
John S. Nelson & Allan Megill1
the 'history after theory' moveme
with the shift from authoritativel
his essay is an initial attempt to recast
toward less global and more local
contemporary debates in of film historio-
film criticism/theory, has pr
graphy using moulds forged by
debate a diverse
amongst film scholars tha
range of scholars working rhetorical
on the important,
imperative of their scho
interdisciplinary project of analysing the
In fact, rhetorical
when viewed from a rh
foundations of scientific inquiry. While the the
perspective, rhetoric
debates in film h
of inquiry literature continues to grow
be seen steadily struggle ov
as a rhetorical
through specific applications of rhetorical analysis to
the scientific texts and contexts of a variety of both
hard science and human science disciplines (includ-
Jeffrey F. Klenotic is an instructor
ing fields as seemingly disparate as anthropology,
ment of Communication at the Un
evolutionary biology, psychology, women's
Hampshire instudies,
Manchester, 220 Ha
Manchester
economics, and sociology)2, there NH 03102, USA.
remains consider-

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46 46Jeffrey F. Kienotic
Jeffrey F. Klenotic

which scholars and

concerned w
granted and
the multide
institution
torical authority.
standards
This
fo
cursively ting' the
constructed hia
between 'traditional'
mary histor
'new' histories and hist
secondary
rians will While
often ther
begin
them against
which
the theor
accou
who are little
often concer
framed e
an orthodoxy
of that
this ne
theor
move on to foregroun
history is p
accounts. Appeals for
institutional
count are generally
Let me tie
be
rigour and sive and the
theoretical
sort of 'academic
opposedetho
to t
rhetorically to validat
rigour and in
rian. In terms of
ing. the
The in
'ne
persuasive course
appeals,has
th
tory, number
which I will of
label
tive revision', reached
'major' film
as is evidenced
ming in
ourthe
un
David Bordwell:
these event
much prov
As I write this, young
cinema
events
are
long
hunched o
histories. Re
cranking through day
are still left
ture World or sitting
studio
within
memos.
a to
These
cal/theoreti
models.
that, perha
Within marginalize
contemporary
(though inquiry
certainly and
not a
ily aroundThe argume
issues of a
ing claims for
and histor
carried
events. - and
While these
today th
longer historical
exclusively an
reser
historical accounts
namics of a
t
rected at earlier
the revis
kinds of
remain persuasive
centred over e
w
or 'valid' counts. Thu
historical e
framed contexts,
within the I
contt
- that is, dissatisfactio
increased hi
accounts has
sive resulte
element
methods and
timeevidenc
I wish
accounts. nature
For the of
most t
ing their accounts
proof th
rather
have In their
centred this essa
cri
tween rhetorical
'good' and co
'bad'
derance of this
sion discu
was gra
modern some
film of th
historiog

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The place of rhetoric in 'new' film historiography: the discourse of corrective revisionism 47
mark this discourse. I seek to do this because I
believe we unnecessarily limit ourselves by obscur-
ing the rhetorical foundations of our inquiry, and
because I believe that much of the energy we spend
attacking each other's historiographic rigour (or lack
thereof), a situation that seems inevitable given a
revisionist discourse that emphasizes 'correction', is
misspent7. We are like a dog chasing its own tail if
we believe that increased methodological rigour will
in essence bring us finally, and once and for all, to
the 'truth' of history; or even to a history on which all
will agree. Further, by fully recognizing the rhetorical
foundations of our historical inquiry generally, and
the rhetorical situation of the historical moment of the
discourse of revision specifically, we can come to
understand how the lack of explicit rhetorical con-
sciousness that now hinders our practice may have,
in the 1 970s and 1980s, been a necessary discur-
sive strategy enabling the institutional and social
effectivity of the revisionist discourse. And we can
also begin to understand that while the absence of
rhetorical consciousness was once necessary for the
successful persuasability of discourses of revision, it
is now just as necessary that we cultivate its
presence. Only by doing so, I will argue, can we
go beyond the 'corrective' limits of the discourse of
revision that dominates our historiographic practice.
The rhetorical situation: revisionist
discourse as fitting response
In his elaboration of 'rhetorical situation', Lloyd F.
Bitzer writes:
In order to clarify rhetoric-as-essentially-related-
to-situation, we should acknowledge a view-
point that is commonplace but fundamental: a
work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into
existence for the sake of something beyond
itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or
change in the world; it performs some task. In
short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not
by the direct application of energy to objects,
but by the creation of discourse which changes
reality through the mediation of thought and
action. The rhetor alters reality by bringing into
existence a discourse of such a character that
the audience, in thought and action, is so en-
gaged that it becomes mediator of change8.
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For Bitzer, a situation is rhetorical 'insofar as it
needs and invites discourse capable of participating
with a situation and thereby altering its reality'9.
Rhetorical situations arise within social groups and
are primarily constituted by an exigence, or 'imper-
fection marked by urgency', that invites rhetorical
discourse as a 'fitting response' by which the
exigence can be alleviated or the particular problem
resolved via the response of audience to the given
rhetorical discourse. Exigences originate and ma-
ture, calling forth rhetorical discourse that is brought
into existence by the situation, which is itself replete
with a variety of constraints. Constraints function to
limit the sorts of decisions that can be made by the
group in order to modify or resolve the exigence.
These constraints can derive from all elements of the
situation, but typical sources include beliefs, values,
interests, documents, traditions, motives, attitudes,
etc. The rhetor's discourse also functions as con-
straint, in as much as it will be shaped by his/her
personal character, style and logical proofs. The
rhetor's task is to discover and make use of proper
constraints to influence an audience to take the
desired action to remedy or otherwise modify the
exigence.
For present purposes, Bitzer's key insight lies in
the recognition that exigencies arise and mature
within social groups, thereby precipitating a situ-
ation that both calls forth rhetorical discourse and
constrains the kinds of modifications that can be
made to alleviate the exigence. The state of film
studies in the 1970s provided just such a mature
exigence. As the field grew and became increas-
ingly centred in institutions of higher learning, it
became necessary for those working in the field to
carve out specialized areas of research and justify
the discipline vis-a-vis other disciplines and branches
of academic inquiry. But the paths that film studies
might have taken were narrowed by the institutional
demands of the academy and its standards of meth-
odological and theoretical sophistication for 'legitim-
ate' scholarly research. In a field that traversed both
humanistic and social scientific domains, this need
for legitimation and the constraints it imposed were
particularly complex and problematic. Could the
once-lowly pop cultural form of film ever be legitim-
ately considered on par with the 'great' works of
literary art? Could the body of a filmmaker's work be
analysed with the same purpose and reason as that
48 48Jeffrey F. Kienotic
Jeffrey F. Klenotic

Fig. 1. Douglas Gomery l

accorded literary artists?

quently, the
developed that would
within the ad
i
essentially aesthetic
standards exp
set
Could the rians.
seeminglyGradu
free
ence of film reception
mission, theev
f
with larger social
own quest
discursiv
medium ing
that in the
cultivatesse
b
exigence provided
Douglas by
Gomsu
responses (1985).
first in the are
cism, which dis
pr produced
In their
otics, structuralism,
ledge the an
ma
(among rhetorical
other less dis
success
including phenomenolog
which had the sort
'One ofof se
the
ethos the new discipline
pline is a r
co
By the lateapproaches,
1970s, sim
above began to mature
believe fo
that
The that
situation itno
was deser
les
questions questions
abounded conc t
as popular as film would
cinema's pas
worthy been
legitimate and
ofacam
was them 10.
exacerbated by the l
rians, who had been prod
meet a growing demand,
The authors frame their discourse as answering
heavily on a perceived need for a conscious
their own metahistorical fore
engaging in primary
overview of the now-mature discipline of film history. hi

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The place of rhetoric in 'new' film historiography: the discourse of corrective revisionism 49
They are also concerned with making an assessment
of 'successes and shortcomings'; with, to some ex-
tent, examining the history of film history so as to
separate the chaff from the wheat.
Allen and Gomery also link the scholarly need
for a metahistorical assessment to a perceived need
on the part of film educators:
The primary impetus for this book came from
our frustrations as teachers of film history. Our
students were all too eager to regard what they
read in film history books as the single, indisput-
able truth, and most of them thought it heretical
to question the film historian's methods, philos-
ophical orientation, evidence or conclusions.
Survey texts contributed to the problem by re-
maining silent as to the process by which histori-
cal questions are posed, research conducted,
evidence analysed, and generalizations
drawn 11
By problematizing survey texts, Allen and
Gomery produce a discourse that is persuasively
responsive to both the perceived situational need to
better educate film history students, and the need to
complexify and sophisticate film historical research.
Lacking the academically accepted signs of profes-
sional documentary history (i.e. extensive citation of
historical documents, historiographic self-reflexivity),
survey texts and the accounts they proffer are called
into question and become the 'immature' and dan-
gerously simplistic background against which the
validity and legitimacy of the 'new', institutionally
entrenched film historiography can be judged.
It is at this analytic juncture, marked by the
publication of Film History: Theory and Practice, that
the 'discourse of revision' begins to gain its clearest
expression. The 'new' film historiography will assert
its difference from 'traditional' historical narratives,
which will be discursively constructed as complicit in
what Andrew Weigert has called 'the immoral
rhetoric of identity deception'12. Much as Weigert
accused his scientific sociologist colleagues of im-
moral rhetorical practice because they profession-
ally represented themselves as objective scientists
when in fact (he argues) they were practicing rhetori-
cians, so too do Allen and Gomery levy at the
survey historian a charge of identity deception. In
the present case, identity deception occurs via the
survey text's 'silence as to the process' of historio-
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graphic investigation. In other words, the 'tradi-
tional' survey historian misrepresents him/herself as
objective or omniscient by using the rhetorical dis-
course of comprehensive narrative, which can only
foreground the history and not the contingency of the
historian's account. They write:
When reading history we cannot afford to be
seduced (emphasis mine) by the story being
told as history so that we neglect to ask those
historiographic questions the fictional storyteller
can so neatly avoid. A historian certainly has
the right to relate historical events as a nar-
rative, but as readers of history we have the
corresponding right to stop him or her at every
turn and ask, 'On what grounds is this narrative
sequence based?' Even if the relationship de-
picted between two events makes narrative
sense, we must also ask, 'Is it supported by
historical evidence?' 3
The 'traditional' narrative film historian, then, is
immoral (to use Weigert's term) because he/she
uses a deceptive rhetorical discourse that 'seduces'
the uncritical reader into accepting the account as
factual without establishing or foregrounding the va-
lidity of the evidence being marshalled to support
historical conclusions.
As an antidote to such rhetorical obfuscation,
Allen and Gomery suggest a turn toward a scientific
mode for the presentation of research. The particular
passage merits quotation in full:
For many years social and physical scientists
have used a non-narrative format for the presen-
tation of research - a format also found in the
presentation of some primary film historical re-
search. Basically this format includes (1) state-
ment of the problem investigated, (2) review of
pertinent literature dealing with that problem,
(3) posing of the specific research question
answered or hypothesis tested, (4) discussion of
the method used, (5) presentation of the data
generated by the study, (6) conclusions derived
from the data, and (7) suggestions for further
research ... This non-narrative mode of histori-
cal writing opens to scrutiny the nature and
extent of background research that has been
done in preparation for conducting a specific
study, the method employed in that study, the
50 Jeffrey F. Klenotic
I

sources used, and the validity of the conclu- seems tacked on, an after-effect of the earlier pro-
sions based on those sources. Rather than cesses of question framing, data collection, and
presenting history as a pre-known and closedtheory building. The rhetorical discourse - the argu-
story to be related, it reveals history to be anment - within the overall 'format' is argued to be
ongoing process of question framing, data col-'moral' because the evidence that lies beneath its
lection, theory building and argumentation4. surface and supports it is openly presented and
available for scrutiny. However, at the root of this
An interesting and important irony developshistoriographic conceptualization is a notion that
here. On one hand, Allen and Gomery base their
historical discourse, though possessed of a rhetorical
critique of narrative on the basis of its rhetoricalcomponent, can none the less be ultimately proven
'seductiveness', which they suggest actually servesor validated by reference to extra-discursive histori-
cal evidence. Thus, the critical reader might
to render history a closed book rather than an open
argument. Thus, they seek to stress the rhetoricalexamine the cited evidence him/herself and find
status of historical inquiry generally as producingthat the historian has either accurately or inaccur-
ately interpreted this evidence. But the evidence
contingent discourses, and by this recognition keep
open the project of revisionist history. Yet, on the
remains the factual foundation upon which an argu-
other hand, they offer as an alternative the scientific
ment can be built, rather than as existing, in terms of
'format for the presentation of research'. This 'format' its substantive meaning, as a construction of the
is argued to be more open to scrutiny than narrative,historian's discourse.
but it is not clear whether Allen and Gomery are The question of the ontological status of histori-
cal facts has been widely debated within the lit-
willing to acknowledge that this 'format' is in its own
right a 'seductive' rhetoric. Furthermore, the down-
erature of the philosophy of history, and Allen and
Gomery recount the empiricist and conventionalist
playing of the scientific process of historiography as
rhetorical is itself a rhetorical manoeuvre, a discur-
poles of this debate in the Film History text. To put it
sive strategy that was perhaps utilized in order tocrudely, the empiricist holds that facts are objectively
knowable and exist independent of the historian,
distance the 'new' historiography from the taint of
who can use them as a window into the past.
age-old notions of rhetoric as sophistry or 'mere'
rhetoric. To associate the 'new' historiography tooConventionalists, conversely, argue a view of facts
closely with the full contingency of rhetoric wouldthemselves as historical mediations that are further
likely have been an unpersuasive response to a mediated and reconstructed through the historian's
rhetorical situation that called for discourse that
own ideologically informed interpretation. History
could establish scientific and institutional legitimacytherefore has no knowable object. Allen and
for the field of film history. Within this situation, theGomery want to carve out a position midway be-
'format for the presentation of research' stands atween these poles, a position that recognizes facts
most alluring alternative discourse. of history as empirically knowable and yet variable
At this point, the ways in which Allen and depending on the historian's theoretical and ideo-
Gomery might recognize the 'format' as rhetoricallogical bent. However, from a rhetoric of inquiry
need clarification, for it is through an understandingpoint of view, this midway position is untenable
of the place of rhetoric in their historiographic con-since as an historiographic conceptualization it fails
ceptualization that we get to the heart of the dis-
to fully recognize empirical facts themselves as dis-
course of revision. cursive constructs that function rhetorically within spe-
Implicit in the distinction between stories andcific social communities. Thus, the discourses of
question framing, data(fact) collection, and theory
'formats' is the assumption that whereas narratives
are rhetorical through and through, 'formats' are building are no less a part of the 'format' as rhetori-
only partially rhetorical and even at this only in thecal discourse than are the specific arguments or
narrowest sense of the term. The above quotation
conclusions drawn from these rhetorical processes.
describes history as an 'ongoing process of questionSteps 1-5 and 7 of the format are not rhetorically
framing, data collection, theory building, and ar-
discrete from the overtly acknowledged rhetorical
gumentation'. In this formulation, argumentation
step 6, the 'validity' of which is therefore in no sense

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The place of rhetoric in 'new' film historiography: the discourse of corrective revisionism 51
testable by any reference to extra-discursive empiri-
cal data or scientific processes, since these are
themselves rhetorical processes (with their framing as
'extra-discursive' in the first place being rhetorically
or discursively constructed).
This overall rhetorical nature of the discursive
practices of scientific communities is precisely the
point of departure for a rhetorical approach to un-
derstanding scientific inquiry. As Sigmund Koch has
argued:
The scientific process is, in principle and at all
stages underdetermined by rule ... Among the
re-analyses of inquiry that are now shaping up
there is no point-for-point consensus, but most
agree in stressing the absurdity in principle of
any notion of full formalization, in underlining
the gap between any linguistic 'system' of as-
sertions and the unverbalized processes upon
which its interpretation and application (not to
mention its formulation) are contingent, in ac-
knowledging the dependence of theory con-
struction and use at every phase on sensibility,
discrimination, insight, judgement, guess5.
And to this view we can add that of rhetorician
Michael Calvin McGee, who formulates rhetoric not
only as a product (as discourse), but as also at the
same time a 'material' process, a '... social function
which permits interactivity among people. It is a
medium, a bridge among human beings, the social
equivalent of a verb in a sentence'16. Rhetoric is a
process and a product; a social and material rela-
tion (speaker/speech/audience/occasion/
change) that exists much as does the air we breathe
and allows for the justification of public motives.
In short, the non-narrative 'format', in all seven
of its stages, is as rhetorical as the narrative 'story'
because both are discourses mobilized within social
communities as justification for public motives (e.g.
revisionist history as a motive). One discourse may
seduce' us and one may 'invite our scrutiny', but
neither can be finally validated by any extra-discur-
sive referent, for both rely for their persuasive effec-
tivity on a community of human beings who are
connected to one another through a material
rhetoric. A community may agree that openly
presented 'extra-discursive' referents will be ac-
corded a certain status as particularly effective per-
suasion, but this agreement itself is already a public
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and professional motive that had to have been
justified within the community; a community that is
always already enmeshed in the material rhetoric
that like a 'verb in a sentence' binds them together
socially and enables justification of public motives.
In their own discourse, Allen and Gomery ar-
ticulate a motive that seeks to preserve an essential
distinction between evidentiary facts of history and
historical discourse or argument. But, as I have
argued, this distinction is itself a rhetorical man-
oeuvre. Indeed, the stronger the call for scrutiny of
evidentiary sources as a means for 'testing' historical
hypotheses, the more persuasive this discourse might
be as a response to the exigence of the rhetorical
situation (or as a justificatory discourse in McGee's
parlance). By articulating a discourse that under-
emphasized the status of question framing, data
collection and theory building as part and parcel of
the 'format' as rhetorical discourse, Allen and
Gomery practised efficient and effective persuasion
that was finely tuned to the institutional constraints of
the rhetorical situation and the perceived needs of
the field at the time of their writing. For it is only
through a metaphorical construction of history as a
'testable' rhetorical surface under which swims the
evidentiary facts of history that 'new' film historians
can successfully institutionalize the practice of ques-
tioning the interpretations of 'traditional' historians
without undercutting their own accounts as thor-
oughly rhetorical discursive constructions. By 'rolling
up their sleeves' in the face of the archive, 'new' film
historians can uncover more facts and evidence and
through this 'extra-discursive' reference bring us
closer to 'correcting' the historical record. The dis-
course of revision, in its very complex articulation,
attempts to figure an historiographic project that can
be both correct and open. The widespread adop-
tion of this discourse by the 'new' generation of film
historians speaks strongly of its power as a persua-
sive response that helped modify the exigence that
called it forth. However, as the body of revisionist
history has grown, it has raised new problems about
the limits of its own discursive framework, and new
exigencies have begun to mature that may signal the
ripening of a fresh rhetorical situation.
The rhetorical limits of 'best evidence'
As is now clear, the rhetorical category of evidence
holds a central place within the discourse of revision.
52 52 Jeffrey F. Kienotic
Jeffr

Fig. 2. Robert C. Allen

The drive to both revise

corrective ac
film cally
historical counte
events a
historical within
questionsthe
unaf
tories has turned
been to
fuelledc
and means
discovery of, of
newad
ation. (From within
But this scrutinization
cal turn, sin
record has rhetorical
created its
ta
ing the to resolve
necessity of th
m
kinds of evidence
problem'andof t
evidentiary sources.
that no In
docu
tional in a
adoption pure
of st
the
historians mediated
could ar
persuas
their selecting
accounts from th
tr
foregrounding
and their
Gomery o
historiographic practic
of revision became
All our nor
info
torically mediated
establishing i
th
particular account
right tobec
ex
new' history'best'
had or com
to le
institutional able, and fu
effectivity
ablaze the the
'strawavailab
man'
ance of investigati
inferior 'tradit

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The place of rhetoric in 'new' film historiography: the discourse of corrective revisionism 53

evidence' was used in a particular account is entertainment programme. However, for a historian
often difficult for the reader to determine, but a with a differing theoretical and ideological starting
close examination of the data sources cited is point, say, a view that argues a conception of film
helpful in comparing historical accounts 7 attendance as heterogeneous and even resistant, the
box office report will seem a highly mediated docu-
By conceptualizing evidence as a gradient ca- ment because it reflects only the theatre owner's
tegory that runs from least to most mediated, Allen point of view (high attendance = high popularity;
and Gomery employ a rhetorical strategy that one ticket = one vote). To get at the historically
frames least mediated evidence as 'best evidence' specific and highly variable motives and meanings
rather than as mediated and rhetorical nonetheless. for film attendance, this historian would likely have
However, if we foreground even least mediated to turn to other evidentiary sources that he/she
evidence as highly rhetorical - both in itself as the would consider 'best evidence' (e.g. letters to editors
rhetoric of an absent social entity and also by virtue of newspapers, oral historical accounts) but which
of its unavoidably rhetorical appropriation by con- the first historian might hold to be highly mediated.
temporary historians - then we begin to reach the In such a situation, when the question in both cases
rhetorical limits of 'best evidence' as a means of concerns reasons for movie attendance, can we
adjudicating between competing historical ac- adjudicate between accounts on the basis of 'best
counts. evidence'? when the level of mediation accorded
For example, even a document as seemingly this evidence is variable by virtue of the historian's
straightforward as a box office report is rhetorical discourse and the ideological position in-formed by
inasmuch as it counts only those people who at- this discourse?
tended a certain film on a certain day at a certain Admittedly, my example presents an extreme
time, and excludes those persons who may have case, but it does point to the rhetorical limits of using
wanted to attend, but could not perhaps because of 'best evidence' as a test of historical validity. It must
a lack of tickets or other personal and social rea- be noted, however, that Allen and Gomery do
sons. Further, and more importantly, even if an histo- acknowledge that differing theoretical or ideologi-
rian did choose to admit this box office report as cal biases on the part of historians will result in
solid empirical proof that X amount of people at- differing interpretations of evidence. The authors
tended a particular screening, this piece of evidence recognize that the problem of assessing the com-
in and of itself remains hollow of meaning. As parative validity of historical accounts on the basis
evidence, it can only be marshalled in support of of extra-discursive evidence is not in all cases easily
some larger discursive proposition, the nature of resolved, and in the light of this, draw from the
which will bear on what meaning is advanced for philosophy of Scientific Realism the 'principle of
the document. Perhaps a historian will work the noncontradiction'. As they explain:
document into a discourse constructed to argue that
A Realist approach to film history insists that
attendance at a film indicates that those attending
historical explanations can and should be
did so because they wanted to be there; the atten-
dee chose to see the film and their recorded attend- tested by reference both to historical evidence
and to other competing explanations. Where
ance records their choice (i.e. one ticket = one
explanations from differing theoretical positions
vote), as well as the larger popularity (or lack
agree, we have, in the words of Terry Lovell, 'a
thereof) of this particular film. Within this discourse,
residue of theoretically grounded "observat-
the box office report may indeed be 'best evidence'
because as a discursive construction it in-forms an ions" which may be taken as the testing ground
for any given theory at any given point in time'.
ideological position that is isomorphic to that of the
[This is the] Realist principle of noncontradic-
historian's own discourse. That is, in its own time,
tion ...18
the box office report served as a rhetorical discourse
that was targeted for an audience of theatre man- The suggestion here is that in cases where
agers and studio executives and functioned to argue validation by reference to historical evidence is
for the popularity (or lack thereof) of the given film or problematic, we can test the problematized account

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54 54 Jeffrey F. Kienotic
Jeffrey F. Klenotic

against subsequently
other accounts fro
spectives, these films.
and if there is
can assume that
A contrary position, on the acco
the other hand, is ad-
have come to awho rhetorically
vanced by Musser, 'correct' positions himself
lar against the
historical 'new' generation of historians. In his
event/quest
here, as noted
words, 'I find myself inby Richa
an unusual historiographic
entirely clear
position: my researchwhy
leads me to defend the "un-hist
achieve similar
defensible" by offering conclusio
qualified support to some of
past those historians Allen has somewhat casually dis-
events'19.
missed'20. Musser's research leads him to conclude
that films did indeed function for a time as 'chasers',
and that this phenomenon is partly
Contradictions in explained by
thethe
noncontradiction:
patent wars that plagued the industry at the turn of th
Nowhere is the Richard Allen
century precipitating a crisis in film production.
expressed This crisis limited
in the kinds of films that were made
practice th
debate between
and discouraged aesthetic Robert
innovation, and the pub- C
over the lic subsequently grew tiredphenome
'chaser' of the cinema's dominant
'models' (tofunction
use as visual newspaper. The growing public
Bordwell
film historiography,
enthusiasm for foreign story films, as well as for the A
expected tonarrative
bring innovations of Edwin S. Porter,
only led the t
graphic industry (after settling
rigour to its patenttheir
problems) to trans- w
historical form itself around narrative as a standard
period of mode of 19
case, as both scholars
representation. hav
array of Capsulizing the poles of the
primary 'chaser' debate in
documen
vidual historical
this way foregrounds the rhetoricalconclu
positioning that
larity of both Musser andduring
films Allen undertake in locating their this
though research within
most the situation of contemporary film in
scholars t
would regard the
historiography, and docum
brings us to the rhetorical limits
accounts toof thebe
intergenerationof a this
metaphor that frames lowcon-
accounts remain diamet
temporary situation. Allen's account, as a challenge
other in their
to 'traditional'final conclu
accounts loses its persuasive power
On one and inherent historiographic
hand, Allen ethos in the face of rh
account against those
Musser's primary evidentiary support for earlier con- o
(Sklar, clusions about film's function
Jowett, as 'chaser'. In this
Jacobs),
of his case, there is no way toresearch
primary adjudicate between the two
03 period accounts on the
did notbasis of evidence,reach
since the evi- s
of public dence in both studies are a result of the very differenttha
popularity
theatre theoretical and ideological predispositions
patrons from of each th
scheduled historian, the premise of the 'principle of noncontra-
programme. T
larger diction' proves insufficient for
argument thatbringing us to a 'test-the
rative filmable' as
or 'correct' standard
explanation as to the 'chaser'
popular question and the transformation
support for to narrative. early
dramatic What sortsof
rise of discourses nickleo
get generated when
a high rhetorical limitsof
volume are reached? films
We can gain an indi- th
around narrative
cation of this from the lively and was
often testy inter- th
means to meet
changes undertaken by thethis
two authors in responsedem
transformation to
to each other's work. Allen, workingnarrati
clearly within
popular the discourse of revision,
public call argues thatfor
Musser's con- su
industrial clusions are not substantively different from
concerns ofhis own exh

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The place of rhetoric in 'new' film historiography: the discourse of corrective revisionism 55
and that therefore Musser's account does not truly
stand as an alternative to Allen's own revisionist
account. In effect, Allen critiques Musser's rhetorical
strategy and accuses him of:
... casting this research as an alternative or
response to the position of a film historian
whom Musser identifies as a member of the
'new generation': ... in the present case, my-
self. Leaving aside the merits of this rhetorical
strategy as a vehicle for the presentation of his
own, quite important historical investigations, it
is significant that ... the position Musser takes
issue with must be either wrenched out of con-
text or inflated beyond recognition if the 'alter-
native' to it is to be made clear21.
Implicit in this response, again, is the central
structure of the discourse of revision: 'rhetorical
strategies' are categorically distinct from 'historical
investigations'; rhetorical arguments form the surface
and primary evidence swims below. The discursive
attempt to construct Musser's work as a non-alterna-
tive is an attempt to appropriate it within the dis-
course of revision. Indeed, there can be no other
option for Allen, since the discourse of revision is
centrally founded around the need to justify 'correct'
historical explanations. Given Musser's voluminous
use of 'best evidence', the two accounts cannot
stand in their difference, but must somehow be
brought together; in this case on an empirical, not
theoretical or ideological level. Thus, later in his
response, Allen asserts the viability of the 'principle
of noncontradiction':
I believe that film history advances not linearly
and unproblematically or by the total 'victory of
one historian's interpretation over another, but
slowly, haltingly, and by virtue of what philos-
opher Roy Bhaskar (1975) and others have
called the 'principle of noncontradiction':
where two investigators of differing philosophi-
cal orientations and methods investigate the
same phenomenon and do not (emphasis his)
disagree, we have an empirically grounded
basis upon which to build our theories. Try as
he might, Musser cannot argue away those
points of noncontradiction22.
Musser, perhaps sensing a contradiction of his
own between Allen's claim that history can be 'em-
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pirically' noncontradictory and at the same time
progress without a need for 'total victory', takes the
occasion of his own response to once again force-
fully state the implications of his work within the
situation of contemporary film historiography:
I not only see my work as greatly indebted to a
wide range of scholars who are comparatively
new to the field, but also to earlier scholarship.
Allen's eagerness to reject past scholarship for
deficiencies of research or ideological correct-
ness not only prevents him from seeing what is
valuable in their work, but also invites scrutiny
of his own work for its deficiencies and ideo-
logical preconceptions. Yet Allen, with the self-
assurance of a man who considers himself the
(emphasis his) authority, dismisses my attempt
to examine our respective philosophical and
political assumptions23.
From this view, the 'principle of noncontradic-
tion' is seen as a rhetorical construction that illumi-
nates the imperative of 'empirical grounding' while
casting shadows over the dialectically connected
issue of how this 'empirical ground' is philosophic-
ally and ideologically in-formed.
Conclusion: a dialogic framework for film
historiography
In his response to Allen, Musser foregrounds the
'authoritative' or what I have been calling the 'correc-
tive' limits of the discourse of revision by turning it on
itself and foregrounding its inability to fully recognize
philosophical and ideological difference. By doing
so, he articulates a discourse that seeks to shift the
discursive terrain of contemporary film historiography
beyond the intergenerational metaphor that marks the
discourse of revision. The clearest expression of
Musser's discourse is found in the conclusion of his
original piece 'Another Look at the 'Chaser Theory':
Although we should not stop questioning the
conclusions of historians like Lewis Jacobs,
Garth Jowett and Robert Sklar, we must be
careful not to dismiss their work too quickly.
We also must be careful not to set up a new,
premature orthodoxy. The one-way intergener-
ational criticisms of the 1 970s need to become
the bilateral, intragenerational debates of the
1980s. It is to be hoped that this can be
56 Jeffrey F. Klenotic
fF

Fig. 3. Charles Musser speaking at the W

[Photo by Robert A. Haller.]

conducted with commitment

as rhetorical and pas
is to i
well as good humour and mutual
relativism. But respe
I wo
relativism is only legi
The call putforth by Musser for a d
effectivity within a
model of historical inquiry that in prac
umentary or empirici
'bilateral, intragenerational debate' poin
that rhetorically mo
direction of a heightened consciousness
academic ethos by d
the rhetorical foundations of our schola
dimensions of its ow
academic exchange generally. Thou
accounts. It is the dis
choose to substitute the metaphor 'intr
itself that by its own
for that of
'intragenerational', in which
model of inquiry as
ibly linger the trace of an exclusionary m
those advocating the
persuaded by Musser's rhetoric that we
'legitimate' and 'pro
a situation with
exigences that are modif
model that foregroun
moving beyond the 'corrective' limits of t
not to annihilate the
of revisionism. To move beyond these lim
illuminate its apolitica
argue, we must begin the work of the
iticize them. This poin
putting in place within the academic i
pra, an intellectual his
model of historicalinquiry that comes fu
rhetorically grounded
with the rhetorical foundations of histor
well as with what McGee has called
... rhetorical th
consid
rhetoric' within which
iticalacademic comm
involvements o
social communities) seemingly
function to justify
disintere
professional motives.of facts, disengaged
Of course, to fully logical
recognize historica
functions it

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The place of rhetoric in 'new' film historiography: the discourse of corrective revisionism 57
... nonetheless approximates a neutralist politi-
cal position25.
Rather than establishing a relativist position in
which all histories, because they are unavoidably
rhetorical, are equally unfounded, LaCapra pro-
poses a 'dialogic' or 'conversational' model of his-
torical inquiry in which the historian is aware of
his/her rhetorical activities in constructing an ac-
count and interpreting historical documents, and
monitors these activities in a critical, self-reflexive
manner. A 'dialogical' model of history would (1)
take into critical consideration the historian's own
socio-historical context and attempt to account for
the political, economic and cultural constraints this
context places on his/her understanding of the past
and discursive practice, and (2) require increased
sensitivity and critical reflection on the rhetorical and
ideological dimensions bound up in historical docu-
ments as complex sites of intersecting socio-political
codes. By engaging in 'dialogues' with the past,
with his/her own discursive practices and modes of
inquiry, and with other historians and accounts
within the field or situation, the historian may find a
means of avoiding the kinds of authoritative and
definitive kinds of accounts mandated by the dis-
course of documentary history.
Indeed, LaCapra's conceptualization of histori-
cal inquiry is built on the contestability of historical
accounts, and keeps open a forum for debate and
revision. However, the 'dialogic' discourse of film
historiography does not root the terms of this debate
and revision in a discursively constructed 'extra dis-
cursive' stone of empirical evidence, nor in the prin-
ciple of noncontradiction between accounts, but
rather within the material rhetoric that forms the
terrain of academic social communities and social
life generally, and which constitutes the context
within which we operate as historical agents and
literally 'make' history. Importantly, by grounding
historiographic practice in this way, full recognition
is granted to the contingency of all historical ac-
counts ('traditional' and 'revisionist' alike) without
normalizing a radically anarchic situation where
'anything goes'. For as Herbert Simons has argued:
... in the classical, non-pejorative sense
'rhetoric' refers to reason-giving activity on judg-
mental matters about which there can be no
formal proof. The classical conception permits
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and even encourages the eulogistic sense of
rhetoric as good (emphasis his) reason-giving
on matters of judgement26.
Thus, heightened consciousness of the material
rhetorical roots that 'tie down' our scholarly work
and valorize historical accounts gives us only more
good reason to be fully and critically aware of our
social, ethical and political responsibilities as mobi-
lizers and adjudicators of historical discourse.
Clearly, within this context, just 'anything' will not
go.
The film historiography community has much to
gain from the 'dialogic' model articulated by LaCa-
pra. I believe the recognition of rhetorical praxis that
informs this model enables us to create and preserve
the kind of self-reflexive openness toward history and
historical discourse that 'new' historians admirably
advocate without subsequently narrowing this open-
ness by maintaining that in the end one historical
account will ultimately and finally prove itself authori-
tative because it will pass the test of 'best evidence'
and/or be noncontradicted by other accounts.
What is ultimately most significant about revisionist
discourse in film history is not that it brings us to
some final 'correct' version of film history, but that it
reminds us of the power of discourses about the past
to alter reality and change history for the present and
for the future.
Notes
1. John S. Nelson and Allan Megill, 'Rhetoric of Inquiry:
Projects and Prospects', QuarterlyJournal of Speech
72 (1986): 36.
2. See, for example, the papers presented at the 1984
University of Iowa conference on 'The Rhetoric of the
Human Sciences', including: Renato Rosaldo
'Where Objectivity Lies: The Rhetoric of Anthropo-
logy', J. A. Campbell, 'Charles Darwin: Rhetorician
of Science', Misia Landau, 'Paradise Lost: The
Theme of Terrestriality in Human Evolution', John
Shotter, 'Psychological Theories as Rhetorical Con-
structions', Jean Elshtain, 'The Rhetoric of Women's
Studies'. Also, Donald McCloskey, The Rhetoric of
Economics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1986), and Andrew Weigert, 'The Immoral Rhetoric
of Scientific Sociology', The American Sociologist 5
(May 1970) 111-119. I am grateful to rhetorical
scholar Herbert W. Simons for introducing me to this
rich body of literature and for providing the impetus
for this project.
58 Jeffrey F. Klenotic

3. Hayden White, Metahistory (Baltimore: Johns Hop- differing historians will not discursively construct this
kins University Press, 1973), and Dominick LaCapra, documentation in differing ways.
History & Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1985) 15-44, both address the rhetorical founda- 8. Lloyd F. Bitzer, 'The Rhetorical Situation', Philosophy
and Rhetoric 1 (Winter 1968): 41.
tions of historical writing, and LaCapra, in particular,
critiques the documentary model that predominates 9. Ibid., p. 42.
within the discipline of intellectual history, as well as
the resistance of 'professional' historians to the rec- 10. Robert C. Allen and Douglas Gomery, Film History:
ognition of rhetoric's role(s) in historiographic prac- Theory and Practice (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
tice. In film studies, there has been relatively little 1985): iii.
concern with matters of rhetoric, and the self-reflexive
11. Ibid., p. iv.
historiographic research that does get produced
often does not explicitly acknowledge its debt to 12. Andrew Weigert, The Immoral Rhetoric of Scientific
rhetorical scholarship; for example, Edward Brani- Sociology: 111.
gan's 'Color and Cinema: Problems in the Writing
of History', Film Reader 4 (1979): 16-34; and Ed- 13. Allen and Gomery, Film History, p. 46.
ward Buscombe's 'Introduction: Metahistory of Film',
Film Reader 4 (1979): 11-15.
14. Ibid., pp. 47-48.
15. Sigmund Koch, as cited in Herbert W. Simons, 'Are
4. See, for instance, David Bordwell's persuasive expo-
sition of the rhetorical foundations and institutional Scientists Rhetors in Disguise? An Analysis of Discur-
sive Processes Within Scientific Communities', in
norms of film interpretation. David Bordwell, Making
Rhetoric in Transition, ed. Eugene White (University
Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980):
of Cinema (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 120.
1989).
1 6. Michael Calvin McGee, 'A Materialist's Conception
5. As quoted in Edward Buscombe, 'Introduction: Meta-
of Rhetoric', in Explorations in Rhetoric: Studies in
history of Film', Film Reader 4 (1979): 12.
Honor of Douglas Ehninger, Ray E. McKerrow (ed.)
6. See, for instance, Paule Seale, 'A Host of Others': (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman & Company, 1982):
27.
Toward a Nonlinear History of Poverty Row and the
Coming of Sound', Wide Angle 13 Uanuary 1991): 17. Allen and Gomery, Film History, p. 50.
72-103. Also, HenryJenkins III, 'Shall We Make it
for New York or for Distribution?: Eddie Cantor, 18. Ibid., p. 17.
Whooppee, and Regional Resistance to the Talkies',
19. Richard Allen, (Book Review), 'Film History: Theory
Cinema Journal 29 (Spring 1990): 32-53.
and Practice by Robert C. Allen and Douglas
7. This is not to say that historiographic rigour is of no Gomery', Wide Angle 8 (1986): 56-58.
importance in assessing the merits of a piece of
historical scholarship. Nor is this to say that it is 20. Charles Musser, 'Another Look at the "Chaser The-
impossible to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' ory"', Studies in Visual Communication 10 (1984):
25.
historiography. Clearly, any historical argument is
likely to be unpersuasive if it has no evidence to
21. Robert C. Alien, Looking at 'Another Look at the
support it, and certainly we are not unwarranted in
"Chaser Theory"', Studies in Visual Communication
expecting judicious use of historical documentation
10(1984): 45.
(which of course highlights the rhetorical nature of
the historian's dialogue with the past through medi- 22. Ibid., p. 50.
ated documents that contain traces of that past).
Rather, the point I am making here is that historio- 23. Charles Musser, 'Musser's Reply to Allen', Studies in
graphic rigour is not the only way to adjudicate Visual Communication 10 (1984): 52.
between competing accounts, and if we elevate this
24. Charles Musser, 'Another Look ... ', p. 42.
criteria above all others such that it becomes a
'sufficient condition' for valid history, then we limit 25. Dominick LaCapra, History and Criticism. (Ithaca:
the scope of our inquiry unnecessarily by a priori Cornell University Press, 1985): 37.
ruling out those kinds of historical inquiry for which
26. Herbert W. Simons, 'Are Scientists Rhetors in Dis-
there is little hard historical documentation (e.g.
historical audience research). I will be taking up this
guise? An Analysis of Discursive Processes Within
matter again later in the essay. It might also be Scientific Communities', pp. 127-128.
pointed out, at this point, that even if historical
documentation does exist, this does not ensure that

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