Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War

Author(s): John M. Vander Lippe

Source: Middle Eastern Studies , Jan., 2000, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 92-102
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4284053

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 Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War:
Turkey's Participation in the Korean War

JOHN M. VANDER LIPPE

The Korean War has been called America's forgotten war, a vaguely
remembered and unpopular police action that took place between the
glorious victories of the Second World War and the ignominious defeat of
Viet Nam. But if the Korean War occupies only a small place in the popular
memory, the role played by Turkey in the war has been almost entirely
forgotten. In the United States, few who did not fight in Korea seem to
remember the Turks were there at all. This really becomes apparent if you
happen to be up at three in the morning watching M*A *S*H reruns hoping
to go to sleep. Turkish soldiers rarely figure in the scripts of M*A *S*H, and
when they do, their image is ambiguous. It is not entirely clear whose side
they are on. Turkey's involvement in the Korean War is not seen by Turks
as being a major event in their recent history. A few blocks from the Ankara
train station there is a monument to those who died in the Korean War. The
monument is unobtrusive, a fact of life, but not a major feature of the
landscape.
Yet Turkey's participation in the Korean War was a crucial point in
recent Turkish history. Indeed, the decision to participate in the Korean War
was an important aspect of a re-evaluation of Turkey's place in international
politics and economics that emerged at the end of the Second World War. It
came along with reconsideration of the meaning of westernization,
democracy, civil-military relations, secularization and the role of Islam in
society, the role of the state in the economy and state interference in social
and cultural affairs. Participation in the war ended nearly 30 years of a
policy of non-involvement in international conflicts, while this period laid
the foundation of debates within Turkey, not only on domestic but also on
foreign affairs, that continue even in the 1990s. This article concentrates on
Turkey's participation in the Korean War in terms of three questions:

1. Why did Turkey participate in the Korean War, especially after

maintaining a strict policy of avoiding involvement in international
conflicts since the founding of the Republic?

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.36, No.1, January 2000, pp.92-102

PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE KOREAN WAR 93

2. What was the immediate impact of its participation on Turkey's foreign

and domestic policies?
3. What was the long-term impact of Turkey's involvement in the Korean
War on Turkish society?

Turkey's participation in the Korean War stemmed from both domestic

and foreign pressures. They were related in the sense that Turkish leaders
believed that participation in Korea would mean closer ties to the West,
which in turn would lead to economic growth and greater diplomatic and
military power.
The Turkish Republic arose from the turmoil of the First World War and
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following its defeat by the Allies.
Following an intense struggle against occupying armies, the government of
the Republic was established with the promise of a new social and political
order in Turkey. Diplomatically isolated, the state set out to develop
Turkey's economy on its own with policies that emphasized the state's role
in investment and management. During this period foreign investment was
quite limited, and indigenous investors virtually non-existent. With meagre
resources and little outside investment, Turkey could not afford to spend
money on expanding or modernizing the military. Instead, Turkish leaders
adopted a policy of non-involvement in foreign conflicts legitimating its
policies within the context of an ideology of advancement which claimed
that non-belligerency was an assurance that the state would devote
resources to development and advancement rather than to war and
militarization. Mustafa Kemal Atatuirk, the charismatic leader of the
Republic, declared the basis of Turkish foreign relations as 'Yurtta sulh,
Cihanda sulh' (peace at home, peace abroad). The second President of
Turkey, Ismet Inonu, was committed to keeping the peace throughout the
Second World War even though it meant violating Turkey's treaty
obligations, and facing tremendous pressure from the Allies to enter the
Inonui believed that any involvement in the war would be detrimental to
Turkey's economic growth, as the country's limited resources had to be
spent on domestic needs, rather than on weapons and the military. Given
this emphasis on avoiding involvement in foreign conflicts, what led
Turkey's third President, Celal Bayar, to commit troops and resources to
fighting a war six thousand miles away in Korea?
During the 1920s and 1930s state policies led to modest economic
growth. The Second World War had a profound impact on Turkey's
economy, setting back most of the gains made in the pre-war period. For
instance, in 1945 agricultural output was only 20 per cent above its 1932
level.' The war seriously hampered foreign trade, shrinking markets for
Turkish exports and cutting off the supply of foreign capital and imports of

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 94 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

industrial goods.2 The inflation rate exceeded 300 per cent for most of the
period. Black marketeering and hoarding were rampant. Military spending,
which rose during the war and remained high in the post-war period, put an
additional burden on the government and the people.
Growing economic problems and increasing disillusionment with the
government's economic and social policies led to widespread and vocal
discussion over the past, present and future of Turkey and fuelled demands
for changes in Turkish financial policy and economic development
programmes. Interest groups within Turkey, as well as foreign, especially
American, policy-makers called for free trade and flow of capital,
favourable conditions for foreign investment, and a shift of ownership and
control of the industrial base from the public to private sector. These
demands culminated in the creation of the multi-party political system, and
the formation of the Democrat Party in 1946. From 1946 to 1950 the
Democrat Party, headed by Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, attacked the
People's Party government, accusing it of economic mismanagement and
political oppression. Opposition leaders also claimed that the non-
belligerent foreign policy of the Inbnui government in the Second World
had 'killed the nation's manhood', and had left it weak and isolated.3
As the first President of Turkey not to have been a retired general, Bayar
strove to assert civilian control over the military. The post-Second World
War era witnessed changing political norms in Turkey. Following the war
the ideology of advancement shifted away from the primacy of self-
sufficiency and non-belligerency to emphasize the importance of alliance
with the West as a source of aid and security, and for advancement. Turks
began to see Western aid and investment as the way to recover from the
devastation of the war and to accelerate economic development after the
war. In particular, the Democrat Party placed special emphasis on the
benefits that would accrue from close ties with the West. But to increase aid,
the Turks had to prove their value to the West. In 1950 the Democrat Party
government presented participation in Korea as the way to insure assistance
from the West.
American aid meant increasing ties to the Western Powers as well as to
the world market. In 1947 Turkey joined the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund; and
in 1948 it entered the Organization of European Economic Cooperation. In
1949 Turkey asked for a 50 million dollar loan from the World Bank to fuel
development of the private sector.
Improvement of relations with the United States meant not only
investment and economic assistance, but also diplomatic and military
support for Turkey. Ismet Inonii, who had held as close as possible to a
policy of neutrality during the war, decided afterwards that without close

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TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE KOREAN WAR 95

ties to the West, Turkey would remain diplomatically isolated. In March

1945 the Soviets announced they would not renew the 1925 Treaty of
Friendship and Non-Aggression between Turkey and the Soviet Union
unless Ankara made concessions. Soviet demands for changes in the
Turkish-Soviet border and for an agreement for joint defence of the Turkish
Straits met with outrage within Turkey, and also fuelled growing tension
between the United States and the Soviet Union after the war. The Soviets
continued their pressure on Turkey throughout the late 1940s, in 1947 going
so far as to mobilize troops along the border with Turkey. Although the
threat of Soviet invasion does not appear to have been imminent, Turkish
leaders saw definite advantages to a commitment from the United States for
the defence of Turkey in the event of hostilities with the Soviets. In this
sense, did the Turks see their participation in the Korean War as a show of
strength aimed at the Soviets? In the Cold War world the term 'limited war'
meant a political war to contain the opponent's power and to force a change
of the opponent's mind by negotiating from a position of strength. Thus, did
the Turks see their actions as a type of limited war? Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes expressed his view that 'in order to negotiate with Russians one
should be powerful. Russians understand power and respect it'.
Washington also saw the strategic value of closer ties with Turkey.
President Truman sent the battleship Missouri to Istanbul in April 1946 to
affirm Turkish-American friendship and to display American strength in
the region. American interests in Turkey's strategic value were further
demonstrated by the economic and military aid extended to Turkey
beginning in 1947 under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. These
two programmes formed the basis for Turkish-American relations in the
post-war period. American interest in Turkey intensified in 1949, with the
formation of NATO and the Soviets' detonation of an Atomic bomb.
When the Atlantic Pact was signed in 1949 the Turks made entry into
NATO the benchmark of America's commitment to Turkey. Turkish leaders
saw entry into NATO as the basis of close relations with the West, and felt
that only full membership in the Atlantic alliance would guarantee a formal
American commitment to Turkish security. Turkey first applied for
admission to NATO in May 1950, while Ismet Inonui was still president. At
that time the Atlantic Pact members denied Turkey's request as the
European members were reluctant to expand their commitments to the
eastern Mediterranean. They saw the function of NATO as the defence of
western Europe, which did not include Greece or Turkey. Britain wanted
Turkey to be the cornerstone of a Middle East defence arrangement, a plan
the British had been pursuing since the end of the war.4
In August 1950, just a week after announcing that Turkey would send
troops to Korea, the Democrat Party government again applied for entrance

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 96 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

into NATO. Feridun Cemal Erkin, the Turkish Ambassador to the United
States, told Secretary of State Acheson that during his recent visit to Turk
he had observed 'a growing feeling among Turkish leaders and the people
that Turkey should be included in the European collective security
arrangement'.1 Erkin continued that 'the Turks feel that they could
contribute materially to the collective strength of Western Europe and, on
the other hand, believe that Turkey's inclusion would enhance its own
security' 6
The Turks tied their commitment to the United Nations effort in Korea
to entry into NATO. Ambassador Erkin told Acheson in August that the
commitment to send troops to Korea intensified the feeling among Turkish
leaders and the people that Turkey should be accepted into NATO.7 In
September President Bayar told the American Ambassador, George
Wadsworth, of his concerns about Washington's apparent reluctance to
extend formal military guarantees to Turkey:

Does your government not realize that we Turks will consider further
deferment of favourable action on our request by the Atlantic Pact
powers as a refusal and as unwillingness to accept us as equal partners
in meeting jointly any threat of aggression? We have shown our good
faith by forthright action towards meeting the Korean crisis. I fear
frankly that, if the Atlantic Pact Council of Foreign Ministers turns
down our request, our morale will be seriously affected ... We feel our
very future is at stake.8

Bayar and other Turkish leaders felt that they had committed Turkey
completely to supporting the West against the Soviets. To support their
position, the Turks felt they required a formal American commitment to the
defence of Turkey. That commitment had to be either entry into NATO or a
treaty of mutual defence.
The Bayar government continued to pursue a military alliance with the
United States. Bayar felt that only a formal military commitment from the
Americans would be sufficient deterrent to Soviet pressure. But in spring
1950 the Americans were still unconvinced of Turkey's strategic
importance to the defence of Europe. The Truman administration remained
reluctant to commit resources to south-east Europe that might be needed in
western Europe, and opposed extending the Atlantic Pact to apply to the
Balkans and eastern Mediterranean. What forced a change in American
attitudes and led to Turkey's entry into NATO was Turkey's participation in
the Korean War.
Along with the domestic pressures to ensure western aid, Soviet
demands on Turkey, and the wish to join NATO, Turkish leaders' vision of
their role in the United Nations played a role in the decision to send troops

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TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE KOREAN WAR 97

to Korea. After the Second World War, the Turks wished to be an equal
partner in the international community, not just a pawn in the Cold War.
Turkey thus took an active role in the United Nations. On 27 June the
Security Council condemned the attack and voted to form under American
leadership a United Nations Command to stop the invasion. Turkey was a
member of the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) which
made the recommendation that the Security Council take military action
against North Korea. From the beginning the Bayar government supported
the Security Council decision. As Turkey sought a closer alliance with the
Western Powers, participation in the Korean War meant not only
membership in the Western bloc but also confirmation of Western ideals a
the westernizing reforms of the Republican government. The third
generation of Turkey's leaders believed that failure to participate in the
United Nations effort in Korea would lessen its international standing, and
argued that participation in a foreign war would now bring advancement
and economic growth, rather than hampering it.
On 25 July Bayar announced that Turkey would send a brigade strength
force of 4,500 soldiers and officers to join the United Nations Command in
Korea. The brigade was rotated twice during the war, and Turkey
maintained troops in Korea as part of the peacekeeping force after the
armistice. The first Turkish brigade, led by Brigadier General Tahsin Yazici
arrived at Pusan amid great fanfare in October 1950.9 The brigade did not
arrive with its own weapons, and had to be trained to use new American
weaponry. After two months of training General Yazici complained to the
Americans that the Turks had come to fight, not to parade, and the brigade
should see action. In December the Turkish brigade was shipped north to the
front just as the Chinese launched a massive counterattack that drove the
UN forces out of North Korea. The Turks first saw action in the battle of
Kunu Ri, at the Chosin Reservoir, one of the bloodiest battles of the entire
war. At one point, surrounded by the Chinese, and low on ammunition, the
Turks fixed bayonets and stormed a Chinese position. The American
division commander refused to believe the Turkish claims and sent his own
inspectors, who counted 900 bayoneted Chinese. For its accomplishment,
the Turkish brigade was awarded the American Distinguished Unit
Citation.'0
Throughout their stay in Korea, the Turks developed a reputation as
excellent soldiers. Constantly short of equipment, and lacking adequate
training in American weapons, they had to rely on their own skills and
ingenuity. Impressed by the Turks, American commanders commended
them for their 'positive, aggressive, war-like qualities', and said that 'it is
through such conduct that the Turkish soldier has such a high reputation
throughout Korea as a splendid fighting man"."

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 98 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

The government interpreted the accomplishments of troops in Korea as

Turkey's full participation in the Western effort, and as success against the
Soviet Union and communism. Although popular sentiment favoured
participation, criticism came from the opposition People's Party, from
intellectuals and from groups such as the Turkish Organization for Peace.
The People's Party attacked the decision, calling it 'adventurism' and
saying it was unconstitutional because President Bayar and the cabinet
committed troops without consulting the Turkish National Assembly.'2
Bayar countered that as Commander in Chief he had the constitutional right
to order the military into battle. The People's Party continued its protests
until December 1950, when Turkish troops won fame for their role in the
Battle of Kunu Ri. The government used the success of troops in Korea to
suppress criticism by groups like the Turkish Organization for Peace. The
forced closure of this organization in December 1950 was among the many
actions taken by the Democrat Party against academics and intellectuals
suspected of having leftist, or pro-peace views, and established a pattern of
political repression by the Democrat Party, which had come to power on a
promise of ending political repression.
The most obvious long-term impact of Turkey's participation in the
Korean War was its acceptance into NATO. In September 1951 the North
Atlantic Council decided to recommend the accession of Turkey and
Greece, which had also sent troops to Korea, to NATO. The Democrat Party
newspaper Zafer carried an editorial on the decision, saying: 'There has
been a great and honorable share of the blood of our Korean heroes in the
signatories' ink used ... for the invitation extended to Turkey for her entry
into the Atlantic community ...Today's Turkey is a source of power for
peace, and not a liability."3 The Western Powers agreed that by fighting in
Korea, the Turks had proved their strategic value to the West.
Turkey's admission to NATO made it the spearhead of western interests
in the region. This affected its relations with both the Soviets and its Middle
Eastern neighbours. In the spring of 1953 the Soviets dropped all claims to
Turkish territory made after the Second World War and asked to renew the
Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. Gradual
warming of relations led to a Soviet offer of economic aid in 1956. Also, in
accordance with the objectives of the Western Alliance, Turkey took a
leading role in the establishment of regional defence arrangements such as
the Balkan Pact of August 1954 and the Baghdad Pact of February 1955.
The Turks believed that they had proved their right to be equal partners
in the Western Alliance, but NATO planners continued to see Turkey as a
plug in the dike holding back Soviet expansion. American aid was
channelled into military hardware, and building infrastructure to suit the
needs of NATO, even when they did not meet those of Turkey. During this

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TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE KOREAN WAR 99

period Turkish military command structure, supply and training, and

strategic planning were integrated into NATO. Because NATO planners
believed the Turks could do little but stall a Soviet attack by retreating to the
hills and attacking supply lines in guerrilla skirmishes, they were unwilling
to give Turkey the advanced weaponry the Turks wanted. The Western
Powers argued that the Turks had no need of advanced weaponry and lacked
the training and ability to put it to good use. But the Turks resented what
they saw as the West's refusal to accept them as equals.
While increasing ties with the West remained an integral aspect of
Turkish policy, the experience of Turks with NATO and in Korea exposed
the duality of these ties. Close ties with America meant both aid for
economic development and interference in internal affairs. Aid from
Washington came with strings attached, and an ideological colouring that
saw economic growth mainly in terms of staving off communism.
Turks who fought in Korea felt they did not receive the respect they
deserved from the Americans. Turkish commanders felt the Americans
were not providing the modern, advanced weaponry they promised, or
sufficient quantities of the weapons that they did provide. There was also
resentment among the ranks of officers that Turkish officers were not being
awarded the medals that they deserved.'
An incident that fuelled their resentment was the American decision to
attach American Counter Intelligence Corps officers to the Turkish Brigade
to debrief Turkish soldiers. The arrival of the CIC met with consternation
among the Turkish troops who understood CIC as siyasi, the Turkish word
for political. Some time passed before the Turks were convinced the
Americans were not political police spying on the Turkish brigade.'5
The feeling among Turkish soldiers that they were being used is perhaps
best summed up in a joke in which a Turkish officer tells his troops that
American planes would be dropping them behind enemy lines that night.
The officer says, 'We will have to fly in low, so the Americans will be
giving us smaller parachutes,' to which a soldier replies, 'Oh really, they're
going to let us have parachutes?'
Another aspect of the Turkish experience in Korea was the glaring
differences in wealth between Americans and others. Turkish soldiers in
Korea were paid five dollars per month, while officers received 25. The
similarities between the Koreans and Turks were obvious to the Turkish
soldiers, who saw the contrast between the poverty of Korea and Turkey and
the wealth and resources of the Americans in Korea. In his memoirs Basri
Daniaman, who served as interpreter for the commander of the third Turkish
brigade to serve in Korea, comments on the elaborate meals, fancy cars,
ostentatious ceremonies and huge quantities of equipment that followed the
Americans everywhere. He points out that the American officers always

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 100 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

seemed to have freshly pressed clean clothes, and that they never seemed to
get dirty. Danisman recalls when he met the commander of the US division
to which the Turkish brigade was attached, General Smith, that 'this was the
first senior American officer the Turks had seen who did not give the
impression he wore every outfit only once'.16
In Korea, and at home, where American aid and advisers were beginning
to flow in, the Turks had a dual vision of America. On the one hand the Turks
admired America's wealth and technological sophistication, but on the other
they resented American attitudes of superiority and condescension.
Another long-term effect of participation in Korea, and the integration of
the Turkish military into the Western Alliance, was a change in the status of
the military in Turkish society. During the 1950s the military became a more
important political actor in Turkey because the bulk of American assistance
and investment went into military related projects. The increasing status of
the military created tensions between civilian and military authority which
were manifested in the military coup of 27 May 1960 which overthrew the
Democrat Party government.
In domestic affairs, the resentment of American attitudes was
accompanied by growing frustration among the people at continuing
economic problems and the failure of the Democrat Party to fulfil its
promise that closer ties with the West were the solution to Turkey's
economic woes. Turkish popular expectations in the post-Second World
War years were reflected in the campaign promises of the Democrat Party:
advancement, democracy, strength through alliance with the West,
expansion of the private sector, and relaxation of state control of the
economy and social life, including Islamic practices. While in power, the
Democrat Party tried to fulfil its promise of economic prosperity by opening
the Turkish economy to foreign investment and by offering incentives for
agricultural production. These incentives resulted in increased grain exports
and arable land, but triggered rural to urban migration as the number of
landless farmers rose sharply. Per capita income increased 14 per cent, but
unemployment also rose. A strained budget which committed 60 per cent of
its spending to the military limited the government's encouragement of
private investment. As a result these policies reduced investment in state
enterprises, but did not lead to steady growth in the private sector. An initial
period of economic growth in the early 1950s gave way to stagnation and
inflation by the middle of the decade. As the economic situation
deteriorated, critics accused government officials and policies of
representing Western interests in Turkey instead of Turkish interests in
West. Facing growing criticism, the Democrat Party government expan
the anti-communist campaign of the early war period to attempt to stifle all
criticism.

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TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE KOREAN WAR 101

While unemployment and inflation soared, the Democrat Party held onto
power throughout the 1950s, winning elections in 1954 and in 1957. Finally
the military removed the Democrat Party from power in 1960.

The long-term impact of Turkey's reluctant participation in the recent Gulf

War is not yet clear, but it seems that there are definite parallels between
Turkey's participation in the Gulf War and the Korean War that help provide
a base for understanding the dilemma of war and peace for a small country.
In both cases Turkish leaders saw participation in the war as a means of
acquiring Western aid and of proving Turkey's continuing importance in
changing strategic situations. In both cases Turkey's contribution has
impressed the West with the strategic value of Turkey, and in both cases one
result has been increased aid and investment from the United States and
Europe. But in both cases, there were profoundly negative effects as well.
Scarce resources were devoted to the military in order to meet the strategic
needs of NATO. And in both cases the government met dissent with
oppression.
Bruce Kuniholm has argued that at the time of the formation of NATO
Western planners perceived Turkey's importance in terms of its contribution
to the defence of Europe against the Soviets, and as a bridge to the Middle
East.'7 Now the Soviet threat to Europe is no longer a concern, but Western
policy-makers feel threatened by developments in the Middle East.
Turkey's role as a bridge to the Middle East has taken on new importance
in the post-Cold War period. By participating in war the Turks have again
proved their value in keeping the peace.

NOTES

I wish to thank Selim l1kin and Ozden Toker, along with the Inonu Foundation, the Institute for
Turkish Studies and the Hoover Institution for their support of my research for this article.

1. (iaglar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development (London,
1987), p. 110.
2. Yahya Tezel, Cumhuriyet Doneminin Iktisadi Tarihi, 1923-1950 (Economic History of the
Republic) (Ankara, 1986), pp. 102-3, 109.
3. $evket Sureyya Aydemir, Ikinci Adam (The Second Man), Vol.11 (Ankara, 1979), p.135.
4. Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 (Boulder, 1977), p.391.
5. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol.V
(Washington, 1978), p.1301.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. pp.1312-13.
9. Mehmet Gonlibol and Haluk Ulman, 'Ikinci Diinya Savaprndan Sonra Turk Di5 Politik
1945-1965: Genel Ilurum (Turkish Foreign Policy after the Second World War, 1945-1965:

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 102 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

The General Condition) in A. Suat Bilge (ed.), Olaylarla Turk Diq Politikasi, 1919-1965
(Turkish Foreign Policy with Events) 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1969), p.245. See also Mim Kemal
Oke, A Chronology of the 'Forgotten War': Korea, 1950-53 (Istanbul, 1991).
10. Basri Daniaman, Situation Negative (The Hague, 1973), pp.i-iii.
11. Letter from General Sam Williams to Sargent Nejdet Ayhan, 12 April 1952; Williams Papers,
Box 4, Folder 4; Hoover Institution Archives.
12. Metin Tamko,, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and
Modernization of Turkey (Salt Lake City, 1976), p.229.
13. Zafer, 22 September 1951, quoted in Tamkoc, Warrior Diplomats, p.232.
14. Letter from Metin Tamkoc, 4 February 1953; Williams Papers, Box 4, Folder 22; Hoover
Institution Archives.
15. Dani~man, Situation Negative, pp.134-5.
16. Ibid., Situation Negative, p.153.
17. Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton, 1980), pp.424-5.

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