STRATEGIC STABILITY

IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC AREA

1 PAPERS
 STRATEGIC STABILITY
IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC AREA

1 PAPERS
EDITORS:
IMANTS LIEĢIS, ANDRIS SPRŪDS

LATVIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

RIGA, 2022
The eighth annual “Riga Dialogue” took place on September 30—October 1, 2021.
High-level international decision-makers and experts participated in off-the-record
discussions on the future of multilateralism, the de-escalation of NATO—Russia
tensions, and arms control and disarmament agreements. The “Riga Dialogue 2021
Papers: Strategic stability in Euro-Atlantic Area” elaborates on many of the ideas
presented at these discussions.

The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the positions of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, the Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the European Leadership Network, or
the Russian International Affairs Council.

Authors: Łukasz Kulesa, Imants Lieģis,

Sergey Utkin, Viljar Veebel

Editors: Imants Lieģis, Andris Sprūds

Cover design: Mikus Kovalevskis

Layout: Oskars Stalidzāns

© Authors of the articles, 2022

© Layout: Oskars Stalidzans, 2022
© Cover design: Mikus Kovalevskis, 2022
© Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2022
TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Riga Dialogue as a unique forum for reflecting

on Euro-Atlantic security and stability dynamics
IMANTS LIEĢIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The transatlantic unity and its challengers:

reflections on the Riga Dialogue panel “America’s return —
benefits and challenges for Europe, Russia, and China
SERGEY UTKIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Supporting democracy and hope in Kiev and Minsk

(as well as in Tbilisi and Kishinev): bitter lessons
for the EU and the Baltic countries
VILJAR VEEBEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

De-escalation through arms control

and confidence building mechanisms
ŁUKASZ KULESA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

About the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

The Riga Dialogue
as a unique forum for reflecting
on Euro-Atlantic security
and stability dynamics
IMANTS LIEĢIS

The eighth “Riga Dialogue” (henceforth “Dialogue”) took place on

30 September and 1 October 2021. Since then, strategic stability has
been impacted firstly, by Russian proposals to the USA and NATO for
security guarantees and secondly, by a series of discussions between
Russia and the USA, Russia and NATO and at the OSCE during January
2022. With troops still massed close to the Ukrainian border, relations
with Russia remain tense and contradictory, but some common
ground for discussion seemed to appear. The reflections on the 2021
Riga Dialogue were prepared prior to these recent developments.
Their impact is therefore not taken on board.
This publication made possible with the ongoing generous
support of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Riga Office, as well as
other partners, offers reflections on the Dialogue from several
distinguished participants. These introductory reflections are partly
based on the discussions, but also extend beyond them. The topics
discussed during three panel sessions were as follows: — “America’s
return — benefits and challenges for Europe, Russia and China”;
“How are developments in Ukraine and Belarus affecting stability
and security in the Baltic region and beyond?” and “Examining tools
for de-escalation through Arms Control and Confidence Building
Mechanisms”. The ensuing contributions in this publication are given
by the three rapporteurs assigned to each session. They will give
more of a focus on recommendations. The publication is part of the
overarching aim of the Dialogue to contribute to the genuine desire

5
to promote discussion and understanding, in the hope of reducing
misunderstandings between parties that have differing views on
security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic space.
Since their inception, the meetings in Riga have embraced a
hybrid format as part of a below the radar dialogue, or, to use the
commonly accepted terminology, “Track II” discussions amongst non-
governmental representatives. Dominated by “off the record” frank
discussions between experienced international affairs researchers
and practitioners from Russia, Europe and America, there has
also traditionally been a public, open discussion allowing certain
participants to engage with the Latvian journalist, student, and
academic community. High level Latvian leadership engagement
helped give an impetus to the debates. Latvia’s President, Egils
Levits, addressed participants at the opening session of the 2021
Dialogue, with the Foreign Ministry’s State Secretary, Andris Pelšs
giving a thought-provoking analysis at an informal opening dinner.
Latvia’s two term EU Commissioner, former Minister and Ambassador,
Andris Piebalgs, closed the Dialogue with his insights on energy
issues. In view of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the hybrid nature
of the Dialogue this year extended also to participants. In person
participants were essentially from Europe, with colleagues in Russia
and America linking in online.
The Dialogue has also worked on the basis that discussions have
tried to avoid becoming entangled in a “blame game” scenario, so
that the exchanges avoid the well-known arguments of each side that
apportion responsibility for the current state of play in international
relations. Instead, the element of “agreeing to disagree” has
underlined debates. The emphasis has been more on seeking even
minor areas of agreement, where solutions could be considered,
and recommendations proposed. These challenges have frequently
been difficult to meet, so that the outcome has instead resulted
more in keeping open channels of communication that have helped
in achieving some increase in trust, confidence, or at least mutual
understanding amongst participants. One reflection on the current
state of play nicely summarised the situation and increased mutual
understanding, with a mixture of “good” and “bad” news. The good
news was that in Russia, there was little appetite for escalation or

6
further confrontation with “the West” on foreign policy issues. The bad
news was that the domestic Russian scene remained nervous about
“foreign interference” in internal affairs and that these sensitivities
were unlikely to diminish. Although not specifically expressed
during discussions, there was probably an understanding amongst
participants that a similar mix of good and bad news prevailed on
the other side of the divide. Namely, an unwillingness to seek an
escalation of confrontation, but ongoing concerns about interference
in internal affairs, especially with the use of hyber-tactics.
The Riga Dialogue 2021 focussed on addressing strategic
stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. This was particularly important
given the arrival of a new administration in Washington at the
beginning of the year. Whilst “strategic stability” may mean
something different to different interlocutors, the fact that
Presidents Putin and Biden had a face-to-face summit meeting in the
summer of 2021 gave impetus and hope for strategic developments.
The two presidents agreed that the United States and Russia bear
“a unique responsibility” for maintaining strategic stability and
preventing dangerous escalation between the world’s two leading
nuclear powers. They repeated the famous Reagan–Gorbachev
declaration from 1985 that, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought”.  Indeed, in referring to this summit meeting, the
term “strategic stability” was even described as being the “flavour
of the season” by a prominent participant of the Dialogue. A follow
up to the two presidents’ summit took place with US and Russian
Foreign Ministry delegations meeting twice and agreeing to set up
two working groups on arms control and “Capabilities and Actions
with Strategic Effects.”1 Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakov
was quoted as expressing limited optimism about the outcome of
the consultations. Nevertheless, it should also be recalled that this
positive dynamic had of course been initiated when an agreement
between the two Presidents on the extension of the New Start
Agreement was reached within weeks of President Biden taking
up office and just days before the treaty was due to expire. This is
currently the only major arms control agreement left between Russia
and the US. Perhaps the most accurate description expressed about
the current state of strategic stability during the Riga Dialogue

7
discussions was that the adversarial relationship is being managed
in such a way to reduce risks and cut down costs.
China is increasingly being considered when global strategic
stability is under discussion. So, it was no surprise that as an increasing
competitor and challenger to US global dominance, China was
frequently mentioned in the Dialogue discussions. Although the aim of
the Riga Dialogue has essentially been to promote a below-the-radar
discourse between participants from adversarial camps (Russia on the
one side, the US and Europe on the other) the China factor seems to
demand an involvement of experts on China which could promote a
more informed discussion. It may be beyond the limits of the Dialogue
to either invite Chinese participants, or at least China experts in the
future. Their absence during the 2021 Dialogue was mentioned at one
stage. Indeed, China was part of the agenda of the first substantial
discussion in the context of “America’s return”.

AMERICA’S CLUMSY RETURN

The importance of the US to global strategic stability inevitably meant
that the Dialogue addressed current issues relating to America’s
“return”, following the Trump administration’s “America First” approach
and the instability injected into global affairs through the personality
of President Trump. After all, with the failure of Trump’s attempt to
secure a second term in office as President, 2021 brought high hopes
amongst US like-minded partners that the Biden administration would
bring America back into the global fold as a predictable and more
normal actor. If that was the expectation when President Biden took
up office as President, by Autumn 2021, these hopes had been at least
bruised, if not slightly shattered. The words “America is back” were
perceived with disappointment following US actions on two counts.
Firstly, through the manner of ending the military engagement in
Afghanistan and, secondly, in the management of signing the so
called AUKUS deal involving the sale of submarines to Australia and
the announcement of a new Indo-Pacific security partnership between
the US, UK and Australia. “Clumsy” was the expression President

8
Biden used in his first post AUKUS meeting with Macron at the end of
October. It could apply to the “return” in general.
The global effects of America’s return on three centres of power
were considered, namely on allies in Europe, as well as on adversaries
in Russia and China. A common thread tying together the US, Europe
and Russia was that from a domestic perspective, foreign policy issues
have limited impact in internal affairs. In other words, those in power
were more concerned about domestic issues which drove decisions,
rather than matters of foreign policy. This also meant that the Biden
decision on Afghanistan was driven by the electorate being perceived
as tiring of ongoing wars and their cost in human and financial terms.
The twenty-year anniversary in 2021 of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on
the US was seen as an opportunity to close the chapter of the war on
terrorism in Afghanistan. Whilst strategically a sound decision, the
tactical implementation was regarded by European allies as being
disastrous. A reminder of the way in which foreign affairs amongst
European powers also had scant impact on domestic issues was made
with reference to Germany’s elections. Germany lacked strategic
debates about foreign policy even when elections were not taking
place. This rule of thumb about the unimportance of foreign policy
to elections does not, however, necessarily apply across the board
in European elections. Brexit in the UK was a case in point. French
presidential elections also tend to feature European issues at quite a
high place on the agenda.
America’s handling of the submarine deal signed by the US, UK
and Australia on 15th September with the launching of a new Indo-
Pacific security partnership between the three countries resulted
in severe short-term repercussions and long-term question marks
about the meaning of America’s “return”. It was noted in the Dialogue
discussions that this US approach was viewed as being confrontational
towards EU partners, especially France. Indeed, France’s immediate
reaction was severe, with the recall of Ambassadors from Washington
and Canberra and statements expressing stabs in the back, breach
of trust and comparisons with the Trump administration’s behaviour.
With the signing of AUKUS, France had also lost the lucrative bilateral
contract they had signed a few years earlier with Australia for the
provision of French submarines. The question of an EU role in the

9
Indo-Pacific region was placed under the spotlight, given that on the
day of AUKUS, the EU announced in Brussels its own strategy for the
Indo-Pacific region. On top of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, this
episode also prompted more calls for European strategic autonomy.
The AUKUS deal was of course intended to offer US (and UK) support
for Australia against the regional challenges being posed by China.
China also viewed the deal as being confrontational.
The Dialogue also touched on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline
project between Germany and Russia for the supply of Russian gas
to Germany which avoids transit through Ukraine. Nord Stream 2 has
been perceived negatively from the outset in the Baltic—Polish region,
as it was always regarded as a politically, rather than economically
motivated project. The decision of the Biden administration to waive
sanctions, in spite of Congressional support for maintaining them and
effectively withdrawing US opposition to the pipeline, also brought
to mind Trumpism. This appeared to be a tactical move to smooth
the new administration’s relations with Germany, whilst offering a
positive spin off to the strained relations with Russia. Even though a
joint statement by the US and Germany on support for Ukraine and
European energy security was signed on 21 July 20212 following
Merkel’s meeting with Biden in Washington, this statement was
perceived during the Dialogue as being a political agreement, difficult
to enforce and therefore worthless.
America’s return clearly had a different impact on Russia. Some
initial benefit for strategic stability was obtained when Presidents
Biden and Putin agreed in February, just days before it was due to
expire, on the extension of the New Start Treaty for a period of five
years. In addition, the above-mentioned summit between both
presidents and the ensuing strategic stability talks added some
beneficial elements for Russia during the year. Russia probably
benefited in an indirect way from the Afghanistan withdrawal and the
AUKUS affair, to the extent that these created rifts between the US and
their European partners. Yet in spite of these small rays of hope in US—
Russian relations, there was a view from the Russian side during the
Dialogue discussions that in fact, Europe, especially key EU member
states, seems more open to relations with Russia. This was seen as a
route to ensuring that any marginalisation of Russia be avoided in the

10
future and as a counter-balance in Russia dealing with America. This
analysis, however, contradicts the prevailing view that Russia prefers
dealing directly with the US rather than Europe on issues of strategic
concern. The short shrift given to the EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, by Foreign Minister
Lavrov and others, during what was perceived as being Mr. Borrell’s
disastrous visit to Moscow in February 2021, also points to Russian
indifference towards the EU as a serious partner. Whereas there seem
to be some options still open for selective US—Russian cooperation.
The jury is still very much out as to whether a so called “return”
by America will contribute towards greater strategic stability.
Developments so far seem to show some benefits for Russia,
challenges for Europe and ongoing dangers in relations with China,
where a continuation of the previous administration’s policy appears
to have prevailed.

UKRAINE AND BELARUS AFFECTING

REGIONAL STABILITY
Global and regional strategic stability was shattered in 2014 by Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Eastern Ukraine.
Efforts by the Normandy Four, the US and the OSCE to resolve the
ongoing conflict have so far been unproductive and lives continue to
be lost in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions where the war rumbles on.
A mass build-up of Russian troops next to these regions in the Spring
of 2021 provoked concerns about Russia’s further intentions, although
during the Dialogue there were assertions that the Ukrainian military
was not overly concerned about these Russian military activities and
that an escalation of the situation was not to be expected. The non-
resolution of this conflict continues to be one of the main impediments
to improving strategic stability between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic
community.
Belarus is in some ways a different story, but in other respects
more of the same, if viewed from Moscow’s perspective. Namely,
the uprising of the local population in seeking to overthrow the

11
prevailing undemocratic/authoritarian regime. Something regarded
by President Putin as a dangerous signal for Russia. The difference
between instability in Belarus and Ukraine is that in the former, there
was no blatant Russian interference which sparked the instability
in Belarus in 2020. For a change, the rigged Presidential elections
keeping Lukashenko in power proved to provide the straw that broke
the camel’s back amongst the Belarus population. Despite early hopes
for a change in regime, in retaining power, Lukashenka has managed
to stifle the opposition, be drawn into closer relations with Russia,
but exacerbate relations with western neighbouring countries and
beyond by defiant and provocative actions in two instances. Firstly,
by what was described as an act of state terrorism in May. A civilian
Ryan air flight from Athens to Vilnius was forced to land in Minsk
whilst flying through Belarusian airspace on the pretext that there
was a security threat on board. On landing, Belarusian opposition
leader Roman Protasevich and his Russian girlfriend were removed
from the plane and imprisoned. There were indications of Russia’s
complicity in this high jacking. Four Russians on board — alleged to
be “operatives” — remained in Minsk after the crew was allowed to
fly on to Vilnius. Russian and Belarusian air defence systems are fully
integrated. And soon after the incident President Putin invited his
Belarusian counterpart to a meeting in Sochi as an expression of
support. Nevertheless, during the Dialogue, there were comments
made that Russia’s approach to Belarus had been very conservative
and that even after seven presidential meetings, Belarus had not been
annexed by Russia.
The second way in which Lukashenko has antagonised immediate
neighbours, and, as a consequence, both the EU and NATO, has been
the use of hybrid weapons in the form of migrants being transported
to the borders with Lithuania, Poland and Latvia and encouraged to
enter these three countries. Belarus had arranged for the migrants
to arrive in Minsk by way of direct flights from Iraq and Syria. These
actions have resulted in sanctions by the EU. Meanwhile, following
Lithuania’s request, NATO sent its Counter Hybrid Support Team to the
Lithuanian-Belarusian border in early September 2021, not long before
the planned Russian-Belarusian military exercise Zapad 2021. In the
event of tensions escalating and military elements being introduced

12
by Belarus, Latvia’s Foreign Minister warned of invoking article 4. of
the Washington Treaty, should the need arise. In a meeting with his
Polish and Baltic counterparts in September he said, “We retain the
right... if the situation evolves with military elements, to request NATO
countries to start article 4 negotiation”3. Meanwhile, NATO’s 14 June
2021Heads of State and Government Summit communique referred
to Russia’s “military integration with Belarus”.
The Zapad 2021 exercise was, during the course of the Dialogue,
perceived to threaten regional stability. It was mentioned that 200,000
Russian and Belarusian troops would participate without the presence
of western observers. A lack of transparency about the exercise,
combined with the absence of any confidence building measures
offered by Russia, added to concerns about increased threats
against NATO. The use of migrants as a hybrid warfare tactic was also
perceived as being closely linked to the Zapad exercise and offering a
further element of destabilisation.
Should efforts to diminish tensions with Belarus be made by
maintaining contacts with state officials? One participant in the
Dialogue pointed out that the Hungarian, Estonian and one other
Foreign Minister had met with the Belarusian Foreign Minister in
the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York in September
2021. Another participant stressed the importance of neighbouring
countries Lithuania, Latvia and Poland needing to actively contribute
to the dialogue between Belarus and Euro-Atlantic countries and
pointed out that Lukashenka had not yet abandoned Belarus’ territorial
integrity. Keeping the channels of communication open would
certainly coincide with the rationale behind the Riga Dialogue. Yet this
approach did not prevail during 2021 as far as Latvia was concerned,
because following the downing of the Ryan Airplane, all diplomatic
ties between Belarus and Latvia were severed. This occurred when
Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs participated in central Rīga at the flag
lowering ceremony of the Belarusian state flag and its replacement
with the red-white Belarusian flag used by the Belarusian opposition.
The flag was amongst those belonging to nations participating in the
Ice Hockey World Championship taking place in Latvia during that
time. Belarus that same day — 24th May — responded immediately by
summoning to the Foreign Ministry Latvia’s Ambassador in Minsk and

13
giving him 24 hours’ notice to leave, with remaining Latvian diplomats
being given 48 hours departure notice. Reciprocal measures were
taken by the Latvian side.
During the Dialogue it was pointed out that Lukashenka had not
yet recognised Crimea — a move that Putin would no doubt welcome.
Lukashenka was also assessed as being the best available partner
for Russia, as long as he continued with a policy of continuing with
structural dependency on his big neighbour. Although the EU has
imposed sanctions on Lukashenka, it was nevertheless mentioned
that there was no common EU policy, but the policy that was being
pursued, was essentially being shaped by Poland, Lithuania and
Latvia.

DE-ESCALATION THROUGH ARMS CONTROL

AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING
Effective arms control and confidence building measures
undoubtedly contribute to greater stability and the reduction of
tensions. Regrettably, trends during recent years have gone in
the opposite direction. The post-Cold War arms control regime
has unfurled, especially following the unravelling of the 1987
Intermediate  — Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty since 2014 and
its demise in 2019. A breakdown in trust with Russia and increasing
concerns about misunderstandings resulting in escalations of
tensions have prevailed at least since 2014, and perhaps earlier.
The positive bilateral elements of arms control measures already
mentioned with the extension of New START and the US-Russian
strategic stability dialogue can be contrasted with the culmination
of the deterioration of NATO-Russian contacts during October 2021.
This culmination came about after the Dialogue discussions. Although
high level military to military contacts continue, the closure of Russia’s
mission to NATO and the NATO offices in Moscow has effectively
suspended official business through the previously established
channels. As NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg pointed out,
NATO — Russia relations had hit a “low point” and had not been

14
more difficult since the end of the Cold War. NATO’s dual track of
maintaining defence and deterrence with openness to dialogue with
Russia, remains in force even if the latter part of this approach appears
to have hit rock bottom.
Warning signs about a risk of conflict between NATO and Russia
going nuclear as a result of miscalculations were expressed during
the Dialogue. The Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions were mentioned
as potential areas of a flaring up of incidents, either in the airspace
or at sea. At the same time there was a comment that Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania have a tendency to overstate the threat from Russia.
This can perhaps be contrasted with post — Dialogue discussions that
this author was engaged in with US, Russian and European colleagues
in late October. The Russian participants in these discussions very
much stressed that the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting that month,
US Defence Secretary’s visit to Georgia, Ukraine and Romania,
together with NATO Secretary General’s visit to Sweden and Finland
all aggravated NATO’s relations with Russia. Russian concerns were
expressed about emerging plans being prepared by NATO. These
overdramatised concerns were, meanwhile, countered by others
engaged in that discussion by saying that the various developments
on the NATO side were all very much “business as usual”. Similar to
the Riga Dialogue, such informal discussions in themselves once
again showed the value of leaving open channels of communication
amongst seasoned practitioners as a way of testing ideas and hearing
out the views of both sides.
It should also be noted that concrete practical measures seeking
to reduce tensions and promote confidence building continue to be
sought by groupings such as the European Leadership Network, the
Euro-Atlantic Senior Network Group, the Expert Dialogue on NATO-
Russian Military Risk Reduction in Europe and others. Some of these
were referred to during the Dialogue.
Coming back to the Strategic Stability Dialogue between Russia
and the US, several elements were considered during the Dialogue.
Firstly, relating to the Reagan-Gorbachev declaration from 1985 that,
“a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, repeated
by Presidents Biden and Putin. Could this be extended to a similar
declaration by the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council? This

15
was perceived as a more realistic option than expecting such a
declaration separately from London or Paris, although there could
then be a risk that the original declaration could get watered down
thereby lessening its effect. Secondly, how about bringing China into
the New START agreement between the US and Russia? Favoured by
America, doubts were expressed in the Dialogue about the feasibility
of such an idea, especially on the Russian side. The rationale being
that if the US-Russia bilateral talks were to become trilateral, then if
China were to join, why not India, Pakistan or even Israel? Thirdly, the
question arose of how, if at all, the Russia-US dialogue could impact
NATO-Russia relations? One practical answer proposed was that the
American side should at least ensure that NATO partners were fully
briefed about the progress of the talks and consultations.

CONCLUSIONS
This overview gives a flavour of some of the substantial discussions
that took place during the Dialogue between participants willing
to put aside differences of opinions, but express frank views about
issues affecting Euro-Atlantic Strategic Stability. Though not always
comfortable listening for everybody involved, the Dialogue also
offered some encouraging words. A prominent Russian participant
alluded to the prevailing view in Russia that relations with western
countries should be conducted with the major capitals, by expressing
strong disagreement with such a view. Instead, according to this
interlocutor, Baltic capitals should not be by-passed. In addition, the
other assertion that the Baltic countries were part of the problem, but
not the solution, should also be rejected. Eight consecutive years of
discussions at the Riga Dialogue, described by the same participant as
being “very special and indispensable”, appear to have left a positive
mark.
It therefore remains to look ahead to the continuation of the Riga
Dialogue in 2022. After a two-year absence, 2022 will hopefully once
again see a strong presence of American and Russian colleagues in
Riga. This will allow for a continuation of what our loyal supporter of

16
the Dialogue, Steve Andreasen of Nuclear Threat Initiative, has called
“this unique forum of discussion affecting the security and stability
dynamics of the Euro-Atlantic region”.

ENDNOTES
1
US Embassy and Consulates in the United Kingdom, US-Russia Joint Statement
on Strategic Stability Dialogue, 30 September 2021 Joint Statement on the
Outcomes of the U.S.—Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue in Geneva on Sep-
tember 30, https://uk.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-the-outcomes-of-the-
u-s-russia-strategic-stability-dialogue-in-geneva-on-september-30/
2
US State Department, US–Germany joint statement on Support for Ukraine etc.,
21 July 2021, Joint Statement of the United States and Germany on Support
for Ukraine, European Energy Security, and our Climate Goals, https://www.
state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-united-states-and-germany-on-support-for-
ukraine-european-energy-security-and-our-climate-goals/
3
Uģis Lībietis, Uldis Ķezberis, Ina Strazdiņa, Baltijas valstu un Polijas ministri Rīgā
spriež par Baltkrievijas izraisītās migrantu krīzes risināšanu, 13 September 2021,
https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/arzemes/baltijas-valstu-un-polijas-ministri-
riga-spriez-par-baltkrievijas-izraisitas-migrantu-krizes-risinasanu.a421082/

17
The transatlantic unity
and its challengers:
reflections on the Riga Dialogue
panel “America’s return —
benefits and challenges for
Europe, Russia, and China
SERGEY UTKIN

As envisaged by the concept of the event, participants of the Riga

Dialogue came from the U.S., Europe and Russia, therefore the
discussions involving China were marked by the absence of a Chinese
view. This aggravated the feeling of mystery and estrangement,
which is, to an extent, natural for a country that far away. The western
foreign policy debate has never been much different in this regard,
but China used to be less central to it. Nowadays, China is seen (along
with Russia) as the principal challenger to the West-inspired ‘rules-
based order’. The mutual suspicion and tensions grow between major
international actors. How the new President Joe Biden’s administration
in the U.S. affects those global power constellations was the topic for
the Riga Dialogue second panel.
“America’s return” is the way many in Europe framed the change
from the erratic U.S. President Donald Trump, openly hostile to the
EU, NATO and, especially, Germany, and Biden, the mainstream
Democrat. As the discussion at the Riga Dialogue revealed, one can
understand the “return” in various ways, and at this point the Biden’s
presidency leaves unanswered a lot of questions about its strategic
intentions and foreign policy.

18
THE RUSSIAN ANGLE
While Europe hoped for a “return” of the U.S. to progressive global
leadership in close cooperation with European allies, a Russian
participant suggested to look at it as a return home, prioritising
domestic business over ambitious foreign policy achievements.
However, this is a question of priorities indeed, as no one expects the
U.S. to disappear from the global arena.
Overall, the Russian view of the U.S. through the Riga Dialogue
discussions was much clearer than the European one, which was
probably helped by the adversarial character of the U.S.—Russia
relations. Even Donald Trump, whose victory at the presidential
elections has been seen by many as a result of the Russian meddling,
did not reverse the trends, on the contrary, the U.S. political system,
led by the Senate, doubled down pressure on Russia. President Biden
is expected to keep the very critical attitude to the Russian policies,
although the bigger China challenge might be a reason for more
restraint. A Russian participant of the discussion claimed that Russia
could then choose to act as a balancer in the U.S.—China rivalry,
avoiding to join any of the two camps in the making.
The discussion of a possible Russian-Chinese alliance is pretty
common now. The Russian officials, as well as Russian experts
repeatedly reject the idea, noting that Russia is determined to maintain
its independence and is not in the mood to copy the NATO-like
collective security obligations with the big neighbour. Nevertheless,
this independent position is easier to claim than certify.
Russian participants of the Riga dialogue repeatedly insisted that
Russia was not interested in being part of any costly escalation but
was not ready to step back from any of its positions either. In terms of
the U.S.—Russia relations that would mean a stabilised confrontation,
where limited cooperation could take place in niche areas of common
interest. These would include strategic stability, cyber security,
climate change and developments in the Arctic. The same would
go for Russia’s relations with many European countries, although the
relations with the EU and NATO are expected to remain at the low
level, given the consensual decision making on foreign policy in these
organisations.

19
 The alleged Russian bet on more stable international environment
was questioned by other participants who interpret Russia’s political
moves differently. To an extent this might depend on where the
benchmarks for stability are set. The critics believe that the Russia’s
actual policies are not conducive to stability, while the proponents
insist that these policies are intended to hold the lines in the power
games, and the absence of further escalation would represent the
only stability achievable in the present-day world.
While some questions might still be raised with regard to
Russia’s policies, the mainstream European political groups are quite
certain (and negative) in their assessment of those. It is much more
complicated when it comes to the relations within the transatlantic
community, which is still preached as unified by common values, while
in some areas interests and strategic goals may vary a lot.

THE EU’S QUESTION MARKS

The Riga Dialogue revealed that, in spite of an openly positive
assessment of the Biden’s win of the presidency in most of the
mainstream Europe, the U.S. policies are not yet clear enough for
allies. While the new team in Washington D.C. is way more positive
toward the EU than Donald Trump was, the details matter. Would
the U.S. be willing to support the development of the EU’s Common
Security and Defence Policy, which is seen by some as a waste of
resources that could otherwise increase NATO capabilities? Would
the U.S. demonstrate its real commitment to multilateralism and
respect the difficult negotiations process or would it rather prefer
to go it alone, relying on its unparalleled economic and political
strength? What would the proclaimed “foreign policy for the middle
class” mean? How much the U.S. expects European allies to converge
with its China-policy? Would a room of manoeuvre be left for Europe
in this global competition?
At times the European questions to the U.S. do sound as
reproaches made because of the uncooperative mood the U.S. often
has. But the U.S. is also not entirely happy with the allies’ behaviour.

20
While appealing to the U.S. to consult with them, NATO and EU
countries omit consultations with the U.S. when it comes to their
own national or multilateral foreign policy process. There is also a
notorious contrast between the EU’s ambition to speak with one voice
on foreign policy and the regularly spotted inability to do so. The U.S.
might be ready to coordinate some of its actions with the EU or within
NATO but it cannot do so with dozens of individual countries. The EU
efforts on defence, while they got a certain boost with the PESCO
projects lately, still raise questions on whether this spending, R&D
and procurement would be complementary to NATO. While these
questions persist, the transatlantic relations remain well-developed
and diverse, with multiple areas of cooperation, from traditional to
newer, like hybrid threats.
The lack of clarity goes further to the national level, where major
European states are facing their own actual or upcoming domestic
turbulence. Even the expected new German coalition government
might eventually represent a certain challenge for the transatlantic
relations, if its foreign and security policy gets under influence of
radical wings within the coalition parties.

THE CHINA FACTOR

China looms as the key issue, which major international actors within
and beyond western community would be happy to agree upon
but tend to do the opposite. While the talk about risks, which come
along with Chinese economic presence, is ever more widespread, the
economic ties to China remain lucrative and important for western
countries. Russia, while willing to maintain balance between power
centres, often has little choice rather than compensate the worsening
relations to the West through advanced cooperation with China.
The U.S. determination to counter China is therefore not the initial
approach of almost any of its allies, let alone opponents. Friends and
foes will have to be persuaded to help the U.S. cause in this way or
another. This will, of course, be easier with the countries that value the
special relationship with the U.S. most. It means that also within the

21
EU, not for the first time, there will remain a divergence of views on
major international challenges and the essence of the transatlantic
relations.
The Biden administration definitely will have its own interpretation
of the U.S. interests and tactics that will not always be shared by allies.
Nevertheless, the upside in comparison to the previous era in U.S.
politics is that the emissaries arriving from Washington D.C. are seen
as serious and honest negotiators looking for ways to achieve results
rather than disruptors. As the U.S.-Russia summit in Geneva and the
resumed talks on strategic armaments seem to demonstrate, this
might also be the impression on the side of the U.S.’ opponents.

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Much of the uncertainties discussed with the arrival of the Biden
administration refer to the future of multilateral frameworks.
Will these be used effectively in the world framed by the U.S.—
China competition, or will they falter one after the other? The
developments in the UN, the WTO, in negotiations on climate will
be a litmus test for things to come. Effort and serious attitude are
required to keep those multilateral platforms afloat. Some of them
might be seen as technical in contrast to high politics but it is at
this technical level where the spirit of international cooperation
must be maintained.
• While the West is seen by many as most prosperous and
stable part of the world, inner troubles will develop unless
properly addressed. Even with the Biden administration, which
is widely welcomed in Europe, the disagreements and/or
misunderstandings are significant. The transatlantic unity requires
attention and care. The mechanisms for ensuring this are already
available. To name just one new invention, the EU—US Trade and
Technology Council, which gathered for its inaugural meeting in
Pittsburgh in September 2021 establishing a number of working
groups, might be an important step in the right direction.

22
• The EU’s decision-making process is not just complex in itself, it
also often ends without palpable outcomes, including on foreign
policy matters. A more focused and efficient EU would also gain
in respect from external powers. The efforts needed to shape the
EU mechanisms accordingly are multiple, but one might already
be on its way. That is the so-called Strategic Compass, an attempt
to elaborate a concerted EU vision of how to deal with crises,
improve resilience, develop capabilities and approach partners.
The Strategic Compass is expected to be approved in 2022 and
might shed more light on the EU’s actual ability to overcome
differences and add value to the national agenda of its members.
• 2022 is also the year when the new NATO Strategic Concept is
expected to substitute the current one, developed in 2010. Last
time this process was used to communicate in advance with a
large number of partners, including Russia. Now, when Russia
and NATO do not see each other as partners, the task of making
NATO evolution contribute to international peace is even more
challenging. The U.S. is turning its focus toward Asia, and, when it
comes to talks with opponents on hard security, Russia and China
seem to prefer bilateral dialogue to multilateral. Whether NATO
could be marginalised by these factors remains to be seen. The
transatlantic Alliance aspires to be more united, but this unity and
determination might also deepen global fault lines and increase
risks of brinkmanship.
• The U.S. and Russia, while remaining on bad terms with one
another, managed to launch a number of negotiation tracks,
started by the presidential summit in Geneva in June 2021. Their
ability to achieve results that both powers would value will be
tested in the coming years. If it is true that both sides, preoccupied
with domestic troubles, are wary of escalating tensions, then the
old, slowly burning conflicts have to be carefully tackled, if not
resolved.
• While China is seen by the western mainstream as a growing
challenge, there are also multiple ties and communication channels
that link the West to China. Using them to reduce tensions rather
than cutting them off would be a preferable option for everyone,
though the feasibility of this approach has yet to be tested.

23
Supporting democracy
and hope in Kiev and Minsk
(as well as in Tbilisi and Kishinev):
bitter lessons for the EU
and the Baltic countries
VILJAR VEEBEL

The conflict in Ukraine that erupted in 2014 created ambivalent

emotions in the Baltic countries. The Baltic states were also among
those EU countries who demanded for strong international reaction
to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Together with Poland and some
other EU members, they took the lead and pushed for new and
tougher sanctions on Russia. Critical stance of the Baltic countries on
Russia is also one reason why Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania feel more
threatened by Russia’s aggressive ambitions today and expect to be
potential targets in the future.
So far, Western countries have sent only mixed signals to Russia.
After the outbreak of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and especially
after shooting down of the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in July 2014,
the EU institutions sent very strong and straightforward messages
to Russia by condemning the aggression of Russian armed forces
on Ukrainian soil. Despite Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior,
response of the EU still remains limited and poor. The current strategy
of the EU institutions that simultaneously pushes back, constrains and
engages Russia, with the aim of moving towards a more constructive
engagement and political commitment by the Russian leadership
might appear for whatever reason promising for the EU itself, however,
in practical terms the strategy does not contain any new elements in
comparison with previous measures the EU has already taken with

24
regard to Russia. Again and again, it is about endless declarations and
calls for speaking up for democratic values, responding to the Russian
government’s malicious actions in an appropriate manner, realizing
full potential of the Eastern partnership, engaging Russia on several
key challenges, and so on. However, it is extremely difficult to imagine
why this old approach that EU uses already for years is supposed to
finally work on Russia today. The NATO Alliance prepares itself to
counter any potential multiple-front Russian offensive and to ensure
that the Alliance has the right forces in the right place at the right time,
but still keeps avenues and channels for communication open. Russia,
however, denies all allegations and accuses NATO of destabilizing
Europe as well as of not being interested in equitable dialogue, to
quote Russia’s latest response to the Alliance’s decision of October
2021 to expel some Russian diplomats of the Russia’s mission working
at the NATO headquarter.
The EU was unprepared for conflicts that erupted in former Soviet
countries. What happened in Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine in 2014 and
in Belarus in 2020 came to a large extent as a surprise for the European
Union. In the past, all three countries were very promising partners
for the EU in the framework of the EU neighborhood policy and the
Eastern Partnership initiative. However, after many years of close
cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus the European Union
wrongly assessed the risk that conflicts break out in these former
Soviet countries and was fully unprepared for it. The Baltic countries
might have a bigger role to play here than they first realize. In this
way the West clearly underestimated the importance of Ukraine,
Georgia and Belarus for Russia today. In the battlefield of modern
hybrid warfare, keeping these former Soviet republics in its sphere
of influence might be more important for Russia today than letting
the Baltics go about 30 years ago. In more detail. As long as Russia
succeeds to flexibly reallocate its resources and actively launch and
intervene in international conflicts, harm the reputation and political
bargaining power of the Western countries and weaken the credibility
of the EU and the NATO Alliance in the eyes of ordinary people, it will
be impossible for the West to deter Russia. In other words, if things in
Kiev, Minsk and Tbilisi (as well as in Yerevan, Chisinau, Baku, Kabul and
Damascus) go in the direction that Russia wants them to go, Russia

25
also has a clear advantage over the Western countries because the
West cannot exclude Russia anymore when solving regional conflicts
or treat Russia as an international pariah.
The partnership between Belarus and Russia grows increasingly
closer. Next to frozen conflicts in Eastern Ukraine and in breakaway
regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia today we see that
Russia is “slowly taking over” Belarus. Similar problems draw Russia
and Belarus closer to each other. Both countries are more or less
treated like pariahs in the international arena and, particularly from
the viewpoint of Belarus the country simply has no other influential
allies except Russia at the regional level. Furthermore, both countries
have to cope with the EU sanctions. In recent years Russia has also
constantly pushed Belarus to take further steps towards closer
cooperation, but until recently Belarus was hesitant in this regard.
However, after the public protests in Belarus in 2020—2021 against
Alexander Lukashenko’s regime it seems that political elite of Belarus
is now more motivated to find common ground for cooperation and
communication with Russia. For example, in September 2021 both
countries agreed on the road map with the aim to move on with closer
cooperation. To quote one of the recent statements of Alexander
Lukashenko from October 2021, “We are absolutely the same both
externally and internally. We have common policy, common goals,
and we are advancing towards these goals along the same route. We
are close related nations. And without any promises we will build our
future and even you won’t be able to hinder us”1. The partnership
with Russia will be costly for Belarus, referring among other things to
Lukashenko’s recent announcement that Belarus acquires weapons
with a value of 850 million EUR from Russia by 2025, however, it is of
vital importance for Lukashenko to remain in power.
Belarus is extremely important battlefield of hybrid warfare
for Russia. The importance of Belarus for Russia should not be
underestimated. First, it imposes another geopolitical victory
for Russia that can be used both in strategic communication and
political negotiations to harm the reputation of the EU and NATO
and to increase public support for Putin’s regime in Russia. Second, it
provides extra guarantees for Russia in the long-term perspective as
it institutionalizes the ever-closer cooperation between two countries

26
and in this way helps Russia to maintain control over Belarus even after
the resignation of Alexander Lukashenko should take place at some
point in the future. Third, both countries need extensive cooperation
and coordination in the battlefield of modern hybrid warfare to achieve
their goals. Russia and Belarus use the same rhetoric when talking
about the EU and the NATO Alliance, organize joint military exercises
on NATOʼs eastern border, and so on. Furthermore, it is difficult to
imagine that current hybrid operations that Belarus organizes at the
EUʼs external borders, referring to the flights arranged by Belarus
mostly from Syria and Iraqi to facilitate transit of migrants to the EU
countries (particularly the Baltics and Poland) are not coordinated with
or even directed by Russia. Last but not least, achieving full control
over Belarus would clearly open up new “opportunities” for Russia as
regards both the Suwalki corridor and the Belarus—Ukrainian border.
From Ukraine’s perspective, the political regime of Belarus in the year
2021 is definitely more uncomfortable neighbor for Ukraine than it
was in 2019, and it is not surprising that Kiew is increasingly panicking
about it.
What is really disappointing in this regard is the reaction and
communication of the European Union, as far as recent events in
Belarus are concerned. Again, the EU takes a passive approach
in many ways and sends mixed signals both to its opponents and
allies. First, the EU has clearly missed the critical point of sending
motivating signals to Belarus. After some hesitation due to public
protests in 2020—2021, Alexander Lukashenko has now regained
its confidence and the likelihood of his resignations only decreases
over time, despite warnings of the European policy-makers and
experts that Lukashenko will not remain in power for long, because
no dictator has ever stayed in power after event like this2. In this way,
once again false hopes and unreasonable expectations are created
at the EU level that could at some point of time potentially lead to
Europe’s disappointment.
Next to that, declarative communication of the European Union
was to a large extent inadequate as far as the recent decision of
Belarus of June 2021 to suspend country’s participation in the EUʼs
Eastern Partnership initiative is concerned. This is simply another
example of the EUʼs vague Twitter-diplomacy, referring to the tweets

27
of the representatives of the EU that it is another step backwards that
escalates tensions further, together with the confirmation that EU
is ready to continue working with Belarus people to strengthen the
bonds, foster regional cooperation and tackle joint challenges. While
West is proud of its tweets and pompous words, there is nothing
what people of Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia, but also of Republic
of Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan can do with these numerous
declarations of condemnation in real life.
The EU might have missed the opportunity to make some
binding decisions as far as the future of the former Soviet republics
in the European family is concerned. It is understandable that the EU
prefers to act cautiously and not to make long-term promises without
knowing where they could lead them to. However, it is also impossible
for the EU to simultaneously stand up for the principles they declare
to support for and to keep ignoring two dictators in Belarus and
Ukraine (until they finally die at some point of time). Standing firmly in
solidarity with the people of Belarus, condemning the repression of
protesters, insisting on the need to ensure fundamental freedoms and
human rights in Belarus and other big speeches remain only empty
worlds, as long as Europeans someday really have to stay “shoulder to
shoulder” with Belarusians. Without wishing in any way to detract the
importance of EUʼs support for democratic opposition of Belarus  —
from imposing a set of sanctions on key figures of Belarus political
leadership to proposing the EU Comprehensive Plan for Belarus
after the new free elections should take place in Belarus or giving the
award of the Sakharov Prize in 2020 to the democratic opposition in
Belarus —, these measures still remain soft or have at most only very
limited positive impact on the overall situation in Belarus, while both
Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin show their “determination”
and without hesitation use violent measures to repress the opposition
leaders, protesters, journalists and other groups in the society.
However, today both organizations are hesitant in making fundamental
decisions in this respect. All what the Ukrainians, Belarusians and
Georgians have today is the so-called Twitter-support in the form of
statements confirming unwavering support of the Western countries
for sovereignty and condemning Russia’s military build-up and
destabilizing activities.

28
 Strengthening the influence of the EU and NATO in Belarus
could be the key element of deterring Russia. Belarus is an important
geopolitical anchor and strategic battlefield for Russia. It is very likely
that when Russia is sure that it has Belarus firmly under its thumb, it
feels motivated to immediately exploit this new platform and to fuel
military conflicts in Eastern Ukraine, expand its aggressive ambitions
in the form of initiating (ethnic) conflicts in the Republic of Moldova
referring to the frozen conflict in Transnistria, or further destabilize
Poland and the Baltic countries.
Although geographical proximity makes it easier for Belarus (and
Russia too) to put direct pressure on the Baltic countries and Poland, in
real terms also other EU countries are not protected because of close
economic ties, energy dependence and other linkages. For example,
although several countries like the Baltics, Ukraine and Poland have
opposed Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany relying
on the argument that it increases Europe’s energy dependence on
Russia and threatens the security of Central and Eastern European
countries. Germany whose gas import from Moscow will double after
the pipeline starts to operate has to a large extent overlooked these
worries by arguing that the EU needs to talk about which economic
relations in the gas sector are acceptable with Russia and which aren’t.
As we see it in the Baltic countries, arguments that stress the threats
on Europe’s security have been pushed into the background, as soon
as there is a risk that gas prices will go up in Germany.
The European Union needs to make it clear, first and foremost,
for itself of what kind of strategic stability is needed and preferred
by the EU, particularly in the light of the previous statement that the
EU seems to be happy about distancing itself from international
conflicts. However, the Western countries, and particularly the core
countries of the European Union should also think of what it is like to
walk in the shoes of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova
and even the Baltic countries. Seeing how the West abandons Kabul
and Minsk, they might have a justified question of what could happen
to Kiev, Riga or Tallinn if things get complicated there. As long as
the Western allies prefer to continue the “game” with bids as low as
possible, the situation fully meets Russian expectations. Thus, in the
nearest future the West should do just the opposite and take more

29
active role in conflict resolution. First and foremost, the EU also needs
to understand that there will be no improvement without making
significant investments. The argument that they are not ready and
we are not ready, but the process is under way to quote the former
President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker simply
does not hold anymore because this time people’s lives are at stake.
As a first step, the EU cannot afford itself vague statements as regards
EU-membership perspective of Ukraine and Belarus anymore, without
increasing the risk that people of Ukraine and Belarus irretrievably
lose trust in the EU. The perspective of the EU membership is basically
the one and only real “carrot” at European Union’s disposal today that
could strengthen the position of democratic opposition in Belarus
and, in this way, help to mobilize the country to choose its right path.

ENDNOTES
1
TASS, West won’t prevent Belarus, Russia from achieving their goals, Lu-
kashenko says, Russian News Agency TASS, 2 October 2021, https://tass.com/
world/1344995
2
Lukashenko will not remain in power for long. ERR (Estonian Public Broadcast-
ing) News, 18 August 2020. https://news.err.ee/1125014/antsu-lukashenko-will-
not-remain-in-power-for-long

30
De-escalation through
arms control and confidence
building mechanisms
ŁUKASZ KULESA

The picture as regards arms control may be less dramatic than a

year ago. One of the first decisions of the Biden administration after
acceding to office was to work with Russia to extend the New START
Treaty to 2026. As one of the results of the Biden-Putin summit held
in June 2021 in Geneva, the two presidents pledged that they would
“seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction
measures”, which led to the launch of the so-called Strategic Stability
Dialogue.1 Still, Russia followed the U.S. in withdrawing from the Open
Skies Treaty, after the United States decided not to come back to the
treaty. There was no progress on legally restraining the development
of INF-class land missiles, and Russian ‘moratorium’ offer on non-
deployment was still viewed with suspicion by NATO. The high
tempo of military activities resumed after a partial slowdown caused
by the COVID pandemics. The year 2021 saw major, unscheduled
concentration of Russian forces in the vicinity of Ukrainian border
and in occupied Crimea, large-scale Russian-Belarussian Zapad-21
exercises, but also a June 2021 naval incident in the Black Sea, when
British ship HMS Defender faced assertive operations by Russian ships
and aircraft. Internal crisis in Belarus and the utilization of migrants
by the Belarussian regime to destabilize the border with its EU
neighbours have brought additional risk factors to European security.
Despite a multitude of risk reduction proposals formulated by
non-governmental experts, including former politicians, diplomats,
and military professionals, multilateral channels of dialogue between
NATO and Russia remained severely constrained. This communication
channels void was exacerbated, after the Riga Dialogue, by Russia’s

31
decision to suspend the operations of its representation to NATO
and of NATO’s mission in Moscow, prompted by the NATO decision
on expelling a number of Russian diplomats accredited at NATO
HQ.2 Both sides seemed to focus on strengthening their deterrence
potential, treating the risks of accidental or inadvertent escalation
as manageable or negligeable. Some participants of the Riga
Dialogue expressed the view that the threat from the other side may
be artificially inflated to justify more aggressive foreign policy, while
others pointed to polities and military developments and actions of
Russia (or NATO states) which have been genuinely threatening for
national decision-makers and publics.
In the nuclear realm, the importance of broad international
support behind the norms such as non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, goal of complete nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses
of nuclear energy was underlined in the discussions. The principles of
international law, rules of the United Nations system and NPT-based
nuclear order remain the foundations for demanding more action
from the nuclear-weapon states towards nuclear risk reduction, for
example in the P5 framework. Repetition by presidents Biden and
Putin of the principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought” has been a positive development, but should ideally
be followed by all similar statement adopted by all P5 countries, or at
least by France and the United Kingdom, before the next NPT Review
Conference. The potential downside in negotiating wording of such
a statement at a multilateral setting could be diluting the value of the
statement through adding caveats and restrictions reflecting national
nuclear doctrines.
Moving from bilateral to multilateral dialogue on nuclear
reductions is also one of the challenges of the recently launched U.S.—
Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue. Another one is the divergence
of views about the scope of the conversation. Some participants
to the Riga Dialogue expressed doubts as regards the likelihood
of agreeing a new arms reductions treaty at the SSD. Both the U.S.
and Russia understand that their dialogue would need to include
some non-nuclear elements which may have an impact on strategic
stability. But while the U.S. insists that the negotiations on future
reductions and verification regime should include all nuclear

32
warheads, strategic and non-strategic alike, Russia seems to be more
interested in discussing long-range precision strike weapons and
U.S. missile defence capabilities. The question on how to include in
the equation some of the new capabilities, such as counter-space
systems and offensive cyber, adds to the complexity of the talks. At
the same time, it was highlighted that the fact that the SSD is taking
place should be treated as a positive development in itself, providing
the U.S. and Russia with space for improving understanding of each
other’s approaches to strategic stability, doctrines and capabilities.
The question how Europe can benefit from these bilateral discussions,
or whether parallel stability dialogues can be initiated at NATO-
Russia or EU-Russia level, remain open. One potential avenue would
be a discussion about potential arms control instrument focused on
intermediate-range missiles.
Utilizing confidence-building measures in the Baltic and Black Sea
region would be technically feasible. Among the proposals discussed
by the participants of the Riga Dialogue3, the following could be used
to stabilize the security situation:
• mutual restraint regarding the specific activities of the armed
forces, including dangerous or unprofessional aerial and sea
intercepts and encounters, as well as confidence measures related
to flights of strategic bombers;
• agreeing multilateral or new bilateral agreements for the
prevention and management of military incidents; building on
existing body of Incidents at Sea and other agreements, but
addressing comprehensively the danger of incidents not only at
sea and in the airspace above, but also the incidents which may
involve the land forces;
• information exchange regarding major exercises and troop
movement in the border area and its vicinity, especially as regards
the so-called snap exercises; modernization of Vienna Document
and review of other OSCE confidence-building measures in this
regards is long overdue in the opinion of some participants of the
Riga Dialogue;
• agreeing a set of naval CSBMs for the Baltic Sea, including pre-
notification regime for major naval exercises and other activities,
detailed information exchange on the naval forces in the region

33
 and their reinforcements, as well as notifications to the coastal
states of the deployment of specific categories of naval ships to
the Baltic Sea by third countries;
• re-establishing dialogue between Russia and NATO, including
direct contacts between the military commanders and experts, on
issues including both conventional and “new domains” activities
(e.g. in cyberspace).
Participants discussed also the question of establishing dialogue
between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization,
with some participants arguing that it may partially substitute the
NATO—Russia contacts and also could be beneficial for both sides as
regards e.g. situation in and around Afghanistan, as well as countering
international terrorism. The sceptics referred to disparity between the
potentials and differences in the mode of functioning of NATO and
the CSTO, and also the central role of Russia in the latter organization,
as factors against engagement.
Overall, a certain degree of strategic stabilization of the U.S.—
Russia relations has not had a spillover effect on the relationship
between Russia and NATO. On the contrary, the contacts have been
further reduced to absolute minimum. One potential scenario may be
the “bilateralization” of the relationships in the security sphere, with
some NATO countries pursuing their own dialogues or even some
forms of cooperation with Russia, and others focusing on building
up their deterrence and defence potential with no interactions with
Moscow. Such as scenario seems to be acceptable, if not welcomed
by Russia. The lack of functioning forum for multilateral dialogue and
atrophy of pan-European confidence-building measures may however
make any next European security crisis very difficult to manage and
contain. In this context, finding more persuasive arguments in favour
of confidence-building measures, and reaching the decision-makers
has emerged as a major challenge identified at the Riga Dialogue.

34
ENDNOTES
1
U.S.—Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability, The White House,
16 June 2021; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releas-
es/2021/06/16/u-s-russia-presidential-joint-statement-on-strategic-stability/
2
NATO Chief: Relations with Russia at Lowest Point Since Cold War, RFE/RL, 21 Oc-
tober 2021; https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-russia-master-plan-threat/31522140.html
3
Several participants referred directly to proposals included in the following
documents: Recommendations of the Participants of the Expert Dialogue on
NATO–Russia Military Risk Reduction in Europe, European Leadership Network,
December 2020; https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2020/12/Russia-NATO-Statement_25-03-21.pdf; and Evgeny Buzhinskiy,
Oleg Shakirov, Outlines for future conventional arms control in Europe: A sub-re-
gional regime in the Baltics, ELN Policy Brief, September 2019; https://www.
europeanleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief/outlines-for-future-conventional-
arms-control-in-europe-a-sub-regional-regime-in-the-baltics/.

35
About the authors

Łukasz Kulesa is Research Director at the European Leadership

Network (ELN), a London-based, non-partisan, non-profit organization,
which works to develop collaborative European capacity to address
foreign and security policy challenges. His own research interests
include NATO and Russian security policy, nuclear and conventional
deterrence, the role of missile defence, the non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and the future of arms control. Łukasz
currently resides in Warsaw, supporting ELN activities in Central
Europe.

Imants Lieģis is a Senior Researcher at the Latvian Institute of

International Affairs. He has cooperated closely with the Institute
since 2011. He was a Latvian public servant for 28 years between 1992
and 2020, during which time he served as Latvia’s Minister of Defence
(2009—2010), Member of Latvia’s 10th Saeima (Parliament) and a
career diplomat with ambassadorial postings to NATO, France, Spain,
Hungary and the Benelux countries. He is on the Advisory Board and
is an active member of the European Leadership Network. He has
published widely on foreign affairs and defence and security matters.

Andris Sprūds is the Director of the Latvian Institute of International

Affairs. He also holds the position of Professor at Riga Stradins
University. Andris Spruds has an MA in Central European History from
the CEU in Budapest, Hungary and in International Relations from
University of Latvia. He has also obtained a PhD in Political Science
from Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland. Andris Spruds has
been a visiting student and scholar at Oxford, Uppsala, Columbia
and Johns Hopkins University, as well as the Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs and Japan’s Institute of Energy Economics. His
research interests focus on energy security and policy in the Baltic Sea
region, the domestic and foreign policy of post-Soviet countries, and
transatlantic relations.

36
Sergey Utkin is the Head of the Strategic Assessment Section at
the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. In 2016—2018 he also headed
Foreign and Security Policy Department at the Moscow-based Centre
for Strategic Research. In 2012—2016 he worked at the Centre for
Situation Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences, now merged with
IMEMO. In 2006—2013 he worked at IMEMO, where his last position
was head of section for Political Aspects of European Integration. His
research is focused on the foreign and security policy of the EU, the
EU’s relations with Russia and the US, Russia’s foreign policy in the
Euro-Atlantic area.

Viljar Veebel is a Researcher of the Department of Political and

Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence College. He holds a BA in
International Relations from University of Tartu, MA in International
relations from University of Tartu (“Spill-over barrier in European
integration process”) and doctoral degree in political science (PhD)
from University of Tartu (“The Role and Impact of Positive Conditionality
in the EU Pre-Accession Policy”). He has worked as academic advisor
of the Estonian government in the European Future Convention and
as researcher for several research institutions, including OSCE, SIDA,
the European Council on Foreign Relations, Estonian Foreign Policy
Institute, Latvia Institute of International Affairs and Eurasia Group. He
has been lecturing in University of Tartu, Estonian National Defence
College, Ukrainian Diplomatic Academy, OSCE Border Management
Staff College and Estonian Diplomatic Academy. His main areas of
competence cover: Russian military doctrine and strategic ambitions;
game theory non-cooperative game models in security studies and
deterrence; positive conditionality concept in initiating reforms and
policy change; concepts and models of deterrence for small nation
states; hybrid warfare and concept of deterrence during hybrid
warfare.
 www.liia.lv

The Latvian Institute of International Affairs is the oldest Latvian think tank
that specializes in foreign and security policy analysis. The LIIA was estab-
lished in 1992 as a non-profit association to provide Latvia's deci-
sion-makers, experts and the wider public with analysis, recommendations
and information about international developments, regional security
issues and foreign policy strategies and choices. It is an independent
research institute that conducts research, develops publications and orga-
nizes public lectures and conferences related to global affairs and Latvia's
international role and policies.

In cooperation with:

European Leadership Network

www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org

Nuclear Threat Initiative

www.nti.org

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

www.fes-baltic.lv

Russian International Affairs Council

www.russiancouncil.ru