The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis

Author(s): ANDREW T. WOLFF

Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) , September
2015, Vol. 91, No. 5 (September 2015), pp. 1103-1121
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Institute of International
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 The future of NATO enlargement

after the Ukraine crisis

ANDREW T. WOLFF

The Ukrainian crisis has created the deepest rift between Russia and the West since
the end of the Cold War. This rift is a result of a complex mixture of economic,
political and historical factors, but one of its more curious antecedents is a disagree
ment over an alleged promise made over 20 years ago. Russia says the origins
of the Ukraine crisis lie in NATO's decision to expand the alliance eastward.
In a televised interview in the spring of 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin
asserted: 'We were promised (I mentioned this at the Munich security confer
ence) that after Germany's unification, NATO wouldn't spread eastward. The then
NATO Secretary-General told us that the alliance wouldn't expand beyond its
eastern borders.' Putin went on to admit that the fear of Ukrainian entry into
NATO had partly motivated his decision to annex Crimea.1 The Russian govern
ment views the situation in Ukraine through a lens of repeated western betrayal,
creeping NATO encroachment and disrespect for its security concerns.
Western governments see the situation differently. For them, the crisis in
Ukraine was sparked by Russian intervention in the internal affairs of Ukraine via
the illegal annexation of Crimea and the backing of separatist groups in the Donbas
region. As for Russia's complaints of betrayal, western leaders argue that NATO
enlargement plays no part in the crisis because enlargement provides stability for
all of Europe, and therefore is not threatening to Russia.2 The West attributes the
persistent tensions between itself and Russia to the latter's unwillingness to under
take liberal reforms and to cooperate with western powers, a reluctance it sees as
arising from historical phobias and longings for the return of past greatness. It is
clear that the two sides view the Ukraine crisis very differently.
These interpretative differences are more than semantics or verbal sparring.
Russia-NATO tensions have practical implications for stability on the European
continent. Thus, it is important to ascertain what, if any, role NATO's policy
of enlargement did play in creating the Ukraine crisis and to determine what
the future options for enlargement are. This article contends that the policy of
enlargement caused a significant and longstanding breach in relations between

Vladimir Putin, 'Direct line with Vladmir Putin', 17 April 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034, accessed 17
July 2015.
For a quick synopsis of these differing viewpoints, see Andrew Monaghan, 'The Ukraine crisis and NATO
Russia relations', NATO Review, 1 July 2014, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/russia-ukraine-nato
crisis/Ukraine-crisis-NATO-Russia-relations/EN/index.htm, accessed 17 July 2015.

International Affairs 91: 5 (2015) 1103-1121

© 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford 0x4 2dq, UK and 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA.

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Andrew T. Wolff

the West and Russia. Moreover, the tensions produced by NATO enlargement
are part of a much broader disagreement grounded in the opposition between
a liberal-minded West and a geopolitically-minded Russia. In order to reduce
these tensions, NATO leaders must admit they have failed in their attempts to
turn Russia into a reliable, western-oriented partner, realize that their open-door
enlargement policy has created insecurity in Europe, and alter this policy by
injecting it with geopolitical reasoning.
Geopolitics refers to the policy-making tool that combines geography, strategy
and relative power.3 It considers how concepts of territory and proximity interact
with political variables, and seeks to create a map of power differentials among vari
ous political units.4 In terms of NATO enlargement, geopolitics means evaluating
countries for membership on the basis not of normative criteria but of how their
inclusion increases overall alliance security, especially in relationship to Russia. It
also suggests that buffer zones play an important role in international affairs by
reducing tensions between the West and Russia through the creation of separating
space.5 A geopolitically driven enlargement policy would seek to establish Ukraine
as a neutral buffer zone. Overall, using geopolitics in enlargement policy would
have the effect of strengthening the alliance, providing more flexibility in dealing
with Russia and, ultimately, creating greater stability on the European continent.6
This article begins by reviewing diplomatic history in order to trace the evolu
tion of NATO—Russia tensions over enlargement. It shows that Russia's opposition
to NATO expansion, while fluctuating in intensity, has been a consistent source
of animosity in NATO—Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. These
tensions are more than a matter of policy dispute; they are fuelled by opposing
world-views—Russia's geopolitical perspective and the West's liberal outlook—
which clash over the structure of European security. The article also presents three
options for the future of enlargement policy, and shows that a geopolitical strategy
would spur the alliance on to pursue enlargement in the Balkans and Scandinavia,
but would deny admission to Georgia and Ukraine. The closing sections explain
the challenges of adopting a geopolitical enlargement policy, and describe how
such a policy would benefit the alliance and improve relations with Russia.

For more about this definition, see Gertjan Dijkink, National identity and geopolitical visions: maps of pride and
pain (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 11—15. For a discussion of the various forms of geopolitical analysis,
see Gearôid O'Tuathail and Gerard Toal, 'Problematizing geopolitics: survey, statesmanship, and strategy',
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 19: 3, 1994, PP· 259-72.
Saul B. Cohen, Geopolitics: the geography of international relations, 3rd edn (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2015), pp. 15-16.
For a review of the basics of the 'buffer zone' concept, see Nicholas J. Spykman, 'Frontiers, security, and inter
national organization', Geographical Review 32: 3, July 1942, pp. 440-41. These buffer zones may also reduce
tensions by facilitating the exchange of ideas and trade between cultures. See Saul B. Cohen, 'Geopolitics in
the new world era: a new perspective on an old discipline', in George J. Demko and William B. Wood, eds,
Reordering the world: geopolitical perspectives on the 21st century (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), pp. 38-44. For
the application of this concept to enlargement debates, see John O'Loughlin, 'Ordering the "crush zone":
geopolitical games in post-Cold War eastern Europe', Geopolitics 4:1, 1999, pp. 46—9.
For more on the geopolitical aspects of enlargement, see John Hillen and Michael P. Noonan, 'The geopolitics
of NATO enlargement', Parameters 28: 3, 1998, pp. 21-34; Martin A. Smith and Graham Timmins, 'Russia,
NATO and the EU in an era of enlargement: vulnerability or opportunity?', Geopolitics 6:1, 2001, pp. 69-90;
F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Russia, Ukraine, and central Europe : the return of geopolitics', Journal of International
Affairs 63: 2, Spring-Summer 2010, pp. 33-52.

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 The future of NATO enlargement

The history of NATO-Russia tensions over enlargement

In order to understand the role NATO enlargement has played in the Ukraine
crisis it is necessary to summarize the reasons why the origins and evolution of the
policy produced a long-lasting rift between Russia and the West. One must recall
that the demise of communism in Europe took the West by surprise. Western
leaders did not have a roadmap to guide Europe through this time of uncertainty.
Also, the fall of communism in eastern Europe was not entirely peaceful: the
anti-communist revolts in Romania and Lithuania were violent, the Soviet Union
experienced a coup in August 1991 and Yugoslavia descended into a series of brutal
wars. Amid this chaos, Russia came to believe that western leaders explicitly
promised not to expand NATO eastward.

The 'no expansion' pledge

There is ample evidence to support Russia's complaint that western leaders prom
ised not to expand NATO to the east. During the 2+4 negotiations to reunify the
two Germanies, US Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister
Hans-Dieter Genscher gave assurances to the Soviets that NATO would not expand
after the incorporation of East Germany. In a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minis
ter Eduard Shevardnadze and Soviet Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev at the

Kremlin on 9 February 1990, Baker asked: 'Would you prefer to see a united
Germany outside of NATO and with no US forces, or would you prefer a unified
Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift
one inch eastward from its present position?'7 Genscher stated in a speech at the Tutzing
Protestant Academy on 31 January 1990: 'What NATO must do is state unequivo
cally that whatever happens in the Warsaw Pact there will he no expansion of NATO
territory eastwards, that is to say closer to the borders of the Soviet Union. '8 Also, NATO
Secretary-General Manfred Worner said the alliance did not seek a 'shift of balance
or an extension of its military borders to the east'.9 Russia claims statements such
as these prove that western leaders pledged to limit NATO's growth.
The West's rebuttal of Russia's claim is three-pronged. First, it argues that
the 'no expansion' pledge pertained only to NATO military forces within East
Germany and did not apply to other ex-communist countries which were not a
party to the 2+4 negotiations.10 Second, it maintains that any supposed promise is
invalid because it was not codified in a treaty and does not carry the force of law."
Third, NATO emphasizes that the supposed 'no expansion' pledge is a violation

Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a new era: the United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991, rev. edn (Balti
more, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 395 (emphasis added).
Stephen F. Szabo, The diplomacy of German unification (New York: St Martin's, 1992), p. 58 (emphasis added).
Quote from Defense News, 29 April 1991, cited in Gerald B. Solomon, The NATO enlargement debate, 1990-1997
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 8.
In the Clinton administration, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs John Kornblum
developed this argument. For more details, see Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: the struggle to create post-Cold War Europe
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 206-207.
Michael Ruhle, 'NATO enlargement and Russia: discerning fact from fiction, American Foreign Policy Interests
36: 4, 2014, p. 235.

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Andrew T. Wolff

of the 1975 Helsinki Charter which enshrines the right of a country to choose its
own alliances.12 Even so, NATO knew it risked sparking Russian hostility when it
began to craft the policy of enlargement. Alliance leaders downplayed this danger
because they believed Russia could be persuaded by their arguments of NATO's
new-found benevolence and their offers of a new cooperative partnership.
Putting aside the facts behind the 'no expansion' pledge, what appears to matter
for the Ukraine crisis is the perception that a pledge was made.13 Even if the
West did not make an explicit promise, Russia firmly believes that NATO offered
a gentlemen's agreement in 1990, and then by its subsequent actions broke that
agreement. For Russia, it is the West that is responsible for spoiling an opportu
nity to create a lasting and inclusive peace in Europe. Even former Soviet Premier
Mikhail Gorbachev, who has admitted that the context of the 1990 discussions
over NATO's eastward expansion were confined to East Germany, has said that
NATO's decision to expand the alliance was 'definitely a violation of the spirit
of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990'.14 This is a case of one side's
misperception creating political and diplomatic realities. NATO's alleged broken
promise has become a central thread in a Russian narrative according to which the
West treats Russia as an adversary and an outsider.15

The birth of enlargement and Russia's reaction

NATO's enlargement policy developed organically through the 1990s.16 This

process included a vigorous debate within the alliance about the pros and cons of
expanding its membership. Proponents argued that NATO expansion would help
former communist states make the transition to democracy, stabilize a security
vacuum in central and eastern Europe, and foster a continent-wide security

12 Michael Riihle, 'NATO enlargement and Russia: myths and realities', NATO Review, ι July 2014, http://
www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Russia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Nato-enlargement-Russia/EN/index.htm,
accessed 27 Jan. 2015.
13 There is considerable scholarly debate about the existence and meaning of the 'no expansion' pledge. Partici
pants in the 2+4 negotiations disagree among themselves about what was implied during the 1990 talks. See
Uwe Klussman, Matthias Schepp and Klaus Wiegrefe, 'NATO's eastward expansion: did the West break
its promise to Moscow?', Spiegel Online, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward
expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-druck.html, accessed 17 July 2015. Mary
Elise Sarotte concludes that 'no eastern expansion' discussions were merely one moment during ever-fluctu
ating 2+4 negotiations: Mary Elise Sarotte, 'Not one inch eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev,
and the origin of Russian resentment toward NATO enlargement in February 1990', Diplomatic History 34:
i, Jan. 2010, pp. 128-9. Mark Kramer argues that western leaders did not give a 'no expansion' pledge and
the Soviets did not seek such a promise. See Mark Kramer, 'The myth of no-NATO-enlargement pledge to
Russia', Washington Quarterly 32: 2, April 2009, pp. 47-9.
14 Maxim Korshunov, 'Mikhail Gorbachev: I am against all walls', Russia Behind the Headlines, 16 Oct. 2014,
http://rbth.com/international/20i4/10/i6/mikhail_gorbachev_i_am_against_all_walls_40073 .html, accessed
17 July 2015.
15 Reacting to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's speech at the 2015 Munich Security Conference, Wolf
gang Ischinger said: 'It seems that we [Russia and the West] have different history books ... [We have a] great
discrepancy of narratives': Nina Werkhâuser, 'Russia, West face deep divide', Deutsche Welle, 8 Feb. 2015,
http://www.dw.de/russia-west-face-a-deep-divide/a-18243006, accessed 17 July 2015.
16 For more on the history of enlargement, see James M. Goldgeier, Not whether but when: the US decision to enlarge
NATO (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999); George W. Grayson, Strange bedfellows: NATO
marches east (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999); Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO's door: how
the alliance remade itself for a new era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

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 The future of NATO enlargement

community.17 Supporters of enlargement frequently asserted that an expanded

NATO would benefit everyone in Europe, including Russia. Opponents
maintained that NATO was no longer necessary for Europe's security after the
end of the Cold War, worried that integrating former communist countries was
too costly, and argued that enlargement was dangerous because it would provoke
Russia.18 In the event, NATO leaders could not resist calls to assist former
communist countries and transformed NATO into more than a mutual defence

organization;19 but at the same time signs of western distrust of Russia became
apparent in the decision-making process of enlargement. NATO determined,
for example, that Russia should have no veto over any enlargement decision.20
This showed that the West was forging ahead with an expanded NATO security
system for Europe which excluded Russia.
Even before NATO began to debate the policy of enlargement openly, the
Russian government under Boris Yeltsin judged that eastward expansion of the
alliance would be a threat to Russia's national interests.21 As NATO author

ized a formal study of enlargement at the end of 1994, Russian hostility to the
idea became openly shrill. At the December 1994 Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe conference in Budapest, President Yeltsin spoke in harsh
tones about NATO enlargement and said that the pursuit of this policy put
'Europe in danger of plunging into a cold peace'.22 Russia's hostility to enlarge
ment continued throughout the mid-1990s until the Founding Act of May 1997
created a new basis for NATO—Russian relations through the establishment of the
Permanent Joint Council. The Founding Act smoothed the road for NATO's first
eastward expansion to incorporate the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in
1999; but having an institutional relationship with NATO did not fully convince
Russia of the benignity of NATO enlargement. Russian Foreign Minister
Yevgeny Primakov considered the Founding Act to be merely damage limitation,

17 See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Building a new NATO', Foreign Affairs
72: 4, Sept.-Oct. 1993, pp. 28-40; Henry A. Kissinger, 'Expand NATO now', Washington Post, 19 Dec. 1994,
p. A27; Strobe Talbott, 'Why NATO should grow', New York Review of Books, 10 Aug. 1995, pp. 27-30; Rich
ard Holbrooke, 'America, a European power', Foreign Affairs 74: 2, March-April 1995, pp. 38-51; William E.
Odom, 'NATO's expansion: why the critics are wrong', The National Interest, Spring 1995, pp. 38-49; Made
leine Albright, 'Enlarging NATO: why bigger is better', The Economist, 15 Feb. 1997, pp. 21-3; Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Ά geostrategy for Eurasia', Foreign Affairs 76: 5, Sept.—Oct. 1997, pp. 50-65.
18 See Michael Mandelbaum, 'Preserving the peace: the case against NATO expansion', Foreign Affairs 74: 3,
May-June 1995, pp. 9-13; George Kennan, 'Fateful error', New York Times, 5 Feb. 1997, p. A19; Robert J.
Art, 'Creating a disaster: NATO's open door policy', Political Science Quarterly 113: 3, 1998, pp. 383-403 ; Amos
Perlmutter, 'The corruption of NATO: NATO moves east', in Ted Galen Carpenter, ed., NATO enters the 21st
century (London: Cass, 2001), pp. 129-53; Roland Dannreuther, 'Escaping the enlargement trap in NATO
Russian relations', Survival 41: 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 145-64.
19 For more on NATO's transformation, see Ivan Dinev Ivanov, Transforming NATO: new allies, missions, and
capabilities (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011); Andrew T. Wolff, 'The structural and political crisis of NATO
transformation', Jowrna/of Transatlantic Studies 7: 4, Dec. 2009, pp. 477-82; Richard K. Betts, 'The three faces
of NATO', The National Interest, March—April 2009, pp. 31-8.
20 NATO, 'Study on NATO enlargement', 3 Sept. 1995, ch. 2.C.27, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_24733.htm, accessed 17 July 2015.
21 This conclusion comes from the 'Primakov Report' by the Russian External Intelligence Service in autumn
1993. See Alexander A. Sergounin, 'Russian domestic debate on NATO enlargement: from phobia to damage
limitation', European Security 6: 4, Winter 1997, pp. 61—2.
22 Elaine Sciolino, 'Yeltsin says NATO is trying to split the continent again', New York Times, 6 Dec. 1994, p. A10.

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Andrew T. Wolff

and Russian hostility towards the policy continued to simmer.23 In February 1999,
Russia declared that any further expansion of NATO would cross a 'red line'.24
Soon after this declaration, the centrepiece of NATO's new relationship with
Russia, the Permanent Joint Council, failed because of the war in Kosovo.25

Temporary abatement of tension in the early 2000s

Another phase of NATO—Russia tensions around enlargement occurred as a result

of political change in Russia and a new strategic environment ushered in by the 11
September 2001 terrorist attacks. The new President of Russia from 2000, Vladimir
Putin, was initially less hostile to NATO enlargement than his predecessor.26 His
Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov signalled acquiescence in NATO enlargement to
the Baltic states by stating: 'Russia is not planning to get overly dramatic about the
situation.'27 The 11 September terrorist attacks on America further muted some of
Russia's objections to enlargement. The following month Putin said: 'If NATO
takes on a different shade and is becoming a political organization ... we would
reconsider our position with regard to such expansion, if we are to feel involved
in such processes.'28 NATO responded by offering a new partnership with Russia,
one based on anti-terrorism cooperation and the creation of the NATO—Russia
Council.

The 11 September attacks also altered NATO's own reasoning about enlarge
ment. As well as arguing that enlargement promoted democracy and provided
stability, NATO leaders now included the point that new members would bolster
the alliance's anti-terrorist capabilities. US President George W. Bush stated at the
2002 Prague summit that:

Expansion of NATO also brings many advantages to the alliance itself. Every new member
contributes military capabilities that add to our common security. We see this already in
Afghanistan—for forces from Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia and others
have joined with 16 NATO allies to help defeat global terror.29

This reframing of enlargement as helping in the fight against global terror

made it more palatable to Russia. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov affirmed: 'Russia
no longer considers NATO enlargement to be a menace because the alliance has

23 Riihle, 'NATO enlargement and Russia: discerning fact from fiction, p. 237.
24 Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeny Gusarov made these comments at the 1999 Munich Security Conference.
See Robert Burns, 'Russia opposes more NATO expansion', Associated Press, 7 Feb. 1999.
25 For more details on the shortcomings of the Founding Act, see Peter Trenin-Straussov, The NATO-Russia
Permanent Joint Council in 1997-1999: anatomy of a failure (Berlin: Berliner Informationszentrum fur Transatlan
tische Sicherheit, July 1999), pp. 1-8.
26 Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme Herd, 'Russia and NATO: from windows of opportunities to closed doors',
Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23: 1, 2015, pp. 46-7.
27 Statement made on 19 July 2002. See Mark Kramer, 'NATO, the Baltic states and Russia: a framework for
sustainable enlargement', International Affairs 78: 4, Oct. 2002, p. 748.
28 William Drozdiak, 'Putin eases stance on NATO expansion', Washington Post, 4 Oct. 2001, p. Ai. See also Frank
Csongos, 'Russia: Moscow's concern over NATO expansion easing', Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 26
Oct. 2001, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1097816.html, accessed 17 July 2015.
29 George W. Bush, 'Remarks to the Atlantic student summit', Prague, Czech Republic, 20 Nov. 2002,
http://2001-2009.state.g0v/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/15317.htm, accessed 10 Feb. 2015.

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The future of NATO enlargement

undergone a radical transformation from a cold war instrument to a defence

against global terrorism and other 2ist-century threats.'30 NATO believed Russia
had finally accepted the legitimacy of enlargement, and the alliance proceeded
with its second round of expansion, admitting seven former communist states
in 2004. Yet Russia's accepting attitude was not long-lived. By the mid-2000s,
goodwill between Russia and NATO had evaporated.

The resurgence of Russian hostility

The next phase of anti-enlargement rhetoric was initially directed at Georgia and
Ukraine. In June 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned Ukraine
not to join NATO and complained that the entry of Georgia and Ukraine into
the alliance would constitute a 'colossal geopolitical shift' for Russia.31 But it
was at the 2007 Munich Security Conference that the full resumption of Russian
hostility towards enlargement policy became apparent. In his speech to the confer
ence Putin said: Ί think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any
relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in
Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level
of mutual trust.'32 With the possibility of NATO offering Georgia and Ukraine
a Membership Action Plan (MAP), Russia decided it needed to be more vigorous
in its opposition to enlargement. At NATO's Bucharest summit in 2008, Putin
cautioned: 'We view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders
... as a direct threat to the security of our country.'33 The alliance decided at
this summit to delay offering Georgia and Ukraine a MAP while stating that
both countries would become members in the future.34 This muddled decision—
delaying a membership plan while promising membership—indicates the lack
of consensus within the alliance on the future direction of enlargement. Some
alliance members, most notably France and Germany, feared that further eastward
expansion would only provoke Russia, while others continued to believe in the
transformative power of an expansive enlargement policy.35
A few months after the summit, Russia and Georgia went to war, which had
the effect of halting serious discussion of Georgia joining the NATO alliance.

30 Summary of interview with Igor Ivanov: Michael Binyon, 'Kremlin enjoys the fruits of its foreign policy',
The Times, 21 Nov. 2002, p. 16.
31 Nick Paton Walsh, 'Russia tells Ukraine to stay out of NATO', Guardian, 7june 2006, http ://www.theguardian.
com/world/20o6/jun/o8/russia.nickpatonwalsh, accessed 17 July 2015.
32 Vladimir Putin, 'Remarks at the 43rd Munich Security Conference', Munich, 10 Feb. 2007, http://www.
washingtonpost.c0m/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html, accessed 11 Feb. 2015. For
a summary of western reactions to this speech, see Stephen Lee Myers, 'No Cold War, perhaps, but surely a
lukewarm peace', New York Times, 18 Feb. 2007.
33 Vladimir Putin, 'Remarks by Russian President Vladimir Putin at NATO Bucharest summit press conference',
4 April 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24903, accessed 17 July 2015.
34 'NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed
today that these countries will become members of NATO' : NATO, 'Bucharest summit declaration', 3 April
2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm, accessed 17 July 2015.
35 For more on this decision and the confusion it sowed about the future of the enlargement process, see Dusica
Lazarevic, 'NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia: old wine in new bottles?', Connections: The Quarterly
Journal 9:1, Winter 2009, pp. 45-6.

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Andrew T. Wolff

NATO's half-step membership decision at Bucharest may have had a hand in

sparking this conflict, signalling as it did that the alliance was internally divided
and would not intervene on Georgia's behalf—or possibly provoking Russia by
indicating that NATO was proceeding with integrating Georgia regardless of
Russia's warnings against enlargement. In either case, the war was a dramatic sign
that Russia would use force to stop the eastward march of NATO membership.36
Russia intensified its anti-enlargement attitude in February 2010 with a new
military doctrine listing NATO expansion as a primary threat.37 During a televi
sion interview in 2013, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu identified NATO expansion
as one of the top three threats to Russia, along with terrorism and withdrawal of
international aid to Afghanistan.38 Since the Georgia-Russia war, NATO leaders
have not been as quick or assertive to counter Russian anti-enlargement rhetoric
as they were previously. Discussions about the merits of enlargement subsided,
partly in response to America's 'reset' strategy with Russia and its 'pivot' to Asia.
A bipartisan US commission urged President Barack Obama to consider alterna
tives other than admitting Ukraine and Georgia into NATO as formal members.39
Yet despite the West's more subdued tone, enlargement tensions reached another
boiling point during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. Although it was actually EU
policy which sparked the Euromaidan protests, through Ukraine's failure to sign
the EU's association agreement, Russia feared that any policy that moved Ukraine
closer to the West would eventually pave the way for Ukraine to join NATO.40
Throughout the post-Cold War period, notwithstanding the variable inten
sity of Russia's criticism of NATO's enlargement policy, its central argument has
remained fairly consistent: that NATO represents an outdated military bloc and
its encroachment in the Russian borderlands is a threat to Russian security. Like
the war with Georgia, the Ukraine crisis shows that Russia is quite willing to use
military force to ensure that its near abroad does not turn towards the West. It is
also apparent that NATO leaders have failed for two and half decades to convince
Russia of the benefits and benign intent of enlargement. Russia's persistent resent
ment of enlargement policy makes any enduring cooperation between Russia and
NATO difficult to achieve; and it is a resentment that stems from a deep difference
in world-views.

36 Asmus claims that the war was about stopping NATO enlargement: Ronald D. Asmus, A little war that shook
the world: Georgia, Russia, and the future of the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 221. See also Denis
Dyomkin, 'Russia says Georgia war stopped NATO expansion', Reuters, 21 Nov. 2011, http://in.reuters.
com/article/20ii/ii/2i/idINIndia-6o645720ini2i, accessed 17 July 2015. For a broader discussion of Russian
motives behind the war, see Roy Allison, 'Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to "coerce Georgia to
peace'", International Affairs 84: 6, Nov. 2008, pp. 1145-71.
37 'The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation', 5 Feb. 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/2oiorussia_military_doctrine.pdf, accessed 17 July 2015.
38 'Russian Defense Minister sees terrorism, NATO expansion as main threats', Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty,
9 Nov. 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-defense-terrorism-nato/25163293.html, accessed I7july 2015.
39 The recommendation is found in Chuck Hagel and Gary Hart, The right direction for US policy toward Russia: a
report from the Commission on US Policy toward Russia (Washington DC : Belfer Center for Science and Interna
tional Affairs and The Nixon Center, March 2009), p. 9.
40 For details on the EU's role in sparking the crisis, see Hiski Haukkala, 'From cooperative to contested Europe?
The conflict in Ukraine as a culmination of a long-term crisis in EU—Russia relations', Journal of Contemporary
European Studies 23: 1, 2015, pp. 33-6; Neil MacFarlane and Anand Menon, 'The EU and Ukraine', Survival
56: 3, 2014, pp. 95-101.

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The future of NATO enlargement

Opposing world-views and enlargement

Behind the enlargement controversy lies a larger and more fundamental disagree
ment between Russia and the West about the structure of security in Europe. This
fundamental disagreement is based on Russia having a geopolitical world-view and
the West having a liberal world-view.41 Russia sees the world in terms of relative
power calculations, national sovereignty and security of the homeland. The West,
on the other hand, believes in the transformative power of free markets, promotes
liberal political reform and champions human rights. Neither side's vision of inter
national affairs is entirely consistent; but in each case it guides most international
policy, and both are intertwined with the NATO enlargement dispute.
Russia's foreign policy is rooted in geopolitics and pragmatic steps to bolster its
power and security. It is, as George Kennan famously said of Russians in his 'Long
Telegram', obsessed with the territorial defence of the motherland.42 From this
perspective, NATO enlargement creates a security dilemma: for every addition to
NATO's membership inherently detracts from Russian security and causes Russia
to react by seeking greater security.43 For Russia, the policy of moving NATO's
borders closer to the Russian heartland is about the West expanding its zone of
influence and concurrently reducing Russian power. Sergei Karaganov explains:

NATO expansion is nothing more than the extension of its zone of influence—and in the
most sensitive military and political spheres. And yet the West's unwillingness to abandon
that effort is coupled with a repeated refusal to recognize Russia's right to have its own
zone of interest. So NATO expansion has left the Cold War unfinished. The ideological
and military confrontation that underlay it is gone, but the geopolitical rivalry that it
entailed has returned to the fore.44

Seeing the world as they do from this geopolitical perspective, Russians

perceive that NATO's policy of enlargement is butting into Russia's 'region of
privileged interests'.45 Russia believes that it should naturally have a proportion
ately stronger sway than the West in its near abroad. In a sense, Russian foreign
policy is neo-imperialist in its intention to dominate the foreign and economic
relations of its closest neighbours.46 Russia has also produced a tailored version
of geopolitics called Eurasianism. Its founder, Alexander Dugin, has a receptive
audience among Russian political and military elites, and his ideology envisions
an expanded Russia that has the ability to shape politics in Europe, the Middle

41 For more on these two world-views and the dominance of liberal foreign policy thinking in the West, see John
J. Mearsheimer, 'Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: the liberal delusions that provoked Putin', Foreign
Affairs 93: 5, Sept.-Oct. 2014, pp. 82-4.
42 George Kennan, 'Long Telegram', 22 Feb. 1946, http://www.trumanhbrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/
coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf, accessed 17 July 2015.
43 Charles L. Glaser, 'The security dilemma revisited', World Politics 50: 1, 1997, pp. 177-8.
44 Sergei Karaganov, 'Russia will save the West', Moscow Times, 29 Dec. 2009, http://www.themoscowtimes.
com/opinion/article/russia-will-save-the-west/396905.html, accessed 17 July 2015.
45 For more on this concept, which Russia President Medvedev announced in August 2008, see Dmitri Trenin,
'Russia's spheres of interest, not influence', Washington Quarterly 32: 4, Oct. 2009, pp* 3~22.
46 Janusz Bugajski, 'Russia's pragmatic reimperialization', Caucasian Review of International Affairs 4: 1, Winter
2010, pp. 7—10.

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Andrew T. Wolff

East and Asia.47 Eurasianism theorizes that in order for Russia to be a Great

Power it must dominate the entry and exit points of Eurasia.48 Ideas such as neo
imperialism, Eurasianism and seeking 'privileged interest' can all be characterized
as geopolitical views of international relations.
In Russia's geopolitical world-view, NATO expansion is acceptable only so
long as NATO becomes primarily a political forum and is much less military
oriented. For this to occur, the West has to include Russia in the maintenance
of Europe's security. This inclusion could be accomplished either by Russia's
joining NATO as a fully fledged member or through the construction of a new
European collective security apparatus.49 For its part, the West has never allowed
Russia to participate fully in managing Europe's security, and this partial exclu
sion has fuelled Russian mistrust and reaffirmed its geopolitical perspective. The
fact that NATO greatly expanded its membership without including Russia in
the decision-making process—while also keeping a strong military presence
in Europe, attacking the pro-Russian Serbian government in 1999, supporting
democratic revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, recognizing Kosovan independ
ence in 2008 without Russian approval, and proposing a European-based missile
defence system—set alarm bells off in Russia. In this context, the West's insist
ence that its liberal-inspired enlargement policy is good for Russia rings hollow.
In Russia's geopolitical world-view, enlargement is highly destabilizing to its
security; and therefore, annexing Crimea to prevent Ukraine fromjoining NATO
is completely rational.50 But only some of the blame for this ideological clash can
be placed on western shoulders; for Russia never truly desired to integrate with
the West and refused to adopt a liberal mentality. Even so, given that Russia is
apparently unable or unwilling to change its world-view, then perhaps NATO
should consider altering its liberal-based policies in a way that better copes with
Russia's intransigence.

47 There is an extensive literature on Eurasianism and Alexander Dugin. For a sample, see: Alan Ingram, 'Alexan
der Dugin: geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia', Political Geography 20: 8, Nov. 2001, pp. 1029-51 ;
Andrei P. Tsygankov, 'Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia's geopolitical thinking after the Soviet break-up',
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36: 1, March 2003, pp. 101-27; John B. Dunlop, 'Aleksandr Dugin's
foundations of geopolitics', Demokratizatsiya 12: 1, Winter 2004, pp. 41-57; Dmitry Shlapentokh, 'Dugin
Eurasianism: a window on the minds of the Russian elite or an intellectual ploy?', Studies in East European
Thought 59: 3, Sept. 2007, pp. 215—36; Natalia Morozova, 'Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian foreign policy
under Putin', Geopolitics 14: 4, Winter 2009, pp. 667-86.
48 John Berryman, 'Geopolitics and Russian foreign policy', International Politics 49: 4, July 2012, p. 537.
49 Russia has repeatedly asked NATO if it could join the alliance. For a short summary of these requests, see
Jakub Kulhanek, 'Russia's uncertain rapprochement with NATO', RUSI Journal 156: 1, Feb.-March 2011,
p. 43. For details of Russia's idea for a pan-European security system, see Glenn Diesen and Steve Wood,
'Russia's proposal for a new security system: confirming diverse perspectives', Australian Journal of Interna
tional Affairs 66: 4, Aug. 2012, pp. 450-67. For a more general summary of the proposal and western reactions,
see Bobo Lo, Medvedev and the new European security architecture (London: Centre for European Reform, 2009),
PP· i~9·
50 Roy Allison identifies this as an explicit policy of strategic denial. See Roy Allison, 'Russian "deniable" inter
vention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules', International Affairs 90: 6, Nov. 2014, pp. 1269-74.
Allison also argues that domestic political consolidation was another significant motivating factor behind
Russia's annexation of Crimea.

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 The future of NATO enlargement

Options for NATO enlargement

How should NATO respond to Russia's deep hostility towards enlargement

fuelled by its geopolitical world-view? Realistically speaking, the alliance can
consider one of three options for enlargement: discard, maintain or recast its
policy.51 Option one, discarding enlargement, means that NATO halts its open
door policy in the short to medium term, barring any more countries fromjoining
the alliance. Halting enlargement has the benefit of removing a thorn from Russia's
side and could be a basis for warmer relations with Russia. If enlargement policy
is one of the sources of tension, why not discard it? This policy option would
ease Russian security concerns and give Russia its sought-after areas of privileged
interest. The downsides of this option are that it is a vision of a NATO in stasis
and it means diminished alliance influence in eastern Europe. This option amounts
to acquiescence in Russian demands and signals weakness to the rest of the world.
It could also encourage Russia and other states to take tougher stances against
western security concerns. Because of these risks, NATO should not choose this
policy option.
The second option, maintaining the current enlargement policy, implies that
NATO retains its vision of an ever-open door to prospective new members and
continues to espouse the transformative rationales for enlargement. The implica
tion of this choice is that NATO seeks eventually to incorporate almost all of
Europe into the alliance, including Georgia and Ukraine. This is a policy based on
the West's ability to encourage internal reform in candidate countries and represents
an expansive vision of western security and economic prosperity. One problem
with this option is that it has so far failed to turn Russia into a reliable partner and
will probably continue to aggravate its government. If NATO continues with its
business-as-usual enlargement policy, then, it risks perpetuating European insta
bility in the form of Russian hostility and periodic episodes of conflict. Another
problem with the current policy is that enlargement is bogged down and lacking
in purpose. NATO leaders need to recognize that the golden age of unencum
bered and unrestricted western expansion has come to an end, and that pursuing
a policy of enlargement in its current form is no longer wise.
Option three, recasting enlargement policy, entails NATO injecting geopo
litical thinking into the process of enlargement. This means thinking more
purposefully about the strategic benefits of each potential candidate country and
downgrading, though not completely jettisoning, the democratization and trans
formative rationales of enlargement. Adopting a more geopolitical rationale for
enlargement will lead to NATO determining that certain candidate countries are
not strategically important and should be excluded from membership for decades
to come. Conversely, other countries will rise in strategic importance, prompting

51 Admittedly, there are more than three options for NATO to pursue. Other options include disbanding the
alliance, creating a new security organization with Russia as an equal partner, and a hyper-enlargement option
where NATO accepts members from around the globe, e.g. Japan, Israel, Jordan or Australia. These are not
listed as viable options because their adoption seems highly improbable and would be too disruptive of the
international system.

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Andrew T. Wolff

the alliance to actively court them for membership. Furthermore, thinking geopo
litically will allow NATO leaders to make trade-offs with Russia which could
become the basis for a new balance of power peace in Europe. The drawbacks
to the geopolitical option are that it does not guarantee that Russia will drop
its overall hostility towards NATO, and that it will have negative economic and
political consequences for countries deemed unworthy of NATO membership.
But this geopolitical option does not mean that the West has to give up pressing
for liberal reforms in eastern Europe; moreover, it preserves western strength
and provides a means for safely navigating Europe's new security environment.
A geopolitical enlargement threads the needle of not giving in to all of Russia's
demands and not continuing with a Utopian policy that antagonizes Russia.52

Details of a geopolitical NATO enlargement policy

What exactly would an enlargement policy motivated by geopolitics look like?

In terms of implementation, pursuing a geopolitical enlargement policy means
reprioritizing NATO's enlargement principles. Candidate countries would be
evaluated on how their military, political and economic assets add to or detract
from alliance capabilities, as well as on the impact of their admission on the overall
security of the alliance vis-à-vis Russia. If a country's entry risks sparking conflict
with Russia or destabilizes the alliance internally, then NATO should judge its
membership as too costly. If a candidate improves lines of communication and
logistics to an isolated ally, then it should be considered more positively for admis
sion. Geopolitical thinking dictates that western leaders focus on countries that
tangibly improve the security of NATO as a whole and downgrades the values
driven vision of enlargement. Normative criteria, such as adherence to democratic
governance, would become secondary to geopolitical considerations. A revised
enlargement policy based on this logic would shore up the Balkan region via a
reinvigorated push for expansion, actively court the Nordic states, and explicitly
exclude the rest of eastern Europe, including the Caucasus region.

The Balkans

NATO expansion into the Balkan region has stalled since the admission of Albania
and Croatia in 2009. A geopolitically motivated enlargement would reverse
NATO's policy of delay by compelling the alliance to expend political and finan
cial capital to bolster its Balkan flank. The rationale behind a reinvigorated Balkan
enlargement is strategic consolidation. This region is currently a black hole in
NATO's south-eastern theatre. Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monte
negro and Macedonia are in limbo, and the stalled enlargement policy allows
Russia to influence the region and divide the alliance. Moreover, too much time

52 In a similar vein, Sten Rynning advocates that the West use a middle-ground stance which he calls 'liberal
power policy'. See Sten Rynning, 'The false promise of continental concert: Russia, the West and the neces
sary balance of power', International Affairs 91: 3, May 2015, p. 547.

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 The future of NATO enlargement

and too many resources have been spent by NATO and the European Union in
administering and reforming these countries to give Russia the opportunity to
pull these states away from the West. Russia has actively been currying favour
in Balkan capitals and has been forthright in its opposition to further NATO
expansion in the region. During a visit to Sarajevo in September 2014, Foreign
Minister Lavrov explained that Russia viewed NATO enlargement to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro as 'as a mistake, even a provocation in a
way'.53 The Russian Ambassador to Serbia, Alexander Chepurin, proclaimed that
Moscow regards Serbia's entry into NATO as crossing a 'red line'.54
Russian resistance to enlargement in the Balkans is to be expected, but
it is unlikely to boil over into conflict. This is primarily because the region is
surrounded by the EU and NATO, and all of these countries have decided that
their future lies in integration with the West. However, what is worrying is that
Russia may team up with a NATO member to slow down or halt the enlargement
process. This may be occurring with Greece which, according to Greek media,
applauded Foreign Minister Lavrov's anti-enlargement statements in Sarajevo.55
To rectify the situation in the Balkans, NATO needs to take a number of steps.
First, it should apply political pressure on Greece to accept Macedonia as a fully
fledged member. Having Macedonia languish outside NATO because of a name
dispute is detrimental both to that state's domestic politics and to the alliance's
overall aims in the Balkans.56 Next, Montenegro's admission needs to be fast
tracked, especially since it appears to meet most of NATO's political and military
reform criteria.57 Inaction on Montenegro's candidacy may cause domestic polit
ical trouble and stall vital internal reforms. Bosnia and Herzegovina currently
has a MAP but requires more political, economic and military assistance from
NATO in order to meet entry criteria. With the application of additional effort
and resources, Bosnia and Herzegovina has the potential to be integrated into the
western security system, and NATO entry would smooth its path towards EU
accession. Serbia and Kosovo are the sticky points in the Balkan enlargement plan.
Their admission into the alliance is unlikely in the near term, but renewed efforts
towards this end would help the two states achieve more positive relations with
each other as well as setting them on a trajectory towards NATO membership.

Daria Sito-Sucic, 'NATO's planned Balkan expansion a "provocation": Russia's Lavrov', Reuters, 29
Sept. 2014, http ://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/29/us-nato-balkans-russia-idUSKCNoHO 11W20140929,
accessed 17 July 2015.
'Serbia in NATO is the red line for Russia: Ambassador of Russia to Serbia', InSerbia News, 27 Nov. 2014,
http://inserbia.info/today/2013/11/serbia-in-nato-is-the-red-line-for-russia-ambassador-of-russia-to-serbia/,
accessed 17 July 2015.
'Greeks happy with Lavrov's opposing attitude about NATO enlargement', Independent.mk, 30 Sept. 2014,
http://www.independent.mk/articles/9835/Greeks+Happy+with+Lavrovs+Opposing+Attitude+about+NAT
O+Enlargement, accessed 17 July 2015.
For a synopsis of the Greek veto on Macedonian NATO membership, see David S. Yost, NATO's balancing act
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), pp. 286-8.
Kacper Rekawek, 'The western Balkans and the alliance: all is not well on NATO's southern flank?', PISM
Policy Paper 14: 62, June 2013, pp. 5-6. See also Michael Haltzel, 'Extend NATO's umbrella to Montenegro
and Macedonia', Washington Post, 27 June 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/extend-natos
umbrella-to-montenegro-and-macedonia/2014/06/27/514d3bd2-fca8 -11 e3 -9320-025 5b8i f48ce_story.html,
accessed 17 July 2015.

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Andrew T. Wolff

There are signs that NATO—Serbian relations are warming, and Serbia's desire
to enter the European Union raises hopes that it, too, will one day want to join
NATO.s8 There is much unfinished business in the Balkans and, in the wake of the
Ukraine crisis, NATO should be motivated to do more in the region.

Finland and Sweden

A geopolitical enlargement necessitates that NATO look seriously at courting

Finland and Sweden for NATO membership, because their admission would add
to the alliance's defensive capabilities. Both countries are members of the EU, have
a strong defence complex and are active in international military peacekeeping.
Furthermore, their strategic location is vital for NATO's provision of security to
the Baltic states. Because any land route to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can be
effectively cut off by the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, sea routes to the Baltic
states are of paramount importance. Access to the Finnish and Swedish coastline
will make NATO's ability to defend the Baltic states more credible.59 Finnish and
Swedish admission would also bolster NATO's strategy in the Arctic, which is
an area of future economic and geostrategic competition between the West and
Russia. The membership of these two countries would pose few internal problems
for the alliance and would most likely enhance EU-NATO cooperation.
For their parts, Finland and Sweden are moving closer to NATO because of
shifts in their security environment and domestic politics. Both nations are feeling
more threatened by Russia. For instance, Russian military aircraft have violated
their airspace and in October 2014 a mysterious submarine, allegedly of Russian
origin, intruded into Swedish coastal waterways.60 Both states have moved away
from strict neutrality, so NATO membership is no longer beyond the realm
of possibility.61 For instance, Finland and Sweden have instituted a policy of
enhancing cooperation with NATO. At the Wales NATO summit in September
2014 both countries signed a 'host nation status' agreement which allows NATO
troops to deploy in their territories. Although Finland and Sweden have not
campaigned to enter the alliance, there are signs of an enlargement debate stirring

1 Jân Cingel and Milan Nic, 'Serbia's relations with NATO: the other (quieter) game in town, Central European
Policy Institute, 10 Jan. 2014, http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/serbias-relations-nato-other-quieter
game-town, accessed 17 July 2015.
1 See Jan Joel Andersson, 'Nordic NATO: why it's time for Finland and Sweden to join the alliance', Foreign
Affairs, 30 April 2014, http://www.foreignafFairs.com/articles/141377/jan-joel-andersson/nordic-nato;
Magnus Nordenman, 'For NATO, benefits of adding Finland and Sweden outweigh costs', World Politics
Review, 17 Dec. 2014, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14686/for-nato-benefits-of-adding
finland-and-sweden-outweigh-costs (both accessed 17 July 201$).
* Dan Bilefsky, 'Sweden says mystery vessel in its waters was a foreign submarine', New York Times, 14 Nov.
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/world/europe/sweden-confirms-mystery-vessel-in-its-waters
was-a-foreign-submarine.html?_r=o; Jonathan Marcus, 'Russia's "close military encounters" with Europe
documented', BBC News, 10 Nov. 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29956277, accessed 17
July 2015.
For more on shifting notions of neutrality in Sweden and Finland, see Jessica L. Beyer and Stephanie C.
Hofmann, 'Varieties of neutrality: norm revision and decline', Cooperation and Conflict 46: 3, Sept. 2011, pp.
285-311; Hans Lôdén, 'Reaching a vanishing point? Reflections on the future of neutrality norms in Sweden
and Finland', Cooperation and Conflict 47: 2, June 2012, pp. 271-84; Andrew Cottey, 'The European neutrals
and NATO: ambiguous partnership', Contemporary Security Policy 34: 3, 2013, pp. 446—72.

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 The future of NATO enlargement

in the region.62 One opinion poll shows, for the first time, that a majority of
Finns would support NATO membership, though only if their national leaders
vigorously lobbied for membership.63 Although Moscow has remained consistent
in its opposition to NATO enlargement in Scandinavia, especially with regard
to Finland,64 it is unrealistic to fear that these countries' admission would ignite
a conflict with Russia. Finland and Sweden are firmly rooted in the West, and
Russian threats cannot disentangle them from western economic, political and
security institutions.63 The benefits of a Scandinavian enlargement are substan
tial, and the opportunity ripe. If NATO leaders engage both governments and
their publics in an open debate about the pros and cons of NATO membership,
it is possible that they may become members and thereby greatly strengthen the
alliance.

Georgia
Enlargement policy recast with geopolitics means that NATO denies Georgia the
possibility of entering the alliance, because any serious discussion of this topic
risks war with Russia. After the August 2008 war and subsequent Russian actions,
it appears that the fate of Georgia is in the hands of Russia.66 For example, in
January 2015 the Russian duma approved the 'Alliance and Integration Treaty' with
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia accepted a similar agreement in March 2015. These
agreements subsume each province's foreign and defence policy within Russia's.67
In the light of these agreements, Georgia will probably never be able to reinte
grate these breakaway provinces back into its territory. It seems, moreover, that
Georgia has not accepted this, and will be a disgruntled country for the foreseeable
future.68 Allowing a recalcitrant Georgia to join NATO would generate too much
friction between Russia and the West. Also, a geostrategic policy would recognize
that Russia should assume more political leadership in the Caucasus region on the
grounds of proximity, economic interests, historical ties and security concerns;
and that, given these factors, it makes no sense for NATO to insert itself into this
region without strong cooperation from Russia. Moreover, this troubled region is
rife with frozen conflicts—Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Turkey, Chechnya,

62 Richard Milne, Once a taboo, NATO membership now a hot topic in Finland', Financial Times, 17 April 2015.
63 Gordon F. Sander, 'Could Putin's Russia push neutral Finland into NATO's arms?', Christian Science Moni
tor, 15 Oct. 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2014/1015/Could-Putin-s-Russia-push-neutral
Finland-into-NATO-s-arms, accessed 17 July 2015.
64 Thomas Nilson, 'Putin envoy warns Finland against joining NATO', Barents Observer, 9 June 2014.
65 Finland and Sweden already enjoy the protections of the EU's Lisbon Treaty, which obliges EU members to
aid and assist any member state that is the victim of armed aggression.
66 Ronald D. Asmus, 'Finlandization of Georgia and Ukraine', Moscow Times, 3 March 2010, http://www.the
moscowtimes.com/opinion/article/finlandization-of-georgia-and-ukraine/400808.html, accessed 17 July 2015.
67 Reid Standish, 'With obscure treaties, Moscow pulls breakaway regions into its orbit', Foreign Policy, 23 Jan.
2015, http : //foreignpolicy.com/2015 /oi /23 /with-obscure-treaties-moscow-pulls-breakaway-regions-into-its
orbit/; Colin Freeman, 'Russia signs integration deal with South Ossetia', Daily Telegraph, 19 March 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/11484030/Russia-signs-integration-deal
with-South-Ossetia.html (both accessed 17 July 2015).
68 Georgia is pursuing a reintegration strategy based on coaxing Abkhazia and South Ossetia back by reference
to their 'Europeanness'. For more details, see Tracey German, 'Heading west? Georgia's Euro-Atlantic path',
International Affairs 91: 3, May 2015, p. 608.

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Andrew T. Wolff

South Ossetia, Abkhazia—and NATO should concentrate on completing its

Balkan integration project before attempting to engage with the thorny problems
of the Caucasus.

If Russia and Georgia were persuaded to accept a truncated Georgia—without

South Ossetia or Abkhazia—entering the alliance, then its inclusion might be
justifiable. However, the chances of either side accepting such a scenario are highly
unlikely, and even this outcome would not resolve Russia's underlying security
fears of NATO encroachment. Russia believes the Caucasus region is within its
'zone of privileged interest', and this region has dubious strategic value to the
West. More benefit may accrue to the West by accommodating Russian interests in
the region and thereby improving overall NATO—Russia relations. In any case, a
geopolitical reading of the situation concludes that Russia exercises a strategic veto
over NATO's enlargement to Georgia and little can be done to change this fact.

Ukraine

With regard to Ukrainian NATO membership, much depends on how events turn
out on the ground. In the current fluid situation, NATO needs to be prepared to
use Ukrainian NATO membership as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations. West
ern leaders should seek to strike a bargain with Russia whereby NATO forswears
the possibility of Ukraine entering the alliance in exchange for Russia agreeing to
withdraw its military and financial support for the Donbas separatists. Such a deal
would include rights of autonomy for the eastern provinces and have the effect of
keeping Ukraine whole.69 This bargain amounts to returning Ukraine to a buffer
zone between the West and Russia. Such a deal would represent not a failure of
policy but a strategic decision which could alleviate larger international tensions.
If, however, Russia formally divides Ukraine by setting up an independent Donbas
or annexes this area as it did Crimea, then NATO should consider allowing west
ern Ukraine to join the alliance. The reason for doing so is that under this scenario
western Ukraine would be unable to act as a buffer state, owing to its pro-European
sentiments and its small size. A neutral western Ukraine state would be too suscep
tible to Russian bullying. Western Ukraine in NATO, on the other hand, would
create a different geopolitical dynamic by establishing a hard demarcation line
between Russia and the West. Although such division may be distasteful, it would
bring stability to eastern Europe by clearly delineating where western influence
ends and Russian influence begins. What is not in NATO's interest is to have
Ukraine become another frozen conflict, fall into perpetual strife or be completely
dominated by Russia. The best option is to avoid these scenarios by restoring
Ukraine as a buffer zone, and this means NATO must drop its insistence on the
right of Ukraine to join the alliance. By using Ukraine as a bargaining chip, west
ern leaders can obtain a broader and more enduring understanding with Moscow
about maintaining peace and stability in Europe.

69 Crimea is excluded from this deal because there appears to be no way, short of a war, to prise the region from
Moscow's grip.

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 The future of NATO enlargement

Challenges of adopting geopolitical enlargement

In order to embark on a geopolitical recasting of enlargement, NATO must

overcome a number of internal challenges, some of a political and some of an
intellectual nature. On the political side, it appears that the alliance is not unified
in its approach to dealing with eastern Europe and Russia. Some new members,
such as the Baltic states and Poland, have a deep distrust of Russia and look to
NATO partners to bolster their defences. These states benefited greatly from
NATO's ideologically driven enlargement policy, and they want their neigh
bours to the east to be similarly transformed into fully fledged members of the
West. Persuading these new member states to draw back from open-door enlarge
ment will be difficult. It will entail assuaging their security concerns by deploying
military assets and personnel to their territories. Fellow NATO members will also
have to persuade these states that a geopolitical enlargement policy will deliver
tangible security benefits to them through warmer relations with Russia. Other
member states, such as Spain, Italy and France, feel less threatened by Russia and
are likely to welcome a change in NATO enlargement policy. The challenge with
these states lies in persuading their leaders to expend capital and resources on a
more discerning enlargement policy while taking Russia's threat to the eastern
allies more seriously. Finally, establishing a consensus on geopolitical enlargement
will require visionary political leadership within the organization and among
members, especially Germany and the United States. The alliance has a track
record of making dramatic policy shifts in the recent past, and vigorous leader
ship was crucial to the making of these changes.70
Intellectually, too, there are a few challenges to adopting a geopolitical enlarge
ment strategy. The main ones are the West's insistence that every country has a
right to choose its own alliance, and western leaders' general aversion to using
geopolitics as a policy tool. The declaration that every country has a right to
choose its own allegiances is technically correct, but it does not reflect how power
works in the world. Hypothetically, the United States would not sit idly by and
allow Mexico to align itself with Iran or North Korea. Why, then, should the West
insist that Moscow accept passively the entry of Ukraine or Georgia into NATO?
The 'right to choose' rhetoric is too legalistic and too divorced from strategic
considerations to serve as a centrepiece of NATO enlargement. Moreover, such
language continually antagonizes Russia. During a December 2014 TV interview,
President Putin said : 'All we hear is "that's none of your business. Every country
has the right to choose its way to ensure its own security." All right, but we have
the right to do so too. Why can't we?'71 In short, NATO leaders should drop
the 'right to choose' as a counter-argument to Russian protests against expansion
because it is neither helpful nor reflective of reality.

70 For more on the role leadership has played in changing NATO policy, see Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and
war at NATO: the secretary general and military action after the Cold War (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri
Press, 2006).
71 Vladimir Putin, 'Remarks during news conference', 18 Dec. 2014, http ://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/23 4o6#sel=,
accessed 17 July 2015.

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Andrew T. Wolff

The second intellectual challenge is that of making western politicians feel

comfortable taking a geopolitical outlook. In the development of enlargement
policy in the 1990s, western politicians purposefully avoided the use of geopo
litical language in order not to antagonize Russia.72 This avoidance of geopoli
tics is also rooted in the West's liberal world-view, which believes the West acts
only on behalf of the greater good. In fact this belief is hypocritical: western
states have frequently acted with geopolitical motives. Accepting a geopolitical
policy direction does not mean that the West no longer believes in democratic
ideals. It simply means that when it comes to the issue of NATO enlargement and
reshaping relations with Russia, policy-makers prioritize strategy over idealism.
Resisting the liberal ideological reflex will be difficult, but the collision course on
which the West currently finds itself with Russia should sharpen western minds
and prod them into a shift to more hard-nosed policy thinking. It appears, indeed,
that the process of changing the West's mentality has already begun, as evidenced
by NATO's decision to bolster its eastern defences at the Wales summit.73

Conclusion

For the past two decades, the West has been ideologically driven in its relations
with Russia. Although a principled policy of a Europe 'whole and free' may be a
noble goal and has worked well in earlier rounds of enlargement, attachment to
these lofty principles makes it difficult to accommodate a Russian state that adheres
to a different ideology. Moreover, a values-laden enlargement policy has limits.
The West's transformational policies have not worked on Russia. An ideological
enlargement policy blinds policy-makers to Russia's willingness to use force in the
service of its geopolitical world-view. It is to be hoped that Russian aggression in
Ukraine will wake up western leaders from their liberal dream and enable them to
see the advantages of adopting an enlargement strategy infused with geopolitics.
A less norm-driven approach to enlargement will provide numerous benefits
to NATO and improve relations with Russia. A geopolitical enlargement policy
will force the alliance to identify areas of critical strategic importance in Europe
and concentrate resources on those areas. Likewise, this focus will diminish the
alliance's aspirations to a 'global NATO', which critics believe has caused NATO
to become overextended.74 Geopolitical enlargement will strengthen the alliance
through the addition of Scandinavian capabilities and logistics, as well as shoring
up strategic weaknesses in the Balkans. This policy will also increase NATO's

72 For a detailed study of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's avoidance of geopolitical terminology, see
Jan Nijman, 'Madeleine Albright and the geopolitics of Europe', Geojournal 46: 4, Dec. 1998, p. 274.
73 For more on the implications of the Wales summit, see John R. Deni, 'NATO's new trajectories after the
Wales summit', Parameters 44: 3, Autumn 2014, pp. 57—65.
74 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, 'Global NATO', Foreign Affairs 85: 5, Sept.-Oct. 2006, pp. 105-13.
For a comprehensive analysis of a global NATO policy, see Rebecca R. Moore, 'Partnership goes global: the
role of nonmember, non-European Union states in the evolution of NATO', in Giilnur Aybet and Rebecca
R. Moore, eds, NATO in search of a vision (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press), pp. 219-42. For a
critique of this policy direction, see Charles A. Kupchan, 'How to keep NATO relevant', International Herald
Tribune, 5 Oct. 2006.

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The future of NATO enlargement

deterrent against Russia by improving the alliance's ability to defend vulner

able member states. A stronger and more defensible West will also enjoy a better
bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia.
A geopolitical enlargement policy improves relations with Russia by injecting
ideas of Great Power bargaining into the relationship. This means that the West
and Russia gain the ability to designate certain regions and states as being in one
camp or the other, and agreeing that other states, such as Ukraine, should be
neutral. By giving Russia some breathing space and signalling that NATO is
not marching ever further eastward, it opens the way to the establishment of
more amicable relations. It is not currently possible to fully integrate Russia into
western political and security structures; nor does the West desire to make Russia
a permanent adversary. Geopolitical enlargement provides a middle path between
these two scenarios by establishing a relationship with Russia based on balance of
power and strategic discernment.
Alliance leaders must recognize that the post-Cold War interregnum is over.
Failure to alter the rationale behind enlargement means that NATO has not fully
adapted to this new security environment. Current enlargement policy is stuck
on autopilot and does not address today's security challenges. It cedes initiative to
the Russians, allows Russia to justify its belligerence on the grounds of western
encroachment, and divides the alliance internally on the future direction of
NATO. Open-door enlargement policy has also had a hand in sparking two wars.
If the alliance maintains this policy it risks more fighting on the continent or, even
worse, igniting direct conflict with Russia. For the sake of peace and security in
Europe, NATO must change its enlargement policy.

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