Neg Case

Resolved: the United Nations should abolish permanent membership on its Security Council.

Bela and I proudly negate the resolution.

As an overview, attempts at reform kill the Security Council

Sara Davies, 08/11/14, Don’t be too quick to condemn the UN Security Council power of veto,
TheConversation,https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-condemn-the-un-security-council-power-of-veto-29980, BM

Although a veto is undoubtedly frustrating to those on the receiving end, the omnipotence of the veto is greatly exaggerated.
Agreement in the Security Council is, and always has been, much more common. Even at the
height of the Cold War – when the Security Council was divided along ideological lines – the number of vetoes never went
beyond 20 in one calendar year. Although recent media attention on the gridlock in the Security Council in the
cases of Syria and Israel/Palestine paint a bleak picture of the divisions, the council has achieved noteworthy
consensus.

Squo is fine. Dunton 23:

Caroline Dunton, 03/01/23, The U.N. Security Council Was Designed for Deadlock — Can it Change?, U.S. Institute of Peace,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/un-security-council-was-designed-deadlock-can-it-change, BM

To understand these changes in practice, how they came about and what kinds of changes at the UNSC are possible even when the P5 are unwilling, we have to start
with why the P5 care about the UNSC at all. Even as their own divergent agendas prevent action on key cases, the P5 have more in common than not on many issues
of international peace and security — when their own primary interests and political processes aren’t at stake, they can agree on even complex issues of

international peace and security, and take action to address pressing issues. For much of the post-Cold War period, and even
amid substantial disagreement on Ukraine and Syria between 2013 and 2016, for example, the P5 agreed to
all proposed new peacekeeping force authorizations. And work continues now despite
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine In fact, the body remains an active site for diplomacy even on conflict cases that divide the P5, and even when one
of the P5 members is a key obstacle to collective action. Many scholars have asked why the P5 turn to the UNSC at all, when in most cases they could simply bypass
it altogether, and when in all cases the UNSC cannot keep powerful states from breaking international law. Some scholars have argued the UNSC is a place where
powerful states can work together to check other states’ military ambitions, each member investing the chamber and its decisions with importance so every other
powerful state will also invest the chamber with importance, and a place where powerful states can offer their own populations and the international community
information about their plans and intentions, making the body a vital part of diplomatic and foreign policy projects even when it can’t stop P5 members from
breaking the U.N. Charter.
Right now, Has 20 writes
While the first half of the twentieth century marked a period of extraordinary violence, the world has become more peaceful in the past 30 years,
a new statistical analysis of the global death toll from war suggests.

Contention 1 is Russian Isolation.

The UNSC is of the utmost importance to Russian politics. T&F 11:

Ritsa A. Panagiotou, 05/20/11, The Centrality of the United Nations in Russian Foreign Policy, Taylor and Franic,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523279.2011.564088

There has always been a link between Russia's foreign policy objectives and its attitude towards
the United Nations (UN). In fact, throughout various phases of Soviet and Russian history, relations with the UN have mirrored important foreign
policy priorities and were used as a means of pursuing and achieving these goals. Although relations with the UN represent an important dimension of Russian
foreign policy, they have not been sufficiently explored in the scholarly literature. Most of the seminal work analysing the foreign policy priorities of the Soviet Union.
This article aims to contribute towards filling this gap in the literature, by analysing the mechanisms through which Russia has used the UN in order to pursue its

foreign policy priorities and goals. The study is structured as follows: the first part analyses Soviet perceptions of the UN during the period of [since] the
Cold War, emphasizing the apprehensive approach of Soviet policy-makers to international organizations in general, and the UN in particular. The next section
discusses the gradual opening during the Gorbachev period, focusing on how the thawing of relations between the Soviet Union and the West was reflected in
improved relations with the UN as well. This phase was characterized by the realization that the Soviet Union had more to gain from co-operation within the UN
framework than confrontation and that the Soviet Union could use its position on the UN Security Council to compensate for its fading international power. The third
part discusses the post-Soviet period: in the light of the collapse of the Soviet ‘empire’ and the unravelling of the Soviet sphere of influence, Russian foreign policy

priorities focused on finding the means to compensate for the loss of its superpower status. In this context , permanent membership of the
UN Security Council was seen as one of the strongest foreign policy tools to [has] allow[ed] Russia to maintain its
position in global affairs and to demonstrate its clout internationally. The fourth section discusses the
implications of the crisis in Iraq in 2003, and the ramifications – from a Russian perspective – of the failure of the UN Security Council to provide a solution to the
crisis. Finally, the last section will attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the future of Russia's relations with the UN in the light of a shifting global equilibrium,
the main characteristics of which are the erosion of US dominance, the re-emergence of a multi-polar global configuration and a resurgent Russian foreign policy.

In this context, the determination to salvage Russia's prestige and global presence was to [which would] be one of the pillars of Russian
foreign policy over the next few years, in an effort to reverse what Neil Robinson calls ‘the politics of faded grandeur’. [as] Relations with the UN were to play a

crucial role in this attempt to counterbalance Russia's declining global power and subsequent marginalization in the international system. The
perception – which had emerged during Gorbachev's leadership – that a permanent seat on an empowered Security
Council could be the most important international forum where Moscow exercised a
significant voice in world affairs was even more relevant and important after the collapse of the Soviet Union. When one analyses the
complex network of stimuli informing Russia's post-Soviet foreign policy, it is clear that one of the most enduring and influential factors was the desire to re-establish
great power status. As discussed above, the underlying theme of Russian foreign policy was the restoration of what its leaders considered to be Russia's rightful
place among the world's great powers, and the re-establishment of the country as one of the influential power centres of the world today. Russian policy was thus
focused on trying to reverse post-Cold War irrelevance and decline, and to prove to the rest of the world that Russia matters internationally. It has been argued in
this study that one of the main means through which Russian policy-makers pursued this goal of ‘fighting against irrelevance’ was through the UN. At the core of
Russian foreign policy was the conviction that the country could enhance and strengthen its global presence through its status as a permanent member of the
Security Council. The aspiration to expand the role of the Security Council during this period was stimulated by the realization that permanent membership on an

empowered Security Council was [acting as] one of the few remaining vestiges of its former Great Power
status, and could be the only way for Russia to play a role in crucial international decision-making. At the same time, strengthening the Security Council was
seen as a means to counter the United States' emerging unilateralism and overwhelming dominance in the global scene.

Unfortunately, losing permanent status means that the big 5 are soon up for reelection.
According to the UN:
General Assembly of the United Nations, United Nations,
https://www.un.org/en/ga/62/plenary/election_sc/bkg.shtml#:~:text=In%20accordance%20with%20rule%2092,by%20a%20two%2Dthirds%20majority
In accordance with Article 23 of the Charter, as amended, [By an amendment dated 17 December 1963 (resolution 1991 A (XVIII)), which came into force on 31
August 1965, the General Assembly increased the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council from 6 to 10. The Security Council consists of five

permanent members (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) and 10

non-permanent members [of the UNSC are] elected by the General Assembly for a term of
two years. In accordance with rule 142 of the rules of procedure, the General Assembly elects each year five non-permanent members of the Security
Council. At its eighteenth session, in 1963, the Assembly decided that the non-permanent members of the Council should be elected according to the following
pattern (resolution 1991 A (XVIII)):As stipulated in rule 144 of the rules of procedure, a retiring member is not eligible for immediate re-election. In accordance with
rule 92 of the rules of procedure, the election is held by secret ballot and there are no nominations. Under rule 83 of the rules of procedure, the non-permanent

members of the Security Council are elected [and] by a two-thirds majority. The names of the States that have served as non-permanent
members of the Security Council are listed in annex IV.

However, the situation in Ukraine has left the world with a less than favorable view of Russian
leadership. Pew 23 indicates that:
06/10/23, Overall opinion of Russia Pew Research Center, , https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/10/overall-opinion-of-russia/

Across 24 countries surveyed, views of Russia are overwhelmingly negative, with a median of 82% saying
they have an unfavorable opinion of the country, compared with 15% who say they have a favorable view. In all but five
countries, majorities express an unfavorable view of Russia. In Australia, the Netherlands, Japan, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the U.S., this share is at least
nine-in-ten. Poles are the most unfavorable toward Russia, with 98% saying they have a negative view of the country and 90% expressing a very unfavorable view. In
Europe, Greeks are the most favorable towards Russia: About a third say they have at least a somewhat favorable view of the country. Still, two-thirds express a
negative opinion of Russia. India, which has not formally taken a stance on the war, stands out as the only country where a majority (57%) has a favorable opinion of
Russia. Views are also less negative in Indonesia, Kenya and Nigeria, where about four-in-ten say they have a favorable opinion.
This has already translated into real political consequences within the UN. Farge 23:

Emma Farge, 10/12/23, Russia fails to return to UN rights body after losing vote, Reuters,
https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-bid-return-un-rights-body-fails-after-vote-2023-10-10/ ,BM

GENEVA, Oct 10 (Reuters) - Russia failed in its bid to return to the United Nations' top human rights body
on Tuesday, with rivals winning considerably more votes at the General Assembly in an election seen as a key test of Western
efforts to keep Moscow isolated. In the secret ballot, Russia won 83 votes versus 160 for Bulgaria and 123 for Albania, which had competed
against it in the same eastern Europe grouping for two seats on the Geneva-based Human Rights Council for a three-year term beginning on Jan. 1. "[In doing
so] UN member states sent a strong signal to Russia's leadership that a government responsible for countless war
crimes and crimes against humanity doesn't belong there," said Louis Charbonneau, United Nations director at Human Rights Watch.

While it’s status as part of the P5 has kept Russia’s UNSC spot safe, that hasn’t stopped
western calls for removal. IANS 22:
IANS, 02/25/22, US Congress wants to kick out Russia from UNSC after Ukraine invasion, Business Standard,
https://www.business-standard.com/amp/article/international/us-congress-wants-to-kick-out-russia-from-unsc-after-ukraine-invasion-122022501013_1.html ,BM

A resolution calling to kick Russia off the U.N. Security Council for its invasion of Ukraine -- which has virtually no
chance of being enforced -- is circulating among US Congress members from both parties, Axios reported. The
development comes as a recessed Congress tries to assert its role in punishing Russia. Driving the news: The resolution is being led by Rep. Claudia Tenney, a
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in coordination with a House Democrat, according to Tenney's office. "It's
obviously a tall effort to kick Russia off," Nick Stewart, Tenney's chief of staff, told Axios. "But, it's one diplomatic tool we have to up the pressure and increase the

isolation." "It's in a sense a messaging bill, but it also empowers our diplomatic counterparts." The resolution, Axios report[ing]ed [with] calls for the
U.N. to "take immediate procedural actions" to amend Article 23 of its charter to remove
Russia as a permanent member of the Security Council. The resolution argues that Russia's invasion of Ukraine "poses a
direct threat to international peace and security" and "run contrary to its responsibilities and obligations as a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council.” According to the U.N. charter, all permanent members of the Security Council have to sign off on any amendments, giving Russia the ability to block such a
move, Axios reported. Russia's veto on the Security Council also would allow it to block any U.N. effort to condemn or intervene in its invasion of Ukraine. Causing
further headaches to the West is that Russia's ambassador to the U.N., Vasily Nabenzya, is serving as the panel's rotating president this month. He was presiding
over an emergency meeting of the council at the precise moment Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his invasion of Ukraine - triggering criticism of Russia's
membership on the panel, Axios reported

Meaning the odds of a successful Russian bid for UNSC reelection seem slim to none.

This would leave Russia feeling in a state of panic and isolation. Feldscher 22:
Jacqueline Feldscher, 03/02/22, It’s ‘Effectively Impossible’ To Kick Russia Out Of The UN, But There Are Other Options, Defense One,
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/03/its-effectively-impossible-kick-russia-out-un-there-are-other-options/362673/ ,BM

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Moscow’s use of its veto to scuttle an initial response by the United Nations, some U.S. lawmakers have called for

revoking [Russia’s] the country’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Experts said they understand the anger
and frustration, but that it’s not possible to expel Russia—nor would [not] it be wise [as it] to shut[s] down a
communications channel at a time of high tension.“The UN is a political body. It is not a church. Ultimately, the UN is there as a
place where states…can talk to each other in the last resort,” said Richard Gowan, UN director at the International Crisis Group. Gowen said expelling Russia would
be “effectively impossible,” and added that it might even be counterproductive. “I worry that if you shove Russia out, if you could find a way to shove Russia out, you

just have [leaving] Russia on the outside trying to undercut even these minimal forms of
cooperation,” he said.

More specifically, isolating Russia on such a major question of security would spiral. TPAC 22:
James R. Stocker, 03/22/22, Russia can’t, shouldn’t be kicked off UN Security Council, The Press of Atlantic City,
https://pressofatlanticcity.com/opinion/columnists/russia-can-t-shouldn-t-be-kicked-off-un-security-council-by-james-r-stocker/article_126fa48b-476a-5bf3-b3ab-cb
91b01b1f40.html ,BM

In addition to these legal considerations, there is a practical argument for retaining Russia’s participation in the United Nations. The United Nations Security Council
is based on the premise that respecting the interests of key, powerful states is essential to ensuring a secure international order. The U.S. Senate works on a similar
principle, distributing power based on statehood rather than population. Such an arrangement recognizes that power and influence must be accounted for in

political institutions. [even] Russia remains an important power. The country plays a key role in conflicts around the world,
even if it is [irrespective of] a largely negative one from the American perspective. In addition to deployments
throughout the former USSR, the Russian army is active in Syria, Libya, Venezuela and the Central African Republic. Through the Wagner Group and other private

military companies, Russia is involved in dozens more areas. Exclu[sion]ding it from the U.N. would remove a key channel
for communication regarding such important conflicts, and ultimately make war more
likely.Fortunately, most of the international community is doing what it can to stop the Russian onslaught. Unprecedented economic sanctions will do serious damage to the Russian economy. These, coupled with military
aid to Ukrainian troops, are the most effective tools that the world has, short of war, for compelling Russia to change its policies in Ukraine. While some may long for an international organization with both power and moral
standing, we are for the moment stuck with the institutions that we have. A better solution is to use the full power of the United Nations to hold Russia to account. Russia isolated within the United Nations is better than Russia
isolated from the United Nations. While some may long for an international organization with both power and moral standing, we are for the moment stuck with the institutions that we have. A better solution is to use the full
power of the United Nations to hold Russia to account. Russia isolated within the United Nations is better than Russia isolated from the United Nations.

Indeed, there’s no situation in which Russia simply takes such a large hit to it’s international
influence lying down. Kitfield 08:
Kitfield 8 – national security and foreign affairs correspondent for National Journal magazine, an independent and non-partisan newsweekly on politics and
government published by Atlantic Media Company (12/20/2008, James, “Russia's New Red Lines”, The National Journal, Lexis)
"Russia's most important national goal is to make the country count again in international
affairs, or as President Medvedev put it, 'Russia exists as a great power, or it doesn't exist at all,' " said Thomas
Graham, who served as the director for Russia on the National Security Council from 2002 to 2007. The region that historically gave Russia geopolitical weight in the
world, he noted, is the former Soviet satellites on its periphery. "Expanding NATO [to Russia's borders] would be the most fateful error of American policy in the
entire post-Cold War era."--George Kennan in 1997 "Great powers are supposed to radiate influence, so where else can Russia do so but in its own neighborhood,

which is critically important to Russia's economic prosperity, to its sense of security, and to its self-identity?" said Graham, speaking at the AEI. On the other hand, if
Putin continues to blame the United States for all of his country's ills and to stoke xenophobic
nationalism to maintain domestic political support in tough times, the Russian mood could
turn even nastier. At some point, that narrative begins to read like Germany's Weimar Republic in the interwar years, a destitute society nursing its
grievances and plotting revenge, largely in isolation.

Indeed, Young 14 corroborates on the dangerous nature of backing Russia into a corner.
Young, 14 – Glennys Young is professor of History and International Studies in the University of Washington’s Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and
the Department of History. “Guest: Cold War containment is the wrong way to deal with Russia”,
(https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/guest-cold-war-containment-is-the-wrong-way-to-deal-with-russia/)

Containment is also problematic because economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation would push Russian
politics, and foreign policy, in a more authoritarian direction. History offers many examples of how isolation makes
autocratic regimes [and] more repressive by justifying fears of encirclement. Isolating Russia gives credibility to Russian
perceptions of American hostility. It has reinforced Putin’s claim that an American-led conspiracy toppled Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovich. Moreover,
containment would cause Russia to forge closer ties with Asia. In last week’s speech, Putin, after denouncing the West, praised China’s and India’s supportive
positions on Ukraine. In Tokyo, Putin’s adviser Igor Sechin warned that further isolation by the West would propel Russia more sharply eastward for diplomatic
alliances, military contracts and business deals. Moscow has for years negotiated a deal to send gas via pipeline to China. It could be signed when Putin travels to

China in May. Ominously, containment [which] could also lead to military confrontation. Isolating Russia could produce [via]
dangerous brinkmanship — post-Cold War versions of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In a global system in which international institutions have had
limited success in defusing post-Cold War tensions, such gambles are too risky. If not containment through isolation to curtail Russian expansion and prevent future
violations of international law, then what?

This manifests in the nuclear flex:

Putin doesn’t back down, he escalates up. FP 18:

Mikheil Saakashvili, 11-27-2018, "Russia’s Next Land Grab Won’t Be in an Ex-Soviet State. It Will Be in Europe.," Foreign Policy//CM,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/15/russias-next-land-grab-wont-be-in-an-ex-soviet-state-it-will-be-in-europe-putin-saakashvili-sweden-finland-arctic-northern-se
a-route-baltics-nato/
Those who attempt to answer this question miss the point. In Crimea, eastern Ukraine, South Ossetia, or anywhere else Putin considers Russia’s backyard, territorial

gain has never been an end in itself. Putin’s goal today is the same as when he invaded my country in 2008: to tighten his
grip on the levers of power in Russia. Whenever Putin’s domestic popularity dips, he either
escalates an ongoing conflict or launches a new offensive.

The next step up is a limited use of nuclear weapons. Press ’24

Associated Press, 3-13-2024, "Putin warns again that Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons if its sovereignty is threatened," AP News,
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-putin-nuclear-weapons-82ced2419d93ae733161b56fbd9b477dPresident Vladimir

Putin said Wednesday that Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons if its sovereignty or independence is
threatened, issuing another blunt warning to the West just days before an election in which he’s all but certain to secure another six-year
term. The Russian leader has repeatedly talked about his readiness to use nuclear weapons since
launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022. The most recent such threat came in his state-of-the-nation
address last month, when he warned the West that deepening its involvement in the fighting in Ukraine would risk a nuclear war. Asked in an
interview with Russian state television released early Wednesday if he has ever considered using battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Putin
responded that there has been no need for that. He also noted that he doesn’t think that the world is heading for a nuclear war, describing U.S.
President Joe Biden as a veteran politician who fully understands the possible

This starts war with the US. Weber 23:

Us, Peter Weber Week. “What Would Actually Happen if Putin Hit Ukraine With Tactical Nukes?” Theweek, 25 Jan. 2023,
theweek.com/russo-ukrainian-war/1017205/what-would-actually-happen-if-putin-hits-ukraine-with-tactical-nukes.

U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said publicly that the Biden administration has made it clear to Russia it
would face unspecified catastrophic consequences if it uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine. That
response wouldn't have to involve nuclear weapons, retired Gen. David Petraeus told ABC's This Week. Hypothetically, the U.S. and
NATO "would take out every Russian conventional force that we can see and identify on the
battlefield in Ukraine and also in Crimea and every ship in the Black Sea."

Contention 2 is Security Synchronism.

The P5 was set up as a method of keeping the world’s biggest powers on one page when it
comes to conversations about security. Joyner 23:

James Joyner, 05/22/23, Kick Russia Off the Security Council?, Outside The Beltway, https://www.outsidethebeltway.com/kick-russia-off-the-security-council/
The creation of the Permanent Five wasn’t a reward for valiant effort against the Nazis. Hell, the French surrendered to the Nazis and fired on American and British forces during Operation Torch. It was about power politics. One of

the many lessons of the failure of the predecessor League of Nations was [demonstrated] that collective security can’t
work if the great powers aren’t all involved. Further, there was a pretty strong possibility in 1944, when the Charter was being drafted, that the Russians (Soviets)
wouldn’t remain in the Western orbit. They were, after all, allies of convenience (the enemy of my enemy is my friend) rather than shared values. Giving each of the P5 a veto was a
nod to reality: the UN couldn’t act collectively without their agreement, so allowing any of
them to demur was a safety valve. If they agreed, fine. Then the UNSC could act collectively. If not, no harm, no foul—it was just status
quo. Individual powers or a coalition of the willing could act but not under UN auspices.

Indeed, the veto ensures that global security is a system of compromise. Dunton 23:
Caroline Dunton, 03/01/23, The U.N. Security Council Was Designed for Deadlock — Can it Change?, U.S. Institute of Peace,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/un-security-council-was-designed-deadlock-can-it-change, BM

The UNSC is the international body charged with maintaining international peace and security. Under international law, it is the sole global body that can
authorize force, but each of its permanent five members — the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China and France (known as the P5) — wields a veto that
allows it to unilaterally thwart any action. By design, the UNSC cannot address some of the biggest issues of war and peace in the world: it cannot act to address,
mitigate or stop human suffering in conflict when one of its permanent members is a party to the conflict. It was explicitly built to be unfair, giving the victors of the
World War II an outsized role in international peace and security, marginalizing whole regions and continents — particularly former colonies that gained

independence after 1945 — and it was explicitly structured to be easily deadlocked, with any of the [if the] P5
[cannot come to an unanimous agreement] able to unilaterally grind its work to a halt. Everyone from U.N. Secretary General
António Guterres, to the Biden administration, to voices from the Global South have called for fundamental, formal revisions to the UNSC’s membership and powers,
with ideas ranging from expanded permanent membership to finding ways to strip the P5 of their veto. Some have even invoked Article 109, the formal procedure
for rewriting the Charter via a general conference that the Charter itself lays out. But in an era of waning multilateralism, efforts to revise the U.N. Charter are more likely to kill most existing
structures of multilateral cooperation than to produce a more just institution. As Natalie Samarasinghe wrote this fall, “there is little chance of a successor organization rising from the

current geopolitical ashes.” In fact, the body remains an active site for diplomacy even on conflict cases that
divide the P5, and even when one of the P5 members is a key obstacle to collective action. Many
scholars have asked why the P5 turn to the UNSC at all, when in most cases they could simply bypass it altogether, and when in all cases the UNSC cannot keep

powerful states from breaking international law. Some scholars have argued the UNSC is a place where powerful states can
work together to check other states’ military ambitions, each member investing the chamber and its decisions with importance so every other
powerful state will also invest the chamber with importance, and a place where powerful states can offer their own populations and the international community information about their plans and intentions, making the body a vital
part of diplomatic and foreign policy projects even when it can’t stop P5 members from breaking the U.N. Charter.

Although gridlock at the UNSC draws the most headlines and external attention, the bulk of the UNSC’s work is on wars and crises where no permanent member has

a primary national interest in the outcome of the conflict. Here, the P5 have an incentive to keep the focus of international decision-making within UNSC chambers.

The status and rank that a permanent seat on the UNSC provides can incentivize the P5 to
continue to work with one another on some issues even when their foreign policy goals and
interests are wildly divergent. This willingness is a space for diplomatic action by other concerned states.
History proves the importance of the veto in ensuring a politically viable UN. Davies 14:

Sara Davies, 08/11/14, Don’t be too quick to condemn the UN Security Council power of veto,
TheConversation,https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-condemn-the-un-security-council-power-of-veto-29980, BM

The P5’s veto powers proved controversial in San Francisco. An Australian-led revolt against the veto was rejected by the US. Washington argued that a world
organisation that hinged on ongoing participation of the great powers must allow them to protect their “vital interests” or fall into irrelevance. This proved to the

case for the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, which had no veto provisions in its Covenant. By the
time it was most needed, at the onset of the Second World War, none of the most significant world powers
(US, USSR, Germany, Japan) were members. Without the veto, the UN Security Council would surely have suffered the same fate.
[furthermore] It is difficult to imagine how the UN would have survived the Cold War were it
not for the veto. Facing an anti-Soviet majority in the years immediately after 1945, [as] the USSR is unlikely to have
remained committed to a capitalist-dominated UN with international enforcement powers.

Which is why Davies ultimately concludes:

Sara Davies, 08/11/14, Don’t be too quick to condemn the UN Security Council power of veto, The
Conversation,https://theconversation.com/dont-be-too-quick-to-condemn-the-un-security-council-power-of-veto-29980, BM

The Security Council has found sufficient unity to act on most of these issues. This is remarkable given the breadth of its deliberations has never been so broad nor
its agenda so comprehensive. There are also grounds for thinking that the veto might inhibit the escalation of local or regional crises – one of the purposes for which
it was intended. Given the radicalisation of elements of Syria’s opposition, manifested in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), it is at least plausible to argue that
tougher one-sided measures against the Assad regime might only have made the situation worse by strengthening the hands of groups even more callous than

Assad. The veto allows Security Council members to set aside those issues on which they cannot
agree but to remain engaged on those others – the great majority of cases – where they can.
International peace and security would not be well served if no veto had existed and Russia was able to influence eight other members to validate the annexation of
Crimea; if the US was able to persuade eight other states that no Palestinian state should ever exist; or if nine states agreed that Israel did not have a right to exist.

The Security Council’s lack of action can sometimes be frustrating and devastating. But, on balance, history has taught us that the world
order is better served by working through the great powers rather than by alienating them.

A world in which the UNSC begins passing resolutions that effect global security without
consent of the biggest actors in global security would be disastrous for 2 reasons:

The first is infighting.

A lack of security Synchronism ensures that the P5 are likely to come to heads with UNSC
action. Lund 10:
Jakob Silas Lund, 01-19-2010, "Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform," No Publication,
https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/48674-pros-and-cons-of-security-council-reform.html

f, for example, the GA magically succeeded in abolishing the veto altogether it is likely that the P5 would take their business elsewhere. The
UN would then, in this expert's opinion, end up with a net loss. The P5 countries point out that the rules of procedure of the Council are to be decided on by the

Council as provided by and in accordance with Article 30 of the Charter. They argue that compromising on that principle could lead to a corrosion
of the relationship between the GA and the Council. On a broader scale, there is a fear that allowing anyone to limit the
privileges of the P5 [which] could undermine the whole functioning of the Council. For those who want to see the
veto modified or eliminated altogether, none of these concerns are sufficient to justify not limiting the veto, which in too many instances, they believe, has blocked
the ability of the Council to take effective, timely action to safeguard peace and prevent the massive loss of life.

Among those who oppose abolishing the veto-and the P5 are the most prominent in that group-references are made to the League of Nations, which many believe ended up in demise because major powers such as the US refused

to join. This, they argue, is exactly what would happen if the veto was abolished: [as] the major powers of the world would either leave the
UN or disregard or refuse to pay for UN actions they oppose. Whether the major powers would actually risk losing the legitimacy provided by the
Charter is an open question, but the scenario presents the flip side of the cost-benefit analysis discussed above in the section on categories of membership. In reality the debate would seem to be moot as long as any P5 member
refuses to agree to abolish or modify the veto: Article 108 of the Charter provides that two-thirds of the membership of the UN including all of the permanent members must ratify amendments to the Charter. Only then does the
amendment come into force for all UN members.

As Bosco 12 corroborates:
‘

David Bosco, 01/21/12, In defense of the veto power, Forigen Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/31/in-defense-of-the-veto-power/

Perhaps the most fundamental point about the veto is that you could not have a Security Council without it. Major powers will simply not
grant an international body binding legal authority on matters of peace and security unless
they are certain that it will not prejudice their interests. So the alternative to the Security
Council veto is really no Security Council, or at least not in a recognizable form. As maddening as the likely Russian nyet will be, that’s a
tradeoff that few would be willing to make. As frustrating as it is, the Security Council is still an enormously useful body, not least because it institutionalizes the
practice of great-power security consultations.

In fact, the veto stands to constrain more than empower. Lowe 10 explains:
Vaughan Lowe, 04/15/10, The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, OUP Oxford,
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=i9zyRYYIJK4C&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=removing+russia+from+the+united+nationas+security+council+would+be+a+mis
take+&ots=03zM3Lw2rb&sig=oYUpmIs1-9raUa5dsWyVIA0OTYI#v=onepage&q=great&f=false,
This sharp contrast is, of course, overdrawn. In most cases, both perspectives contain part of the truth, and recent writing has rightly emphasized the particular

benefits for powerful states that derive from the restraining and legitimating effect of international institutions." In the case of the Security Council,
though, this more balanced picture might appear forced, given [and] the far-reaching privileges of its Permanent
Members which, already in 1949, led Hans Morgenthau to interpret the Council [acts] as the 'international government of
the Great Powers'" For the Great Powers acting in concert, constraints seem largely absent; and for any single Great Power,
the only real constraint is that it needs to ensure the consent (or acquies-cence) of the other
Permanent Members. Even if this consent is not fortheoming, the Security Council does not truly operate as a constraint: given it cannot act against
a Great Power, the Council merely fails to be a useful instrument. Thus, for the Great Powers, the Council seems to be at best a good tool, at worst irrelevant, just as
one would expect from a Great Power concert.

Removal of this constraint ultimately increases the odds of great power conflict. Claude 24:

Claude, 03/28/24, Understanding “Permanent Membership (P5) Status” on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 21st Century
Debate,https://21stcenturydebate.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Essay-Understanding-Permanent-Membership-P5-Status-on-the-UNSC-Claude-3.0-2024-03-08.
pdf

The veto power allows any of the five permanent members to block a resolution in the Security Council, even if it has the support of the other members. This means that a single "no" vote from a P5 member can prevent a resolution

from being adopted, giving them significant influence over the Council's decisions. The veto is intended to encourage the P5 to work together and find consensus. The veto power ensures
that the most powerful nations are invested in the UN's decision-making process and
prevents the Council from taking actions that could lead to direct confrontation between the
P5. It encourag[ing]es compromise and consensus-building among the permanent members. 1. Cold War Stability: During the Cold War,
the veto power helped prevent[ing] direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, as both countries
could block actions they perceived as threats to their interests, maintaining a fragile balance and avoiding escalation. 2.
Suez Crisis Resolution: In 1956, the United States used its veto to condemn the invasion of Egypt by France,
the UK, and Israel, leading to the withdrawal of foreign troops and upholding international
law, demonstrating how the veto can be used to enforce international norms and prevent aggression by powerful states. 3. Iraq War Oversight: France
and Russia's threat to veto a resolution authorizing the 2003 invasion of Iraq led to increased
international scrutiny and helped to constrain the scope of the conflict, illustrating how the veto power can
check unilateral action and promote multilateral decision-making.

And empirics prove this trend to be true. As Claude continues:

Claude, 03/28/24, Understanding “Permanent Membership (P5) Status” on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 21st Century
Debate,https://21stcenturydebate.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Essay-Understanding-Permanent-Membership-P5-Status-on-the-UNSC-Claude-3.0-2024-03-08.
pdf

1. Cold War Stability: During the Cold War, the veto power helped prevent[ing] direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, as both
countries could block actions they perceived as threats to their interests, maintaining a fragile balance and avoiding escalation. 2. Suez Crisis Resolution: In 1956,

the United States used its veto to condemn the invasion of Egypt by France, the UK, and
Israel, leading to the withdrawal of foreign troops and upholding international law, demonstrating
how the veto can be used to enforce international norms and prevent aggression by powerful states. 3. Iraq War Oversight: France and Russia's
threat to veto a resolution authorizing the 2003 invasion of Iraq led to increased international
scrutiny and helped to constrain the scope of the conflict, illustrating how the veto power can check unilateral action and
promote multilateral decision-making. :

While the current global power structure has largely maintained a peaceful order, avoiding
direct military clashes between the P5 is of the utmost importance to global security. Baron
13:
Baron, 13 (Joshua Baron, BS, University of Pennsylvaia, MS, University of Cambridge, PhD, Columbia University, 78-1-2013, accessed on 12-18-2021, Link.springer,
"Great Power Peace and American Primacy | SpringerLink", https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137299482)//Babcii

D. The meaning of great power peace From the beginning of the modern era until approximately 1962, war
was the dominant factor in the relations of great powers. Periods of extended peace were relatively rare and tended to
follow devastating wars, serving as respites for exhausted belligerents. Even interludes between conflicts had moments when the brink of war was approached. In

the second half of the 20th century, major war receded into the background for the great powers . We have experienced over 50 years
without approaching the precipice of great power war, which is a modern record by a
considerable distance. A group of countries have taken this time of tranquility a step farther. They still disagree, but no longer use military means –
or even the threat of them – to resolve their disputes. In sum, great power peace has broken out. The last half-century certainly has not felt like a time of peace. By
comparison, in World War II alone 16.6 million soldiers lost their lives.14 Every death due to war, genocide, oppression, terrorism, or any other violent source is

tragic. At the same time, it is critical to underscore what happened when the great powers last turned the full extent of their military capabilities on each other.

[but] As bad as the World Wars were, they would pale in comparison to the devastation that
would result from a major war among the great powers today. Back in 1984, a group of highly respected scientists
examined the destructive potential of such a conflict. They estimated that a major nuclear war would be expected to
immediately kill somewhere between 750 million and 1.1 billion people. In addition, the “very
fabric of industrial society would be destroyed.” Almost all cities would, “simply cease to exist” and much of our “know-how
would disappear along with them.” 15 The exact effects of a nuclear war among the great powers are hard to predict, but the possibility of a “nuclear winter” means
that the survival of the human species would be at risk.16

The second is proliferation.

The NPT has been successful in achieving its goals.

O'Hanlon 22 quantifies,
In the last 50 years, the United States and the USSR/Russia have made huge progress toward nuclear
disarmament, reducing their nuclear weapons inventories by close to 90% from Cold War
levels. Mike is right that they pursued nuclear arms limitations and reductions primarily because they believed such arms agreements would serve their own security interests, not because they were obliged to do so under
the NPT. But Mike is also right that the NPT helped create the stable strategic framework in which such agreements
were acceptable to the superpowers. And the desire of Washington and Moscow to ensure the success of the treaty and its nonproliferation goal gave them additional incentive
to pursue nuclear disarmament. So the NPT’s first 50 years have been remarkably successful. But there are warning signs that its continued success
cannot be taken for granted.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is key to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and
technology.
Zabel 22 explains,
On January 3, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the P5) issued a joint statement on their continued commitment to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Mounting tensions between the great powers (the U.S., Russia, and China) and their nuclear modernization efforts, Iran’s significantly
reduced breakout time, and North Korea’s recent hypersonic missile test and “more advanced” ballistic missile test all raise concerns. This declaration is an important re-affirmation of the desire to prevent nuclear war and the
further spread of nuclear weapons.

The joint statement was made prior to the 10th NPT review conference, which was planned to take place in January 2022 but has once again been postponed to August 2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The NPT
is intended to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, while
promoting cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Its main three pillars are: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful
use of nuclear energy.

Nuclear proliferation increases the probability of nuclear war, Taylor explains,

Nuclear proliferation is greatly enhanc[es]ing the likelihood of nuclear war. It dramatically increases the number of scenarios for
small-scale nuclear wars or nuclear terrorism, that could escalate to nuclear war between the superpowers. Deterrence, the cornerstone of national security in present strategies, fails against
nuclear terrorism simply because there are no well-defined targets against which to retaliate.

UN 24 furthers,
With geopolitical tensions escalating the risk of nuclear warfare to its highest point in
decades, reducing and abolishing nuclear weapons is the only viable path to save humanity, the UN chief told the
Security Council, as delegates expressed deep concern about the continuous erosion of the international non-proliferation architecture.

“There is one path — and one path only — that will vanquish this senseless and suicidal shadow, once and for all.
The most probable cause of nuclear war is nuclear miscalculation, as Abrams 20 finds,
The resolution of superpower conflict to the point where nuclear war is no longer a threat is a 30- to 50-year project. In the interim, our survival depends on the degree to which we are able to manage short-term risk. No rational

leader of the United States or the Soviet Union would embark on a nuclear adventure by design because they understand too well the impact of weapons of annihilation. Nuclear war, if it comes, is far
more likely to be unintentional or accidental, based on miscalculation, misunderstanding, or misperception. To focus on the short term is not to accept the nuclear
stockpiles as reasonable or desirable avenues to national goals. Instead, it recognizes contemporary reality and attempts to come to grips with the means whereby nuclear peace may be extended for the foreseeable future.

Miscalculation is the biggest impact in the round, FLI confirms,

The most devastating military threat arguably comes from a nuclear war started not intentionally but by accident or miscalculation.
Accidental nuclear war has almost happened many times already, and with 15,000 nuclear
weapons worldwide — thousands on hair-trigger alert and ready to launch at a moment’s
notice — an accident is bound to occur eventually. The list of close calls above is too long for comfort, yet it’s likely very incomplete, given that these
represent only America’s declassified events. Many other events may have occurred in the U.S. that we don’t know about, and we certainly don’t know about close calls the other eight nuclear countries have had. Many nuclear
experts are concerned about a war between India and Pakistan, and if one of them were to accidentally start a nuclear war, the resulting nuclear winter could kill 1 billion people worldwide. Moreover, there are signs of the Cold War
restarting.

The result of nuclear miscalculation is devastating. Helfand 13 finds that,

The local effects were devastating: 20 million dead in the first week from blast effects, burns, and acute radiation
exposure. Even more disturbing were their findings concerning the far-reaching disruption to global climate conditions that this conflict would cause. In April 2012, at the Nobel Peace Laureates Summit in Chicago, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and its U.S. affiliate, Physicians for Social Responsibility, released a

report, “Nuclear Famine,” examining this potential catastrophe.[8] The report concluded that more than one billion people might starve as a result of a limited, regional
nuclear war.

Thus we are proud to negate.