Globalization - ERA OF THE “POSTS”

We have already had occasion to mention post-colonization in the context of a discussion

of colonization. However, it is also possible to argue that almost all of the processes discussed

in this chapter can be described as being in the “era of the posts.” That is, they have

passed into history, passed their prime, or are showing signs of moving into the past tense.

Most, if not all, of them remain important, but what is also important are the signs of their

passage into history. Thus, we could talk in terms (and many do) of post-imperialism, postcolonialism,

post-development, post-Easternization, and post-Americanization.26

One concrete example of this is post-Westernization, specifically the post-Westernization

of the sport of cricket (Rumford 2007c: 97–106). As discussed earlier, cricket was at its

origin a Western, especially an English, sport. However, in recent years, former British colonies,

especially in Asia, have become more equal combatants in global cricket matches and

competitions (Fletcher 2011). Indeed, there is an ongoing struggle for control of cricket

between the traditional and the nascent powers. This is especially true of India: “In many

ways, India is the focal point for both the globalization of cricket – a new focus for generating

cricket finance through massive TV audiences and administrative leadership – and for

post-Westernization of the game” (Rumford 2007c: 95).

The more general issue, of course, is whether we have moved into a post-Western era in

a broader sense. The idea of Easternization, especially in terms of the rise of China, and to

a lesser extent India, as global powers, can be taken as an indication of post-Westernization.

If the twentieth century marked the peak of Westernization, it may be that the twenty-first

century will come to be seen as a post-Western era, as the era of Easternization.

Fareed Zakaria (2008, 2011) has argued that we are living in the post-American age. He

is quite clear from the opening sentence of his book that the key issue is not the decline of

the US, but rather “the rise of everyone else” (2008: 1). Everyone else involves other nationstates

(especially China – “the second-most-important country in the world” [2008: 93], but

not likely to surpass the US in any domain for decades, at least), as well as various non-state

actors (e.g. EU). The US has lost, or is losing, its top position in many realms, large and
small, but it maintains and is likely to continue to retain, its politico-military position as the

world’s dominant, if not only, superpower. However, in virtually every other important

domain – “industrial, financial, educational, social, cultural” – the pendulum is swinging

away from US dominance (2008: 4). In other words, “we are moving into a post-American

world, one defined and directed from many places and by many people” (2008: 5). The US

is most threatened by these changes, and has the most to lose, but it is likely to remain on

top in at least some areas for some time and its effects will be felt long into the future. One

of the reasons for the resiliency of the US is the vibrancy of its demographics, at least in

contrast to many other parts of the world (especially the EU) where populations are shrinking

and immigrants are less welcome. It is this dynamic population that helps to give the US

its edge in innovativeness.

While Zakaria focuses on the rest, he is not oblivious to problems in the US that have

contributed to its relative decline. He is especially critical of what he considers a dysfunctional

government that is able to accomplish little or nothing. Beyond that he recognizes that there are
problems in the economy – the US dollar is weak, the savings rate is low, and

the costs associated with rapidly growing entitlements (e.g. Medicare) are soaring.

In the end, what this means for Zakaria is that the US will no longer be in a position to

dictate to the rest of the world. Instead, the US will need to engage in “consultation, cooperation,

and even [shockingly!] compromise” (Zakaria 2008: 233). Nevertheless, the role of

the US will remain very important both in terms of setting agendas for the rest of the world

and in organizing coalitions in support of its preferred courses of action.

It follows that if we are witnessing a “post-American” world, we might also see a “post

anti-American” world. As Meunier (2013: 1) argues, “the financial crisis that erupted in

September 2008 seemed to confirm all the worst stereotypes [that Europeans held] about

the United States,” including their consumerist greed, materialist excess, and blind commitment

to free-market ideology. But yet, anti-Americanism did not surge – at least not in

Europe, because it was mitigated by the election of Obama, new global trends, and the

perception of the relative decline of the US with the simultaneous rise of China. As competing

superpowers appear more like the US, and the US loses its ability to dictate the futures
of others countries, we will likely see a drop in anti-American sentiment as well.