Globalization and the post-cold war order

Introduction

 The principal characteristics of the contemporary order that give it its distinctive quality
are difficult to discern.
 Our understanding of, say, the inter-war period {1919-39) is informed by how it ended,
but we do not yet know how our present period will 'end'.
 The international order now delivers a range of international 'goods', but also a wide
range of 'bads'.

A typology of order

 When we speak of order, we need to specify order for whom-states, peoples, groups, or
individuals. • International order focuses on stable and peaceful relations between states,
often related to the balance of power. It is primarily about military security.
 World order is concerned with other values, such as justice, development, rights, and
emancipation.
 A pattern of order may advance some values at the expense of others.

The elements of contemporary order

 Order is shaped by the changed nature of states and of the tasks they perform.
 Security is increasingly dealt with on a multilateral basis, even when this does not
conform to classical 'collective security' models.
 The global economy is primarily shaped by relations between the three key groupings
(North America, Western Europe, and East Asia) and is managed by panoply of Western-
dominated institutions.
 Human rights have a much higher profile than in earlier historical periods.
 Are there two separate orders in the North and South, or a more complex diversity of
orders?

Globalization and the post-Westphalian order

 Globalization is often portrayed as an effect of the end of the cold war because this led to
its further geographical spread.
 At the same time, globalization needs to be understood as one of the factors that
contributed to the end of the cold war. It was the Soviet Union's marginalization from
processes of globalization that revealed, and intensified, its weaknesses.
 Accordingly, globalization should be regarded as an element of continuity between the
cold war and post-cold war orders.
  There is reason for scepticism that globalization is the exclusive hallmark of
contemporary order.
 Globalization embodies a range of often competing values.

Globalization and Legitimacy

On the face of it, globalization potentially creates several problems for the political stability of
the current order. Not least is this so with regard to its legitimacy. There is a widely shared view
that the emergence of a diffuse protest movement against globalization is symptomatic of a new
wave of resistance to it. This creates tensions at several levels. The central problem is understood
to be one of the limited effectiveness of democratic practice in present world conditions. At a
time when so much emphasis is placed on the virtues of democracy, many question its viability
when organized on a purely national basis, given the context of globalization. There are two
facets to this issue: representation and accountability.

It is all very well for citizens to be represented in national electoral institutions, but what voice
does this give them in controlling those very economic, social, and cultural forces that cut across
national borders, if their own governments do not have the capacity to deal with these?
Conversely, this creates an issue of accountability. There may be little point in holding national
and local politicians accountable through elections if these politicians remain relatively
powerless to exercise influence over global corporations, global technology, global
environmental changes, or the global financial system. These concerns apply specifically to just
how democratic are bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well
as international organizations such as the United Nations.

On a regional level, there has been recurrent anxiety about the so-called legitimacy deficits that
afflict the institutions of the European Union. The general issue is the lack of congruence
between the geographical organization of our various political systems, and the 'deterritorialized '
nature of our current economic, social, and political activities. In the face of these concerns, there
has been much debate about the role of an emerging global civil society. This embraces a variety
of cross-national social movements, including anti-globalization activists as well as a multitude
of international non-governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International.
Their proponents see these movements as the only feasible way of directly influencing global
policies on such matters as development, environment, human rights, and international security
and hence as the best way of democratizing global governance.

Others, however, remain sceptical. There is nothing inherently democratic about global civil
society as such, as there is no legitimate basis of representation or accountability to many of
these movements. They may simply represent sectional interests, and make policy hostage to
those that are better organized, have greater resources, and are more vocal. Indeed, from the
perspective of many governments in the South, global civil society may aggravate the
inequalities between rich and poor. Civil society is resented as an extension of the power of the
North, for the reason that such movements have a much more solid basis in the developed world,
and are more likely to speak for its interests. This is illustrated, for example, in the tension
between the economic development objectives of many governments in the South and the
preferred policies of many environmental movements in the North. The possible objection is that
this perpetuates the sense of two contrasting global orders, one for the North (represented both
by strong governments and strong civil society movements) and another for the South (led by
weak governments, and weakly organized civil society). This may contribute to a perceived
crisis of legitimacy for the state in the developing world.

An international order of globalized states?

 Globalization is often thought of as an extreme form of interdependence. This sees it

exclusively as an outside-in development.
 The implication of such analyses is that states are now much weaker as actors.
Consequently, they are in retreat or becoming obsolete.
 But if globalization is considered as a transformation in the nature of states themselves,
this suggests that states are still central to the discussion of order: they are different but
not obsolete. This leads to the idea of a globalized state as a state form, and introduces an
inside-out element.
 In this case, there is no contradiction between the norms and rules of a state system
operating alongside globalized states.

The global financial crisis

The on-going financial upheaval since 2007 lends further support to the core argument of this
chapter. On the one hand, it certainly seemed to reaffirm the strong version of the globalization
thesis that the world is so powerfully interconnected that no state can isolate itself from harmful
impacts. This was demonstrated in the speed with which the sub-prime credit implosion in the
USA transmitted itself globally. As the squeeze on international lending affected the real
economy, production and trade experienced sharp falls. Small states such as Iceland and Ireland,
and then Greece, seemed 'hollowed out' by this financial globalization. As part of the associated
crisis in the Eurozone, even larger economies such as Spain and Italy have been placed at risk.
On the other hand, the response to the crisis gave the lie to those accounts suggesting that the
global economy was no longer embedded in state and political structures, and somehow was able
to operate autonomously.

The most striking feature of the events of 2008 was the return of state action to underwrite the
banking and financial sectors. Leading states, including the USA, had to bail out the banks,
either through loans, or effectively through forms of nationalization. Even the USA, the bastion
of laissez-faire capitalism, undertook unprecedented levels of governmental intervention in the
economy, including the automobile industry. As governments introduced their various stimulus
packages to try to push their economies out of recession, there was even a barely concealed
attempt to interfere with the market by veiled forms of protectionism.

In short, if the discussion of globalization hitherto had tended to proceed on the basis of a false
opposition between globalization and state power-viewed as in a zero-sum relationship where
more globalization further weakened the role of states-then the financial crunch of 2008 made
abundantly clear the extent to which a global economy and global finance remained critically
dependent on structural supports from state sources. Indeed, this age of globalization witnessed
the return to unusually high levels of state capitalism in the so-called market economies. The
major challenge to a business-as-usual model for the future global economy comes from climate
change.

While responding to this challenge appears particularly difficult during an economic recession,
with many competing demands on public finances, the move towards a post-carbon economy is
being presented as an opportunity for, not an obstacle to, economic recovery. How far, and how
fast, this will go depends on interlocking domestic and international negotiations. Domestically,
many governments are trying to enact 'clean energy' legislation, or to introduce carbon trading
schemes, to curb emissions. Internationally, much depends on whether an effective post-Kyoto
regime can be implemented, and whether it will deliver an acceptable deal that involves all major
emitters, whether 'developing' or not.

More realistically, the financial crisis points towards the beginning of the end of one version of
it. That particular model of Anglo-American financial deregulation, which has reigned supreme
since the 1980s, does, indeed, now face major challenges. It certainly faces an almost universal
crisis of legitimacy, both at the governmental and at the civil society levels. By itself, however,
this does not indicate the end of globalization. Levels of interdependence remain very high.
While there is, at the moment, a strong desire to insulate national economies from the worst
excesses of deregulation, this is unlikely to go as far as policies aimed actively at cutting national
economies adrift from the global.

Virtually all states retain high stakes in this economy. While there is much talk of a burgeoning
Chinese economy coming to take the place of the USA as the most powerful influence, there is
nothing to suggest that China is about to lead the attack on the international economy, given its
own high dependence on access to it. Had China wished to destroy the liberal project, 2008
presented its best opportunity for doing so. Instead, China played its part in helping to bail out
the stricken US economy. We do not yet face the end of globalization, because there is no major
state interested in acting as the champion of de-globalization. Nonetheless, critical to the future
evolution of the global economy, as with many other aspects of the international order, will be
what kind of relationship, or accommodation, proves possible between the US and China, as they
still represent distinctively different types of globalized states.

Conclusion
In short, we now face a hybrid situation in which states share a host of responsibilities with both
intergovernmental organizations and a multiplicity of non-governmental and transnational actors.
This does not, however, mean that the international order has become redundant. It means simply
that it needs to be redesigned to take account of the new division of labour between states, global
networks, and the rudimentary forms of global governance. As long as states persist as important
sources of political agency, they will construct a states-system with its own rules and norms. It is
this that we regard as the essential basis of the international order. Currently, the identity of
states is undergoing considerable change, to the extent that we can describe them as globalized
states. But these globalized states still coexist within an international order, albeit one that now
differs from its recent historical forms. This order is currently seeking to develop a set of
principles to reflect that transformation. The quest for a post-cold war order is the expression of
this uneasy search. There is no reason to assume that recent trends are irreversible, as the revival
of the security state after 9/11 would seem to indicate. Likewise, the return to forms of state
capitalism during 2008 was almost wholly unexpected. The globalized state of the late twentieth
century is evidently not the only model of likely state development in the future.