Regional Affairs

THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF

THE U.S.-TALIBAN AGREEMENT
March 5, 2020 by Saurav Sarkar
      
As the United States and the Afghan Taliban inked an agreement to end the
almost two-decade-long war in Afghanistan on February 29, many onlookers
welcomed the possibility of an end to the violence while nonetheless fearing
conflict resurgence and possible regional spillover. These fears are not
unfounded: since the deal’s signing there has been an uptick in
violence between the Taliban, Afghan government forces, and U.S. troops.
The peace agreement calls for a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces and an
intra-Afghan dialogue, and urges the Taliban to cut ties with any terrorist
groups threatening the United States and its allies. It is important to
understand the perceptions and implications of this peace deal in the region
for two of Afghanistan’s most consequential neighbors: India and Pakistan. It
is in Pakistan’s interests that future security dynamics in Afghanistan give
Pakistan an edge over its regional rivals, allow it to manage cross-border
threats to the west, and maintain its leverage over the Taliban. For India, it is
important that its relationship with the Afghan government not be
jeopardized, including security and diplomatic relationships that it has
cultivated over the years.

Afghanistan and its role in Pakistan’s regional strategy

It is in Pakistan’s interests that future security

dynamics in Afghanistan give Pakistan an edge
over its regional rivals, allow it to manage cross-
border threats to the west, and maintain its
leverage over the Taliban. For India, it is
important that its relationship with the Afghan
government not be jeopardized, including
security and diplomatic relationships that it has
cultivated over the years.
Pakistan’s interests lie in an intra-Afghan power sharing arrangement that
leaves involved parties, specifically the United States, dependent on
Islamabad for its enforcement. This type of arrangement has heretofore
guaranteed Pakistan a fairly steady supply of aid from the United States.
Along these lines, Pakistan would benefit from continued state weakness and
decentralization in Afghanistan. A united Afghan government might restrict
Islamabad’s influence in Afghanistan. While Pakistan and the Taliban may
have a long-standing relationship, a Taliban government with total control
would likewise reduce Pakistan’s leverage therein.

Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban derives from its own internal ethnic
issues in its regions bordering Afghanistan, which have a sizable Pashtun
population. Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban—an Islamist form of
Pashtun nationalism combining Pashtun tribal customs of Pashtunwali with a
society based on sharia—largely provided a work-around solution to Pashtun
sub-nationalism within Pakistan by depicting Islamabad as sympathetic to
Pashtun political goals. During the U.S-Taliban peace talks Pakistan played a
large role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table through
its influence over Taliban leadership—primarily based out of the Pakistan
city of Quetta. Pakistan demonstrated its significance in the negotiations after
it released one of the chief Taliban negotiators, Abdul Ghani Baradar, after
U.S. pressure in 2018, illustrating Pakistan’s power to enable or restrict
attempts at resolution unsupervised by Islamabad.
While Pakistan has offered support for a “responsible withdrawal” of U.S.
troops, the possibility of reemerging militancy in its border areas is a cause
for concern. The majority Pashtun Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) militant group
which targets the Pakistani state—also known as the Pakistani Taliban—is a
cause for concern for Pakistan as the U.S. reduces its presence in the region.
The TTP officially formed in 2007 in response to the Pakistan military’s
growing footprint in the Federally Administered Tribal Regions (FATA) as
part of assistance to U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The TTP has since
carried out some of the deadliest attacks in Pakistan. Pakistan has also
alleged that the TTP had received support and sanctuary in Afghanistan
as retaliation from Kabul for Pakistan’s continued support to the Afghan
Taliban. As of September 2019 there are some 3,000-5,000 TTP members in
Afghanistan according to the U.S. Department of Defense.

The security situation in Pakistan’s tribal areas is of major significance to

Pakistan, as it had at great cost worked to dismantle safe havens of the TTP
and other militant groups in those regions and many have
reportedly relocated to Afghanistan. In the event of a U.S. withdrawal and
the Taliban’s return to Afghan politics, the TTP could take advantage of the
ensuing developments for a potential resurgence. TTP members could either
merge with the Taliban or defect to other groups, such as the Islamic State in
Khorasan Province (ISKP), or alternatively join forces with Taliban members
who do not support the peace process. Recently, however, multiple senior
TTP leaders have been killed in Afghanistan by Afghan and U.S. forces,
allegedly to fulfill Pakistan’s demands that the United States and Afghanistan
weaken the TTP for the Afghan peace deal to go ahead. These sudden
developments coincide with the signing of the Afghan peace deal and have
led some to speculate that the U.S.-Taliban agreement is playing out in
Pakistan’s favor, since the United States may increase reliance on Pakistan to
force the Taliban to deliver on the terms of the deal.

India’s concerns in Afghanistan

For India, the signing of the US-Taliban deal may jeopardize its present stake
in Afghanistan if the Afghan government is sidelined moving forward. Since
2002, India has developed significant influence with the Afghan government
through trade, cultural and diplomatic links, and foreign aid. This
had alarmed Pakistan, which saw Afghanistan as part of its “strategic depth”
to maintain a safe zone on its western frontier while it focused its foreign
policy on India.

India would be wary of an Afghanistan ruled by

Islamic extremists like the Taliban, as they might
provide fresh fuel for anti-India terrorist groups
operating in Jammu and Kashmir, which would
take cues from the Taliban in increasing their
activities.
India has kept its options and communication channels open with multiple
parties involved in Afghanistan, including the Taliban, as it becomes mindful
of emerging realities in a post-peace agreement. One such reality is that the
Afghan government may cede a degree of legitimacy and power to the
Taliban. Still, India has maintained that any peace process in Afghanistan
must be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned, and that the democratically elected
government in Kabul must be given priority. India would be wary of an
Afghanistan ruled by Islamic extremists like the Taliban, as they might
provide fresh fuel for anti-India terrorist groups operating in Jammu and
Kashmir, which would take cues from the Taliban in increasing their
activities. Last year the Pulwama suicide bomber linked to the traditionally
anti-India militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) was reportedly
inspired by a “Taliban victory” in Afghanistan. JeM has also
previously cooperated with the Taliban against its rivals and found safe-
havens in Afghanistan. Notably, JeM appears excluded from the groups the
Taliban is required to cut ties with on the terms of the U.S.-Taliban
agreement.
Post-peace deal, India will likely aim to keep its relationship with
Afghanistan intact in the future to counter Pakistan. Afghan intelligence, for
instance, reportedly provided India with intelligence for the targets of the
India Air Force’s February 2019 Balakot airstrikes against a reported JeM
terrorist camp linked to the Pulwama attack (although Pakistan
has dismissed claims that India hit its intended target). India stands to gain
from supporting the Afghan government while maintaining communications
channels with the Taliban, recognizing their renewed political legitimacy.
India is in a better position today than in the 1990s to influence outcomes in
Afghanistan, owing to its increasing regional clout, strategic
partnership with the United States, and growing ties with regional powers
like Iran.

Conclusion

In the absence of an alternative, even after the signing of the U.S.-Taliban

agreement, Pakistan is likely to continue using the Afghan Taliban as a
counterweight against rising Indian and Iranian political influence in
Afghanistan. It especially will hope to prevent potential Indian interference in
Pakistan by means of Afghanistan. As of now, Pakistan benefits from a
situation that would enable it to weaken the anti-Pakistan TTP and increases
the Taliban’s legitimacy within the Afghan political process. India
understands that peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan with Pakistani
involvement will not be favorable to its long-term interests. The strategic
rivalry between India and Pakistan, and any future hostilities it may entail,
has the potential to derail the intra-Afghan negotiations. India would prefer to
back the democratically-elected Afghan government rather than support the
traditionally Pakistan-supported Taliban, which would not guarantee its
interests in Afghanistan.