Int Polit

https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0147-z

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The precarious role of emerging powers

in a transforming international order: the Brazilian
and Turkish initiative for a nuclear deal with Iran

Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi1,3 · Suhnaz Yilmaz1,2

© Macmillan Publishers Ltd., part of Springer Nature 2018

Abstract This article analyzes the complex dynamics of international hierarchy

and functional delegation among established and emerging powers, by focusing on
one of the most pressing and highly debated issues of the global security agenda,
nuclear non-proliferation. While the established powers delegate some responsibili-
ties in mediation efforts to enhance the legitimacy of the liberal international order,
this delegation of a mediator role has challenges and limitations, as well. Therefore,
this article examines the Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil (Tehran Dec-
laration) on nuclear fuel in May 2010 as an empirical case that reveals the challeng-
ing quest of emerging powers to elevate their position in the hierarchical pyramid
of the international order. We argue that the Nuclear Deal reflects the limits of the
functional delegation in the international order, since the emerging powers encoun-
ter difficulties in their mediation efforts, particularly when they want to display more
foreign policy autonomy.

Keywords Iran nuclear deal · Brazil · Turkey · International order · Hierarchy ·

Functional delegation

* Suhnaz Yilmaz
syilmaz@ku.edu.tr
Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi
agonzalez14@ku.edu.tr
1
Department of International Relations, College of Administrative Sciences and Economics, Koc
University, CAS-416, Rumelifeneri Yolu, Sariyer, 34450 Istanbul, Turkey
2
Luskin School of Public Affairs, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA
3
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University
of Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina
 A. G. Levaggi, S. Yilmaz

The Iran Nuclear Deal is once again in the limelight of global security debates. The
Obama administration presented the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
of 2015 as a great foreign policy achievement. In contrast, US President Donald
Trump called the agreement “catastrophic” and expressed his resolve toward “decer-
tifying” the Iran nuclear deal, much to the dismay of the other international signa-
tories, particularly the European allies. These two opposing perspectives highlight
the challenges of international mediation and negotiation efforts by the great powers
regarding major global security issues. Assessing the role of emerging powers in
these issues is even more complicated, since in their case not only the content of the
deal, but also its implications for functional delegation, hierarchy, and the nature of
international order are equally significant.
With the end of the Cold War, the international system has undergone a cum-
bersome systemic transition. In response, the emerging powers are striving to cre-
ate niches to become more influential in their respective regions and on the global
scene. In a still unbalanced global system led by the USA, a wide range of emerging
powers have tried to narrow the gap with the dominant power by attempting to coor-
dinate joint actions in numerous fields, from climate change to global governance,
and by developing soft-balancing practices against global actors. Although most of
these actions have a non-military agenda, emerging powers have also attempted to
change their role from mere influencers to agenda-setters and problem-solvers in
issues surrounding international peace and security (Amar 2012; Abdenur 2016). In
some cases, these initiatives have seen support from the established powers, espe-
cially for those actors who share normative prospects for a more effective and liberal
international order (Jones et  al. 2010). In other cases where the emerging powers
tried to display more autonomy, their tasks became more challenging and their posi-
tions more precarious, as the initial functional delegation transformed into hegem-
onic resistance.
In spite of the anarchical nature of the international system (Waltz 1979), the cur-
rent configuration of international politics displays a significant degree of hierar-
chy. The power transition theory presents the international order as hierarchically
organized, similar to the domestic political system (Kugler and Organski 1989, p.
172). With respect to this power hierarchy, peripheral realism—based on the Raúl
Prebisch-ECLA center-periphery perspective—argues that “peripheral states” have
a limited impact on the establishment of the written and informal rules of the sys-
tem, when compared to those at the top of the hierarchical pyramid (Escudé 2015b;
Escudé and Schenoni 2016). In recent years, the rigid divide between central and
peripheral states seems to have been challenged by the so-called “emerging powers,”
to which the core or established powers delegate some responsibilities to enhance
the legitimacy of the liberal international order.1 Some of the members of this newly
“emergent club,” however, strive to display relatively autonomous foreign policy
maneuvers challenging the great power game’s rules, thus diverging from their

1
We use the terms “rising powers” and “emerging powers” interchangeably, referring to those states that
are recognized by “the growing economic as well as political and strategic status of a group of nations
once categorized as part of the ‘third world’ or ‘global South’” (Acharya 2014, p. 59).
The precarious role of emerging powers in a transforming…

expected role. Ultimately, this delegation of a mediator role for conflicts within the
existing power hierarchy in a transforming international order has its challenges and
limitations.
In this context, this article analyzes the case of the Joint Declaration by Iran, Tur-
key and Brazil (Tehran Declation)  on nuclear fuel in May 2010, as an empirical
case that elucidates the challenging quest of emerging powers to elevate their posi-
tion in the hierarchical pyramid of the international order. Our main argument posits
that the Nuclear Deal demonstrates the problematic interaction between the guard-
ians of the established international order and the middle-size emerging powers in
a still transitionary global context. The great powers initially had some functional
delegation to promote and extend the legitimacy of a rule-based international order.
By ultimately diverging from these expectations of the established powers, however,
Brazil and Turkey encountered the risk of being labeled as “irresponsible stake-
holders.” This affected their international legitimacy and, therefore, the efficacy of
their foreign policy maneuvers. Hence, instead of enjoying the transformative role
that they strove to promote in a polycentric world, both Brazil and Turkey were frus-
trated in their aspirations to become mediators or solution facilitators in the high-
politics, security-related realm of world affairs.
The role of mediator raises a series of questions: In which instances do estab-
lished powers delegate responsibilities to emerging powers? How is the middle
emerging powers’ assertiveness concerning the international security agenda influ-
encing their global legitimacy? How does the hierarchical nature of international
politics constrain the behavior and initiatives of second-line players?
To address these questions, the first section of the article focuses on the relevant
literature and theoretical interpretations about the nature and implications of the
global systemic transformation and about the role of the emerging middle powers.
The second section analyzes the regional and global foreign policy strategies of Bra-
zil and Turkey, as well as their quests for gaining higher status in the international
power hierarchy. Finally, the study examines the roots and repercussions of the Tri-
partite Declaration as an ambitious, yet precarious attempt by these emerging mid-
dle powers to have a greater voice concerning the high-politics agenda, as well as
the broader implications of this attempt for a better understanding of functional del-
egation, hierarchy, and international order.

Emerging powers, hierarchy, and functional delegation

The transformation of the global power structure has triggered multiple concep-
tual interpretations, ranging from ones that focus on the anarchical to others that
emphasize the interstate order’s hierarchical nature. The neo-realist interpretation
highlights the anarchical nature of the international system which shapes power and
security relations in a Hobbesian kind of setting, while the hierarchical approach
emphasizes the power asymmetries in the global power pyramid. The neo-realist and
power-transition literature reflects these approaches, respectively.
The theoretical approaches that highlight anarchy offer different interpretations
about the nature of the post-Cold War international system. The unipolar-centered
 A. G. Levaggi, S. Yilmaz

perspective posits that, after the fall of the Soviet Union, no single power in the
international system could counterbalance the military and economic capabilities
of the USA (Wohlforth 1999). This narrative reflects the existence of an unprec-
edented supremacy due to the ability of the Unites States to project its strategic and
commercial power with a strong presence in all global commons, such as interna-
tional waters, outer space, or global communications (Posen 2003). In contrast to
these projections, however, the post-Cold War unipolar momentum has proven to
be ephemeral. The end of the Cold War transformed the world order with the disap-
pearance of the bipolarity producing a “geo-political thaw” (Rojas 2010), ensued
by an untenable unipolarity. In this highly volatile context, the literature about the
emerging powers has stressed that the supremacy of the USA—from both realist
and liberal perspectives—has led to a new, but still inscrutable situation (Schweller
2011; Acharya 2014; Stuenkel 2015). The shift from a bipolar world to a “we-do-
not-know-what-order” world has allowed for different actors and new processes to
emerge. The military-strategic factor was the most important issue during the Cold
War; in the post-Cold War era, however, while high politics maintained its predomi-
nance, “soft power” features also started to shape the international agenda (Nye
2004). Thus, we identify three main approaches to analyzing current global develop-
ments in terms of a non-polar, multipolar, or interpolar world.
The end of the Cold War has caused not merely a readjustment at the state level,
but also a novel redistribution of power among states, markets, and civil societies
(Mathews 1997). Scholarly debates reveal the transition from a state-centric world-
view to a multicentric and multidimensional approach to power. According to Nye,
the dissemination and distribution of power in the post-Cold War era has led to an
analysis of world politics analogous to a three-dimensional chess game in which mil-
itary, economic, and cultural powers are in parallel contention (Nye 2002). Neither
the state nor military capabilities are the only forces that rule the world, but both are
still relevant. A radical interpretation of the previous arguments proposes a world
without polarity. The overall structure of security, economy, production, and knowl-
edge is not under the protection of a single actor; instead, there exist many differ-
ent, globally distributed power centers. Haas argues that “in contrast to multipolar-
ity—which involves several distinct poles or concentrations of power—a non-polar
international system is characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power”
(Haass 2008, p. 44). At the same time, the main state actors are increasingly chal-
lenged, since the power is no longer in the hands of the state, but “in many hands
and in many places” (Haass 2008, p. 45). The distinction between high and low poli-
tics is blurred. Increasing interdependence and globalization are the main drivers
of non-polarity, which manifests itself as an accelerated version of the moderniza-
tion process that connects economic, financial, and communicational dots across the
world. The emerging powers are part of these economically empowered nodes, and
the main strengths and fragility of these powers are related to their economic dyna-
mism and power. Nevertheless, this analysis only partially reflects the complexity of
the current global interactions.
A second approach postulates that we are living in a multipolar system, or on
our way to do so. Although this literature recognizes the primacy of the US, it
also argues that other big players such as Russia and China have sufficient military
The precarious role of emerging powers in a transforming…

and economic capabilities to balance the US presence regionally and sometimes

even globally, by developing soft-balancing strategies (Schweller and Pu 2011;
Mearsheimer 2006; Pape 2005). Simultaneously, the (re)emergence of rising powers
is a fundamental factor in the nascent multipolar world. For example, the BRICS2
group might be interpreted as an alternative pole of power (Stuenkel 2015), or
merely as a “platform of convenience” (Abdenur and Folly 2015, p. 69). While in
1995 BRICS represented only 7% of the global GDP or gross world product (GWP),
by 2009 that percentage had grown to 22% of the global GDP in nominal terms and
30% of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (Renard 2010, pp. 10–11). Since then, it has
grown slowly, reaching 31% in 2016 (World Bank 2016).
The emerging powers have utilized non-military forms of balancing, such as
economic, diplomatic, and multilateral actions. Regional organizations such as the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
zation (SCO) attest to an increasing interest gap between the emerging and estab-
lished powers. Lately, the emerging powers have incorporated military balancing to
their agendas; this is especially evident as China and Russia have increased their
assertiveness in their own regional environments.
The last approach, an eclectic one, combines the causal mechanisms of the realist
school (power and economic competence) with the liberal school (economic inter-
dependence and multilateral cooperation). Interpreting the world system as interpo-
lar, the eclectic perspective views a growing competence of emerging powers, even
if somewhat circumscribed by economic interdependence and globalization (Grevi
2009). The concept of an interpolar world recognizes two fundamental trends:
The global redistribution of power from the West to the East—or the West to the
rest—and from the North to the South is creating a new global order, by increasing
economic interdependence with significant opportunities and challenges. Military
capabilities and economic interdependence do not separately explain international
politics; hence, they need to be interpreted interactively.
In this context, the emerging or rising powers provide us with conceptual insights.
While still lacking a consensus on the definition of an emerging power (Hart and
Jones 2010, p. 65), we can identify one by its relatively important economic, mili-
tary, and political resources; its capacity to make the international order more par-
ticipatory; its key roles in its own region; its ability to develop soft power strategies
through multilateral initiatives at the regional and global levels; and its search for
enhanced status in world politics (Tank 2012; Hurrell 2006; Fukuyama 2006). It is
important to differentiate those “rising” powers that already have great power sta-
tus, such as Russia and China, from middle-size emerging powers—such as India,
Brazil, Turkey, or Indonesia—which have tried to achieve recognition within and
beyond their respective regions.

2
Jim O’Neill coined the acronym BRIC in Goldman Sachs’ 2001 paper “The World Needs Better Eco-
nomic BRICs,” in which he identified Brazil, Russia, India, and China as the new engines of economic
growth for the global economy. These countries then decided to establish a high-level global grouping,
whose relevance grew after the 2008 financial global crisis. In 2010, it became a formal institution, and
South Africa was invited to join, thus expanding the scope of the group and renaming it BRICS.
 A. G. Levaggi, S. Yilmaz

The mere existence of emerging powers is revealing about the structure of inter-
national politics. While the neo-realist approach highlights the anarchical nature of
the international system, alternative realist explanations, such as the Power Tran-
sition Theory, compel us to approach the international system as a hierarchy. The
world is defined not only by the distribution of capabilities, but also by a series of
pyramidal layers. This perspective elucidates the interaction between the hierarchi-
cal structure of the international system and foreign policy choices (Organski 1968).
It argues that the world system has an implicit hierarchy with regional sub-hierar-
chies (Lemke 2002). This approach portrays the international order as a “pyramid
with one nation at the top and many nations at the bottom. Those at the top of the
pyramid are most powerful and those at the bottom are least powerful” (Organski
1968, p. 365), while there are multiple smaller pyramids that reproduce this inequal-
ity of power within regional systems (Lemke 2002, p. 49). At the top of the pyramid
is the USA, the primus inter pares of the established major powers, distinguished
by “unusual capabilities with which to pursue its interests in interstate relations;
[it] uses those capabilities to pursue unusually broad and expansive foreign policies
beyond its immediate neighborhood or region” (Volgy et al. 2011, p. 6). Below the
major great powers—that is, the permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council, plus Germany and Japan—there are the “would-be” or “would-like-to-be”
great powers, the emerging middle powers (Hurrell 2006). These powers share a set
of common characteristics: They have a strong international identity; they are situ-
ated in structural contexts different from those of the industrialized powers; they do
not necessarily emphasize involvement in issue areas that require a sense of mor-
ally infused responsibility toward the international community; they have “reform-
ing” strategies toward international organizations and the whole international order;
and, finally, they are regional powers (Huelsz 2009; Önis and Kutlay 2013). These
emerging powers are partially reflected in the G-20 and MIKTA3 groups, while the
G-7 represents the established major powers, and the BRICS coalition occupies a
position between the primary and middle powers.
The hierarchy in an interpolar world also implies a debate about control and
responsibilities vis-à-vis the governance of world politics. There are three func-
tionally differentiated types of states: rule-makers who forge both the written and
unwritten rules of the world order, rule-takers, and rebel states (Escudé 2015a). In
this context, we argue that the emerging powers often appear as rule-takers, with
aspirations to become rule-makers. Paradoxically, while they are partially empow-
ered by the established powers to enforce the rules of the international order, emerg-
ing powers are not expected to challenge their prevalent position by pursuing more
autonomous foreign policy strategies. If they do, they risk being labeled as “irre-
sponsible stake-holders.”
While the established powers command the main international institutions of
the liberal order, the rising powers—especially China and Russia—increasingly
contest this old order. The middle powers, however, lack both decisive influence in

3
MICTA is a grouping of middle-sized emerging powers that includes Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of
Korea, Turkey and Australia.
The precarious role of emerging powers in a transforming…

post-WWII institutions and the power to change the rules for their own benefit. They
have been promoting a multilateral approach by building consensus in particular
niches, while seeking to improve their positions by assuming mediator roles (Flemes
2007, pp. 10–13). In this context, there is concern about how to determine the con-
tent and direction of global governance regarding major issues on the international
agenda, while aligning the high capabilities of the major powers with the construc-
tive collaboration of lesser powers (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p. 59). During the first
years of the Bush administration, and partially continued under the Obama admin-
istration, the US promoted a series of nations as emerging powers, anticipating that
these countries would become “responsible” global actors (Stewart 2010, p. 44). For
example, the White House supported Brazil as a rising power based on a mix of
domestic, regional, and international factors (Spektor 2014, p. 256).
Having responsibilities delegated to them empowered the rising powers and
expanded their roles and stakes in the international order. These states were pro-
moted as “responsible stake-holders” by assuming broader obligations, including
the maintenance of international peace and security, although primarily in regional
and multilateral spheres. According to the mainstream narrative, the closer to West-
ern positions and policies, the stronger and more legitimate were those emerging
powers. The rising powers assumed that accepting more responsibility on the global
stage would earn them a more autonomous position. Hence, the middle powers
strove to use their autonomy more effectively, by “maximizing their influence over
small countries, minimizing the influence of great powers, and preventing the emer-
gence of other middle powers in their respective regions” (Spanakos and Marques
2014, p. 215).
We argue that greater autonomy in global “low-politics” issues and “high-pol-
itics” topics on the regional agenda did not necessarily lead to less support from
major powers. In some instances, however, the quest for more autonomy in strate-
gic global issues produced a boomerang effect that negatively influenced the actor’s
overall international trajectory as a rising power. This tension between delegation
and more autonomy has been one of the core issues, not only in the discussions lead-
ing to the Tehran Declaration, but also more broadly in the debate about the limits of
the emerging powers’ engagement in global governance (Kahler 2013).
Another key debate about nuclear proliferation issues highlights the difference
between considering them as a strategic conflict or as a particular problem with non-
proliferation norms. According to Sauer,
…emerging powers follow a double-track approach that at first sight seems not
very consistent: on the one hand, they are at the vanguard pushing the nuclear
weapon states to disarm. On the other hand, the emerging powers seem to
resist pressure from the nuclear weapon states—especially the US, the UK,
and France—to counter proliferation (Sauer 2011, p. 5).
From a hierarchical perspective, great powers used to monopolize the strategic
chessboard, while the second-tier powers (or rule-takers) are mere viewers, support-
ers, or detractors without the capabilities, or even the will, to play a more active role.
If they want to build such capabilities to challenge great powers, they become rebels,
as in the case of Iran.
 A. G. Levaggi, S. Yilmaz

Alternatively, the emerging powers, owing to their increasing power of attraction,

have been boosting their performance in the low-politics spheres. Meanwhile, the
strict division between “high” and “low” politics has been relativized by the assump-
tion that the hierarchy of issues is not as clear today, due to changing agendas and
linkages between issues basically generated by economic interdependence. Within
this theoretical context, this article will analyze Brazil’s and Turkey’s regional and
global strategies, which intersected regarding the Iranian nuclear issue during the
negotiations of the Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey, and Brazil on Nuclear Fuel
(Tehran Declaration) in May 2010.4

The quest for a new status: the foreign policy strategies of Brazil

and Turkey

A month after the Tehran Declaration, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Celso Amorim, vehemently argued that emerging nations such as Brazil and Turkey
needed to be included in matters of war and peace, not only because they deserved
it due to their credentials and abilities, but also in hope of a better, more peaceful
world (Amorim 2010, 2015). The Tripartite Nuclear Deal was initially perceived
as a turning point for Brazil’s aspirations and legitimacy in the regional and global
arenas. Since the early 2000s, the emerging middle powers have tried to amplify
their voices and to gain a higher status in shaping international affairs, with varying
degrees of success. After more than fifteen years, the dynamics of international poli-
tics present an unpromising outlook. The emerging middle powers have so far failed
to achieve new rankings among the major powers in global governance. Moreover,
some of the emerging powers have been losing their glitter due to a mix of domestic,
regional, and global factors.
In the post-Cold War era, Brazil and Turkey shared common sources of dyna-
mism and legitimacy as middle-sized emerging powers. Particularly in the first dec-
ade of the twenty-first century, both strategically located countries had vibrant and
fast-growing economies, despite some setbacks. Both also had potentially promis-
ing paths to liberal democracy, while their strategic choices could influence regional
dynamics by bringing more capability and legitimacy to international efforts (Fon-
taine and Kliman 2013). During the negotiation and signing of the Tehran Declara-
tion in May 2010, both countries boasted a rising trajectory in striving for a greater
role in regional and global politics. However, in the early 2010s, these exemplary
models were increasingly criticized, partially due to domestic and regional crises.
At the same time, their strategic choices started to diverge from the expectations of
the Western powers. In Brazil, economic indicators revealed decreasing dynamism,5

4
Signed by Manucher Mottaki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran; Ahmet
Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey; and Celso Amorim, Minister of Exter-
nal Relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil.
5
As an example, according to the World Bank, the current Brazilian GDP measured by current USD in
2015 was almost as much as in 2009, while the economy fell an additional 3.4% in 2016.
The precarious role of emerging powers in a transforming…

while domestic problems multiplied, ending with the impeachment of President

Dilma Rousseff and endless corruption investigations into most key political figures.
In addition to domestic issues, Brazil’s and Turkey’s international strategies have
encountered significant setbacks as well. After Lula’s rule, the new administration
led by Rousseff had underplayed the external agenda and Brazil’s leadership role in
the region; later political and economic crises accentuated Brazil’s instability. Tur-
key’s primary foreign policy challenge was on the regional level, as it had to cope
with the many unexpected developments caused by upheavals in several Arab coun-
tries, particularly profound in Turkey’s neighbor Syria (Öniş 2014; Keyman 2016;
Aras and Yorulmazlar 2016).

Brazil: the quest for global autonomy

Building on the political and economic stability of Fernando Henrique Cardozo’s

government (1995–2003), Lula’s Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT)
offered a critical momentum to affirm Brazil as the major regional actor and to
promote its interests globally as an emerging power. This idea was not new in the
“country of the future.” In the era of the military, during the 1960s and 1970s, the
idea of “Brasil-Potência” was an ambition of the elites—that is, to transform the
country into a great player. Later, in 1994, Celso Amorim, the former Minister of
Foreign Affairs under Itamar Franco, launched the candidacy for a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council (Ferreira and Cunha 2015, p. 1065). Structural prob-
lems and an inward-oriented elite curtailed the take-off in the international arena.
However, there were periods of international activism, such as the short rule of Jânio
Quadros, followed by João Goulart (1961–1964), Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979), and
Cardozo’s second term (1999–2002). The Brazilian elite has long sustained a strong
expectation that Brazil should play a greater role in world affairs, due to “Brazil’s
geographical size, population, gross domestic product, level of industrialization,
diversity of commercial links, and the institutional robustness of the state apparatus”
(Herz 2011, p. 160). The Lula years (2003–2011) reflected Brazil’s high potential
for positioning itself among the interpolar world’s forces through several means: by
attracting a significant amount of investments; by developing new trade ties in not-
so-traditional regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East;
and by participating in the new informal global platforms, such as BRICS or IBSA
(India, Brazil, South Africa).6 At the same time, the USA started to recognize Brazil
as an emerging power—even before the BRIC acronym was broadly accepted—that
could support or undermine American interests (Spektor 2014, pp. 14–15).
Brazil’s emerging strategy was essentially based on its attractive policies of eco-
nomic cooperation, commercial interests, development aid, technology transfer, and
a strong commitment to an international order based on equity. For example, one

6
In the period from 2003 to 2010, FDI to Brazil skyrocketed from USD 10 billion to USD 88 billion,
according to IMF data. Overall trade more than tripled from USD 126 billion to USD 388 billion, but
in Latin America (3.5 times), Sub-Saharan Africa (4 times) and China (7 times) growth was even more
pronounced.
 A. G. Levaggi, S. Yilmaz

of Brazil’s major concerns during these years was the conceptual revision of global
governance institutions, particularly reforming the UN Security Council (Ferreira
and Cunha 2015). This strategy was also a continuation of the so-called “strategy of
insertion,” which changed Brazil’s international profile in the 1990s, by participat-
ing in international regimes, especially in the nuclear area, through supporting UN
operations, playing a key role in multilateral trade negotiations, and enhancing its
roles as mediator and trust-builder (Herz 2011, p. 161; Lafer and Fonseca 1994).
Brazil’s strategy moved across two levels, the regional and the global, each reinforc-
ing the other. The prospect of a peaceful region under its “benevolent hegemony”
presented Brazil as a key regional partner in the global international order. In the
meantime, Brazil also strove to assume a leadership role in the global arena, through
a more active engagement in crisis management and by leading initiatives such as
the Africa-South America Summit (ASA) and the South American-Arab Countries
Summit (ASPA).
Regionally, two fundamental events changed the agenda. First, during the IV
Summit of the Americas (2005), the major players of the region—Brazil, Argen-
tina, and Venezuela—opposed the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as a
mechanism of hemispheric regional integration, because the FTAA sought to unite
all the national markets of the Americas into one regional market. Second, in order
to limit the influence of the US and the global organizations inherited from the Cold
War, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American
Defense Board (IADB), three multilateral institutions were created. The Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR), established in 2011 and based on the Com-
monwealth of South American Nations, embraces an image of regional unity behind
Brazil’s vision. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA),
founded in late 2004, has an anti-hegemonic profile born as an agreement between
Venezuela and Cuba, in which Brazil plays a moderator role to avoid increasing ten-
sions within and outside the region, particularly with the USA. Finally, there is the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), created in Mexico
in 2010. Paradoxically, in all these regional initiatives, Brazil plays a key role to
limit US influence, when, at the same time, Brazil presented itself as an interlocutor
and mediator between the US and the region. One of the key criticisms of the Bra-
zilian role in South America is that, despite proclaiming itself as the regional leader,
few followed Brazil (Malamud 2011).
At the global fora, the Lula government developed a highly active agenda, visiting
85 countries and signing a plethora of agreements, especially with countries located
in the Global South, thus broadening the scope of Brazilian diplomacy. Grounded
by a South–South Cooperation agenda, Brazil expanded its ties with Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia. It played a key role in the development of
the IBSA and BRICS initiatives. It also started to undertake additional responsibili-
ties in “high-level” politics at regional and global levels, by joining peace-keeping
efforts in Haiti and Lebanon (Santos and Cravo 2014).
Obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council has been its highest aspi-
ration since the 1990s, when Brazil started to push for membership expansion within
a broader reform of the Security Council. However, becoming a rule-maker, as it is
guaranteed by a UNSC permanent seat, has been an elusive goal. To press its case,
The precarious role of emerging powers in a transforming…

Brazil focused its efforts to receive support and legitimacy from the G4 (Brazil, Ger-
many, India, and Japan) initiative and from one of its flagship actions to present
itself as a “responsible stake-holder”—that is, mediation in the Iranian nuclear issue.

Turkey: the quest for regional leadership

The first decade of the twenty-first century was marked by a multidimensional and
proactive foreign policy for Turkey. While confronting a number of domestic and
international challenges, Turkey followed a rising trajectory and became increas-
ingly categorized as both an “emerging power” (Dal 2016; Kubicek et al. 2015) and
a “middle power” (Sandal 2014; Önis and Kutlay 2016). Turkey’s increasing eco-
nomic prospects and proliferating international ties also fueled its quest for regional
leadership.
During this period, a multidimensional approach influenced by Davutoğlu’s
“strategic depth” perspective shaped the new initiatives of Turkey’s foreign policy
agenda (Davutoğlu 2001; Murinson 2006). Moving beyond the perception of foreign
affairs as a series of bilateral relations, Turkish policymakers started to approach for-
eign policy strategy as a series of mutually reinforcing and interlocking processes.
Davutoğlu highlighted that, in order to formulate an effective and long-lasting stra-
tegic perspective, two key components consisted of: (1) “historic depth,” which
requires a prudent assessment of the links between past, present, and future; and (2)
“geographical depth,” which is driven by the intricate relationships between domes-
tic, regional, and global factors. Geo-political, geo-economic, and geo-cultural fac-
tors all contribute to defining strategic depth, which lies at the intersection of the
historical and geographical paradigms (Davutoğlu 2008, p. 80).
During this period, Turkey also tried to strike a delicate balance between its long-
standing quest for enhancing its ties with the European Union and its increasing
foreign policy emphasis on Eurasia (Öniş and Yılmaz 2009). In emphasizing the
significance of Turkey’s long-neglected Asian ties, Davutoğlu stressed: “If Turkey
does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would have very limited chances with the
EU” (Davutoğlu 2001, pp. 551–563). Presenting Turkey as a “central country” with
a strategic location at the heart of the Afro-Eurasian landmass, he highlighted Tur-
key’s multiple regional identities. Turkish policymakers also viewed these multiple
identities as an asset in Turkey’s efforts to simultaneously expand its influence in the
Middle East, Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Mediterra-
nean. The goal was to emerge as a provider of security and stability in these regions
(Davutoğlu 2008).
Turkey’s ascending role in the Middle East and Eurasia was particularly critical for
this strategy. Pursuing a more proactive approach toward the Middle East, Turkey tried
to enhance its ties with the Arab world (Altunısık 2005; Dung 2005; Altunisik and
Martin 2011). In this context, its leadership role in the Organization of Islamic Coop-
eration (OIC) from 2005 to 2009 was particularly significant. On 1 March 2003, Tur-
key withheld permission for US troops to pass through Turkish territory during the US
invasion of Iraq. While this critical decision greatly strained Turkey’s relations with the
US, it generally had a positive reception in the Arab world, increasing Turkey’s prestige
 A. G. Levaggi, S. Yilmaz

in the region. These political and strategic ties were consolidated by Turkey’s increas-
ing emphasis on expanding its trade partners and volume (Kirisci 2009). In Eurasia,
Turkey pursued a pragmatic strategy to develop its relations with Russia and the Cen-
tral Asian republics. Energy ties, as well as Turkey’s desire to become an “energy hub,”
despite its high level of energy dependence on Russia and Iran, became a critical factor
in defining a complex interaction marked by cooperation, competition, and asymmet-
ric interdependence (Öniş and Yılmaz 2016). In the meantime, Turkey maintained its
energy collaboration with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the US within the framework of the
East–West Energy Corridor and particularly the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
project, which was also significant for European energy security (Sever-Mehmetoglu
and Yılmaz 2016). The emphasis on Turkey’s global role also increased in the AKP
era. For instance, at a time of rising Islamophobia in the West after 9/11, Turkish lead-
ers emphasized Turkey’s ability to act as a facilitator of intercultural dialogue and as a
bridge between the Christian and Islamic worlds. Accordingly, the AKP government
particularly supported the Alliance of Civilizations Initiative, which was initially pro-
posed by the Spanish Prime Minister Jose Zapatero at the UN General Assembly on 21
September 2004. When the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended
inviting a Muslim country to be a co-leader of this initiative, the Turkish government
co-sponsored the proposal. Turkey became a vocal advocate of the initiative, promoting
it on numerous international platforms, such as the EU General Affairs Council Meet-
ing in March 2006, the Arab League Summit in March 2006, and the World Economic
Forum in May 2006 (Balci and Mis 2008). Despite limited concrete international
achievements, Turkey’s leadership role, which simultaneously emphasized its Islamic
identity and its Western ties, also appealed to the domestic audience.
In this period, the normative aspect of Turkish foreign policy beyond the confines
of narrow self-interest was stressed, reflecting Turkey’s desire to assume more regional
responsibility and a heightened global role. For instance, Turkey increased its engage-
ment in humanitarian assistance (Bayer and Keyman 2012). Turkey also pursued a
strategy of “rhythmic diplomacy,” displaying pro-activism in the field of diplomacy,
aiming for a more active role in international organizations, and reaching out to new
areas with limited Turkish contacts in the past (Davutoğlu 2008). Turkey hosted NATO
and OIC summits. Ankara also started to actively promote its case to become a per-
manent member of the UN Security Council. As part of its new Africa outreach, Tur-
key assumed an observer status in the African Union. These relations were also sup-
plemented with civil society contacts and enhanced business ties. These new areas of
emphasis and the desire for more proactive roles in regional and global affairs equally
affected Turkey’s relations with Iran, including Turkey’s approach to the international
negotiations centering on the nuclear proliferation issue.

The Tehran declaration and the limits of Brazil’s and Turkey’s

influence

From a neo-realist perspective, in a bipolar or multipolar system, the state’s behavior

aims at achieving the balance of power among great powers. In a hierarchical world,
practical actions of diplomatic balancing can also be observed between core and
The precarious role of emerging powers in a transforming…

peripheral powers. While the Western powers try to maintain their authority by fos-
silizing the traditional organizational structures of international institutions such as
the UN Security Council, the “new kids on the block” (Amorim 2010, 2015) attempt
to challenge the status quo through institutional reform proposals, or through the
generation of new autonomous spaces of political and economic cooperation. These
new agreements facilitate a process of “multi-multilateralism” (Fukuyama 2006, p.
11). This concept reflects the strengthening of an asymmetrical and dynamic coop-
eration process in which (1) countries are becoming members of a variety of over-
lapping institutions, creating a new mosaic of multilateral interactions; (2) states
meet continuously in multiple fora, hence increasing the density of international
relations; and (3) formal institutions cohabit with informal groups in a moving and
overlapping configuration (Renard 2009, p. 20).
The BRICS Summit, the IBSA Dialogue Forum, and the G-20, among others, are
examples of informal fora that deepen the multi-multilateralism mechanisms. The
resolution of the most critical issues of the international security agenda, however, is
still restricted to the members of the UN Security Council. One significant coopera-
tion agreement that attempted to challenge this monopoly was the Tripartite Agree-
ment on the Iran Nuclear Fuel Swap, or the Tehran Declaration signed by Presidents
Ahmadinejad (Iran), Lula da Silva (Brazil), and Prime Minister Erdoğan (Turkey) at
the end of the G15 summit meeting in Tehran from May 15 to 17, 2010.

The Tehran declaration: high stakes, opportunities, and setbacks

The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Celso Amorim, explained that the
onset of the “Operation Yasmin”7 started when President Obama requested Presi-
dent Lula’s assistance in the dialogue with Iran during the L’Aquila G8 + 5 meet-
ing in July 2009. High-level contacts between Brazil and the US continued until the
Tehran Declaration was signed. President Obama even sent a letter to President Lula
three weeks before the declaration (Folha de S. Paulo 2010), explaining the main
issues of American concern, highlighting the significance of the place of exchange,
quantity, and simultaneity of the delivery (Amorim 2015, pp. 60–64). While the
relatively more problematic agenda issues seemed to be resolved at the time, sig-
nificant changes occurred between the L’Aquila meeting and the Tehran Declaration.
In February 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that
the “first package of 20 percent fuel was produced and provided to the scientists,”
meaning that Iran had succeeded in enriching uranium to 20% (NBCNews 2010).
Immediately thereafter, the US actively promoted sanctions against Iran in the UN
Security Council. By the time the Tehran Declaration was signed, all the perma-
nent members of the Security Council were already committed to approving the
sanctions. Brazil and Turkey were caught off-guard. The negotiations fulfilled the

7
The code Name of the Joint Political Action was given by the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Ahmet Davutoğlu, in honor of Amorim’s granddaughter, whose father is a Turkish diplomat (Amorim
2015, p. 52).
 A. G. Levaggi, S. Yilmaz

original scheme proposed by the USA, but the diplomatic timing and the perceptions
and position of the established powers regarding this issue had changed.
The Joint Declaration (JD) on Nuclear Fuel, which was based on previous nego-
tiations between the P5 + 1 and Iran, projected the restoration of dialogue channels
with Iran by proposing confidence-building measures in which Turkey and Brazil
testified that Iran was committed to swap LEU (low-enriched uranium) for fuel for
the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). These countries presented the Nuclear Deal as
an example of a confidence-building initiative by middle powers who assumed the
role of mediators with the aim of resolving the crisis and preventing nuclear prolif-
eration, while negating the need for future international sanctions against Iran. At
the same time, this initiative was also presented as an effort to solve a non-Western
issue by non-Western powers (Ozkan 2011, p. 29).
The Joint Declaration (JD) affirmed that, “in order to facilitate the nuclear coop-
eration mentioned above, the Islamic Republic of Iran agrees to deposit 1200  kg
(2600 lb) LEU (low-enriched uranium) in Turkey,” while the “Vienna Group should
deliver 120 kg fuel required for TRR in no later than one year” (The Guardian 2010).
Apart from technical issues about nuclear energy, the Tehran Declaration also high-
lighted in Article 10 that Iran “appreciated the constructive efforts of the friendly
countries Turkey and Brazil in creating the conducive environment for the realiza-
tion of Iran’s nuclear rights” (The Guardian 2010).
The deal was presented as a milestone for the rising powers’ momentum, because,
on the one hand, the emerging middle powers had the opportunity to challenge the
established rules by underwriting an alternative prospect, trying to reinforce diplo-
macy against possible sanctions, and offering dialogue as a viable solution for an
international crisis. On the other hand, these well-meaning moves turned out to
undermine Turkey’s and Brazil’s aspirations to become responsible stake-holders in
the international order. The Vienna Group and the G5 + 1 dismissed the deal, and
there was a wide range of criticism from the Western powers, while Russia and
China took a cold, distant position. While the then US Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton, said that the USA acknowledged the “sincere efforts” of Turkey and Brazil,
all the permanent members of the UN Security council were “proceeding to rally
the international community on behalf of a strong sanctions resolution” (Al Jazeera
2010). On June 9, 2010, France, the USA, and Russia sent a joint letter to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, arguing that the Tehran Declaration “provides no
alternative means of ensuring that the confidence-building element of the arrange-
ment would be maintained” (Reuters 2010). That same day, the UN Security Coun-
cil passed Resolution 1929 (2010), imposing economic sanctions against Tehran. At
the time, both Turkey and Brazil were non-permanent members of the UN Secu-
rity Council and voted against the resolution, despite extensive US pressure to do
otherwise.

Brazil and Turkey confronting the hierarchy of the international order

Following the Tehran Declaration, there were two diverging narratives regarding
the interpretation of the underlying motives of this initiative and its impact on the
The precarious role of emerging powers in a transforming…

relations between the established and the emerging powers. The non-Western nar-
rative primarily stressed the need for a diplomatic solution based on the proposed
Fuel Swap agreement and the positive signals from the USA to create confidence
between Iran and the P5 + 1. Further interpretations highlighted that the intentions
of Brazil and Turkey were to contribute to the broader process, in which the creation
of confidence was vital for promoting a definitive solution for the future (Ramalho
da Rocha and Pereira 2014, p. 663; Amorim and Davutoğlu 2010).
By contrast, the Western narrative argued that Brazil and Turkey became over-
engaged in performing the “duties” which the major powers had assigned to them, in
an attempt to pursue a central position for themselves as interlocutors. This incident
clearly indicated the limits of functional delegation. After this deal, these countries
were viewed as challengers (Metais 2013, p. 13) or spoilers of the liberal interna-
tional order (Schweller 2011, p. 293). In this context, the rule-takers, who had orig-
inally attempted to improve the nature of the international order, ultimately were
depicted as normative rebels. According to this narrative, Turkey and Brazil com-
plicated international efforts to pressure Iran (Fontaine and Kliman 2013, p. 102).
This narrative was reinforced further by domestic accusations, especially in Brazil,
of geo-political misperception and over-engagement in issues non-vital to their own
national interests (Lampreia 2014).
Although Brazil and Turkey displayed a high level of coordination, each of them
had their own interests based on their respective domestic, regional, and global
agendas. Brazil wanted to play a global role with high visibility; Turkey sought to
strengthen its role as a decisive regional power in the Middle East; and Iran needed
to enhance its legitimacy and international support in the political realm, while try-
ing to avoid sanctions.
Turkey started to make more inroads to facilitate negotiations through its good
offices, in line with its prevalent foreign policy objective at the time—a strategy
called “zero problems with the neighbors.” Meanwhile, Brazil had increased its
international presence in the global arena and promoted its particular interest in
defending the peaceful development of nuclear technology in emerging countries.
The AKP’s foreign policy intended to increase the country’s importance in the
neighboring regions, as well as in global politics. At the same time, Ankara viewed
emerging powers, such as BRICS, as a model to emulate a more active role in inter-
national affairs. This new foreign policy strategy of easing tensions with neighbors
led to the normalization of Iranian–Turkish relations. One of the issues that helped
the rapprochement was Turkey’s approach toward the Iranian nuclear program (Sin-
kaya 2012, p. 146). Turkey had five main interests in the Tripartite Agreement: (1)
to strengthen its role as a mediator in the Middle East; (2) to be among the “rule-
makers” in defining the limitations regarding the peaceful development of nuclear
technology in emerging countries; (3) to promote regional stability by trying to
avoid a military solution regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program; (4) to avoid sanctions
against Iran, which would hinder Turkey’s extensive energy ties with Iran; and (5) to
display higher regional assertiveness.
Brazil, as a regional or emerging global power, had its own agenda in this media-
tion effort (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006; Spektor 2009). Vieira de Jesus identi-
fies four main drivers: (1) to achieve a permanent seat in the UN Security Council;
 A. G. Levaggi, S. Yilmaz

hence, its desire to present results in settling international disagreements; (2) to initi-
ate a common emerging powers agenda that balances the asymmetries in the distri-
bution of power in the international system; (3) to avoid sanctions that could affect
its own commercial opportunities; and (4) to strengthen its leadership, prestige, and
reputation as a global player (Vieira de Jesus 2011, p. 63). The defense of its own
non-proliferation policy could be considered an additional factor (Metais 2013, p.
14), while the overall Brazilian position could be associated with an effort to gener-
ate a broader discussion about the non-proliferation regime (Spektor 2010).
The attempt to offer an alternative solution to the Iranian Nuclear Issue ultimately
had a negative impact on the international standing of Brazil and Turkey, because it
strained their ties with the established powers. The major powers, including Russia
and China, viewed these actions as a move away from the established rules of the
game, while the Western powers were perplexed about how a functional delegation
to solve an international problem had become a problem in itself. When the major
powers had fixed a scheme of sanctions, they expected an automatic alignment of
the emerging middle powers, especially those that were perceived to be in the Amer-
ican sphere of influence. Brazil and Turkey opted for an alternative path, trying to
avoid the Western sanctions calendar. Hence, while Brazil and Turkey were initially
praised as responsible partners of the international security agenda, once they tried
to pursue more autonomous policies, they were shunned, and their international and
regional strategies based on soft power began to crumble.
The setback stemming from the Nuclear Deal seriously hindered relations
between Brazil and the US, cooling them to the iciest level since the 1980s (Spektor
2014, p. 259). Distrust between Turkey and the US also increased. There were other
pressing domestic and regional issues for both countries over the coming years,
which further challenged their upward trajectory in the regional and global power
calculus, such as the passivity of Brazilian foreign policy under Rousseff’s leader-
ship since 2011, due to increasing political and economic problems. In the mean-
time, Turkey’s quest for regional leadership was eclipsed by the challenges resulting
from the turbulence that engulfed the Middle East due to the Arab upheavals, and
particularly the protracted crisis in Syria.

Conclusion

Governments’ abilities to realize their goals is central to foreign policy studies

(Baldwin 2013, p. 278). In the case of the Tehran Declaration, Brazil’s and Tur-
key’s search for greater autonomy in resolving an issue central to the international
security agenda indicated that such a maneuver could have a “boomerang effect” on
their rising power ambitions and perceived assets. First, since the functional delega-
tion by major powers was only a limited one, this partial authorization undermined
the efficacy of their mediation efforts and their powers of persuasion. Second, in
terms of international legitimacy, their inability to act without forming a broader
coalition and their ultimate labeling as “irresponsible stake-holders” in the interna-
tional liberal order hindered their ongoing prospects in global affairs and led to criti-
cism in domestic political fora. Third, this setback also overshadowed their quest
The precarious role of emerging powers in a transforming…

for a higher status in the global and regional power hierarchy. After this incident,
Brazil and Turkey’s diplomatic relations with the established powers failed to reach
their previous levels. This was particularly true for the Brazilian case, in which the
agenda density is much thinner.
The international community initially viewed the Tripartite Declaration as an
indicator of an emerging multipolar system, revealing that the rising powers could
take important steps to support conflict resolution in key areas in the non-Western
world. In this context, Brazil and Turkey tried to play a central role as mediators
and confidence-builders in one of the most complex problems of the international
security agenda: the challenge of nuclear proliferation, and, more specifically, the
Iranian Nuclear issue, the resolution of which originally had been in the hands of the
P5 + 1 Group.8 As middle-size emerging powers, they jointly attempted to provide
a negotiated solution with Iran, but failed to gain recognition from the established
powers, despite being initially empowered. After receiving harsh criticism regarding
their over-engagement and lack of genuine dialogue with the Western negotiators,
the international trajectories of both countries began to plummet, also as a result of
the increasing problems in their regional and domestic politics.
While both Brazil and Turkey continued to play significant roles in shaping
regional politics, their ascent in the international power hierarchy through functional
delegation started to lose momentum; one of the critical turning points proved to be
the setback regarding the Tehran Declaration. In this context, the Tripartite Agree-
ment demonstrated the limits and challenges of foreign policy alignment and agree-
ments among regional and established powers in an emerging interpolar world.

Acknowledgements We would like to thank TUBITAK (BIDEB 2219) grant for the financial support.
The authors would also like to acknowledge Luskin School of Public Affairs and Luskin Center for Inno-
vation, UCLA, for facilitating this research project and JR Deshazo and Ziya Onis for their invaluable
support and comments. We would like to thank Jean Bennett and Nina Ergin for their able assistance in
editing.

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