People of the Philippines vs.

CFI of Quezon;
G.R. No. L-46772;
February 13, 1992.

Facts:
The private respondents were charged with qualified log theft, which is defined and
punished by Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines).
According to the information provided, Godofredo Arrozal, administrator of the Infanta
Logging Corporation, Luis Flores, and 20 other unidentified John Does, conspired and entered
the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion Pujalte, titled in the name of her deceased father,
Macario Prudente, and proceeded to illegally cut, gather, and take therefrom 60 logs of different
species, without the consent of the said owner and without any authority under a license
agreement.
The accused moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) the circumstances
alleged do not constitute an offense; and (2) the information does not comply substantially with
the prescribed form. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds invoked, and later on
denied the motion for reconsideration.
This petition was filed with this Court, and it raised the following legal issues: (1)
whether the information charged an offense; and (2) whether the trial court had jurisdiction over
the case.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not the information charged an offense;
(2) Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
(1) Yes, The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut,
gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest
products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private
individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under
a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the State.
The information's failure to assert that the logs obtained belonged to the State is not fatal.
It should be noted that the logs in question were removed from a private woodland registered in
the name of the complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente, rather than a public forest. The
fact that only the government can grant a license agreement, license, or lease does not imply that
the State owns all logs and timber products produced in the Philippines, including those from
private woodlands. As defined in Section 60 of P.D.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the
information to allege the true owner of the forest products is immaterial. Thus, it was enough to
allege that the taking was done without government authorization or license.

(2) Yes, prosecutions in Courts of First Instance may be started by an information signed
by a fiscal after a preliminary investigation, with the exception of so-called "private crimes" and
election offenses. Section 80 of P.D. 705 did not divest the fiscals of this general authority.
Neither did the said decree grant forest officers the right of preliminary investigations. In both
cases under said Sec 80, namely, 1) after a forest officer had made the arrest, for offenses
committed in his presence or; 2) after conducting an investigation of reports or complaints of
violations of the decree, for violations not committed in his presence. He is still required to file
the proper complaint with the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary
investigations in court. Said section should not be interpreted to vest exclusive authority upon
forest officers to conduct investigations regarding offenses described in the decree rather, it
should be construed as granting forest officers and employees special authority to arrest and
investigate offenses described in P.D. 705, to reinforce the exercise of such authority by those
upon whom it is vested by general law.
The petition is GRANTED.
Ernesto Aquino vs. People of the Philippines;
G.R. No. 165448;
July 27, 2009.

Facts:
Sergio Guzman applied to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) for permission to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees in the Teachers' Camp in Baguio
City to be used for repairs in the same.
A team from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and
Michael Cuteng, a forest ranger, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut before the permit
was issued. Following that, the DENR issued a permit to cut down 14 trees.
Certain forest rangers received information later that unauthorized pine tree cutting was
occurring at the Teachers' Camp. They found Ernesto Aquino, Santiago, and Cuteng among
others when they visited the site. Santiago was one of the sawyers and Aquino was the one
appointed to supervise the cutting. The forest rangers discovered that the number of trees cut had
exceeded what the permit allowed. This led them to file a case against all those present in the site
for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705.
The trial court found Aquino, Santiago, and Cuteng guilty while acquitting the others.
When Aquino, Santiago, and Cuteng filed an appeal, the Court of Appeals only upheld Aquino's
conviction. As a result, Santiago and Cuteng were aquitted. Thus, Aquino took this petition to
the Supreme Court.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioner, Aquino, who supervised the cutting of the pine trees, is
guilty of violating Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.

Held:
No. Aquino is not guilty of violating Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code. Section 68
of the Revised Forestry Code provides two distinct and separate offenses: (a) Cutting, gathering,
collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (b)
Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations.
The provision clearly states that it “punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority.” Aquino was not the one who
cut, gathered, collected, or removed the pine trees in the case at hand. He was simply the person
assigned by the CENRO to oversee the permit's implementation. Also, because the timber was
used by Teachers' Camp, he was also not the owner of the cut trees. Although Aquino may have
been negligent in his duties by failing to prevent the sawyers from cutting more trees than the
permit allowed, this fact can only make him administratively liable. “It is not enough to convict
him under Section 68 of PD No. 705.”
De Lima vs. Laguna Tayabas Co., et al;
G.R. No. L-35697-99;
April 15, 1988.

Facts:
On June 3, 1958, a Laguna Tayabas Bus Company passenger bus and a Seven Up
Bottling Co., Philippines delivery truck collided, killing Petra Dela Cruz and seriously injuring
Eladia De Lima and Nemesio Flores. Three suits were filed against the respondents before the
Court of First Instance of San Pablo City, Laguna.
On December 29, 1971, the petitioners requested that the case be expedited in the hopes
of receiving legal interest as soon as possible after the decision. The decision was made by
January 31, 1972. The petitioners reiterated their request for the decision to be modified so that
the effective date is pushed back to December 27, 1963. In addition, Dela Cruz's heir filed a
reconsideration for an increase in indemnity from P3,000 to P12,000. With the pending
motion for reconsideration, Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., filed an appeal for the case.
The plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court, which stated
that an appeal should have been filed for the legal interest award. The petition was reviewed
thirty years after the incident, in 1988.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioners are precluded from questioning the ruling of the appellate
court after their failure to appeal the decision of the court a quo.

Held:
No. In this case, the Court is inclined to take a liberal stance, as it has done in other cases
where it held that litigations should be decided on their merits as much as possible and not on
technicality.
The Court took note that petitioners are litigating as paupers. Although they may not have
appealed, they had filed their motion for reconsideration with the court a quo which
unfortunately did not act on it. They were unable to appeal due to their poverty, but De Lima and
Requijo, the petitioners, had filed their manifestation making reference to the law and
jurisprudence upon which they base their prayer for relief while petitioner Flores filed his brief.
Pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be liberally construed so that litigants have
ample opportunity to pursue their claims and a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities is avoided.
 According to current jurisprudence, the P3,000.00 indemnity should be increased to
P30,000.00, not P12,000.00 as petitioner requested. The Court finds ample justification in the
aforementioned award for interest and indemnity to mitigate the impact of such a long delay in
this case.
Petition is GRANTED.
Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals;
G.R. No. 104988;
June 18, 1996.

Facts:
This is a consolidation of three cases. Petitioner is a domestic corporation that is
registered with the Bureau of Forest Development as a lumber dealer. Respondents are DENR
Sec. Factoran and Atty. Robles of the Special Actions and Investigations Division (SAID) of the
DENR.
On April 1, 1990, DENR organized a team of foresters and policemen to conduct
surveillance at the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, after receiving
information that a large stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs had been seen inside. The
petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of various sizes and dimensions, was
seen coming out of the lumberyard by the team members during the surveillance. The team
seized the truck and its cargo at the DENR compound on Visayas Avenue, Quezon City after the
driver failed to produce the required invoices and transport documents. The team was not able to
gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.
Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, granted the team a search warrant on April 3, 1990. As a result, the team seized
four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs from the petitioner's lumberyard on that
date; a negligible amount of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and
shorts of various species, including almaciga and supa.
The team returned to the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela the following day, and
placed the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber, totaling 311,000 board feet,
under administrative seizure because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts
from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of the invoices.
The petitioner now challenges the seizure, claiming that possession of lumber, rather than
timber, is not punishable under Section 68 of the P.D. Even if arguendo that lumber falls within
the purview of the same law, as amended, the same may not be used in evidence against him
because they were taken as a result of an illegal seizure.

Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that neither timber nor lumber are defined in the Revised
Forestry Code. While the former is included in forest products as defined in Section 3 paragraph
(q), the latter is defined in Section 3 paragraph (aa) in the definition of "processing plant."
The term “lumber” is used in the Code in its ordinary or common usage. Lumber is
defined as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market" in the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
Lumber is simply a log or timber that has been processed. It is well established that
words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary. In the case of timber possession
without the required legal documents, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 makes no distinction between
raw and processed wood.
Alejandro Tan vs. People of the Philippines;
G.R. No. 115507;
May 19, 1998.

Facts:
In two instances, forest guards in the town of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, intercepted a
dump truck carrying tanguile lumber in one case and narra and white lauan lumber in the other.
Employees of A & E Construction drove the truck. The drivers in both cases failed to produce
documents proving legal ownership of the lumber. Forest guards confiscated the lumber as a
result of this.
The Provincial Prosecutor charged Alejandro Tan, the owner of A & E Corporation and
the trucks, and Fred Moreno, one of the drivers, with violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705. In
his defense, the accused claimed that: (1) Executive Order No. 277 (EO No. 277) was
unconstitutional because it violated substantive due process "because it requires the possession
of certain legal documents to justify mere possession of forest products, which, under Section
3(q) of PD No. 705, includes, among other things, firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even
grass, shrub, flowering plant, associated water, or fish, and penalizes failure to do so; and (2)
they are not liable because the law only punishes the illegal cutting, gathering, collection, and/or
possession of timber, not lumber.
The trial court convicted Tan and Moreno and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether Section 68 of EO No. 277 was constitutional;
(2) Whether lumber and timber should be given a distinction.

Held:
(1) No. Section 68 makes it illegal to "cut, gather, or collect timber or other forest
products without a license." The existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict
of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination is one of the most important requirements for
a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law. Petitioners were not "charged
with the [unlawful] possession of 'firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, 'the
associated water,' or fish," as the Respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, so the
inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO 277 "is absolutely of no concern" to them. At
this time, they are not asserting a legal right to which they are entitled to a judicial determination.
Furthermore, they failed to present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal
constitutional violation that would justify the repeal of the provision in question. A statute is
always presumed to be constitutional, and one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality
must convincingly prove its invalidity.

(2) No. The Supreme Court ruled in "Mustang Lumber Inc v. CA" that lumber is included
in the term "timber." A processed log or processed forest raw material is referred to as lumber.
The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. Excluding possession of
"lumber" from the acts punishable under Section 68 would emasculate the law.
Amado Taopa vs. People of the Philippines;
G.R. No. 184098;
Nov. 25, 2008.

Facts:
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes
(CENR), seized a truck loaded with illegally cut 113 pieces of Philippine Mahogany Group and
Apitong species without any authority or legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, prejudicing the public interest, and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. To
avoid detection, the lumber was wrapped in abaca fiber bundles.
Cuison identified petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners
of the seized lumber after an investigation. In the RTC Virac, Catanduanes, Taopa, Ogalesco,
and Cuison were charged with violating Sec. 68 of PD No. 705 as amended. At their
arraignment, they pleaded not guilty. RTC found them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after a
trial. Only Taopa and Cuison took their cases to the CA; Cuison was aquitted on reasonable
doubt, but Taopa's conviction was upheld. Taopa, on the other hand, filed a petition to have the
charges against him dismissed, claiming that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the
owner of the seized lumber because he was not in the truck when it was seized.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Sec. 68 of PD No. 705.

Held:
Yes, he is guilty. The RTC and CA discovered that the truck was loaded with cargo in
front of Taopa's house, and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying Cuison as he drove the
truck and lumber up to where they were seized. Taopa's dominion and control over the lumber
loaded in the truck was proven by these facts. As a result, the court was convinced that Taopa
and Ogalesco owned the seized lumber.
However, the Court disagrees with the penalties imposed, which is “four (4) years, nine
(9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum.”. Section 68 PD No. 705 refers that the penalties imposed on violators are
described in Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC. Violation of Section 68 PD No. 705 is penalized
as qualified theft.
Following Article 310 in relation to 309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months
and one day to 20 years plus as additional period of four years for the excess of P47, 630.00. The
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower
to that prescribed in the RPC.
Perfecto Pallada v. People of the Philippines;
G.R. No. 131270;
March 17, 2000.

Facts:
Sometime in the latter part of 1992, The Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's
warehouse was raided by DENR officers with the help of the PNP. The company is engaged in
rice milling and trading. Large stockpiles of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw were
found in the raid.
Petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard in Maramag,
Bukidnon as proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, dated March 6 and
17, 1992. The DENR officers, on the other hand, did not give credit to the receipts because R. L.
Rivero Lumberyard's operating permit had been suspended for quite some time. Furthermore, the
lumber was cut with a chain saw, indicating that it did not come from a licensed sawmill. As a
result, all of the lumber in the warehouse was seized, and the petitioner was charged with
violating Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.
The RTC found the petitioner guilty. The trial court did not believe the petitioner's
Certificates of Timber Origin because the company's lumber should be covered by Certificates of
Lumber Origin. Conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus the petition for review
was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber.
(2) Whether the presence of erasures in the certificate of timber origin render them
valueless as evidence.

Held:
(1) Yes. Different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber
forest products. The issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in
order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to
have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."

(2) Yes. Even if a Certificate of Timber Origin could be substituted for a Certificate of
Lumber Origin, the trial court and Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, given
the numerous irregularities and flaws discovered in the latter's documents. The presence of such
glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were properly executed by the
DENR officials concerned. Their irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which
they are found not only questionable but invalid, justifying the trial court in giving no credence
to the same.
Conviction is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION to the penalties.
Lt. Gen. Alfonso Dagudag (Ret.) vs. Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga;
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017;
June 19, 2008.

Facts:
The Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) in Region VII
received information that NMC Container Lines, Inc.'s MV General Ricarte was shipping
container vans containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. To avoid DENR
inspection, the shipments were falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains. The crew of the
MV General Ricarte failed to produce the Certificate of Origin and other relevant transport
documents for the forest products, as required by DAO No. 07-94, during inspection. After due
notice, the illegal forest products were confiscated in favor of the government.
A certain Roger Edma (Edma) requested a writ of replevin be issued ordering the
defendants DENR, CENRO, Gen. Dagudag, and others to deliver the forest products to him, as
well as a judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay him moral damages, attorney's
fees, and litigation expenses in a complaint filed before Judge Paderanga on March 16, 2005.
Judge Paderanga showed manifest partiality in favor of Edma during the hearing for the
writ of replevin. Judge Paderanga issued a writ of replevin ordering Sheriff Reynaldo Salceda to
take possession of the forest products.
Judge Paderanga was charged with gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming
of a judge in an affidavit complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator by Gen.
Dafudag. Judge Paderanga was ordered by the OCA to comment on the affidavit complaint.
Judge Paderanga stated in his comment that he used judicial discretion in issuing the writ of
replevin and that he could not comment on the issues raised by Gen. Dagudag because they were
related to a case he was currently hearing.
Judge Paderanga violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, violated
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and used inappropriate language in court, according to the
OCA. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docked as a regular administrative matter, and
that Judge Paderanga be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and violation of Section 6,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
The case was re-docked as a routine administrative matter, and the parties were asked to
indicate whether they were willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already
filed. Judge Paderanga expressed his willingness to decide the case based on the pleadings
already filed. Because Gen. Dagudag did not file a manifestation, the Court assumed he had
waived his compliance with the August 16, 2006 Resolution.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of replevin was proper.

Held:
No, the issuance of writ of replevin was IMPROPER. For three reasons, Judge Paderanga
should have dismissed the replevin suit outright.
First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as cited in Factoran, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies. Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Dy v. Court of Appeals and Paat vs. Court of
Appeals that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.
Edma did not use or benefit from any administrative remedy in this case. He immediately went
to court and filed a replevin and damages complaint.
Section 8 of PD No. 705, as amended, states that “(1) all actions and decisions of
the Bureau of Forest Development Director are subject to review by the DENR
Secretary; (2) the decisions of the DENR Secretary are appealable to the President; and
(3) the courts cannot review the decisions of the DENR Secretary except through a special
civil action for certiorari or prohibition”. The Court held in Dy that all actions seeking to
recover forest products held by the DENR must be directed to that agency rather than the courts.
Second, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of
special competence under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The DENR is in charge of
enforcing forestry laws.
Members of DENR's Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and
brought them to the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, according to
the replevin complaint, itself. Judge Paderanga should have been notified that the DENR had
custody of the forest products.
Third, because the forest products are already in custodia legis, replevin is not possible.
The Revised Forestry Code was violated, and the DENR seized the forest products in accordance
with the law.
Factoran vs. Court of Appeals;
G.R. No. 93540;
December 13, 1999.

Facts:
A six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber was stopped and taken to
the Quezon City DENR office. Following an investigation into the truck, DENR officials
discovered that the lumber did not come with the necessary documents to demonstrate legal and
authorized possession, in violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705. As a result, the truck and the
lumber were seized.
There was no request for reconsideration or appeal to the DENR at first. When the
lumber was about to be auctioned off, the truck driver and his employers, Jesus Sy and Lily Uy,
filed a complaint, asking for the issuance of writs of replevin and a preliminary injunction to
allow them to recover the confiscated truck and lumber.
The trial court granted both and issued a writ of seizure, but the Secretary of the
Department of the Environment and Natural Resources, Sec. Fulgencio Factoran, refused to
comply.
To overturn the trial court's orders, Factoran filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and/or Mandamus. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that because
the affidavit and bond requirements had been met, the issuance of a writ of replevin was
required.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not confiscated lumber can be the subject of replevin.
(2) Whether or not the DENR may simply confiscate lumber and forego criminal
prosecution.

Held:
(1) No. Replevin cannot be applied to the confiscated lumber. One of the requirements
for issuing a writ of replevin is that the property must have been wrongfully detained by the
defendant. In the case at bar, the issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a
valid exercise of his power under Section 68-A of PD No. 705. The narra lumber and six-wheeler
truck of private respondents were held in custodia legis and thus beyond the reach of replevin by
virtue of said order.
 (2) Yes. The DENR is not required to criminally prosecute and can simply confiscate
lumber. The Secretary’s authority to confiscate forest products under Section 68 of PD No. 705
is “distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action
provided for in Section68 of PD No. 705.” "Precisely because of the need to make forestry laws
'more responsive to present situations and realities,' and in light of the 'urgency of conserving the
remaining resources of the country,' the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory
provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings,"
the Court said in a previous case.
Basilio P. Mamanteo, et al. vs. Deputy Sheriff Manuel M. Magumun;
A.M. No. P-98-1264;
July 28, 1999

Facts:
On April 12, 1996 forestry employees of the DENR intercepted a San Miguel
Corporation van with Plate No. PJC-321 loaded with narra flitches wrapped in nylon sacks and
covered with empty beer bottles and cartons. The van's driver was unable to produce any legal
documents allowing him to transport the narra lumber. As a result, the DENR forestry employees
confiscated the vehicle and its load of narra flitches after issuing seizure receipts. DENR
eventually ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of all lumber possessed without a permit, as
well as its transportation.
San Miguel Corporation filed a case for personal property recovery and damages, along
with a writ of replevin application, through its agent. The trial court issued a warrant for the
sheriff to seize the van and its contents.
Deputy Sheriff Manuel Magumun went to the DENR office in Tabuk, Kalinga, on
August 1, 1996, to enforce the warrant. Because the van was now in custodia legis, forestry
employees and officials refused to release it. Deputy Sheriff Magumun upheld the writ and took
the van despite the explanation. The vehicle was delivered to a San Miguel Corporation agent
after the five-day deadline for filing an opposition to the writ had passed.
Deputy Sheriff Magumun was charged with grave misconduct by the DENR forestry
employees for arbitrarily carrying out the writ of execution.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the sheriff has the prerogative to enforce a replevin of forestry items
forfeited in favor of the government.

Held:
No, respondent Deputy Sheriff Magumun is found guilty of grave misconduct and fined
P5,000 for implementing the warrant of personal property seizure arbitrarily and for failing to
follow proper procedure in serving writs of replevin in cases where the personal property to be
recovered has already been seized and forfeited in favor of the government for forestry law
violations.
A sheriff's prerogative does not grant him the authority to decide who among the parties
is entitled to possession of the attached property, let alone which agency has primary jurisdiction
and authority over the matter.
 When a sheriff receives a writ, it is his responsibility to carry it out according to its
mandate in the absence of any instructions to the contrary. However, prompt execution of a
warrant of seizure is only necessary when the plaintiff's right to the property is clear.
Respondent's best course of action was to stop executing the warrant and inform his
judge and plaintiff of the situation.
Leonardo Paat vs. Court of Appeals;
G.R. No. 111107;
January 10, 1997

Facts:
Victoria de Guzman's truck was seized by Department of Environment and Natural
Resources personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao,
Cagayan, on May 19, 1989, because the driver could not produce the required documents for the
forest products discovered hidden in the truck.
Jovito Layugan of Aritao CENRO issued a confiscation order for the truck on May 23,
1989. De Guzman, the owner, failed to submit the needed explanation within the
reglementary time frame established by Layugan.
Invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order 277,
DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan upheld the Alitao CENRO's confiscation
action and ordered the forfeiture of the truck on June 22, 1989. De Guzman filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied.
The case was appealed to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, De Guzman and
company have filed a replevin suit (Civil Case 4031) against Layugan and Baggayan with the
RTC of Cagayan (Branch 2), claiming that only the court has the authority to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances used in the transportation of illegal forest products, according to Section
68, par. 2. De Guzman also claimed that the seizure was illegal because she did not use the truck
in the commission of a qualified theft under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
punishable under Section 68, as the Regional Executive Director allegedly admitted, absolving
her of criminal liability.
The trial court then issued a writ ordering the return of De Guzman's truck. The
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The appellate court upheld the
trial court's decision that the issue at hand is solely one of law. As a result, this petition was
created.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the authority to confiscate or to forfeit conveyances belongs solely to the
courts;
Held:
No. The construction that conveyances are subject of confiscation by the courts
exclusively, pursuant to Section 28, paragraph 2, unduly restricts the clear intention of the law
and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, aside to the fact that conveyances are
not mentioned nor included in the former provision.
In construing statutes, it is necessary to read them in such a way that the statute's intended
purpose is realized. Statutes should be construed in light of the goal to be achieved and the evil
or mischief to be avoided, and they should be interpreted in a way that advances the goal,
eliminates the mischief, and ensures the intended benefits.
The phrase "to dispose of the same" in this case is broad enough to cover the act of
forfeiting conveyances to the government. The only restriction is that it must be made "in
accordance with applicable laws, regulations, or policies."
Furthermore, when a statute is clear and explicit, there is little room for judicial
rationalization or interpretation. When the amendatory executive order removed the phrase "shall
be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code" and replaced it with the words "shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code," it meant that cutting, gathering, collecting,
removing, or possessing forest products without authority was now considered a separate
offense, independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The petition was GRANTED.
Hon. Heherson Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.;
G.R. Nos. 162243, 164516 & 171875;
December 3, 2009

Facts:
Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines (PICOP) submitted an application to the DENR
to convert its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 into an IFMA.
PICOP initially attempted to comply with Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government
Code, which require the prior approval of the Sanggunians concerned. Only one of the many
provinces affected, however, approved the issuance of an IFMA. Despite this, PICOP submitted
to the DENR a purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur endorsing the approval of
PICOP's IFMA conversion application.
PICOP filed a Petition for Mandamus against then-DENR Sec Alvarez before the RTC,
alleging that he refused and/or failed to sign and execute PICOP's IFMA contract despite the fact
that the latter had met all of the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43,
as amended, into an IFMA.
The cause of action of PICOP in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear:
the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand
Marcos, to enter into an IFMA with PICOP.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment
clauseby which the government may be bound for the issuance of the IFMA.

Held:
NO. The Supreme Court's decision in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a
contract subject to the non-impairment clause is pertinent. Needless to say, executive action has
the power to revoke or rescind all licenses. It is not a contract, property, or a property right
protected by the Constitution's due process clause. The non-impairment clause cannot be used
because timber licenses are not contracts.
In no way should the Presidential Warranty be construed as a contractual undertaking
guaranteeing PICOP exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an
interpretation would result in the State completely relinquishing control and supervision of the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources in the area to PICOP.
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals;
G.R. No. 98310;
October 24, 1996.

Facts:
Milagros Matuguina, a sole proprietor, owns Matuguina Logging Enterprises in Davao,
which operates under the Provisional Timber License No. 30 for a specific area. Milagros also
became the majority stockholder of MIWP (Matuguina Integrated Wood Products) by
purchasing 70% of the company's stock at the same time. Milagros requested that the director of
Forest Development transfer management of the timber license no. 30, granted for MLE, to
MIWP .
DAVENCOR, a private respondent, filed a complaint regarding MLE's encroachment on
DAVENCOR's concession area, during the pendency of the approval of the license transfer.
Hon. Ernesto M. Perez, Minister of Natural Resources, Maceda found MLE guilty of
illegal logging on DAVENCOR-contracted land. DAVENCOR then requested that a writ of
execution be issued for MLE and/or MIWP.
As a defense, MIWP filed for prohibition, damages, and injunction, as well as a
restraining order, claiming that they are a separate entity from MLE and thus not a party to
DAVENCOR's complaint.
Trial Court granted the TRO. RTC ruled in favor of MIWP which was reversed by
the Court of Appeals; hence, this petition on certiorari.

Issue/s:
Whether or not MIWP shall be held liable for the acts of MLE

Held:
No, MIWP cannot be held liable. A corporation has its own distinct personality. It may
not be held liable for the actions of the individuals who make up the corporation unless the
corporation's legal personality is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrongdoing, protect
fraud, or defend crime, in which case the corporation is treated as a mere association of people.
However, in order for a corporation's separate legal personality to be disregarded, the
wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.
It is also incorrect to assert that the MIWPI is the privy or successor-in-interest of MLE
in terms of liability for the encroachment on DAVENCOR's timber concession, by virtue of the
transfer of interest in PTL No. 30 from MLE to MIWPI. The transfer has never become
effective.
More importantly, even if it is determined that the PTL No. 30 underwent a valid change
of name and transfer of interest, this only represents a transfer of authority from MLE to MIWPI
to conduct logging operations in the area. It does not provide conclusive evidence that MIWPI
was merely a conduit or successor of Milagros Matuguina/MLE in terms of the latter's liability
for the encroachment on DAVENCOR's concession.
Soledad Dy vs. Court of Appeals;
G.R. No. 121587;
March 9, 1999.

Facts:
The Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01, which established Task
Force Kalikasan to combat illegal logging, log smuggling, and the possession and/or
transportation of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches, and other forest products in the
city. The team included respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, acting chief of civilian security in the
mayor's office.
After receiving confidential information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would
be brought to Butuan City from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan, the task force set up a
checkpoint along kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan City on July 1, 1993.
Two trucks loaded with lumber were flagged down by the operatives around 10:00 p.m.,
but they did not stop and instead accelerated, prompting the task force to pursue them. They
caught up with the two vehicles at the compound of Young Metalcraft and Peterwood
Agro-Forest Industries at Baan, Butuan City.
Pulcita Lucero, the compound's caretaker-in charge, was unable to produce any
documentation as proof of the legality of the forest products' origin/possession when asked by
the operatives.
The DENR's Forester Resurreccion Maxilom issued a temporary seizure order and a
seizure receipt for the two vehicles and their cargo, which included several different sizes and
dimensions of lumber. The seized lumber and vehicles were subsequently delivered to the City
motorpool and placed in respondent Lausa's custody.
The following day, Maxilom submitted a memorandum-report on the seizure of the
lumber and two vehicles to Butuan City's Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO). On July 6, the CENRO issued a notice of confiscation, which was officially
posted for three days.
On July 29, 1993, DENR Regional Technical Director Raoul Geollegue proposed
forfeiture of the lumber and two vehicles to the Secretary due to a lack of claimants. On the
authority of DENR Regional Director De la Rosa, CENRO Angelita Orcasitas issued the
necessary forfeiture orders on July 30, 1993.
Petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the lumber, filed a replevin suit in the Regional
Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch 5) on October 20, 1993, more than two months after it had
been forfeited. The trial court issued a preliminary writ of replevin the next day, October 21,
1993.
 Respondent Lausa filed a motion for the approval of a counterbond on October 29, 1993.
He moved to dismiss and/or quash the writ of replevin before the court could act on his other
motion, claiming that the lumber in question had been seized and forfeited by the DENR
pursuant to P.D. No. 705, because it was in charge of the DENR, , the DENR should be
consulted first.
The trial court refused respondent Lausa's application for the approval of the
counterbond, as well as his request to dismiss and/or quash the replevin suit, on November 29,
1993. As a result, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, requesting
that his counterbond be approved as well as the nullification of two orders, dated October 21,
1993 and November 29, 1993, granting petitioners prayer for a preliminary writ of replevin and
denying his Motion to Dismiss Case and/or Quash Writ of Replevin.
On January 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, granting said petition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied hence, this petition.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court could take cognizance of the replevin suit,
considering that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement
agents of the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705.

Held:
No. The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort
to the courts. In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court has repeatedly maintained that a
party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking court intervention. If a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be sought by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that falls within his authority, then that
remedy should be pursued first before resorting to a court's judicial power.
Invoking a court's involvement too soon can be harmful to one's case. As a result, unless
there is a finding of waiver or estoppel, the lawsuit may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The Court of Appeals correctly overturned the trial court's orders granting petitioner's
application for a replevin writ and denying private respondents' motion to dismiss because
petitioner had clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. P.D. The lumber was
properly entrusted to the DENR under No. 705, as amended, and all actions aimed at regaining
possession of it should be directed to that agency.
PICOP Resources, Inc. vs. Base Metals Mineral Resource Corporation, and The Mines
Adjudication Board;
G.R. No. 163509;
December 6, 2006.

Facts:
A Mines Temporary Permit was issued to Banahaw Mining and Development
Corporation, acting as Mine Operator for Central Mindanao Mining and Development
Corporation (CMMCI), allowing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its
mining claims.
Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
because a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims were located in petitioner PICOP's
logging concession in Agusan del Sur. Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims into
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement applications (MPSA).
While the MPSAs were pending, Banahaw Mining decided to sell/assign its rights and
interests in 37 mining claims to private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources
Corporation (Base Metals), which included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own
right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI.
CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved Banahaw Mining's assignment in favor of
private respondent BaseMetals, recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator
of its claims.
Then, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA
applications with the Bureau of Mines, replacing Banahaw Mining as the applicant and
submitting additional documents in support of the application. As required, area clearances from
the DENR Regional Director and the Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife
Sanctuary were submitted.
Petitioner PICOP, on the other hand, filed an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private
respondent Base Metals' application with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB). The Panel
Arbitrator rejected private respondent BaseMetals' MPSA for a variety of reasons, including the
fact that the area is considered closed to mining.
Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB, which issued the
contested decision overturning the Panel Arbitrator's decision. The MAB's decision was upheld
by the Court of Appeals.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals’ MPSA is, by law, closed to
miningactivities.

Held:
No. There is no evidence that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been
designated as watershed forest reserves in this case. Even if the MPSA area is part of the
Agusan-Davao-SurigaoForest Reserve, this does not necessarily mean that mining activities are
prohibited.
According to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can obtain mining rights within forest
reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by first applying for a permit to
prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and then applying for a permit to explore
with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences. Furthermore, under Section 18 of RA 7942, mining
is permitted in timberland and forestry, subject to existing rights and reservations. Similarly,
Section 47 of PD 705 allows mining operations on forest lands such as the public forest,
permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations.
ASAPHIL Construction and Development Corp. vs Vicente Tuason, Jr., Induplex Inc. and
Mines Adjudication Board;
G.R. NO. 134030;
April 25, 2006.

Facts:
Respondent Vicente Tuason, Jr. (Tuason) and Induplex, Inc. (Induplex) signed a Contract
for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore on March 24, 1975, in which Induplex agreed to buy all
perlite ore found and mined in Tuason's mining claim in Taysa, Daraga, Albay. In exchange,
Tuason will receive assistance from Induplex in securing and perfecting his rights over the
mining claim.
Tuason then signed an Agreement to Operate Mining Claims in favor of petitioner
Asaphil Construction and Development Corporation (Asaphil) on May 29, 1976.
Tuason filed a complaint against Asaphil and Induplex with the Bureau of Mines of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on November 9, 1990, seeking
declaration of nullity of the two contracts, the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore and
the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims.
Tuason claimed that Induplex's stockholders formed and organized Ibalon Mineral
Resources, Inc. (Ibalon), an entity whose purpose is to mine any and all kinds of minerals, and
that Ibalon has been mining, extracting, and utilizing the perlite ore in Ibalon's mining claim; that
this is in violation of the condition imposed on Induplex by the Board of Investments (BOI) in its
Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc.; that Induplex acquired the majority stocks of
Asaphil on January 14, 1989, and that 95% of Ibalon’s shares were also transferred to Virgilio R.
Romero, who is a stockholder of Induplex, Asaphil and Ibalon. He claimed that the acts in
question harmed not only his claimowner interests, but also the government's.

Issue/s:
Whether or not DENR has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
No. Section 7 of P.D. 1281 provides:
"Section 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies,
partnerships or persons engaged in mining exploration, development and exploitation,
development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases involving:
(a) a mining property subject of different agreements entered into by the claim holder thereof
with several mining operators;
(b) complaints from claimowners that the mining property subject of an operating agreement has
not been placed into actual operations within the period stipulated therein; and
(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the
claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof."
Tuason's case based on its facts is not a mining dispute. The second contract, while a
mining contract, does not create a mining dispute because its nullity is determined by Induplex's
alleged violation of the conditions in entering into a joint venture with Grefco Ltd., which is a
judicial question. The nullity shall be determined by regular courts. "A judicial question arises
when the answer requires the exercise of judicial function, which includes determining what the
law is all about and what the parties' legal rights are."
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. (DESAMA) Et al. vs. Elisea Gozun,
et al.;
G.R. No. 157882;
March 30, 2006

Facts:
On July 25, 1987, then-President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 279,
which empowered the DENR Secretary to accept, consider, and evaluate proposals from foreign-
owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale mineral exploration, development, and utilization, which,
upon the Secretary's appropriate recommendation, would be implemented by the President.
A petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed challenging the constitutionality of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, as well as the IRR issued by DENR Administrative Order No.
96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40), as well as the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) between the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), an
Australian corporation owned by Australian nationals, which was signed on June 20, 1994.
The petitioners finally submitted a petition to the court after several unsuccessful
attempts to have the FTAA agreement with the government canceled.
In their memorandum petitioners pose whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the
CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without
payment of just compensation, in violation of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution issues,
among others issues.

Issue/s:
Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled against DESAMA. The requisites for eminent domain are
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period.
3. The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;
 5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Didipio failed to show that the law is unconstitutional in this case. There is taking
involved, but it is not done without just compensation. Section 76 of RA 7942, as well as section
107 of the DENR RR, provide for just compensation.
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant-Any damage done to the
property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of
the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the
infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.
Furthermore, mining is a government policy, and the government can use eminent
domain to gain access to, acquire, and use private lands.
Petitioners' eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication, according to public
respondents, because they do not allege that CAMC has actually taken their properties, nor that
their property rights have been endangered or are in danger as a result of CAMC's FTAA. In
effect, the public respondents argue that the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable
controversy that this Court should hear. When the act being challenged has had a direct negative
impact on the person challenging it, the question is considered ripe for adjudication. However,
the court cannot wait for the law's negative consequences before considering the dispute to be
real and ripe for judicial intervention.
The landowners and occupants do not have to be evicted in order for this Court to
intervene. Even without any other overt act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy by the mere enactment of the questioned law or approval of the challenged act.
Indeed, even a single violation of the Constitution and/or the law is sufficient to trigger judicial
action. Despite this, the petition was dismissed due to the meritless claims made in the issues
presented.
The FTAA complied completely with all legal and constitutional requirements. The claim
of not receiving just compensation was dismissed because the court has the authority in eminent
domain cases to ensure that the proper amount was determined regardless of whether or not an
executive department or legislature would intervene to make an initial determination of the
amount.
Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (RMDC);
G.R. No. 149927;
March 30, 2004.

Facts:
After discovering high-quality marble deposits, the Bureau of Mines granted RMDC
License No. 33, allowing them to mine in the mountains (Mt. Mabio) of Biak na Bato, San
Miguel, Bulacan.
After Ernesto Maceda was appointed as DENR Minister, he issued a letter to RMDC
canceling License No. 33.
According to Maceda, the issuance of License No. 33 was illegal because it violated
section 69 of PD 463, and the license's continued existence or renewal serves no public interest.
Also, reverting the excluded land and making it part of Biak na Bato National Park would also
serve the public interest, according to Proclamation No. 84.
RMDC claimed that their right to due process was violated in the license cancellation,
and that Proclamation No. 84 was invalid because it violated the clause on non-impairment of
contracts, was an ex post facto law/bill of attainder, and was issued by the President after the
1987 Constitution took effect.

Issue/s:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 84 was valid.

Held:
Yes, it is valid. It did not violate the non-impairment clause because the respondents'
license is not a contract to which the clause's protection can be extended.
It's not a bill of attainder because the license cancellation was not a punishment that fell
under the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder.
Because Proclamation 84 was not a penal act, it is not an ex post facto law. Ex post facto
legislation is limited to criminal matters.
Furthermore, under the Provisional Constitution, the President had legislative power at
the time she issued the Proclamation.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. WMC Resources;
G.R. No. 162331;
November 20, 2006

Facts:
In accordance with EO No. 279 and DAO No. 63, Series of 1991, the Philippine
Government and WMC Philippines signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large-scale exploration, development, and commercial
exploration of possible mineral resources in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and
North Cotabato.
According to the Option Agreement between WMC Philippines and the Tampakan
Companies, the Columbio FTAA is partially covered by 156 mining claims held by the
Tampakan Companies. The Tampakan Companies were given the right of first refusal under the
Option Agreement if WMC Philippines wanted to sell its rights and interests in the mining
claims. WMC Resources then sold its entire shareholding in WMC Philippines to Lepanto,
subject to the Tampakan Companies' right of first refusal.
Tampakan Companies then attempted to exercise its right of first refusal. Lepanto
refused, claiming that Tampakan Companies did not comply with the Agreement's terms and
conditions.
WMC Resources and Tampakan Companies signed another Sale and Purchase
Agreement in which Sagittarius Mines was named "assignee and corporate vehicle which would
acquire the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities," and WMC Resources
sold its stock to Sagittarius Mines. The transfer of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines
to Sagittarius Mines was eventually approved by the DENR.
Lepanto filed a Petition for Review of the DENR Secretary's Order with the Office of the
President (OP), expressing dissatisfaction with the transfer of the Columbio FTAA to Sagittarius
Mines.
The validity of the petition is challenged on the grounds that it "violates Lepanto's
constitutional right to due process," "preempts the resolution of very important legal issues
pending in regular courts," and "blatantly violates Section 40 of the Mining Act."
The petition was dismissed by the OP. Petitioner's appeal was also dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, resulting in the current petition to the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which requires the
President's approval before assigning or transferring financial or technical assistance agreements,
applies to the Columbio FTAA.

Held:
No. Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act does not apply to the Columbio FTAA.
Before the Philippine Mining Act took effect, the Columbio FTAA was signed. Unless otherwise
stated, a statute is construed to be prospective in application.
There is no provision in the Philippine Mining Act that states that it will apply
retroactively. As a result, it will apply prospectively.
If the provision, which requires President approval for FTAA assignment or transfer, is
applied retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, it will be in violation of the Constitution. Because
it "effectively restricts the right of the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the
said FTAA," there is a prohibition against contract impairment.
The Supreme Court went on to say that, assuming the provision applies, "the lack of
presidential approval will not be fatal in rendering the transfer illegal, especially since, as in
this case, the alleged lack of presidential approval was remedied when petitioner appealed the
matter to the Office of the President, which approved the Order of the DENR Secretary granting
the application for transfer of the Columbio FTAA to Sagittarius Mines, Inc."
As held in the case of La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, “When the
transferee of the FTAA happens to be a Filipino corporation, the need for such safeguard is not
critical; hence, the lack of prior approval and notification may not be deemed fatal as to render
the transfer invalid.”
Benguet Corporation vs. DENR – Mines Adjudication Board and J.G. Realty and Mining
Corporation;
G.R. No. 16310;
February 13, 2008

Facts:
Benguet Corporation and JG Realty and Mining entered into a Royalty Agreement with
Option to Purchase (RAWOP), wherein JG Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four
mining claims covered by MPSA Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly filed by JG Realty as
claim owner and Benguet as operator.
Among other things, the RAWOP states that "any disputes between Benguet and J.G.
Realty relating to the RAWOP shall not be the subject of any legal or administrative action, but
shall be referred to a Board of Arbitrators composed of three (3) members, one chosen by
Benguet and the other by J.G. Realty and the third arbitrator chosen by the aforementioned two
arbitrators.
J.G. Realty subsequently informed Benguet that the RAWOP was being terminated due
to Benguet's failure to meet its obligations. J.G. Realty filed a petition with the Panel of
Arbitrators (POA) with territorial jurisdiction over the mining area in question to have the
RAWOP cancelled.
The POA declared the RAWOP to be canceled in its decision. The MAB then received a
notice of appeal from Benguet. On appeal to the MAB, the decision was upheld.
Benguet contended that the issue raised by the J.G. Realty should have been first raised
with the arbitration before POA took cognizance of the case.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the controversy should have first been submitted to arbitration before the
POA took cognizance of the case.

Held:
Yes, however Benguet Corporation is estopped. The Congress reiterated the efficacy of
arbitration as an alternative mode of dispute resolution in RA 9285, the "Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004," by stating in Section 32 that domestic arbitration will continue to be
governed by RA 876. Clearly, a contractual provision requiring the parties to first engage in
voluntary arbitration before proceeding to court is not illegal and is actually encouraged by the
government.
 Furthermore, the argument that RA 7942 takes precedence over RA 876 assumes that the
two laws are in conflict. This is not the case in this instance. To reiterate, the use of voluntary
arbitration before resorting to government courts or quasi-judicial agencies is a valid contractual
stipulation that the parties must follow.
In the event a case that should properly be the subject of voluntary arbitration is
erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on motion of the defendant, the court
or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such contractual provision for arbitration is
sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall then order the
enforcement of said provision.
The argument made by J.G. Realty that prior arbitration is ineffective in this case because
the POA's mandate is to arbitrate disputes involving mineral agreements is incorrect. It's
important to distinguish between voluntary and mandatory arbitration.
Compulsory arbitration is defined as "the process of settling labor disputes by a
government agency with the authority to investigate and make an award that is binding on all
parties," as well as "a mode of arbitration in which the parties are compelled to accept the
resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party." While a voluntary arbitrator is
not employed by the government or the labor department, he or she provides arbitration services
as required by labor laws.
Arbitration is divided into two types: compulsory and voluntary. The POA provides for
mandatory arbitration, whereas the RAWOP's arbitration provision is voluntary and does not
involve any government agency. As a result, J.G. Realty's argument must fail.
Benguet, on the other hand, is estopped from challenging the POA's jurisdiction,
according to the Court. As it happened, J.G. Realty filed DENR Case No. 2000-01, and Benguet
responded and participated in the proceedings before the POA, Region V. Second, after the POA
issued an adverse decision on March 19, 2001, Benguet filed an appeal with the MAB in Mines
Administrative Case No. 2000-01. R-M-2000-01 and took part in the MAB proceedings once
more.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition, and AFFIRM the December 2, 2002 Decision and
March 17, 2004 Resolution of the DENR-MAB in MAB Case No. 0124-01 upholding the
cancellation of the June 1, 1987 RAWOP. No costs.
Metro Iloilo Water District v. Court of Appeals;
G.R. No. 122855;
March 31, 2005

Facts:
The Metro Iloilo Waters District (MIWD) is a water district established under
Presidential Decree No. 198 (P.D. 198), with service areas that include all of Iloilo City as well
as the municipalities of Ma-asin, Cabanatuan, Santa Barbara, and Pavia.
Between April and May 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) separate but identical injunction
petitions against private respondents Nava et al., requesting a preliminary injunction and/or a
temporary restraining order based on the following grounds: Having abstracted or withdrawn
ground water within the petitioner's territorial jurisdiction without first obtaining a Water Permit
from the National Water Resources Council; unauthorized extraction or withdrawal of ground
water by the respondent without the necessary permit is thus in violation of the petitioner's Board
of Directors' rules and regulations; and as a result, the respondent's continued extraction or
withdrawal of groundwater without a Water Permit is a violation of Art. XIII in the P.D. 1067 of
the Philippine Water Code, and unless such act is restrained, the petitioner as a Water District
will undoubtedly suffer significant losses.
Private respondents denied extracting or withdrawing water from the ground, as well as
having built any waterworks in their neighborhood. They did, however, admit to extracting water
from the ground, but only on their private property, and claimed that they met the requirements
for obtaining a water permit.
The RTC dismissed the petitions, stating that the issue falls under the jurisdiction of the
National Water Resource Council (NWRC) under PD 1067, as it involved the appropriation,
exploitation, and utilization of water, as well as factual issues within the NWRC's jurisdiction.
The RTC also found that MIWD had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the
doctrine of "primary administrative jurisdiction," a finding that was upheld by the CA.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the trial courts have jurisdiction in this case

Held:
Yes. The petitions before the trial court sought an injunction prohibiting Nava, et al. from
extracting or withdrawing water from MIWD's well or selling it within its service areas. In
essence, the petitions focus on Nava's alleged violations of MIWD's vested rights as a water
district as a result of their alleged unauthorized extraction and withdrawal of groundwater within
MIWD's service area.
The question is whether Nava's extraction and sale of groundwater within MIWD's
service area infringed on MIWD's water district rights. It is self-evident that the petitions raise a
legal issue.
The issue of "acquiring rights over the use of waters or the taking or diverting of waters
from a natural source in any manner and for any purpose allowed by law," which would fall
under the Council's jurisdiction, is, in reality, merely incidental to the petitions' main thrust.
Bienvenido Amistoso vs. Senecio Ong, Epifania Neri, et al.
G.R. No. L-60219;
June 29, 1984

Facts:
Amistoso and Neri are the owners of adjacent agricultural parcels. An irrigation canal
runs through Neri's land, carrying irrigation water from the Silmod River to the Amistoso's land
for the latter’s benefit.
Amistoso filed a complaint for Recognition of Basement with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against Neri and Ong (cultivator of Neri's land) for refusing, despite repeated demands,
to recognize the former's rights and title to the beneficial use of water passing through the
irrigation canal and to have Amistoso's rights and/or claims annotated on Neri's Certificate of
Title.
Neri denied that Amistoso had any right to the use of the canal, that there was no
contract, deed, or encumbrance on their property, and that they had done nothing prejudicial
to the petitioner that would justify the filing of the complaint against them.
Neri claims that the complaint should be dismissed because Amistoso's claim is based on
his right to use water from the Silmod River, and he asks that Neri respect Amistoso's right to
use that water and not interfere with it.
The dispute thus concerns the use, conservation, and protection of the right to water, and
the annotation is merely a request for relief based on the claim to the use and protection of water
flowing through Neri's territory.
Because the dispute concerns the right to use and protect water from the Silmod River,
which flows from Neri's land to Amistoso's, the National Water Resources Council, which has
exclusive jurisdiction over such matters, is the proper authority to resolve it. The trial court
dismissed Amistoso’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not Amistoso has the right over the use of the canal
(2) Whether or not National Water Resources Council has exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter.
Held:
(1) Yes. Neri admits that Amistoso has an approved Water Rights Grant issued by the
Department of Public Works, Transportation, and Communications, based on the facts agreed
upon by the parties. Neri claims that the grant does not cover the beneficial use of Silmod River
irrigation water. However, apart from that coming from the Silmod River, the records show no
other irrigation water going to petitioner's property passing through respondents' lot, rendering
Neri's claims invalid.
The record clearly shows that Amistoso was granted a Water Rights Grant. The grant was
made three (3) years before PD 1067 was issued (Water Code of the Philippines). The water
rights grant is similar to a water permit, which is recognized under Article 13 of PD 1067.
(2) No. Amistoso's WATER RIGHTS GRANT does not fall under "claims for a right to
use water existing on or before December 31, 1974," which must be registered with the National
Water Resources Council within two (2) years of PD 1067's promulgation, or it will be deemed
waived and its use abandoned.
The grant overturns the respondent Judge's erroneous findings and unquestionably
entitles petitioner to the beneficial use of water from the Silmod River. That right is now vested,
and it cannot be used to bring petitioner's case under the National Water Resources Council's
jurisdiction. Resurrecting that issue would be a violation of the res judicata rule. Amistoso is
asking the court to compel Neri to recognize his right to use and have it annotated on the latter's
TCT, not to grant him the right to use. Petitioner's cause of action in the lower court was the
interruption of the free flow of water caused by the refusal to reopen the closed irrigation canal,
which clearly does not fall within the authority of the National Water Resources Council.
John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid and Pedro Hernandez vs. People of the Philippines;
G.R. No. 152644;
February 10, 2006

Facts:
President, CEO, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Marcopper's Mining
Operation in Marinduque, respectively, are Loney, Reid, and Hernandez.
In Mt. Tapian, Marinduque, Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a
pit. A drainage tunnel ran from the pit's bottom to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. The tailings
gushed out of or near the tunnel's end, indicating that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at
the tunnel's end. The Mt. Tapian pit dumped millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers in just a few days.
The Department of Justice charged petitioners with violating the Philippine Water Code
(PD 1067), the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995 (RA 7942), and RPC Article 365 for reckless imprudence resulting in property damage.
Petitioners argued that the information was duplicitous because it charged multiple
offenses for a single act, that Loney and Reid were not officers at the time of the incident, and
that the information contained allegations that constituted legal excuse or justification.
The MTC partially overturned the indictments for violating PD 1067 and PD 984, but
upheld the violations of RA 7942 and RPC. MTC then issued a consolidated order in relation to
RPC's offense. As a result, petitioners filed a certiorari petition with the RTC-Marinduque,
challenging the Consolidated Order.
The RTC granted appeal but denied the petition for certiorari. The Consolidated Order
was upheld, and the information related to the PD 1967 and PD 984 violations was reinstated.
Petitioners petitioned the CA for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion and repeating the
defense that the information was derived from a single act.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue/s:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property should stand.
Held:
No. There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of charges simply
means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense.
Except in cases where existing laws prescribe a single punishment for multiple offenses,
a complaint or information must only charge one offense. When a single Information charges
more than one offense, it is called duplicity (or multiplicity).
The prosecution, on the other hand, charged each petitioner with four counts, with each
Information charging only one count. The filing of multiple charges is legal. A single act or
incident may violate two or more entirely separate and unrelated provisions of law, justifying the
accused's prosecution for multiple offenses.
The only exception to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition against putting someone
in double jeopardy for "the same offense." Double jeopardy isn't an issue here because not all of
the elements are present.
On the petitioners' claim that violating Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" violating PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Property Damage) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those
violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). The former is a felony because of criminal intent
(dolo) or negligence (culpa); the latter is a crime because of the special laws enacting it.
MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay;
G.R. Nos. 171947-48;
December 18, 2008

Facts:
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court for
the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of Manila Bay against several government agencies,
including the Petitioner MMDA.
The complaint claimed that the Manila Bay's water quality had deteriorated far beyond
the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152. The Respondents also claimed that the
Petitioner's failure to address the pollution of Manila Bay is a violation of the Water Code,
among other things.
The RTC ruled in favor of complainant and rendered an order to clean up and rehabilitate
Manila Bay.
The Petitioners argued on appeal that the relevant provisions of PD 1152 only apply to
specific pollution incidents and not to cleaning in general. Petitioners also claimed that cleaning
the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act that can be compelled by mandamus, in addition to raising
concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes.
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC’s decision, hence this petition.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not PD 1152 include a cleanup in general.
(2) Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

Held:
(1) Yes. PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. The fundamental need to improve water quality is not
contingent on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
Even though no specific legislative provision exists, they cannot avoid their responsibility
to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of Manila Bay as clean and clear as feasible.
 (2) Yes, petitioners may be compelled. The MMDA's solid waste disposal responsibilities
are outlined not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but also in its charter.
This task of establishing a proper waste disposal system cannot be classified as
discretionary because discretion implies that public officials have the authority or right granted
by law to act in accordance with their judgment or conscience. A discretionary duty "allows a
person to exercise judgment and decide whether or not to perform."
The MMDA charter would lead to the conclusion that these government entities are
required to fulfill specific responsibilities related to the cleanup, restoration, protection, and
preservation of Manila Bay as a matter of statutory responsibility. They are not allowed to refuse
to do these tasks.
Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority and Hon. General
Manager Calixto Cataquiz vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.;
G.R. No. 170599;
September 22, 2010.

Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority's (LLDA) Pollution Control Division inspected
waste water from the SM City Manila branch. The findings revealed that SM had failed to meet
the law's effluent standards for inland water.
LLDA notified SM of its violation and ordered it to take corrective action as well as pay
a fine of PhP 1,000.00 per day of discharge calculated from February 4 until the water quality
was fully restored.
SM requested a resampling, claiming that their sewage treatment plants had been
modified to meet LLDA standards. An Order to Pay was issued, requiring SM to pay a PhP
50,000.00 fine and penalty between February 4 and March 25.
SM requested a waiver of the fine, claiming that it took immediate corrective action,
controlling the pH levels of its effluent even before requesting re-sampling, resulting in minimal
environmental damage; and that it is a responsible operator, and that this was the first time that
SM City Manila's wastewater discharge failed to meet the law's inland water discharge standards.
The LLDA treated this as a Motion for Reconsideration and denied it.
SM submitted another letter requesting reconsideration. In an order, the LLDA denied the
request for reconsideration once more and demanded payment of the fine within ten days of
receiving the order.
The Orders were nullified after SM filed a certiorari petition with the CA. The CA
granted SM's petition and reversed and set aside the LLDA orders, ruling that an administrative
agency's authority to levy fines must be expressly granted and cannot be implied.
The CA determined that under Republic Act No. 4850 (RA 4850), the LLDA is not
expressly given the power or authority to impose fines for violations of statutory effluent
standards. As a result, the orders were found to be issued without jurisdiction and with a grave
abuse of discretion. LLDA's MR was turned down.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the LLDA has the power, conferred by law, to impose fines
Held:
Yes. The Court agreed with the LLDA that SM was already estopped from challenging
the LLDA's power to impose fines as a penalty because respondent actively participated in the
hearing of its water pollution case without challenging the LLDA's power.
SM even requested that the LLDA reconsider its Order imposing a fine on it, as
evidenced by letters dated July 2, 2002 and November 29, 2002, in which respondent, through its
pollution control officer and counsel, requested a waiver of the fine(s) imposed by the LLDA.
By asking for the LLDA's fine to be reconsidered, the Court comes to the conclusion that
respondent has implicitly acknowledged the latter's authority to impose such a penalty. As a
result, contrary to what respondent claims in its Comment and Memorandum, it is already barred
from challenging the LLDA's fine-imposition authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority;
G.R. No. 165299;
December 18, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. is a company that provides laundry services.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources' (DENR) Environmental
Management Bureau endorsed to respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the
inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission from petitioner's plant at 114
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, on June 6, 2001.
On June 22, 2001, the LLDA conducted an investigation and discovered that petitioner's
untreated wastewater was discharged directly into the San Francisco Del Monte River. The
Investigation Report also stated that the petitioner's plant was operating without LLDA
clearance, AC/PO-ESI, or an LLDA Discharge Permit.
The LLDA's Environmental Quality Management Division took wastewater samples
from petitioner's effluent on September 5, 2001. The laboratory analysis revealed non-
compliance with effluent standards, particularly in terms of Total Suspended Solids (TSS),
Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration, and Color Units.
As a result, LLDA issued a Notice of Violation to petitioner. The petitioner submitted an
application for an LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would take
the necessary steps to reduce water pollution. There was no compliance. The petitioner's
wastewater treatment facility was said to be under construction. Following that, another
wastewater sample was taken, but the results were still negative.
Before the LLDA, petitioner was charged with Pollution Control and Abatement.
Petitioner requested another test. It showed compliance this time. Respondent requested that the
Notice of Violation issued on October 30, 2001, as well as the daily penalty associated with it, be
set aside, and that the penalty imposed be calculated from the date of the actual hearing, not from
September 5, 2001.
The Notice of Violation and the imposition of the penalty, according to respondent, had
no legal or factual basis because it had already installed the necessary wastewater treatment to
reduce water pollution.
Respondent's arguments are found to be without merit by the Public Hearing Committee.
The discharge of pollutive wastewater is prohibited under Presidential Decree No. 984, and
anyone found in violation is subject to a fine of not more than five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00)
for each day the violation continues.
The violation referred to in PD No. 984 is the simple discharge of wastewater that does
not meet the effluent standard. CA ruled that the LLDA has the authority to levy fines.
Issue/s:
Whether or not LLDA have the implied power to impose fines as set forth in PD 984.

Held:
Yes. The petitioner claims that the LLDA lacks the authority to impose fines because the
National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) has delegated that authority to the Pollution
Adjudication Board under Executive Order No. 192. (EO 192). This is something that the
Supreme Court does not agree with. The NPCC was created and established under the Office of
the President by Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984). The Pollution Adjudication Board was
established under the Office of the DENR Secretary by Executive Order 192, which assumed the
powers and functions of the NPCC in the adjudication of pollution cases.
LLDA is given additional powers and functions under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927)
in order to effectively perform its role and expand its monitoring, licensing, and enforcement
prerogatives.
LLDA may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary
to carry out its duties and responsibilities," according to Section 4(h) of EO 927.
In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld LLDA's
power to issue an ex-parte cease-and-desist order even though the power was not expressly
granted by law, holding that an administrative agency has all powers that are necessary in the
exercise of its express powers.
The Court determined that the LLDA has the implied authority to issue a "cease and
desist order" in the exercise of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.
Similarly, the Court holds that the LLDA, in its capacity as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body, has the authority to impose fines in cases of pollution in the Laguna Lake region.
The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development Authority;
G.R. No. 169228;
September 11, 2009

Facts:
The Alexandra Condominium Corporation (TACC) was notified by the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) on June 24, 1998, that its wastewater did not meet government
effluent standards. To meet government standards, LLDA informed TACC that it needed to build
its own sewage treatment plant (STP).
TACC's water discharge failed to meet government standards despite experimenting with
a proposed solution from Larutan Resources Development Corporation. As a result, the LLDA
issued a Notice of Violation and fined TACC P1,000 per day from March 26, 1999 until the
pollutive wastewater discharge was completely stopped.
TACC reached an agreement with World Chem Marketing for the construction of the
sewage treatment plant in order to comply. Because of the favorable analysis conducted by the
LLDA's Pollution Control Division, TACC requested that the water pollution case against it be
dismissed.
The request was denied by the LLDA. TACC petitioned the Court of Appeals for
certiorari, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not the petition for certiorari was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
(2) Whether or not the Laguna Lake Development Authority is authorized to levy fines.

Held:
(1) Yes. The petition was filed prematurely. Prior to filing a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, TACC should have pursued an administrative remedy with the DENR
Secretary. The DENR is required to promulgate rules and regulations for pollution control, as
well as ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality, under Executive Order No. 192,
which reorganized the agency.
The Pollution Adjudication Board was established under the Office of the DENR
Secretary by Executive Order No. 192. It assumed the NPCC's powers and functions in relation
to the adjudication of pollution cases, including the NPCC's function to "serve as arbitrator for
the determination of reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from
pollution." As a result, TACC has an administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary, which it
should have pursued before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
(2) Yes. LLDA has the authority to levy fines. Under Section 4-A of RA No. 4850, as
amended, LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages caused by failure to comply with
established water and effluent standards.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, et al.;
G.R.No. 110120;
March 16, 1994

Facts:
The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
on March 8, 1991, requesting that the garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, be closed down.
The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities to stop dumping any form or
kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite after an on-site investigation
and public hearing.
The Caloocan City Government halted the dumping operation, but it was resumed later
after a failed settlement. The LLDA issued another Alias Cease and Desist Order, this time
prohibiting the City Government of Caloocan from dumping in the Camarin area.
LLD enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order with the help of the Philippine National
Police, prohibiting all garbage dump trucks from entering the area. The Caloocan City
Government filed an action in the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court for the declaration of the
cease and desist order null and void, claiming that it is the sole authority empowered to promote
public health and safety, as well as the people's right to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction.
A temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, prohibiting the
LLDA from enforcing its Cease and Desist Order. The LLDA claims that the complaint is
reviewable by the Court of Appeals, not the Regional Trial Court, on both the law and the facts
of the case. The LLDA lacked the authority to issue a Cease and Desist Order, according to the
Court of Appeals.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to issue a Cease and Desist Order.

Held:
Yes. Under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, it is specifically mandated
to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of
Rizal and Laguna, as well as the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon, and Caloocan, with
due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and coexistence.
Aside from the legal powers granted to it, an administrative agency also has powers that
are implied in the exercise of its express powers. The LLDA's authority to issue a Cease and
Desist Order is implied in the exercise of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71;
December 7, 1995

Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was established by Republic Act No.
4850, which gave it the authority to manage the area's environmental resources. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of the Local Government
Code of 1991 to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges and fish pen permits within their municipal waters after the
law was passed.
Later, the LLDA issued a public notice informing the public that illegally built fishpens,
fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures would be demolished. Injunction cases against
LLDA were filed by the affected fishpen owners in various regional trial courts.
The LLDA filed motions to dismiss the cases brought against it on jurisdictional grounds,
but they were denied. Meanwhile, LLDA was ordered to stop demolishing the fishpens and other
structures in question by a temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
As a result, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the LLDA has jurisdiction over the issuance of fishery privileges.

Held:
Yes. The Laguna Lake Development Authority has sole authority to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay, as well as the authority to exercise all other
powers conferred on it by its charter.
The provisions of the Local Government Code do not necessitate the repeal of the
aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority because it lacks an
express provision that categorically and/or expressly repeals the LLDA charter.
It must be admitted that the legislature had no intention of repealing RA No. 4850 and its
amendments. The repeal of laws should be stated explicitly. The ability of local government
units to grant fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes.
 The LLDA, on the other hand, has the authority to issue permits for fish pens, fish cages,
and other aquaculture structures in order to effectively regulate and monitor activities in the
Laguna de Bay region, as well as to control and manage lake quality.
It is in the nature of police power. As a result, in matters affecting Laguna de Bay, the
LLDA charter, which embodies a valid exercise of police power, should take precedence over
the Local Government Code of 1991.