Does Business Diversification Affect Performance?

Author(s): Allen Michel and Israel Shaked

Source: Financial Management, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter, 1984), pp. 18-25
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Financial Management Association International
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Does Business DiversificationAffect
Performance?
Allen Michel and Israel Shaked
Allen Michel is an Associate Professor and Israel Shakedis an
AssistantProfessor in the School of Managementat Boston
University.
* In spite of the trend toward diversification during
the past decade, relatively little is known about the
relationshipbetween financial performanceand the ex-
tent to which a firm diversifies. This study relates
several measures of financial performance to the de-
gree of relatedness of a firm's operations. The empiri-
cal question of whether shareholdervalue is increased
through increasing amounts of diversification is inves-
tigated. The study concludes that firms diversifying
into unrelatedareas have been able to generate superior
performance over those with predominantly related
businesses.
From the firm's perspective the decision whether to
diversify into a related or unrelatedbusiness is primar-
ily based on two conflicting considerations. On one
hand, diversifying into a related field is likely to yield
more synergism than pure conglomeration or highly
unrelateddiversification. The management is familiar
with the marketsor technology of the related business,
The authorswish to thankJocelyn Bourgetfor excellent researchassis-
tance and the two anonymousreferees for their helpful suggestions.
18
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and thus, it is expected that merging and employing
similar distributionchannels or productiontechnology
will result in incremental value. Obviously, such
economies cannot be realized by shareholders simply
diversifying their own portfolios. In addition, this type
of relateddiversification will also be likely to affect the
combined firm's systematic risk. This results because
the synergy created by related diversification is likely
to affect the individual earnings streams (not necessar-
ily linearly), which in turn non-trivially affect the de-
termination of beta. However, because the earnings
streams resulting from related diversification are sub-
stantially correlated (e.g., earlier-than-expectedtech-
nological obsolescence of a similar production tech-
nology), it is unlikely that total risk will be
significantly reduced.
On the other hand, unrelated diversification is less
likely to produce significant operating synergies. With
the beta of the combined businesses calculated as the
weighted average of the individual betas, the systemat-
ic risk of the combined businesses is unlikely to be
substantiallyaffected. Chung and Weston [2], howev-
MICHELAND SHAKED/BUSINESSDIVERSIFICATION 19

er, suggest the potential carry-overof general manage- Exhibit 1. Specialization Ratio, Related Ratio, and
ment functions, such as planning, controlling, and or- Vertical Ratio Determination for American Home
ganizing. Although finance is a specific management Products
function, they suggest that because of the broad gener- in EachSegment
Percentage
ality of its applications, it is also a transferablefunc- 1975 1981
tion. Combining both systematic and unsystematic
A. All Business Segments
risk, the effect of pure conglomeration is thus likely to Prescriptiondrugs 39.0 42.0
result in total risk reduction. Packagedmedicines 14.0 13.7
In sum, related diversification, therefore, is likely to Food products 22.0 19.1
Household products 25.0 25.1
yield potential synergy, has little total risk reduction,
B. Related Business Segments
and has an uncertain impact on the level of systematic
Prescriptiondrugs 39.0 42.0
risk. In contrast, unrelateddiversification is not likely
Packagedmedicines 14.0 13.7
to yield potential synergy, has little effect on the
Related ratio 53.0 55.7
weighted average systematic risk, but has the potential Average related ratio 54.3
to reduce total risk. Thus, a priori, the direction of Specializationratio 39.0 42.0
change in risk-adjusted performance associated with Vertical ratio 0.0 0.0
relatedand unrelateddiversification is ambiguous and,
thus, ex ante indeterminate. business. It measures the degree to which a firm's
This study differs from the previous studies men- revenues are dependent on this single business seg-
tioned in that it investigates financial performanceas a ment. Prescription drugs is the segment from which
function of the degree of a firm's diversification. It American Home Products derives the largest fraction
extends the pioneering work of Richard Rumelt [9], of its revenues. As such, it is the segment from which
who evaluated firms at ten-year intervals, 1949, 1959 the specialization ratio is derived. The percentages of
and 1969. He related financial performance to the fol- revenues attributableto this segment, correspondingto
lowing firm classifications: single product, dominant the specialization ratio, are 39% in 1975 and 42% in
product, related products, and unrelatedproducts. Our 1981.
study focuses only on Rumelt's categories of related Because this study focuses only on the relationship
and unrelated product diversification. This study not between performance and the degree of relatedness in
only updates Rumelt's work, but also utilizes market business diversification, highly specialized or single
measures of financial performance rather than ac-
product firms are not included. Following Rumelt's
counting measures. In addition, a determination is categorization, if a firm's specialization ratio is greater
made of the degree to which a firm's operating compo- than 70% it is considered a dominant or single product
nents are related, whereas Rumelt classified firms as firm and accordingly is not included in the sample.
entirely related or unrelated. The vertical ratio is defined as the percentage of
Section I presents the methodology and data used in revenue each year attributableto the largest group of
the paper. The results are provided in Section II with
vertically integratedbusinesses. In the case of Ameri-
the conclusions presented in Section III. can Home Productsnone of the businesses are vertical-
ly integrated, thus resulting in a vertical ratio of zero.
I. Methodology and Data However, those firms with a significant fraction of
In order to determine the degree to which a firm's their output vertically linked were considered to be
operations are related, several ratios suggested by Ru- more closely allied to a dominant business than a di-
melt were obtained. They include a specialization ra- versified firm. More precisely, firms with a vertical
tio, a vertical ratio, and a related ratio (RR). To illus- ratiogreaterthan 70% were not included in the sample.
tratethe calculation and use of these ratios, an example Rumelt also used this cutoff to separate related firms
describing American Home Products is presented in from those more concentrated in a single line of busi-
Exhibit 1. The data in Exhibit 1, which is used to ness.
determine the ratios, were obtained from information The related ratio is defined as the proportion of a
provided in the firms' annual reports, in 10Ks, and in firm's revenues attributableto its largest group of relat-
Moody's Industrial Manual. ed businesses. Three factors were considered to deter-
The specialization ratio is defined as the percentage mine the related ratio for a firm:
of the firm's revenues attributableto its largest single (1) percentage of business using same technology;

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20
(2) percentage of business which is marketed
through the same distribution channels;
(3) vertical ratio, if it is less than 70%.
While other operational definitions could have been
selected, the related ratio was defined for the purpose
of this study as the maximum value of these criteria.
This selection considers the degree of similarity of the
firm's marketsand productiontechnology as well as its
ability to make use of captive markets for its own
production. For American Home Products both the
technology and the marketing channels are virtually
identical for prescription drugs and packaged medi-
cines. The related ratios for both 1975 and 1981 are
thus determined by adding the percentage of revenues
in each of the related segments during each of the
respective years. The resulting related ratios are 53%
in 1975 and 55.7% in 1981.
The determination of the ratios typically required
judgmental input from the researchers. While efforts
were made to reduce any resulting bias, the evaluation
of firms' operating data by the researchersdoes repre-
sent a potential source of judgmental bias. Firms for
which data were not available on either the CRSP or
the Compustattapes or for which the degree of related-
ness could not be determined were not included in the
sample. Also rejected were firms showing a relatively
unstablerelatedratio (varying more than 15%)over the
period investigated. The period included the 60
months from January 1, 1976 through December 31,
1980. The related ratio was determined from 1975 and
1980 financial information.' Furthermore, if the per-
centage change in the related ratio was less than 15%,
but the composition of the related segments changed
over time (e.g., one or more related segments have
been replaced by other segments), the firms were also
rejected as unstable. By updating Rumelt's analysis,
this study encounters a different economic environ-
ment. The three decades covered by Rumelt were more
stable, with lower inflation and lower interest rates
than the last half of the 1970s. This period was charac-
terized by considerable uncertainty precipitated to a
large degree by the oil shock. The initial sample con-
sisted of the Fortune 250 from which 51 firms met the
criteriarequiredfor inclusion in this study. The sample
thus is likely to be relatively large and more mature
than a random selection of firms. While the sample
may be relatively stable comparedto less maturefirms,
the sampled firms may face problems of low growth
'In several instances, informationin the desired year was unavailable.
in which case informationfrom the prioror succeeding year was used.
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FINANCIALMANAGEMENT/WINTER
1984
not encounteredby more entrepreneurialventures. The
sample used by Rumelt was also comprised of large
firms, with his sample selected from the Fortune 500.
As such, in analyzing both Rumelt's results and those
presented in this paper, it is useful to recall the special
characteristics of the samples.
Two approaches were used to determine the rela-
tionship between relatedness and performance. The
first approach analyzes the relationship between an
individual company's performance and its degree of
relatedness, while the second approach groups firms
into portfolios and then considers the relationship be-
tween portfolio performanceand the degree of related-
ness. In addition, the performance of those firms
which have been rejected as unstable is compared with
that of the 51 firms included in the study.
A. Individual Firm Performance
Individual firm performance was measured using
the Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen measures. As inputs
to the Treynor and Jensen measures, the betas for each
security were obtained using the excess returnform of
the CAPM:
Ri,- Rt = aj+ bi(Rn,-Rlt) + i,,,
where R,-R, = excess return above the risk-free
rate on stock i in month t, and
where Rn,-R,, = excess returnon the market portfo-
lio in month t, and
where E(s,) 0.
The monthly return of a value-weighted portfolio of
NYSE stocks was selected to represent the marketre-
turn. The risk-free rate, Rf,, was estimated by the
monthly T-bill returns and was obtained from the Ib-
botson-Sinquefield tape.
The three measures of performance are calculated:
R- R0
Sharpe Measure:
R R-R
Treynor Measure:
bi
Jensen Measure: RI- [R + b(R - Rt)],
where R. = geometric average return on stock i,
Ri = geometric average returnon risk-free se-
curity,
RG = geometric average return on the market
portfolio,
MICHELAND SHAKED/BUSINESSDIVERSIFICATION
ci = standarddeviation of monthly rate of re-
turn.
Because of the well-documented increase in debt ca-
pacity of conglomerates (i.e., Mead [4], Weston [13],
Weston and Mansinghka [12], Melicher and Rush [5,
6], Shrieves and Pashley [10], Chung [I], Stapleton
[I1], Michel and Shaked [7]) it was decided to assess
whether leverage was a factor underlying the financial
performance of the sampled firms. Therefore, unle-
vered betas were determined and used in recalculating
the Treynor and Jensen measures. The unlevered beta
is calculated from
-
bunlevered blevered X
D unstable was constructed and the resulting perform-
[1 + (1-T)]
E unstable either increased or decreased their related ra-
where T = tax rate calculated from
income tax
income after taxes + income tax
D more relatedness or more conglomeration.
and - = ratio of long-term debt to equity.
E II. Results
The unlevered beta (bu)performancemeasures were
then calculated as follows:
R?-R,
Treynor Measure (unlevered beta)
bu
Jensen Measure (unlevered beta)
R-iR + bu(R - Rf)]
Each of the five performance measures described
above was then regressed on the associated related
ratio to determine if a relationship exists between fi-
nancial performance and the degree of relatedness.
B. Portfolio Performance
Two types of portfolio groupings were used to relate
portfolio performance and the degree of business seg-
ment relatedness.
(1) Equal Number. Of the 51 securities in the
sample, 17 were placed in each of 3 portfolios.
This placement was based on their related ratio,
with the 17 having the lowest related ratio in
portfolio 1, the 17 with the next lowest in port-
folio 2, and so on.
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21
(2) Equal Range. The related ratios varied from
34.5% to 100%. Using this approach, equal
ranges between 34.5% and 100% were con-
structed. Twelve firms were included in the
portfolio with the lowest related ratios. Sixteen
were included in the second portfolio, and 23
were included in the portfolio with the highest
related ratios.
For each of these portfolios, the beta, the average
monthly portfolio return, standarddeviation, and geo-
metric average portfolio return were calculated over
the 60-month period of the study. The Sharpe,
Treynor, and Jensen performance measures described
earlier were calculated for each of the portfolios.
In addition, a portfolio of those firms classified as
ance measures were calculated. The firms included as
tios by more than 15% over the 60-month period or
changed the composition of their related segments over
the period. Twenty-one firms were considered unsta-
ble and included in the portfolio. Because of sample
size considerations, no attempt was made to segregate
the unstable firms into those that have moved toward
The results suggest that non-related diversification
leads to improved performance over related diversifi-
cation. The results are most evident in the second part
of this study which relates portfolio performanceto the
relatedness of operating segments of the firm. Howev-
er, the results can also be observed in the analysis of
individual performance. The Appendix presents the
relatednessratios and performancemeasures of each of
the 51 firms included in the study. The betas and stan-
dard deviations of return used to derive the perform-
ance measures are calculated over the 60-month period
of the study. This permits the appropriatecalculation
of each of the performance measures over the same
period.
To determine the relationship between the perform-
ance of individual firms and the degree of relatedness,
the following regressions were run:
Performance measurea = a+b(Related ratio),.
As indicated by Exhibit 2, in each of the regressions
the coefficient of the relatedness ratio is negative.
While the value of the negative term is small, each
of the regressions is significant, at least at the .05
level. The results therefore suggest a small but signifi-
22 FINANCIALMANAGEMENT/WINTER
1984

Exhibit 2. Individual Firm's Regression Results: Per- ratio of the portfolio increases. Moreover, in order to
formance vs. Relatedness Ratio* evaluate whether the mean performance measures dif-
Slope F Signifi- fer significantly across portfolios, t-tests have been
Constant (Std. Error) Statistic cance performed where the t-statistic is given by
Sharpe Measure .1836 -.0015 4.30 .045
(.0007) (ni- )s+ (ni- l)s2 I 1
TreynorMeasure calc -ni+n (n- l)+(n-l) n n
Standard .0131 -.0001 3.93 .050
(.00006)
Unleveraged .0253 -.0002 6.57 .015 where
(.00009)
Jensen Measure nk = number of firms in portfolio k,
Standard .0080 -.0001 5.43 .030 s2 = variance of the performancemeasure for port-
(.00005) folio k,
Unleveraged .0108 -.0001 5.45 .030
a = significance level.
(.00005)
*Thefirm'sperformancemeasureis the regression'sdependentvariable The cases where the mean performance measures dif-
and the relatednessratio is the independentvariable.
fer significantly across portfolios are presented in Ex-
hibit 4. Although not all differences across portfolios
cant inverse relationship between financial perform- are statistically significant, the results indicate a mono-
ance and the degree of relatedness. tonic decrease in the performancemeasure as the relat-
The results are more evident in the case where the ed ratio increases. For example, while Exhibit 3 indi-
firms are grouped into portfolios. Exhibit 3 illustrates cates that the Sharpe measure for the low related
the relationship between the financial performance of portfolio (P1) is .215 and for the medium related ratio
the portfolios and their degree of relatedness. With portfolio (P2) is . 142, as shown in Exhibit 4, the differ-
both the equal number and equal range methods of ence is not statistically significant. However, the mean
portfolio construction, it is evident that all of the per- Sharpe measure for the low relatedness portfolio (PI)
formance measures tend to decrease as the degree of is significantly higher than that for the high relatedness
relatedness increases. portfolio (P3). This informationis contained in Exhibit
For example, using the method in which there are an 4 in the cells entitled P 1>P2 and P I >P3 for the Sharpe
equal numberof firms in each portfolio, the three port- measureapplied to the equal size portfolio. An asterisk
folios have mean related ratios of 50.2, 75.5, and denotes that the difference is significant at 5%. From
98.5. The associated Sharpe measures are respectively Exhibit 4 it is evident that some of the inequalities are
.215, .142, and .088. Similarly, each of the other significant under the equal size analysis and were not
performance measures decreases as the mean related significant under the equal range analysis. However,

Exhibit 3. Portfolio Summary Statistics and Performance Measures

Portfolios Based on Equal Range of
Portfolios Based on EqualNumberof Firms RelatednessRatio
Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3 Portfolio I Portfolio 2 Portfolio 3
A. Summary Statistics
Mean-Related Ratio 50.20 75.50 98.50 45.30 68.30 94.50
Portfolio Beta 0.93 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.06
Unlevered Portfolio Beta 0.60 0.69 0.72 0.64 0.64 0.71
No. of Firms in Portfolio 17 17 17 12 16 23
Portfolio Std. Deviation 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Range of Related Ratio 35-63 66-88 90-100 35-57 57-79 79-100
B. Performance Measures
Sharpe Measure .215 .142 .088 .190 .179 .102
Treynor Measure .010 .007 .004 .009 .009 .004
Treynor Measure (Unlev.) .016 .011 -.006 .014 .014 .007
Jensen Measure .004 .001 -.002 .003 .003 -.002
Jensen Measure (Unlev.) .006 .004 .000 .005 .005 .001

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MICHELAND SHAKED/BUSINESSDIVERSIFICATION 23

Exhibit 4. Significance of Portfolio Comparisons Exhibit 5. SummaryStatistics and PerformanceMea-

Pl > P2 P2 > P3 Pl > P3 sures of Portfolios with Stable and Unstable Related
A. Equal Size Portfolios Ratios
Sharpe Portfolio Portfolio
Treynor Consisting Consisting
Standard t of Firms of Firms
Unlevered t * withStable withUnstable
Jensen Related Related
Ratios Ratios
Standard t *
Unlevered * A. SummaryStatistics
B. Equal "Range" Portfolios Mean Related Ratio 74.7 57.0
Sharpe * * Portfolio Beta 1.03 1.14
Treynor Portfolio Std. Dev. 0.05 0.05
Standard * * No. of Firms in Portfolio 51 21
Unlevered * * B. PerformanceMeasures
Jensen Sharpe Measure .153 .194
Standard * * TreynorMeasure .007 .008
Unlevered * * Jensen Measure .001 .003
*5 percentsignificancelevel
t 10 percentsignificancelevel
firms having unstable related ratios. Summary statis-
this fact is simply a result of the different partitioning tics and performance measures for the two portfolios
of the 51 securities in the two portfolios. Interestingly, are presented in Exhibit 5. The results suggest that
there is virtually no difference between the results ob- each of the Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen measures for
tained using the standardSharpe, Jensen, and Treynor the portfolio consisting of firms with unstable RRs
performance measures and those generated with the exceeded the respective measures for the portfolio of
unleveraged betas. all 51 firms. T-tests, however, reveal that the differ-
These results suggest a conclusion opposite than that ences are not statistically significant.
reached by Rumelt: namely, our findings indicate that In order to further investigate whether the portfolio
unrelateddiversification generates superiorrisk-return consisting of firms with unstable related ratios more
profiles than related diversification. Possible reasons closely resembles portfolios associated with high, me-
for the divergent results include the selection of market dium, or low related ratios, we compared their per-
risk-adjusted performance measures rather than ac- formance measures. The portfolio of unstable firms
counting measures, as well as the investigation of dif- also was compared with each of the three portfolios
ferent time periods. These conclusions, however, do constructed using equal ranges of related ratios and
support the findings reported by Elgers and Clark [3] equal numbers of firms.
and Michel, Shaked, and Yobaccio [8], who suggest The results suggested that the performance of those
that conglomerate acquisitions outperformother types firms classifed as unstable fell between the perform-
of acquisitions. ance of the low RR and medium RR portfolios. How-
One might hypothesize that firms with unstable re- ever, a series of t-tests indicated that the only statisti-
lated ratios are those that have responded to new op- cally significant result is that the portfolio of firms with
portunities. In such cases, the instability of the related unstable RRs consistently outperformed the portfolio
ratio is a result of the firm's entry into new business with the highest related ratio. This may, in fact, have
segments. In order to evaluate whether these firms little to do with those firms taking advantage of market
outperformedtheir more stable counterparts, a portfo- opportunitiesand, as a result, changing their composi-
lio, consisting of all firms that have been excluded tion over time. The findings may simply be explained
from the initial sample due to unstable RRs, was con- by a second factor. The mean related ratio of the unsta-
structed.2For purposes of comparison, we pooled the ble firms is 57.0, which is between the related ratios of
51 firms in the original sample into a portfolio and the lowest and the medium related ratio portfolios for
compared it with the portfolio consisting of the 21 both the equal number and equal range grouping meth-
ods. Since performance was found to vary inversely
deviationsof theunstablefirmsare with the related ratio, the performance measures asso-
ratios,betasandstandard
2Related
availableuponrequestfromthe authors. ciated with the portfolio of unstable firms are also

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24 FINANCIALMANAGEMENT/WINTER
1984

likely to be associated with the degree of relatedness 10. R.E. Shrieves and M.M. Pashley, "A Test of Financial
ratherthan with any instability in the extent of diversi- Economics Through Increased Leverage Merger Theor-
fication. ies," Working Paper, University of Tennessee (August
1980).
III. Conclusions 11. R.C. Stapleton, "Mergers, Debt Capacity, and the Valu-
ation of CorporateLoans," in M. Keenanand L.J. White
The evidence suggests that firms diversifying in un-
(eds.), Mergers and Acquisitions, Lexington, MA, Lex-
related areas are able to generate statistically superior
ington Books, 1982, pp. 9-28.
performance over those with businesses that are pre- 12. J.F. Weston and S.K. Mansinghka, "Tests of Efficiency
dominantly related. Given the micro nature of this Performanceof ConglomerateFirms," Journalof Finance
study, evaluating the degree of business segment di- (September1971), pp. 919-956.
versification obviously involves significant judgment 13. J.F. Weston, "DiversificationandMergersTrends," Busi-
on the part of the researcher. Unfortunately, methods ness Economics (January1970), pp. 50-57.
other than a painstaking review of annual reports,
lOKs and Moody's, are not available for this type of
research. Furthermore, because of the subjective na-
ture of researcher input into the analysis, the conclu-
sions must be viewed as tentative until other research-
ers are able to support these results. Furtherresearch
would be useful to determine whether studies using
other definitions of business-segment diversification
would yield similar conclusions.

References
1. K.S. Chung, "Tests of Synergies from Diversification,"
Working Paper, Graduate School of Management,
U.C.L.A. (August 1980).
2. K.S. Chungand J.F. Weston, "Diversificationand Merg-
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M. Keenan and L.J. White (eds.), Mergers and Acquisi-
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347.
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4. W.J. Mead, "InstantaneousMergerProfit as a Conglom-
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1974), pp. 141-149.
7. A. Michel and I. Shaked, "Are ConglomeratesSafer?", in
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MICHELAND SHAKED/BUSINESSDIVERSIFICATION 25

Appendix. Performance Measures

Related Treynor Jensen
Ratio Sharpe Treynor Unleveraged Jensen Unleveraged
MMM 34.5 -0.0355 -0.0028 -0.0030 -0.0066 -0.0062
Textron 36.5 0.0671 0.0039 0.0061 -0.0028 0.0000
United Industries 37.0 0.1494 0.0137 0.0030 0.0069 0.0092
MidlandRoss 39.5 0.1836 0.0125 0.0194 0.0076 0.0101
ForemostMcKesson 40.0 0.1724 0.0135 0.0326 0.0070 0.0104
Scovill 40.9 0.0640 0.0051 0.0091 -0.0009 0.0016
SperryRand 47.5 0.0512 0.0027 0.0043 -0.0049 -0.0017
Bendix 51.5 0.1205 0.0081 0.0137 0.0022 0.0048
Rockwell 51.6 0.2767 0.0185 0.0334 0.0147 0.0179
Johnsonand Johnson 54.1 -0.0464 -0.0039 -0.0042 -0.0068 -0.0065
AmericanHome Pdts. 54.3 -0.0931 -0.0086 -0.0090 -0.0089 -0.0087
FMC 56.8 0.2460 0.0190 0.0377 0.0134 0.0165
Raytheon 59.1 0.3034 0.0189 0.0279 0.0152 0.0176
Ethyl Corporation 59.5 0.0855 0.0118 0.0177 0.0037 0.0050
GeneralElectric 60.1 0.0401 0.0023 0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0023
American Brands 63.5 0.2762 0.0230 0.0356 0.0085 0.0096
United Brands 65.0 0.0992 0.0071 0.0238 0.0020 0.0106
ConsolidatedFoods 66.5 0.0292 0.0036 0.0056 -0.0010 -0.0001
Joy Manufacturing 66.5 0.0670 0.0047 0.0059 -0.0017 -0.0002
GeneralMills 69.1 -0.0771 -0.0090 -0.0120 -0.0080 -0.0072
McGraw-Hill 69.5 0.2837 0.0196 0.0236 0.0131 0.0141
Westinghouse 70.0 0.1266 0.0080 0.0187 0.0028 0.0079
Big Three 70.4 0.1237 0.0080 0.0091 0.0022 0.0031
Gould 72.5 0.0489 0.0037 0.0057 -0.0025 -0.0002
Monsanto 73.5 -0.0491 -0.0030 -0.0048 -0.0106 -0.0080
Beatrice Foods 74.0 -0.0944 -0.0095 -0.0127 -0.0093 -0.0084
Rexnord 76.0 0.1070 0.0087 0.0124 0.0023 0.0038
Evans Products 76.0 0.2171 0.0159 0.0329 0.0129 0.0170
Colt Industries 77.5 0.1623 0.0106 0.0179 0.0055 0.0086
Grumman 80.5 0.1062 0.0070 0.0171 0.0013 0.0068
Ideal Basic Ind. 80.7 0.1252 0.0073 0.0105 0.0018 0.0045
Ralston Purina 87.0 -0.1700 -0.0135 -0.0184 -0.0143 -0.0131
Eli Lilly 87.5 0.0024 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0045 -0.0041
Sherwin Williams 87.5 -0.0214 -0.0014 -0.0034 -0.0113 -0.0060
Union Camp 90.5 -0.0257 -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0083 -0.0072
Pfizer 92.0 0.1219 0.0103 0.0140 0.0032 0.0044
AndersonClayton 94.5 0.0041 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0061 -0.0041
Eaton Corporation 97.0 0.0782 0.0052 0.0092 -0.0008 0.0015
Bristol Myers 100.0 0.0407 0.0032 0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0019
EmersonElectric 100.0 -0.0436 -0.0029 -0.0033 -0.0070 -0.0064
Ferro 100.0 0.0344 0.0026 0.0039 -0.0049 -0.0021
GeneralFoods 100.0 0.0009 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0034 -0.0025
General Signal 100.0 0.1644 0.0111 0.0135 0.0056 0.0068
Honeywell 100.0 0.1616 0.0095 0.0135 0.0056 0.0068
Interco 100.0 0.0241 0.0018 0.0023 -0.0034 -0.0023
Dow Chemical 100.0 -0.1298 -0.0078 -0.0120 -0.0155 -0.0131
WarnerLambert 100.0 -0.1817 -0.0139 -0.0184 -0.0175 -0.0162
Celanese 100.0 0.0433 0.0027 0.0053 -0.0036 -0.0005
Ingersoll Rand 100.0 -0.0130 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0079 -0.0056
A.E. Staley Manuf. 100.0 0.0437 0.0049 0.0083 -0.0011 0.0012
Abbott 100.0 0.2083 0.0169 0.0201 0.0081 0.0089

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