A.

Justifying circumstances and convincing evidence that all the requisites of

1. Defense of self, relatives, and strangers selfdefense are present.
Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a
MANABAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS
justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances and
from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on
Absolutory Causes
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
DOCTRINE: Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
means employed to prevent or repel the aggression;
provides the three requisites to prove self-defense
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an
accused or the person defending himself. Unlawful
accused from criminal liability: (1) unlawful
aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-defense.
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
Self-defense is founded on the necessity on the part of
necessity of the means employed to prevent or
the person being attacked to prevent or repel the
repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
unlawful aggression. Thus, without prior unlawful and
provocation on the part of the accused or the
unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no
person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is
complete or incomplete selfdefense.
an indispensable requisite of self-defense. Self-
defense is founded on the necessity on the part of
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at
the person being attacked to prevent or repel the
least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a
unlawful aggression. Thus, without prior unlawful
person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is
and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be
not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is
no complete or incomplete selfdefense.
offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the
wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an
FACTS: The deceased, a member of the UP Police,
actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
brought his daughter to UP Health Center because
thereof, which puts the defendants life in real peril. In
of difficulty in breathing. The doctors prescribed
this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part
certain medicines to be purchased. Needing
of the victim. First, the victim was shot at the back as
money, the deceased, who had taken alcoholic
evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second,
drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI Kalayaan
when the victim was shot, his gun was still inside a
Branch to withdraw some money from its ATM.
locked holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when
victim turned his back at petitioner, petitioner was
The deceased started kicking and pounding on the
already pointing his service firearm at Bautista.
machine. For said reason, the bank security guard,
petitioner, approached and asked him what the
The allegation of petitioner that the victim was about to
problem was.
draw his gun when he turned his back at petitioner is
mere speculation. Besides, petitioner was already
The victim complained that his ATM card was
aiming his loaded firearm at the victim when the latter
captured by the machine and that no money came
turned his back. In that situation, it was the victim
out of it. Petitioner checked the receipt and he
whose life was in danger considering that petitioner,
informed the victim that the PIN entered was
who had already fired a warning shot, was pointing his
wrong and advised him to just return the next
firearm at victim. The victim, who was a policeman,
morning. This angered the victim all the more and
would have realized this danger to his life and would not
resumed pounding on the machine for according to
have attempted to draw his gun which was still inside a
the victim he cannot leave the premises without
locked holster tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if
the money because it is for the medication of his
petitioner really feared that the deceased was about to
daughter.
draw his gun to shoot him, petitioner could have easily
disabled the victim by shooting his arm or leg
Because the victim continues to pound the machine
considering that petitioner’s firearm was already aimed
and cannot be pacified, petitioner fired a warning
at the victim.
shot. The victim confronted the petitioner and after
some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally
The Court affirmed the decision finding the petitioner
hitting the victim.
Manaban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide but with modification. Applying the
Petitioner claimed self-defense, he feared that the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into account
victim will pull out his gun first and might kill him so
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
he shot the victim. Trial court found the accused
petitioner Manaban is hereby sentenced to suffer an
guilty for the crime of Homicide. The decision was
indeterminate penalty ranging from six years and one
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Ramonito
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the justifying Manaban is ordered to pay the heirs of Joselito
circumstance of self-defense can be appreciated in Bautista: P892,570.56 as indemnity for loss of earning
this particular case. capacity; P69,500 as actual damages; and P50,000 as
indemnity for death.
RULING: When the accused invokes self-defense, SENOJA v. PEOPLE
he in effect admits killing the victim and the burden TOPIC: MODULE 5: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
is shifted to him to prove that he killed the victim
AND ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
to save his life. The accused must establish by clear
DOCTRINE: Unlawful aggression presupposes an
actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof. After the danger has passed, one is
not justified in following up his adversary to take his
life.
FACTS: Petitioner Exequiel Senoja, Fidel Senoja,
Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac were drinking gin
in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay Zarah,
San Luis, Aurora. An angry Leon Lumasac suddenly
arrived at the said place, holding a bolo in his right
hand and looking for his brother Miguel. Petitioner
and Jose tried to pacify Leon. But when petitioner
approached Leon, the latter tried to hack him so he
embraced Leon and Jose took Leon's.
Subsequently, Leon walked out of Crisanto's hut
followed by petitioner. Suddenly, about ten meters
from the hut, petitioner stabbed Leon at the back.
When Leon turned around, petitioner continued
stabbing him until he fell to the ground. Then,
petitioner ran towards the barangay road and
threw away the "kolonial" knife he used in stabbing
Leon.
The latter died on the spot.
The petitioner admitted killing the victim but
invoked the affirmative defense of self-defense. He
contends Leon Lumasac who was the aggressor
both in the first and second phases of the incident
and Exequiel Senoja was compelled to defend
himself.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Senoja’s acts were
selfdefense and therefore, he is not criminally
liable.
RULING:
No. Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal
Code provides: ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.
— The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or
rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur; First. Unlawful aggression; Second.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. It is essential to selfdefense that it should
be a defense against a present unlawful attack.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude. Hence, when an inceptual/unlawful
aggression ceases to exist, the one making a
defense has no right to kill or injure the former
aggressor. After the danger has passed, one is not
justified in following up his adversary to take his
life
It is the well-considered finding of this Court that
while Leon Lumasac had ceased being the
aggressor after he left the hut to go home, accused
Exequiel Senoja was now the unlawful aggressor in
this second phase of their confrontation. It bears
mentioning he contradicted himself with respect
for (sic) the reason why he left the hut. First, it was
topacify Leon and the second reason was that he
was going home.
PEOPLE v. DECENA
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances and
Absolutory Causes
DOCTRINE: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES (Article ll of
the Revised Penal Code) Are those where the act of a
person is said to be in accordance with the law, so that
such person is deemed not to have transgressed the law
and is free from both civil and criminal liability.
FACTS: Luzviminda Ballesteros, 14-year-old daughter of
the victim was playing with her siblings at home. Her
mother asked her to fetch her father, Jaime Ballesteros,
who was then watching a game in the basketball court.
On her way, he met her father walking home in a
wobbly manner due to drunkenness. Suddenly she saw
appellant rushing towards her father with a long-bladed
weapon, so she shouted at her father to warn him. But,
instead, Jaime just raised his hand, allowing the
appellant to stab him on the right chest just below the
nipple. Appellant-accused then fled from the crime
scene. Jaime, the victim managed to run but stumbled
and fell to ground.
Luzviminda called her mother at their house,
immediately called for a tricycle and rushed Jaime to
the Provincial Hospital, however, the victim was
declared dead on arrival. The accused- appellant
invokes self-defense. He testified that on that day while
he is watching a basketball game, the victim Jaime
Ballesteros was walking around the basketball court in
a wobbly manner because of drunkenness. He (Jaime)
stops near the place where he was sitting, for no
reason, held his neck with one arm and at the same time
poking a fork against his neck with the other arm.
Barangay Tanod Romeo Decena who was also watching
the game intervened. He took the fork from Jaime and
advised appellant to go home. So, the accused left and
was followed later by Jaime. Relatives of the accused
were also presented as witnesses of accused appellant.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not accused appellant acted in a complete
self-defense in killing Jaime Ballesteros.
RULING:
No. Accused-appellant’s action is not an act of
selfdefense. The Supreme Court held that the basic
requirement for self-defense is that there was an
unlawful aggression against the person defending
himself. In the theory of the accused-appellant, the
unlawful aggression started in the basketball court
when the victim tried to poke a fork on the neck of the
appellant, but the barangay intervened, advised the
two to go home and then the two heeded. It is an
elementary rule that when the aggressor leaves, the
unlawful aggression ceases, when the appellant and
Jaime heeded the advice of the barangay tanod for
them to go home, therefore the unlawful aggression,
ended. CA said that that when a person had inflicted
slight physical injuries on another, without any
intention to inflict other injuries, and the latter attacked
the former, the one making the attack was an unlawful
aggressor. In the case at bar, the attack made by the
accused-appellant was evidently a retaliation not self-
defense. The Supreme Court distinguished retaliation
from self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that
was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist
when the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the
aggression was still existing when the aggressor was
injured or disabled by the person making a defense. The
CA modified the judgment of the trial court and lowered
the crime from murder to homicide because the killing
of the victim was not attended by treachery. Although
the attack was sudden, it does not bespeak the
circumstance of alevosia (treachery). The qualifying
circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated, for
none of the prosecution’s arguments can uphold its
allegation that, in the language of the law, appellant
committed the crime by employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tended directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO E. DELA
CRUZ
TOPIC: Module 5: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
AND ABSOLUTORY CAUSE
SA. Defense of self, relatives, and strangers (Art. 11
(1), (2), and (3), RPC)
DOCTRINE: Self-defense requires that there be (1)
an unlawful aggression by the person injured or
killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel that
unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. All these conditions must concur.
FACTS: The victim Daniel Macapagal, a married
man, had been a live-in partner of prosecution
witness Ma. Luz Perla San Antonio for about two to
three years before Luz Perla took appellant Roberto
dela Cruz, widower, as lover and live-in partner. At
the time of the incident, appellant and Luz Perla
were living in a house being rented by Luz Perla.
At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening on May 27,
1996, Luz Perla and appellant were resting in their
bedroom when they heard a car stop in front of
their house and later knocks on their door. Luz
Perla opened the front door and she was
confronted by Daniel who made his way inside the
house holding a
gun in his hand, despite Luz Perla’s refusal to let him
in. He seemed to be looking for something or
somebody as Daniel walked passed Luz Perla and
inspected the two opened bedrooms of the house.
He then went to the closed bedroom where
appellant was and banged at the door with his gun
while yelling 'Come out. Come out'. Appellant then
opened the door but he was greeted by Daniel's
gun which was pointed at him. Appellant
immediately closed the door while Danie;
continued banging at it. When appellant again
opened the door moments later, he was himself
armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The two at that
instant immediately grappled for each other's
firearm. A few moments later shots were heard.
Daniel fell dead on the floor. Appellant told the
police that he shot Daniel in self-defense.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Roberto may invoke self
defense in the case at bar.
RULING: When self-defense is invoked, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing
has been legally justified. Having owned the killing of
the victim, the accused should be able to prove to the
satisfaction of the court the elements of self- defense in
order that he might be able to rightly avail himself of
the extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this
burden by clear and convincing evidence. When
successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be
excused mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent
of the accused. Self-defense requires that there be (1)
an unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed
by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression,
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. All these conditions must
concur.
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of
selfdefense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and
limb of a person — not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude — but, most importantly, at the
time the defensive action was taken against the
aggressor. True, the victim barged into the house of
accused-appellant and his live-in partner and, banging
at the master bedroom door with his firearm, he yelled,
"come out." Accused-appellant, however, upon
opening the door and seeing the victim pointing a gun
at him, was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself
by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped
there. Instead, accused appellant, taking his .38 caliber
revolver, again opened the bedroom door and,
brandishing his own firearm, forthwith confronted the
victim. At this encounter, accused- appellant would be
quite hard put to still claim self-defense.
The second element of self-defense would demand that
the means employed to quell the unlawful aggression
were reasonable and necessary. The number of the
wounds sustained by the deceased in this case would
negate the existence of this indispensable component
of self-defense. It would be essential, finally, for self-
defense to be aptly invoked that there be lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. When accused- appellant, opening
the bedroom door the second time, confronted, instead
of merely taking precautionary measures against, the
victim with his own gun he had taken from the cabinet,
accusedappellant could no longer correctly argue that
there utterly was no provocation on his part.
PEOPLE v. JAURIGUE
TOPIC: Module 5: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
AND ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
DOCTRINE: Article 11 (1) of the RPC states that
anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights
do not incur any criminal liability provided that
these requisites are present: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAMERTO
NARVAEZ
FACTS: The deceased Amado had been courting TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances and
appellant Avelina Jaurigue in vain. One day, while
Absolutory Causes
Avelina was feeding a dog, Amado approached her
and spoke to her of his love which she flatly
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder
refused. He then suddenly embraced and kissed her
(qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano
and touched her breast, Avelina slapped Amado
Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and
and gave him fist blows and kicked him. Since then,
Rubia during the time the two were constructing a
she armed herself with a long fan knife whenever
fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his
she went out for self-protection. One night, Amado
house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap
climbed up the house of Avelina and entered the
when he heard sounds of construction and found fence
room where she was sleeping. He touched her
being made. He addressed the group and asked them to
forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing
stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk
her. She screamed for help which awakened her
things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit,
parents. He asked for forgiveness. A few days after
proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium,"
that incident, Avelina had heard of information that
and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia
Amada had been falsely boasting in the
who was running towards the jeep where the
neighborhood of having taken liberties with her
deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting,
person and that she even asked him to elope with
Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family)
her and if he refused to marry her she would poison
was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and
herself. At around 8:00pm the same day, Avelina
other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of
arrived at the chapel. Amado saw Avelina and went
property.
to the bench where she was sitting and sat beside
her and without saying a word, with the greatest of
At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still
impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of
pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of
his right thigh. Avelina, conscious of her personal
property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of
dignity and honor, pulled out the fan knife she had
the shooting, defendant had leased his property from
in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of
Fleisher (though case pending and ownership
punishing Amado’s offending hand. He seized her
uncertain) to avoid trouble.
right hand but she grabbed the knife with her left
hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the
On June 25, defendant received letter terminating
left side of the neck inflicting on him a mortal
contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was
wound. Jaurigue was prosecuted for the crime of
given 6 months to remove his house from the land.
murder but was found guilty of homicide. She
Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant
appealed the decision of the lower court arguing
claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
that she had acted in defense of her honor and
Court of First Instance ruled that Narvaez was guilty.
should be absolved of criminal liability.
Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Jaurigue should be
surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to
absolved of criminal liability for having acted in
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay
defense of her
for moral damages.
honor
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the lower court erred in
RULING: NO. The Court ruled that in the instant
convicting Narvaez of murder despite the fact the he
case, if she had killed Amado when he climbed up
acted in defense of his person and rights.
her house that late night and surreptitiously
entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose
RULING: YES. Narvaez admitted having shot the two
of raping her, she could have been perfectly
deceased but did so in defense of his person and of his
justified in killing him. According to the facts
property however, he cannot be exempted from
established, when the deceased sat by the side of
criminal liability because the argument of the justifying
defendant and appellant on the same bench, near
circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the
the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand
three requisites are present (unlawful aggression,
on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric
or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part
lights, and there were already several people inside
of the person defending himself). Although there was
the chapel including her own father and the barrio
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims towards
lieutenant and other dignitaries of the
Narvaez’s property rights and lack (or absence even) of
organization; and under the circumstances, there
provocation since appellant was resting, it was not a
was and there could be no possibility of her being
reasonable necessity for him to kill the two. Since not
raped. When she inflicted upon him a mortal
all requisites were present, defendant is credited with
wound which caused his death, the means
the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
employed by hear in the defense of her honor was
defense. Also, there was no direct evidence of planning
evidently excessive and under the facts and
or preparing to kill. The crime committed was homicide
circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally
and the penalty for such is reclusion temporal but due
declared completely exempt from criminal liability.
to mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
obfuscation and incomplete self-defense, penalty was
lowered to arresto mayor. Appellant has been under
detention for almost 14 years thus his immediate
release was ordered by the Court.
SABANG v. PEOPLE
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstance and
Absolutory Clauses
DOCTRINE: Unlawful aggression is a primary and
indispensable requisite without Which defense of
relative, whether complete or otherwise, cannot be
validly invoked.
FACTS: On January 17, 1997 during the fiesta in
Liloan, Ormoc City, a drunk Nicanor Butad
murmured words such as "I will shoot you" to
Randy Sabang, to the horror of Randy Sabang's
father, Nilo, and the other eyewitnesses. Moments
later, Butad himself lay dead from four gunshot
wounds on his body by Nilo Sabang using Butad’s
gun that was tucked in on his waist. Nilo Sabang
was charged and later convicted for homicide. He
admitted to the killing of Butad, but claimed that
the shooting was accidental and was done to
defend his son. On the night when the crime
happened, petitioner and Butad were drinking
together with spouses Cruz and Andresa Villamor
outside the store of Melania Sombilon. Butad was
a civilian agent with the Philippine National Police,
was then armed with a .38-caliber revolver which
was tucked in his holster.
Another witness, testified that petitioner reacted to
Butad's statement saying, "Just try to shoot my
child because I’ll never fight for him because he is a
spoiled brat."
ISSUE/S: Did Nilo Sabang act in defense of his son,
a justifying circumstance?
RULING: No. The act of Nilo Sabang is not justified.
In order to successfully claim that he acted in
defense of a relative, the accused must prove the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed
or injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) the person defending the
relative had no part in provoking the assailant,
should any provocation been given by the relative
attacked.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLANDO DAGANI y
REYES and OTELLO SANTIANO y LEONIDA
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances and
Absolutory Causes
FACTS: On 11 September 1989, Javier, Miran, and two
other individuals were having a drinking spree at the
canteen located inside the compound of Philippine
National Railways. Appellants Dagani and Santiano
went to the canteen and approached the group. Dagani
pushed Javier, causing the latter to fall from his seat.
When Dagani held Javier, Santiano shot Javier twice,
which caused the death of the latter. In their defense,
Dagani and Santiano invoked the justifying
circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance
of duty as security guards of PNR. According to the
appellants, they received an order from their superior
to go to the canteen because the group was causing
trouble. Dagani approached Javier, and the latter pulled
out his caliber revolver and attempted to fire Dagani.
However, Dagani was able to grappled the revolver
from Javier. Santiano heard a gunshot so he entered the
canteen and shot Javier. The Regional Trial Court found
the appellants guilty of the crime of Murder. The RTC
ruled that there was no unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of RTC. Hence, the case at bar.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the appellants may invoke the
justifying circumstance of self- defense.
RULING: NO. The Court ruled that the elements of self-
defense are as follows: (i) unlawful aggression; (ii)
reasonable necessity of means to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (iii) lack of provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. There is unlawful
aggression if there is an actual, sudden and unexpected
attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a
person. It must not be mere speculative. None of these
elements occurred. There was no unlawful aggression
on the part of Javier, hence the life and limb of the
appellants were not in an actual or imminent danger.
The mere fact that Dagani was able to grapple the
revolver from Javier means that the unlawful
aggression already ceased to exist. When an unlawful
aggression no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
defense has no right to kill or wound the former
aggressor.
Therefore, it was unnecessary for Santiano to kill Javier.
Further, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code states that
a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur
criminal liability. There are two (2) requisites before an
accused may invoke this defense: (i) the accused acted
in the performance of duty or in the lawful exercise of
his right or office; and (ii) the injury caused or the
offense committed should have been the necessary
consequence of such lawful exercise. These requisites
were also absent in this case. Appellants failed to prove
that they were performing their duties. Even if they
were, the death of Javier was not a necessary
consequence of the appellants’ act. Appellant Otello
Santiano y Leonida is guilty of Homicide, while Rolando
Dagani y. Reyes was acquitted.
PALAGANAS v. PEOPLE
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances and
Absolutory Causes
FACTS: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael,
were having a drinking spree in their house. They
decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke bar to
continue their drinking spree and to sing. Inside the
karaoke bar, they were having a good time, singing
and drinking beer. Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas
arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and
Virgilio Bautista. At that time, only the Ferrer
brothers were the customers in the bar.
 The two groups occupied separate tables. Later,
when Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton sang
along with him as he was familiar with the song My
Way. Jaime, however, resented this and went near
the table of the Ferrer brothers. He felt that he was
being mocked by Melton that caused him to go to
the latter’s table and uttered statements which
began the fight. Ferdinand sought help from
Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the bar and upon
seeing the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to shoot
them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton
and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As
a result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally
wounded and Michael was shot in his right
shoulder.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Rujjeric can invoke on the
ground of self- defense.
RULING: NO. Under Art. 11 (1), of the Revised Penal
Code provides for the elements and/or requisites in
order that a plea of self-defense may be validly
considered in absolving a person from criminal
liability. Anyone who acts in defense of his person
or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur: First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel
it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself. As an element of
self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an
assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent
manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual
peril. It is an act positively strong showing the
wrongful intent of the aggressor and
not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. It is also described as a
sudden and unprovoked attack of immediate and
imminent kind to the life, safety or rights of the
person attacked. There is unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim when he puts in actual or
imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the person
invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical
force or actual use of weapon. In order to constitute
unlawful aggression, the person attacked must be
confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and
the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and
actual, not merely imaginary.
In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that
justified the act of the petitioner in shooting them.
There were no actual or imminent danger to the lives of
petitioner and Ferdinand when they proceeded and
arrived at the videoke bar and saw there at the Ferrer
brothers. It appears that the Ferrer brothers then were
merely standing outside the videoke bar and were not
carrying any weapon when the petitioner arrived with
his brother Ferdinand and started firing his gun.
People (Plaintiff-Appellee) vs. Olarbe (Accused-
Appellant)
Facts: On May 2006, Olarbe and his common-law wife
were sleeping in their house in Luisiana,Laguna, when
at midnight, they were awakened by the seemingly
drunk Arca, carrying a rifle and a bolo, shouting insults
and threatening to kill them from outside their home.
Arca then forcibly entered their home and held the two
at gunpoint, but Olarbe grabbed the gun and from Arca
and fought for its possession, and the accused won the
gun and shot Arca.
However, Arca still managed to get his bolo from his
waist and attack them, until the fight had moved to the
outer portion of the house, where accused and
deceased fought again for the possession of the bolo,
which Olarbe managed to acquire, and hack Arca, and
after the killing incident, surrendered himself to the
authorities.
Olarbe was charged and convicted of the murder of
Romeo Arca on the year of 2014 by the Regional Trial
Court, and this conviction was also reaffirmed by the
Court of Appeals in 2016, and again invokes self defense
and defense of stranger in his case.
Issue: Whether or not Olarbe may be acquitted on
grounds of self-defense.
Ruling: Yes, the court rules that Olarbe may be
acquitted on grounds of self-defense, and reverses the
statements of the Regional Trial Court and Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 3 of the
Penal Code, where “Any person acting in defense of the
person or rights of the stranger, provided that the first
and second requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this article are present and that the
person defending may not be induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.”
The first and second requisites from the first paragraph
of justifying circumstances are “Unlawful Aggression”,
and “Reasonable necessity of the means provided to
prevent or repel it.” The Court held that Olarbe had
established the justifying circumstances invoked, as
Arca’s act was a culmination of consistent aggression
towards Olarbe and his common-law wife, and Olarbe’s
actions were of someone driven to protect himself and
his spouse, and repel the unlawful aggression towards
them, as the danger to their lives was imminent.
The Court’s rationale also holds in his pleas of
selfdefense and defense of stranger, that they should
not demand that he conduct himself in a rational
manner as the threat to their lives were fatally close,
and he had to respond quickly to them. Thus, pursuant
to Article 11, paragpraph 3, Olarbe was acquitted on
grounds of self-defense and defense of stranger.
2. Avoidance of greater evil
PEOPLE V. RICOHERMOSO
TOPIC: MODULE 5: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
AND ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
DOCTRINE: Avoidance of greater evil (Art. 11 (4),
RPC)
FACTS: Geminiano owned a parcel of land in that
barrio which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin.
Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about his share of
the palay harvest. He added that he should at least
be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his
land. Ricohermoso answered that Geminiano could
 go to his house anytime and he would give the
latter palay. Geminiano rejoined that he could not
get the palay that morning because he was on his
way to Barrio Bagobasin but, on his return, he
would stop at Ricohermoso's house and get the
palay.
When Geminiano returned to Barrio Tagbacan
Silañgan, he stopped at Ricohermoso's place. It was
about two o'clock in the afternoon. Geminiano sat
on a sack beside Fabiana Rosales in front of the
house while Marianito stood about three meters
behind his father. A .22 caliber rifle was slung on
Marianito's right shoulder. Ricohermoso stood
near the door of his house while Severo Padernal
was stationed near the eaves of the house.
Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about the palay.
The latter, no longer conciliatory and evidently
hostile, answered in a defiant tone: "Whatever
happens, I will not give you palay." Geminiano
remonstrated: "Why did you tell us to pass by your
house, if you were not willing to give the palay?"
At that juncture, as if by pre-arrangement,
Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo and approached
Geminiano from the left, while Severo Padernal
(Ricohermoso's father-in-law) got an axe and
approached Geminiano from the right.
The latter looked up to the sexagenarian Severo
Padernal, with both hands raised and pleaded:
"Mamay (Grandpa), why will you do this to us. We
will not fight you." While Geminiano was still
looking up to Severo Padernal on his right,
Ricohermoso walked to Geminiano's left, and,
when about one meter from him, stabbed him on
the neck with his bolo. Geminiano fell face
downward on the ground. While in that helpless
position, he was hacked on the back with an axe by
Severo Padernal.
At that same place and time, while Severo Padernal
and Ricohermoso were assaulting Geminiano de
Leon, another episode was taking place. Juan
Padernal (Ricohermoso's brother-in-law and the
son of Severo) suddenly embraced Marianito de
Leon from behind, with his right arm locked around
Marianito's neck and his left hand pressing
Marianito's left forearm. They grappled and rolled
downhill towards a camote patch. Marianito
passed out. When he regained consciousness, his
rifle was gone. He walked uphill, saw his mortally
wounded father Geminiano in his death throes, and
embraced him. He carried Geminiano for a short
distance. The fifty-one year old Geminiano died at
two o'clock on that same day.
Appellants' version is that in the afternoon of January
30, 1965, when Ricohermoso refused to give any palay
to Geminiano de Leon, because the land tilled by the
former was allegedly a public land, Geminiano
approached Ricohermoso. When Geminiano
unsheathed his bolo, Ricohermoso met him, drew his
bolo and struck Geminiano on the left side of the neck.
The latter tried to parry the blow. He was wounded in
the wrist. As Geminiano turned right to flee,
Ricohermoso struck him again on the left side of his
body, causing him to fall on the ground. Geminiano died
on the spot due to the bleeding from the wound on his
neck.
While Geminiano was being assaulted, his son
Marianito tried to shoot with his rifle but Juan Padernal
disabled him and wrested the gun. Marianito suffered
abrasions on the neck and other parts of the body.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not appellant Juan Padernal can
invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a
greater evil or injury?
RULING: No. Appellant Juan Padernal invokes the
justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or
injury (par. 4, Art. 11, Revised Penal Code) in explaining
his act of preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting
Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal. His reliance on that
justifying circumstance is erroneous. The act of Juan
Padernal in preventing Marianito de Leon from
shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, who were
the aggressors, was designed to insure the killing of
Geminiano de Leon without any risk to his assailants.
Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought
to disable Marianito. Padernal's malicious intention was
to forestall any interference in the felonious assault
made by his father and brother-in-law on Geminiano.
That situation is unarguably not the case envisaged in
paragraph 4 of article 11.
Juan Padernal's role of weakening the defense, by
disabling Marianito de Leon, was part and parcel of the
means of execution deliberately resorted to by the
assailants to insure the assassination of Geminiano de
Leon without any risk to themselves (Par. 16, Article 14,
Revised Penal Code). Inasmuch as Juan Padernal did not
touch upon the lesiones leves case in his brief, he, like
his father Severo, seems to have acquiesced in the
correctness of the trial court's decision.
PEOPLE vs. NORMA HERNANDEZ
TOPIC: Avoidance of greater evil (Art. 11 par.4, RPC)
DOCTRINE: Any person who, in order to avoid an
evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to
another, provided that the following requisites are
present: First. That the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists; Second. That the injury feared be
greater than that done to avoid it; Third. That there
be no other practical and less harmful means
ofpreventing it.
FACTS: Vivencio Lascano, and Maria Norma
Hernandez are in a relationship. The two talked
about getting married. Vivencio’s parents went to
the house of Norma to have a “pamamanhikan”.
They brought chickens and goats. The marriage was
set on March 19, 1955. The preparation went on
but on the day of wedding, Norma did not show up,
causing Vivencio and his family great shame and
humiliation. Norma Hernandez confessed that she
was not really in love with him, and that she
accepted the proposal because she was convinced
by her parents. That she decided to leave home as
last recourse to prevent the marriage. Norma’s
parents also corroborated her testimony. RTC
 convicted her of serious slander by deed because
she purposely and deliberately fled to prevent
celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not respondent Hernandez
should be convicted.
RULING: No .The court reversed the RTC judgment
and acquitted the appellant. A party to an
agreement to marry who backs out cannot be held
liable for the crime of slander by deed, for then that
would be an inherent way of compelling said party
to go into a marriage without his or her free
consent, and this would contravene the principle in
law that what could not be done directly could not
be done indirectly; and said party has the right to
avoid to himself or herself the evil of going through
a loveless marriage pursuant to Article 11,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. One of the
essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven.
There is no malice in the act of the appellant
changing her mind. She was merely exercising her
right not to give her consent to the marriage after
mature consideration. Appellant had the right to
avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless
marriage.
3. Fulfillment of duty
PEOPLE v DELIMA
TOPIC: MODULE 5: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
AND ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
DOCTRINE: Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The
following do not incur any criminal liability: (6) Any
person who acts in the fulfilment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office.
FACTS:
The victim in this case was serving his sentence
when he escaped from the jail. Defendant Delima,
a policeman who was looking for him, saw the
victim in the house of Jorge Alegria and demanded
him to surrender. Armed with a pointed piece of
bamboo in the shape of a lance, the victim attacked
the defendant with a stroke of his lance. The latter
was able to dodge it and in return, fired his revolver
but missed. The victim ran away holding his
weapon, the defendant went after him and fired
again his revolver, this time hitting and killing the
victim. Delima was convicted for homicide.
ISSUE/S: Whether the accused can be convicted of
homicide
RULING: No, the defendant cannot be held criminally
liable for the death of the fugitive since the killing was
done in the performance of his duty as a police officer.
The victim was obliged to submit himself to the
authority and had no right to evade the service of his
sentence. Notwithstanding the fact that he tried to
assault the defendant while ordered to surrender, the
means employed by the defendant were justified by the
circumstances.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. IGNACIO LAGATA, DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT.
Facts: The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of
Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners (Jesus,
Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to
work in the capitol plaza of Samar. Lagata ordered the
prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long
afterwards, they were called to assemble. Epifanio
Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining
prisoners to go look for him. Eusebio Abria said that
while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He
was wounded by the 2nd one. They were already
assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see
Tipace being shot. He said he ran away because he was
afraid that he might be shot again and that his
companions were also probably scared and that is why
they ran.
Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio
Labong did not answer their call so Ignacio Lagata
ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He said that
Abria went to the camote plantation and found
footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the
footprints. When Abria told Lagata of the flattened
grass and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio
Lagata fired at him and he was hit on his left arm. Abria
told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told
them to assemble. Once they were assembled, Lagata
cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said
that when he saw Tipace was shot, he ran away because
he also could have been shot.
Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good
treatment from Lagata though his testimony
corroborated those of the other prisoners.
Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital &
Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division president, verified
the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace
resulted therein. Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he
fired his gun because the prisoners were running far
from him when he already ordered them to stop. He
said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner
escaped under his custody. Furthermore, he would be
discharged from duty like the others. He was hopeless
already.
HELD: Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for
homicide and serious physical injuries. Appellant was
entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of
incomplete justifying circumstance.
RATIO: It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason
to fire at Tipace. The record does not show that Tipace
was bent on committing any act of aggression or that
he attempted to escape. According to Lagata himself,
Tipace was running towards and around him. How
could anyone intending to escape run towards and
around the very guard one was supposed to escape
from? Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in
the performance of his duties, the circumstances show
that there was no necessity for him to fire directly
against the prisoners as to wound them seriously and
even kill one of them. While custodians should take
care for prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE
NECESSITY would authorize them to fire against them.

RUFINO S. MAMANGUN v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances and
Absolutory Causes
DOCTRINE: The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised Penal
Code may be invoked only after the defense
successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or
offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.
FACTS:
On the evening of July 31, 1992, someone was heard
shouting, " Magnanakaw . .. Magnanakaw." Several
residents responded and chased the suspect who
proceeded to the rooftop of a house. With the
homeowner’s permission, petitioner PO2 Rufino S.
Mamangun and his crew went to the rooftop where
they saw a man whom they thought was the robbery
suspect. At that instance, petitioner Mamangun fired
his handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out
to be Gener Contreras who was not the robbery
suspect. Contreras died from the gunshot wound.
ISSUE/S: Whether petitioner may invoke the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph
5, Article II, of the Revised Penal Code
RULING: No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment
of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised
Penal Code may not be invoked by petitioner. The first
requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a police
officer, was responding to a robbery-holdup incident.
His presence at the site of the crime was in accordance
with the performance of his duty.
However, there was no reason for the petitioner to
shoot Contreras. Petitioner could have first fired a
warning shot before pulling the trigger against
Contreras who was one of the residents chasing the
suspected robber. Hence, the shooting and ultimate
death of Contreras was not a necessary consequence of
the due performance of his duty as a policeman. IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in
all respects. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLANDO DAGANI y
REYES and OTELLO SANTIANO Y LEONIDA
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances and
Absolutory Causes
DOCTRINE: 1. To invoke self-defense successfully, there
must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack
that endangered the life of the accused, who was then
forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by
employing reasonable means to resist the attack. 2. In
the defense of fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office, these requisites must be
present 1) the accused must have acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense
committed should have been the necessary
consequence of such lawful exercise.
FACTS: At 4:45pm Javier, Miran and other two
individuals were drinking at the canteen located inside
the compound of the PNR. Appellants Rolando Dagani
and Otello Santiano, security officers of PNR entered
the canteen and approached the group. Appellant
Dagani shoved Miran, causing the latter to fall from his
chair. Dagani then held Javier while Santiano shot Javier
twice at his left side, killing the latter. Appellants
invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and
lawful performance of official duty as PNR security
officers. RTC found both Dagani and Santiano guilty of
the crime of murder. The appellants appealed to the CA
and argued that the lower court erred in not
appreciating self-defense on the part of the accused
and that they were in lawful performance of an official
duty. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the justifying circumstance of
selfdefense existed in this case at bar. 2. Whether or not
the justifying circumstance of lawful performance of
official duty existed in this case at bar.
RULING:
1. No, self-defense was not present in this case
since not all the requisites constituting self-
defense were present. Self-defense requires that
there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the person
injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. All these conditions must
concur.
To invoke self-defense successfully, there must
have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that
endangered the life of the accused, who was then
forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant
by employing reasonable means to resist the
attack. After the victim had been thrown off-
balance, there was no longer any unlawful
aggression that would have necessitated the act of
killing. The number of gunshot wounds sustained
by the victim went beyond the call of self-
preservation since it was still inflicted after the
unlawful aggression had already ceased.
2. No, they were not in the lawful performance of
their official duty. In the defense of fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office,
these requisites must be present 1) the accused
must have acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the
injury caused or the offense committed should
have been the necessary consequence of such
lawful exercise. These requisites are absent in the
instant case since the defense failed to prove that
they were on official duty at the time of the
incident and that the injury inflicted upon him
cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of
appellants' due performance of an official duty. The
Court modified the decision finding the accused-
appellants guilty of homicide.
4. Obedience to a lawful order of a superior
PEOPLE v. BERONILLA
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances and
Absolutory Causes
DOCTRINE: Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent.
FACTS: Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz,
Abra, but had to flee to Bangued because of an attempt
upon his life by unknown persons. On December 18,
1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed
Military Mayor of La Paz. Simultaneous with his
appointment, a memorandum was issued authorizing
all Military Mayors to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to
try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding
and abetting the enemy. Another memorandum was
issued instructing them to investigate and gather
against complaints from people of the municipality with
the enemy the given list of puppet officials (which
included Borjal, puppet Mayor of La Paz).
Pursuant to his instructions, Beronilla placed Borjal
under custody when the latter returned to the
municipality and asked the residents of La Paz to file
complaints against him. In no time, charges of
espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority
were filed against Borjal. A 12-man jury was
subsequently appointed by Beronilla which found Borjal
guilty on all counts and imposed upon him the death
penalty. On the night of the same day, Beronilla ordered
the execution of Borjal.
Two years hereafter, Beronilla et. al. were indicted in
the Court of First Instance for murder, for allegedly
conspiring and confederating the execution of Arsenio
Borjal. Beronilla et. al. appealed to the decision of the
lower court convicting them of the crime of murder.
They claim that the arrest, prosecution, and trial of
Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of superior
officers.
ISSUE/S: WON accused appellants are criminally liable
RULING: NO. It appearing that the charge is the heinous
crime of murder, and that the accused- appellants acted
upon orders, of a superior officer that they, as military
subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good
faith, without being aware of their illegality, without
any fault or negligence on their part, we can say that
criminal intent has been established.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain
crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to
duty or to consequences, as in law, is equivalent to
criminal intent. The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi
mens rea – a crime is not committed if the mind of the
person performing the act complained of be innocent.
Judgment is REVERSED. Accused-appellants are
ACQUITTED.
TABUENA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances And
Absolutory Causes : Obedience to a lawful order of a
superior (Art. 11 (6), RPC)
DOCTRINE: Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea—a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.
FACTS: Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta were
convicted of malversating under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. Tabuena and Peralta were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having malversed the
total amount of P55 Million of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their incumbency
as General Manager and Acting Finance Services
Manager, respectively, of MIAA. President Marcos
instructed Tabuena over the phone and through a
written memorandum dated January 8, 1986 to pay
directly to the president’s office and in cash what the
MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC).
In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction
and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Dabao
and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA
funds by means of three withdrawals. It was only upon
delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez, the private
secretary of Pres. Marcos issued a receipt for all the
amounts she received from Tabuena.
The defense of Tabuena and Peralta was that they acted
in good faith. Tabuena acting in compliance with the
MARCOS memorandum while Peralta with the same
belief as Tabuena regarding the instructions set forth in
the memorandum, heeded his superior Tabuena’s
request to help release the P5 Million. Sandiganbayan
rejected the petitioners’ claims of good faith.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of the
crime of malversation?
RULING: No. Tabuena and Peralta are not guilty of
malversation. Tabuena had no other choice but to make
the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be
faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the
presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is
something easier said than done. Marcos was
undeniably Tabuena’s superior— the former being then
the President of the Republic who unquestionably
exercised control over government agencies such as the
MIAA and PNCC.
In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving
inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such
as, for instance, directing payment of liability of one
entity to another and the manner in which it should be
carried out. And as a recipient of such a directive
coming from the highest official of the land no less,
good faith should be read on Tabuena’s compliance,
without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS
Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the
justifying circumstance of “Any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose.” The subordinate
superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is
clear. The same premise applies with the case of
Peralta, who acted in good faith when he, upon the
directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal
of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the MIAA funds.
Wherefore, the court ruled that Luis A. Tabuena and
Adolfo M. Peralta are acquitted from the crime of
malversation.
B. Exempting Circumstances
1. Insanity
PEOPLE V. TANEO
TOPICS: Criminal Law, Somnambulism, Sleep Walking,
Legal Medicine
FACTS: Potenciano Tadeo lived with his wife in his
parent’s house. In January 1932, a fiesta was being
celebrated, and visitors were entertained in the house
including Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that
afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while
sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand
and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he
wounded her in the abdomen. Taneo attacked Tanner
and Malinao and tried to attack his father after which
he wounded himself. Potenciano’s wife who was then
seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result
of her wound, and also the foetus which was
asphyxiated in the mother’s womb.
Taneo was charged with parricide. From this sentence,
the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the
commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel
over a glass of “tuba” with Enrique Collantes and
Valentin Abadilla. On the day of the commission of the
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and
weak, and early in the afternoon he had severe
stomachache. The defendant states that when he fell
asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab
him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason
of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his
enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed
himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he
met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was
wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really
wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his
enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked
everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not
have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her
dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and
Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
ISSUE: Whether or not Taneo is criminally liable.
RULING: No. The Court concluded that the defendant
acted while in a dream. His acts were not voluntary in
the sense of entailing criminal liability.
The Court took the special circumstances of the case, in
which the victim was the defendant’s own wife whom
he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact
that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in
whose house and under whose protection he lived,
besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests,
whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the
evidence presented, the Court found not only a lack of
motive for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts
complained of, but also motives for not committing said
acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of
the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering
the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted
while in a dream, under the influence of a hallucination
and not in his right mind.
The Court found that the defendant is not criminally
liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is
ordered that he be confined in the Government insane
asylum, whence he shall not be released until the
director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer
constitute a menace.
PEOPLE V. BONOAN
Imbecility
Facts:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the
City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then decided
purposely to kill one Carlos Guison and stab him on the
different parts of his body with a knife which caused his
death three days afterwards.. Celestino Bonoan is
charged with the crime of murder. An arraignment was
then called, but the defense objected on the ground
that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at
the time confined at the Psychopatic Hospital. After
several months of summons for doctors, production of
the defendant’s complete record of mental condition
from the hospital and defendant’s admission to the
hospital for personal observation, assistant alienist Dr.
Jose Fernandez finally reported to the court that
Bonoan may be discharged for being a “recovered
case”. After trial, the lower court found Bonoan guilty
and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court
made errors in finding Bonoan suffered dementia only
occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind
of abnormality, that the defense did not establish the
defendant’s insanity and finding accused guilty.
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in finding the
accused guilty
Held: Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the
time he perpetrated the crime, which consequently
exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his
confinement in San Lazaro Hospital or other hospital for
the insane. This ruling was based on the following
evidence:
1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in
the insane department of San Lazaro Hospital and
diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the
commission of the offense and recurrence of ailments
were not entirely lacking of scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from
legal responsibility because they have no control of
their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to
manic depression psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to
dementia praecox, four days prior to act according to
Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same
day of crime and arrest, indicating the police’s doubt of
his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis
according to Dr. Joson
Dissenting (Justices Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion):
1. The dissenting opinions pose that the accused
committed the crime when he was sane, or at least,
during a lucid interval.
2. The legal presumption is always in favor of sanity; no
positive evidence of accused mental state was
established
3. Based on expert testimonies, accused was cured of
dementia praecox and later manic depressive psychosis
4. Based on observance of arresting officer Damaso
Arnoco, corrobating statement of Benjamin Cruz, and
other witnesses, accused appear sane at the time
immediately after commission
5. There is a motive of aggression on part of accused is real
and positive fact: deceased’s failure to pay
borrowed money
PEOPLE V FORMIGONES
FACTS: From November to December 1946, defendant
Abelardo Formigones together with his wife Julia
Agricola, and his five children lived in the house of his
half-brother, Zacarias Formigones to find employment
as harvesters. One afternoon, the accused, without any
previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his
bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife at
the back, the blade penetrating the right lung which
latter caused her death. When she fall on the ground
the defendant carried her up the house, laid her on the
floor of the living room and then lay down beside her.
He was convicted of parricide and was sentenced to
prison. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. His
counsel presented testimonies of two guards of the
provincial jail where defendant was confined. They said
that he behaved like an insane person, that sometimes
he would remove his clothes in front of others, would
not take a bath, and remained silent and indifferent to
his surroundings. His counsel claimed that e is an
imbecile therefore exempt from criminal liability. Dr.
Francisco Gomez told that Abelardo was suffering only
from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he
could distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile so as to
be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of
the will at the time of committing the crime.
ISSUE: WON the defendant who is suffering from
feeblemindedness is exempt from criminal liability.
HELD: No. In order that an exempting circumstance may
be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that
there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts
without the least discernment; that there be a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. As to the strange
behaviour of the accused during his confinement,
assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity,
it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or
eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by
remorse at having killed his wife. He could distinguish
right from wrong.
PEOPLE V. PUNO
The accused are were charged with kidnapping for
ransom, the accused pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment. September 26, 1990 they were sentenced
of being guilty of robbery with extortion committed on
a highway, the said act was punishable under the PD No.
532 and was sentenced to jail to a term of reclusion
perpetua. They were also asked to pay the actual
damages. Mrs. Maria Socorro MutucSarmiento
(Sarmiento) an owner of a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue,
Quezon city. In January 13, 1988 the accused Isabelo
Puno (Beloy) is the personal driver of Sarmiento’s
husband who is in Davao, Beloy said that he would be
the one to substitute for the real driver of Sarmiento
because of the an emergency. Sarmiento was heading
back to her home in Valle Verde Pasig, with Beloy as her
driver and when they are in a corner of Araneta Avenue,
Beloy stopped which allowed Enrique Puno (Enry) to
enter the said car. Enry went to where Sarmiento was
seated and pointed a gun towards Sarmiento and said
“Ma’a,m you know, I want to get money from you”. In
response Sarmiento said that she has money
(amounting to P 7,000) inside her bag and get it so that
they can let her go. Furthermore, Beloy and Enry
demanded that they still want P100,000 more
Sarmiento agreed with them and asked them to drop
her off at a gas station near Kamagong St. Makati When
they are in the area of Sta. Mesa, Sarmiento is holding
to her rosary while Enry’s gun was pointing at her neck.
They went towards the North superhighway. Beloy
demanded Sarmiento to issue a check for the said
amount, Sarmiento did comply and issued a check in
three denomination two for 30 thousand and one for 40
thousand pesos. Beloy changed his mind going back to
Metro Manila but did not continue. Sarmiento jumped
out of the car then crossed the superhighway and hailed
a van, Sarmiento’s dress had blood because she fell
down on the ground and was injured when she jumped
out of the car. The statement above was contradicting
to the statement of the accused, they allegedly stopped
north bound and they let Sarmiento to step out of the
car and waited for her to get a ride. She fell down when
she stubbed her toe while crossing the highway.
Issues: W/N the accused-appellants committed the
felony of kidnapping for ransom under article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Rationale/Doctrines: WHEREFORE, the assailed
judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered CONVICTING
accusedappellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and
Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in
Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of
the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them
an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and
severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M.
Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual
damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with
costs.
The trial court cohered with the submission of the
defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for
ransom as charged in the information. We likewise
agree.
there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any
motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed
the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the
extortion of money from her under the compulsion of
threats or intimidation
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-avis
the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can
rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that
for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof
that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive
the offended party of her
liberty
That appellants in this case had no intention
whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her
personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably
confessional testimony of appellant Puno: o
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came
to my mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other
place along the way we might be apprehended by the
police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her
"Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out
of the car." 16
In relation to the topic of General and Specific Intent
There is no general intent in the case for the said felony
committed by the accused is not committed by dolus, in
other words the accused does not have any malice
intent to injure Sarmiento. But however there is a
specific intent coming from the accused because of the
fact that they only want to get money from Sarmiento
for their needs (to cure the ulcer) so as to the specific
intent, they have the intent to gain.
PEOPLE V. DUNGO
FACTS: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm,
the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office at the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga.
After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the
envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua
several times. After which he departed from the office
with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed
weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the victim
sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal.
The accused, in defense of him, tried to show that he
was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea
Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her, her
husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when
he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in
December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia
and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his
two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival,
he underwent medical treatment. He was confined for
one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his
monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not
able to resume his farming. Two weeks prior to March
16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep
thought always; maltreating their children when he was
not used to it before; demanding another payment
from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing
any child when their children quarreled with other
children. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When
Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer
there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind.
She looked for him. She returned home only when she
was informed that her husband had arrived. While on
her way home, she heard from people the words
"mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as
"stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in
her parents-in-law's house with people milling around,
including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked
her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "That
is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my
heart." Her husband further said that if he would not be
able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die,
and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The
testimony on the statements of her husband was
corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who
heard their conversation. Turning to the barangay
official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you
surrender me." However, the barangay official did not
bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the
accused went to Manila.
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the
National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per
order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on
August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff,
they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or
insane long before, during and after the commission of
the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified
under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-
vascular accident or stroke.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was insane during
the commission of the crime charged.
RULING: No. For insanity to relieve the person of
criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that
he acts without or the least discernment and that there
be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of
the will.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the
commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held
criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the
product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order
that insanity may relieve a person from criminal
responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is,
that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts
without the least discernment; that there is complete
absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.
(People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is
no definite defined border between sanity and insanity.
Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria
in determining the existence of insanity, namely:
delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and
wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false
belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which
would be incredible under the given circumstances to
the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the
delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of
things, the existence of which no rational person would
believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse
when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost
the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid
the act in question, his free agency being at the time
destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is
insane when he suffers from such perverted condition
of the mental and moral faculties as to render him
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong.
Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or
criterion for insanity. However, the definition of insanity
under Sec 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code can
be applied. In essence, it states that insanity is evinced
by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties, which is manifested in language or conduct.
An insane person has no full and clear understanding of
the nature and consequence of his act.
Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition
at the very time of doing the act. However, it is also
permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition
for a reasonable period before and after the time of the
act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be
known by outward acts.
It is not usual for an insane person to confront
a specified person who may have wronged him. But in
the case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs. Sigua.
From this, it can be inferred that the accused was aware
of his acts. This also established that the accused has
lucid intervals. Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the
effect that the appellant could have been aware of the
nature of his act at the time he committed it when he
shouted (during laboratory examination) that he killed
Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful that
the accused was insane when he committed the act.
The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope
where he hid the fatal weapon, that he ran away from
the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim
several times, that he fled to Manila to evade arrest,
indicate that he was conscious and knew the
consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. POLICARPIO RAFANAN
On the eve of March 16, 1976 and upon closing the
store, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. allegedly raped Estelita
Ronaya, a househelper who was hired by the former’s
mother named Ines Rafanan and who, at the time of
criminal action, was fourteen years old. Ronaya, the
complainant, narrates the sexual assault committed to
her by Rafanan, the accused, that should she
complained and resisted the proposed sexual
intercourse and if anyone will know of the event, the
accused threatened her life by pointing out his 1 ½ inch-
size bolo on her throat. However, the said sexual assault
was subsequently known by both the family of Rafanan
and the mother of Ronaya. This prompted to an
arraignment in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
wherein the accused was convicted of the crime of rape
and sentenced reclusion perpetua and a fine of
₱10,000.00 for moral damages. The accused, however,
pleaded not guilty. On his appeal, Rafanan, now
appellant, raised errors for the judgment decided by the
lower court on the ground that at the time of the
alleged rape, he was suffering insanity brought by
schizophrenia. The appeal in the Trial Court was later
suspended and the appellant was ordered to be
confined in the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong for observation and treatment until
1978.
ISSUE: Whether the mental aberration of the appellant
characterized by schizophrenia is a valid defense for
insanity and can be qualified as exempting circumstance
from criminal liability afforded by the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines, Article 12.
RULING: No. Schizophrenia, in this case, is not a valid
defense for insanity to be qualified as an exempting
circumstance to criminal liabilities because the said
illness does not completely deprive the offender of a
crime of his consciousness of his acts. To understand
insanity in the context provided by the Revised Penal
Code, Article 12, Judge Guevarra on his commentary
cited the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain against a
similar case, People v. Formigiones, where it is held that
In order that insanity as an exempting circumstance
may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act.
In the case at bar, the fact that appellant Rafanan
threatened complainant Ronaya with death should she
reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him,
indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was
aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that
assault. Hence, Rafanan is not absolutely deprived by
his intelligence or freedom of will. In a similar case
People v. Puno, schizophrenia can be credited to as a
mitigating circumstance defined by Article 13, par. 9 of
the Revised Penal Code which states
Such illness of the offender as would diminish the
exercise of the will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.
Though it is indeed a mitigating circumstance, Article 63
of the same Code shall remain to apply,
In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the deed.
Therefore, Rafanan is still guilty of the crime of rape
sentenced with reclusion perpetua and charged with
fine for moral damages which is then increased to
₱30,000.00.
PEOPLE V MADARANG
Appellant was convicted of parricide for stabbing his
wife, causing her death. Appellant alleges he was in a
state of insanity and claims he had no recollection of
the stabbing incident.He insists that he was deprived of
intelligence , making his act involuntary.His psychiatric
evaluation revealed he was suffering from
schizophrenia but after two years in the National
Center for Mental Health his condition improved thus,
he was released.
Held:
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more
stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act,i.e., the accused is
deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of
the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation
of the will.Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability.The issue of insanity is a
question of fact.The state or condition of a man’s mind
can only be measured and judged by his
behavior.Establishing one’s insanity requires testimony
of an expert witness, such as a psychiatrist.The proof
must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with
the commisssion of the offense with which he is
charged.None of the witnesses declared that he
exhibited any of the symptoms associated with
schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous
with the stabbing incident.Also schizophrenics have
lucid intervals during which they are capable of
distinguishing right from wrong.
PEOPLE v. MELECIO ROBIÑOS Y DOMINGO, GR No.
138453, 2002-05-29
Facts: Finding Melecio Robiños y Domingo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing
him to death.
Fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños was in his parents'
house at Barangay San Isidro in Camiling, Tarlac. While
Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his parents, appellant
Melecio Robiños and the victim Lorenza Robiños, who
were at the sala, quarrelling.
Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you
come home, why don't you just leave?' After hearing
what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about
five meters, saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife,
stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from
where Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor.
Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim Lorenza
Robiños went to his mother's house for the purpose of
informing his relatives that on the evening of March 24,
1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robiños,
at Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at
his mother's house, he received the more distressing
news that his own sister Lorenza had been killed by
appellant.
Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, 'It's good
you would see how your sister died.'
The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some
barangay officials and barangay folk, proceeded to the
scene of the crime where they saw blood dripping from
the house of appellant and Lorenza. The police told
appellant to come out of the house. When appellant
failed to come out, the police, with the help of barangay
officials, detached the bamboo wall from the part of the
house where blood was dripping. The removal of the
wall exposed that section of the house where SPO1
Lugo saw appellant embracing [his] wife.
Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor.
Appellant, who was lying on his side and holding a
bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand,
was embracing his wife. He was uttering the words, 'I
will kill myself, I will kill myself.'
The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months
pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the different
parts of her body.
'That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the
influence of liquor/drunk [who] came home and
argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got
irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered forty one (41)
stab blows
Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant
interposed insanity.
Issues: RTC erred in imposing the death penalty on
appellant
Ruling: It nonetheless erred in imposing the death
penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty
without considering the presence or the absence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The
imposition of... the capital penalty was not only
baseless, but contrary to the rules on the application of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code.
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be
imposed on him should be that for the graver offense
which parricide is. This is in accordance with the
mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
which... states: "When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is
mandated to impose one or the other, depending on
the presence or... the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.
The rules with respect to the application of a penalty
consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent
portion of which is quoted as... follows:
"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser
penalty shall be applied."
Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital
crime per se, it is not always punishable with death.
The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death -- two indivisible penalties, the
application of either one of which depends on the...
presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.
Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances were... established in this case, the
imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua
Principles: The law on parricide, as amended by RA
7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death.
When the penalty provided by law is either of two
indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall
be imposed.
PEOPLE V. OPURAN
Accused Anacito Opuran stabbed Allan Dacles. After
more than an hour and a half, Demetrio Patrimonio was
seen walking on the National Highway of Catbalogan
Samara but was later stabbed by the accused as he
emerged from where he was hiding. The accusations
were denied by the accused, claiming that he was never
out that night when the crime happened and that he
was only resting in his house when policemen came to
arrest him. Dr. Lyn Verona testified that she examined
the accused 3 times through interviews and confirmed
her medical findings that the accused was psychotic
before and during the commission of the offense
and even up to the present, that the accused was
suffering schizophrenia. However, when the trial court
still held Opuran guilty of murder and homicide, he
contends that he was suffering from a psychotic
disorder and was therefore, completely derived of
intelligence when he stabbed the victims.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused Anacito Opuran
can use the exempting circumstance of insanity as a
defense.
RULING: No. Insanity must exist immediately before or
during the moment of the commission of the act.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden of proving it however, the
accused failed to prove that he was insane at the
precise moment or before the commission of the
offense. Although the accused has defense
testimonies that he was brought to the National
Center for Mental Health due to difficulty of sleeping
and talking irrelevantly, that he was prescribed
thorazine and evadyne, it should be noted that there
was no proof that Anacito needed the medicine during
the period where he ran out of stock
SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA v. PEOPLE, GR No.
216021, 2016-03-02
Facts: On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father
Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together
with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report
that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation
pump.[7]After a confrontation with Verdadero at the
police station, the three men made their way home on
a tricycle but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard
intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded
towards a store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed
inside the tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw
Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the
shouts of Ronnie.[8]Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the
left side of the latter's upper back with the use of a
Rambo knife. He again struck Romeo's upper back, just
below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his
father but Verdadero attempted to attack him as well.
He defended himself using a small stool, which he used
to hit Verdadero in the chest.
Issues: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF
THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
Ruling: To completely evade culpability, Verdadero
raises insanity as a defense claiming that he had
suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12
of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt
from criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during
a lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility
must be clearly proved for there is a presumption that
the acts penalized by law are voluntary.[18]In the case
at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999,
Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric Department
of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with
depression in 2001; (3) he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in
the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a relapse;
(5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time
of his first confinement in 1999 until the stabbing
incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a
relapse on March 20, 2009.Thus, it is without question
that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only
thing left to be ascertained is whether he should be
absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because
of his mental state.
Principles:
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between
fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. A showing that an accused
is suffering from a mental disorder, however, does not
automatically exonerate him from the consequences of
his act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability.
PEOPLE VS. GENOSA
Criminal Law | Battered Woman Syndrome as
SelfDefense | Treachery as a Qualifying Circumstance
FACTS: Appellant was married to the victim Ben
Genosa. In their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben
lived happily but soon thereafter, the couple would
quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
Ben, a habitual drinker, became cruel to Marivic; he
would provoke her, slap her, pin her down on the bed
or beat her. These incidents happened several times
and Marivic would often run home to her parents. She
had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but
Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile.
On the night of the killing, appellant, who was then
eight months pregnant, and the victim quarreled. The
latter beat her, however, she was able to run to another
room. Allegedly there was no provocation on her part
when she got home that night, and it was her husband
who began the provocation. Frightened that her
husband would hurt her and wanting to make sure she
would deliver her baby safely, appellant admitted
having killed the victim, who was then sleeping at the
time, with the use of a gun. She was convicted of the
crime of parricide. Experts opined that Marivic fits the
profile of a battered woman syndrome and at the time
she killed her husband, her mental condition was that
she was re-experiencing the trauma, together with the
imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the
past.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the
Battered Woman Syndrome as constituting
selfdefense;
2.) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
RULING: No, the Court ruled in the negative on both
issues.
1.) The Court held that the defense failed to establish all
the elements of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome, to wit: (a) each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized
at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimate partner; (b) the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear
of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her
life; and (c) at the time of the killing, the batterer must
have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and
actual – grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of
these were duly established. Here, there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. In fact,
she had already been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. The
attack had apparently ceased and the reality or even
imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. Ben was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
2.) The Court ruled that when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased
may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in
order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously
and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
Here, there is no showing that appellant intentionally
chose a specific means of successfully attacking her
husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory
act that he might make. It appears that the thought of
using the gun occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse.
Thus, in the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by
which she committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, the Court resolved the doubt in her favor.
MARIA DIORY F. RABAJANTE, THE PRIVILEGE OF BEING
INSANE: AN EXAMINATION OF, AND A SANER
ALTERNATIVE TO THE INSANE RULE ON INSANITY
DEFENSE
2. Minority
PEOPLE V. DOQUEÑA
ORTEGA VS. PEOPLE
Facts: At the time of commission of rape, the accused
was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The case was
pending when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted amending among others
the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9
to 15 years old. At the time of the promulgation of
judgment, the accused already reached the age of
majority.
Issue: Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in the
resolution of the case.
Held: The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A.
9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the
age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9
to 15 years old, this law is evidently favorable to the
accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of
the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly
proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's
own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother.
Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any
of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA.
Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission
of the crime, was below 15 years of age.
Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal
liability.
PEOPLE V. MANTALABA
Facts: Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report that
Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After
a buy-bust operation, two informations was filed
against Mantalaba which was later on consolidated.
Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.
RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to death and
fine of 500k for selling shabu and (2) for illegally
possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in
application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and
8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the
present appeal.
Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting
him and that there was no evidence of actual sale
between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust
operation. He also claims that the chain of custody of
the seized shabu was not established.
Issue: Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking
and possession.
Ruling:The petition is without merit.
The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the
following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefore. From the
above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well
established that the elements have been satisfactorily
met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly
identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the
marked money used, were also satisfactorily
presented. The testimony was also clear as to the
manner in which the buy-bust operation was
conducted.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team
with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable
ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.
Its non-compliance will not render an accused arrest
illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.
As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the
buy-bust operation but was of legal age during the
promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA
9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's
decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend
the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and
Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in
People vs Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be
applied but NOT when the offender upon the
promulgation of judgment is 21 yrs old. or older.
Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension
of sentence is already moot and academic.
But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated
Mantalaba's minority as privileged mitigating
circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the
rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is
reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority having been appreciated.
Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision
mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from
the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being
no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating
circumstance.
DORADO V. PEOPLE
Doctrine: R.A. No. 9344 provides that those minors
above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted
from criminal responsibility. Discernment is the mental
capacity of a person to understand the difference
between right and wrong. The basic reason behind the
exempting circumstance is the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is
an essential element of a felony.
FACTS: Petitioner Jerwin Dorado, a 16-year-old minor,
and his friends, Jeffrey Confessor and Jayson Cabiaso
threw stones at Ronald Bonion, Raniel Parino, Delon
Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain Erwin
along A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig on April 15,
2004, which led the Ronald’s group to hide inside the
“talipapa.” When they thought that their attackers
were gone, they came out of hiding but found that
Dorado, who was carrying a makeshift shotgun called
“sumpak”, and his friends were waiting for them and
resumed throwing stones. During the commotion,
Dorado fired his “sumpak” and hit Ronald between the
eyes. Ronald fell unconscious and was rushed to a
hospital while Dorado’s group ran away.
Dorado raised the defenses of alibi and denial by
presenting witnesses that he was at home watching
television with his siblings and mother at the time of the
incident. In addition, no “sumpak” was taken from his
house. A witness also testified that she saw the incident
and told the court that she could not recognize the
assailant but she was certain it was not Dorado.
The Regional Trial Court found petitioner Dorado guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of frustrated
murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. Despite of Dorado’s minority at the time of the
commission of the crime, he was no longer entitled to a
suspension of sentence because he was above twenty-
one (21) years old at the time of the pronouncement of
guilt. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
decision and did not give weight to the petitioner’s
defense. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court
(SC) seeking to reverse the Decisions of the lower
courts.
Dorado was a 16-year old minor at the time of the
commission of the crime on March 15, 2004. For said
reason, he is benefitted from the provisions of R.A. No.
9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
as amended. Even though the said law was enacted on
April 28, 2006, the same must still be retroactively
applied for the benefit of Dorado. (Penal laws which are
favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect)
Consequently, R.A. No. 9344 provides that only those
minors above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age who acted with discernment shall not
be exempted from criminal responsibility. In this case,
there was no discussion at all on whether Dorado acted
with discernment when he committed the crime
imputed against him. Nevertheless, the said child does
not immediately proceed to trial. Instead, he or she may
undergo a diversion, which refers to an alternative,
childappropriate process of determining the
responsibility and treatment of the child in-conflict of
law (CICL) without resorting to formal court
proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the
other grounds provided by law are present, then the
CICL shall undergo the appropriate preliminary
investigation of his or her criminal case, and trial before
the courts may proceed.
Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall not immediately execute its judgment;
rather, it shall place the CICL under suspended
sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age
or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her
guilt. During the suspension, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the SC
rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. If the
disposition measures are successful, then the court
shall discharge the CICL. Conversely, if unsuccessful,
then the court has the following options: (1) to
discharge the child, (2) to order execution of sentence,
or (3) to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years.
Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado
intended to do away with Ronald. Discernment is
different from intent. While both are products of the
mental processes within a person, the former refers to
the desire of one’s act while the latter relate to the
moral significance that person ascribes to the said act.
He may negligently shoot his friend, thus, did not intend
to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the
undesirable result of his negligence.
In this case, the Prosecution did not determine the
discernment of Dorado at the time of the commission
of the crime. Considering that there was no
determination of discernment by the trial court, the
Court cannot rule with certainty that Dorado was
criminally responsible. In the absence of such
determination, it should be presumed that he acted
without discernment.
Accordingly, Dorado is deemed exempted from criminal
liability.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN V.
QUEZON CITY (See also: J. Leonen’s Separate
Opinion)
https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2019/08/s
park-v-qc-gr-no-225442-august-08-2017.html
3. Accident
US V. TAÑEDO
In the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with
Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano
Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon
or dam on his land. The defendant took with him a
shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt
wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work. He
remained with his laborers an hour or so and then
went a short distance away across a stream to see how
the alteration which he had made in the malecon
affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the
other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with
him across the stream. On the other side of the stream
he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle,
had been living in a small shack for a month or so
during the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked
the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good
place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was
lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of
fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of
age, was working at something under a manga tree a
short distance from the shack. Although the accused
directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack,
the deceased answered the question and pointed out
in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge
of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction
between the testimony of the accused and the
Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of
the deceased testified that the boy and the accused
invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and
that the accused accepted the invitation. The accused,
however, testified that he did not invite the deceased
to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased go
with him, but that he remained under the manga tree
"trying something." At any rate the accused went into
the forest with his gun. What took place there is
unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that
subject he testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to
me, that place where the wild chickens were to be
found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place,
if I could kill some wild chickens we would have
something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at that
place I saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And after I
shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the
chicken and went near the place where I heard the
noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I went
back toward the malecon, where my companions were
working, running back, and when I arrived there I left
my shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my
companions were working; and I called Bernardino
Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence, and to him I
told of that occurence because he is my friend and
besides that he was a relative of the deceased, and
when Tagampa heard of this he and myself went
together to see the dead body.
ISSUE: Is he guilty of murder?
HELD: No. He was just guilty of homicide. There
appears to have been no motive whatever for the
commission of the crime. The Government has not
attempted to show any. The only possible reason that
the accused could have for killing the deceased would
be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them
during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact
that the chicken and the man were shot at the same
time, there having been only one shot fired.We are of
the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support
the judgment of conviction. The judgment of conviction
is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and
his discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So
ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ISAIAS CASTILLO Y
COMPLETO
FACTS: In the evening of 5 November 1993, the accused-
appellant came home drunk and angry. His father-in-
law (Guillermo) tried to subdue him but to no avail
which caused the former to leave the house. As he was
leaving, Guillermo saw him take out his sling and arrow.
Consorcia, the accused’s wife, was heard crying and
screaming. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was seen
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia out of the
house and was later taken to the hospital but to no
avail. Cause of death was the cut jugular vein caused by
a fatal weapon which could have been a “pointed
instrument like a nail.”
ISSUE: Whether the fatal injury inflicted on the victim
was accidental
RULING: The essential requisites for this exempting
circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act
(2) with due care; (3) he causes and injury to another by
mere accident (4) without fault or intention of causing
it. The mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable
under the law. In penalizing the act, the consideration
of the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but
to inflict injury. Also, the fact that the accused-appellant
disappeared while his wife was in the hospital is
unbecoming of a husband with a dying wife. Due to the
weakness of the defense’s evidence, the claim that the
act was accidental cannot be appreciated in favour of
the accused.
Wherefore, the accused was found guilty of the crime
of Parricide wherein the court imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE V. JESUS G. RETUBADO, GR NO. 124058,
2003-12-10
Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Branch 29, in Criminal
Case No. TCS-2153 convicting the appellant
Jesus G. Retubado of murder
On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50-yearold
Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab driver called it a day
and decided to go home after a day's work. He drove his
pedicab and stopped at the junction of Rizal and
Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The
appellant who was conversing with Marcial Luciño saw
him. "Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my
brother?" Emmanuel ignored the appellant. The
appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He
overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the pedicab
which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again ignored
the appellant and pedaled on until he reached his
house. His wife, Norberta Cañon was in the balcony of
their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive.
Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep.
Undeterred, the appellant continued following
Emmanuel.
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the
appellant arrived and tarried at the porch. Emmanuel
suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why
he was being followed. The appellant told Emmanuel
that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but
Emmanuel told the appellant that his son was already
asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and
placed her hand on her husband's shoulder to pacify
him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from
under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the forehead.
The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away
from the scene. Norberta shouted for help. The
neighbors, her daughter, and her son-inlaw arrived.
They brought Emmanuel to the Tuburan District
Hospital, but the victim died shortly thereafter. Dr. Ivar
G. Arellano, the Municipal Health Officer, performed an
autopsy on the cadaver of Emmanuel and prepared a
report thereon with the following findings:
Possible cause of death:
Gunshot wound at the head (left side) with injury to
brain and meninges
Hypovolemic shock secondary to loss of blood (Severe
loss of blood)... appellant admitted shooting the victim
but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act
with due care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable
for the victim's death.
When he insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son,
Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom
holding a handgun with his right hand.
Fearing that he would be shot, the appellant took hold
of Emmanuel's right hand with his left and pulled the
gun towards Emmanuel's stomach. The appellant
grabbed Emmanuel's free hand with his right hand, and
the old man almost fell on his knees to the ground.
Emmanuel still resisted. The appellant pulled the gun
to the level of Emmanuel's forehead, and the gun
suddenly went off. The bullet hit Emmanuel's forehead.
Norberta fled from the house.
He placed the gun on the dining table before entering
his bedroom. When he went back to the... dining room
to get the gun, his younger sister, Enrica told him that
their brother Edwin had taken the gun.
He found Edwin outside their house near the church,
and the latter told the appellant that he threw the gun
into the sea. When the appellant asked his brother to...
show him where he threw the gun, Edwin refused to do
so.
Issues: Whether the accused acted under a state of
necessity is a question of fact,
Ruling: Reviewed the records and find no basis to
deviate from the findings of the trial court that the
appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor
and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of
shooting the victim at close range on the forehead.
Principles: The defense of a state of necessity is a
justifying circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that
must be proved by the accused with clear and
convincing evidence.

By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim,
the accused must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of
the prosecution because if such evidence is weak but
the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of
the prosecution can no longer be disbelieved.
ROWENO POMOY v. PEOPLE, GR No. 150647, 200409-
29
Facts: Tomas Balboa was a Master teacher of the
Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in
Concepcion, Iloilo.
To arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery
which took place in the municipality in December 1989
Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already
defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary Company at
Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail
thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another suspect in
the robbery case
Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come
out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the
investigation room, as he told
Balboa: 'Let's go to the investigation room.' The
investigation room is at the main building of the
compound where the jail is located. The jail guard on
duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail door and
walked towards the investigation room.
At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol,
tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his
belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with
only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.
petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol,
facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood,... about
two (2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer of
the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and
directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital.
he was one of the investigators of their outfit; about 2
o'clock or past that time of January 4, 1990 he got
Tomas Balboa... from their stockade for tactical
interrogation; as he was already holding the door knob
of their investigation room and about to open and enter
it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him
and take hold or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas
Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case who was
apprehended by the police of Concepcion and then
turned over to them (PC) and placed in their stockade;
he asked the sergeant of the guard to let Balboa out of
the stockade for interrogation; from the stockade with
Balboa walking with him, he had his .45... caliber pistol
placed in his holster attached to his belt on his waist;
then as he was holding the doorknob with his right hand
to open the door, the victim, who was two meters away
from him, suddenly approached him and grabbed his
gun, but all of a sudden he held the handle of... his gun
with his left hand... his gun was already loaded in its
chamber and cocked when he left his house, and it was
locked when it fired; during the grappling he used his
left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while
the victim used his right hand in trying to reach the...
gun; after the gun fired, they were separated from each
other and Balboa fell; he is taller than Balboa though
the latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor
determine who of them was stronger;
CA's ruling... claim of petitioner that the death of Balboa
resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes,[10]
the CA maintained that "a revolver is not prone to
accidental firing if it... were simply handed over to the
deceased as appellant claims because of the nature of
its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and
pressure was exerted on the trigger in the process of
allegedly handing it over. If it were uncocked, then
considerable pressure had to be... applied on the
trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of
the deceased must have been intentional because
pressure on the trigger was necessary to make the gun
fire."[11]
OSG's position: "[Petitioner's] theory of accident would
have been easier to believe had the victim been shot
only once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the
victim not only once but twice, thereby establishing
[petitioner's] determined effort to kill the victim. By any
stretch of the imagination, even assuming without
admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it
should not have been followed by another shot on
another vital part of the body. The fact that [petitioner]
shot the victim two (2) times and was hit on two
different and distant parts of the body, inflicted from
two different locations or angles, means that there was
an intent to cause the victim's death, contrary to
[petitioner's] pretensions of the alleged accidental
firing. It is an oft-repeated... principle that the location,
number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the
victim have a more revealing tale of what actually
happened during the incident.
Ruling on aggravating circumstance of abuse of
authority
"x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, the public official must use
his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office
gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could
have perpetrated the crime without... occupying his
position, then there is no abuse of public position.'
(People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant
case, there is no showing that the [petitioner] had a
premeditated plan to kill the victim when the former
fetched the latter from the stockade, thus, it... cannot
be concluded that the public position of the [petitioner]
facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the
trial court's finding that the said aggravating
circumstance that [petitioner] took advantage of his
public position to commit the crime cannot be...
sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and no
mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum of the
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime
of homicide. x x x."[13]
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a
finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the
fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances
that could not have been foreseen or controlled.[17]
Thus, in determining whether an "accident"... attended
the incident, courts must take into account the dual
standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or
negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the
fore the main question in the present case: was
petitioner in control of the .45 caliber... pistol at the
very moment the shots were fired?
Issues: Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from
a finding that the harm to the
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a
finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the
fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances
that could not have been foreseen or controlled.[17]
Thus, in determining whether an "accident"... attended
the incident, courts must take into account the dual
standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or
negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the
fore the main question in the present case: was
petitioner in control of the .45 caliber... pistol at the
very moment the shots were fired?
Ruling: The foregoing account demonstrates that
petitioner did not have control of the gun during the
scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest
the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to
thwart those attempts. That the hands of both
petitioner and the... victim were all over the weapon
was categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the
course of grappling for the gun, both hands of
petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was
trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while his
left was warding off the... victim. It would be difficult
to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner
would coolly and effectively be able to release the
safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at
the victim.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim
grappled for possession of the gun. This frenzied
grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been
finished in a matter of seconds -- was fierce and vicious.
The eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical...
conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the
course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been
accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired.
Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a
caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when fired,
immediately slides backward throwing away the empty
shell and returns immediately carrying again a live
bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it... did, fire
in succession. Verily, the location of, and distance
between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets
jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the
trajectory of the first shot going downward from left to
right thus pushing Balboa's upper body,... tilting it to the
left while Balboa was still clutching petitioner's hand
over the gun; the second shot hitting him in the
stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboa's body
as he was falling down and releasing his hold on
petitioner's hand
Thus, the appellate court's reliance on People v.
Reyes[21] was misplaced. In that case, the Court
disbelieved the accused who described how his gun
had exploded while he was simply handing it over
to the victim. Here, no similar... claim is being
made; petitioner has consistently maintained that
the gun accidentally fired in the course of his
struggle with the victim. More significantly, the
present case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the
mechanism of which is very different from that of
a... revolver, the gun used in Reyes.[22] Unlike a
revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently
described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing
when possession thereof becomes the object of a
struggle.
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the
accused was at the time performing a lawful act
with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by
mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused,
there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.
From the facts, it is clear that all these elements
were present. At the time of the incident,
petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the
investigators -- of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company.
Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties
as investigating officer that, under the instructions
of his superior, he fetched the victim from the
latter's cell for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty
as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim
suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an
enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to
prevent the snatching of... his service weapon by
anyone, especially by a detained person in his
custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to
facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the
vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated... by Frontal
Location of Wounds
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He
exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent
his service weapon from causing accidental harm to
others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had
kept his service gun locked when he left his house;
he kept it inside its... holster at all times, especially
within the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused
admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased,
much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato
Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of
Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part
of petitioner that... would indicate the intent to
harm the victim while being fetched from the
detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim's
death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an
enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from
its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the
firing of the... two successive shots -- all of which
led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently
demonstrated to have been consequences of
circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At
the very least, these factual circumstances create
serious doubt on the latter's... culpability.
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative.
Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he
claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real
and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting
circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to
kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to
defend oneself from imminent danger.[28]
Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not
occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to
overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of
self-defense against any aggression; rather, they
appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result
of both parties' attempts to possess the firearm.
4. Irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury
US V. POMOY
FACTS:
The defendants have been sentenced by the CFI of
Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor
as accessories after the fact in the crime of
assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of
the American school-teachers , because, without
having taken part in the said crime as principals or as
accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses
of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this
sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
confessed to having assisted in the burial of the
corpses, it appears that he did so because he was
compelled to do so by the murderers of the four
teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this,
but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the
crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness
for the prosecution. This witness says he was present
when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi
was not a member of the group who killed the
Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on
his property gathering some bananas; that when he
heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however,
seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band;
that the latter called to him and striking him with the
butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendants are criminally liable.
RULING: The Penal Code exempts from liability any
person who performs the act by reason of irresistible
force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under
such circumstances when he executed the acts which
are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio
Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part
in any way in the execution of the crime with
which he has been charged; there is conclusive
proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one
of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro
Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did
not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid
corpses, nor was he even in the place of the
occurrence when the burial took place. The
confession of his supposed liability and guilt,
made before an official of the division of
information of the Constabulary, Enrique
Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a
witness, can not be considered as legal proof,
because the same witness says that Roberto
Baculi was the only one of the defendants who
made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears
besides, from the statements of another witness
for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the
confession of Caballeros was made through the
promise made to him and to the other defendants
that nothing would be done to them. Confessions
which do not appear to have been made freely
and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or
promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof
on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine
Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the
authorities the perpetration of the crime, which
seems to be one of the motives for the conviction
and which the court below takes into
consideration in his judgment, is not punished by
the Penal Code and therefore that can not render
the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and
with a reversal of the judgment appealed from,
we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the
costs de oficio in both instances.
PEOPLE V. LORENO
PEOPLE V. DEL ROSARIO
Facts: ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of
the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario
y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of
Robbery with Homicide
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez
alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and
John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having
robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and...
jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed
her.
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not
guilty,[3] Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe alias
"Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun"
Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only
Joselito del Rosario was tried.
On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the
evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of
Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan
City, when three... women flagged him. Parked at a
distance of about one and a-half (1½) meters in
front of him was a tricycle driven by accused
Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two
(2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a
bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two
men... armed with a gun started chasing a man who
was trying to help the woman, while the other
 snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the
ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and
while the woman was still on the ground he shot
her on the head. The bag taken by the man was...
brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario
where someone inside received the bag. The armed
man then sat behind the driver while his
companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle
sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get
the plate number of the tricycle. He also...
recognized the driver, after which he went to the
nearest police headquarters and reported the
incident.
Issues: that there was no lawful warrantless arrest
within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of
Court.
Ruling: Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was
unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:[
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by
SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of
"Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In
People vs Sucro[44] we held that when a police officer
sees the offense, although at a... distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to
the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since
the offense is deemed committed in his presence or
within his view. In essence, Sec. 5,... par. (a), Rule 113,
requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto
or caught immediately after the consummation of the
act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the
purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested
on the day following the... commission of the robbery
with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113,
necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has
just been committed; and (2) the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the... person to be arrested had committed it. Hence,
there must be a large measure of immediacy between
the time the offense was committed and the time of the
arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a
warrant of... arrest must be secured. Aside from the
sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the
person making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to
be taken into custody has committed the crime.[45]
Again,... the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with
these requirements since, as earlier explained, the
arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime
and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had
not been "just committed" at the time the accused was
arrested.
Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed the offense since they were
not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the
crime, and they became aware of his identity as the
driver of the getaway... tricycle only during the
custodial investigation.
5. Insuperable cause
PEOPLE vs. BANDIAN G.R. No. 45186 September
30, 1936 Infanticide, Article 12 Exempting
Circumstances
FACTS:At About 7 in the morning of January 31,
1936, Valentine Aguilar, the apellant’s neighbor,
saw the appelant go to the thicket about four or
five brazas from her house, apparently to respond
to a call of nature because it was there that the
people of the place used to go for that purpose. A
few minutes later, he then again saw her emerge
from the thicket with her clothes stained with
blood both in front and back, stagerring and
visibly showing signs of not being able to support
herself. He ran to her aid and having noted that
she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and
helped her go up to her house and placed her in
her bed.
Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to
her house, what had happened to her, the
appellant answered that she was very dizzy. Not
wishing to be alone with the appellant in such
circumstances, Aguilar called Adriano Comcom
who lived nearby to be there and help him and the
appellant. He asked Comcom to take bamboo
leaves to stop the hemhorrage which had come
upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone
about five brazas when he saw the body of
newborn baby near a path adjoining the thicket
where the appellant had gone a few moments
before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and the
latter told him to bring the body to the appellant’s
house. Upon being askes whether the babywhich
was shown to her was hers or not, the appellant
answered in the affirmative.
In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division
went to the appellant’s house and found her still
lying in bed still bleeding. In his opinion, the
physician declared that the appellant gave birth in
her house, and afterwhich, he threw the child into
the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing
her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom
she was married to, because the child was not his
but with another man with whom she had
previously has amorous relations. Nepomuceno
testified that the appellant admitted killing her
child.
ISSUE: What was the crime committed by
appellant?
RULING: The evidence certainly does not show
that the appellant , in causing her child’s death in
one way or another, or in abandoning it in the
thicket, did so willfully, consciously, or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon
it, to expose it to death , because her affair with a
former lover, Luis Kirol took place three years
before the incident. The husband of the appellant
 testified at the trial affirming the belief that the
child was his.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be
punishable must be committed willfully and
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a
voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in
cases where said crimes are committed through mere
imprudence, the person who commits them, under
said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of
his mental facilities, or must be conscious of his acts,
in order that he may be held liable.
The law exempts from criminal liability any person
who acts under the circumstances in which the
appellant acted in this case, by giving birth to a child in
the thicket and later abandoning it, not because of
imprudence or any other cause than that she was
overcome by severe dizziness and extreme debility,
with no fault or intention on her part. She has in her
favor the fourth and the seventh exempting
circumstances.
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts
and considerations, and granting that the appellant
was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket
and that she later failed to take her child therefrom,
having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely
independent of her will, it should be held that… under
such circumstances, appellant has the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstances of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code in her favor.
C. Other exculpatory causes
1. Instigation
PEOPLE v. DORIA
TOPIC: Module 5: Justifying Circumstances and
Absolutory Cause
DOCTRINE: Entrapment in the Philippines is not a
defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is
a defense and is considered an absolutory cause.
FACTS:
PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received
information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that
one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in
Mandaluyong City. Narcom agents decided to entrap
and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. PO3 Manlangit
as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up.
PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 as money for the
buy-bust operation. "Jun" appeared and the CI
introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying PO3
Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills. "Jun"
instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him while he got
the marijuana from his associate. After a while, "Jun"
took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and
gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith
arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the
arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked
bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left
the money at the house of his associate named
"Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's"
house. Team found the door of "Neneth's" house open
and at woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his
associate. PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house
and noticed a carton box under the dining table.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua
recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." 8 The
policemen arrested "Neneth”. It was only then that the
police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado
while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama.
ISSUE/S: Is there an absolutory cause in buy-bust
operation?
RULING: NO, there is no absolutory cause in buy-
bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an
effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act
of the commission of an offense. Entrapment
consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion,
trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement
officers or the agents to induce a defendant to
commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal
design in the minds of the government officials
rather than that of the innocent defendant, such
that the crime is the product of the creative activity
of the law enforcement officer. Test of entrapment
is whether the conduct of the law enforcement
agent was likely to induce a normally law abiding
person, other than one who is ready and willing, to
commit the offense for purposes of this test, it is
presumed that a lawabiding person would normally
resist the temptation to commit a crime that is
presented by the simple opportunity to act
unlawfully.
Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense
available to the accused. It is instigation that is a
defense and is considered an absolutory cause. The
instigator practically induces the would-be accused
into the commission of the offense and himself
becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and
means are resorted to by the peace officer for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker
in the execution of his criminal plan.
PEOPLE v. LUA CHU
TOPIC: Absolutory Causes
DOCTRINE: ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION -
While it has been said that the practice of
entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of
instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored,
and while instigation, as distinguished from mere
entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being
criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is
no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilitates for its commission were purposely placed
in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
"decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose
the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity
in the act were present and apparently assisting in
its commission.
FACTS: Uy Se Tieng, was the consignee of the
Shipments of Opium coming from Hongkong, who
represented agents of the real Owners of
Shipments of Opium containing 3,252 tins. He
collaborated with Juan Samson, chief of the
customs secret service of Cebu, & Joaquin
Natividad of the Customs by paying them an
 amount of P6,000 for the opium to be released
safely from Customs.
On Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment of Opium in
the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that
the former consult the real owners of the shipment on
how to proceed the payment of P6,000 & will come
over to Samson house on Dec. 17, 1929 to inform the
decision of the owners.
On the same day Samson informed the Constabulary
represented by Captain Buencosejo & the Provincial
Fiscal requesting a stenographer to take down the
conversation between Samson & Uy Se Teung.
On the night of Dec. 17, 1929, Captain Buencosejo and
a stenographer named Jumapao from a law firm and hid
themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson
to witness the conversation between Samson, Uy Se
Teung and Lua Chu.
Captain Buencosejo & Jumapao noted the ff. important
facts:
1. Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that Lua Chu was
one of the owners of the Opium.
2. Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him,
there were co-owners named Tan and another located
in Amoy.
3. Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon
delivery of the opium from the warehouse of Uy Se
Tieng.
4. A Customs Collector had a conversation before
when Samson was on vacation in Europe, with Lua Chu
and agreed on the business of shipping the Opium.
The following morning Uy Se Tieng and companion, Uy
Ay presented papers to Samson & Captain Buencosejo
showed up & caught them in the act & arrested the two
Chinese. The Constabulary then arrested Lua Chu &
confiscated P50K worth of Opium (3,252 tins).
ISSUE/S: Whether Juan Samson, a public official,
involved in the crime and petitioners can take as a
defense the absolutory cause of instigation.
RULING: A public official shall be involved in the crime
if:
• He induces a person to commit a crime for
personal gain
• Does not take the necessary steps to seize the
instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders
before he obtained the profits in mind.
• He obtained the profits in mind even through
afterwards does take the necessary steps seize the
instrument of the crime & to arrest the offenders.
Even though Juan Samson smoothed the way for the
introduction of the prohibited drugs, the ff should be
noted that held Samson not guilty for the crime:
• The accused have already planned and actually
ordered the opium without the consent or
participation of Juan Samson.
• Did not help the accused to successfully
implement their plan rather, Samson assured the
seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the
smugglers.
• This is not a case where an innocent person is
induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute
him, but it is simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
Thus, what happened was an entrapment.
Therefore, accused are not entitled to the defense
or absolutory cause of instigation.
2. Pardon (Art. 266-C and Art. 344)
3. Absolutory circumstances
a. Art. 6 (3) - There is an attempt when the
offender commences the commission of a felony
directly or over acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than this
own spontaneous desistance.
b. Art. 20 - that the crime be committed with the
aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by
means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft,
airships, or
other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438)
c. Art. 247 Death or physical injuries under
exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act
of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon
them any serious physical injuries, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any
other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rule shall be applicable, under the same
circumstances, to parents with respect to their
daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducers, while the daughters are living with their
parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the
prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse, shall not be entitled to the benefts of
this article.
d. Art. 280* - Qualified trespass to dwelling. —
Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of
another against the latter's will shall be punished
by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000
pesos. If the offense be committed by means of
violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be
prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos.chanrobles virtual law
library
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable
to any person who shall enter another's dwelling
for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to
himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third
 person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who
shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering
some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone
who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public
houses, while the
same are open
e. Art. 332 - Persons exempt from criminal
liability. — No criminal, but only civil liability, shall
result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling or malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or
relatives by affinity in the same line.chanrobles virtual
law library
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the
property which belonged to the deceased spouse
before the same shall have passed into the possession
of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law, if living together.chanrobles virtual law
library
The exemption established by this article shall not be
applicable to strangers participating in the commission
of the crime.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
WILLIAM SATO
TOPIC: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND ABSOLUTORY
CAUSES
DOCTRINE: The rule applies when the court is faced with
two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that
is prejudicial to the accused and another that is
favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
2. Whether William Sato can avail of Article 332
in his favor.
RULING:
1. No, the relationship by affinity is not dissolved.
Article 332 provides for a absolutory cause in the crimes
of theft, estafa, and malicious mischief. It limits the
responsibility of the offender to civil liability only. In the
American legal system, there are two views on the
subject – one is that relationship by affinity is
terminated by the death of a spouse. The view
supported by most judicial authorities is that if the
spouses have no living issues or children, and a spouse
dies, then the relationship of affinity is dissolved. On the
other hand, if the spouses have children, then the
relationship by affinity is continued. Because of the
principle of in dubio pro reo, or when in doubt, rule for
the accused, the second view is applied.
2. No, William Sato cannot avail of Article 332 in
his favor. Article 332, which is limited to the felonies
mentioned, plainly and unmistakably shows that it
applies only to simple crimes. This situation is
complexed with another crime as estafa through
falsification of public documents. Since the crime that
William Sato was charged with was not simple estafa,
William cannot avail of Article 332’s provisions in his
favor. His crimes of estafa and falsification were not
separate but component crimes of a single complex
crime. The accused is found guilty.

FACTS: On November 24, 1992, William Sato, a

Japanese national, defrauded his deceased wife’s
mother, Manolita Gonzales Vda De Carungcong (79),
who was already blind. William made her sign and
thumbmark a special power of attorney authorizing his
daughter, Mitsuko Sato (then 20) to sell, assign,
transfer, or dispose to anyone the properties of
Gonzales at Tagaytay. William made Manolita believe
that the document involved only taxes. Mediatrix
Carungcong, the duly appointed administrator of the
intestate estate of her now deceased mother,
Manlolita, filed a complaint against her brother-inlaw,
William. William was able to sell the properties through
Mitsuko, collected an amount exceeding ₱22 million
and failed to account for the same and never delivered
the proceeds to Manolita who died in1994. William
Sato is accused of estafa, but he moved to quash the
information, claiming that his relationship to Manolita
as his mother-in-law was an exempting circumstance
(Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code).

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the death of Zenaida, who was the
wife of William Sato, dissolved the relationship by
affinity of William Sato and Manolita, making Article
332 inapplicable to William.