The Political Applicability of Political Science Research

Alexis J. Cabauatan
Das Scriber Interdisciplinary Research and Development
scriberPH

This article sought to provide political scientists perspective into how an independent yet productive
relationship with political practice may be maintained. To this end, I propose three phases about how
political science has to do with political practice, each of which offers a distinct picture of how issues may
and should be addressed, how these problems are conceptualized and how they might be investigated.
Finally, these disparities depend on their perspectives on the relationship between declarations of political
worth and empirical assertions.

INTRODUCTION
Political science and political practice have different purposes. Political practice is to serve the realization
of certain collective goals by making political decisions and producing public policies. Political science is
to provide well-validated knowledge about the operation of politics. These two purposes are not necessarily
aligned. In fact, political practitioners may at times consider well-validated knowledge as an obstacle rather
than an asset, for instance, when it highlights those certain important interests have been disregarded in the
preparation of a policy proposal. In turn, on the side of political science it is not uncommon to reach insights
that do not chime with our generally established political preferences; the people themselves may, for
instance, be much less enthusiastic about the institutions of democracy than we would expect them to be.
Nevertheless, the purposes of political science and political practice also connect. Particularly in a
democratic society, political practice can be expected to base itself on well-validated knowledge and to
justify its decisions in the light of it. In turn, I maintain that good political science has to address politically
relevant questions, be it by providing knowledge that is of policy relevance in the short run or by opening
up perspectives for political action in the longer run.
The overview departs from the classical position expressed by Max Weber in his methodological writings
(especially Weber 1904 [1991]). Weber’s view on social science was certainly motivated by a sense of
political engagement. At the same time, however, he drew a strict distinction between facts and values, in
which science holds the authority over statements of facts while politics is ultimately responsible for choices
between values. As a consequence of this distinction, the politically relevant contributions that social
science can make are limited and circumscribed. This view remains very instructive of what contribution
political science can make to political practice, and of the limitations of its potential contribution.
The second position builds upon Weber’s position in that it does separate the domain of political values
from that of scientific observations of fact, but it recognizes that observations are informed by theories and,
thereby, by values. As a consequence, scientific observations do take place against a given value
background, and it is essential for the scientist to own up to that background. For this, different strategies
can be adopted, ranging from a (minimal) declaratory approach to a foundational approach in which the
value position adopted is subject to some kind of rational, though non-empirical, justification.
While the former two are well-established positions, the third position I add as a kind of counterpoint. This
position takes issue with the strict distinction between facts and values and indeed with the assignment of
the social sciences to the exclusive domain of facts. I develop this position on the basis of Richard Rorty’s
pragmatist vision of the vocation of the scientist. In Rorty’s view, scientific theories should not so much be
assessed on their compliance to certain discipline-internal standards but rather on their ability to yield
insights that offer new lines of possible action on which people may come to agree (Rorty 1991).

MAX WEBER AND THE EMPIRICAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

‘We all know that our science . . ., which concerns the institutions and events of human culture, was first
motivated by practical considerations’, Max Weber (1904 [1991], p. 23) wrote as he assumed the co-
editorship of the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik. However, having recognized the origins
of social science in practical concerns, he immediately proceeded by playing down any too grand
expectations: ‘it can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from
which directives for immediate practical action can be derived’ (Weber 1904 [1991], p. 24). Crucially, for
Weber the choices of norms and ideals lay beyond the domain of science. Such choices should be left to
the political process. In contrast, the task of the social sciences is an empirical one: to make sense of social
action and institutions on the basis of observation and interpretation.
The crucial distinction underlying Weber’s conception of the social sciences is the distinction between
empirical claims and normative claims, between the choice of ends or values (which are a matter of faith
or ideology) and the choice of means once an end is given (which can be subject to scientific analysis). As
he writes: ‘An empirical science cannot tell anyone what he should do, only what he can do and – under
certain circumstance – what he wishes to do’ (Weber 1904 [1991], p. 27). Importantly, however, the latter,
scientific, questions are not completely unrelated to the former, practical, one. For anyone considering what
he or she should do, it may be very instructive to know what he or she can do and what he or she wishes to
do. It is exactly in these ways that social science can be politically relevant. Thus, Weber defends a socially
informed social science that can contribute to political questions in some specific ways, but only in these
specific ways. Specifically, he distinguishes three ways in which scientific analysis can directly be of value
for normative decisions 1. The distinction between these three tasks for social science – which I label the
‘instrumental’, ‘sociological’ and ‘logical’ task, respectively – remains useful and relevant as most
contemporary social scientists can probably identify with one or the other.
The first way in which scientific analysis can contribute to political decisions is essentially instrumental in
character. It relies on a recasting of the distinction between normative claims and empirical claims in terms
of ends and means. The choice of social ends is obviously a political choice. However, once a social end
has been determined, social science can step in to analyze whether, in light of the actual conditions at hand,
the means are available to attain this end in the first place (Weber 1904 [1991], pp. 24–5). Furthermore, if
that question is answered affirmatively, social science can help to determine the appropriate means as well
as the potential costs that their employment is likely to have.
This is, of course, a very recognizable role of social science. Consider, for example, the widespread social
desire to reduce road congestion. Social scientific studies can draw on available evidence to estimate the
impacts and costs of measures like road pricing or the promotion of public transport use. Or, to think of a
more specifically political example, if political parties are keen to marginalize an extremist competitor, a

1
THE THREE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IDENTIFIED BY MAX WEBER
● Instrumental: identify the most efficient means towards a given societal end.
● Sociological: explicate the social conditions under which specific values andideas emerge.
● Logical: scrutinize the internal consistency and logic of political positionsadopted.
political scientist may help in estimating whether a strategy of cooperation or one of ostracizing is more
likely to be effective and, indeed, how such strategies may reflect on the parties involved themselves (for
example, Downs 2001; Art 2007).
If the first task that Weber discerns for the social sciences focuses on the question of what actors can do,
the second task that he identifies is more sociological in character, as it is concerned with the clarification
of what an actor wishes to do and why she does so (Weber 1904 [1991], p. 26). Essentially, this task can
be equated with the sociology of knowledge and values, which is concerned with tracking the ideational
and sociological conditions from which given political convictions originate. As Weber puts it, such
analysis offers an actor knowledge of the meaning of what he wants: ‘We can teach him to think in terms
of the context and the meaning of the ends he desires, and among which he chooses’ (Weber 1904 [1991],
p. 26). That is, the social scientist can trace patterns in the evolution of political preferences by identifying
how similar conditions give rise to similar ideas and by demonstrating how certain ideas have come to be
logically and sociologically related to each other 2.
While the first two tasks that Weber discerns for the social sciences contribute to understanding and
reflexivity, the third is of a more directly critical character as it involves the review of the internal
consistency and compatibility of the ends chosen and their underlying value-orientations. This is a logical
task as it assesses normative positions adopted by social actors on their internal consistency and seeks to
increase their reflexivity by identifying the presuppositions and consequences that are logically implied by
them. Weber is particularly concerned to identify the ‘final axioms’ underlying value-positions, which
should help the actors involved to attain greater clarity of what they stand for (Weber 1904 [1991], p. 27).
Of the three tasks distinguished, this last one relies eventually less on empirically observed regularities and
more upon the rules of logic and the principles of good reasoning 3.
To sum up, being the godfather of the social sciences that he is, Weber systematically separated the domain
of social science from that of political practice. He delineated the practical contributions that social science
can make to three kinds of tasks: instrumental, sociological and logical. He recognized that its very
assignment to these particular niches would be a precondition for social science to become more specialized
and to progress. Yet, in the end he was also confident that, whatever trajectory social science will follow,
sooner or later its ‘viewpoint and conceptual apparatus’ will be called back to its original vocation of
contributing to the solution of practical problems (Weber 1904 [1991], p. 101).

2
EXAMPLES OF THE ‘SOCIOLOGICAL’ CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963) draws on extensive surveys of attitudes and values to compose integrated characterizations of
the political cultures in the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Mexico, and to map these in relation to three ideal types of political culture:
‘parochial,’ ‘subject,’ and ‘participant.’

Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993) establishes a close relation between the density of voluntary social
relations and organizations and the level of political engagement in different Italian regions. He explains this relation by submitting that social engagement
creates ‘social capital’ that is conducive to political participation.

Other examples of research that explicates the social conditions under which specific values and ideas emerge can be found in: the history of political
thought;public opinion research (for example, Dalton 2013); work on the evolution of political ideologies (for example, Keman 2011); and on the ideas of political
elites andparties (for example, Adams et al. 2004).

3
EXAMPLES OF THE ‘LOGICAL’ CONTRIBUTIONOF SOCIAL SCIENCE
● Conceptual analysis seeks to clarify the meaning and use of specific political concepts by way of definition, logical analysis and analytical
differentiation. For instance: what is liberty, and what is it not? How does it relate to competing values, like equality? What different kinds of liberty
can be distinguished? (For example, Miller 1991; Carter 1999).
● Ideology critique assesses a set of viewpoints of an actor both in light of itsinternal consistency as well as in light of the underlying interests that may
account for why certain viewpoints are adopted rather than others. This trainof work originates in Marx’s (for example, Marx and Engels 1848 [1967])
critique of liberal ideology and is continued in many strands of contemporarycritical theory (Thompson 1984).
BRACKETING VALUES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
Eventually, Weber’s vision aspires to a social science that operates in a safely enclosed world of facts which
can be neatly delineated from the political world of values. This position assumes that the values will not
impact on the scientific practice itself or, at least, that such influence will only be discernable to the extent
that the scientist deliberately chooses to do so, as in the case of the instrumental scientist who puts his or
her work at the service of a given political end. Even if value-judgments obviously inform what scientists
choose to study, it is a fundamental conviction of Weber that they do not and should not affect how scientists
proceed and hence what results they attain (Weber 1904 [1991], p. 65). Crucially, in his view, scientific
findings have an autonomous foundation that does not rely on specific values but on scientific method. It
is method that ensures the ‘objective’ character of social science and that sets it apart from any subjective
value judgments.
Method has become ever more important with the progressive institutionalization and specialization of the
social sciences (cf. Easton et al. 1991). It serves as the currency between specializations as well as the
bulwark against subjective, non-scientific value-judgments. Yet, as much as contemporary scientists may
rely on it, the objectivity of scientific method is far from uncontested. A fundamental challenge to the
objective status of scientific method has emerged from Thomas Kuhn’s depiction of scientific progress
being premised on the establishment of a ‘paradigm’ (Kuhn 1962, 1963). Typical examples of such
paradigms in the natural sciences are the wave theory of light, Newtonian physics and quantum physics. A
paradigm offers a conceptualization of the key entities that are to be studied and the basic logic according
to which they behave. It also informs the kind of scientific questions that are asked as well as indicating the
techniques that can properly be used to answer them (Kuhn 1963, p. 359). At the same time, every paradigm
forecloses a range of findings that can only come to light once a different paradigm is embraced. This is so
because by its very nature of being an intellectual construction, no paradigm can ever be comprehensive
and final. Indeed, ‘because no paradigm ever accounts for all the facts or solves all its problems, anomalies
can always be found and theories falsified’ (Stokes 1998, p. 33).
Applied to the social sciences, the understanding of the practice of science by way of paradigms
fundamentally challenges the objectivity of scientific method on which Weber relied. If all scientific
observations are premised on a point of view (a paradigm) that is inevitably incomplete and partial, then
these observations become inherently contingent. Also, to the extent that these observations suit certain
value-positions better than others, method is no longer a convincing means for the scientist to eradicate the
influence of values on them. Once the inevitable presence of a value background is recognized, there are
roughly three strategies that can be distinguished for dealing with it, which I label the declaratory, the
conformatory and the justificatory strategy 4.
The declaratory strategy fits, in a way, very well with the instrumental role for the social sciences as
identified by Weber. It involves little more than that the social scientist from the outset declares the central
values that inform her work. Thus, an expert in logistics may declare that her model is exclusively geared
towards reducing road congestion and that hence any environmental effects are not within the purview of
her work. Such a declaration of values may be facilitated by an official research assignment that already
specifies the aims that the research is to serve. However, the declaratory approach is also a widely
maintained heuristic strategy as most social scientists will not contest that scientific models inevitably

4
THREE STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THEVALUE-BACKGROUND OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
● Declaratory: explicate values as given and assume scientific research to beself-contained against that background.
● Conformatory: engage in empirical research while adopting, and subscribing to, generally accepted values.
● Justificatory: provide an autonomous rational justification for the value position adopted and engage in empirical social research on that basis.
involve a reduction of the complexity of the world, which is managed by the adoption of presumptions that
help to delineate and frame the research from the start. From this heuristic perspective it is not even
necessary that the researcher herself fully subscribes to the value position that is assumed in the research.
For the declaratory strategy, the test is not that the value position adopted is comprehensive or fully justified,
but only the marginal demand that the values invoked can be considered worthwhile and reasonable. In
fact, by declaring its values squarely from the start, this strategy essentially leaves the choice to the reader:
if he or she does not consider the values posited relevant, then he or she is free, and indeed justified, to
ignore the findings.
The reference to the acceptability of the values invoked already anticipates the second strategy, which I
label the conformatory strategy. This approach does not merely declare the values from which it departs,
but it essentially identifies with them on the assumption that they are widely shared and engrained in the
basic value positions obtaining in society (or even humanity) at large. Typical examples of this kind of
research are work that concerns the adoption of human rights (for example, Risse-Kappen et al. 1998) or
the level and scope of democracy around the world (for example, Huntington 1991). Human rights and
democracy typically are overarching values that are little contested.
The big risk of the conformatory strategy is that political research becomes the handmaiden of prevalent
political positions 5. The only more critical role it may play under these conditions is essentially a negative
one (along the lines of Weber’s ‘logical’ contribution) of dispelling myths concerning, for instance,
unfeasible or incompatible policy ends. However, to the extent that its value base remains indebted to the
prevailing political order, social science lacks any basis to offer constructive alternatives. This is only
possible once political scientific research is pursued on a normative foundation of its own, which is (at least
partly) autonomous from the values prevailing in society. That is, such a foundation cannot be established
empirically but will have to be derived from the precepts of reason or political philosophy.
This is what the ‘justificatory strategy’ aspires to: to engage in empirical social research on the basis of
autonomously justified normative foundations. As it happens, however, in contemporary political science
we witness a tendency for empirical research and normative foundationalism to grow apart. Still, the pre-
eminent example of a contemporary social thinker who indeed covers the whole range from deep normative
foundations to concrete and original empirical observations is Jürgen Habermas. While probably most
widely known as a normative philosopher, Habermas has always also styled himself as an empirical
scientist who addresses concrete political questions, ranging from European integration to the rise of the
Internet and the social adoption of new biotechnologies. However, whatever empirical issue Habermas
turns to, his viewpoint is always anchored in his normative philosophy which ultimately relies on the
normative validity of what he calls the ‘discourse principle’, which stipulates that the validity of every
social norm is ultimately subject to the test of being rationally acceptable to all people who are affected by
it (Habermas 1992, p. 138).
In Habermas’s approach the justificatory strategy implies that any theory of social action should aspire to
yield generalizable knowledge that can both be anchored in normative foundations and is empirically

5
A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF THE PITFALLS OF THECONFORMATORY STRATEGY
Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes (1963) famously take post-war electionstudies (which they rubric under the label ‘the new democracy’) to task, arguing:
‘The theorists of the new democracy, however, are less concerned to make the competitive “democratic system” more democratic in the traditional sense than
tojustify it as an efficient and stable system, depending on compromise, “pluralism”, and a general background of apathy and political incompetence The
confrontation of classic democratic ideals with actual “democratic systems” (“what we call democracy”) has no other result than the acceptance of the actual
systems and their assumed conditions as entirely desirable’ (Duncan and Lukes 1963, pp.168–9).
consequential (Habermas 1983 [1990], p. 39; cf. 6 Note, however, that empirical effectiveness is not to be
taken as a straightforward confirmation or falsification of theoretical claims by empirical observations.
Rather, it involves a more active, productive relationship in which theories have a practical impact on the
way we perceive or evaluate the social world. Social science theories may for instance be constitutive in
that they constitute new meanings that enable people to discuss about, and coordinate in, the world
(Habermas 1983 [1990], p. 39). An example of this would be the notion of the separation of powers between
an executive, a legislative and an adjudicative power, which has prominently re-entered political practice
in the way political institutions are maintained. Alternatively, a social theory may be critically effective in
that it may help to identify and evaluate observations that deviate from the categories and regularities
posited by it. Such a mismatch between theory and observations may point at a fallacy in the theory.
However, to the extent that the theory is anchored in normatively validated principles, it might also point
to a normatively deficient social practice.
In short, if we recognize that political science takes place against a value-impregnated societal background,
the three strategies sketched essentially involve different conceptions of the division of tasks between
society and political science. The declaratory strategy departs from the assumption that scientific practice
cannot accommodate all relevant considerations and that, indeed, it can only be fruitful if it abstracts from
some of them; leaving it for society to judge whether the research produced is relevant or not. In contrast,
the conformatory strategy actively seeks to depart from values that are also taken to be widely supported in
society, and puts its research at their service. Finally, the justificatory strategy takes it upon itself to ensure
that the values that inform the research process are themselves the object of an autonomous process of
rational justification.

THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION

The one thing that all strategies sketched so far share is that they put the identification of empirical
regularities at the heart of the scientific enterprise. It is through the exploration of such regularities that
political scientific research can be of political relevance. At the same time, it is this focus on empirical
regularities that also conditions and delineates the practical contribution political scientists can aspire to
make. Before moving to the conclusion, I want to briefly reflect upon this focus and question whether it
indeed captures all political science can practically contribute and whether it is indeed the right perspective
for political scientists to adopt.
Weber already underlined that social science explanation differs from that in the natural sciences as it can
depart from a reconstruction of the motivations of the agents under study. Yet, in his approach this
interpretive (or even imaginative) dimension remains largely subservient to science’s ultimate aim of causal
explanation. Still, there remains a powerful strand in social science that suggests that its contribution is not

6
AN EXAMPLE OF THE JUSTIFICATORY STRATEGY: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PUBLICSPHERE (BASED
ON HABERMAS 1995)
Normative premises: (1) a functioning democracy requires ‘a political public spherewhich enables citizens to take positions at the same time on the same topics of
thesame relevance’ (p. 306); (2) ‘institutions of acting supranationally must be formed’(p. 305) to overcome the ‘gap between the nation state’s
increasingly limitedmaneuverability, and the imperative of modes of production worldwide’ (p. 304). Theoretical knowledge: national identities in modern
Europe were formed ‘as theflowing contexts of a circulatory process that is generated through the legal institutionalization of citizens’ communication’ (p.
306).

Empirical observations: ‘the EU exercises a supreme authority previously claimedonly by individual states’ (p. 303); but ‘a European-networked civil society,
a European-wide public sphere and a common political culture are lacking’ (p. 304).Constitutive and critical recommendations: ‘Given the political will, there
is no a priori reason why [Europe cannot] create the politically necessary communicative context as soon as it is constitutionally prepared to do so’ (p. 307,
original emphasis).
restricted to the identification of causal regularities but also involves a distinctive capacity to put social
experiences in an original light and indeed to open prospects for change (cf. Wright Mills 1959).
Such a line of argument has most provocatively been pursued by Richard Rorty. Rorty, in a way, brings
Paul Feyerabend’s famous creed ‘against method’ (which Feyerabend primarily targeted at the natural
sciences) to the social sciences. As a pragmatist philosopher, he uncompromisingly insists that knowledge
ultimately requires human judgment, without any “outside” touchstone’ (Rorty 1987 [1991], p. 42); such
judgment is not to be pre-empted by an insistence on some conception of scientific method or on externally
given ‘facts’.
From this anti-methodical view on the social sciences emerges a distinctive perspective on the practical
relevance of the social sciences, which is fundamentally at odds with the predominant focus on regularities.
Most strikingly, Rorty (1987 [1991], p. 40) posits that ‘prediction and control may not be what we want
from our sociologists and our literary critics’. On the contrary, the (over-)reliance on regularities (on which
prediction and control are premised) may rather inhibit our ability to offer rational answers to practical
problems. Rorty (1987 [1991], p. 43) nicely illustrates his point by arguing: ‘Suppose that for the last three
hundred years we had been using an explicit algorithm for determining how just a society was, and how
good a physical theory was. Would we have developed either parliamentary democracy or relativity
physics?’ In other words, a conception of science that is focused on regularities seems misplaced if we
aspire it to yield innovative and useful ideas. Hence, in Rorty’s view, scientific practice needs to be
redirected so that there will be ‘less talk about rigor and more about originality’ (Rorty 1987 [1991], p. 44).
That is, he aspires to a conception of science in which the ‘image of the great scientist would not be of
somebody who got it right but of somebody who made it new’ (Rorty 1987 [1991], p. 44).
Rorty’s position runs the risk that it dispenses with any standards that can differentiate scientific practice
from other forms of reasonable deliberation. However, even for political scientists that do not want to go
that far, Rorty’s argument still has the virtue that it puts the generation of new ideas at the heart of scientific
practice. What he does, in effect, is to (re-) elevate the scientific task of hypotheses generation (or, in
Popperian terms, ‘conjectures’) to at least an equal plane as the task of hypotheses review (or ‘refutations’).
This is in contrast to most methodological textbooks in the social sciences that tend to focus on the latter
task and have little or nothing to say on the former, exactly because it does not lend itself to any easily
instructable recipes. Ultimately, Rorty regards the domain of science as a community for the unrestricted
generation and assessment of original ideas on no other basis but open debate, curiosity and unforced
agreement. The relevance of science lies exactly in its presence besides all other spheres within modern
society in which the operation of human reason is compromised by other forces (like power, economic gain
and tradition) and for which it can serve as a kind of critical mirror and provide new ideas to which they
may, or may not, be receptive.

CONCLUSION
As Weber reminded us, social science was initially motivated by practical considerations. At the same time,
however, he underlined that social science is subject to specific methodological standards that are internal
to science itself and independent from any societal value judgments. With the progressive
institutionalization of, and specialization in, the social sciences, such science-internal standards have
become ever more important. They also imply that science can only make certain, rather tangential,
contributions to political choices, which can be represented as the instrumental, the sociological and the
logical tasks that were discussed in section 1.
In turn, we have seen that it has become common within the social sciences to bracket normative questions,
either by assuming, with Weber, that the domain of empirical observations can be wholly delineated from
that of value statements or by adopting (what I have called) a declaratory or conformatory strategy.
However, the strict separation of the scientific domain from that of values is challenged by Habermas and,
more directly, by Rorty.
When it comes to the relation between political science research and the values by which society will assess
its relevance, we probably best seek to chart a middle course between the ‘unconscious’ and the ‘over-
conscious’ researcher – to borrow a distinction once made by Giovanni Sartori (1970). An ‘over-conscious’
attitude towards the specter of values that haunts political science may well be a drag on the realization of
any findings and risks paralyzing the researcher. At the same time, if anything, this chapter has sought to
make the point that political scientists cannot simply adopt an ‘unconscious’ attitude and bracket the
question of values. One way or the other, society weighs in on the choices they make in framing their
research problems and in picking their theories. Political science research inevitably takes place, and is
received, in a context that is informed by values and practical problems. In that context, political scientists
need to have a sense of the values that motivate and inform the research that they do; and they have to be
ready to justify their choices in this, if not on philosophical or political then at least on heuristic grounds.

NOTE
1. See Runciman (1972) and Ringer (1997, esp. ch. 5) for more extensive discussions of Weber’s views on
the relation between the domain of science and the domain of values.

FURTHER READING
The openness and directness with which Max Weber (1904 [1991]) addresses the practical challenges for
the social sciences has rarely been matched since. Still, the style and composition of his methodological
writings is somewhat dated, and interested readers may thus prefer to access his ideas through a secondary
source like Ringer (1997). Habermas (1990, 2012) and Rorty (1987 [1991]) are compact statements of their
respective views on the practical aspirations of the social sciences. For a related and possibly more
accessible view, see the excellent discussion in Hesse (1978). As a general introduction, Baert (2005) offers
a wonderful overview of the main positions discussed in this chapter, against a slightly broader
philosophical background. Ultimately, however, the best insight in how political science can attain political
relevance is to be found by closely studying successful examples (such as some that have been mentioned
in this chapter).

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Author:
Alexis J. Cabauatan
ORCid 0000-0002-9623-1959
+639952471322

Author bio
Alexis Jose Cabauatan was a Filipino political scientist who founded the Das Scriber Interdisciplinary Research and Development, and was involved as consultant to
different Academic Researches here and abroad. Earned his Bachelor’s Degree in Political Science and a Master of Political Science and International Relations in
Victoria University of Wellington.