VARIETIES OF

POLITICAL
STRUCTURE
Global (Higher-Order) Structures –
Structure, Agency and Power in Political Analysis
 Global (Higher-Order) Structures

 use of the term has gained in popularity since the re-

emergence, in the 1980s, of the kind of concern for
constraints on behaviour and institutions.
 one author writes "In view of the assumption that health
services are a subsystem of the larger society it is well to set
forth the main contours of the political and economic
structure that shaped them
 Clearly the term here draws attention to the broadest context
or constraints within which health services are provided.
 it has been the practice to call upon the structure of the social system

 Within the context-of such parameters as the collocation of rich and

poor in metropolitan regions, racial tensions, propensity to police
lawlessness, dissatisfied expectations in a consumer-oriented society
 Such conditions have often been characterized as the structural
context of urban violence.
 In this meaning, structure identifies no specific property of the social
system. It just refers to a diffuse or undifferentiated global set of
phenomena which, in one way or another, seems to provide the
underlying conditions, determinants, or constraints for the events
being described or explained.
 It is scarcely news to say that the broad context may influence
action and institutions, including political structures themselves.
 We speak of the historical conditions which shape or constrain
events and their outcomes.
 we began to feel that we cannot understand political and social
events in general without interpreting them as products of great
historical movements originating in the medieval European
period.
 we cannot hope to understand the here and now, including
ordinary observed structures, without in some way seeing them
interwoven in the total political fabric.
 there is a reality to this usage even though to be persuaded of it
fully, we need a kind of justification and specification
 to set out on our exploration of political structures it is not only
useful but also necessary to distinguish between those that seem
to be given directly to us through observation (lower-order ones)
and others that may need to be discovered through a more
deliberate process of abstraction (higher-order structures).
 we have tended to show a greater interest in the description and
effects of these kinds of lower-order political structures, together
with their specific determinants than in their relation to the
overall structure of the political system
if we are convinced that lower-order structures do have
effects we might well begin our thinking about any theory
of such structures by inquiring into why they take the form
they do.
if we are searching for the determinants of their form, it
will not be enough to look for specific determinants.
We would need to take into consideration the extent to
which the form of observed structures, such as that of the
regime, results from the overall structural context (the
higher-order structure) of the political system itself.
The idea that structures do have effects has not
gone without serious challenge. Once we have
satisfied ourselves that structure is not merely
epiphenomenal, we can then move to the core of
our argument and inquire into the way in which
we may go about understanding the forces that
influence the forms of observed structures, such
as those found in regimes and their associated
structures.
 Structure, Agency and Power in Political Analysis: Beyond
Contextualised Self-Interpretations
 Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes’ interpretive approach to political
analysis.
 they have endeavoured to construct a distinctive approach which
strikes a productive balance between philosophical reflection and
analytical attention to the empirical domain.
 They wage a war along a number of fronts:
 positivism, institutionalism and post-structuralism, and so an
analysis of their work enables us to take stock of a range of
contemporary methods and approaches.
 It can be argued that Bevir and Rhodes risk overplaying the role
of interpreting the individual beliefs and desires of relevant actors
to the detriment of a wider net of social practices and logics.
 the radical contingency of social structures and human agency
discloses new ways of understanding both their character and
their mutual intertwining.
 they argue that an approach developed around different sorts of
logics goes some way to steering a different course between a
pure thick descriptivism that focuses principally on individual
beliefs and desires on the one hand, and a concern with causal
laws and mechanisms on the other..
 We can understand and explain practices and actions adequately only
by reference to the beliefs and desires of the relevant actors. Hence to
study political life adequately we have to engage in the interpretation of
the beliefs and desires of those we study.
 Recent discussions about the character, purpose and methods of
political science have highlighted a number of problems in law-like and
positivist accounts of political science.
 The debates have also brought a renewed interest in alternative
approaches to political analysis
 interpretivism’s characters draw upon a variety of theoretical traditions
to articulate a distinctive critique and response to the positivist
mainstream.
 there has been a proliferation of interpretive approaches in the social
and political sciences.
 while interpretivism comes in many forms, its proponents are unified in
their opposition to the causal law model, and their desire to understand
the meanings of human actions and practices in particular contexts.
 the common denominator of this approach is a critique of the
naturalistic ideal of causal explanation
 equally important is the adoption of a perspective that seeks ‘from
within’ to make intelligible the meanings and reasons social agents give
for their actions and practices.
 This approach contrasts with the objectivistic standpoint of the
positivist mainstream
 those within the hermeneutical tradition focus on the practice
of interpreting the self-interpretations of social actors in
particular historical contexts.
 Contextualised self-interpretations thus become the key
component of the hermeneutical logic of explanation in the
social sciences.
 an analysis of their work enables us to take stock of a range of
contemporary methods and approaches. In so doing analysing
the history of various traditions of political science and models
of government and governance, as well as conducting
ethnographies of several governance regimes and practices.
 It is important to stress that the concern is not so much with an
evaluation of their empirical studies and conclusions.
 Bevir and Rhodes overplay the role of interpreting the individual
beliefs and desires of relevant actors to the detriment of a wider net of
social practices and logics, and second that they not only provide a
caricature of ‘the’ post-structuralist account of the so-called ‘structure–
agency’ debate, but that in so doing they miss an opportunity to take
advantage of an important set of conceptual and theoretical resources
with which to address this thorny issue in contemporary political analysis.
 radical contingency of social structures and human agency discloses
new ways of understanding both their character and their mutual
intertwining.
 Analytical Interpretivism: Tradition, Dilemmas, Situated Agency
 Bevir and Rhodes present us with a relatively clear and
parsimonious model of critical explanation in political science.
 Drawing upon and modifying Donald Davidson’s picture of
human action, their first task is to ‘unpack’ the beliefs and desires
of individual actors in an effort to explain the latter’s for acting the
ways they did.
 The second task is to construct ‘narratives’ which ‘point to the
beliefs and desires that cause the actions’. Rival narratives are
then compared and evaluated by determining which ‘best fit’ the
available facts.
 This opens the way for a critical evaluation of the different stories
and, more importantly, prepares the way for a critique of the actual
beliefs, practices and traditions so interpreted.
 In this conception a fact is ‘a statement, typically about a piece of
evidence, which nearly everyone in the relevant community would
accept as true’, and narratives ‘explain shared facts by postulating
significant relationships, connections, or similarities between them’.
 Bevir and Rhodes advocate the comparison of ‘bundles of narratives’
by assessing ‘their success in relating facts to one another, highlighting
similarities and differences, and exploring continuities and
disjunctions’.
 we need to move beyond self-interpretations to the practice
of interpreting self-interpretations.
 , interpretivists (of various hues) agree that interpreting self-
interpretations yields contextualised self-interpretations as the
prime means of elucidating social and political phenomena
 Bevir and Rhodes’ work is especially attractive because it
holds out the promise of furnishing us with a set of concepts
with which to explain social and political change beyond the
self- interpretations of the actors themselves.
 the notion of a tradition refers ‘to the initial human condition of being thrown
into a world already inhabited not only by people, but also by their definite
beliefs’
 ‘a set of understandings someone acquires as an initial web of beliefs during
a process of socialization’, traditions are ‘contingent entities’ which ‘people
produce by their own activities’.
 This means that the notion of a tradition incorporates both inherited beliefs
and transformed beliefs, ‘as they are handed down from generation to
generation’. And while the notion of tradition is evocative of social structures
‘in which individuals are born’, and ‘which then acts as the background of
their beliefs and actions’, individuals can ‘adapt, develop, and reject much of
this inheritance’.
The concept of tradition therefore makes possible an
analysis of individuals who ‘inherit’ ‘a set of beliefs that
forms the background to their later reasoning’, but who can
nevertheless via their ‘local reasoning’ transform such
beliefs over time.
The concept of ‘tradition’ is intimately connected to the
idea of a ‘dilemma’.
any new belief, merely by virtue of being adopted, poses a
question of the web of beliefs into which it is inserted
 Dilemmas are deemed to occur when there is a mismatch or conflict
between ‘perceptions of failings’ and the existing beliefs of
individuals, which ‘push them to reconsider beliefs and the
intellectual tradition that informs those beliefs’.
 It is this interplay between traditions and dilemmas that Bevir and
Rhodes use to explore the question of social change.
 This is because change occurs when agents respond to novel ideas
or problems.
 It is a result of people’s ability to adopt beliefs and perform actions
through a reasoning that is embedded in the tradition they inherit.
 the emergence of novel ideas or problems in a particular tradition
offers opportunities for individuals to reflect and act in different ways,
and the resultant social practices can have the effect of altering
institutions and traditions.
 while critical of aggregate concepts and abstractions such as
‘structure’ or ‘ideology’, Bevir and Rhodes are not averse to
acknowledging their importance in explaining political action and social
change.
 the key question they must address is how to connect traditions and
dilemmas with individual beliefs and desires, and thus to explain
change.
 It is here that Bevir and Rhodes insist on the importance of what
they call ‘situated agency’
 While they endorse post-structuralist critiques of strong human
autonomy, which do away with any form of structural constraint
or empowerment, they are opposed to what they present as the
complete abandonment of agency by post-structuralist theorists
such as Foucault and Laclau.
 for post-structuralists in general individuals are ‘mere effects of
discourse’. The basic claim here, then, is that post-structuralists
reify entities such as discourses or ideologies
 As Bevir and Rhodes put it, post-structuralists are mistaken
‘to conceive of traditions as reified quasi-structures that
somehow determine the beliefs that people come to hold’.
Instead, their alternative categories of traditions, dilemmas and
situated agency entail neither the valuing of order as such, nor
the idea that structures constitute insurmountable obstacles to
change, but are compatible with a form of methodological
individualism in which agents can alter their beliefs and
traditions. As Bevir puts it, ‘Individuals are agents capable both
of modifying traditions and of migrating across traditions’