University of Santo Tomas

Faculty of Civil Law

CRIMINAL LAW

Questions Asked More Than Once

QuAMTO 2021
QuAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as suggested by the UPLC and other
distinct luminaries in the academe, and updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the
2021 Bar Exams.

Bar questions are arranged per topic in accordance with the bar syllabus released by the
Supreme Court and were selected based on their occurrence on past bar examinations from 1987
to 2019.

ACADEMICS COMMITTEE

MARIA FRANCES FAYE R. GUTIERREZ SECRETARY GENERAL

JOHN EDWARD F. FRONDA

ANGEL ISAH M. ROMERO
KIRBY ANNE C. RENIA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
KAREN ABBIE C. ASPIRAS
JOSE CHRISTIAN ANTHONY I. PINZON
NATHAN RAPHAEL D.L. AGUSTIN

MARIA FRANCES FAYE R. GUTIERREZ LAYOUT AND DESIGN

QuAMTO COMMITTEE MEMBERS

JUSTINE ISCAH F. MADRILEJOS

RON-SOPHIA NICOLE C. ANTONIO
REEM D. PRUDENCIO
LARISA C. SERRANO

ATTY. VICENTE JAN O. PLATON III

ATTY. AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON
ADVISERS
OUR DEEPEST APPRECIATION TO OUR
MENTORS AND INSPIRATION
JUSTICE AMPARO CABOTAJE-TANG

JUDGE OSCAR B. PIMENTEL

JUDGE PHILIP AGUINALDO

JUDGE CHRISTIAN PIMENTEL

JUDGE MADONNA ECHIVERRI

JUDGE PEDRO DABU

PROSECUTOR VICTORIA GARCIA

ATTY. LORENZO GAYYA

ATTY. RONALD CHUA

ATTY. RAMON ESGUERRA

ATTY. JEDREK NG

ATTY. GIDGET ROSE DUQUE

ATTY. ALWYNE FAYE MENDOZA

For being our guideposts in understanding

the intricate sphere of Criminal Law.
- Academics Committee 2021
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
CRIMINAL LAW QUAMTO
________________________________________________________
PART I.
REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK I
________________________________________________________
A. FUNDAMENTAL AND GENERAL
PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW
Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws
Q: What are the limitations upon the power of
Congress to enact penal laws? (1988, 2012
BAR)
A: The limitations upon the power of congress to
enact penal laws are as follows:
1. Congress cannot enact an ex post facto law.
2. Congress cannot enact a bill of attainder.
3. Congress cannot provide for a cruel
punishment.
However, other limitations may be considered
such as:
1. Congress cannot enact a law which shall
punish for a condition. Congress shall punish
an act and not the condition or status.
(Robinson v. California)
2. Congress should consider Article 21 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that
“penalties that may be imposed.” No felony
shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission.”
Doctrine of Pro Reo (2010, 2012 BAR)
Q: What is the Doctrine of Pro Reo? How does it
relate to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
(2010 BAR)
A: The Doctrine of Pro Reo provides that whenever
a penal law is to be construed or applied and the
law admits of two interpretations, one lenient to
the offender and one strict to the offender, that
interpretation which is lenient or favorable to the
offender will be adopted.
Following this doctrine, crimes under Art. 48 of the
RPC are complexed and punished with a single
penalty (that prescribed for the most serious crime
and to be imposed in its maximum period). The
rationale being, that the accused who commits two
crimes with a single criminal impulse
demonstrates lesser perversity than when the
crimes are committed by different acts and several
criminal resolutions. (People v. Comadre, G.R. No.
153559, June 8, 2004)
However, Art. 48 shall be applied only when it
would bring about the imposition of a penalty
lesser than the penalties imposable for all the
component crimes if prosecuted separately.
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2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
Q: What is the fundamental principle in
applying and interpreting criminal laws xxx?
(2012 BAR)
A: The fundamental principle in interpreting and
applying penal laws is the principle of pro reo.
The phrase “in dubio pro reo” means “when in
doubt, for the accused” (Intestate Estate of
Gonzales v. People, GR No. 181409, February 11,
2010). This is in consonance with the
constitutional guarantee that the accused ought
to be presumed innocent until and unless his
guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt
(See People v. Temporary, GR No. 173473)
Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita (1997, 1999,
2001, 2003, 2005, 2017 BAR)
Q: Distinguish between crimes mala in se and
mala prohibita. (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003,
2005, 2017 BAR)
A: In concept, crimes mala in se are those where
the acts or omissions penalized are intently bad,
evil, or wrong that they are almost universally
condemned. Crimes mala prohibita are those
where the acts penalized are not inherently bad,
evil, or wrong but prohibited by law for public
good, public welfare, or interest and whoever
violate the prohibition are penalized.
In legal implications, in crimes mala in se, good
faith or lack of criminal intent or negligence is a
defense, while in crimes mala prohibita, good
faith or lack of criminal intent or malice is not a
defense; it is enough that the prohibition was
voluntarily violated. Also, criminal liability is
generally incurred in crimes mala in se even
when the crime is only attempted or frustrated,
while in crimes mala prohibita, criminal liability
is generally incurred only when the crime is
consummated.
Further, in crimes mala in se, mitigating and
aggravating circumstances are appreciated in
imposing the penalties, while in crimes mala
prohibita, such circumstances are not
appreciated unless the special law has adopted
the scheme or scale of penalties under the
Revised Penal Code.
Lack of criminal intent is a valid defense in mala
in se except when the crime results from
criminal negligence. Such defense is not
available in cases of mala prohibita.
All crimes punished under the Revised Penal
Code, and any amendments thereto through
special penal laws, are considered mala in se. As
such, they are called Felonies. While Crimes
punished by special penal laws, standing alone,
are considered as mala prohibita.
Q: May an act be malum in se and be, at the
same time, malum prohibitum? (1997 BAR)
UST
1 BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
A: YES, an act may be malum in se and malum
prohibitum at the same time. In People v. Sunico,
et. al. (CA, 50 OG 5880) it was held that the
omission or failure of election inspection and poll
clerks to include a voter’s name in the registry
list of voters is wrong per se because it
disenfranchises a voter of his right to vote. In this
regard, it is considered as malum in se. Since it is
punished under a special law (Sec. 101 and 103,
Revised Election Code), it is considered malum
prohibitum.
Applicability and Effectivity of the Penal Code
(1988, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2014, 2015, 2016
BAR)
Q: State the characteristics of criminal law
and explain each. (1988, 1998 BAR)
A: The characteristics of criminal law are as
follows:
1. Generality – that the law is binding upon all
persons who reside to sojourn in the
Philippines, irrespective of age, sex, color,
creed, or personal circumstances.
2. Territoriality – that the law is applicable to
all crimes committed within the limits of
Philippine territory, which includes its
atmosphere interior water and maritime
zone. (Art. 2)
3. Prospectivity – that the law does not have any
retroactive effect, except if it favors the
offender unless he is a habitual delinquent
(Art. 22) or the law otherwise provides.
Q: Abe, married to Liza, contracted another
marriage with Connie in Singapore.
Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the
Philippines and lived as husband and wife in
the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna. Can
Abe be prosecuted for bigamy? (1994 BAR)
A: NO. Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy
since the bigamous marriage was contracted or
solemnized in Singapore; hence, such violation is
not one of those where the Revised Penal Code,
under Art. 2 thereof, may be applied
extraterritoriality. The general rule on
territoriality of criminal law governs the
situation.
Q: After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel
Beer and taking two plates of “pulutan”,
Binoy, a Filipino seaman, stabbed to death Sio
My, a Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V
“Princess of the Pacific”, an overseas vessel
which was sailing in the South China Sea. The
vessel, although Panamanian registered, is
owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino
businessman. When M/V “Princess of the
Pacific” reached a Philippine Port at Cebu
City, the Captain of the vessel turned over the
assailant Binoy to the Philippine authorities.
An Information for homicide was filed against
Binoy in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
He moved to quash the Information for lack of
jurisdiction. If you were the judge, will you
grant the motion? Why? (2000 BAR)
2
A: YES. The motion to quash the information
should be granted. The Philippine court has no
jurisdiction over the crime committed since it
was committed on the high seas or outside of
Philippine territory and on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines. (US v.
Fowler, 1 Phil 614)
It is the registration of the vessel in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines, not the
citizenship of her owner, which makes it a
Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in
Panama, the laws of Panama shall govern while it
is in the high seas.
Q: Ando, an Indonesian national who just
visited the Philippines, purchased a ticket for
a passenger vessel bound for Hong Kong.
While on board the vessel, he saw his mortal
enemy Iason, also an Indonesian national,
seated at the back portion of the cabin and
who was busy reading a newspaper. Ando
stealthily approached Iason and when he was
near him, Ando stabbed and killed Iason. The
vessel is registered in Malaysia. The killing
happened just a few moments after the vessel
left the port of Manila. Operatives from the
PNP Maritime Command arrested Ando.
Presented for the killing of Iason, Ando
contended that he did not incur criminal
liability because both he and the victim were
Indonesians. He likewise argued that he could
not be prosecuted in Manila because the
vessel is a Malaysian- registered ship. Discuss
the merits of Ando's contentions. (2015 BAR)
A: Both contentions of Ando lack merit. The
argument of Ando that he did not incur criminal
liability because both he and the victim were
Indonesians is not tenable. Under the generality
principle, penal laws shall be obligatory upon all
who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory
(Art. 14, New Civil Code). The foreign
characteristic of an offender and offended party
does not exclude him from operation of penal
laws (People v. Galacgac, C.A., 54 O.G. 1027).
Under the Revised Penal Code, except as
provided in treaties and laws of preferential
application, penal laws of the Philippines shall
have force and effect within its territory. Here,
since the killing took place within the Philippine
territory, our penal laws applies and Ando may
be held criminally responsible despite his being
and Indonesian citizen.
Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws
Q: Congress passed a law reviving the Anti-
Subversion Law, making it a criminal offense
again for a person to join the Communist Party
of the Philippines. Reporma, a former high-
ranking member of the Communist Party, was
charged under the new law for his
membership in the Communist Party when he
was a student in the 80’s. He now challenges
the charge against him. What objections may
he raise? (2014 BAR)
A: Reporma may raise the limitations imposed by
the 1987 Constitution on the power of Congress to
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
enact retroactive penal laws which are prejudicial
to the accused. Under the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution such is classified as an ex post facto
law. It should be noted that when Congress
decriminalized the crime of subversion, under R.A.
7637, it obliterated the felony and its effects upon
Reporma. Consequently, charging him now under
the new law for his previous membership in the
Communist Party would be constitutionality
impermissible.
B. FELONIES
Corpus delicti (2000, 2001 BAR)
Q:
a. Define “Corpus delicti”.
b. What are the elements of “Corpus delicti”?
(2000 BAR)
A:
a. Corpus Delicti literally means “the body or
substance of the crime” or the fact that a crime
has been committed, but does not include the
identity of the person who committed it.
(People v. Pascal, 44 OG 2789)
b. Elements of corpus delicti: The actual
commission by someone of the particular
crime charged. It is a compound fact made up
of two things:
1. The existence of a certain act or result
forming the basis of the criminal charge;
and
2. The existence of a criminal agency as the
cause of the act or result.
NOTE: The identity of the offender is not a
necessary element of corpus delicti.
Q: At a birthday party in Cebu, A got
intoxicated and started quarreling with B and
C. At the height of their arguments, A left and
took a bolo from his house, after which he
returned to the party and threatened to stab
everybody. B got scared and ran towards the
seashore, with A chasing him. B ran up a steep
incline along the shore and was cornered on
top of a cliff. Out of fear, B jumped from the
cliff into the sea. A returned to the scene of
their confrontation and seeing that nobody
was there, went home to sleep. The next day,
B’s wife reported to the police station that her
husband had not yet come home. A search
was conducted by the residents of the
barangay but after almost two days, B or his
body could not be located and his
disappearance continued for the next few
days. Based on the testimony of C and other
guests, who had seen A and B on top of the
cliff, A was arrested and charged with
Murder. In his defense, he claimed that since
B’s body has not been found, there was no
evidence of corpus delicti and therefore, he
should be acquitted.
Is the defense of A tenable or not? State the
reason(s) for your answer? (2001 BAR)
A: NO. The defense of A is not tenable. “Corpus
delicti” does not refer to the body of the
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purported victim which had not been found.
Even without the body of the purported victim
being found, the offender can be convicted
when the facts and circumstances of a crime,
the body of the crime or “corpus delicti” is
established.
In other words, the non-recovery of the body
of the victim is not a bar to the prosecution of
A for Murder, but the fact of death and identity
of the victim must be established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Motive and Intent (1988, 1996, 1999, 2004,
2006 BAR)
Q: May a crime be committed without
criminal intent? (1988 BAR)
A: YES A crime may be committed without
criminal intent in two cases:
1. In offenses punishable as mala prohibita;
and
2. Felonies committed by means of culpa.
Q: Distinguish intent from motive in
Criminal Law. (1996, 2004 BAR)
A: Motive is the moving power which impels
one to action for a definite result; whereas
intent is the purpose to use a particular means
to effect such results. Motive is not an
essential element of a felony and need not be
proved for purpose of conviction, while intent
is an essential element of felonies by dolo.
Q: When is motive relevant to prove a case?
When is it not necessary to be established?
Explain. (1999, 2006 BAR)
A: Motive is relevant to prove a case when
there is doubt as to the identity of the offender
or when the act committed gives rise to variant
crimes and there is the need to determine the
proper crime to be imputed to the offender.
It is not necessary to prove motive when the
offender is positively identified or the criminal
act did not give rise to variant crimes.
Classification of felonies
Q: Define/Distinguish the following terms:
a. Grave, less grave, and light felonies;
b. Aberratio ictus, error in personae, and
praeter intentionem (2019 BAR)
A:
a. Under Art. 9 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), grave felonies are those to which the
law attaches the capital punishment or
penalties which in any of their periods are
afflictive, in accordance with Art. 25 of the
same Code. Less grave felonies are those
which the law punishes with penalties
which in their maximum period are
correccional, also in accordance with Art.
25. Light felonies are those infractions of
law for the commission of which a penalty
3 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
P40,000 or both is provided. (as amended by
R.A. 10951)
b. In aberratio ictus, there is a mistake in the
blow meaning to say that the offender
intending to cause an injury to one person
actually inflicts it on another because of lack
of precision. In error in personae, there is a
mistake in the identity of the victim. In
praeter intentionem, the injurious result is
greater than that intended by the offender,
the act exceeds the intent.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME (1994, 1998, 2000,
2004, 2009, 2014 BAR)
Q: JP, Aries, and Randal planned to kill Elsa,
a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel,
Batangas. They asked the assistance of Ella,
who is familiar with the place.
On April 3, 1992, at about 10:00 in the
evening, JP, Aries, and Randal, all armed
with automatic weapons, went to Barangay
Pula. Ella, being the guide, directed her
companions to the room in the house of
Elsa. Whereupon, JP, Aries and Randal fired
their guns at her room. Fortunately, Elsa
was not around as she attended a prayer
meeting that evening in another barangay
in Laurel. JP, et. al., were charged and
convicted of attempted murder by the
Regional Trial Court at Tanauan, Batangas.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all the
accused ascribed to the trial court the sole
error of finding them guilty of attempted
murder. If you were the ponente, how will
you decide the appeal? (1994 BAR)
A: If I were the ponente, I will set aside the
judgment convicting the accused of attempted
murder and instead find them guilty of
impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2, RPC, in
relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for impossible
crime arises not only when the impossibility is
legal, but likewise when it is factual or physical
impossibility, as in the case at bar.
Elsa’s absence from the house is a physical
impossibility which renders the crime intended
inherently incapable of accomplishment. To
convict the accused of attempted murder
would make Art. 4, par. 2, practically useless as
all circumstances which prevented the
consummation of the offense will be treated as
an incident independent of the actor’s will
which is an element of attempted or frustrated
felony. (Intod v. CA, 215 SCRA 52)
Q: Puti detested Pula, his roommate,
because Pula was courting Ganda, whom
Puti fancied. One day, Puti decided to teach
Pula a lesson and went to a veterinarian to
ask for poison on the pretext that he was
going to kill a sick pet, when actually Puti
was intending to poison Pula, the Vet
instantly gave Puti a non-toxic solution
which, when mixed with Pula’s food, did not
kill Pula. What crime, if any, did Puti
commit? (1994, 1998, 2004, 2009, 2014
4
BAR)
A: Puti committed an impossible crime of
murder. Puti, with intent to kill Pula,
unknowingly employed ineffectual means to
accomplish the intended felony, that is, using a
non-toxic solution.
Q:
a. What is an impossible crime?
b. Is an impossible crime really a crime?
c. A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites,
proceeded to the house of X, Y, a
neighbor of X, who happened to be
passing by, pointed to the four culprits
the room that X occupied. The four
culprits peppered the room with bullets.
Not satisfied, A even threw a hand
grenade that totally destroyed X’s room.
However, unknown to the four culprits, X
was not inside the room and nobody was
hit or injured during the incident. Are A,
B, C and D liable for any crime? Explain.
d. Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by
Enrique, the tricycle driver paid by her
parents to bring and fetch her to and
from school. Enrique wrote a ransom
note demanding P500,000 from Carla’s
parents in exchange for Carla’s freedom.
Enrique sent the ransom note by mail.
However, before the ransom note was
received by Carla’s parents, Enrique’s
hideout was discovered by the police.
Carla was rescued while Enrique was
arrested and incarcerated. Considering
that the ransom note was not received
by Carla’s parents, the investigating
prosecutor merely filed a case of
“Impossible Crime to Commit
Kidnapping” against Enrique. Is the
prosecutor correct? (2000 BAR)
A:
a. Impossible crime is an act which would be an
offense against person or property, were if
not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means (Art. 4, par. 2, RPC).
b. NO. An impossible crime is not really a crime.
It is only so-called because the act gives rise
to criminal liability. But actually, no felony is
committed. The accused is to be punished for
his criminal tendency or propensity although
no crime was committed.
c. YES. A, B, C and D are liable for destructive
arson because of the destruction of the room
of X with the use of an explosive, the hand
grenade.
Liability for an impossible crime is to be
imposed only if the act committed would not
constitute any other crime under the Revised
Penal Code. Although the facts involved are
parallel to the case of Intod v. CA (215 SCRA
52), where it was ruled that the liability of the
offender was for an impossible crime, no
hand grenade was used in the said case,
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
which constitutes a more serious crime
though different from what was intended.
d. NO. The prosecutor is not correct in filing a
case for “impossible crime to commit
kidnapping” against Enrique.
Impossible crimes are limited only to acts
which when performed would be a crime
against persons or property. As kidnapping is
a crime against personal security and not
against persons or property, Enrique could
not have incurred an “impossible crime” to
commit kidnapping. There is thus no
impossible crime of kidnapping.
Q: Edgardo induced his friend Vicente, in
consideration of money, to kidnap a girl he is
courting so that he may succeed in raping her
and eventually making her accede to marry
him. Vicente asked for more money which
Edgardo failed to put up. Angered because
Edgardo did not put up the money he
required, he reported Edgardo to the police.
May Edgardo be charged with attempted
kidnapping? (1996 BAR)
A: NO. Edgardo may not be charged with
attempted kidnapping inasmuch as no overt act
to kidnap or restrain the liberty of the girl had
been commenced. At most, what Edgardo has
done in the premises was a proposal to Vicente
to kidnap the girl, which is only a preparatory act
and not an overt act. The attempt to commit a
felony commences with the commission of overt
act, not preparatory act. Proposal to commit
kidnapping is not a crime.
Q: Taking into account the nature and
elements of the felonies of coup d’etat and
rape, may one be criminally liable for
frustrated coup d’etat or frustrated rape?
Explain. (2005 BAR)
A: NO. A person may not be held liable for
frustrated coup d’etat or for frustrated rape
because in a frustrated felony, it is required that
all acts of execution that could produce the
felony as a consequence must have been
performed by the offender but the felony was not
produced by reason of causes independent of the
will of the offender. In the said felonies, one
cannot perform all the acts of execution without
consummating the felony. The said felonies,
therefore, do not admit of the frustrated stage.
Q: Why is there no crime of frustrated serious
physical injuries? (2017 BAR)
A: The crime of physical injuries is a formal
crime since a single act consummates it as a
matter of law; hence, it has no attempted or
frustrated stage. Once the injuries are inflicted,
the offense is consummated.
Q: Mr. A has a long-standing feud with Mr. B.
As payback for Mr. B's numerous
transgressions against him, Mr. A planned to
burn down Mr. B's rest house.
One night, Mr. A went to the rest house and
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2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
started pouring gasoline on its walls.
However, just as Mr. A had lit the match for
burning, he was discovered by Mr. B's
caretaker, Ms. C, and was consequently
prevented from setting the rest house on fire.
Mr. A was then charged with Frustrated
Arson. Is the charge of Frustrated Arson
proper? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: NO, the proper charge is Attempted Arson.
Under Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt when
the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. Here, Mr. A commenced the
commission of arson by pouring gasoline on the
house and lighting a match. However, he did not
perform all the acts of execution which includes
setting the rest house on fire. Thus, Mr. A should
only be liable for Attempted Arson.
COMPLEX AND COMPOSITE CRIMES
Complex crime (1987, 1989, 1991,
1994,1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2007,
2019 BAR)
Q: Jose purchased roofing materials worth
P20,000 from PY & Sons Construction
Company owned by Pedro and paid the latter
a check in the said amount. The following day,
Pedro deposited the check but it was
returned dishonored because it was drawn
against a closed account. Jose failed to make
good the said check despite written demands.
Atty. Saavedra, counsel for Pedro, filed two
complaints against Jose with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, one for estafa under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code and another
for violation of BP Blg. 22. Atty. San Pascual,
counsel for Jose, claimed that if his client was
at all liable, he could only be liable for
violation of BP 22 and not for estafa under
Art. 315 of the RPC because one precludes the
other and because BP 22 is more favorable to
the accused as it carries a lighter penalty.
The investigating fiscal, on his resolution,
stated that only one crime was committed,
namely, the complex crime of estafa under
Art. 315 of the RPC and another under BP 22.
Is the investigating fiscal correct? (Question
reframed) (1987 BAR)
A: NO. The resolution of the investigating fiscal is
erroneous. There is no complex crime of estafa
under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code and the
violation of BP 22. A complex crime refers only to
felonies which are punished in the Revised Penal
Code.
STAGES OF EXECUTION (1996, 2000, 2005,
2015, 2017, 2019 BAR)
Q: Rodolfo, a policeman, was cleaning his
service pistol inside his house when it fell
from his hand and fired. The bullet hit a
neighbor on the stomach and a second
5 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
neighbor on the leg. The injuries sustained by
the two neighbors required thirty-five (35)
days and nine (9) days of medical attendance,
respectively. The investigating fiscal later
filed an information for frustrated homicide
and slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Rodolfo. Is the charge
correct?
Explain. (1989 BAR)
A: NO, the charge is not correct. One single act of
accidental shooting cannot give rise to two
felonies - one of which is intentional and the
other negligent. Frustrated homicide
presupposes intent to kill. The facts do not show
any intent to kill on the part of Rodolfo. At most,
he was careless, and therefore only negligent.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Two separate crimes of serious physical injuries
(against the first neighbor whose injuries
requires 35 days of medical attendance), and
slight physical injuries (against the second
neighbor), both through reckless imprudence,
were committed by Rodolfo. Although both of
these offenses were the result of one single act, a
complex crime is not committed. It is only when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies that a complex crime may be
committed under Article 48 of the RPC. Slight
physical injuries is not a grave or less grave
felony.
The information filed should be reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries
and slight physical injuries.
Q: Harry, an overseas contract worker,
arrived from Saudi Arabia with considerable
savings. Knowing him to be “loaded”, his
friends Jason, Manuel and Dave invited him to
poker session at a rented beach cottage.
When he was losing almost all his money
which to him was his savings of a lifetime, he
discovered that he was being cheated by his
friends. Angered by the betrayal, he decided
to take revenge on the three cheats.
Harry ordered several bottles of Tanduay
Rhum and gave them to his companions to
drink, as they did, until they all fell asleep.
When Harry saw his companions already
sound asleep, he hacked them all to death.
Then he remembered his losses, he rifled
through the pockets of his victims and got
back all the money he lost. He then ran away
but not before burning the cottage to hide his
misdeed. The following day, police
investigators found among the debris the
charred bodies of Jason, Manuel, Dave and the
caretaker of the resort.
The Provincial Prosecutor charged Harry
with the complex crime of arson with
quadruple homicide and robbery. Was Harry
properly charged? Discuss. (1995 BAR)
A: NO. Harry was not properly charged. Harry
should have been charged with three (3)
6
separate crimes, namely: murder, theft, and
arson.
Harry killed Jason, Manuel and Dave with evident
premeditation, as there was considerable lapse of
time before he decided to commit the crime and
the actual commission of the crime. In addition,
Harry employed means which weakened the
defense of Jason, Manuel, and Dave. Harry gave
them the liquor to drink until they were drunk
and fell asleep.
The taking of the money was a mere afterthought
of the killings. Hence, Harry committed the
separate crime of theft and not the complex
crime of robbery with homicide. Although theft
was committed against dead persons, it is still
legally possible as the offended party are the
estates of the victims.
In burning the cottage, it is another separate
crime of arson. The act of burning was not
necessary for the consummation of the two
previous offenses he committed. The fact that the
caretaker died from the blaze did not qualify
Harry’s crime into a complex crime of arson with
homicide for there is no such crime.
Hence, Harry was improperly charged with the
complex crime of arson with quadruple homicide
and robbery. Harry should have been charged
with three separate crimes, murder, theft and
arson.
Q: A, actuated by malice and with the use of a
fully automatic M-14 sub-machine gun, shot a
group of persons who were seated in a
cockpit with one burst of successive,
continuous, automatic fire. Four (4) persons
were killed thereby, each having hit by
different bullets coming from the sub-
machine gun of A. Four (4) cases of murder
were filed against A.
The trial court ruled that there was only one
crime committed by A for the reason that,
since A performed only one act, he having
pressed the trigger of his gun only once, the
crime committed was murder. Consequently,
the trial judge sentenced A to just one penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
a. Was the decision of the trial judge
correct? Explain.
b. What constitutes a complex crime? How
many crimes may be involved in a
complex crime? What is the penalty
therefor? (1999 BAR)
A:
a. NO. The decision of the trial judge is not
correct. When the offender made use of an
automatic firearm, the acts committed are
determined by the number of bullets
discharged inasmuch as the firearm being
automatic, the offender need only press the
trigger once and it would fire continually.
For each death caused by a distinct and
separate bullet, the accused incurs distinct
criminal liability. Hence, it is not the act of
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
pressing the trigger which should be
considered as producing the several
felonies, but the number of bullets which
actually produced them.
b. A complex crime is constituted when a
single act caused two or more grave or less
grave felonies or when an offense is
committed as a necessary means to commit
another offense. (Art 48, RPC)
At least two crimes are involved in a
complex crime; either two or more grave or
less grave felonies resulted from a single
act, or an offense is committed as a
necessary means for committing another.
The penalty for the more serious crime shall
be imposed and in its maximum period.
(Art. 48, RPC)
Q: Distinguish between compound and
complex crime as concepts. (2004, 2019 BAR)
A: Compound crimes result when the offender
committed only a single felonious act from which
two or more crimes resulted. This is provided for
in modified form in the first part of Article 48,
RPC, limiting the resulting crimes to only grave
and/or less grave felonies. Hence, light felonies
are excluded even though resulting from the
same single act.
Complex crime results when the offender has to
commit an offense as a necessary means for
committing another offense. Only one
Information shall be filed and if proven, the
penalty for the more serious crime shall be
imposed.
Special Complex Crime (1989, 1995, 1997,
2003, 2005, 2006, 2016 BAR)
Q: After raping the complainant in her house,
the accused struck a match to smoke a
cigarette before departing from the scene.
The brief light from the match allowed him to
notice a watch in her wrist. He demanded
that she hand over the watch. When she
refused, he forcibly grabbed it from her. The
accused was charged with and convicted of
the special complex crime of robbery with
rape. Was the court correct? (1997 BAR)
A: NO. The accused should instead be held liable
for two separate crimes of robbery and rape,
since the primary intent or objective of the
accused was only to rape the complainant, and
his commission of the robbery was merely an
afterthought. The robbery must precede the
rape, in order to give rise to the special complex
crime for which the court convicted the accused.
Q: Distinguish between an ordinary complex
crime and a special complex crime as to
their concepts and as to the imposition of
penalties. (2003 BAR)
A: In concept – An ordinary complex crime is
made up of two or more crimes being punished
in distinct provisions of the Revised Penal Code
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
but alleged in one information either because
they were brought about by a single felonious
act or because one offense is a necessary means
for committing the other offense or offenses.
They are alleged in one information so that
only one penalty shall be imposed. A special
complex crime, on the other hand, is made up
of two or more crimes which are considered
only as components of a single indivisible
offense being punished in one provision of the
Revised Penal Code.
As to penalties – In ordinary complex crime, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed and in its maximum period. In special
complex crime, only one penalty is specifically
prescribed for all the component crimes which
are regarded as one indivisible offense. The
component crimes are not regarded as distinct
crimes and so the penalty to be imposed for the
most serious crime is not the penalty to be
imposed nor in its maximum period. It is the
penalty specifically provided for the special
complex crime that shall be applied according
to the rules on imposition of the penalty.
Q: Pedro, Pablito, Juan, and Julio, all armed
with bolos, robbed the house where
Antonio, his wife, and three (3) daughters
were residing. While the four were
ransacking Antonio's house, Julio noticed
that one of Antonio's daughters was trying
to escape. He chased and caught up with her
at a thicket somewhat distant from the
house, but before bringing her back, raped
her.
a. What crime or crimes, if any, did Pedro,
Pablito, Juan, and Julio commit? Explain.
b. Suppose, after the robbery, the four took
turns in raping the three daughters
inside the house, and, to prevent
identification, killed the whole family
just before they left. What crime or
crimes, if any, did the four malefactors
commit? (2016 BAR)
A:
a. Julio is liable for special complex crime of
robbery with rape since he had carnal
knowledge of Antonio’s daughter on
occasion or by reason of robbery. Even if the
place of robbery is different from that of
rape, what is important is the direct
connection between the crimes (People v.
Canastre, G.R. No. L-2055, December 24,
1948).
Pedro, Pablito, and Juan are liable for
robbery by a band since more than three
armed malefactors took part in the
commission of robbery. There were four of
them. Under Art. 296 of RPC, any member of
a band, who is present at the commission of a
robbery by a band, shall be punished as
principal of any of the assaults committed,
unless it be shown that he attempted to
prevent the same.
However, Pedro, Pablito, and Juan are not
liable for rape since they were not present
7 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
when the victim was raped and thus, they
had no opportunity to prevent the same.
They are only liable for robbery by band
(People v. Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June
8, 2011).
b. They are liable for special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. It is immaterial that
several persons are killed and the number of
rapes committed by reason or on occasion of
the crime. Since homicides are committed by
or on occasion of the robbery, the multiple
rapes committed shall be integrated into one
and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide (People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April
3, 2013)
Composite crime (1998, 1999, 2004, 2017,
2018 Bar)
Q: A, B, C and D all armed, robbed a bank and
when they were about to get out of the bank,
policemen came and ordered them to
surrender but they fired on the police officers
who fired back and shot it out with them.
Suppose a bank employee was killed and the
bullet which killed him came from the
firearm of the police officers, with what crime
shall you charge A, B, C and D? (1998, 2004,
2018 Bar)
A: A, B, C and D should be charged with the crime
of robbery with homicide because the death of
the bank employee was brought about by the acts
of said offenders on the occasion of robbery.
They shot it out with the policeman, thereby
causing such death by reason or on the occasion
of robbery; Hence, the composite crime of
robbery with homicide.
Q: Samuel, a tricycle driver, plied his usual
route using a Honda motorcycle with a
sidecar. One evening, Raul rode on the
sidecar, poked a knife at Samuel and
instructed him to go near a bridge. Upon
reaching the bridge, Raul alighted from the
motorcycle and suddenly stabbed Samuel
several times until he was dead. Raul fled
from the scene taking the motorcycle with
him. What crime(s) did Raul commit? (1998,
2004 BAR)
A: Raul committed the composite crime of
Carnapping with homicide under Sec. 14 of R.A.
6539, as amended, considering that the killing “in
the course of” or “on the occasion of” a carnapping.
(People v. De la Cruz, 183 SCRA 763). A motorcycle
is included in the definition of a “motor vehicle” in
said Republic Act. There is no apparent motive for
the killing of the tricycle driver but for Raul to be
able to take the motorcycle. The fact that the
tricycle driver was killed brings about the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
Q: During the nationwide transport strike to
protest the phase out of old public utility
vehicles, striking jeepney drivers Percy, Pablo,
Pater and Sencio, each armed with guns, hailed
several MMDA buses then providing free
transport to the stranded public to stop them
8
from plying their routes. They later on
commandeered one of the buses without
allowing any of the passengers to alight, and
told the driver to bring the bus to Tanay, Rizal.
Upon reaching a remote area in Tanay, Percy,
Pablo, Pater and Sencio forcibly divested the
passengers of their cash and valuables. They
ordered the passengers to leave thereafter.
Then, they burned the bus. When a tanod of
the barangay of the area came around to
Intervene, Pater fired at him, instantly killing
him.
After Percy, Pablo, Pater and Sencio were
arrested, the police authorities recommended
them to be charged with the following crimes,
to wit: (1) carnapping; (2) robbery, (3) direct
assault with homicide; (4) kidnapping; and
(5) arson.
State your legal opinion on the
recommendation of the police authorities on
the criminal liabilities incurred by Percy,
Pablo, Pater and Sencio. (2017 BAR)
A: The proper charges should be carnapping and
robbery with homicide. Robbery absorbs
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
detention was only incidental to the main crime of
robbery. If the main objective is to commit
robbery while homicide and arson are perpetrated
by reason or on occasion thereof, the crime
committed is robbery with homicide while arson
shall be integrated into this special complex crime.
However, the use of fire shall only be considered
as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Q: Two young men, A and B, conspired to rob a
residential house of things of value. They
succeeded in the commission of their original
plan to simply rob. A, however, was sexually
aroused when he saw the lady owner of the
house, and so raped her.
The lady victim testified that B did not in any
way participate in the rape but he watched the
happening from a window and did nothing to
stop the rape. Is B as criminally liable as A for
robbery with rape? Explain. (1999 BAR)
A: YES. B is as criminally liable for the composite
crime of robbery with rape under Art. 294 (1).
Although the conspiracy of A and B was only to
rob, B was present when the rape was being
committed which gave rise to a composite crime, a
single indivisible offense of robbery with rape. B
would not have been liable had he endeavored to
prevent the commission of the rape. But since he
did not when he could have done so, he in effect
acquiesced with the rape as a component of the
robbery and so he is also liable for robbery with
rape.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
(1993, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 1996,
2008, 2016, 2017, 2019 BAR)
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between
justifying and exempting circumstances in
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
criminal law. (2004, 1998 BAR)
A: Justifying circumstance affects the act, not the
actor; while exempting circumstance affects the
actor, not the act. In justifying circumstance, no
criminal and, generally, no civil liability is
incurred; while in exempting circumstance, civil
liability is generally incurred although there is no
criminal liability.
Self-Defense (Defense of Person, Rights,
Property and Honor)
Q: Porthos made a sudden turn on a dark
street, and his Rolls-Royce SUV bumped the
rear of a parked Cadillac Sedan inside which
Aramis was then taking a nap. Angered by
the violent Impact, Aramis alighted and
confronted Porthos who had also alighted.
Aramis angrily and repeatedly shouted at
Porthos: Putang Ina mo! Porthos, displaying
fearlessness, aggressively shouted back at
Aramis: Wag kang magtapang-tapangan
dyan, papatayin kita! Without saying
anything more, Aramis drew his gun from his
waist and shot Porthos in the leg. Porthos'
wound was not life threatening.
a. What are the kinds of unlawful
aggression, and which kind was
displayed in this case?
b. Standing trial for
frustrated murder, Aramis pleaded self-
defense. The Prosecution's contention
was that the plea of self-defense applied
only to consummated killings. Rule, with
explanations, on the tenability of Aramis'
claim of self-defense, and on the
Prosecution's contention. (2017 BAR)
A:
a. Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a)
actual or material unlawful aggression; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression. (People v.
Dulin, 760 SCRA 413, June 29, 2015)
There was neither material nor imminent
unlawful aggression here. On the part of
Porthos, while Aramis displayed
fearlessness and aggressively shouted back
at him, there was no physical force or
weapon that might endanger his life. In
other words, it was not life threatening.
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
It was Aramis who was the aggressor here in
view of his act in actually shooting Porthos,
although on his leg only. Hence, we could
conclude that there was no intent to kill.
b. Aramis cannot plead that his act in shooting
Porthos was self- defense. There was no
element of unlawful aggression as a
condition sine qua non on the part of
Porthos.
The accidental bumping of his car by
Porthos cannot be considered as enough
provocation, neither was the verbal tussle
between them. No person can be killed or
injured by act of shouting fearlessly against
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
each other. I cannot also adhere to the
prosecution’s contention that self- defense
applies only to consummated killings. Self-
defense applies even in frustrated murder as
the law did not qualify its application.
(People v. Dulin, 760 SCRA 413, June 29, 2015;
People v. Nugas, 661 SCRA 159, November 23,
2011)
Q: BB and CC, both armed with knives,
attacked FT. The victim's son, ST, upon seeing
the attack, drew his gun but was prevented
from shooting the attackers by AA, who
grappled with him for possession of the gun.
FT died from knife wounds. AA, BB and CC
were charged with murder. In his defense, AA
invoked the justifying circumstance of
avoidance of greater evil or injury,
contending that by preventing ST from
shooting BB and CC, he merely avoided a
greater evil. Will AA's defense prosper?
Reason briefly. (2004 BAR)
A: NO, AA's defense will not prosper. The act of
the victim's son, ST, appears to be a legitimate
defense of relatives; hence, justified as a defense
of his father against the unlawful aggression by
BB and CC. ST’s act to defend his father's life and
to stop BB and CC achieve their criminal
objective cannot be regarded as an evil
inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a lawful
act. What AA did was a lawful defense, not
greater evil. Likewise, AA’s defense will not
prosper because in this case there was a
conspiracy among the three of them, hence, the
act of one is the act of all.
Q: Pat. Negre saw Filemon, an inmate,
escaping from jail and ordered the latter to
surrender. Instead of doing so, Filemon
attacked Pat. Negre with a bamboo spear.
Filemon missed in his first attempt to hit Pat.
Negre, and before he could strike again, Pat.
Negre shot and killed him.
a. Can Pat. Negre claim self defense?
Explain.
b. Suppose Pat Negre missed in his shot,
and Filemon ran away without parting
with his weapon. Pat Negre pursued
Filemon but the latter was running so
fast that Pat Negre fired warning shots
into the air shouting for Filemon to stop.
In as much as Filemon continued running
Pat. Negre fired at him hitting and killing
him. Is the plea of self- defense
sustainable? Why would you then hold
Pat. Negre criminally liable? Discuss.
(1993 BAR)
A:
a. YES. Self-defense can be claimed as there is
an imminent and great peril on the life of
Negre.
b. NO. Self-defense is no longer sustainable as
there is no more peril on his life.
Q: Osang, a married woman in her early
twenties, was sleeping on a banig on the floor
of their nipa hut beside the seashore when
she was awakened by the act of a man
9 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
mounting her. Thinking that it was her
husband, Gardo, who had returned from
fishing in the sea, Osang continued her sleep
but allowed the man, who was actually their
neighbor, Julio, to have sexual intercourse
with her. After Julio satisfied himself, he said
“Salamat Osang" as he turned to leave. Only
then did Osang realize that the man was not
her husband. Enraged, Osang grabbed a
balisong from the wall and stabbed Julio to
death. When tried for homicide, Osang
claimed defense of honor. Should the claim be
sustained? Why? (2000, 1998 BAR)
A: NO. Osang's claim of defense of honor should
not be sustained because the aggression on her
honor had ceased when she stabbed the aggressor.
In defense of rights under Art. 11(1) of the RPC, it
is required inter alia that there be (1) unlawful
aggression, and (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it. The
unlawful aggression must be continuing when the
aggressor was injured or disabled by the person
making a defense. Otherwise, the attack made is a
retaliation and not a defense. Hence, Osang's act of
stabbing Julio to death after the sexual intercourse
was finished, is not defense of honor but an
immediate vindication of a grave offense
committed against her, which is only mitigating.
Q: In dire need of money, Mr. R decided to steal
from his next-door neighbor, Mrs. V. On the
night of May 15, 2010, Mr. R proceeded with
his plan entered Mrs. V's bedroom by breaking
one of the windows from the outside. Finding
Mrs. V sound asleep, he silently foraged
through her cabinet, and stashed all the
bundles of cash and jewelries he could find.
As Mr. R was about to leave, he heard Mrs. V
shout, "Stop or I will shoot you!", and when he
turned around, he saw Mrs. V cocking a rifle
which has pointed at him. Fearing for his life,
Mr. R then lunged at Mrs. V and was able to
wrest the gun away from her. Thereafter, Mr. R
shot Mrs. V, which resulted in her death. Mr.
R's deeds were discovered on the very same
night as he was seen by law enforcement
authorities fleeing the crime scene. May Mr. R
validly invoke the justifying circumstances of
self- defense? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: NO, Mr. R may not invoke the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. There was no
unlawful aggression on the part of Mrs. V, who was
defending her property. As the owner of the cash
and jewelry, Mrs. V had the lawful right to take
back the goods stolen by Mr. R who was actually
the unlawful aggressor. (People v. Salamuddin, 52
Phil. 670, January 24, 1929)
Defense of Relatives
Q: When A arrived home, he found B raping his
daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran away. A took
his gun and shot B, killing him. Charged with
homicide, A claimed he acted in defense of his
daughter's honor. Is A correct? If not, can A
claim the benefit of any mitigating
10
circumstance or circumstances? (2002, 2000,
1998 BAR)
A: NO. A cannot validly invoke defense of his
daughter's honor in having killed B since the rape
was already consummated; moreover, B already
ran away, hence, there was no aggression to
defend against and no defense to speak of. Defense
of honor as included in self- defense, must have
been done to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression. There is no defense to speak of where
the unlawful aggression no longer exists.
A may, however, invoke the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of having acted in
immediate vindication of a grave offense to a
descendant, his daughter, under par. 5, Art. 13 of
the RPC.
Q: Pedro is married to Tessie. Juan is the first
cousin of Tessie. While in the market, Pedro
saw a man stabbing Juan. Seeing the attack on
Juan, Pedro picked up a spade nearby and hit
the attacker on his head which caused the
latter’s death. Can Pedro be absolved of the
killing on the ground that it is in defense of a
relative? Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: NO. The relatives of the accused for purpose of
defense of relative under Art. 11(20) of the
Revised Penal Code are his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters or of his relatives by affinity in
the same degrees, and those by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree. Relative by affinity
within the same degree includes ascendant,
descendant, brother or sister of the spouse of the
accused. In this case, Juan is not the ascendant,
descendant, brother or sister of Tessie, the spouse
of Pedro. Relative by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree includes first cousin. But in this
case, Juan is the cousin of Pedro by affinity but not
by consanguinity. Juan, therefore, is not a relative
of Pedro for purpose of applying the provision on
defense of relative.
Pedro, however, can invoke defense of a stranger.
Under the Revised Penal Code, a person who
defends a person who is not his relative may
invoke the defense of a stranger provided that all
its elements exist, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the attack; and (c) the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment,
or other evil motive.
Defense of Stranger
Q: A chanced upon three men who were
attacking B with fist blows. C, one of the men,
was about to stab B with a knife. Not knowing
that B was actually the aggressor because he
had earlier challenged the three men to a fight,
A shot C as the latter was about to stab B. May
A invoke the defense of a stranger as a
justifying circumstance in his favor? Why?
(2002 BAR)
A: YES A may invoke the justifying circumstance
of defense of stranger since he was not involved in
the fight and he shot C when the latter was about
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
to stab B. There being no indication that A was
induced by revenge, resentment or any other evil
motive in shooting C, his act is justified under par.
3, Art. 11 of the RPC.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
(1998, 2000, 2010 BAR)
Insanity
Q: While his wife was on a 2-year scholarship
abroad, Romeo was having an affair with his
maid Dulcinea. Realizing that the affair was
going nowhere, Dulcinea told Romeo that she
was going back to the province to marry her
childhood sweetheart. Clouded by anger and
jealousy, Romeo strangled Dulcinea to death
while she was sleeping in the maid’s quarters.
The following day, Romeo was found catatonic
inside the maid’s quarters. He was brought to
the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH)
where he was diagnosed to be mentally
unstable. Charged with murder, Romeo
pleaded insanity as a defense.
a. Will Romeo’s defense prosper? Explain.
b. What is the effect of the diagnosis of the
NCMH on the case? (2010 BAR)
A:
a. NO. Romeo’s defense of insanity will not
prosper. Insanity as a defense to the
commission of a crime must have existed and
proven to have been existing at the precise
moment when the crime was being
committed. The facts of the case indicate that
Romeo committed the crime with
discernment and was only diagnosed to be
mentally unstable after the crime was
committed.
b. The effect of the diagnosis made by NCMH is
possibly a suspension of the proceeding
against Romeo and his commitment to
appropriate institution for treatment until he
could already understand the proceedings.
Minority
Q: While they were standing in line awaiting
their vaccination at the school clinic, Pomping
repeatedly pulled the ponytail of Katreena, his
11 years, 2 months and 13 days old classmate
in Grade 5 at the Sampaloc Elementary School.
Irritated, Katreena turned around and swung
at Pomping with a ball pen. The top of the ball
pen hit the right eye of Pomping which bled
profusely. Realizing what she had caused,
Katreena immediately helped Pomping. When
investigated, she freely admitted to the school
principal that she was responsible for the
injury to Pomping's eye. After the incident, she
executed a statement admitting her
culpability. Due to the injury, Pomping lost his
right eye. (2000, 1998 Bar)
a. Is Katreena criminally liable? Why?
b. Discuss the attendant circumstances and
effects thereof.
A:
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
a. NO. Katreena is not criminally liable due to
her minority. She is exempted from criminal
liability for being a minor less than fifteen
(15) years old although over nine (9) years of
age. Nonetheless, she is civilly liable.
b. The attendant circumstances which may be
considered are:
1. Minority of the accused as an exempting
circumstance under Art. 12(3) of RPC, where
she shall be exempt from criminal liability,
unless it was proved that she acted with
discernment. She is however civilly liable;
2. If found criminally liable, the minority of the
accused is a privileged mitigating
circumstance. A discretionary penalty lower
by at least two (2) degrees than that
prescribed for the crime committed shall be
imposed in accordance with Art. 68(1) of RPC.
The sentence however, should automatically
be suspended in accordance with Sec. 5(a) of
R.A. No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997);
3. Likewise if found criminally liable, the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of not
intending to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed under Art. 13(3) of the RPC may
apply;
4. The ordinary mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation on the part of the
offended party immediately preceded the act.
Q: Lito, a minor, was bullied by Brutus, his
classmate. Having had enough, Lito got the key
to the safe where his father kept his licensed
pistol and took the weapon. Knowing that
Brutus usually hung out at a nearby
abandoned building after class, Lito went
ahead and hid while waiting for Brutus. When
Lito was convinced that Brutus was alone, he
shot Brutus, who died on the spot. Lito then
hid the gun in one of the empty containers. At
the time of the shooting, Lito was fifteen years
and one month old. What is Lito's criminal
liability? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A: Lito is criminally liable for murder qualified by
the circumstance of treachery, or evident
premeditation, as well as illegal possession of
firearms. Minority is not an exempting under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9644 since his age is above
fifteen years but below eighteen years and he
acted with discernment. Circumstance will show
that he discerned the consequences of his criminal
acts as shown from the fact he employed means to
make a surprise attack and he even hid the
murder weapon in an empty container. It was also
clear that he planned the killing. However,
minority will be considered as a privileged
mitigating circumstance, which will require the
graduation of the penalty prescribed by law to
one degree lower (Article 68).
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (1988, 1992,
1996, 1997, 1999, 2012, 2016, 2019 BAR)
Q: What is a privileged mitigating
circumstance? Distinguish a privileged
mitigating circumstance from an ordinary
mitigating circumstance as to reduction of
penalty and offsetting against aggravating
circumstance/s. (2012 BAR)
11 UST
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 Criminal Law
A: Privileged mitigating circumstances are those
that mitigate the criminal liability of the accused
by graduating the imposable penalty for the crime
being modified to one or two degrees lower.
These circumstances cannot be offset by
aggravating circumstance. The circumstance of
incomplete justification or exemption (when
majority of the conditions are present), and the
circumstance of minority (if the child above 15
years of age acted with discernment) are
privileged mitigating circumstance.
The distinctions between ordinary and privileged
mitigating circumstances are as follows:
a. Under the rules for application of divisible
penalties (RPC, Art. 64), the presence of a
mitigating circumstance, if not off-set by
aggravating circumstance, has the effect of
applying the divisible penalty in its minimum
period. Under the rules on graduation of
penalty (RPC, Art. 68, 69), the presence of
privileged mitigating circumstance has the
effect of reducing the penalty one to two
degrees lower;
b. Ordinary mitigating circumstances can be off-
set by aggravating circumstances. Privileged
mitigating circumstances are not subject to
the off-set rule.
Surrender and Confession of Guilt
Q: When is surrender by an accused
considered voluntary, and constitutive of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender? (1999 BAR)
A: A surrender by an offender is considered
voluntary when it is spontaneous, indicative of an
intent to submit unconditionally to the authorities.
To be mitigating, the surrender must be:
a. Spontaneous, i.e., indicative of
acknowledgment of guilt and not for
convenience nor conditional;
b. Made before the government incurs expenses,
time and effort in tracking down the
offender's whereabouts; and
c. Made to a person in authority or the letter's
agents.
Q: In order that the plea of guilty may be
mitigating, what requisites must be complied
with? (1999 BAR)
A: For plea of guilty to be mitigating, the requisites
are:
1. That the accused spontaneously pleaded
guilty to the crime charged;
2. That such plea was made before the court
competent to try the case and render
judgment; and
3. That such plea was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
Q: After killing the victim, the accused
absconded. He succeeded in eluding the police
until he surfaced and surrendered to the
authorities about two years later. Charged
12
with murder, he pleaded not guilty but, after
the prosecution had presented two witnesses
implicating him to the crime, he changed his
plea to that of guilty. Should the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and
plea of guilty be considered in favor of the
accused? (1997 BAR)
A: NO. Voluntary surrender may not be
appreciated in favor of the accused. Two years is
too long a time to consider the surrender as
spontaneous. (People v. Ablao, G.R. No. 69184,
March 26, 1990)
For sure the government had already incurred
considerable efforts and expenses in looking for
the accused. Plea of guilty can no longer be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because
the prosecution had already started with the
presentation of its evidence. (Art. 13[7], RPC)
Q: Mr. X and Mr. Y engaged in a violent fistfight
which Mr. X instigated. This culminated in Mr.
X repeatedly smashing Mr. Y's head on the
concrete pavement. Thereafter, Mr. X left Mr. Y
barely breathing and almost dead. A few
minutes after the incident, Mr. X immediately
went to the police station to confess what he
did and told the police where he left Mr. Y.
Fortunately, the police rescued Mr. Y and he
survived with the help of timely medical
intervention. Mr. X was then charged in court
with Frustrated Homicide, to which he openly
confessed his guilt upon arraignment.
Based on the above-stated facts, what is/are
the mitigating circumstance/s that may be
appreciated in favor of Mr. X. Explain. (2019
BAR)
A: The mitigating circumstances of Voluntary
Surrender and Voluntary Confession of Guilt can
be appreciated in Mr. X’s favor. Mr. X voluntarily
and immediately went to the police station after
his altercation with Mr. Y. He acknowledged his
wrongdoing and saved the authorities’ time and
investigative resources. (People v. Gervacio, G.R.
No. 107328 September 26, 1994) This satisfies the
requirements for Voluntary Surrender.
Mr. X likewise voluntarily pleaded “Guilty” in open
court during his arraignment. This satisfies the
requirements for a Voluntary Confession of Guilt,
(a) that the offender spontaneously confessed his
guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in
open court, or before the competent court that is
to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt
was made prior to the presentation for the
prosecution. (People v. Bueza, G.R. No. 79619,
August 20, 1990)
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(1988, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999,
2000, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2017 BAR)
Q: Name the four (4) kinds of aggravating
circumstances and state their effect on the
penalty of crimes and nature thereof.
Distinguish generic aggravating
circumstance from qualifying aggravating
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
circumstance. (1999 BAR)
A: The four (4) kinds of aggravating
circumstances are:
1. Generic aggravating or those that can
generally apply to all crimes, and can be offset
by mitigating circumstances, but if not offset,
would affect only the maximum of the penalty
prescribed by law;
2. Specific aggravating or those that apply only
to particular crimes and cannot be offset by
mitigating circumstances;
3. Qualifying circumstances or those that change
the nature of the crime to a graver one, or
brings about a penalty next higher in degree,
and cannot be offset by mitigating
circumstances;
4. Inherent aggravating or those that essentially
accompany the commission of the crime and
do not affect the penalty whatsoever.
The distinctions between generic aggravating
circumstances and qualifying aggravating
circumstances are as follows:
Generic aggravating circumstances:
a. affect the nature of the crime or brings about
a penalty higher in degree than that ordinarily
prescribed;
b. can be offset by ordinary mitigating
circumstances;
c. need not be alleged in the Information as long
as proven during the trial;
d. the same shall be considered in imposing the
sentence.
Qualifying circumstances:
a. affect the nature of the crime or brings about
a penalty higher in degree than that ordinarily
prescribed;
b. cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances;
c. must be alleged in the Information and
proven during trial.
Q: When would qualifying circumstances be
deemed, if at all, elements of a crime? (2003
BAR)
A: A qualifying circumstance would be deemed an
element of a crime when:
1. It changes the nature of the crime, bringing
about a more serious crime and heavier
penalty;
2. It is essential to the crime involved, otherwise
some other crime is committed; and
3. It is specifically alleged in the information and
proven during trial.
Q: The robbers killed a mother and her baby,
then threw the body of the baby outside the
window. Can the aggravating circumstance of
cruelty be considered in this case? Reason.
(1988 BAR)
A: NO. Cruelty cannot be considered in this case
because the aggravating circumstance of cruelty
requires deliberate prolongation of the suffering
of the victim. In this case, the baby was dead
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
already so that there is no more prolongation to
speak of.
Q: At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and
Raffy were walking along Padre Faura Street,
Manila, Johnny hit them with a rock injuring
Dino at the back. Raffy approached Dino, but
suddenly, Bobby, Steve, Danny and Nonoy
surrounded the duo. Then Bobby stabbed
Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on
hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result,
Dino died.
Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny were
charged with homicide. Can the court
appreciate the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and band? (1994 BAR)
A: NO. Nighttime cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance because there is no
indication that the offenders deliberately sought
the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission
of the crime or that they took advantage of
nighttime (People v. De los Reyes, 203 SCRA 707)
Besides, judicial notice can be taken of the fact
that Padre Faura Street is well-lighted.
However, band should be considered as the crime
was committed by more than three armed
malefactors; in a recent Supreme Court decision,
stones or rocks are considered deadly weapons.
Q: Rico, a member of the Alpha Rho Fraternity,
was killed by Pocholo, a member of the rival
group, Sigma Phi Omega. Pocholo was
prosecuted for homicide. During the trial, the
prosecution was able to prove that the killing
was committed by means of poison in
consideration of a promise or reward and with
cruelty. If you were the Judge, will you
consider the aggravating circumstances of
using poison, in consideration of a promise or
reward and cruelty? (2000 BAR)
A: The circumstances of using poison, in
consideration of a promise or reward and cruelty
which attended the killing of Rico could only be
appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances
since none of them have been alleged in the
Information to qualify the killing to murder. A
qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the
Information and proven beyond reasonable doubt
during the trial to be appreciated as such.
Q: Candido stabbed an innocent bystander
who accidentally bumped him. The innocent
bystander died as a result of the stabbing.
Candido was arrested and was tested to be
positive for the use of “shabu” at the time he
committed the stabbing. What should be the
proper charge against Candido? Explain. (2005
BAR)
A: Candido should be charged with murder
qualified by treachery because the suddenness of
the stabbing caught the victim by surprise and
was totally defenseless. Being under the influence
of dangerous drugs is a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime (Sec.
25, R.A. 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act
of 2002); Hence, the penalty for murder shall be
13 UST
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 Criminal Law
imposed in the maximum.
Q: Bernardo was enraged by his conviction
for robbery by Judge Samsonite despite
insufficient evidence. Pending his appeal,
Bernardo escaped in order to get even with
Judge Samsonite. Bernardo learned that the
judge regularly slept in his mistress' house
every weekend. Thus, he waited for the judge
to arrive on Saturday evening at the house of
his mistress. It was about 8:00 p.m. when
Bernardo entered the house of the mistress.
He found the judge and his mistress having
coffee in the kitchen and engaging in small
talk. Without warning, Bernardo stabbed the
judge at least 20 times. The judge instantly
died.
Prosecuted and tried, Bernardo was convicted
of direct assault with murder. Rule with
reasons whether or not the conviction
for direct assault with murder was justified,
and whether or not the trial court should
appreciate the following aggravating
circumstances against Bernardo, to wit: (1)
disregard of rank and age of the victim, who
was 68 years old; (2) dwelling; (3) nighttime;
(4) cruelty; and (5) quasi-recidivism. (2017
BAR)
A: The phrase “on occasion of such performance”
used in Art. 148 of the RPC means “by reason of
the past performance of official duty” because the
purpose of the law is to allow them to discharge
their duties without fear of being assaulted by
reason thereof. Attacking Judge Samsonite by
reason of past performance of duty of convicting
Bernardo based on his assessment of the evidence
constitutes qualified direct assault. Since the
single act of attacking Judge Samsonite constitutes
direct assault and murder qualified by the
circumstance of treachery, the two shall be
merged together to form a complex crime of
direct assault with murder.
Disregard of rank, being inherent in direct assault,
is absorbed. Disregard of age shall not be
considered for lack of showing intent to offend or
insult the age of Judge Samsonite.
Dwelling and nighttime shall not be appreciated
because the presence of treachery in the instant
case absorbs these aggravating circumstances.
The crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply
because the judge sustained 10 stab wounds. For
cruelty to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, it must be proven that in inflicting
several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator
intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of
the victim. The number of wounds on the victim is
not proof of cruelty. Unless there is proof that
when the 2nd or subsequent stabs were made, the
Judge was still alive, there is no cruelty to speak of.
A quasi-recidivist is a person who shall commit a
felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve such
sentence, or while serving the same (Art. 160,
RPC). In this case, Bernardo committed the crime
while the judgment of conviction is on appeal.
14
Thus, quasi-recidivism cannot be considered since
he did not commit the crime after having been
convicted by final judgment.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
(2004, 2008, 2012, 2019 BAR)
Article 332: Persons exempt from criminal
liability for theft, swindling and malicious
mischief
Q: The wife of AAA predeceased his mother- in-
law. AAA was accused of defrauding his
mother-in-law under a criminal information
for estafa, but the actual recital of facts of the
offense charged therein, if proven, would
constitute not only the crime of estafa, but also
falsification of public document as a necessary
means for committing estafa. AAA invokes the
absolutory cause of relationship by affinity.
Which statement is most accurate? (2012 BAR)
A: There are two views on whether the
extinguishment of the marriage by death of the
spouse dissolves the relationship by affinity for
purpose of absolutory clause.
The first holds that the relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage,
while the second maintains that relationship
continues even after the death of the deceased
spouse. The principle of pro reo calls for the
adoption of the continuing affinity view because it
is more favorable to the accused. However, the
absolutory cause applies to theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply to theft
through falsification or estafa through
falsification. (Intestate estate of Gonzales v. People,
G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010)
Q: Ms. E was charged with the complex crime of
Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents before the trial court. Prior to her
arraignment, Ms. E moved for the dismissal of
the criminal case against her, pointing out that
the private offended party is her biological
father, and that such relationship is an
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Is Ms. E's contention
correct? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: NO. In order to qualify as an absolutory cause,
there must be lack of voluntariness in committing
a crime. In falsification of Public Document, there
is deceit. Thus, an act of falsification shows intent
to defraud in order to commit the crime of estafa.
Article 20: Accessories exempt from criminal
liability by reason of relationship
Q: DCB, the daughter of MCB, stole the earrings
of XYZ, a stranger. MCB pawned the earrings
with TBI Pawnshop as a pledge for P500 loan.
During the trial, MCB raised the defense that
being the mother of DCB, she cannot be held
liable as an accessory. Will MCB's defense
prosper? Reason briefly. (2004 BAR)
A: NO. MCB's defense will not prosper because the
exemption from criminal liability of an accessory
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
by virtue of relationship with the principal does
not cover accessories who themselves profited
from or assisted the offender to profit by the
effects or proceeds of the crime.
This non-exemption of an accessory, though
related to the principal of the crime, is expressly
provided in Art. 20 of the RPC.
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
(1988, 1991, 2001, 2007, 2015, 2016 BAR)
Q: At 10:00 in the evening, upon his arrival,
Marco surprised his wife, Rosette and her
former boyfriend, Raul, both naked and in the
act of illicit copulation. Raul got his revolver
and upon seeing the revolver, Marco ran
toward the street, took a pedicab and
proceeded to the house of his brother, a
policeman from whom he borrowed a
revolver. With the weapon, he returned to his
residence. Unable to find Raul and Rosette,
Marco proceeded to a disco jointly owned and
operated by Raul. It was already 11:00 that
evening when he arrived at the joint. Upon
seeing Raul with two (2) male companions, A
and B, drinking beer at one of the tables,
Marco fired two (2) shots at Raul, who was hit
on his forehead with one of the bullets; the
other hit A, injuring him on his stomach. As a
consequence of the gunshot wound, Raul died
instantaneously. Due to the timely medical
attention given to A, he survived. He was,
however, hospitalized for 45 days. Marco was
prosecuted for Murder for the death of Raul
and for frustrated murder in the case of A. You
PERSONS LIABLE AND DEGREE OF
PARTICIPATION
are Marco’s lawyer, what will be your defense?
(1991 BAR)
A: The defense with respect to the death of Raul is
death under exceptional circumstances (Art. 247,
People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735). Although the
killing happened one hour after having surprised
the spouse, that would still be within the context
of “immediately thereafter”.
The term “immediately thereafter” means that
from discovery to the escape and the killing, there
must be no interruption or interval of time. The
pursuit and the killing must form part of one
continuous act. However, it is not necessary that
the victim is to be killed instantly by the accused
after surprising his spouse in the act of
intercourse with another person. What is required
is that the death caused must be the proximate
result of the outrage overwhelming the accused
after chancing upon his spouse in the act of
infidelity.
With respect to the wounding of the stranger, the
defense of lawful exercise of a right is a justifying
circumstance. Under Art. 11, par. 5 could be
invoked. At the time the accused shot Raul, he was
not committing a felonious act and therefore could
not have been criminally liable under Art. 4, RPC.
Q: Procopio, a call center agent assigned at a
graveyard shift, went home earlier than usual.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
He proceeded immediately to their bedroom
to change his clothes. To his surprise, he found
his wife Bionci in bed making love to another
woman Magna. Enraged, Procopio grabbed a
knife nearby and stabbed Bionci, who died.
a. What crime did Procopio commit, and what
circumstance attended the case? Explain.
b. Assuming that Procopio and Bionci were
common-law spouses, will your answer be
the same? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A:
a. The crime committed by Procopio is
parricide qualified by the circumstance of
relationship. Killing a spouse after having
been surprised in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another woman is
death under exceptional circumstance under
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, in this case this is not death under
exceptional circumstance because Bionci was
having homosexual intercourse with another
woman and not sexual intercourse with a
man. “Homosexual intercourse “is not within
the contemplation of the term “sexual
intercourse” in Article 247. However, the
crime of parricide is attended by the
circumstance of passion arising from a lawful
sentiment as a result of having caught his
wife in the act of infidelity with another
woman. (People v. Belarmino, G.R. No. L-4429,
April 18, 1952)
b. NO, the answer is not the same. The crime
committed is Homicide if Procopio and
Bionci were common law spouses. Parricide
contemplates killing by spouse who are
legally married.
Q: Macky, a security guard, arrived home late
one night after rendering overtime. He was
shocked to see Joy, his wife and Ken, his best
friend, in the act of having sexual intercourse.
Macky pulled out his service gun and shot and
killed Ken. Macky was charged with murder
for the death of Ken.
The court found that Ken died under
exceptional circumstances and exonerated
Macky of murder but sentenced him to
destierro. The court also ordered Macky to pay
indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00. Did the court correctly
order Macky to pay indemnity? (2007 BAR)
A: NO. Since the killing of Ken was committed
under the exceptional circumstances in Article
247, RPC, it is the consensus that no crime was
committed in the light of the pronouncement in
People v. Cosicor (79 Phil 672) that banishment
(destierro) is intended more for the protection of
the offender rather than as a penalty. Since the
civil liability under the RPC is the consequence of
the criminal liability, there would be no legal basis
for the award of indemnity when there is no
criminal liability.
Q: Jojo and Felipa are husband and wife.
Believing that his work as a lawyer is
sufficient to provide for the needs of their
15 UST
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 Criminal Law
family, Jojo convinced Felipa to be a stay-at-
home mom and care for their children. One
day, Jojo arrived home earlier than usual and
caught Felipa in the act of having sexual
intercourse with their female nanny, Alma, in
their matrimonial bed. In a fit of rage, Jojo
retrieved his revolver from inside the
bedroom cabinet and shot Alma, immediately
killing her.
Is Art. 247 (Death or physical injuries inflicted
under exceptional circumstances) of the RPC
applicable in this case given that the paramour
was of the same gender as the erring spouse?
(2015, 2016 BAR)
A: The crime committed is parricide qualified by
the circumstance of relationship.
Killing a spouse after having been surprised in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another
woman is death under exceptional circumstance
under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, in this case this is not death under
exceptional circumstance because Felipa was
having homosexual intercourse with another
woman and not sexual intercourse with a man.
“Homosexual intercourse “is not within the
contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse” in
Article 247. However, the crime of parricide is
attended by the circumstance of passion arising
from a lawful sentiment as a result of having
caught his wife in the act of infidelity with another
woman. (People v. Belarmino, G.R. No. L-4429, April
18, 1952, En Banc)
PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES, AND ACCESSORIES
Principals (1994, 2000, 2002, 1994, 2014,
2015, 2018 BAR)
Q: Tata owns a three-storey building. She
wanted to construct a new building but had no
money to finance the construction. So, she
insured the building for P3,000,000.00. She
then urged Yoboy and Yongsi, for monetary
consideration, to burn her building so she
could collect the insurance proceeds. Yoboy
and Yongsi burned the said building resulting
to its total loss. What is their respective
criminal liability? (1994 BAR)
A: Tata is a principal by inducement for the crime
of destructive arson because she directly induced
Yoboy and Yongsi for a price or monetary
consideration, to commit arson which the latter
would not have committed were it not for such
reason. Yoboy and Yongsi are principals by direct
participation. (Art. 17, pars. 21 and 3, RPC
Q: Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45
caliber pistol so that he could use it to knock
down Jepoy and end his arrogance. When
Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately shot him
with Jaja’s .45 caliber gun but missed his
target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy’s five-year-
old son who was following behind him, killing
the boy instantaneously. What is the criminal
liability of Jonas and Jepoy? (Question
16
reframed) (2000 BAR)
A: Jonas shall be convicted of the complex crime of
attempted murder with homicide. Jonas as
principal by direct participation and Jaja as co-
principal by indispensable cooperation. It is a case
of aberratio ictus. The single act of pulling the
trigger resulted into a less grave felony and a
grave felony: (1) attempted murder, with respect
to his real target, Jonas; and (2) homicide, with
respect to the 5-year-old son. Jaja should be liable
as co- principal and not only as an accomplice
because he knew of Jonas’ criminal design even
before he lent his firearm to Jonas and still he
concurred in that criminal design by providing the
firearm.
Q: A asked B to kill C because of a grave
injustice done to A by C. A promised B a
reward. B was willing to kill C, not so much
because of the reward promised to him but
because he also had his own long-standing
grudge against C, who had wronged him in the
past. If C killed by B, would A be liable as a
principal by inducement? (2002 BAR)
A: NO. A would not be liable as principal by
inducement because the reward he promised B is
not the sole impelling reason which made B kill C.
To bring about the criminal liability of a co-
principal, the inducement made by the inducer
must be the sole consideration which caused the
person induced to commit the crime and without
which the crime would not have been committed.
The facts of the case would indicate that B, the
killer supposedly induced by A had his own
reason to kill C out of a long-standing grudge.
Q: Mr. Red was drinking with his buddies, Mr.
White and Mr. Blue when he saw Mr. Green
with his former girlfriend, Ms. Yellow. Already
drunk, Mr. Red declared in a loud voice that if
he could not have Ms. Yellow, no one can. He
then proceeded to the men’s room but told Mr.
White and Mr. Blue to take care of Mr. Green.
Mr. Blue and Mr. White asked Mr. Red what he
meant but Mr. Red simply said, "You already
know what I want," and then left. Mr. Blue and
Mr. White proceeded to kill Mr. Green and hurt
Ms. Yellow.
a. What, if any, are the respective liabilities
of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the
death of Mr. Green?
b. What, if any, are the respective liabilities
of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr. Blue for the
injuries of Ms. Yellow? (2014 BAR)
A:
a. Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable for the death
of Mr. Green as principals by direct
participation. They were the ones who
participated in the criminal resolution and
who carried out their plan and personally
took part in its execution by acts which
directly tended to the same end. Mr. Red
cannot be held criminally liable as principal
by inducement because his statement that Mr.
Blue and Mr. White are to take care of Mr.
Green was not made directly with the
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
intention of procuring the commission of the
crime. There is no showing that the words
uttered by him may be considered as so
efficacious and powerful so as to amount to
physical or moral coercion (People v. Assad,
G.R. No. L- 33673, February 24, 1931). Neither
is there evidence to show that Mr. Red has an
ascendancy or influence over Mr. White and
Mr. Blue. (People v. Abarri, F.R. No. 90815,
March 1, 1995)
b. Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable as principals
by direct participation for the crime of
physical injuries for hurting Ms. Yellow to the
extent of the injuries inflicted. Having no
participation in the attack upon Ms. Yellow,
Mr. Red would have no criminal liability
therefor.
Q: Roberto and Ricardo have had a long-
standing dispute regarding conflicting claims
over the ownership of a parcel of land. One
night, Roberto was so enraged that he decided
to kill Ricardo. Roberto asked his best friend,
Rafael, to lend him a gun and drive him to
Ricardo’s house. Rafael knew about Roberto’s
plan to kill Ricardo, but agreed to lend him a
gun nevertheless. Rafael also drove Roberto to
the street corner nearest the house of Ricardo.
Rafael waited for him there, until the task had
been accomplished, so that he could drive
Roberto to the next town to evade arrest.
Roberto also asked another friend, Ruel, to
stand guard outside Ricardo’s house, for the
purpose of warning him in case there was any
danger or possible witnesses, and to keep
other persons away from the vicinity. All three
– Roberto, Rafael and Ruel – agreed to the plan
and their respective roles.
On the agreed date, Rafael drove Roberto and
Ruel to the nearest corner near Ricardo’s
house. Roberto and Ruel walked about 50
meters where Ruel took his post as guard, and
Roberto walked about five (5) meters more,
aimed the gun at Ricardo’s bedroom, and
peppered it with bullets. When he thought that
he had accomplished his plan, Roberto ran
away, followed by Ruel, and together they rode
in Rafael’s car where they drove to the next
town to spend the night there. It turned out
that Ricardo was out of town when the
incident happened, and no one was in his room
at the time it was peppered with bullets. Thus,
no one was killed or injured during the
incident. If a crime was committed, what is the
degree of participation of Roberto, Rafael, and
Ruel? (2018 BAR)
A: All the perpetrators (Roberto, Ricardo and
Rafael) are criminally liable as principals since the
conspiracy among them was clearly established by
their participation.
Roberto is principal by direct participation as he
took a direct part in the execution of the plan to
kill Ricardo by firing his gun at the room of the
intended victim. Rafael is principal by
indispensable cooperation not only becuase he
lent his gun to Roberto fully knowing the unlawful
intent of the latter, but also drove him to the place
of the commission of crime and to a place where
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
he could escape.
Ruel being involved in the criminal plan to kill
Ricardo acted in conspiracy with the two (2) other
perpetrators staying in the place from the time
they planned the crime up to its finalization. They
were together in the car driven by Rafael going to
the next town in escaping from the scene of the
crime.
Accomplices (2007, 2009, 2012 BAR)
Q: Who is an accomplice? (2012 BAR)
A: Accomplices are those persons who, not being
the principal, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts which
are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime. (Art. 18, RPC)
Q: Ponciano borrowed Ruben’s gun, saying
that he would use it to kill Freddie. Because
Ruben also resented Freddie, he readily lent
his gun, but told Ponciano: "O, pagkabaril mo
kay Freddie, isauli mo kaagad, ha." Later,
Ponciano killed Freddie, but used a knife
because he did not want Freddie’s neighbors to
hear the gunshot.
a. What, if any, is the liability of Ruben?
Explain.
b. Would your answer be the same if,
instead of Freddie, it was Manuel, a
relative of Ruben, who was killed by
Ponciano using Ruben’s gun? Explain.
(2009 BAR)
A:
a. Ruben’s liability is that of an accomplice only
because he merely cooperated in Pociano’s
determination to kill Freddie. Such
cooperation is not indispensable to the killing,
as in fact the killing was carried out without
the use of Ruben’s gun. Neither may Ruben be
regarded as a co- conspirator since he was not
a participant in the decision-making of
Ponciano to kill Freddie; he merely
cooperated in carrying out the criminal plan
which was already in place (Art. 18, RPC).
b. NO. The answer would not be the same
because Ruben lent his gun purposely for the
killing of Freddie only, not for any other
killing. Ponciano’s using Ruben’s gun in killing
a person other than Freddie is beyond
Ruben’s criminal intent and willing
involvement. Only Ponciano will answer for
the crime against Manuel.
Accessories (1998, 2010 BAR)
Q: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake
went to his mother to seek refuge. His mother
told him to hide in the maid’s quarters until
she finds a better place for him to hide. After
two days, Jake transferred to his aunt’s house.
A week later, Jake was apprehended by the
police.
Can Jake’s mother and aunt be made
criminally liable as accessories to the crime of
murder? Explain. (2010, 1998 BAR)
17 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
A: Obviously, Jake’s mother was aware of her son’s
having committed a felony, such that her act of
harbouring and concealing him renders her liable
as an accessory. But being an ascendant of Jake,
she is exempt from criminal liability by express
provision of Art. 20 of the RPC. On the other hand,
the criminal liability of Jake’s aunt depends on her
knowledge of his commission of the felony, her act
of harbouring and concealing Jake would render
her criminally liable as accessory to the crime of
murder; otherwise, without knowledge of Jake’s
commission of the felony, she would not be liable.
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT
CONSPIRACY (1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997,
1998, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2012, 2013, 2016,
2017, 2019 BAR)
Q: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito
engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob
Disco, Special Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Manolo
Yabang suddenly approached them, aimed his
revolver at Sergio whom he recognized as a
wanted killer and fatally shot the latter.
Whereupon, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito ganged
up on Yabang, Warlito, using his own pistol,
shot and wounded Yabang.
What are the criminal libailities of Yoyong,
Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to Yabang?
Was there conspiracy and treachery? (1992
BAR)
A: If they have to be criminally liable at all, each
will be responsible for their individual acts as
there appears to be no conspiracy, as the acts of
the three were spontaneous and a reflex response
to Yabang’s shooting of Sergio. There was no
concerted act that will lead to a common purpose.
Q: As a result of a misunderstanding during a
meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan,
Reden, and Arthur. He ran towards his house
but the four chased and caught him.
Thereafter, they tied Joe’s hands at his back
and attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a
shovel; Arthur, his fists; and Reden, a piece of
wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the
digging of a grave to bury Joe’s lifeless body.
Thereafter, the four (4) left together.
Convicted for the killing of Joe, Arthur now
claims that his conviction is erroneous as it
was not he who conflicted the fatal blow.
Would you sustain his claim? (1993 BAR)
A: NO. Arthur’s claim is without merit. The
offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the victim
and hence, liable collectively. The act of one is the
act of all.
The existence of a conspiracy among the offenders
can be clearly deduced or inferred from the
manner they committed the killing, demonstrating
a common criminal purpose and intent. There
being a conspiracy, the individual acts of each
participant is not considered because their
liability is collective.
Q: State the concept of “implied conspiracy”
18
and give its legal effects. (1998, 2003 BAR)
A: An implied conspiracy is one which is only
inferred or deduced from the manner of
participants in the commission of crime carried
out its execution. Where the offenders acted in
concert in the commission of the crime, meaning
that their acts are coordinated or synchronized in
a way indicative that they are pursuing a common
criminal objective, they shall be deemed to be
acting in conspiracy and their criminal liability
shall be collective, not individual.
The legal effects of an implied conspiracy are:
1. Not all those who are present at the scene of
the crime will be considered as co-
conspirators;
2. Only those who participated by criminal acts
in the commission of the crime will be
considered as co-conspirators; and
3. Mere acquiescence to or approval of the
commission of the crime, without any act of
criminal participation, shall not render one
criminally liable as co-conspirator.
Q: During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight
erupted in the public plaza. As a result of the
tumultuous affray, A sustained one fatal and
three superficial stab wounds. He died a day
after. B, C, D and E were proven to be
participants in the “rumble”, each using a knife
against A, but it could not be ascertained who,
among them, inflicted the mortal injury. Who
shall be held criminally liable for the death of
A and for what? (1997 BAR)
A: B, C, D and E being participants in the
tumultuous affray and having been proven to have
inflicted serious physical injuries, or at least,
employed violence upon A, are criminally liable
for the latter’s death. And because it cannot be
ascertained who among them inflicted the mortal
injury on A, there being a free-for-all fight or
tumultuous affray, B, C, D and E are all liable for
the crime of death caused in a tumultuous affray
under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code.
Q: Together XA, YB and ZC planned to rob Miss
OD. They entered her house by breaking one of
the windows in her house. After taking her
personal properties and as they were about to
leave, XA decided on impulse to rape OD. As XA
was molesting her, YB and ZC stood outside the
door of her bedroom and did nothing to
prevent XA from raping OD.
What crime/s did XA, YB and ZC commit and
what is the criminal liability of each? Explain
briefly. (2004 BAR)
A: The crime committed by XA, YB and ZC is the
composite crime of Robbery with Rape, a single,
indivisible offense under Art. 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Although the conspiracy among the offenders was
only to commit robbery and only XA raped CD, the
other robbers, YB and ZC, were present and aware
of the rape being committed by their co-
conspirator. Having done nothing to stop XA from
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
committing the rape, YB and ZC thereby
concurred in the commission of the rape by their
co-conspirator XA.
The criminal liability of all, XA, YZ, and ZC, shall be
the same, as principals in the special complex
crime of robbery with rape which is a single,
indivisible offense where the rape accompanying
the robbery is just a component.
Q: Mr. X has always been infatuated with Ms. Y.
Scorned by Mr. Y's disregard for his feelings
towards her, Mr. X came up with a plan to
abduct Ms. Y in order to have carnal
knowledge of her with the help of his buddies,
A, B, and C.
On the day they decided to carry out the plan,
and while surreptitiously waiting for Ms. Y, C
had a change of heart and left. This
notwithstanding, Mr. X, A, and B continued
with the plan and abducted Ms. Y by forcefully
taking her to a deserted house away from the
city. There, Mr. X restrained Ms. Y's arms,
while A held her legs apart. B stood as a
lookout. Mr. X was then able to have carnal
knowledge of Ms. Y, who was resisting
throughout the entire ordeal.
Consequently, Mr. X was charged with the
crime of Forcible Abduction under the Revised
Penal Code. Assuming that A, B, and C are also
charged, may they be held criminally liable
together with Mr. X? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: NO. Only A and B may be held criminally liable
together with Mr. X. Under Art. 8, par. 1 of the
RPC, a conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
With A holding Ms. Y’s legs apart and B standing
as a lookout, they actively participated in the
commission of the crime and are guilty as co-
conspirators. (People v. Tumalip, G.R. No. L-28451,
October 28, 1974)
C may not be held criminally liable. C dissociated
himself from the conspiracy when he had a
change of heart and left. His disavowal of the
conspiracy was effective since he decided not to
perform his part in the conspiracy before any
material act of execution leading to the Rape was
committed. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or
approval of the act without cooperation is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy. (Taer v. CA, G.R. No. 85204, June 18,
1990)
Q: Differentiate wheel conspiracy and chain
conspiracy. (2016, 2017 BAR)
A: There are two structures of multiple
conspiracies, namely: wheel or circle conspiracy
and chain conspiracy.
A “wheel conspiracy” occurs when there is a single
person or group (the hub) dealing individually
with two or more other persons or groups (the
spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the
hub rather than with another spoke. In the event
that the spoke shares a common purpose to
succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
the instances when each spoke is unconcerned
with the success of the other spokes, there are
multiple conspiracies.
A “chain conspiracy”, on the other hand, exists
when there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965,
February 26, 2002)
MULTIPLE OFFENDERS
(2018, 2019 BAR)
Recidivism
Q: Robbie and Rannie are both inmates of the
National Penitentiary, serving the maximum
penalty for robbery which they committed
some years before and for which they have
been sentenced by final judgment.
One day, Robbie tried to collect money owed
by Rannie. Rannie insisted that he did not owe
Robbie anything, and after a shouting episode,
Rannie kicked Robbie in the stomach. Robbie
fell to the ground in pain, and Rannie left him
to go to the toilet to relieve himself. As Rannie
was opening the door to the toilet and with his
back turned against Robbie, Robbie stabbed
him in the back with a bladed weapon that he
had concealed in his waist. Hurt, Rannie ran to
the nearest “kubol” where he fell. Robbie ran
after him· and, while Rannie was lying on the
ground, Robbie continued to stab him,
inflicting a total of 15 stab wounds. He died on
the spot. Is Robbie a recidivist, or a quasi-
recidivist? (2018 BAR)
A: Robbie is considered a quasi-recidivist
pursuant to Article 160 of the RPC. At the time he
stabbed Rannie which resulted in the latter’s
death, he had been convicted by final judgment
and had been serving sentence at the National
Penitentiary.
In quasi-recidivism, the first and second offenses
need not be embraced in the same title of the RPC.
A recidivist, on the other hand, requires that the
crimes committed must be embraced in the same
title of the RPC. Because the killing of Rannie and
the robbery, in which Robbie was previously
convicted by final judgment, were not under the
same title, Robbie cannot be considered a
recidivist.
Habitual Delinquency
Q: In November 2018, Mr. N, a notorious
criminal, was found guilty of three (3) counts
of Murder and was consequently sentenced
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count. A month after, he was likewise found
guilty of five (5) counts of Grave Threats in a
separate criminal proceeding, and hence,
meted with the penalty of prision mayor for
each count. Is Mr. N considered a habitual
delinquent? Explain. (2019 BAR)
19 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
A: NO. Mr. N is not a habitual delinquent. Under
Art. 62 of the RPC, a person shall be deemed to be
a habitual delinquent, if within the period of 10
years from the date of his last release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa, or
falsification, he is found guilty of any of the said
crimes a third time or oftener. Here, Mr. N did not
commit the specific crimes above mentioned.
PENALTIES (1988, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2001,
2004, 2005, 2007 BAR)
Q:
a. State the two classes of penalties under the
Revised Penal Code. Define each.
b. May censure be included in a sentence of
acquittal? (1988 BAR)
A:
a. The two classes of penalties under Article 25
of the RPC are as follows:
1. Principal – A principal penalty is defined
as that provided for a felony and which
is imposed by court expressly upon
conviction.
2. Accessory – An accessory penalty is
defined as that deemed included in the
imposition of the principal penalty.
b. Censure may not be included in a sentence of
acquittal because a censure is a penalty.
Censure is repugnant and is essentially
inconsistent and contrary to an acquittal.
(People v. Abellera, 69 Phil 623)
Q: Imagine that you are a Judge trying a case,
and based on the evidence presented and the
applicable law, you have decided on the guilt
of two (2) accused. Indicate the five (5) steps
you would follow to determine the exact
penalty to be imposed. Stated differently, what
are the factors you must consider to arrive at
the correct penalty? (1991 BAR)
A:
1. Determine the crime committed;
2. Stage of execution and
degree of participation;
3. Determine the penalty
4. Consider the modifying circumstances;
5. Determine whether Indeterminate Sentence
Law is applicable or not.
Q: After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the Manila
RTC found Benjamin Garcia guilty of Murder,
the victim having sustained several bullet
wounds in his body so that he died despite
medical assistance given in the Ospital ng
Manila. Because the weapon used by Benjamin
was unlicensed and the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was found to be
present. Judge Laya rendered his decision
convicting Benjamin and sentencing him to
"reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment". Are
"reclusion perpetua" and life imprisonment
the same and can be imposed interchangeably
as in the foregoing sentence? Or are they
20
totally different? State your reasons. (1994,
2001, 2005 BAR)
A: The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
penalty of life imprisonment are totally different
from each other and therefore, should not be used
interchangeably. Reclusion perpetua is a penalty
prescribed by the RPC, with a fixed duration of
imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day to 40
years, and carries it with accessory penalties. Life
imprisonment, on the other hand, is a penalty
prescribed by special laws, with no fixed duration
of imprisonment and without any accessory
penalty.
Q: Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7959,
reclusion perpetua shall be from 20 years and
1 day to 40 years. Does this mean that
reclusion perpetua is now a divisible penalty?
Explain. (2005 BAR)
A: NO, because the Supreme Court has repeatedly
called the attention of the Bench and the Bar to
the fact that the penalties of reclusion perpetua
and life imprisonment are not synonymous and
should be applied correctly and as may be
specified by the applicable law. Reclusion
perpetua has a specific duration of 20 years and 1
day to 40 years (Art. 27) and accessory penalties
(Art. 41), while life imprisonment has no definite
term or accessory penalties. Also, life
imprisonment is imposable on crimes punished by
special laws, and not on felonies in the Code.
Q: What are the penalties that may be served
simultaneously? (2007 BAR)
A: The penalties that may be served
simultaneously are imprisonment/destierro and –
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification;
2. Perpetual special disqualification;
3. Temporary absolute disqualification;
4. Temporary special disqualification;
5. Suspension from public office, the right to
vote and be voted for and the right to
follow a profession or calling;
6. Fine; and any principal penalty with its
accessory penalties.
7. Fine and bond to keep the peace;
8. Public Censure;
9. Civil Interdiction; and
10. Confiscation and payment of costs
Principles (including R.A. No. 9346 – Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines) (1988, 1995, 1997, 2004 BAR)
Q: What offenses, if any, may be punished with
the death penalty in our jurisdiction at
present? Explain. (1988, 1995 BAR)
A: At present, no offense may be punished with
the death penalty in our jurisdiction at present.
The 1987 Constitution has abolished the death
penalty and the abolition affects even those who
has already been sentenced to death penalty.
Therefore, unless Congress enacts a law, no
offense may be punished with the death penalty at
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
present. then simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit. However, the
Application (2005, 2013 BAR) maximum duration of the convict’s sentence
shall not be more than three-fold the length
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as of time corresponding to the most severe of
amended) (Refer to SPL Section) the penalties imposed upon him. No other
penalty to which he may be liable shall be
inflicted after the sum total of those
Three-Fold Rule (2013, 2019 BAR)
imposed equals the same maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case
Q: Roman and Wendy are neighbors. On
exceed 40 years.
Valentine's Day, without prior notice, Roman
visited Wendy at her condo to invite her to
Subsidiary imprisonment (2005, 2019 BAR)
dinner, but Wendy turned him down and
abruptly left, leaving her condo door unlocked.
Q: E and M are convicted of a penal law that
Roman attempted to follow, but appeared to
imposes a penalty of fine or imprisonment or
have second thoughts; he simply went back to
both fine and imprisonment. The judge
Wendy's condo, let himself in, and waited for
sentenced them to pay the fine, jointly and
her return. On Wendy's arrival later that
severally, with subsidiary imprisonment in
evening, Roman grabbed her from behind and,
case of insolvency.
with a knife in hand, forced her to undress.
Wendy had no choice but to comply. Roman
a. Is the penalty proper? Explain.
then tied Wendy's hands to her bed and
b. May the judge impose an alternative
sexually assaulted her five (5) times that night.
penalty of fine or imprisonment?
Roman was charged with, and was convicted
Explain. (2005 BAR)
of, five (5) counts of rape, but the judge did not
impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
A:
each count. Instead, the judge sentenced
a. NO. The penalty should be imposed
Roman to 40 years of imprisonment on the
individually on every person accused of the
basis of the three-fold rule. Was the judge
crime. Any of the convicted accused who is
correct? (2013 BAR)
insolvent and unable to pay the fine, shall
serve the subsidiary imprisonment.
A: NO, the three-fold rule is applicable only in
b. NO. Although the law may prescribe an
connection with the service of the sentence not
alternative penalty for a crime, it does not
in the imposition of the proper penalties. The
mean that the court may impose the
court must impose all penalties for all the crimes
alternative penalties at the same time. The
for which the accused have been found guilty.
sentence must be definite. Otherwise, the
Thus, the court should not make a computation
judgment cannot attain finality.
in it decision and sentence the accused to not
more than the three-fold of the most severe of
Q: Mr. Q was found guilty beyond reasonable
the penalties imposable. The computation under
doubt of the crime of Serious Physical
the three-fold rule is for the prison authorities to
Injuries, and accordingly, was sentenced to
make.
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months of
Q: In November 2018, Mr. N, a notorious
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years,
criminal, was found guilty of three (3) counts
two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision
of Murder and was consequently sentenced
correccional, as maximum. He was also
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
ordered to pay the victim actual damages in
each count. A month after, he was likewise
the amount of ₱50,000.00, with subsidiary
found guilty of five (5) counts of Grave
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Was the
Threats in a separate criminal proceeding,
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment
and hence, meted with the penalty of prision
proper? (2019 BAR)
mayor for each count.
A: NO, subsidiary imprisonment does not apply
a. What are the respective durations of the
to civil liability but only for non-payment of fine.
penalties of reclusion perpetua and
Here, there is no penalty of fine imposed by the
prision mayor?
trial court.
b. How long will Mr. N serve all his
penalties of imprisonment? Explain.
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES
(2019 BAR)
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
A:
(1988, 1990, 2004, 2015 BAR)
a. Under Art. 27 of the RPC, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be from 20 years
Q:
and 1 day to 40 years; while the duration of
a. How is criminal liability totally
the penalty of prision mayor shall be from 6
extinguished? (1988, 1990 BAR)
years and 1 day to 12 years.
b. How is criminal liability partially
b. Mr. N will serve all these penalties of extinguished?
imprisonment for a total of 40 years. Under c. If an accused is acquitted does it
Art. 70 of the RPC, when the culprit has to necessarily follow that no civil liability
serve two or more penalties, he shall serve arising from the acts complained of may

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS 21 UST

2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
be awarded in the same judgment?
Explain briefly. (1988 BAR)
A:
a. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides
for the following causes of total extinction of
criminal liability:
1. Death of the convict as to personal
penalties, as to the pecuniary liabilities,
liability therefore is extinguished only
when death occurs before final judgment
2. Service of sentence
3. Amnesty
4. Absolute pardon
5. Prescription of the crime
6. Prescription of the penalty
7. Marriage of the offended woman as
provided in Article 344.
b. Article 94 of the Revised Penal Code provides
for the following causes of the partial
extinction of criminal liability:
1. Conditional pardon
2. Commutation of sentence
3. Good conduct allowance during
confinement
4. Parole
5. Probation
c. If an accused is acquitted, it does not
necessarily follow that no civil liability
arising from the acts complained of may be
awarded in the same judgment except: If
there is an express waiver of the liability;
and if there is a reservation to file a separate
civil action. (Rule 107; Padilla v. CA, People v.
Jalandoni)
Q: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found
Tiburcio guilty of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of
four years and one day of prision correccional
as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor
as maximum, and ordered him to pay actual
damages in the amount of 1125,000.00.
Tiburcio appealed to the Court of Appeals
which sustained his conviction as well as the
penalty imposed by the court a quo. After
sixty days, the Court of Appeals issued an
Entry of Judgment and remanded the records
of the case to the RTC. Three days thereafter,
Tiburcio died of heart attack. Atty. Abdul,
Tiburcio's counsel, filed before the RTC a
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss,
informing the court that Tiburcio died
already, and claiming that his criminal
liability had been extinguished by his demise.
a. Should the RTC grant the Motion to
Dismiss the case? Explain.
b. Assuming that Tiburcio's death occurred
before the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, will you give a different answer?
Explain. (2015 BAR)
A:
a. NO. The RTC may not grant the motion to
22
dismiss because the Court of Appeals, having
issued an Entry of Judgment, the decision has
become final and executory. Moreover, the
pecuniary penalty, such as the civil liability
arising from the crime consisting of actual
damages of P25,000 survives the death of
Tiburcio.
b. YES. The RTC decision must be set aside and
the case against Tiburcio must consequently
be dismissed. The demise of Tiburcio which
occurred before the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision causes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto,
to be totally extinguished inasmuch as there
is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action is instituted therein
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on
criminal case.
Q: AX was convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. The trial court
sentenced him to a prison term as well as to
pay P150,000 as civil indemnity and damages.
While his appeal was pending, AX met a fatal
accident. He left a young widow, 2 children,
and a million-peso estate. What is the effect, if
any, of his death on his criminal as well as
civil liability? Explain briefly. (2004 BAR)
A: The death of AX while his appeal from the
judgment of the trial court is pending,
extinguishes his criminal liability. The civil
liability insofar as it arises from the crime and
recoverable under the RPC is also extinguished;
but indemnity and damages may be recovered in
a civil action if predicated on a source of
obligation under Art. 1157, NCC, such as law,
contracts, quasi-contracts and quasi- delicts, but
not on the basis of delicts. (People v. Balagtas,
236 SCRA 239)
Prescription of crimes (1987, 1990, 1993,
1994, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2009, 2010,
2015 BAR)
Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered
owner of a lot, in a special power of attorney
naming him (B) as his attorney-in- fact of A.
On February 13, 1964, B mortgaged the lot to
a bank using the special power of attorney to
obtain a loan. On the same day, both the
special power of attorney and the mortgage
contract were duly registered in the Registry
of Deeds. Because of B’s failure to pay, the
bank foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was
sold to X in whose name a new title was
issued. In March, 1974, A discovered that the
property was already registered in the name
of X because of an ejectment case filed against
him by X. If you were the counsel of B, what
would be your defense? Discuss. (1993 BAR)
A: My defense will be prescription because the
crime was committed in 1964 and almost ten
(10) years had already elapsed since then. Even if
we take Falsification and Estafa individually, they
have already prescribed.
It is to be noted that when it comes to discovery,
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
the fact that the crime was discovered in 1974
will be of no moment because the offended party
is considered to have constructive notice on the
forgery after the Deed of Sale where his signature
had been falsified was registered in the office of
the Register of Deeds. (Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA
606)
Q: On January 1990, while 5-year old Albert
was urinating at the back of their house, he
heard a strange noise coming from the
kitchen of their neighbor and playmate, Ara.
When he peeped inside, he saw Mina, Ara’s
stepmother, very angry and strangling the 5-
year old Ara to death. Albert saw Mina carry
the dead body of Ara, place it inside the trunk
of her car and drive away. The dead body of
Ara was never found. Mina spread the news
in the neighborhood that Ara went to live
with her grandparents in Ormoc. For fear of
his life, Albert did not tell anyone, even his
parents and relatives. 20 and ½ years after
the incident, and right after his graduation in
Criminology, Albert reported the crime to NBI
authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes
in 20 years. Can the State still prosecute Mina
for the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20
and ½ years? Explain. (2000 BAR)
A: YES. The State can still prosecute Mina for the
death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 & ½ years.
Under Article 91, RPC, the period of prescription
commences to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents.
In the case at bar, the commission of the crime
was known only to Albert, who was not the
offended party nor an authority or an agent of an
authority. It was discovered by the NBI
Authorities only when Albert revealed to them
the commission of the crime. Hence, the period
of prescription of 20 years for homicide
commenced to run only from the time Albert
revealed the same to the NBI Authorities.
Q: On June 1, 1988, a complaint for
concubinage committed in February 1987
was filed against Roberto in the Municipal
Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite for purposes of
preliminary investigation. For various
reasons, it was only on July 3, 1998 when the
judge of said court decided the case by
dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction since the
crime was committed in Manila. The case was
subsequently filed with the City Fiscal of
Manila but it was dismissed on the ground
that the crime had already prescribed. The
law provides that the crime of concubinage
prescribes in ten (10) years. Was the
dismissal by the fiscal correct? Explain. (2001
BAR)
A: NO. The fiscal’s dismissal of the case on
alleged prescription is not correct. The filing of
the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court,
although only for preliminary investigation,
interrupted and suspended the period of
prescription inasmuch as the jurisdiction of a
court in a criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, not
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
by the result of proof. (People v. Galano, 75 SCRA
193)
Q: A killed his wife and buried her in their
backyard. He immediately went into hiding in
the mountains. Three years later, the bones of
A’s wife were discovered by X, the gardener.
Since X had a standing warrant of arrest, he
hid the bones in an old clay jar and kept quiet
about it. After two years, Z, the caretaker,
found the bones and reported the matter to
the police. After 15 years of hiding, A left the
country but returned three years later to take
care of his ailing sibling. Six years thereafter,
he was charged with parricide but raised the
defense of prescription.
a. Under the Revised Penal Code, when does
the period of prescription of a crime
commence to run?
b. When is it interrupted?
c. Is A’s defense tenable? Explain. (2000,
2004, 2009, 2010 BAR)
A:
a. Generally, the period of prescription of a
crime commences to run for the date it was
committed; but if the crime was committed
clandestinely, the period of prescription of
the crimes under the RPC commence to run
from the day on which the crime was
discovered (the discovery rule) by the
offended party, the authorities or their
agents. (Art. 91, RPC)
b. The running of the prescriptive period of the
crime is interrupted when “any kind of
investigative proceedings is instituted
against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution.”
(Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571,
November 25, 2008)
c. NO, the defense of prescription of the crime
is not tenable. The crime committed is
parricide which prescribes in twenty (20)
years (Art. 90, RPC). It was only when the
caretaker, Z, found the victim’s bones and
reported the matter to the police that the
crime is deemed legally discovered by the
authorities or their agents and thus the
prescriptive period of the crime commenced
to run. When A left the country and returned
only after three (3) years, the running of the
prescriptive period of the crime is
interrupted and suspended because
prescription shall not run when the offender
is absent from the Philippine Archipelago
(Art. 91, RPC). Since A had been in hiding for
15 years after the commission of the crime
and the prescriptive period starting running
only after 5 years from such commission
when the crime was discovered, only 10
years lapsed and 3 years thereof should be
deducted when the prescriptive period was
interrupted and suspended. Hence, the 3
years when A was out of the Philippines
should be deducted from the 10 years after
the prescription starts running. Adding the 7
years of prescription and the 6 years that
lapsed before the case was filed, only a total
of thirteen (13) years of the prescriptive
period had lapsed. Hence, the crime has not
23 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
yet prescribed.
Q: Taylor was convicted of a violation of the
Election Code, and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one year as minimum, to
three years as maximum. The decision of the
trial court was affirmed on appeal and
became final and executory. Taylor failed to
appear when summoned for execution of
judgment, prompting the judge to issue an
order for his arrest. Taylor was able to use
the backdoor and left for the United States.
Fifteen years later, Taylor returned to the
Philippines and filed a Motion to Quash the
warrant of arrest against him, on the ground
that the penalty imposed against him had
already prescribed.
a. If you were the judge, would you grant
Taylor's Motion to Quash? Explain.
b. Assuming that instead of the United
States, Taylor was able to go to another
country with which the Philippines had
no extradition treaty, will your answer be
the same? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A:
a. NO. If I were the judge, I will deny the motion
to quash. Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code provides when the prescription of
penalties shall commence to run. Under said
provision, it shall commence to run from the
date the felon evades the service of his
sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same
Code, evasion of service of sentence can be
committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping
during the term of his sentence. Taylor never
served a single minute of his sentence, and
thus, prescription never started to run in his
favor. Clearly, one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have
escaped therefrom. (Del Castillo v.
Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18,
2002)
b. Even if Taylor was able to go to another
country which the Philippines had no
extradition treaty, I will deny the motion to
quash. Going to a foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty to
interrupt the running of prescription is not
applicable nor even material because the
period of prescription is not applicable nor
even material because the period of
prescription had not commenced to run in
the first place; hence, there is nothing to
interrupt.
Pardon and Amnesty (2006, 2009 BAR)
Q: Enumerate the differences between pardon
and amnesty. (2006 BAR)
A: The following are the differences between
pardon and amnesty:
In pardon – The convict is excused from serving
the sentence but the effects of conviction remain
unless expressly remitted by the pardon; hence,
for pardon to be valid there must be a sentence
24
already final and executory at the time the same
is granted. Moreover, the grant is in favor of
individual convicted offenders, not to a class of
convicted offenders; and the crimes subject of
the grant may be common crimes or political
crimes. Finally, the grant is a private act of the
Chief Executive which does not require the
concurrence of any other public officer or office.
In amnesty – The criminal complexion of the act
constituting the crime is erased, as though such
act was innocent when committed; hence, the
effects of the conviction are obliterated. Amnesty
is granted is in favor of a class of convicted
offenders, not to individual convicted offenders;
and the crimes involved are generally political
offenses, not common crimes. Amnesty is a
public act that requires the conformity or
concurrence of the Philippine Senate.
Q: Senator Adamos was convicted of plunder.
About one year after beginning to serve his
sentence, the President of the Philippines
granted him absolute pardon. The signed
pardon states: "In view hereof, and in
pursuance of the authority vested upon me by
the Constitution, I hereby grant absolute
pardon unto Adamos, who was convicted of
plunder in Criminal Case No. XV32 and
upon whom the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed." He now comes to you
for advice. He wants to know if he could run
for senator in the next election.
a. What advice will you give Adamos?
Explain.
b. Assuming that what Adamos committed
was heading a rebellion for which he was
imposed the same penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and what he received was
amnesty from the government, will your
answer be the same? Explain. (2015
BAR)
A:
a. If I were the counsel of Senator Adamos, I
will give him the advice that he cannot run
in the Senatorial race since the terms of the
pardon has not expressly restored his right
to hold public office or remitted the
Accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Under Article 36 of the
Revised Penal Code, a pardon shall not work
the restoration of the right to hold public
office unless such right be expressly
restored by terms of the pardon. Under
Article 41, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall carry with it perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall
suffer even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
(Risos-Vidal v. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January
21, 2015)
b. If he was given amnesty, he can run in the
Senatorial race. Under Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty, which
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
completely extinguishes the penalty and all
its effects. Thus, the amnesty extinguishes
not only the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua but also its effects such as the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Amnesty looks backward
and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged, so that
the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense. (Barrioquinto v.
Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21,
1949)
CIVIL LIABILITIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
(1987, 1990, 1991, 1992 BAR)
Q: Rico was convicted of raping Letty, his
former sweetheart, by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila and he was ordered to serve
the penalty of life imprisonment, to
indemnify Letty in the amount of P30,000.00
and to support their offspring. Pending
appeal in the Supreme Court, Rico died. His
widow, Bernie, moved for a dismissal of the
case. What is the legal effect of Rico’s death
on his civil liability? State your reasons.
(1990 BAR)
A: The civil liability of Rico survives. (People v.
Tirol, G.R. L-30588, January 31, 1981, People v.
Naboa, et. al., 132 SCRA 410)
PART II. REVISED PENAL CODE (BOOK II)
Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason
Q: The brothers Roberto and Ricardo Ratute,
both Filipino citizens, led a group of armed
men in seizing a southern island in the
Philippines, and declaring war against the
duly constituted government of the country.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
led by its Chief of Staff, General Riturban,
responded and a full-scale war ensued
between the AFP and the armed men led by
the brothers. The armed conflict raged for
months.
When the brothers-led armed men were
running out of supplies, Ricalde, also a
Filipino, and a good friend and supporter of
the Ratute brothers, was tasked to leave for
abroad to solicit arms and funding for the
cash-strapped brothers. He was able to travel
to Rwanda, and there he met with Riboli, a
citizen and resident of Rwanda, who agreed to
help the brothers by raising funds
internationally, and to send them to the
Ratute brothers in order to aid them in their
armed struggle against the Philippine
government. Before Ricalde and Riboli could
complete their fund-raising activities for the
brothers, the AFP was able to reclaim- the
island and defeat the Ratute-led uprising.
Ricalde and Riboli were charged with
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
conspiracy to commit treason. During the
hearing of the two cases, the government only
presented as witness, General Riturban, who
testified on the activities of the Ratute
brothers, Ricalde, and Riboli. Can Ricalde and
Riboli be convicted of the crime of conspiracy
to commit treason? Explain. (2017 BAR)
A: NO. Ricalde and Riboli cannot be convicted of
the crime of conspiracy to commit treason,
because there was no war existing when they
committed the acts. Jurisprudence considers
treason as a crime committed in times only of an
international armed conflict. The same is true
with the felony of conspiracy to commit treason.
Moreover, the crimes were committed outside
the jurisdiction of Philippine Court.
Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters (2006, 2008 BAR)
Q: The inter-island vessel M/V Viva Lines I,
while cruising off Batanes, was forced to seek
shelter at the harbor of Kaoshiung, Taiwan
because of a strong typhoon. While anchored
in said harbor, Max, Baldo and Bogart arrived
in a speedboat, fired a bazooka at the bow of
the vessel, boarded it and divested the
passengers of their money and jewelry. A
passenger of M/V Viva Lines I, Dodong took
advantage of the confusion to settle an old
grudge with another passenger, and killed
him. After their apprehension, all four were
charged with qualified piracy before a
Philippine court.
a. Was the charge of qualified piracy
against the three person (Max, Badong
and Bogart) who boarded the inter-
A. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (2006, 2008,
2016, 2017 BAR)
island vessel correct? Explain.
b. Was Dodong correctly charged before
the Philippine court for qualified
piracy? Explain. (2008 BAR)
A:
a. The charge is correct. Qualified Piracy was
committed when the offenders seized the
vessels by firing on or boarding the same.
In the problem, they even went further by
divesting the passengers of their money and
jewelry. The vessel was anchored in the
harbour of Kaoshioung, Taiwan and it is
submitted that the crime was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of another
country. The Supreme Court has ruled that the
high seas contemplated under Art. 122 of the
RPC include the three-mile limit of any state
(People v. Lol- lo, G.R. No. 17958, February 27,
1922). Moreover, piracy is an offense that can
be tried anywhere because it is a crime
against the Law of Nations.
b. NO. Dodong was not correctly charged with
qualified piracy because committing piracy
was never in his mind nor did he have any
involvement in the piracy committed. He
25 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
merely took advantage of the situation in
killing the passenger. He should be charged
with murder since there was evident
premeditation and intent to kill.
Q: While SS Nagoya Maru was negotiating the
sea route from Hongkong towards Manila,
and while still 300 miles from Aparri,
Cagayan, its engine malfunctioned. The
Captain ordered the ship to stop for
emergency repairs lasting for almost 15
hours. Due to exhaustion, the officers and
crew fell asleep. While the ship was anchored,
a motorboat manned by renegade Ybanags
from Claveria, Cagayan, passed by and took
advantage of the situation. They cut the ship’s
engines and took away several heavy crates of
electrical equipment and loaded them in their
motorboat. Then they left hurriedly towards
Aparri. At daybreak, the crew found that a
robbery took place. They radioed the Aparri
Port Authorites resulting in the apprehension
of the culprits.
a. What crime was committed? Explain.
b. Supposing that while the robbery was
taking place, the culprits stabbed a
member of the crew while sleeping. What
crime was committed? Explain. (2006
BAR)
A:
a. The crime committed was piracy under Art.
122, Revised Penal Code, the essence of
which is robbery directed against a vessel
and/or its cargoes. The taking of the several
heavy crates of electrical equipment from a
vessel at sea, was effected by force and
undoubtedly with intent to gain. It is of no
moment that the vessel was anchored when
deprecated so long as it was at sea.
b. The crime was qualified piracy under Art.
123 of the RPC because it was attended by a
killing committed by the same culprits
against a member of the crew of the vessel.
Q: The Royal S.S. Maru, a vessel registered in
Panama, was 300 nautical miles from Aparri,
Cagayan when its engines malfunctioned. The
Captain ordered his men to drop anchor and
repair the ship. While the officers and crew
were asleep, armed men boarded the vessel
and took away several crates containing
valuable items and loaded them in their own
motorboat. Before the band left, they planted
an explosive which they detonated from a
safe distance. The explosion damaged the hull
of the ship, killed ten (10) crewmen, and
injured fifteen (15) others. What crime or
crimes, if any, were committed? Explain.
(2016 BAR)
A: The crime committed is Qualified Piracy under
Article 123 of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of piracy being present, namely, (1) the
vessel is on the high seas; (2) that the offenders
are not members of its complement or passenger
of the vessel; and (3) that the offenders attack or
seize the vessel, or seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment or personal
26
belongings of its complement or passengers. The
latter act is committed when the offenders took
away the several crates containing valuable
items and loaded them in their own motorboat.
It is qualified because: (1) the offenders have
seized the vessel by boarding; and (2) the crime
or piracy was accompanied by murder and
physical injuries. The facts show that the
offenders planted an explosive in the vessel
which they detonated from a safe distance and
the explosion killed ten (10) crewmen and
injured fifteen (15) others.
The number of persons killed on the occasion of
piracy is not material. The law considers
qualified piracy as a special complex crime
regardless of the number of victims. (People v.
Siyoh, G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986)
Arbitrary Detention or Expulsion, Violation of
Dwelling, Prohibition, Interruption, and
Dissolution of Peaceful Meeting and Crimes
Against Religious Worship
ARBITRARY DETENTION AND EXPULSION
(2006, 2008, 1992 BAR)
Q: What are the 3 ways of committing
arbitrary detention? Explain each. What are
the legal grounds for detention? (2006 BAR)
A: The three (3) ways of committing arbitrary
detention are:
a. by detaining or locking up a person without
any legal cause or ground therefore
purposely to restrain his liberty (RPC, Art.
124);
b. by delaying delivery to the proper judicial
authority of a person lawfully arrested
without a warrant (RPC, Art. 125); and
c. by delaying release of a prisoner whose
release has been ordered by competent
authority. (RPC, Art. 126)
In all the above-stated ways, the principal
offender should be a public officer acting under
color of his authority.
The legal grounds for detention are:
1. commission of a crime;
2. violent insanity or other ailment requiring
compulsory confinement in an institution
established for such purpose.
Q: Major Menor, while patrolling Bago-Bago
community in a police car with SP03 Caloy
Itliong blew his whistle to stop a Nissan
Sentra car which wrongly entered a one- way
street. After demanding from Linda Lo Hua,
the driver, her driver’s license, Menor asked
her to follow them to the police precinct.
Upon arriving there, he gave instructions to
Itliong to guard Lo Hua in one of the rooms
and not to let her out of sight until he returns;
then got the car key from Lo Hua. In the
meantime, the latter was not allowed to make
any phone calls but was given food and access
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
to a bathroom.
When Menor showed up after two days, he
brought Lo Hua to a private house and told
her that he would only release her and return
the car if she made arrangements for the
delivery of P500,000.00 in a doctor’s bag at a
certain place within the next twenty-four
hours. When Menor went to the designated
spot to pick up the bag of money, he suddenly
found himself surrounded by several armed
civilians who introduced themselves as NBI
agents. What criminal offense has Menor
committed? Explain. (1992 BAR)
A: Menor is liable under Art. 124, RPC (Arbitrary
Detention) he being a public officer who
detained, a person without legal grounds.
Violation of a traffic ordinance by entering a one-
way street is not a valid reason to arrest and
detain the driver. Such only merits the issuance
of a traffic violation ticket. Hence, when Lo Hua
was ordered to follow the police officers to the
precinct (confiscating her license to compel her
to do so), and confining her in a room for two
days and prohibiting her to make phone calls, is a
clear case of deprivation of personal liberty.
Giving her food and access to the bathroom will
not extinguish or mitigate the criminal liability.
Menor is further liable for robbery, because
money or personal properly was taken, with
intent to gain, and with intimidation. The
peculiar situation of Lo Hua practically forced her
to submit to the monetary demands of the major.
CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
(2017 BAR)
Q: In his homily, Fr. Chris loudly denounced
the many extrajudicial killings committed by
the men in uniform. Policeman Stone, then
attending the mass, was peeved by the
denunciations of Fr. Chris. He immediately
approached the priest during the homily,
openly displayed his firearm tucked in his
waist, and menacingly uttered at the priest:
Father, may kalalagyan kayo kung hindi kayo
tumigil. His brazenness terrified the priest,
who cut short his homily then and there. The
celebration of the mass was disrupted, and
the congregation left the church in disgust
over the actuations of Policeman Stone, a co-
parishioner.
Policeman Stone was subsequently charged.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is now
about to resolve the case, and is mulling on
what to charge Policeman Stone with. May
Policeman Stone be properly charged with
either or both of the following crimes, or, if
not, with what proper crime?
a. Interruption of religious worship as
defined and punished under Art. 132 of
the Revised Penal Code; and/or
b. Offending the religious feelings as defined
and punished under Art. 133 of the
Revised Penal Code. Explain.
A:
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
a. YES. Policeman Stone may be charged with
Interruption of religious worship. Under the
RPC, a public officer or employee who shall
prevent or disturb the ceremonies or
manifestations of any religion shall be liable
for interruption of religious worship. Hence,
Policeman Stone, a public officer, approached
the priest, displayed his firearm, and
threatened the priest, which caused the
disruption of the mass and the leaving of the
congregation. Policeman Stone, therefore,
may be charged of interruption of religious
worship.
b. NO. Policeman Stone may not be charged
with the crime of offending religious feelings.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the acts
must be directed against religious practice,
dogma, or ritual for the purpose of ridicule as
mocking or scoffing at or attempting to
damage an object of religious veneration
(People v. Baes, G.R. No. 46000, May 25,
1939). Policeman Stone threatened the
priest because the priest’s statements during
his homily and not to mock or ridicule the
ceremony; consequently, Policeman Stone
may not be charged with the crime of
offending religious feelings.
C. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
REBELLION, COUP D’ETAT, SEDITION AND
DISLOYALTY
Rebellion (1991, 1994, 1998, 2004 BAR)
Q: In the early morning of 25 October 1990,
the troops of the Logistics Command
(LOGCOM) of the AFP at Camp General Emilio
Aguinaldo headed by their Operations Officer,
Col. Rito Amparo, withdrew firearms and
bullets and, per prior agreement, attacked, in
separate teams, the offices of the Chief of
Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and
other offices, held hostage the Chief of Staff of
LOGCOM and other officers, killed three (3)
pro-Government soldiers, inverted the
Philippine flag, barricaded all entrances and
exits to the camp, and announced complete
control of the camp. Because of the
superiority of the pro-Government forces, Col.
Amparo and his troops surrendered at 7:00 in
the morning of that day.
Did Col. Amparo and his troops commit the
crime of coup d’etat (Article 134-A, RPC) or of
rebellion? (1991 BAR)
A: Under the facts stated, the crime committed
would be coup d’etat (R.A. 6988 incorporating
Art. 134-A).
However, since the law was not yet effective as of
October 25, 1990, as the effectivity thereof (Sec.
8) is upon its approval (which is October 24,
1990) and publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation, the felony
committed would be rebellion.
Q: VC, JG, GG, and JJ conspired to overthrow
27 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
the Philippine Government. VG was
recognized as the titular head of the
conspiracy. Several meetings were held and
the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his
conscience, confessed to Father Abraham that
he, VG, JG and GG have conspired to
overthrow the government. Father Abraham
did not report this information to the proper
authorities. Did Father Abraham commit a
crime? If so, what crime was committed?
What is his criminal liability? (1994 BAR)
A: NO. Father Abraham did not commit a crime
because the conspiracy involved is one to
commit rebellion, not a conspiracy to commit
treason which makes a person criminally liable
under Art 116, RPC. And even assuming that it
will fall as misprision of treason, Father Abraham
is exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12,
par. 7, as his failure to report can be considered
as due to "insuperable cause", as this involves
the sanctity and inviolability of a confession.
Conspiracy to commit rebellion results in
criminal liability to the co- conspirators, but not
to a person who learned of such and did not
report to the proper authorities. (US v. Vergara, 3
Phil. 432; People vs. Atienza, 56 Phil. 353)
Coup d’ etat (1988, 1991, 1998, 2002 BAR)
Q: Distinguish rebellion from coup d’etat.
(1991, 2004 BAR)
A: Rebellion distinguished from coup d’etat:
As to overt acts, in rebellion, there is public
uprising and taking up arms against the
Government. In coup d’etat public uprising is not
necessary. The essence of the crime is a swift
attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly
constituted authorities of the Government, or
any military camp or installation, communication
networks, public utilities, or facilities needed for
the exercise and continued possession of
government power.
As to objective or purpose, in rebellion, the
purpose is to remove from the allegiance of the
Philippines, the whole or any part of the
Philippines, or any military or naval camps,
deprive the Chief Executive or Congress from
performing their functions. In coup d’etat, the
objective is to seize or diminish the state powers.
As to participation, in rebellion, any person may
commit. In coup d’etat, any person belonging to
the military or police or holding public office,
with or without civilian participation may
commit.
Q: Supposing a public school teacher
participated in a coup d'etat using an
unlicensed firearm. What crime or crimes did
he commit? (1998 BAR)
A: The public school teacher committed only
coup d'etat for his participation therein. His use
of an unlicensed firearm is absorbed in the coup
d'etat under the new firearms law (R.A. 8294).
28
Q: If a group of persons belonging to the
armed forces makes a swift attack,
accompanied by violence, intimidation and
threat against a vital military installation for
the purpose of seizing power and taking over
such installation, what crime or crimes are
they guilty of?
If the attack is quelled but the leader is
unknown, who shall be deemed the leader
thereof? (1998, 2002 BAR)
A: The perpetrators, being persons belonging to
the Armed Forces, would be guilty of the crime of
coup d'etat, under Art. 134-A of the RPC, as
amended, because their attack was against vital
military installations which are essential to the
continued possession and exercise of
governmental powers, and their purpose is to
seize power by taking over such installations.
The leader being unknown, any person who in
fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed
receipts and other documents issued in their
name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the
group shall be deemed the leader of said coup
d'etat (Art 135, RPC).
Sedition (1987, 2007 BAR)
Q: A, B, C, D, and E were former soldiers who
deserted their command in Mindanao. Jose
and Pedro, two big landowners, called A, B, C,
D, and E to a conference. Jose and Pedro
proposed to these former soldiers that they
recruit their comrades and organize a group
of 100 for the purpose of challenging the
government by force of arms in order to
prevent the enforcement or implementation
of the Land Reform Law in Cotabato Province.
Jose and Pedro promised to finance the group
and to buy firearms for the purpose. The
former soldiers agreed. After Jose and Pedro
left, A, the leader of the former soldiers, said
that in the meanwhile he needed money to
support his family. D suggested that they rob
a bank and agreed to carry put the plan on the
15th day of the month. Unknown to all of
them, as they were conferring with Jose and
Pedro and as they were planning to rob the
bank, Rosauro, a houseboy was within
hearing distance.
On the pretext of buying cigarettes, Rosauro
instead went directly to the Police and told
them what transpired. All the former soldiers,
as well as Jose and Pedro, were arrested.
a. What crime, if any, did the former
soldiers commit?
b. What about Jose and Pedro? (1987 BAR)
A:
a. The former soldiers committed the crime of
conspiracy to commit sedition. What Jose
and Pedro proposed to the soldiers that they
recruit their comrades and organize a group
of 100 for the purpose of challenging the
government by force of arms in order to
prevent the implementation of the Land
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
Reform Law in Cotabato Province is to
commit sedition.
Proposal to commit sedition is not punished.
But since the soldiers agreed, a conspiracy to
commit sedition resulted which is now
punishable. Conspiracy arises on the very
moment the plotters agree. (People v. Peralta,
25 SCRA 759)
b. Jose and Pedro will also be liable for
conspiracy to commit sedition since they are
members of the conspiracy where the act of
one is the act of all. If the soldiers did not
agree to their proposal, they would not incur
any criminal liability because there is no
proposal to commit sedition.
Q: What are the different acts of inciting to
sedition? (2007 BAR)
A: The different acts which constitute the crime
of inciting to sedition are:
1. Inciting others through speeches, writings,
banners and other media of representation
to commit acts which constitute sedition;
2. Uttering seditious words, speeches or
circulating scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Philippines or any of its
duly constituted authorities, which tend to
disturb or obstruct the performance of
official functions, or which tend to incite
others to cabal and meet for unlawful
purposes;
3. Inciting through the same media of
representation rebellious conspiracies or
riots;
4. Stirring people to go against lawful
authorities, or disturb the peace and public
order of the community or of the
Government; or
5. Knowingly concealing any of the aforestated
evil practices (Art. 142, RPC)
ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND
DISOBEDIENCE TO PERSONS IN AUTHORITY
AND THEIR AGENTS (1993, 1995, 2001, 2002,
2013, 2019 BAR)
Direct assaults (2001, 2019 BAR)
Q: A, a teacher at Mapa High School, having
gotten mad at X, one of his pupils, because of
the latter’s throwing paper clips at his
classmates, twisted his right ear. X went out
of the classroom crying and proceeded home
located at the back of the school. He reported
to his parents, Y and Z, what A had done to
him, Y and Z immediately proceeded to the
school building and because they were
running and talking in loud voices, they were
seen by the barangay chairman, B, who
followed them as he suspected that an
untoward incident might happen. Upon
seeing A inside the classroom, X pointed him
out to his father, Y, who administered a fist
blow on A, causing him to fall down. When Y
was about to kick A, B rushed towards Y and
pinned both of the latter’s arms. Seeing his
father being held by B, X went near and
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2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
punched B on the face, which caused him to
lose his grip on Y. Throughout this incident, Z
shouted words of encouragement at Y, her
husband, and also threatened to slap A.
Security guards of the school arrived,
intervened and surrounded X, Y and Z so that
they could be investigated in the principal’s
office. Before leaving, Z passed near A and
threw a small flower pot at him but it was
deflected by B.
a. What, if any, are the respective criminal
liability of X, Y and Z?
b. Would your answer be the same if B were
a barangay tanod only? (2001 BAR)
A:
a. X is liable for direct assault only, assuming
the physical injuries inflicted on B, the
Barangay Chairman, to be only slight and
hence, would be absorbed in the direct
assault. A Barangay Chairman is a person in
authority (Art. 152, RPC) and in this case,
was performing his duty of maintaining
peace and order when attacked.
Y is liable for the complex crimes of Direct
Assault with Less Serious Physical Injuries
for the fist blow on A, the teacher, which
caused the latter to fall down. For purposes
of the crime in Arts. 148 and 151 of the RPC,
a teacher is considered a person in
authority, and having been attacked by Y by
reason of his performance of official duty,
direct assault is committed with the
resulting less serious physical injuries
complexed.
Z, the mother of X and wife of Y may only be
liable as an accomplice to the complex of
crimes of direct assault with less serious
physical injuries committed by Y. Her
participation should not be considered as
that of a co-principal, since her reactions
were only incited by her relationship to X
and Y, as the mother of X and the wife of Y.
b. If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act of
X of laying hand on him, being an agent of a
person in authority only, would constitute
the crime of Resistance and Disobedience
under Art. 151, RPC since X, a high school
pupil, could not be considered as having
acted out of contempt for authority but
more of helping his father get free from the
grip of B. Laying hand on an agent of a
person in authority is not ipso facto direct
assault, while it would always be direct
assault if done to a person in authority in
defiance to the latter’s exercise of authority.
Q: Ms. L, dean of a duly recognized private
school, caught K, one of her students,
vandalizing one of the school’s properties.
Ms. L called K’s attention and proceeded to
scold him, causing a crowd to gather around
them. Embarrassed with the situation, K
attacked Ms. L by repeatedly punching her on
the face. Just as K was about to strike Ms. L
again, J, another student, intervened. K then
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 Criminal Law
turned his anger on J and also hit him
repeatedly, causing him physical injuries.
What crime/s did K commit under the
Revised Penal Code for his acts against Ms.
Land J? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: K committed two counts of Direct Assault. The
elements of direct assault under Art. 148 of the
RPC are:
1. that the offender makes an attack, employs
force, makes a serious intimidation or makes
a serious resistance;
2. that the person assaulted is a person in
authority or his agent;
3. that at the time of the assault, the person in
authority or his agent is engaged in the
actual performance of official duties, or that
he is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties;
4. that the offender knows that the one he is
assaulting is a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties; and
5. that there is no public uprising. Art. 152
further provides that teachers, professors,
and persons charged with the supervision of
public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges, and universities in the actual
performance of their professional duties or
on the occasion of such performance shall be
deemed persons in authority.
Here, all the elements of direct assault are
present, where K repeatedly punched Ms. L, a
person in authority engaged in the performance
of her official duties.
K also committed Direct Assault against J. Art.
152 states that any person who comes to the aid
of persons in authority shall be deemed an agent
of a person in authority. Here, while K was
attacking Ms. L, K also hit J, an agent of a person
in authority who came to the aid of a person in
authority. (Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, July
28, 2010)
Evasion of Service of Sentence
Q: Dancio, a member of a drug syndicate, was
a detention prisoner in the provincial jail of X
Province. Brusco, another member of the
syndicate, regularly visited Dancio. Edri, the
guard in charge who had been receiving gifts
from Brusco everytime he visited Dancio,
became friendly with him and became
relaxed in the inspection of his belongings
during his jail visits. In one of Brusco's visits,
he was able to smuggle in a pistol which
Dancio used to disarm the guards and destroy
the padlock of the main gate of the jail,
enabling Dancio to escape. What crime(s) did
Dancio, Brusco and Edri commit? Explain.
(2015 BAR)
A: Dancio committed the crime of direct assault
under Article 148 for disarming the guards with
the use of pistol while they are engaged in the
performance of their duties. Using a pistol to
disarm the guards manifests criminal intention
30
to defy the law and its representative at all
hazard.
NOTE: Illegal possession of firearms may also be
considered.
It is noteworthy to mention that Dancio cannot
be convicted for the crime of evasion of service
of sentence under Art. 157 of the RPC because
this crime can only be committed by a convict
who shall evade service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment. By escaping while
undergoing preventive imprisonment, he is not
evading the service of his sentence.
Edri committed infidelity in the custody of
prisoner or evasion through negligence under
Article 224. As the guard in charge, Edri was
negligent in relaxing the inspection of the
Brusco’s belongings during jail visits allowing
him to smuggle a pistol to Dencio, which he
subsequently used to escape. By accepting gifts
from Brusco, who was part of the syndicate to
which Dancio belonged, he is also guilty of
indirect bribery under Article 211.
Brusco committed delivery of prisoner from jail
under Article 156, qualified by his bribery of
Edri. Helping a person confined in jail to escape
constitutes this crime. “Helping” means
furnishing the prisoner with the material means
or tools which greatly facilitate his escape; hence,
providing a pistol which helped Dencio to escape
is delivery of prisoner from jail.
D. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Forgeries
Q: How are "forging" and "falsification"
committed?
A: Forging or forgery is committed by giving to a
treasury or bank note or any instrument payable
to bearer or to order the appearance of a true
and genuine document; or by erasing,
substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by any
means the figures, letters, words or signs
contained therein.
Falsification, on the other hand, is committed
through:
PUCHAGID
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated
in an act or proceeding statements other
than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its
meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
8. Purporting to be a copy of an original
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary
to, or different from, that of the genuine
original; or
9. Intercalating any instrument or note relative
to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry,
or official book.
Counterfeiting coins; Forging treasury or
bank notes, obligations and securities;
Importing and uttering false or forged notes,
obligations and securities
Q: Is mere possession of false money bills
punishable under Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code? (1999 BAR)
A: NO. Possession of false treasury or bank note
alone without an intent to use it, is not
punishable. But the circumstances of such
possession may indicate intent to utter, sufficient
to consummate the crime of illegal possession of
false notes.
Introduction of false documents
Q: M was forced by a policeman to sign a
document entitled “Sinumpaang Salaysay” in
which M implicated X as the brain behind the
robbery of a bank where P500,000.00 were
lost. The document was prepared by the
policeman upon advice of B, the bank’s
lawyer, who was present when the policeman
asked M to sign the document. As M refused to
sign it, the policeman held him by the neck
and forced him to sign, which he did as he was
afraid he might be bodily harmed.
During the hearing of the robbery before the
Fiscal’s Office, B submitted the “Sinumpaang
Salaysay” as evidence, on the basis of which X
was included in the information filed by the
Fiscal in court.
When M testified in court, he repudiated the
document and told the court there was no
truth to its contents as he was merely forced
to sign it. Did lawyer B commit any crime
when he used the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” as
evidence?
A: The lawyer would be liable under Article 172
of the RPC for the offense of introducing a false
document in a judicial proceeding as he knew the
same to be false.
Falsification of Public Document (1988, 1992,
1993, 1999, 2000, 2008 BAR)
Q: Andrea signed her husband’s name in
endorsing his treasury warrants which were
delivered to her directly by the district
supervisor who knew that her husband had
already died, and she used the proceeds to
pay for the expenses of her husband’s last
illness and his burial. She knew that her
husband had accumulated vacation and sick
leaves the money value of which exceeded
that value of the three treasury warrants, so
that the government suffered no damage.
Andrea’s appeal is based on her claim of
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2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
absence of criminal intent and of good faith.
Should she be found guilty of falsification?
Discuss briefly. (1988 BAR)
A: Andrea should be held guilty of falsification of
public documents. Her claim of absence of
criminal intent and of good faith cannot be
considered because she is presumed to know
that her husband is dead. The element of damage
required in falsification does not refer to
pecuniary damage but damage to public interest.
NOTE: Executive clemency can, however, be
sought for by Andrea.
Q: Jose Dee Kiam, a Chinese citizen born in
Macao, having applied with a recruitment
agency to work in Kuwait, went to Quezon
City Hall to procure a Community Tax
Certificate, formerly called Residence
Certificate. He stated therein that his name is
Leo Tiampuy, a Filipino citizen born in Binan,
Laguna. As he paid for the Community Tax
Certificate, Cecille Delicious, an employee in
the office recognized him and reported to her
boss that the information written in the
Community Tax Certificate were all lies.
Shortly thereafter, an information was filed
against Dee Kiam alias Tiampuy.
a. An information was filed against Dee
Kiam. What crime, if any, may he be
indicted for? Why?
b. The accused move to quash the
information on the ground that it did not
allege that he had the obligation to
disclose the truth in the Community Tax
Certificate; that the same is a useless
scrap of paper which one can buy even in
the Quiapo underpass and that he had no
intent of deceiving anybody. Would you
grant the motion to quash? (1992 BAR)
A:
a. Dee Kiam can be indicted for the felony of
Falsification of a Public Document committed
by a private individual under Art. 172 of the
RPC in relation to Art. 171 thereof. A
residence certificate is a public or official
document within the context of said
provisions and jurisprudence. Since Dee
Kiam made an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts (Art. 171(4), RPC), and he
being a private individual, he is culpable
thereunder.
b. Falsification of public documents under Arts.
171 and 172, RPC does not require that the
document is required by law. The sanctity of
the public document, a residence certificate,
cannot be taken lightly as being a “mere
scrap of paper”. Intent to cause damage or
actual damage, is not an indispensable
requisite for falsification of public document.
Q: A falsified official or public document was
found in the possession of the accused. No
evidence was introduced to show that the
accused was the author of the falsification. As
a matter of fact, the trial court convicted the
accused of falsification of official or public
31 UST
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 Criminal Law
document mainly on the proposition that “the
only person who could have made the
erasures and the superimposition mentioned
is the one who will be benefited by the
alterations thus made” and that “he alone
could have the motive for making such
alterations”.
Was the conviction of the accused proper
although the conviction was premised merely
on the aforesaid ratiocination? Explain your
answer. (1999 BAR)
A: YES. The conviction is proper because there is
a presumption in law that the possessor and user
of a falsified document is the one who falsified
the same.
Falsification of Private Document (1989,
1991, 2007 BAR)
Q: In a civil case for recovery of a sum of
money filed against him by A, B interposed
the defense of payment. In support thereof,
he identified and offered in evidence a
receipt which appears to be signed by A. On
rebuttal, A denied having been paid by B and
having signed the receipt. He presented a
handwriting expert who testified that the
alleged signature of A on the receipt is a
forgery and that a comparison thereof with
the specimen signatures of B clearly shows
that B himself forged the signature of A.
a. Is B liable for the crime of using a
falsified document in a judicial
proceeding (last paragraph of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code)?
b. If he is not, what offense of offenses may
he be charged with? (1991 BAR)
A:
a. NO. B should not be liable for the crime of
using a falsified document, under the last
paragraph of Art. 172, RPC. He would be
liable for forgery of a private document
under the second mode of falsification under
Art. 172, RPC.
Being the possessor and user of the falsified
document he is presumed to be the forger or
falsifier and the offense of introducing
falsified document is already absorbed in the
main offense of forgery or falsification.
b. If he testified on the genuineness of the
document, he should also be liable under Art.
182, which is false testimony in civil cases.
Q: Fe is the manager of a rice mill in Bulacan.
In order to support a gambling debt, Fe made
it appear that the rice mill was earning less
than it actually was by writing in a “talaan” or
ledger a figure lower than what was collected
and paid by their customers. Fe then
pocketed the difference. What crime/s did Fe
commit, if any? Explain your answer. (2007
BAR)
A: If the “talaan” or ledger which Fe made to
32
show a falsehood was a private document, the
only crime that Fe committed was estafa thru
abuse of confidence or unfaithfulness.
Criminal liability for falsification of a private
document does not arise without damage or at
least proof of intent to cause damage. It cannot
co-exist with the crime of estafa which also
essentially requires damage or at least proof of
intent to cause damage.
Since the “talaan” was falsified to cover up or
conceal the misappropriation of the amount
involved, whatever damage or intent to cause
damage that will attend the estafa.
If such “talaan” or ledger was a commercial
document, damage or proof of intent to cause
damage is not necessary. The falsification alone if
done with intent to pervert the truth, would
bring about criminal liability for falsification of a
commercial document. Damage or intent to cause
damage, would sustain the estafa independently
of the falsification of the commercial document.
In this case, two (2) separate crimes are
committed – estafa and falsification of the
commercial document. The falsification should
not be complexed with estafa since it was not
committed as a necessary means to commit the
estafa but rather resorted to, to conceal or hide
the misappropriation of the amount she
pocketed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The crime committed by Fe are theft and
falsification of private document because Fe’s
possession of the proceeds of the rice mill was
only physical, not juridical, possession, and
having committed the crimes with grave abuse of
confidence, it is qualified theft.
The falsification is a separate crime from the
theft because it was not committed as a
necessary means to commit the theft but
resorted to only to hide or conceal the unlawful
taking.
Simulation of birth
Q: A childless couple, A and B, wanted to have
a child they could call their own. C, an unwed
mother, sold her newborn baby to them.
Thereafter, A and B caused their names to be
stated in the birth certificate of the child as
his parents. This was done in connivance with
the doctor who assisted in the delivery of C.
What are the criminal liabilities, if any, of the
couple A and B, C and the doctor? (2002 BAR)
A: The couple, A and B, and the doctor shall be
liable for the crime of simulation of birth
penalized under Article 347 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The act of making it appear in
the birth certificate of a child that the persons
named therein are the parents of the child when
they are not really the biological parents of the
said child constitutes the crime of simulation of
birth. C, the unwed mother is criminally liable for
“Child Trafficking”, a violation of Article IV, Sec. 7
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
of R.A. 7610. The law punishes inter alia the act
of buying and selling of a child.
False testimony (1987, 1991, 1993, 1994,
1996, 1997, 2005, 2008 BAR)
Q: Explain and illustrate “subordination of
perjury” (1993 BAR)
A: Subordination of perjury refers to the act of a
person procuring a false witness to testify and
thereby commit perjury. The procurer is a co-
principal by inducement.
Q: Sisenando purchased the share of the
stockholders of Estrella Corporation in two
installments, making him the majority
stockholder thereof and eventually, its
president. Because the stockholders who sold
their stocks failed to comply with their
warranties attendant to the sale, Sisenando
withheld payment of the second installment
due on the shares and deposited the money in
escrow instead, subject to release once said
stockholders comply with their warranties.
The stockholders concerned, in turn,
rescinded the sale in question and removed
Sisenando from the Presidency of the Estrella
Corp., Sisenando then filed a verified
complaint for damages against said
stockholders in his capacity as president and
principal stockholder of Estrella Corp. In
retaliation, the stockholders concerned, after
petitioning the Securities and Exchange
Commission to declare the rescission valid,
further filed a criminal case for perjury
against Sisenando, claiming that the latter
perjured himself when he stated under oath
in the verification of his complaint for
damages that he is the President of the
Estrella Corporation when in fact he had
already been removed as such.
Under the facts of the case, could Sisenando
be held liable for perjury? Explain. (1996
BAR)
A: NO. Sisenando may not be held liable for
perjury because it cannot be reasonably
maintained that he willfully and deliberately
made an assertion of a falsehood when he alleged
in the complaint that he is the President of the
Corporation.
Obviously, he made the allegation on the premise
that his removal from the presidency is not valid
and that is precisely the issue brought about by
his complaint to the SEC. It is a fact that
Sisenando has been the President of the
corporation and it is from that position that the
stockholders concerned purportedly removed
him, whereupon he filed the complaint
questioning his removal. There is no willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood which is a
requisite of perjury.
Q: A, a government employee, was
administratively charged with immorality for
having an affair with B, a co-employee in the
same office who believed him to be single. To
exculpate himself, A testified that he was
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2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
single and was willing to marry B, He induced
C to testify and C did testify that B was single.
The truth, however, was that A had earlier
married D, now a neighbor of C. Is A guilty of
perjury? Are A and C guilty of subordination
of perjury? (1997 BAR)
A: NO. A is not guilty of perjury because the
willful falsehood asserted by him is not material
to the charge of immorality. Whether A is single
or married, the charge of immorality against him
as a government employee could proceed or
prosper. In other words, A's civil status is not a
defense to the charge of immorality, hence, not a
material matter that could influence the charge.
There is no crime of subornation of perjury. The
crime is now treated as plain perjury with the
one inducing another as the principal
inducement, and the latter, as principal by direct
participation. (People v. Podol, 66 Phil. 365)
Since in this case, A cannot be held liable for
perjury, the matter that he testified to being
immaterial, he cannot therefore be held
responsible as a principal by inducement when
he induced C to testify on his status.
Consequently, C is not liable as principal by
direct participation in perjury, having testified
on matters not material to an administrative
case.
Q: Al Chua, a Chinese national, filed a petition
under oath for naturalization, with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. In his petition,
he stated that he is married to Leni Chua; that
he is living with her in Sampaloc, Manila; that
he is of good moral character; and that he has
conducted himself in an irreproachable
manner during his stay in the Philippines.
However, at the time of the filing of the
petition, Leni Chua was already living in
Cebu, while Al was living with Babes Toh in
Manila, with whom he has an amorous
relationship. After his direct testimony, Al
Chua withdrew his petition for
naturalization. What crime or crimes, if any,
did Al Chua commit? Explain. (2005 BAR)
A: Al Chua committed perjury. His declarations
under oath for naturalization that he is of good
moral character and residing at Sampaloc,
Manila are false. This information is material to
his petition for naturalization. He committed
perjury for this willful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood which is contained in a verified
petition made for a legal purpose.
E. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
(1996, 1993 BAR)
Q: Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a
plush condominium in Makati City sunbathed
naked at its penthouse every Sunday
morning. She was unaware that the business
executives holding office at the adjoining tall
buildings reported to office every Sunday
morning and, with the use of powerful
binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she
sunbathed. Eventually, her sunbathing
became the talk of the town.
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 Criminal Law
a. What crime, if any, did Pia commit?
Explain.
b. What crime, if any, did the business
executives commit? Explain. (1996 BAR)
A:
a. Pia did not commit a crime, the felony
closest to making Pia criminally liable is
Grave Scandal, but then such act is not to
be considered as highly scandalous and
offensive against decency and good
customs. In the first place, it was not done
in a public place and within public
knowledge or view. As a matter of fact, it
was discovered by the executives
accidentally and they have to use
binoculars to have full view of Pia
sunbathing in the nude.
b. The business executives did not commit
any crime. Their acts could not be acts of
lasciviousness (as there was no overt
lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk
of the town, resulting from her sunbathing,
is not directly imputed to the business
executives, and besides such topic is not
intended to defame or put Pia to ridicule.
Q: Juan and Petra are officemates. Later,
intimacy developed between them. One day,
Juan sent to Petra a booklet contained in a
pay envelope which was securely sealed. The
booklet is unquestionably indecent and
highly offensive to morals. Juan was
thereafter charged under par. 3 of Art. 201 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D.
969, which provides that the penalty of
prision mayor or a fine from P6,000 to
P12,000, or both such imprisonment and fine
shall be imposed upon those who shall sell,
give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to
morals. Is Juan guilty of the crime charged?
Reasons. (1993 BAR)
A: NO. Juan is not guilty of the crime charged
because the law (Art. 201, RPC) covers only the
protection of public moral and not only the moral
of an individual.
F. CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC
OFFICERS
MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE
Q: Define malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance. (2016 BAR)
A: Malfeasance is the doing of an act which a
person ought not to do at all.
Misfeasance is the improper doing of an act
which a person may or might lawfully do.
Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a
person ought to do. (Black’s Dictionary, 6th
Edition, West Publishing 1990)
Bribery (1990, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005,
2006, 2010, 2014 BAR)
34
Q: During a PNP buy-bust operation, Cao Shih
was arrested for selling 20 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) to
a poseur-buyer. Cao Shih, through an
intermediary, paid Patrick, the Evidence
Custodian of the PNP Forensic Chemistry
Section, the amount of P500,000 in
consideration for the destruction by Patrick
of the drug. Patrick managed to destroy the
drug.
State with reasons whether Patrick
committed the following crimes:
a. Direct bribery
b. Indirect bribery
c. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act)
d. Obstruction of Justice under P.D. 1829
(2005 BAR)
A: Patrick committed the crimes of direct bribery
under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code,
Violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti- Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA3019) and Obstruction
of Justice under Section 1 (b) of PD 1829.
a. Direct bribery was committed by Patrick
when, for a consideration of
P500,000.00, he committed a violation of
PD 1829 by destroying the drugs which
were evidence entrusted to him in his
official capacity.
b. Indirect bribery is not committed
because he received the P500,000.00 as
consideration for destroying the
evidence against the offender, which was
under his official custody as a public
officer. The money was not delivered to
him simply as a gift or present by reason
of his public office.
c. Patrick also violated Section 3 (e), R.A.
3019 causing undue injury to the
government through evident bad faith,
giving unwarranted benefit to the
offender by destroying evidence of a
crime.
d. Obstruction of justice under Section 1
(b) of P.D. 1829 is committed by
destroying evidence intended to be used
in official proceedings in criminal case.
Indirect bribery (1993, 1997, 2006 BAR)
Q: Commissioner Marian Torres of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) wrote solicitation
letters addressed to the Filipino-Chinese
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and to
certain CEOs of various multinational
corporations requesting donations of gifts for
her office Christmas party. She used the
Bureau's official stationery. The response was
prompt and overwhelming so much so that
Commissioner Torres' office was
overcrowded with rice cookers, radio sets,
freezers, electric stoves and toasters. Her staff
also received several envelopes containing
cash money for the employees' Christmas
luncheon. Has Commissioner Torres
committed any impropriety or irregularity?
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
What laws or decrees did she violate? (2006
BAR)
A: YES. Commissioner Torres violated the
following:
1. Indirect bribery (Art. 211, RPC) for receiving
gifts offered by reason of office.
2. R.A. 6713 or Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees
when he solicited and accept gifts (Sec. 7[d])
3. P.D. 46 making it punishable for public
officials and employees to receive, and for
private persons to give gifts on any occasion,
including Christmas.
Q: A, who is the private complainant in a
murder case pending before a Regional Trial
Court judge, gave a judge a Christmas gift,
consisting of big basket of assorted canned
goods and bottles of expensive wines, easily
worth P10, 000.00. The judge accepted the
gift knowing it came from A. What crime or
crimes, if any, were committed? (1997, 1993
BAR)
A: The judge committed the crime of indirect
bribery under Art. 211 of the RPC. The gift was
offered to the judge by reason of his office. In
addition, the judge will be liable for the violation
of P.D. 46 which punishes the receiving of gifts by
public officials and employees on occasions like
Christmas.
Qualified bribery (2010 BAR)
Q: What is the crime of qualified bribery? May
a judge be charged and prosecuted for such
felony? How about a public prosecutor? A
police officer? Explain. (2010 BAR)
A: Qualified bribery is a crime committed by a
public officer who is entrusted with law
enforcement and who, in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift of offer, refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/ or death. (Art. 211-A, RPC)
NO, a judge may not be charged of this felony
because his official duty as a public officer is not
law enforcement but the determination of cases
already filed in court.
On the other hand, a public prosecutor may be
prosecuted for this crime in respect of the
bribery committed, aside from dereliction of duty
committed in violation of Art. 208 of the Revised
Penal Code, should he refrain from prosecuting
an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death
in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present.
Meanwhile, a police officer who refrains from
arresting such offender for the same
consideration above stated, may be prosecuted
for this felony since he is a public officer
entrusted with law enforcement.
Corruption of public officials (2018, 2019
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
BAR)
Q: Ricky was driving his car when he was
flagged down by a traffic enforcer for over
speeding. Realizing his undoing, but in a
hurry for a meeting, Ricky shoved a PhP500
bill in the traffic enforcer’s pocket and
whispered to the latter to refrain from
issuing him a traffic violation receipt. The
traffic enforcer still issued him a ticket, and
returned his money. What crime, if any, was
committed by Ricky? (2018 BAR)
A: Ricky in showing a P500 bill in the traffic
enforcer’s pocket, clearly committed the crime of
corruption of public under Art. 212 of the RPC,
which states that any person who shall have
made the offers or promises or given the gifts or
present to a public officer is guilty of corruption
of public officer. Even if the P500 bill was
returned it cannot erase the fact that gifts or
presents was given to the traffic enforcer.
Q: One Sunday afternoon, Mr. X, President of
ABC Corp., happened to bump into the Labor
Arbiter assigned to the illegal dismissal case
filed by certain employees against his
company. During their encounter, Mr. X
promised the Labor Arbiter a luxury car in
exchange for a favorable ruling. The Labor
Arbiter immediately rejected the offer and
walked away.
What crime did Mr. X commit under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), if any? Explain.
(2019 BAR)
A: Mr. X committed the crime of Attempted
Corruption of a Public Official. He offered to give
the Labor Arbiter a luxury car in exchange for a
favorable ruling on a pending illegal dismissal
case. By making such offer, Mr. X already
commenced the performance of material acts of
execution in corrupting the Labor Arbiter. He
was not able to perform all the material acts of
execution only because the Labor Arbiter refused
to accept the offer. (Pozar v. CA, G.R. No. L-62439,
October 23, 1984)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Mr. X committed no crime. Because there was no
acceptance, there is no crime, and therefore, no
penalty should be imposed. Nullum crimen nulla
poena sine lege. There is no crime where there is
no law punishing it.
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND
PROPERTY
Malversation of Public Funds (1987, 1988,
1990, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2006,
2008, 2016 BAR)
Q: Dencio, who is the Municipal Treasurer of
the town, was also the treasurer of a charity
ball of the church. Because he was short of
payroll funds for the municipal employees, he
used part of the church funds to replenish the
payroll funds with the intention of returning
the same when the public funds came.
35 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
a. Is Dencio guilty of malversation under
the RPC? State your reasons.
b. Assuming that he failed to replenish the
church funds, may he be held criminally
liable thereby? (1990 BAR)
A:
a. NO. The church funds used by Dencio do not
constitute public funds which are the
proper subject of malversation. Neither
does said funds constitute the so called
private funds which could be the proper
subject of malversation under Art. 222, RPC,
which pertain to private property placed in
the custody of publicofficers by reason of
their office.
b. YES. Momentary use of funds, since there is
defraudation, is tantamount to estafa under
Art. 215 of the RPC. This is because he
received the funds in his capacity as
treasurer and there was temporary damage
caused. Personal benefit is not an element
of the crime of estafa.
Q: Randy, an NBI agent, was issued by the NBI
an armalite rifle (M16) and a Smith and
Wesson Revolver Cal. 38. After a year, the NBI
Director made an inspection of all the
firearms issued. Randy, who reported for
work that morning, did not show up during
the inspection. He went on absence without
leave (AWOL). After two years, he
surrendered to the NBI the two firearms
issued to him. He was charged with
malversation of government property before
the Sandiganbayan.
Randy put up the defense that he did not
appropriate the armalite rifle and the
revolver for his own use, that the delay in
accounting for them does not constitute
conversion and that actually the firearms
were stolen by his friend,Chiting. Decide the
case. (1994 BAR)
A: Randy is guilty as charged under Art. 217,
RPC. He is accountable for the firearms they
issued to him in his official capacity. The failure
of Randy to submit the firearms upon demand
created the presumption that he converted them
for his own use. Even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation, his failure to
account for the government property is enough
factual basis for a finding of malversation.
Indeed, even his explanation that the guns were
stolen is incredible for if the firearms were
actually stolen, he should have reported the
matter immediately to the authorities.
Q: Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of
Masinloc, Zambales. On January 10, 1994, she
received, as municipal treasurer, from the
Department of Public Works and Highways,
the amount of P100, 000.00 known as the
fund for construction, rehabilitation,
betterment, and Improvement (CRBI) for the
concreting of Barangay Phanix Road located
in Masinloc, Zambales, a project undertaken
on proposal of the Barangay Captain.
Informed that the fund was already
36
exhausted while the concreting of Barangay
Phanix Road remained unfinished, a
representative of the Commission on Audit
conducted a spot audit of Elizabeth who failed
to account for the P100,000 CRBI fund.
Elizabeth, who was charged with
malversation of public funds, was acquitted
by the Sandiganbayan of that charge but was
nevertheless convicted, in the same criminal
case, for illegal use of public funds. On appeal,
Elizabeth argued that her conviction was
erroneous as she applied the amount of
P50,000.00 for a public purpose without
violating any law or ordinance appropriating
the said amount for any specific purpose. The
absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact,
established. Is the contention of Elizabeth
legally tenable? Explain. (1996 BAR)
A: NO. Elizabeth's contention that her conviction
for illegal use of public funds (technical
malversation) was erroneous is legally tenable
because she was charged for malversation of
public funds under Art. 217 of the RPC but was
convicted for Illegal use of public funds which is
defined and punished under Art. 220.
A public officer charged with malversation may
not be validly convicted of illegal use of public
funds (technical malversation) because the latter
crime is not necessarily included nor does it
necessarily include the crime of malversation.
The Sandiganbayan should have followed the
procedure provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court and order the filing of the proper
Information (Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
96025, May 15, 1991). From the facts, there is no
showing that there is a law or ordinance
appropriating the amount to a specific public
purpose. As a matter of fact, the problem
categorically states that the absence of such law
or ordinance was, in fact, established.
So, procedurally and substantially, the
Sandiganbayan's decision suffers from serious
infirmity.
Q: Alex Reyes, together with Jose Santos, were
former warehousemen of the Rustan
Department Store. In 1986, the PCGG
sequestered the assets, fund and properties of
the owners-incorporators of the store,
alleging that they constitute "Ill-gotten
wealth" of the Marcos family. Upon their
application, Reyes and Santos were appointed
as fiscal agents of the sequestered firm and
they were given custody and possession of the
sequestered building and its contents,
including various vehicles used in the firm's
operations.
After a few months, an inventory was
conducted and it was discovered that two
delivery vans were missing. After demand
was made upon them, Reyes and Santos failed
to give any satisfactory explanation why the
vans were missing or to turn them over to the
PCGG; hence, they were charged with
Malversation of Public Property. During the
trial, the two accused claimed that they are
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
not public accountable officers and, if any
crime was committed, it should only be Estafa
under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code. What is the proper offense committed?
State the reason(s) for your answer. (2001
BAR)
A: The proper offense committed was
Malversation of Public Property, not estafa,
considering that Reyes and Santos, upon their
application, were constituted as "fiscal agents" of
the sequestered firm and were "given custody
and possession" of the sequestered properties,
including the delivery vans which later they
could not account for.
They were thus made the depositary and
administrator of properties deposited by public
authority and hence, by the duties of their
office/position, they are accountable for such
properties. Such properties, having been
sequestered by the Government through the
PCGG, are in custodia legis and therefore
impressed with the character of public property,
even though the properties belong to a private
individual (Art. 222, RPC).
The failure of Reyes and Santos to give any
satisfactory explanation why the vans were
missing, is prima facie evidence that they had put
the same to their personal use.
Q: Allan, the Municipal Treasurer of the
Municipality of Gerona, was in a hurry to
return to his office after a day-long official
conference. He alighted from the government
car which was officially assigned to him,
leaving the ignition key and the car unlocked,
and rushed to his office. Jules, a bystander,
drove off with the car and later sold the same
to his brother, Danny for P20,000.00,
although the car was worth P800,000.00.
a. What are the respective crimes, if any,
committed by Allan, Danny and Jules?
Explain.
b. What, if any, are their respective civil
liabilities? Explain. (2005 BAR)
A:
a. Allan, the municipal treasurer is liable for
malversation committed through negligence
or culpa. The government car which was
assigned to him is public property under his
accountability by reason of his duties. By his
act of negligence, he permitted the taking of
the car by another person, resulting in
malversation, consistent with the language of
Art. 217 of RPC.
Danny committed the crime of fencing for
having bought the car which was the
proceeds of carnapping, a crime in the nature
of theft or robbery of motor vehicle. The
presumption of fencing applies to him for he
paid a price so inadequate for the value of
the car.
Jules committed the crime of carnapping for
the unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of
the government’s motor vehicle. (Unlawful
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
taking of a motor vehicle is now governed by
the Anti-Carnapping Act, R.A. 10883, not by
the provisions of the RPC on theft or robbery)
b. Allan, Jules and Danny are all civilly liable for
restitution of the car to the government or if
not possible, reparation of damages caused
by payment of the replacement cost of the
car minus allowance for depreciation, and to
indemnify consequential damages.
Technical Malversation
Q: Governor A was given the amount of P10
million by the Department of Agriculture for
the purpose of buying seedlings to be
distributed to the farmers. Supposedly
intending to modernize the farming industry
in his province, Governor A bought farm
equipment through direct purchase from XY
Enterprise, owned by his kumpare B, the
alleged exclusive distributor of the said
equipment. Upon inquiry, the Ombudsman
discovered that B has a pending patent
application for the said farm equipment.
Moreover, the equipment purchased turned
out to be overpriced. What crime or crimes, if
any, were committed by Governor A? Explain.
(2016 BAR)
A: Governor A committed the crimes of (1)
Technical Malversation; and (2) Violation of
Sections 3(e)and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019
Governor A committed the crime of illegal use of
public funds or property punishable under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, also
known as Technical Malversation. The crime has
three elements: a) that the offender is an
accountable public officer; b) that he applies
public funds or property under his
administration to some public use; and c) that
the public use for which such funds or property
has been applied is different from the purpose
for which they were originally appropriated by
law or ordinance. (Ysidro v People, G.R. No.
192330, November 14, 2012)
The amount of P 10 M granted by the
Department of Agriculture to Governor A, an
accountable public officer, is specifically
appropriated for the purpose of buying seedlings
to be distributed to the farmers. Instead,
Governor A applied the amount to acquire
modern farm equipment through direct purchase
from XY Enterprise owned by his kumpare. The
law punishes the act of diverting public funds
earmarked by law or ordinance for a specific
public purpose to another public purpose, hence,
the liability for technical malversation.
Governor A can also be held liable for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, which has the following
elements: (1) the accused is a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross excusable
negligence; and (3) his action caused undue
injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
37 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
The facts show that the first element is present.
The second element is likewise present because
“through manifest partiality” in favoring his
kumpare, Governor A did not hold pubic bidding
and directly purchased the farm equipment from
the latter. With respect to the third element,
Governor A’s actions caused undue injury to the
government as well as the farmers deprived of
the seedlings. His acts likewise gave his kumpare,
a private party, the unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference, to the exclusion of
other interested suppliers.
The act committed by the Governor is also in
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. no. 3019 for
entering a contract on behalf of the government
which is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the same.
Q: A typhoon destroyed the houses of many of
the inhabitants of X Municipality. Thereafter,
X Municipality operated a shelter assistance
program whereby construction materials
were provided to the calamity victims, and
the beneficiaries provided the labor. The
construction was partially done when the
beneficiaries stopped helping with the
construction for the reason that they needed
to earn income to provide food for their
families. When informed of the situation,
Mayor Maawain approved the withdrawal of
ten boxes of food from X Municipality's
feeding program, which were given to the
families of the beneficiaries of the shelter
assistance program. The appropriations for
the funds pertaining to the shelter assistance
program and those for the feeding program
were separate items on X Municipality's
annual budget.
a. What crime did Mayor Maawain commit?
Explain.
b. May Mayor Maawain invoke the defense
of good faith and that he had no evil
intent when he approved the transfer of
the boxes of food from the feeding
program to the shelter assistance
program? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A:
a. Mayor Maawain committed the crime of
Illegal use of public funds or property
punishable under Article 220 of the RPC.
This offense is also known as Technical
Malversation. The crime has 3 elements: a.)
that the offender is an accountable public
officer; b) that he applies public funds or
property under his administration to some
public use; and c) that the public use for
which such funds or property were applied is
different from the purpose for which they
were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance. The funds for the feeding
program are not specifically appropriated for
the beneficiaries of the shelter assistance
program in X Municipality’s annual budget.
Mayor Maawain ought to use the boxes of
food earmarked particularly for the feeding
program, which would cater only to the
malnourished among his constituents who
38
needed the resources for proper
nourishment.
b. NO. Mayor Maawain cannot invoke good
faith when he approved the transfer of the
boxes of food from the feeding program to
the Shelter Assistance program. “Criminal
intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law
or ordinance for a particular purpose to
another public purpose. The offense is mala
prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is
not inherently immoral but becomes a
criminal offense because positive law forbids
its commission based on considerations of
public policy, order and convenience. It is the
commission of an act as defined by the law,
and not the character or effect thereof that
determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. Hence, malice or criminal
intent is completely irrelevant”. (Ysidoro v.
People, G.R. No. 192330, 14 November 2012)
INFIDELITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Custody of prisoners (1989, 1990, 1996,
1997, 2002, 2009, 2014 BAR)
Q: Ernani was accused of estafa. Unable to
post a bail bond for his provisional liberty
pending trial of his case, he was detained in
the city jail. On the date of the hearing of the
estafa case, Daniel, a policeman detailed in
the city jail, escorted Ernani to the city hall for
the trial. Daniel removed the handcuffs of
Ernani and allowed him to sit on one of the
chairs inside the courtroom. As Daniel was
talking to a lawyer inside the courtroom,
Ernani, with the help of a cigarette vendor,
Meynardo, who used his cigarette container
as cover, surreptitiously moved out of the
room and escaped. Ernani and Meynardo
went to the comfort room for a while, then
went down the stairs and lost themselves in
the crowd. What crime/s were committed by
Ernani, Daniel and Meynardo? Give your
reasons. (1989 BAR)
A:
1. Ernani, the escaped prisoner himself is not
criminally liable for any offense. The
detention prisoner who escapes from
detention does not commit any crime. If he
were a convict by final judgment who is
serving a sentence which consists of
deprivation of liberty and he escapes during
term of his sentence, he would be liable for
Evasion of Service Sentence (Art. 157)
2. Daniel, the policeman, committed the crime
of Evasion thru Negligence, one of the forms
of Infidelity in the custody of Prisoner (Art.
224), the essential elements of which offense
are:
a. That the offender is a public officer
b. That he has in his custody or charge a
prisoner, either detention prisoner/s by
final judgment
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
c. That such prisoner escaped from his which can be considered real and actual evasion
custody thru his negligence. of service under Article 223 of the RPC. (People v.
Leon Bandino, 29 Phil 459)
All of these elements are present, Daniel, a
policeman detailed in the city jail, is a public Other Offenses or Irregularities by Public
officer. As the escort for Ernani in the Officers
latter’s trial, he had custody of charge of a
detention prisoner. Ernani escape was thru Q: During the presentation of the
his negligence because after removing prosecution’s evidence, Reichter was called
Ernani’s handcuffs and allowing him to sit to the witness stand with the stated purpose
in one of the chairs inside the courtroom, he that he would testify that his wife Rima had
should have taken the necessary shot him in the stomach with a .38 caliber
precautions to prevent Ernani’s escape by pistol, resulting in near fatal injuries. Upon
keeping an eye on him. Instead, he provided objection of the defense on the ground of the
the opportunity for the escape by talking marital disqualification rule, the presiding
with a lawyer and not keeping watch over judge (Judge Rossano) disallowed Reichter
his prisoner. from testifying in the case. Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the
3. Meynardo, not being a public officer, is
People of the Philippines went up on
guilty of the crime of Delivering Prisoners
certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA)
From Jails (Art. 156), which is committed by
questioning Judge Rossano’s ruling.
any person who either removes from any
jail or penal establishment any person
After due proceedings, the CA rendered
confined therein, or who helps the escape of
judgment declaring Judge Rossano’s ruling
such person by means of violence,
void ab initio for having been made with
intimidation, bribery of other means. The
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
act of Meynardo in giving to Ernani his
or excess of jurisdiction, and directing Judge
cigarette container is helping in the latter’s
Rossano to allow Reichter to testify in the
escape by other means.
criminal case for the stated purpose. This is
based on the fact that the marital privilege
Q: Amy was apprehended and arrested by the
rule does not apply where a spouse
Patrolman Bart for illegal parking. She was
committed the crime against the other.
detained at the police precinct, underwent
investigation, and released only after 48
As the CA decision became final and
hours.
executory, the criminal case before the RTC
was calendared for trial. At the scheduled
a. Is Patrolman Bart liable for any offense?
trial, the prosecution called Reichter to the
Explain your answer.
witness stand in order to testify on the same
b. Suppose Amy resisted the arrest and
matter it earlier announced. The defense
grappled with patrolman Bart, is she
objected on the ground that the CA erred in
criminally liable thereby? State your
its disposition of the certiorari case. Judge
reasons. (1990 BAR)
Rossano sustained the objection and again
disallowed Reichter from testifying in the
A:
criminal case. Repeated pleas from the
a. YES. Patrolman Bart is liable for violation of
prosecution for Judge Rossano to reconsider
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code – Delay
his ruling and to allow Reichter to testify fell
on the Delivery of Detained Persons to the
on deaf ears.
Proper Judicial Authorities.
b. YES. She is criminally liable for slight
May Judge Rossano be convicted of a crime? If
disobedience under Art. 151 of the RPC –
yes, what crime did he commit? (2018 BAR)
Resistance and disobedience to a person in
authority or the agents of such person.
A: Yes. Judge Rossano may be convicted of the
crime of open disobedience (Art. 231, RPC)
Q: During a town fiesta, A, the chief of police,
which provides that any judicial or executive
permitted B, a detention prisoner and his
officer who shall openly refuse to execute the
compadre, to leave the municipal jail and
judgment, decision or order of any suspension
entertain visitors in his house from 10:00 am
authority made within the scope of the
to 8:00 pm. B returned to the municipal jail at
jurisdiction of the latter and issued with all the
8:30 pm. Was there any crime committed by
legal formalities shall suffer the penalties of
A? (1997 BAR)
Arresto Mayor in its medium period to prision
correctional, special disqualification and fine.
A: YES. A committed the crime of infidelity in the
custody of a prisoner. Since B is a detention
The ruling was issued by the Court of Appeals, it
prisoner, as Chief of Police, A has custody over B.
was already final and executoy; the act of Judge
Even if B returned to the municipal jail at 8:30
disallowing Reichter from testifying is open
pm. A, as custodian of the prisoner, has
disobedience under the law.
maliciously failed to perform the duties of his
office, and when he permits said prisoner to
obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment, he
consents to the prisoner escaping the
punishment of being deprived of his liberty

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS 39 UST

2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
G. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
Parricide (1994, 1996, 1997, 2003, 2006,
2015 BAR)
Q: Aldrich was dismissed from his job by his
employer. Upon reaching home, his pregnant
wife, Carmi, nagged him about money for her
medicines. Depressed by his dismissal and
angered by the nagging of his wife, Aldrich
struck Carmi with his fist. She fell to the
ground. As a result, she and her unborn baby
died. What crime was committed by Aldrich?
(1994 BAR)
A: Aldrich committed the crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. When Aldrich struck his
wife, Carmi, with his fist, he committed the crime
of maltreatment under Art. 266, par. 3 of the RPC.
Since Carmi died because of the felonious act of
Aldrich, he is criminally liable of parricide under
Art. 246, RPC in relation to Art. 4, par. 1 of the
same Code. Since the unborn baby of Carmi died
in the process, but Aldrich had no intention to
cause the abortion of his wife, Aldrich committed
unintentional abortion as defined in Art. 257,
RPC. Inasmuch as the single act of Aldrich
produced two grave or less grave felonies, he
falls under Art. 48, RPC, i.e. a complex crime
(People v. Salufrancia, 159 SCRA 401)
Q: After a heated argument over his
philandering, Higino punched on the head his
wife Aika, who was six and a half months
pregnant. Because of the impact, Aika lost her
balance, fell on the floor with her head hitting
a hard object. Aika died and the child was
expelled prematurely. After thirty-six hours,
the child died.
a. What crime(s) did Higino commit?
Explain.
b. Assuming that when the incident
occurred, Aika was only six months
pregnant, and when she died, the fetus
inside her womb also died, will your
answer be different? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A:
a. With respect to the killing of the wife,
parricide under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed because of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship. With
respect to the killing of the child, Higino is
liable for infanticide under Article 255 of the
Revised Penal Code because his child was
born alive and was already viable or capable
of independent existence and the child’s age
is less than three (3) days for the latter died
after thirty -six hours from expulsion. Higino
shall incur criminal liability for parricide and
infanticide although these crimes committed
are different from his criminal intention of
maltreating his wife (Article 4, RPC). This is a
complex crime because the single act of
punching the victim constitutes two grave
felonies (Article 48).
b. If the child died inside the womb of Aika,
who was only six months, the crime
40
committed is complex crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion. Killing the
unborn child as a result of the violence
employed against the mother without intent
to abort is unintentional abortion. Since the
child died inside the womb of the mother,
unintentional abortion is committed
regardless of viability of the victim. Because
the same violence that killed the mother also
caused unintentional abortion, the crime
committed is a complex crime. (People v.
Pacayna, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008;
People v. Robinos, G.R. No. 138453, May 29,
2002; People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 95851,
March 01, 1995; People v. Salufrania, G.R. No.
L- 50884, March 30, 1988)
Q: In 1975, Pedro, then a resident of Manila,
abandoned his wife and their son, Ricky, who
was then only three years old. Twenty years
later, an affray took place in a bar in
Olongapo City between Pedro and his
companions, on one hand, and Ricky and his
friends, upon the other, without the father
and son knowing each other. Ricky stabbed
and killed Pedro in the fight, only to find out,
a week later, when his mother arrived from
Manila to visit him in jail, that the man whom
he killed was his own father.
a. What crime did Ricky commit?
b. Suppose Ricky knew before the killing
that Pedro is his father, but he
nevertheless killed him out of bitterness
for having abandoned him and his
mother, what crime did Ricky commit?
Explain. (1996 BAR)
A:
a. Ricky committed parricide because the
person killed was his own father and the law
punishing the crime (Art. 246, RPC) does not
require that the crime be knowingly
committed. Should Ricky be prosecuted and
found guilty of parricide, the penalty to be
imposed is Art. 49 of the Revised Penal Code
for Homicide (the crime he intended to
commit) but in its maximum period.
b. The crime committed should be parricide if
Ricky knew before the killing that Pedro is
his father, because the moral basis for
punishing the crime already exists. His
having acted out of bitterness for having
been abandoned by his father may be
considered mitigating.
Q: Ana has been a bar girl/GRO at a beer
house for more than 2 years. She fell in love
with Oniok, the bartender, who impregnated
her. But Ana did not inform about her
condition and, instead, went to Cebu to
conceal her shame.
However, her parents drove her away so she
returned to Manila and stayed with Oniok in
his boarding house. Upon learning of her
pregnancy, already in an advanced state,
Oniok tried to persuade her to undergo an
abortion, but she refused. Because of their
constant and bitter quarrels, she suffered
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
birth pangs and gave birth prematurely to a
live baby girl while Oniok was at his place of
work. Upon coming home and learning what
happened, he prevailed upon Ana to conceal
his dishonor. Hence, they placed the infant in
a shoe and threw it into a nearby creek.
However, an inquisitive neighbor saw them
and with the help of others. Retrieved the
infant who was already dead from drowning.
The incident was reported to the police who
arrested Ana and Oniok.
The two were charged with parricide under
Article 246 of the RPC. After trial, they were
convicted of the crime charged. Was the
conviction correct? (2006 BAR)
A: NO. The conviction was incorrect because:
a. Under Art. 46, Civil Code, a newborn with
an intra-uterine life of less than 7 months
must live for at least 24 hours before it
may be considered born and hence, before
it may acquire personality of its own;
b. The newborn, therefore was still a fetus
when killed and was not yet a person.
Hence, the crime in law is abortion. It is
legally a fetus who was killed, not a person
or child because legally it has no
personality yet.
c. Infanticide and parricide involves a killing
when the victim is already a person.
Q: Rafa caught his wife, Rachel, in the act of
having sexual intercourse with Rocco in the
maid’s room of their own house. Rafa shot
both lovers in the chest, but they survived.
Rafa charged Rachel and Rocco with adultery,
while Rachel and Rocco charged Rafa with
frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide.
In the adultery case, Rachel and Rocco raised
the defense that Rafa and Rachel, prior to the
incident in question, executed a notarized
document whereby they agreed to live
separately and allowed each of them to get a
new partner and live with anyone of their
choice as husband and wife. This document
was executed after Rachel discovered that
Rafa was cohabiting with another woman.
Thus, they also raised the defense of in pari
delicto. In the frustrated parricide and
frustrated homicide cases, Rafa raised the
defense that, having caught them in flagrante
delicto, he has no criminal liability.
Will the actions for frustrated parricide and
frustrated homicide prosper? (2018 BAR)
A: NO. The actions for frustrated parricide and
frustrated homicide will not prosper because
Rafa is entitled to the benefit of Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 247 of the RPC states
that any legally married person who having
surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill
any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them
any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them
physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be
exempt from punishment. The action will
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prosper to allow the court to receive evidence.
However, Rafa can be held liable only for
destierro based on Art. 247 of the RPC. The act
committed by Rafa amounts to at least, serious
physical injuries, so the penalty of destierro will
be imposed. If the court finds that the act
amounts to less than serious physical injuries,
Rafa will not have any criminal liability.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
YES. The actions for frustrated parricide and
frustrated homicide will prosper, and Rafa will
be found guilty of these crimes. The penalty,
however, that the Trial Court can impose is only
destierro not penalties for frustrated parricide
and frustrated homicide, being the spouse of
Rachel (Art. 246, RPC)
Murder (1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999,
2001, 2008, 2009 BAR)
Q: Define murder. What are the elements of
the crime? (1999 BAR)
A: Murder is the unlawful killing of a person
which otherwise would constitute only homicide,
had it not been attended by any of the following
circumstances:
1. With treachery or taking advantage of
superior strength, or with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward or
promise;
3. By means or on the occasion of inundation,
fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding
of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or
other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanely augmenting the suffering of the
victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person
or corpse.
Q: A, a 76-year old woman, was brought to the
hospital in a coma with slight cerebral
hemorrhage. An endotracheal tube was
inserted in her mouth to facilitate her
breathing. B, a hospital janitor, removed the
tube. The victim started to convulse and bleed
in the mouth. Only the timely arrival of the
nurse prevented the patient’s death. The
patient was then transferred to another
hospital where she died the next day of
cardio-respiratory. Is B criminally liable? If
so, what crime was committed? (1991 BAR)
A: YES. B is criminally liable for Murder
(qualified by treachery) because the death of A
appears to be the proximate cause of the overt
acts of B.
A died of cardio-respiratory arrest which
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 Criminal Law
evidently was brought about by the convulsion
and bleeding in the mouth of the victim due to
the removal by B of the endotracheal tube twice.
The two acts of B can be considered as the result
of one criminal design.
In People v. Umaging, 107 SCRA 166, the Supreme
Court ruled that removal of the endotracheal
tube is attempted murder, qualified by treachery,
because the patient did not die.
Q: Lina worked as a housemaid and yaya of
the one-week old son of the spouses John and
Joana. When Lina learned that her 70- year
old mother was seriously ill, she asked John
for a cash advance of P20,000.00, but the
latter refused. In anger, Lina gagged the
mouth of the child with stockings, placed him
in a box, sealed it with masking tape, and
placed the box in the attic. Lina then left the
house and asked her friend Fely to demand a
P20,000.00 ransom for the release of the
spouses' child to be paid within twenty-four
hours. The spouses did not pay the ransom.
After a couple of days, John discovered the
box in the attic with his child already dead.
According to the autopsy report, the child
died of asphyxiation barely minutes after the
box was sealed. What crime or crimes, if any,
did Lina and Fely commit? Explain. (2016
BAR)
A: Lina is liable for murder. Gagging the mouth of
the child with stockings, placing him in a box,
sealing it with masking tape, and placing the box
in the attic were only the methods employed by
the defendant in committing the murder
qualified by treachery (People v. Lora, G.R. No. L-
49430, March 30, 1982). Taking advantage of the
defenseless condition of the victim by reason of
his tender age, one-week old, is treachery (People
v. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004). She
is not liable for kidnapping with murder. The
essence of kidnapping or serious illegal detention
is the actual confinement or restraint of the
victim or the deprivation of his liberty. In this
case, the victim was not deprived of his liberty
since he immediately died. The demand for
ransom did not convert the offense into
kidnapping with murder. The defendant was well
aware that the child would be suffocated to death
in a few moments after she left. The demand for
ransom is only a part of the diabolic scheme of
the defendant to murder the child, to conceal his
body and then demand money before the
discovery of the cadaver. (People v. Lora, G.R. No.
L-49430, March 30, 1982)
Fely is not liable for murder as principal or
accomplice since there is neither conspiracy or
community of design to commit murder since her
criminal intention pertains to kidnapping for
ransom. In addition, her participation of
demanding ransom for the release of the child is
not connected to murder. Her criminal mind to
assist Lina in committing kidnapping for ransom
is not constitutive of a felony. Mens rea wihout
actus reus is not a crime.
Q: Candido stabbed an innocent bystander
42
who accidentally bumped him. The innocent
bystander died as a result of the stabbing.
Candido was arrested and was tested to be
positive for the use of “shabu” at the time he
committed the stabbing. What should be the
proper charge against Candido? Explain.
(2005 BAR)
A: Candido should be charged with murder
qualified by treachery because the suddenness of
the stabbing caught the victim by surprise and
was totally defenseless. Being under the
influence of dangerous drugs is a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the commission of a
crime (Sec. 25, R.A. 9165, Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Hence, the penalty
for murder shall be imposed in the maximum.
Homicide (1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995,
1996, 2003, 2005, 2014, 2019 BAR)
Q: Tommy saw Lino and Okito engaged in a
street fight. Lino then suddenly drew his
balisong and lunged at Okito. In an effort to
break up the fight, Tommy tried to snatch the
balisong from Lino but not before the latter
had inflicted a wound on Okito. As Lino
withdrew the weapon and attempted to stab
Okito a second time, Tommy tried to grab the
weapon again. In so doing, his left forearm
was slashed. As he succeeded in snatching
away the balisong with his right arm, it flew
with such force, that it hit Nereo, a passerby
who was seriously injured. Explain your
answers fully.
a. What is the criminal liability of Lino with
respect to Okito, Tommy and Nereo?
b. In turn, is Tommy criminally liable to
Nereo? (1992 BAR)
A:
a. As far as Okito is concerned, Lino is liable for
frustrated homicide, assuming that the
wound suffered by Okito is such that for
reasons or causes independent of the will of
Lino (such as timely medical attention) Okito
would have died. If the injury is not serious
enough, the liability is only attempted
homicide.
Intent to kill is manifest because of the use of
a deadly weapon. For the injury on the arm
of Tommy, Lino is liable only for physical
injuries (serious, less serious or slight,
depending on the nature of the injury).
Apparently, there is no intent to kill.
For Nereo, Lino should be liable for serious
physical injuries as the wounding of Nereo
was the natural and logical consequences of
Lino’s felonious act.
b. Tommy is exempted from criminal liability
for the injury to Nereo as he was performing
a lawful act with due care and the injury was
caused by mere accident (Art. 12, par. 4), or
that he was in lawful exercise of a right (Art.
11, par. 6), that is, defense of a stranger.
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
Q: In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after
some customers inside a nightclub became
unruly, guns were fired by a group, among
them A and B, that finally put the customers
back to their senses. Unfortunately, one
customer died. Subsequent investigation
revealed that A’s gunshot had inflicted on the
victim a slight wound that did not cause the
deceased’s death nor materially contribute to
it. It was B’s gunshot that inflicted a fatal
wound on the deceased. A contended that his
liability should, if at all, be limited to slight
physical injury. Would you agree? Why?
(2003 BAR)
A: NO. I beg to disagree with A’s contention that
his liability should be limited to slight physical
injury only. He should be held liable for
attempted homicide because he inflicted said
injury with the use of a firearm which is a lethal
weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the use of a
firearm. (Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 187
SCRA 123)
Q: Belle saw Gaston stealing the prized cock
of a neighbor and reported him to the police.
Thereafter, Gaston, while driving a car, saw
Belle crossing the street. Incensed that Belle
had reported him, Gaston decided to scare
her by trying to make it appear that he was
about to run her over. He revved the engine
of his car and drove towards her but he
applied the brakes.
Since the road was slippery at that time, the
vehicle skidded and hit Belle causing her
death. What is the liability of Gaston? Why?
(2005 BAR)
A: Gaston is criminally liable for homicide in
doing the felonious act which caused Belle’s
death, although the penalty therefor shall be
mitigated by lack of intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed (Art. 13 [3], RPC). The
act having been deliberately done with malice, is
felonious and being the proximate cause of
Belle’s death, brings about criminal liability
although the wrong done.
Q: Ms. M, a Malaysian visiting the Philippines,
was about to depart for Hong Kong via an
Indonesian-registered commercial vessel.
While on board the vessel, which was still
docked at the port of Manila, she saw her
mortal enemy, Ms. A, an Australian citizen.
Ms. A was seated at the front portion of the
cabin and busy using her laptop, with no idea
whatsoever that Ms. M was likewise onboard
the ship.
Consumed by her anger towards Ms. A, Ms. M
stealthily approached the Australian from
behind, and then quickly stabbed her neck
with a pocketknife, resulting in Ms. A's
immediate death. Operatives from the
Philippine National Police - Maritime
Command arrested Ms. M for the killing of Ms.
A, and thereafter, intended to charge her
under the RPC. Ms. M contended that the
provisions of the RPC cannot be applied and
enforced against her because both she and
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the victim are not Filipino nationals, and
besides, the alleged crime was committed in
an Indonesian-registered vessel.
Assuming that the provisions of the RPC can
be applied against Ms. M, what crime under
the RPC should she be charged with? Explain.
(2019 BAR)
A: Ms. M should be charged with the crime of
Homicide under the RPC. Article 249 of the RPC
punishes any person who shall kill another
without the attendance of any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Art. 248, including
treachery. The suddenness of the attack does not
by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia,
even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the
decision was made suddenly, and the victim’s
helpless position was accidental. (People v.
Lubreo, G.R. NO. 74146, August 2, 1991)
In a number of cases, the Court held that
treachery cannot be appreciated simply because
the attack was sudden and unexpected. (People v.
Vilbar, G.R. No. 186541, February 1, 2012)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Ms. M should be charged with Murder. She killed
Ms. A by stealthily approaching the latter from
behind and stabbing the latter’s neck with a
pocketknife. Ms. M therefore employed means
and methods which tend directly and specially to
insure the execution of the planned killing,
without risk to herself arising from the defense
which Ms. A might make. Hence, there was
treachery on Ms. M’s part, and treachery qualifies
an act of killing to Murder.
Physical Injuries (2017, 2018 BAR)
Q: Mrs. Robinson is a teacher at an
elementary school. In one of her classes, she
found, to her consternation, that an 8-year old
Richard was always the cause of distraction,
as he was fond of bullying classmates smaller
in size than him.
One morning, Reymart, a 7-year old pupil,
cried loudly and complained to Mrs. Robinson
that Richard had boxed him on the ear.
Confronted by Mrs. Robinson about
Reymart’s accusation, Richard sheepishly
admitted the same. Because of this, Mrs.
Robinson ordered Richard to lie face down on
a desk during class. After Richard obliged,
Mrs. Robinson hit him ten (10) times on the
legs with a ruler and pinched his ears.
Richard ran home and reported to his mother
what he had suffered at the hands of Mrs.
Robinson. When Richard’s parents went to
Mrs. Robinson to complain, she interposed
the defense that she merely performed her
duty as a teacher to discipline erring pupils.
Richard’s parents ask your advice on what
actions can be instituted against Mrs.
Robinson for acts committed on their minor
child.
a. May Mrs. Robinson be charged with child
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 Criminal Law
abuse OR slight physical injuries? Explain.
b. May Mrs. Robinson be charged with child
abuse AND slight physical injuries?
Explain. (2018 BAR)
A:
a. YES. Mrs. Robinson can be charged with
either child abuse under R.A. 7610 or slight
physical injuries if the injuries inflicted
constitute slight physical injuries. Sec. 10 of
R.A. 7610 provides that “Any person who
shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty, or exploitation, or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by Art.
59 of P.D. 603 but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor.”
In other words, Richard’s parents may
choose to prosecute Mrs. Robinson under the
Revised Penal Code or R.A. 7610. I will advise
them to consider R.A. 7610 as there was no
showing of the extent of the physical injuries
inflicted.
b. NO. Mrs. Robinson cannot charged with both
of child abuse and slight physical injuries,
because the latter is deemed absorbed in the
charge of child abuse.
Rape (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002,
2004, 2009, 2015, 2017 BAR)
Q: If the slightest penetration of the female
genitalia consummates rape by carnal
knowledge, how does the accused commit
attempted rape by carnal knowledge? (2017
BAR)
A: To be held liable for attempted rape by carnal
knowledge, the penis of the accused must not
touch the labia of the pudendum of the victim,
but his acts must be committed with clear
intention to have sexual intercourse. Intent to
have sexual intercourse is present if it is shown
that the erectile penis of the accused is in the
position to penetrate (Cruz v. People, G.R. No.
166441, October 08, 2014) or the accused actually
commenced to force his penis into the victim’s
sexual organ (People v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060,
December 11, 2013). If the offender touches the
body of the victim through force, with lewd
design but without clear intention to have sexual
intercourse, the crime committed is acts of
lasciviousness. (People v. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469,
August, 13, 2014)
Q: The complainant, an eighteen-year old
mental retardate with an intellectual capacity
between the ages of nine and twelve years,
when asked during the trial how she felt
when she was raped by the accused, replied
“Masarap, it gave me much pleasure.”
With the claim of the accused that the
complainant consented for a fee to the sexual
intercourse, and with the foregoing answer of
the complainant, would you convict the
accused of rape if you were the judge trying
44
the case? Explain. (1996 BAR)
A: YES, I would convict the accused of rape. Since
the victim is a mental retardate with an
intellectual capacity of a child less than 12 years
old, she is legally incapable of giving a valid
consent to the sexual intercourse. The sexual
intercourse is tantamount to a statutory rape
because the level of intelligence is that of a child
less than 12 years of age. Where the victim of
rape is a mental retardate, violence or
intimidation is not essential to constitute rape
(People v. Trimor, G.R. 106541-42, March 31,
1995). As a matter of fact, R.A. No. 7659, the
Heinous Crimes Law, amended Art. 335, RPC, by
adding the phrase “or is demented.”
Q: Flordeluna boarded a taxi on her way
home to Quezon City which was driven by
Roger. Flordeluna noticed that Roger was
always placing his car freshener in front of
the car aircon ventilation but did not bother
asking Roger why. Suddenly, Flordeluna felt
dizzy and became unconscious. Instead of
bringing her to Quezon City, Roger brought
Flordeluna to his house in Cavite where she
was detained for two (2) weeks. She was
raped for the entire duration of her
detention. May Roger be charged and
convicted of the crime of rape with serious
illegal detention? (2000 BAR)
A: NO. Roger may not be charged and convicted
of the crime with serious illegal detention.
Roger may be charged and convicted of multiple
rapes. Each rape is a distinct offense and should
be punished separately. Evidently, his principal
intention was to abuse Flordeluna; the detention
was only incidental to the rape.
Q: A, a male, takes B, another male, to a motel
and there, through threat and intimidation,
succeeds in inserting his penis into the anus
of B. What, if any, is A’s criminal liability?
Why? (2002 BAR)
A: A shall be criminally liable for rape by
committing an act of sexual assault against B, by
inserting his penis into the anus of the latter.
Even a man may be a victim of rape by sexual
assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, “when the
offender’s penis is inserted into his mouth or
anal orifice.”
Q: Braulio invited Lulu, his 11-year old
stepdaughter, inside the master bedroom. He
pulled out a knife and threatened her with
harm unless she submitted to his desires. He
was touching her chest and sex organ when
his wife caught him in the act.
The prosecutor is unsure whether to charge
Braulio for acts of lasciviousness under Art.
336 of the RPC, for lascivious conduct under
R.A. 7610 (Special Protection against Child
Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act);
or for rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC. What
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
is the crime committed? Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: The acts of Braulio of touching the chest and
sex organ of Lulu who is under 12 years of age,
are merely acts of lasciviousness and not
attempted rape because intent to have sexual
intercourse is not clearly shown. (People v.
Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013)
To be held liable of attempted rape, it must be
shown that the erectile penis is in the position to
penetrate (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 166441,
October 8, 2014) or the offender actually
commenced to force his penis into the victim’s
sexual organ. (People v. Banzuela, supra)
The same acts of touching the chest and sex
organ of Lulu under psychological coercion or
influence of her stepfather, Braulio, constitutes
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
(People v. Optana, G.R. No. 133922, February 12,
2001)
Since the requisites for acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code are
met, in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610, and the victim
is under 12 years of age, Braulio shall be
prosecuted for acts of lasciviousness under the
Revised Penal Code but the penalty imposable is
that prescribed by R.A. No. 7610. (Amployo v.
People, G.R. No. 157718, April 26, 2005) Under
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, when the victim (child
subjected to sexual abuse) is under 12 years of
age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted (for
acts of lasciviousness) under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That the penalty
for lasciviousness conduct when the victim is
under 12 years of age shall be reclusion temporal
in its medium period.
Q: Charlie was charged for the qualified rape
of AAA. The Information alleged that AAA was
14 years old at the time the crime was
committed and that Charlie was AAA's
stepfather. The presentation of AAA's birth
certificate during the trial duly established
the following: (1) that AAA was indeed 14
years old at the time of the rape; and (2) that
AAA's mother is BBB and her father was the
late CCC. BBB and Charlie only became live-in
partners after CCC's death. The RTC found
Charlie guilty of qualified rape. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals convicted Charlie of simple
rape. Charlie appealed before the Supreme
Court. How will you rule and why? (2015
BAR)
A: The CA ruling is correct. The crime committed
by Charlie is simple rape. To be held liable for
qualified rape, a qualifying circumstance should
be alleged in the information and proven by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Although
minority and step- relationship as a qualifying
circumstance are alleged in the information,
what is proven by the evidence is the qualifying
circumstance of minority and common-law
relationship with the mother of the victim. The
concept of step- relationship is different from
that of common - law relationship because in the
former the mother of the victim and the offender
are legally married while in the latter they are
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
not. To appreciate this qualifying circumstance of
minority and common-law relationship will
offend the constitutional right of the accused to
be informed of the nature of the crime charged
against him.
Q: Sixteen-year (16) old Aliswan prodded
Amethyst, his girlfriend, to remove her
clothing while they were secretly together in
her bedroom late one evening. Failing to get a
positive response from her, he forcibly
undressed her. Apprehensive about rousing
the attention of the household who did not
know of his presence inside her room, she
resisted him with minimal strength, but she
was really sobbing in a muffled manner. He
then undressed himself while blocking the
door. Yet, the image of a hapless and sobbing
Amethyst soon brought him to his senses, and
impelled him to leave her room naked. He did
not notice in his hurry that Amante, the father
of Amethyst, who was then sitting alone on a
sofa in the sala, saw him leave his daughter's
room naked.
Outside the house, the now-clothed Aliswan
spotted Allesso, Amethyst's former suitor.
Knowing how Allesso had aggressively
pursued Amethyst, Aliswan fatally stabbed
Allesso. Aliswan immediately went into
hiding afterwards.
Upon learning from Amethyst about what
Aliswan had done to her, an enraged Amante
wanted to teach Aliswan a lesson he would
never forget. Amante set out the next day to
look for Aliswan in his school. There, Amante
found a young man who looked very much
like Aliswan. Amante immediately rushed and
knocked the young man unconscious on the
pavement, and then draped his body with a
prepared tarpaulin reading “RAPIST AKO
HUWAG TULARAN.” Everyone else in the
school was shocked upon witnessing what
had just transpired, unable to believe that the
timid and quiet Alisto, Aliswan's identical
twin brother, had committed rape.
a. A criminal complaint for attempted rape
with homicide was brought against
Aliswan in the Prosecutor's Office.
However, after preliminary investigation,
the Investigating Prosecutor
recommended the filing of two separate
Informations: one for attempted rape and
the other for homicide. Do you agree with
the recommendation? Explain.
b. After receiving medical attendance for ten
(10) days, Alisto consulted you about
filing the proper criminal complaint
against Amante. What crimes, if any, will
you charge Amante with? Explain. (2017
BAR)
A:
a. NO. I do not agree with the recommendation
for the filing of attempted rape. Intent to
have sexual intercourse is an essential
element of attempted rape. In other words,
intent to lie with the victim must be closer.
However, this intent is not established for
45 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
failure to show that Aliswan had done acts to
have sex with Amethyst (Cruz v. People, G.R.
NO. 116441, October 08, 2014); or that
Aliswan had actually commenced to force his
penis into the victim’s sexual organ (People v.
Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11,
2013). Moreover, he spontaneously desisted
from committing further lascivious acts after
undressing Amethyst which is a defense in
attempted rape. Undressing the victim with
lewd design merely constitutes acts of
lasciviousness (People v. Sanico, G.R. No.
208469, August 13, 2014)
However, I agree with the recommendation
of separate charges instead of a special
complex crime. Acts of lasciviousness cannot
be merged with homicide to form a special
complex crime. There is no special complex
crime of acts of lasciviousness with homicide
under the statute books; moreover, to be
held liable of a special complex crime, there
must be a direct connection between the
components thereof. In this case, the
homicide is not directly connected with the
acts of lasciviousness since the killing was
motivated by personal grudge of Aliswan
against Alesso, which has no link to the crime
committed against Amethyst.
b. In People v. Lasala (G.R. No. L-12141, January
30, 1962), the Supreme Court ruled that the
crime committed in Less Serious Physical
Injuries under Art. 265 of the RPC as the
medical attendance if for a period of ten (10)
days only.
Considering, however, that the Less Serious
Physical Injuries was inflicted with manifest
intent to insult or offend the offended party
or under circumstances adding ignominy to
the offense, there shall be an added penalty
of fine not exceeding P500 pesos (Art. 265,
par. 2).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
I will charge Amante for violation of R.A. No.
7610 in relation to Art. 265 of the RPC. The
victim Alisto was the twin brother of Aliswan.
Hence, he is also sixteen (16) years old and a
minor. The act of Amante constitutes child abuse
as he maltreated Alisto when he inflicted on him
physically with cruelty. Further, by rapping the
body with prepared tarpaulin reading RAPIST
AKO HUWAG TULARAN”, it debases, degrades, or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of Alisto.
Considering that Alisto received medical
attendance for ten (10) days due to the injury he
suffered from Amante, the latter is also liable for
Less serious physical injuries under Art. 265 of
the Revised Penal Code. (Bongalon v. People, G.R.
No. 169533, March 20, 2013)
Q: Maita was the object of Solito's avid sexual
desires. Solito had attempted many times to
entice Maita to a date in bed with him but
Maita had consistently refused. Fed up with
all her rejections, Solito abducted Maita
46
around 7 p.m. one night. With his cohorts,
Solito forced Maita into a Toyota lnnova and
drove off with her to a green-painted house
situated in a desolate part of the town. There,
Solito succeeded in having carnal knowledge
of Maita against her will.
Meanwhile, the police authorities were
tipped off that at 11:30 p.m. on that same
night Solito would be selling marijuana
outside the green-painted house. Acting on
the tip, the PNP station of the town formed a
buy-bust team with PO2 Masahol being
designated the poseur buyer. During the buy-
bust operation, Solito opened the trunk of the
Toyota lnnova to retrieve the bag of
marijuana to be sold to PO2 Masahol. To cut
the laces that he had tied the bag with, Solito
took out a Swiss knife, but his doing so
prompted PO2 Masahol to effect his
immediate arrest out of fear that he would
attack him with the knife. PO2 Masahol then
confiscated the bag of marijuana as well as
the Toyota lnnova.
Two Informations were filed against Solito in
the RTC: one for forcible abduction with rape,
raffled to Branch 8 of the RTC; the other for
illegal sale of drugs, assigned to Branch 29 of
the RTC. Was Solito charged with the proper
offenses based on the circumstances?
Explain. (2017 BAR)
A: YES. The charge of rape through forcible
abduction is correct. The rule is settled that if the
main objective of the accused is to rape the
victim, the crime committed is rape even if he
adbucted her forcefully. Forcible abduction is
absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather than
Article 48 of the RPC is applicable, since forcible
abduction is an indispensable means to commit
rape. (People v. Mejoraday, G.R. No. 102705, July
30, 1993; People v. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July
11, 2002; People v. Sabadablab, G.R. No. 175924,
March 14, 2012)
Where the victim was abducted with lewd design
and brought to a house (People v. Magdaraog,
G.R. No. L-40988, April 15, 1988; People v. Buhos,
G.R. No. L-40995, June 25, 1980; People v.
Velasquez, G.R. No. 137383-84, November 23,
2000) in a desolated place where she was raped,
forcible abduction should be treated as a
necessary means to commit rape, and thus, the
crime committed is a complex crime of rape
through forcible adbudction under Art. 48 of the
RPC.
As to the charge of sale of dangerous drugs, it is
improper since this crime is consummated only
upon the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the
poseur buyer for a consideration. In this case,
Solito has not yet delivered the marijuana to PO2
Masahol when the latter apprehended the
former; therefore, the crime committed is not
sale of dangerous drugs but attempted sale of
dangerous drugs.
H. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY
AND SECURITY
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
Kidnapping (1991, 2009, 2014, 2016 Bar)
Q: A charged B with the crime of rape. While
the case was pending in court, B, together
with his mother and brother, overpowered A
while riding a tricycle, dragged her inside a
carenderia owned by them and detained her
for two (2) days. They demanded that she
sign an affidavit of desistance and reimburse
B the sum of P5,000.00 which he paid to his
lawyer in the case. She was released only
after she signed the affidavit asking for the
dismissal of the case and delivered to B P1,
000.00. She promised to deliver the balance
of P4,000.00 thirty (30) days later. What
crime/s was/were committed by B, his
mother and brother? (1991 BAR)
grave coercion
A: This is Kidnapping with Ransom which is
kidnapping or illegal detention committed by a
private person for the purpose of extorting
ransom. Since the victim is a woman, it is serious.
Q: A, with lewd designs, took a 13-year old
girl to a nipa hut in his farm and there had
sexual intercourse with her. The girl did not
offer any resistance because she was
infatuated with the man, who was good-
looking and belonged to a rich and prominent
family in the town. What crime, if any, was
committed by A? Why? (2002 BAR)
A: A committed the crime of Consented
Abduction under Article 343 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
The said Article punishes the abduction of a
virgin over 12 and under 18 years of age, carried
out with her consent and with lewd designs.
Although the problem did not indicate the victim
to be a virgin, virginity should not be understood
in its material sense, as to exclude a virtuous
woman of good reputation, since the essence of
the crime is not the injury to the woman but the
outrage and alarm to her family. (Valdepeñas v.
People, 16 SCRA 871)
Q: Angelino, a Filipino, is a transgender who
underwent gender reassignment and had
implants in different parts of her body. She
changed her name to Angelina and was a
finalist in the Miss Gay International. She
came back to the Philippines and while she
was walking outside her home, she was
abducted by Max and Razzy who took her to a
house in the province. She was then placed in
a room and Razzy forced her to have sex with
him at knife's point. After the act, it dawned
upon Razzy that Angelina is actually a male.
Incensed, Razzy called Max to help him beat
Angelina. The beatings that Angelina received
eventually caused her death. What crime or
crimes, if any, were committed? Explain.
(2016 BAR)
A: Razzy is liable for kidnapping with homicide.
Abducting Angelino is not forcible abduction
since the victim in this crime must be a woman.
Gender reassignment will not make him a woman
within the meaning of Art. 342 of RPC. There is
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
no showing, moreover, that at the time abduction
is committed with lewd design; hence, his
abduction constitutes illegal detention. Since
Angelino was killed in the course of the
detention, the crime constitutes kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with homicide under
Art. 267.
Since the victim is not a woman, it cannot be rape
by sexual intercourse. Neither can it be rape by
sexual assault for Razzy did not insert his penis
into the anal orifice or mouth of Angelino or an
instrument or object into anal orifice or genital
orifice, hence, this act constitutes acts of
lasciviousness under Art. 336. Since the acts of
lasciviousness is committed by reason or
occasion of kidnapping, it will be integrated into
one and indivisible felony of kidnapping with
homicide (People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June
26, 2009; People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April
5, 2016)
Max is liable for kidnapping with homicide as an
accomplice since he concurred in the criminal
design of Razzy in depriving Angelino his liberty
and supplied the former material aid in an
efficacious way by helping him beat the latter.
Trespass to dwelling
Q: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced
his way inside the house of Mamerto. Jay,
Mamerto’s son, saw Dante and accosted him.
Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay on his
abdomen. Mamerto heard the commotion and
went out of his room. Dante, who was about to
escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered
injuries which, were it not for the timely
medical attendance, would have caused his
death. Mamerto sustained injuries that
incapacitated him for 25 days.
What crime/s did Dante commit? (1994 BAR)
A: Dante committed qualified trespass to
dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of
Jay, and less serious physical injuries for the
assault on Mamerto.
The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling
should not be complexed with frustrated
homicide because when the trespass is
committed as a means to commit a more serious
crime, trespass to dwelling is absorbed by the
greater crime and the former constitutes an
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. (People v.
Abedoza, 53 Phil 788)
The stabbing of Jay and the assault on Mamerto
were merely an afterthought, hence Dante is
liable for the separate crimes of trespass to
dwelling, frustrated homicide, and less serious
physical injuries.
THREATS AND COERCION
(1987, 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999 BAR)
Grave Coercion
Q: Isagani lost his gold necklace bearing his
initials. He saw Roy wearing the said
47 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
necklace. Isagani asked Roy to return to him
the necklace as it belongs to him, but Roy
refused. Isagani then drew his gun and told
Roy, “If you will not give back the necklace to
me, I will kill you!” Out of fear for his life and
against his will, Roy gave the necklace to
Isagani. What offense did Isagani commit?
(1998 BAR)
A: Isagani committed the crime of grave coercion
(Art. 286, RPC) for compelling Roy, by means of
serious threats or intimidation, to do something
against the latter’s will, whether it be right or
wrong. Serious threats or intimidation
approximating violence constitute grave
coercion, not grave threats. Such is the nature of
the threat in this case because it was committed
with a gun, is a deadly weapon.
The crime cannot be robbery because intent to
gain, which is an essential element of robbery, is
absent since the necklace belongs to Isagani.
Q:
a. Distinguish coercion from illegal
detention.
b. Forcibly brought to the police
headquarters, a person was tortured and
maltreated by agents of the law in order
to compel him to confess a crime imputed
to him. The agents failed, however, to
draw from him a confession which was
their intention to obtain through the
employment of such means. What crime
was committed by the agents of the law?
(1999 BAR)
A:
a. Coercion may be distinguished from illegal
detention as follows: In coercion, the basis of
criminal liability is the employment of
violence or serious intimidation
approximating violence, without authority of
law, to prevent a person from doing
something not prohibited by law or to
compel him to do something against his will
whether it be right or wrong; while in Illegal
Detention, the basis of liability is the actual
restraint or locking up of a person thereby
depriving him of his liberty without
authority of law. If there was no intent to
lock up or detain the offended party
unlawfully, the crime of illegal detention is
not committed.
b. Evidently, the person tortured and
maltreated by the agents of the law is a
suspect and may have been detained by
them. If so and he had already been booked
and put in jail, the crime is maltreatment of
prisoner and the fact that the suspect was
subjected to torture to extort a confession
would bring about a higher penalty, in
addition to the offender’s liability for the
physical injuries inflicted.
But if the suspect was forcibly brought to the
police headquarters to make him admit the
crime and tortured/maltreated to make him
confess to such crime, but later released
48
because the agents failed to draw such
confession, the crime is grave coercion
because of the violence employed to compel
such confession without the offended party
being confined in jail. (US v. Cusi, 10 Phil 143)
It is noted that the offended party was
merely “brought” to the police headquarters
and is thus not a detention prisoner. Had he
been validly arrested, the crime committed
would be maltreatment of prisoners.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Robbery (1987, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000,
2001, 2012, 2018 BAR)
Q: Five robbers robbed one after the other
five houses occupied by different families
located inside a compound enclosed by a six-
foot high hollow block fence. How many
robberies did the five commit? Explain. (1996
BAR)
A: The offenders committed only one robbery in
the eyes of the law because when they entered
the compound, they were impelled only by a
single indivisible criminal resolution to commit a
robbery as they were not aware that there were
five families inside said compound, considering
that the same was enclosed by a six-foot high
hollow block fence. The series of robbery
committed in the same compound at about the
same time constitutes one continued crime,
motivated by one criminal impulse.
Q: A, brother of B, with the intention of having
a night out with his friends, took the coconut
shell which is being used by B as a bank for
his coins from inside their locked cabinet
using their common key. Forthwith, A broke
the coconut shell outside of their home in the
presence of his friends.
a. What is the criminal liability of A, if any?
Explain.
b. Is A exempted from criminal liability
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code for being a brother of B? Explain.
(2000 BAR)
A:
a. A is criminally liable for Robbery with force
upon things, because the coconut shell with
the coins inside, was taken with intent to gain
and broken outside of their home. (Art. 299
[b], [2], RPC)
b. NO. A is not exempt from criminal liability
under Art. 332 because said Article applies
only to theft, swindling, or malicious mischief.
Here, the crime committed is robbery.
Q: A entered the house of another without
employing force or violence upon things. He
was seen by a maid who wanted to scream
but was prevented from doing so because A
threatened her with a gun. A then took money
and other valuables and left. Is A guilty of
theft or robbery? Explain. (2002 BAR)
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
A: A is liable for robbery because the
intimidation he employed on the maid before the
taking of the money and other valuables. It is the
intimidation of the person relative to the taking
that qualifies the crime as robbery, instead of
simply theft. ‘
The non-employment of force upon things is of
no moment because robbery is committed not
only by employing force upon things but also by
employing violence against or intimidation of
persons.
Q: Wielding loose firearms, Rene and Roan
held up a bank. After taking the bank’s
money, the robbers ran towards their
getaway car, pursued by the bank security
guards. As the security guards were closing in
on the robbers, the two fired their firearms at
the pursuing security guards. As a result, one
of the security guards was hit on the head
causing his immediate death.
For the taking of the bank’s money and killing
of the security guard with the use of loose
firearms, the robbers were charged in court
in two separate Informations, one for robbery
with homicide attended by the aggravating
circumstance of use of loose firearms, and the
other for illegal possession of firearms.
Are the indictments correct? (2018 BAR)
A: The indictment for Robbery with homicide is
correct. Robbery with homicide, a special
complex crime, is primarily a crime against
property and not against persons, homicide
being a mere incident of the robbery with the
latter being the main purpose of the criminal. The
elements of robbery with homicide are: (a) the
taking of personal property with the use of
violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the
property thus taken belongs to another; the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or
animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion, the
crime of homicide, which is therein used in a
generic sense, was committed.
The indictment for illegal possession of firearm is
wrong. In the case of People v. Gaborne (G.R. No.
210710, July 27, 2016), the Supreme Court
clarified the issue, to wit: In view of the
amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and
R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential Decree No. 1866,
separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal
possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal
possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder.
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder
results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
crime is not qualified illegal possession but
murder. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed
firearm is not considered as a separate crime but
shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating
circumstance. Thus, where murder was
committed, the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes
merely a special aggravating circumstance. The
intent of Congress is to treat the offense of illegal
possession of firearm and the commission of
homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
firearm as a single offense.
Q: In dire need of money, Mr. R decided to
steal from his next-door neighbor, Mrs. V. On
the night of May 15, 2010, Mr. R proceeded
with his plan entered Mrs. V's bedroom by
breaking one of the windows from the
outside. Finding Mrs. V sound asleep, he
silently foraged through her cabinet, and
stashed all the bundles of cash and jewelries
he could find.
As Mr. R was about to leave, he heard Mrs. V
shout, "Stop or I will shoot you!", and when he
turned around, he saw Mrs. V cocking a rifle
which has pointed at him. Fearing for his life,
Mr. R then lunged at Mrs. V and was able to
wrest the gun away from her. Thereafter, Mr.
R shot Mrs. V, which resulted in her death. Mr.
R's deeds were discovered on the very same
night as he was seen by law enforcement
authorities fleeing the crime scene.
What crime/s did Mr. R commit under the
Revised Penal Code? Explain (2019 BAR)
A: Mr. R committed Robbery with Homicide
under Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, par. 1 of
the RPC. The elements of the crime are: a) the
taking of personal property with the use of
violence or intimidation against the person; b)
the property taken belongs to another; c) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or
animus lucrandi; and d) on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as
used it is generic sense, was committed. It must
be established that the original criminal design of
the malefactor is to commit robbery and the
killing is merely incidental thereto. Here, Mr. R’s
intent to commit robbery preceded the taking of
Mrs. V’s life. The killing took place on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery.
Theft (1989, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2008,
2012, 2018 BAR)
Q: Sunshine, a “beauteous” colegiala but a
shoplifter, went to the Ever Department Store
and proceeded to the women’s wear section.
The saleslady was of the impression that she
brought to the fitting room three (3) pieces of
swimsuits of different colors. When she came
out of the fitting room, she returned only two
(2) pieces to the clothes rack. The saleslady
became suspicious and alerted the store
detective. Sunshine was stopped by the
detective before she could leave the store and
brought to the office of the store manager.
The detective and the manager searched her
and found her wearing the third swimsuit
under her blouse and pants. Was the theft
consummated, frustrated, or attempted?
Explain. (2000 BAR)
A: The theft was consummated because the
taking or asportation was complete. The
asportation is complete when the offender
acquired the exclusive control of the personal
property being taken. In this case, when Sunshine
wore the swimsuit under her blouse and pants
and was on her way out of the store, with evident
49 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
intent to gain, the taking constitutes theft and
being complete, it is consummated. It is not
necessary that the offender is in a position to
dispose of the property.
Q: Francis Garcia, a Jollibee waiter, found a
gold bracelet in front of his working place in
Makati and, upon inspecting it, saw the name
and address of the owner engraved on the
inside. Remembering his parents’ admonition
that he should not take anything which does
not belong to him, he delivered the bracelet to
PO1 Jesus Reyes of the Makati quad precinct
with the instruction to locate the owner and
return it to him. PO1 Reyes, instead, sold the
bracelet and misappropriated the proceeds.
Subsequent events brought out the fact that
the bracelet was dropped by a snatcher who
had grabbed it from the owner a block away
from where Francis had found it and further
investigation traced the last possessor as PO1
Reyes.
Charged with theft, PO1 Reyes reasoned out
that he had not committed any crime because
it was not he who had found the bracelet, and
moreover, it turned out to have been stolen.
Resolve the case with reasons. (2001 BAR)
A: PO1 Reyes is criminally liable. His contention
that he has not committed any crime because he
was not the one who found the bracelet and it
turned out to be stolen also, is devoid of merit. It
is enough that the bracelet belonged to another
and the failure to restore the same to its owner is
characterized by intent to gain.
The act of PO1 Reyes of selling the bracelet
which does not belong to him and which he only
held to be delivered to its owner, is furtive
misappropriation with intent to gain.
Where a finder of lost or mislaid property
entrusts it to another for delivery to the owner,
the person to whom such property is entrusted
and who accepts the same, assumes the relation
of the finder to the owner as if he was the actual
finder; if he would misappropriate it, he is guilty
of theft. (People v. Avila, 44 Phil 720)
Q: Bruno, a taxi driver, had an indebtedness
in the sum of P10,000.00 which would
become due in one week. He was starting to
worry because he still had not raised the
amount to pay for his debt. Every day, he had
prayed for divine intervention. One night,
while returning the taxi to the garage, he
found a wallet on the back seat. Inspecting it,
he learned that it contained exactly Pl
0,000.00 cash, the amount of his obligation,
and IDs. Thinking it was divine intervention,
and that his prayers were answered, he took
the money and used it to pay his debt.
a. What crime, if any, did Bruno commit?
Explain.
b. Assuming that instead of using the
money, Bruno turned over the wallet and
its contents to the nearby police station,
50
and it was the chief of police of that
station who appropriated the money for
his own benefit, what crime was
committed by the chief of police?
Explain. (2015 BAR)
A:
a. Bruno committed the crime of theft. The
owner is known to Bruno because there are
IDs found in the wallet. Under Article 308 of
RPC, “theft is likewise committed by any
person who, having found lost property, shall
fail to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner”
b. The chief of police is liable for theft. Although
he is not the one who found the property, he
is considered as finder in fact since the
property was surrendered to him by the
actual finder. He acquired the position
occupied by the actual finder and assumed by
voluntary substitution the obligation to
surrender the property to the lawful owner.
Appropriating the property is of the same
character of that made by one who originally
found the same (People v. Avila, G.R. No. L-
19786, March 31, 1923). The liability of the
finder in fact is the same liability of the finder
in law. Thus, what the Chief of Police
committed is Theft.
Q: On the way home from work, Rica lost her
necklace to a snatcher. A week later, she saw
what looked like her necklace on display in a
jewelry store in Raon. Believing that the
necklace on display was the same necklace
snatched from her the week before, she
surreptitiously took the necklace without the
knowledge and consent of the store owner.
Later, the loss of the necklace was discovered,
and Rica was shown on the CCTV camera of
the store as the culprit. Accordingly, Rica was
charged with theft of the necklace. Rica
raised the defense that she could not be guilty
as charged because she was the owner of the
necklace and that the element of intent to
gain was lacking.
What should be the verdict if:
a. The necklace is proven to be owned by
Rica?
b. It is proven that the store acquired the
necklace from another person who was
the real owner of the necklace? (2018
BAR)
A:
a. Under Art. 308 of the RPC, theft is committed
by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence, against, or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the
latter's consent. While the CCTV captured
Rica surreptitiously taking the necklace from
a jewelry store without the knowledge and
consent of the store owner, she cannot be
charged with theft, because the taking was
made under a claim of ownership. The fact of
ownership negates any intention to gain, as
Rica cannot steal the necklace which she
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
claims to own.
b. Even if it was proven that the necklace was
bought by the store from another person
who was the real owner of the necklace, Rica
still cannot be held liable for theft absent a
felonious intent. “Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea”. A crime is not committed if the
mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent.
The ruling in U.S. v. Vera (1 Phil 485, May 31,
1974) is emphatic; i.e. if a person takes
personal property of another believing it to
be his own, the presumption of intent to gain
is rebutted and therefore he is not guilty of
theft.
Qualified theft (1992, 2002, 2006, 2016 BAR)
Q: Domingo is the caretaker of two (2) cows
and two (2) horses owned by Hannibal.
Hannibal told Domingo to lend the cows to
Tristan on the condition that the latter will
give a goat to the former when the cows are
returned. Instead, Tristan sold the cows and
pocketed the money. Due to the neglect of
Domingo, one of the horses was stolen.
Knowing that he will be blamed for the loss,
Domingo slaughtered the other horse, got the
meat, and sold it to Pastor. He later reported
to Hannibal that the two horses were stolen.
a. What crime or crimes, if any, did Tristan
commit? Explain.
b. What crime or crimes, if any, were
committed by Domingo? Explain. (2016
BAR)
A:
a. Tristan is liable for Estafa through
Misappropriation under Article 315 of RPC.
Their transaction is a commodatum. He
received the cows with the duty to return the
same thing deposited, and acquired legal or
juridical possession. Selling the cows as if he
owned it constitutes misappropriation or
conversion within the contemplation of Art.
315.
b. Domingo is liable for qualified theft.
Although Tristan received the horse with the
consent of the owner, Hannibal, his
possession is merely physical or de facto
since the former is the employee of the latter.
Slaughtering the horse, which he physically
possessed, and selling its meat to Pastor shall
be considered as taking without the consent
of the owner with intent to gain, which
constitutes theft (Balerta v. People, G.R. No.
205144 November 26, 2014). Since the horse
is accessible to him, the theft is qualified by
the circumstances of abuse of confidence
(Yangco v. People, G.R. No. 209373 July 30,
2014)
Further, Domingo committed an act in
violation of the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (P.D.
No. 533). Cattle rustling is the taking away by
any means, method or scheme, without the
consent of the owner/raiser of large cattle,
which includes cows and horses, whether or
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
not for profit or gain, or whether committed
with or without violence against or
intimidation or intimidation of any person or
force upon things. It includes the killing of
large cattle, or taking its meat or hide
without the consent of the owner/raiser
Q: A fire broke out in a department store. A,
taking advantage of the confusion, entered
the store and carried away goods which he
later sold. What crime, if any, did he commit?
Why? (2002 BAR)
A: A committed the crime of qualified theft
because he took the goods on the occasion of and
taking advantage of the fire which broke out in
the department store. The occasion of a calamity
such as fire, when the theft was committed,
qualifies the crime under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Q: Forest Ranger Jay Velasco was patrolling
the Balara Watershed and Reservoir when he
noticed a big pile of cut logs outside the gate
of the watershed. Curious, he scouted around
and after a few minutes, he saw Rene and
Dante coming out of the gate with some more
newly-cut logs. He apprehended and charged
them with the proper offense. What is that
offense? Explain. (2006 BAR)
A: The offense committed is qualified theft
pursuant to Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 330 and Sec. 68 of
P.D. No. 705 defining the offense committed by
any person who directly or indirectly cuts,
gathers, removes or smuggles timber or other
forest products in violation of existing laws, rules
and regulation, from any public forest reserves,
and other kinds of public forest or even privately
owned forest lands.
Q: A is the driver of B’s Mercedez Benz car.
When B was on a trip to Paris, A used the car
for a joy ride with C whom he is courting.
Unfortunately, A met an accident. Upon his
return, B came to know about the
unauthorized use of the car and sued A for
qualified theft. B alleged that A took and used
the car with intent to gain as he derived some
benefit or satisfaction from its use. On the
other hand, A argued that he has no intent of
making himself the owner of the car as he in
fact returned it to the garage after the joy
ride. What crime/s, if any, were committed?
Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: The crime committed by A is carnapping. The
unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered
by the Anti-Carnapping Law (R.A. 10883 as
amended) and not by the provisions on qualified
theft or robbery. (People v. Bustinera, G.R. No.
148233, June 8, 2004) The concept of carnapping
is the same as that of robbery and theft. Hence,
rules applicable to theft or robbery are also
applicable to carnapping. (People v. Asamuddin,
G.R. No. 213913, September 2, 2015) In theft,
unlawful taking should be understood within the
Spanish concept of apoderamiento. In order to
constitute apoderamiento, the physical taking
must be coupled with the intent oto appropriate
the object, which means intent to deprive the
51 UST
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 Criminal Law
lawful owner of the thing, whether permanently
or temporarily. (People v. Valenzuela, G.R. No.
160188, June 21, 2007) In this case, A took the car
without the consent of B with intent to
temporarily deprive him of the car. Although the
taking was “temporary” and for a “joy ride”, the
Supreme Court in People v. Bustinera (supra),
sustains as the better view which holds that
when a person, either with the object of going to
a certain place, or learning how to drive, or
enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle
belonging to another, without the consent of its
owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking
possession of the personal property belonging to
another and using it, his intent to gain is evident
since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction,
enjoyment and pleasure.
Usurpation (1988, 1989, 1996, 2018, 2019
BAR)
Q: Jorge is the owner of 10 hectares of land in
the foothills which he planted with lanzones.
On his last visit there, he was shocked to
discover that his land had been taken over by
a group of 15 families whose members had
forcibly driven away his caretaker, had
appropriated the fruits for themselves, and
were not threatening to kill him should he try
to eject them. What crime should Jorge charge
these 15 families? Explain. (1988 BAR)
A: Jorge can charge the 15 families of 2 separate
crimes namely:
a. Violation of Article 282, Grave threats xxx
b. Violation of Article 312 which provides that:
“Occupation of real property or usurpation of
real rights in property. – Any person who, by
means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, shall take possession of any real
property or shall usurp any real rights in
property belonging to another, in addition to
the penalty incurred for the acts of violence
executed by him, shall be punished by a
fine...”.
Q: Erwin and Bea approached Mayor Abral
and requested him to solemnize their
marriage. Mayor Abral agreed. Erwin and Bea
went to Mayor Abral's office on the day of the
ceremony, but Mayor Abral was not there.
When Erwin and Bea inquired where Mayor
Abral was, his chief of staff Donato informed
them that the Mayor was campaigning for the
coming elections. Donato told them that the
Mayor authorized him to solemnize the
marriage and that Mayor Abral would just
sign the documents when he arrived. Donato
thereafter solemnized the marriage and later
turned over the documents to Mayor Abral for
his signature. In the marriage contract, it was
stated that the marriage was solemnized by
Mayor Abral. What crime(s) did Mayor Abral
and Donato commit? Explain. (2015, 2019
BAR)
A: Mayor Abral is liable for falsification of public
document by a public officer under Article 177 of
the RPC. Making an untruthful statement by
52
stating in a marriage contract, a public document,
that the marriage was solemnized by him, is an
act of falsification. The crime of illegal marriage is
not committed because element that “the
offender has performed an illegal marriage
ceremony” is lacking. (Ronulo v. People, G.R. No.
182438, July 2, 2014)
Donato committed the crime of usurpation of
function under Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code because he performed the act of
solemnizing marriage, which pertained to the
mayor, a person in authority, without being
lawfully entitled to do so. The crime of illegal
marriage is not committed, because the element
that “the offender is authorized to solemnize
marriage” is lacking. (Ronulo v. People, G.R. No.
182438, July 2, 2014)
Q: A and B, both farmers, entered the land
owned by X and planted palay thereon. When
X came to know about it, he confronted A and
B and inquired why the latter occupied his
land and planted palay thereon.
A, with a bolo in hand, replied that the land
belongs to the family of S, and not to X and at
the same time said, “If you touch this land
and my palay, blood will flow on this ground.”
Because of the said remark, X went to the
Chief of Police and complained. The Chief of
Police filed a complex crime of Usurpation of
Real Property with Grave Threats.
What crime/s were committed? (1989 BAR)
A: The crime committed by A and B is squatting
under PD 772 and not Usurpation of Real
Property because in the latter crime, there must
be violence against or intimidation of persons
employed in taking possession of any real
property or in usurping any real rights in
property belonging to another (Art. 312, RPC). In
this case, it appears that A and B entered X’s land
without the owner’s consent or against his will
but without any violence against or intimidation
of persons.
The crime of squatting is committed by any
person, who, with the use of force, intimidation
or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in
occupying or possessing the property of the
latter against his will for residential, commercial
or any other purposes.
The threat uttered by A, not having been used in
the taking of possession of the land, it is not
absorbed in the crime of squatting. When A
threatened X that blood will flow if X touches the
land and his palay, he committed the crime of
grave threats by threatening another with the
infliction of a wrong amounting to a crime. Only
A is criminally liable for the crime of grave
threats.
Q: A group of homeless and destitute persons
invaded and occupied the houses built by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) for certain
military personnel. To gain entry to the
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
houses, the group intimidated the security
guards posted at the entrance gate with the
firearms they were carrying and destroyed
the padlocks of the doors of the houses with
the use of crowbars and hammers. They
claimed that they would occupy the houses
and live therein because the houses were
idle, and they were entitled to free housing
from the government.
For the reason that the houses were already
awarded to military personnel who have been
found to have fully complied with the
requirements for the award thereof, NHA
demanded the group to vacate within ten (10)
days from notice the houses they occupied
and were still occupying. Despite the lapse of
the deadline, the group refused to vacate the
houses in question.
What is the criminal liability of the members
of the group, if any, for their actions? (2018
BAR)
A: The members of the group who, by means of
violence against or intimidation, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp
any real rights in property belonging to another,
is criminally liable under Art. 312 of the RPC or
Occupation of real property or usurpation of real
rights in property. In addition, they may also be
charged with other crimes resulting from their
acts of violence.
Swindling and Other Deceits (2017, 2018,
2019 BAR)
Q: What crime is committed by a capataz who
enrolls two fictitious names in the payroll and
collects their supposed daily wages every
payday? (2017 BAR)
A: The crime committed is Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents. A capataz is a
foreman for the government and since the
falsification of the public document is committed
as a means to commit estafa, the proper charge is
estafa through falsification of public documents.
Q: In August 2018, B entered a contract with S
for the purchase of the latter's second-hand
car in the amount of ₱400,000.00 payable in
two (2) equal monthly installments.
Simultaneously with the signing of the
contract and S's turnover of the car keys, B
executed, issued, and delivered two (2) post-
dated checks, all payable to S, with the
assurances that they will be honored on their
respective maturity dates.
However, all two (2) checks were dishonored
for being drawn against insufficient funds.
Consequently, notices therefore were duly
issued to and received by B, but this
notwithstanding, no payment arrangements
were made by him. Further, upon S's
investigation, it was uncovered that B's
checking account had only ₱50,000.00 when
it was opened in June 2018 and no further
deposits were made after that. S also found
out that B knew fully well of such
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
circumstance at the time he issued the two (2)
checks.
What crime/s should B be charges with and
for how many counts? Explain. (2018, 2019
BAR)
A: B should be charged with 1 count of Estafa and
2 counts of violation of B.P. 22. Under Art. 315,
par. 2(d) of the RPC, estafa by postdating a check
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation is
committed when: (a) the offender post-dated a
check, or issued a check in payment of an
obligation; and (b) such postdating or issuing a
check was done when the offender had no funds
in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
Here, B’s act of postdating checks in payment of
an obligation was the efficient cause of the
defraudation. Postdating the checks was
committed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud.
B should also be charged with two (2) counts of
violation of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law.
B.P. 22 may be violated by making or drawing
and issuing any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check,
which check is subsequently dishonored for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment. Here, all the elements of
the offense are present. B issued two (2) checks,
which was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. The
gravamen of B.P. 22 is the issuance of the check,
thus, the issuance of each bouncing check
constitutes as one count of the offense.
While a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be
rooted from an identical set of facts, they
nevertheless present different causes of action,
which, under the law, are considered "separate,
distinct, and independent" from each other
(Rimando v. Aldaba, G.R. No. 203583, October 13,
2014).
Arson (1994, 2000, 2015, 2019 BAR)
Q: One early evening, there was a fight
between Eddie Gutierrez and Mario Cortez.
Later that evening, at about 11 o’clock, Eddie
passed by the house of Mario carrying a
plastic bag containing gasoline, threw the bag
at the house of Mario who was inside the
house watching television, and then lit it. The
front wall of the house started blazing and
some neighbors yelled and shouted.
Forthwith, Mario poured water on the
burning portion of the house. Neighbors also
rushed in to help put the fire under control
before any great damage could be inflicted
and before the flames have extensively
spread. Only a portion of the house was
burned. Discuss Eddie’s liability. (2000 BAR)
A: Eddie is liable for destructive arson in the
consummated stage. It is destructive arson
53 UST
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 Criminal Law
because fire was resorted to in destroying the
house of Mario which is an inhabited house or
dwelling. The arson is consummated because the
house was in fact already burned although not
totally. In arson, it is not required that the
premises be totally burned for the crime to be
consummated. It is enough that the premises
suffer destruction by burning.
Q: Senio planned to burn Bal' s house. One
evening, during a drinking spree at his house,
Senio told his friends what he intended to do
and even showed them the gasoline in cans
that he would use for the purpose. Carlo, a
common friend of Senio and Bal, was present
at the drinking spree. He was still sober when
Senio told them his plans. Before going home,
Carlo warned Bal that Senio would burn his
house and had already bought gasoline that
would be used for the purpose. Bal reported
the matter to the police authorities.
Meanwhile, Senio went to Bal' s house and
proceeded to pour gasoline around the walls
of the house and it was at that point when he
was caught by the police. What crime did
Senio commit, if any? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A: Senio is liable for attempted arson. He
manifested before his intention to burn the
house of Bal to his friends. He then performed
the act of pouring gasoline around the walls of
the house to execute his criminal design to
commit arson. This is not just a preparatory act,
because it already ceased to be equivocal and
revealed a clear intention to burn the house. In
sum, he already commenced the commission of
the crime of arson directly by overt acts but he
did not perform all acts to execute his criminal
design to commit arson by setting the house on
fire due to a cause other than his spontaneous
desistance, and that is, having been caught by the
police.
Q: Mr. A has a long-standing feud with Mr. B.
As payback for Mr. B's numerous
transgressions against him, Mr. A planned to
bum down Mr. B's rest house.
One night, Mr. A went to the rest house and
started pouring gasoline on its walls.
However, just as Mr. A had lit the match for
burning, he was discovered by Mr. B's
caretaker, Ms. C, and was consequently
prevented from setting the rest house on fire.
Mr. A was then charged with Frustrated
Arson.
a. Is the charge of Frustrated Arson
proper? Explain.
b. Assuming that Mr. A successfully burned
down Mr. B's rest house, and as a result,
Ms. C was trapped therein and was
subsequently killed in the fire, what
crime/s did Mr. A commit? Explain.
(2019 BAR)
A:
a. NO. The proper charge is Attempted Arson.
Under Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt
when the offender commences the
54
commission of a felony directly by overt
acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. Here, Mr.
A commenced the commission of arson by
pouring gasoline on the house and lighting a
match. However, he did not perform all the
acts of execution which includes setting the
rest house on fire. Thus, Mr. A should only
be liable for Attempted Arson.
b. In cases where both burning and death
occur, in order to determine what crime
was committed, there is a need to ascertain
the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if
the main objective is the burning of the
building or edifice but death results by
reason or on occasion of arson, the crime is
simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed; (b) if the main objective is to kill
a particular person who may be in the
building or edifice, when fire is resorted to
as a means to accomplish such goal, the
crime committed is murder only; and (3) if
the objective is to kill a particular person,
and in fact the offender has already done so,
but the fire is resorted to as a means to
cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed –
homicide/murder and arson (People v. Sota
and Gadjadli, G.R. No. 203121, November 29,
2017). Here the main purpose was to burn
the house and the death of Mr. C was only
incidental, hence, arson was committed, and
the homicide is absorbed.
J. CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Adultery & Concubinage (1991, 1994, 2002,
2005, 2010, 2019 BAR)
Q: A, a married woman, had sexual
intercourse with a man who was not her
husband. The man did not know she was
married. What crime, if any, did each of them
commit? Why? (2002 BAR)
A: A, the married woman, committed the crime
of adultery under Article 333 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, for having sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband while
her marriage is still subsisting. But the man who
had carnal knowledge of her, not knowing her to
be married, shall not be liable for adultery.
Q: A is married. He has a paramour with
whom he had sexual relations on a more or
less regular basis. They meet at least once a
week in hotels, motels, and other places
where they can be alone. Is A guilty of any
crime? Why?
A: A is guilty of the crime of concubinage by
having sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife.
Having sexual relations on a more or less regular
basis in hotels, motels, and other places may be
considered scandalous circumstances that
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
offends public conscience, giving rise to criticism
and general protest, such acts being imprudent
and wanton and setting a bad example. (People v.
Santos, 86 SCRA 705)
Acts of Lasciviousness
Q: Mr. O, a 75-year-old retiree who has been a
widower for the last ten (10) years, believed
that, at past 70, he is licensed to engage in
voyeurism to satisfy his lustful desires. If not
peeping into his neighbors' room through his
powerful single-cylinder telescope, he would
trail young and shapely girls along the
hallways and corridors of shopping malls,
While going up the escalator, he stayed a step
behind a mini-skirted, 20-year old girl, and in
the heat of the moment, put his hand on her
left buttock and massaged it. The girl
screamed and hollered for help. Mr. O was
thus apprehended and charged with Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code. Mr. O's counsel, however,
claimed that Mr. O should only be charged
with the crime of Unjust Vexation.
Is the contention of Mr. O's counsel tenable?
Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: NO. The contention of Mr. O’s counsel is
untenable. Under Article 366 of the RPC, the
elements of Acts of Lasciviousness are:
1. That the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. That the lascivious act is committed against a
person of either sex; and
3. That it is done under any of the following
circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority; or
d. When the offended party is under 12
years of age or is demented.
Lascivious conduct is defined as “the intentional
touching, either directly or through clothing, of
the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttock, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether
of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse , humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person” (Orsos v.
People, G.R. No. 214673, November 20, 2017)
Here, when Mr. O touched the buttocks of the
offended party, he was animated with lewdness;
thus, acts of lasciviousness was committed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
YES. The contention of Mr. O’s counsel is tenable.
Mere touching or massaging the buttocks does
not clearly indicate sexual design. To be liable
under acts of lasciviousness, the act must be one
that shows perversity to gratify sexual arousal or
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
desire. Circumstances in the problem fell short to
qualify as one. Thus, unjust vexation is proper
where it only brought annoyance and irritation
to the woman.
K. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
Libel (2002, 2005, 2013, 2016, 2019 BAR)
Q: A was nominated Secretary of a
Department in the Executive Branch of the
government. His nomination was thereafter
submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. While the
Commission was considering the nomination,
a group of concerned citizens caused to be
published in the newspapers a full-page
statement objecting to A’s appointment. They
alleged that A was a drug dependent, that he
had several mistresses, and that he was
corrupt, having accepted bribes or favors
from parties transacting business in his
previous office, and therefore he was unfit for
the position to which he had been nominated.
As a result of the publication, the nomination
was not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The official sued the
concerned citizens and the newspapers for
libel and damages on account of his non-
confirmation. How will you decide the case?
(2002 BAR)
A: I will acquit the concerned citizens and the
newspapers involved from the crime of libel. One
of the requisites of libel is the existence of malice
on the part of the accused. In this case, the
publication is made from a moral or social duty.
Thus, there is an absence of malice.
As a nominee for the public position of a
Department Secretary, A’s moral, mental, and
physical fitness becomes a public concern. The
publication merely reflects on his public
character and image as a public official. Hence,
the act of publishing such criticisms is bereft of
malice.
Q: A is the president of the corporate
publisher of the daily tabloid, Bulgar; B is the
managing editor and C is the author/writer.
In his column, Direct Hit, C wrote about X, the
head examiner of the BIR-RDO Manila as
follows:
"Itong si X ay talagang BUWAYA kaya ang logo
ng Lacoste T shirt niya ay napaka suwapang
na buwaya. Ang nickname niya ay si Atty.
Buwaya. Ang PR niya ay 90% sa bayad ng
taxpayer at ang para sa RP ay 10% lang. Kaya
ang baba ng collection ng RDO niya.
Masyadong magnanakaw si X at dapat
tanggalin itong bundat na bundat na buwaya
na ito at napakalaki na ng kurakot."
A, B and C were charged with libel before the
RTC of Manila. The three (3) defendants
argued that the article is within the ambit of
qualified privileged communication; that
there is no malice in law and in fact; and that
defamatory comments on the acts of public
officials which are related to the discharge of
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 Criminal Law
their official duties do not constitute libel.
Was the crime of libel committed? If so, are A,
B and C all liable for the crime? Explain.
(2016 BAR)
A: YES, the crime of libel is committed. While,
fair comment on acts of public officers related to
the discharge of their duties is a qualified
privileged communication, the accused can still
be held liable for libel if actual malice is shown.
In fair comment, actual malice can be established
by showing that comment was made with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
(Guingguing v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 128959, September 30, 2005). Journalists
bear the burden of writing responsibly when
practicing their profession, even when writing
about public figures or matters of public interest.
The report made by C describing a lawyer in the
Bureau of Customs as corrupt cannot be
considered as “fair” and “true” since he did not
do research before making his allegations, and it
has been shown that these allegations were
baseless. The articles are not “fair and true
reports,” but merely wild accusations. He has
written and published the subject articles with
reckless disregard of whether the same were
false or not(Erwin Tulfo v. People, G.R. No.
161032, September 16, 2008).
YES, A, B and C are liable for the crime. Under
Art. 360 of the RPC, “Any person who shall
publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by
similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or
the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall
be responsible for the defamations contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof.” A, the president, and B, the
managing editor, are liable to the same extent of
C, the author. The provision in the RPC does not
provide absence of participation as a defense,
but rather plainly and specifically states the
responsibility of those involved in publishing
newspapers and other periodicals. Hence, A, B,
and C are all liable for libel. (Erwin Tulfo v.
People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008)
Q: Mr. L is a newspaper reporter who writes
about news items concerning the judiciary.
Mr. L believed that members of the judiciary
can be criticized and exposed for the
prohibited acts that they commit by virtue of
the public nature of their offices. Upon
receiving numerous complaints from private
citizens, Mr. L released a scathing newspaper
expose involving Judge G and his alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption.
Consequently, Mr. L was charged with the
crime of Libel.
In response, Mr. L contended that truth is a
valid defense in Libel and in this relation,
claimed that he was only exposing the truth
regarding Judge G's misdeeds. Further, Mr. L
contended that in any event, his expose on
56
Judge G is based on the complaints he
received from private citizens, and as such,
should be deemed as a mere fair commentary
on a matter of public interest.
Are the contentions of Mr. L tenable? Explain.
(2019 BAR)
A: YES. Mr. L’s contention that truth is a valid
defense in libel is tenable. Under Art. 361 of the
RPC, if the defamatory statement is made against
a public official with respect to the discharge of
his official duties and functions, and the truth of
the allegations is shown, the accused will be
entitled to an acquittal even though he does not
prove that the imputation was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends. (Lopez v.
People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011)
Defamation (1988, 1993, 2003 BAR)
Q: Romeo Cunanan, publisher of the Baguio
Daily, was sued by Pedro Aguas for libel for
the public publication of his picture with the
notice that: “This is to inform the public that
Mr. Pedro Aguas whose picture appears
above has ceased to be connected with the
Sincere Insurance Company as underwriter as
of December 31, 1987. Any transaction
entered into by him after the said date will
not be honored.
Is the publication defamatory? Explain
briefly. (1988 BAR)
A: NO. The publication is not defamatory,
because the element of imputation of a
defamatory statement is absent. There is no
imputation of a crime, vice, defect, or any act, or
omission, condition, status or circumstance,
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt to a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. This is a
mere announcement and does not carry any
implication.
Q: During a seminar workshop attended by
government employees from the Bureau of
Customs and Bureau of Internal Revenue, A,
the speaker, in the course of his lecture,
lamented the fact that a great majority of
those serving in said agencies were utterly
dishonest and corrupt.
The following morning, the whole group of
employees in the two bureaus who attended
the seminar, as complainants, filed a criminal
complaint against A for uttering what the
group claimed to be defamatory statements of
the lecturer.
In court, A filed a Motion to Quash the
Information, reciting fully the above facts, on
the ground that no crime was committed. If
you were the judge, how would you resolve
the motion? (2003 BAR)
A: I would grant the Motion to Quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, since there is no definite person or
persons dishonored.
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
The crime of libel or slander is a crime against
honor such that the person/s dishonored must
be identifiable even by innuendoes. Otherwise,
the crime against honor is not committed.
Moreover, A was not making a malicious
imputation, but merely stating an opinion; he
was delivering a lecture with no malice at all
during a seminar workshop. Malice being
inherently absent in the utterance, the statement
is not actionable as defamatory.
Slander (1990 BAR)
Q: Lando and Marco are candidates in the
local elections. In his speeches, Lando
attacked his opponent Marco alleging that he
is the son of Nanding, a robber and a thief
who amassed his wealth through shady deals.
May Marco file a case against Lando for grave
oral defamation? State your reasons. (1990
BAR)
A: NO. Marco cannot file a case for grave oral
defamation. If at all, he may file a case for light
slander.
The gravity of the oral defamation depends not
only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2)
on the personal relations of the accused and the
offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the case. It is a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall
under one or the other, depending not only upon
their sense, grammatical significance, and
accepted ordinary meaning judging them
separately, but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which might tend to prove the intention
of the offender at the time. (Rogelio Pader v.
People, G.R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000)
In the case of People v. Laroga (40 OG 123), it was
held that defamation in a political meeting when
feelings are running high and people could not
think clearly only amount to light slander.
Moreover, his statements against Marco pertains
to a person who is running for public office
wherein a wider latitude is given.
PART III. QUASI-OFFENSES
ARTICLE 365 – CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
(2001, 2007 BAR)
Q: Eddie brought his son Randy to a local faith
healer known as “Mother Himala”. He was
diagnosed by the faithhealer as being
possessed by an evil spirit. Eddie thereupon
authorized the conduct of a “treatment”
calculated to drive the “spirit” from the boy’s
body. Unfortunately, the procedure
conducted resulted in the boy’s death.
The faith healer and three others who were
part of the healing ritual were charged with
murder and convicted by the lower court. If
you were the appellate court Justice, would
you sustain the conviction upon appeal?
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
Explain your answer. (2007 BAR)
A: NO. The conviction for murder should not be
sustained because there is no indication that the
accused acted with intent to kill Randy. On the
contrary, the facts show that the accused aimed
to “treat” the victim by driving away the evil
spirit which was believed to have “possessed”
him. Considering that the proximate cause of the
victim’s death was the healing ritual done by the
accused which is not recognized in law as
legitimate, the accused are still criminally liable
for the victim’s death. As they may have
overdone the “healing ritual” they conducted on
the victim’s body, causing the latter’s death,
although the intent to kill was absent, the
accused may be held criminally liable for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.
PART IV. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
ANTI-CHILD ABUSE LAW (R.A. NO. 7610,
AS AMENDED) (1993, 2004, 2018 BAR)
Q: Sometime in December 1992, retired Lt.
Col. Agaton, celebrating the first year of his
compulsory retirement from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had in his company
a fourteen (14) year-old girl whose parents
were killed by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and
being totally orphaned has been living or
fending for herself in the streets in Manila.
They were alone in one room in a beach
resort and stayed there for two (2) nights. No
sexual intercourse took place between them.
Before they parted, retired Lt. Col. Agaton
gave the girl P1,000.00 for her services. She
gladly accepted it.
a. What crime may the retired colonel be
charged with, if any? Discuss.
b. What possible defenses can he
interpose? Explain. (1993 BAR)
A:
a. The retired colonel may be charged with
the violation of Sec. 10 (b) of RA 7610 or
the Anti-Child Abuse Law. Under the law,
“any person who shall keep or have in his
company a minor, twelve (12) years or
under or who in is ten (10) years or more
his junior in any public or private place,
hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque,
cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage
parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort
or similar places” is liable for other acts of
neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development. (Sec. 10 (b), RA 7610)
Considering that Lt. Col Agaton is
compulsory retired and that the child is
only 14 years old, there must be an age
difference of more than 10 years between
them. The age difference and the fact that
Lt. Col. Agaton stayed with the child in one
room at a beach resort for two nights and
thereafter giving her P1,000.00 “for her
services,” constitutes violation of the said
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BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
law.
b. The possible defenses Lt. Col. Agaton may
interpose are:
1. That the child is related to him
within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity or by a
bond recognized in law, or local
customs and traditions; or
2. That he was only acting in
pursuance of a moral, social or legal
duty. (Sec. 10 (b), Art. VI, R.A. 7610)
Q: Arnold, 25 years of age, was sitting on a
bench in Luneta Park, watching the statue of
Jose Rizal, when, without his permission,
Leilani, 17 years of age, sat beside him and
asked for financial assistance, allegedly for
payment of her tuition fee, in exchange for
sex. While they were conversing, police
operatives arrested and charged him with
violation of Section 10 of RA 7610 (Special
Protection of Children against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act),
accusing him of having in his company a
minor, who is not related to him, in a public
place. It was established that Arnold was not
in the performance of a social, moral and
legal duty at that time.
Is Arnold liable for the charge? Explain. (2016
BAR)
A: NO, Arnold is not liable. Under Section 10 (b)
of RA No. 7610, any person who shall keep or
have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years
or under or who in ten (10) years or more his
junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel,
beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house,
sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other
tourist resort or similar places is liable for child
abuse. To be held liable, it is indispensable that
the child in the company of the offender must be
12 years old or under or who is 10 years or more
his junior in a public place.
In this case, Leilani is 17 years of age, and she is
only 8 years younger than Arnold. Moreover,
Leilani sat beside Arnold without his permission.
Hence, he is not in the company of a child in a
public place.
Lastly, applying the ejusdem generis principle,
Luneta Park is not a place similar to hotel, motel,
beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house,
sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other
tourist resort.
Q: With a promise of reward, Robert asked
Romy to bring him a young girl that he
(Robert) can have carnal knowledge with.
Romy agreed, seized an eight-year old girl
and brought her to Robert. After receiving his
reward, Romy left while Robert proceeded to
have carnal knowledge with the girl.
a. For what felony may Robert and Romy be
charged?
58
b. Will your answer in (a) be the same if the
victim is a 15-year old lass who was
enticed, through cunning and deceit of
Romy, to voluntarily go to the house of
Robert where the latter subsequently had
carnal knowledge with her? (2018 BAR)
A:
a. Robert may be charged with the crime of
Child Prostitution or other sexual abuse
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 (the
Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act) by having sexual intercourse with a
child exploited in prostitution. Because the
victim was under 12 years of age, (in this
case, 8 years), Robert shall be prosecuted
under Article 266-A and 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. Romy, on the other
hand, may be charged with the crime of
Child Prostitution or other sexual abuse
under Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 7610 by acting
as procurer of a child prostitute.
b. YES. R.A. No. 7610 covers sexual abuse
committed against a child or children below
eighteen (18) years of age. Children, who for
money, profit or any other consideration due
to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse. Robert
and Romy may be prosecuted under the said
law.
ANTI-FENCING LAW (P.D 1612) (1987,
1990, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2005, 2010, 2013
BAR)
Q: Pedro, a municipal treasurer, received
from the Provincial Treasurer of the Province
five (5) brand new typewriters for use in the
municipal treasurer’s office. Each typewriter
is valued at P10,000.00. Since Pedro needed
money for the hospitalization of his sick son,
he sold four (4) of the typewriters to his
friend, Rodolfo, a general merchant in San
Isidro for P2,000.00 each. Rodolfo, as a
general merchant knew that one typewriter
could easily be between P6,000.00 to
P10,000.00.For this reason, he readily agreed
to buy the typewriters. Rodolfo then resold
the typewriters at P6,000.00 thus making a
profit of P16,000.00. Two months after the
transaction, Pedro was audited and the
investigation as to his accountabilities led to
the discovery that Rodolfo bought the four (4)
typewriters from Pedro. Is Rodolfo liable for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law? (1987
BAR)
A: Rodolfo is not liable for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law as this law is applicable only to the
buy and sell of articles of value which are the
proceeds of robbery and theft. In this case, the
typewriters were proceeds of malversation.
Q:
a. What are the elements of fencing?
b. What is the difference between a fence
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
and an accessory to theft or robbery?
Explain.
c. Is there any similarity between them?
(1995 BAR)
A:
a. The elements of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been
committed;
2. Accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the crime, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals or
disposes or buys and sells or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object
or anything of value , which has been
derived from the proceeds of said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have
known that said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused,
intent to gain for himself or for another.
b. As to the degree of participation and penalty
– a fence is punished as a principal under PD
1612 and the penalty is higher, whereas an
accessory to robbery or theft under the RPC
is punished with penalty two degrees lower
than the principal, unless he bought or
profited from the proceeds of theft or
robbery arising from robbery in Philippine
highways under PD 532 where he is
punished as an accomplice, hence the penalty
is one degree lower.
As to the presumption - there is a
presumption of fencing by mere possession
of any good, article, item, object, or anything
of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery. There is no such
presumption applicable to an accessory to
theft or robbery.
c. There is similarity in the sense that all the
acts of one who is an accessory to the crimes
of robbery or theft are included in the acts
defined as fencing. In fact, the accessory in
the crimes of robbery or theft could be
prosecuted as such under the RPC or as a
fence under PD 1612. The state may choose
to prosecute the person either under the
Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612,
although the preference for the latter would
seem inevitable considering that fencing is a
malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates
a presumption of fencing and prescribes a
higher penalty based on the value of the
property. (Dizon- Pamintuan v. People, G.R.
No. 111426 July 11, 1994)
Q: Ofelia engaged in the purchase and sale of
jewelry, was charged with violation of PD
1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing
Law, for having been found in possession of
recently stolen jewelry valued at P100,000.00
at her jewelry shop. Her defense is that she
merely bought the same from Antonia and
produced a receipt covering the sale. She
presented other receipts given to her by
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2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
Antonia representing previous transactions.
Convicted of the charge, Ofelia appealed,
arguing that her acquisition of the jewelries
resulted from a legal transaction and that the
prosecution failed to prove that she knew or
should have known that the pieces of jewelry
which she bought
from Antonia were proceeds of the crime of
theft.
a. What is a “fence” under PD 1612?
b. Is Ofelia liable under the Anti-Fencing
Law? Explain. (2016 BAR)
A:
a. A fence includes any person, firm,
association, corporation or partnership or
other organization who/which commits the
act of fencing (Sec. 2(b), PD 1612). Fencing is
the act of any person who, with intent to
gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell
or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. (Section 2(a), PD 1612)
b. NO. Ofelia is not liable under the Anti-
Fencing Law. The presumption of fencing
only shifted the burden of evidence to the
defense. Burden of proof is upon the fence
to overcome the presumption.
In this case, Ofelia’s defense that the
jewelries werea cquired in a legitimate
transaction is sufficient. Further, there is no
other circumstance indicating that Ofelia, an
innocent purchaser, should have known
that the jewelries were the subject of theft.
On the contrary, there was even a receipt
produced by Ofelia for the transaction.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
YES. Under Section 5 of P.D. 1612, mere
possession of any good, article, item, object,
or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or theft shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing. Failure to prove
that Ofelia knows, or should have known
that the jewelry is stolen is not a defense
since this element is presumed to be
present because Ofelia is in possession of
the stolen property. Moreover, there is no
showing that Ofelia secured a permit or
clearance from PNP station commander of
the place of sale required in Section 6 of P.D.
1612.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT (R.A. NO. 3019, AS AMENDED)
(1990, 1991, 2001, 2008, 2009, 2010,
2014, 2016, 2019 BAR)
Q:
a. Melda who is the private secretary of
Judge TolitsNaya, was persuaded by a
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BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
litigant, Jumbo, to have his case
calendared as early as possible for a
consideration of P500.00.May she be
held criminally liable for this
accommodation? Explain your answer.
b. What will be the criminal liability of
Melda if she volunteered to persuade
Judge TolitsNaya to rule in Jumbo’s favor
without asking any consideration?
Explain your answer. (1990 BAR)
A:
a. The answer would depend or be qualified
by the implication of the phrase “to have his
case calendared as early as possible.”
If the phrase is interpreted as an unjust act
and in violation of the rule to give priority
to the older cases, then she would be liable
under direct bribery for an act which does
not constitute a crime but is unjust. He may
also be held liable under Section 3 (e) of RA
3019 for“giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits.”
If the phrase is interpreted as a non-
violation of the rules and regulations, then
she can only be held liable for direct
bribery.
b. Melda is not criminally liable because the
act of volunteering to persuade is not a
criminal act. It is the act of persuading that
is considered a criminal act. The act does
not fall under Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code on Direct Bribery nor does it fall
under Article 211 of the RPC on Indirect
Bribery. Neither does it fall under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(a)
of RA 3019 refers to acts of persuading
another public official to violate rules and
regulations.
Q: Malo, a clerk of court of a trial court,
promised the accused in a drug case pending
before the court, that he would convince the
judge to acquit him for a consideration of P5
million. The accused agreed and delivered
the money through his lawyer to the clerk of
court.
The judge, not knowing of the deal,
proceeded to rule on the evidence and
convicted the accused.
Malo was charged with violation of Section 3
(b), RA 3019 which prohibits a public officer
from directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, share percentage
or benefit wherein the public officer, in his
official capacity, has to intervene under the
law. He was later charged also with indirect
bribery under the RPC. Malo claims he can no
longer be charged under the RPC for the same
act under RA 3019. Is he correct? (2014 BAR)
A: NO, Malo is not correct. Although the two
charges against Malo stemmed from the same
transaction, the same act gave rise to two
separate and distinct offenses. Whereas the
60
mere request or demand of a gift, present, share,
percentage or benefit is enough to constitute a
violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance
of a promise or offer or receipt of a gift or
present is required in direct bribery. Moreover,
the ambit of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It
is limited only to contracts or transactions
involving monetary consideration where the
public officer has the authority to intervene
under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand,
has a wider and more general scope: (a)
performance of an act constituting a crime; (b)
execution of an unjust act which does not
constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or
refraining from doing an act which is his official
duty to do. No double jeopardy attached since
there was a variance between the elements of the
offenses charged. The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy proceeds from a second
prosecution for the same offense, not for a
different one. (Merencillo v. People, G.R. Nos.
142369-70, April 13, 2007)
Q: One Sunday afternoon, Mr. X, President of
ABC Corp., happened to bump into the Labor
Arbiter assigned to the illegal dismissal case
filed by certain employees against his
company. During their encounter, Mr. X
promised the Labor Arbiter a luxury car in
exchange for a favorable ruling. The Labor
Arbiter immediately rejected the offer and
walked away.
Assuming that Mr. X's offer was instead
accepted, should the Labor Arbiter be held
liable for any crime under the RPC? If so, for
what crime? May the Labor Arbiter also be
held liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act? Explain. (2019 BAR)
A: The Labor Arbiter should be held liable for
Direct Bribery. Under Art. 210 of the RPC, public
officer commits direct bribery by accepting a gift
in consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime, in connection with
the performance of his official duties. By
accepting Mr. X’s offer of a luxury car, the Labor
Arbiter agreed to render a ruling in Mr. X’s favor.
The Labor Arbiter may also be held liable for
violation of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Under Sec. 3(e), it is
considered a corrupt practice of any public
officer to cause any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or give any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality when evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest
partiality when there is a clear, notorious or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or
person rather than another (Fuentes v. People,
G.R. No. 186421, April 17, 2017). Here, the Labor
Arbiter committed manifest partiality in favor of
Mr. X.
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY
ROBBERY (P.D. NO. 532) (2000, 2001, 2006,
2008, 2012 Bar)
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
Q: A postal van containing mail matter,
including checks and treasury warrants, was
hijacked along a national highway by ten (10)
men, two of whom, were armed. They used
force, violence and intimidation against the
three postal employees who were occupants
of the van, resulting in the unlawful taking
and aspiration of the entire van and its
contents.
a. If you were the public prosecutor, would
you charge the ten (10) men who hijacked
the postal van with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise
known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974? Explain
your answer.
b. If you were the defense counsel, what are
the elements of the crime of highway
robbery that the prosecution should
prove to sustain a conviction? (2012 BAR)
A:
a. NO. I would not charge the 10 men with the
crime of highway robbery. The mere fact that
the offense charged was committed on a
highway would not be thedeterminant for
the application of PD No. 532. If a motor
vehicle, either stationary or moving on a
highway is forcibly taken at a gunpoint by
the accused who happened to take a fancy
thereto, the location of the vehicle at the time
of the unlawful taking would not necessarily
put the offense within the ambit of PD 532.
In this case, the crime committed is violation
of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. (People v.
Puno, GR No. 97471, February 17, 1993)
Moreover, there is no showing that the 10
men were a band of outlaws organized for
the purpose of depredation upon the persons
and properties of innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to
another. What was shown is one isolated
hijacking of a postal van. It was not stated in
the facts given that the 10 men previously
attempted at similar robberies by them to
establish the “indiscriminate” commission
thereof. (Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
79543, October 16, 1996)
b. Under Section 2 of PD 532, highway robbery
is defined as “the seizure of any person for
ransom, extortion, or other unlawful
purposes, or the taking away of the property
of another by means of violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things
or other unlawful means, committed by any
person on any Philippines highway.” Hence,
the elements of highway robbery are:
1. Intent to gain;
2. Unlawful taking of property of
another;
3. Violence against or intimidation of any
person;
4. Committed on a Philippine highway.
To obtain a conviction for highway robbery,
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
the prosecution must prove that the accused
were organized for the purpose of
committing robbery indiscriminately. If the
purpose is only a particular robbery, the
crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants.
(See People v. Mendoza, GR No. 104461,
February 23, 1996)
Q: Distinguish Highway Robbery under PD
No. 532 from Robbery committed on a
highway. (2000 BAR)
A: Highway Robbery under PPD 532 differs from
ordinary Robbery committed on a highway in
these respects:
1. In Highway Robbery under PD 532, the
robbery is committed indiscriminately
against persons who commute in such
highways, regardless of the potentiality they
offer; while in ordinary Robbery committed
on a highway, the robbery is committed
only against predetermined victims;
2. It is Highway Robbery under PD 532, when
the offender is a brigand or one who roams
in public highways and carries out his
robbery in public highways as venue,
whenever the opportunity to do so arises. It
is ordinary Robbery under the RPC when
the commission thereof in a public highway
is only incidental and the offender is not a
brigand; and
3. In Highway Robbery under PD 532, there is
frequency in the commission of the robbery
in public highways and against persons
traveling thereat; whereas ordinary robbery
in public highways is only occasional
against a predetermined victim, without
frequency in public highways.
ANTI-PLUNDER ACT (R.A. NO. 7080, AS
AMENDED) (1993, 2014, 2017 BAR)
Q: Through kickbacks, percentages or
commissions and other fraudulent
schemes/conveyances and taking
advantage of his position, Andy, a former
mayor of a suburban town, acquired assets
amounting to P10 billion which is grossly
disproportionate to his lawful income. Due to
his influence and connections and despite
knowledge by the authorities of his ill-gotten
wealth, he was charged with the crime of
plunder only after twenty (20) years from his
defeat in the last elections he participated in.
a. May Andy still be held criminally liable?
Why?
b. Can the State still recover the properties
and assets that he illegally acquired, the
bulk of which is in the name of his wife
and children? Reason out. (1993 BAR)
A:
a. NO. Andy will not be criminally liable.
Under Sec. 6 of RA 7080, “the crime
punishable under this Act shall prescribe in
twenty years.” For crimes punished by
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 Criminal Law
special penal laws, Sec. 2 of Act 3326
provides that “prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.” In this case, Andy was
charged with the crime of plunder after
twenty (20) years from his defeat in the last
elections he participated in, despite
knowledge by the authorities of his ill-
gotten wealth. Thus, the crime has already
prescribed.
b. YES. Sec. 6 of RA 7080 provides that the
right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officers from
them or their nominees or transferees shall
not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel. (Sec. 6, R.A. 7080)
Q: Overjoyed by the award to his firm of a
multi-billion government contract for the
development of an economic and tourism hub
in the Province of Blank, Mr. Gangnam
allotted the amount of P100 Million to serve
as gifts for certain persons instrumental in
his firm's winning the award. He gave 50% of
that amount to Governor Datu, the official
who had signed the contract with the proper
authorization from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; 25% to Bokal Diva, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member who had
lobbied for the award of the project in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and 25% to
Mayor Dolor of the Municipality where the
project would be implemented. Governor
Datu received his share through his wife,
Provincial First Lady Dee, who then deposited
the amount in her personal bank account.
Previously, upon facilitation by Bokal Diva,
Mr. Gangnam concluded an agreement with
Mayor Dolor for the construction of the Blank
Sports Arena worth ₱800 Million. The project
was highly overpriced because it could be
undertaken and completed for not more than
₱400 Million. For this project, Mayor Dolor
received from Mr. Gangnam a gift of ₱10
Million, while Bokal Diva got ₱25 Million.
In both instances, Bokal Diva had her
monetary gifts deposited in the name of her
secretary, Terry, who personally maintained
a bank account for Bokal Diva's share in
government projects.
May each of the above-named individuals be
held liable for plunder? Explain your answer.
(2017 BAR)
A: NO. Not all of them could be held liable for
plunder based on the elements of R.A. No. 7080
as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Only the following
individuals could be held liable for plunder:
1. Governor Datu who received the amount of
P50,000,000.00 after he signed the contract
in favor of the firm of Mr. Gangnam. His wife
Provincial First Lady Dee is also liable as the
62
amount given to Governor Datu, his husband,
was deposited in her account. She is
considered as co-conspirator;
2. Bokal Diva is also liable for plunder. He was
the one who lobbied for the award of the
Project to the firm of Mr. Gangnam in the
Sanguniang Panlalawigan. He received 25%
of or P25,000,000.00 and another
P25,000,000.00 in another project of Mr.
Gangnam in the construction of an
overpriced Blank Sports Arena in the
Municipality to which Dolor is the Mayor.
The aggregate amount has a total of
P50,000,000.00. Further, Terry, the
Secretary of Bokal Diva is also liable as co-
conspirator. The amount was deposited in
her bank account.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the
amassment, accumulation or acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than
P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the
corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of
the criminal prosecution. (Macapagal-Arroyo
vs. People, 797 SCRA 241, 19 July 2016, En
Banc)
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AND THEIR CHILDREN (R.A. NO. 9262)
Battered Woman Syndrome (2010, 2014,
2015, 2018 BAR)
Q: Define "Battered Woman Syndrome." What
are the three phases of the "Battered Woman
Syndrome"? Would the defense prosper
despite the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under
the Revised Penal Code? Explain. (2010 BAR)
A: “Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a
scientifically define pattern of psychological and
behavioural symptoms found in woman living in
battering relationships as a result of cumulative
abuse. (Sec. 3[d], R.A. 9262)
The three (3) phases of the BWS are: (1) tension-
building phase; (2) acute battering incident; and
(3) tranquil, loving, or non- violent phase. (People
v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004)
YES, the defense will prosper. Sec. 26 of R.A.
9262 provides that victim-survivors who are
found by the courts to be suffering from battered
woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and
civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any
of the elements of justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the RPC.
Q: Ms. A had been married to Mr. B for 10
years. Since their marriage, Mr. B had been
jobless and a drunkard, preferring to stay
with his “barkadas” until the wee hours of the
morning. Ms. A was the breadwinner and
attended to the needs of their three (3)
growing children. Many times, when Mr. B
was drunk, he would beat Ms. A and their
three children, and shout invectives against
them. In fact, in one of the beating incidents,
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
Ms.A suffered a deep stab wound on her
tummy that required a prolonged stay in the
hospital. Due to the beatings and verbal
abuses committed against her, she consulted
a psychologist several times, as she was
slowly beginning to lose her mind. One night,
when Mr. B arrived dead drunk, he suddenly
stabbed Ms. A several times while shouting
invectives against her.
Defending herself from the attack, Ms. A
grappled for the possession of a knife and she
succeeded. She then stabbed Mr. B several
times which caused his instantaneous death.
Medico-Legal Report showed that the
husband suffered three (3) stabbed wounds.
Can Ms. A validly put up a defense? Explain.
(2014 BAR)
A: YES. Ms. A can put up the defense of battered
woman syndrome. It appears that she is suffering
from physical and psychological or emotional
distress resulting from cumulative abuse by her
husband.
Under Section 26 of RA 9262, “victim survivors
who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the RPC.”
As a rule, once the unlawful aggression ceased,
stabbing the victim further is not self-defense.
However, even if the element of unlawful
aggression in self-defense is lacking, Ms. A, who is
suffering for battered woman syndrome, will not
incur criminal and civil liability.
Q: Dion and Talia were spouses. Dion always
came home drunk since he lost his job a
couple of months ago. Talia had gotten used
to the verbal abuse from Dion. One night, in
addition to the usual verbal abuse, Dion beat
up Talia. The next morning, Dion saw the
injury that he had inflicted upon Talia and
promised her that he would stop drinking and
never beat her again. However, Dion did not
make good on his promise. Just after one
week, he started drinking again. Talia once
more endured the usual verbal abuse. Afraid
that he might beat her up again, Talia stabbed
Dion with a kitchen knife while he was passed
out from imbibing too much alcohol. Talia
was charged with the crime of parricide.
a. May Talia invoke the defense of Battered
Woman Syndrome to free herself from
criminal liability? Explain.
b. Will your answer be the same, assuming
that Talia killed Dion after being beaten
up after a second time? Explain. (2015
BAR)
A:
a. NO. A single act of battery or physical harm
committed by Dion against Talia resulting to
the physical and psychological or emotional
distress on her part is not sufficient to avail
of the benefit of the justifying circumstance
of “Battered Woman Syndrome”. The defense
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
of Battered Woman Syndrome can be
invoked if the woman with marital
relationship with the victim is subjected to
cumulative abuse or battery involving the
infliction of physical harm resulting to the
physical and psychological or emotional
distress. Cumulative means resulting from
successive addition. In sum, there must be
“at least two battering episodes” between the
accused and her intimate partner and such
final episode produced in the battered
person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent
harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save
her life. (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981,
January 15, 2004)
b. YES, Talia can invoke the defense of Battered
Woman Syndrome to free herself from
criminal liability for killing her husband
since she suffered physical and emotional
distress arising from cumulative abuse or
battery. Under Section 26 of RA 9262, victim
survivors of Battered Woman Syndrome do
not incur any criminal or civil liability
despite the absence of the requisites of self-
defense.
Q: Romeo and Julia have been married for
twelve (12) years and had two (2) children.
The first few years of their marriage went
along smoothly. However, on the fifth year
onwards, they would often quarrel when
Romeo comes home drunk. The quarrels
became increasingly violent, marked by quiet
periods when Julia would leave the conjugal
dwelling. During the times of quiet, Romeo
would court Julia with flowers and chocolates
and convince her to return home, telling her
that he could not live without her; or Romeo
would ask Julia to forgive him, which she did,
believing that if she humbled herself, Romeo
would change. After a month of marital bliss,
Romeo would return to his drinking habit
and the quarrel would start again, verbally at
first, until it would escalate to physical
violence.
One night, Romeo came home drunk and
went straight to bed. Fearing the onset of
another violent fight, Julia stabbed Romeo,
while he was asleep. A week later, their
neighbors discovered Romeo’s rotting corpse
on the marital bed. Julia and the children
were nowhere to be found. Julia was charged
with parricide. She asserted “battered woman
syndrome” as her defense.
a. Explain the cycle of violence.
b. Is Julia’s “battered woman syndrome”
defense meritorious? Explain. (2016
BAR)
A:
a. The Battered Woman Syndrome is
characterized by the so-called “cycle of
violence,” which has three phases: (1)
tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil,
loving (or at least, nonviolent) phase.
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BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
During the tension-building phase, minor
battering occurs – it could be verbal or
slight physical abuse or another form of
hostile behavior. The woman tries to pacify
the batterer through a kind, nurturing
behavior; or by simply staying out of his
way. The acute battering incident is
characterized by brutality, destructiveness
and sometimes, death. The battered woman
deems this incident as unpredictable, yet
also inevitable. During this phase, she has
no control; only the batterer may put an end
to the violence. The final phase of the cycle
of violence begins when the acute battering
incident ends. During this tranquil period,
the couple experience profound relief..
b. YES. Under Section 3(c) of RA No. 9262,
“Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a
scientifically defined pattern of
psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of “cumulative
abuse”. Under Section 3(b), “Battery” refers
to an act of inflicting physical harm upon
the woman or her child resulting in physical
and psychological or emotional distress.
In sum, the defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome can be invoked if the woman in
marital relationship with the victim is
subjected to cumulative abuse or battery
involving the infliction of physical harm
resulting to the physical and psychological
or emotional distress. Cumulative means
resulting from successive addition. In sum,
there must be “at least two battering
episodes” between the accused and her
intimate partner and such final episode
produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life.
(People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January
15, 2004)
In this case, because of the battering
episodes, Julia feared the onset of another
violent fight and honestly believed the need
to defend herself even if Romeo had not
commenced an unlawful aggression. Even in
the absence of unlawful aggression,
however, Battered Woman Syndrome is a
defense. Under Section 27 of RA No. 9262,
Battered Woman Syndrome is a defense
notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the Revised Penal Code
such as unlawful aggression. (Section 26, RA
No. 9262)
Q: For the past five years, Ruben and Rorie
had been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. Initially, they
had a happy relationship which was blessed
with a daughter, Rona, who was born on
March 1, 2014. However, the partners’
relationship became sour when Ruben began
indulging in vices, such as women and
alcohol, causing frequent arguments between
64
them. Their relationship got worse when,
even for slight mistakes, Ruben would lay his
hands on Rorie. One day, a tipsy Ruben
barged into their house and, for no reason,
repeatedly punched Rorie in the stomach. To
avoid further harm, Rorie ran out of the
house. But Ruben pursued her and stripped
her naked in full view of their neighbors; and
then he vanished.
Ten days later, Ruben came back to Rorie and
pleaded for forgiveness. However, Rorie
expressed her wish to live separately from
Ruben and asked him to continue providing
financial support for their daughter Rona. At
that time, Ruben was earning enough to
support a family. He threatened to withdraw
the support he was giving to Rona unless
Rorie would agree to live with him again. But
Rorie was steadfast in refusing to live with
Ruben again, and insisted on her demand for
support for Rona. As the ex-lovers could not
reach an agreement, no further support was
given by Ruben.
What crimes did Ruben commit:
a. For beating and humiliating Rorie?
b. For withdrawing support for Rona?
(2018 BAR)
A:
a. For beating and humiliating Rorie, such acts
violate R.A 9262, known as the “Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004,” particularly section 3 (a)
thereof under “Physical Violence” referring
to acts that include bodily or physical harm
against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship.
b. For withdrawing support for Rona, such act
is a violation of RA 9262, section 3 (d), which
reads: “Economic abuse” refers to acts that
make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following: Withdrawal of
financial support or preventing the victim
from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in
cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds
as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22) (1987,
1990, 1991, 1995, 1996, 2009, 2010, 2013,
2018 BAR)
Q: As security for a loan of P50,000.00 he
obtained from his friend, Joseph David,
payable not later than 17 April 1990, Roger
Vasquez drew and delivered to Joseph a check
on due date. The check was dishonored on the
ground of insufficiency of funds. After
appropriate preliminary investigation, the
City Prosecutor filed against Roger an
Information for violation of B.P. Blg. No. 22
alleging therein, inter alia, that Roger “with
intent to defraud, by means of deceit,
knowing fully well that he had no funds
and/or sufficient funds in the bank, for value
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
received, did then and there, willfully and
feloniously, issue the aforesaid check” but
“when the said check was presented for
encashment, said check was dishonored and
returned” on the ground of insufficiency of
funds.
In a decision rendered thereafter, the trial
judge ruled that Roger cannot be convicted of
the offense charged because the information
failed to allege that he knew, when he issued
the check, that he would have insufficient
funds for its payment in full upon its
presentment to the drawee bank.
Is the judge correct? (1991 BAR)
A: NO. The allegation satisfies the legal definition
of the offense. The maker’s knowledge of
insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed
from the dishonor of the check for lack of funds.
(People v. Lagui, G.R. No. 131840. April 27, 2000)
Q: Val, a Nigerian, set up a perfume business
in the Philippines. The investors would buy
the raw materials at a low price from Val. The
raw materials consisted of powders, which
the investors would mix with water and let
stand until a gel was formed. Val made a
written commitment to the investors that he
would buy back the gel at a higher price, thus
assuring the investors of a neat profit. When
the amounts to be paid by Val to the investors
reached millions of pesos, he sold all the
equipment of his perfume business,
absconded with the money, and is nowhere to
be found. What crime or crimes were
committed, if any? Explain. (2016 BAR)
A: The crime committed is estafa through false
pretenses (Art. 315 par. 2[a]). Val defrauded the
investors by falsely pretending to possess
business or imaginary transactions. The fact that
he sold all the equipment of his perfume
business, and absconded with the money when
the amounts to be paid by him to the investors
reached millions of pesos shows that the
transaction or his business is imaginary, and he
defrauded the victims.
Q: The accused was convicted under BP Blg.
22 for having issued several checks which
were dishonored by the drawee bank on their
due date because the accused closed her
account after the issuance of checks. On
appeal, she argued that she could not be
convicted under B.P. Blg. 22 by reason of the
closing of her account because said law
applies solely to checks dishonored by reason
of insufficiency of funds and that at the time
she issued the checks concerned, she had
adequate funds in the bank. While she admits
that she may be held liable for estafa under
Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code, she
cannot however be found guilty of having
violated B.P. Blg. 22. Is her contention
correct? Explain. (1996 BAR)
A: NO. BP 22 also covers any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when he makes or draws and issues a
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2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90)
days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. (Sec.
1, Par. 2, BP 22)
Estafa (1989, 1998, 1990, 1991, 2005, 2010,
2013, 2014 BAR)
Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered
owner of a lot, in special power of attorney
naming him (B) as the attorney-in-fact of A.
On February 13, 1964, B mortgaged the lot to
a bank using the special power of attorney to
obtain a loan of P8, 500. On the same day,
both the special power of attorney and the
mortgage contract were duly registered in
the Registry of Deeds.
Because of B’s failure to pay, the bank
foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was sold
to X in whose name a new title was issued. In
March 1974, A discovered that the property
was already registered in the name of X
because an ejectment case filed against him
by X.
a. If you were the lawyer of A, with what
crime or crimes would you charge B?
Explain.
b. If you were the counsel of B, what would
be your defense? Discuss. (1993 BAR)
A:
a. The crime to be charged against B is estafa
through falsification of a public document.
When the offender commits in a public
document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a
necessary means to commit another crime,
like estafa, theft or malversation, the two
crimes form a complex crime under Article
48 of the same Code. The falsification of a
public, official or commercial document
may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause
damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of a public, official or
commercial document. In other words, the
crime of falsification was committed prior
to the consummation of the crime of estafa.
Actually utilizing the falsified public, official
or commercial document to defraud
another is estafa. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by
the falsification of the document. (Intestate
Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409,
February 11, 2010)
b. The defense may be prescription if the filing
of the complaint against B was done beyond
the prescriptive period.
Art. 90 of the RPC states that “crimes
punishable by death, reclusion perpetuaor
reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty
65 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
years. Crimes punishable by other afflictive
penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty
shall prescribe in ten years; with the
exception of those punishable by arresto
mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.”
Article 91 of the same Code provides that
the period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents. Under Art. 48 of
the same Code, “When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum
period.”
In this case, the most serious crime is
Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC
which has a corresponding penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
₱5,000.00 and not Estafa, because under RA
10951, the penalty is only arresto mayor if
the amount involved does not exceed
P40,000.00. Since prison mayor is an
afflictive penalty, the prescriptive period
under Art. 90 of RPC is 15 years from the
time the crime is discovered by the offended
party, which is March 1974. Thus,
prescription is a defense if the complaint
was filed beyond March 1989.
Q: On March 31, 1995, Orpheus Financing
Corp. received from Maricar the sum of
P500,000 as money market placement for
sixty days at fifteen (15) percent interest, and
the President of said Corp. issued a check
covering the amount including the interest
due thereon, postdated May 30, 1995. On the
maturity date, however, Orpheus Financing
Corp. failed to deliver back Maricar's money
placement with the corresponding interest
earned, notwithstanding repeated demands
upon said Corporation to comply with its
commitment. Did the President of Orpheus
Financing Corporation incur any criminal
liability for estafa for reason of the non-
payment of the money market placement?
Explain. (1996 BAR)
A: NO. The President of the financing corporation
does not incur criminal liability for estafa
because a money market transaction partakes of
the nature of a loan, such that non- payment
thereof would not give rise to estafa through
misappropriation or conversion. In money
market placement, there is transfer of ownership
of the money to be invested and therefore the
liability for its return is civil in nature. (Sesbreño
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84096, January 26,
1995)
Q: A sold a washing machine to B on credit
with the understanding that B could return
the appliance within two weeks if after
testing the same, B decided not to buy it. Two
weeks lapsed without B returning the
appliance. A found out that B had sold the
66
washing machine to a third party. Is B liable
for estafa? Why? (2002 BAR)
A: NO. B is not liable for estafa because he is not
just an entrustee of the washing machine which
he sold; he is the owner thereof by virtue of the
sale of the washing machine to him. The sale
being on credit, B as buyer is only liable for the
unpaid price of the washing machine; his
obligation is only a civil obligation. There is no
felonious misappropriation that could constitute
estafa.
Q: A and B agreed to meet at the latter's house
to discuss B's financial problems. On his way,
one of A's car tires blew up. Before A left
following the meeting, he asked B to lend him
money to buy a new spare tire. B had
temporarily exhausted his bank deposits,
leaving a zero balance. Anticipating, however,
a replenishment of his account soon, B issued
A a postdated check with which A negotiated
for a new tire. When presented, the check
bounced for lack of funds. The tire company
filed a criminal case against A and B. What
would be the criminal liability, if any, of each
of the two accused? Explain. (2003 BAR)
A: A who negotiated the unfunded check of B in
buying a new tire for his car may only be
prosecuted for estafa if he was aware at the time
of such negotiation that the check has no
sufficient funds in the drawee bank; otherwise,
he is not criminally liable.
B who accommodated A with his check may
nevertheless be prosecuted under B.P. 22 for
having issued the check, knowing at the time of
issuance that it has no funds in the bank and that
A will negotiate it to buy a new tire, i.e., for value.
B may not be prosecuted for estafa because the
facts indicate that he is not actuated by intent to
defraud in issuing the check which A negotiated.
Obviously, B issued the postdated check only to
help A; criminal intent or dolo is absent.
Q: DD was engaged in the warehouse
business. Sometime in November 2004, he
was in dire need of money. He, thus, sold
merchandise deposited in his warehouse to
VR for P500,000.00. DD was charged with
theft, as principal, while VR as accessory. The
court convicted DD of theft but acquitted VR
on the ground that he purchased the
merchandise in good faith. However, the
court ordered VR to return the merchandise
to the owner thereof and ordered DD to
refund the P500,000.00 to VR. DD moved for
the reconsideration of the decision insisting
that he should be acquitted of theft because
being the depositary, he had juridical
possession of the merchandise. VR also
moved for the reconsideration of the decision
insisting that since he was acquitted of the
crime charged, and that he purchased the
merchandise in good faith, he is not obligated
to return the merchandise to its owner. Rule
on the motions with reasons. (2005 BAR)
A: The motion for reconsideration of DD should
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
be denied.
In this case, there being no proof that title to the
goods was transferred to DD, only physical
possession is presumed transferred to and
obtained by DD. (U.S. v. De Vera, G.R. No. L- 16961,
September 19, 1921)
The principal distinction between the two crimes
is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa
the accused received the property and converts it
to his own use or benefit. However, there may be
theft even if the accused has possession of the
property, if he was entrusted only with the
material or physical (natural) or de facto
possession of the thing, his misappropriation of
the same constitutes theft, but if he has the
juridical possession of the thing, his conversion
of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa.
(Santos v. People, G.R. No. 77429, January 29,
1990)
While VR is acquitted of theft, such acquittal does
not of itself negate civil liability of VR to return
the property stolen by DD. Civil liability on the
part of VR exists despite acquittal since his
acquittal is premised on the finding that his
liability is only civil in nature. (De Guzman v. Alva,
51 OG 1311)
Q: Rashid asked Rene to lend him PhP50,000,
payable in six (6) months and, as payment for
the loan, Rashid issued a postdated check for
the said amount plus the agreed interest.
Rashid assured Rene that the account would
have sufficient funds on maturity date. On
that date, Rene presented the check to the
drawee bank for payment but it was
dishonored for the reason that it was drawn
against insufficient funds (DAIF).
Rene sent Rashid a timely notice of dishonor
of the check and demanded the latter to make
good the same within five (5) days from
notice. After the lapse of the five (5)-day
notice, Rene redeposited the check with the
drawee bank but it was again dishonored for
the same reason, i.e., DAIF. Rene thereafter
filed two (2) separate criminal actions
against Rashid: (1) Estafa under Art.
315(2)(d) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
4885, i.e, estafa committed by postdating a
check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation without sufficient funds in the
bank; and (2) Violation of B.P. 22 or the
Bouncing Checks Law.
a. Can he be held liable under both actions?
b. If the check is presented for payment
after four (4) months, but before it
becomes stale, can the two actions still
proceed? (2018 BAR)
A:
a. YES. Rashid can be liable for estafa and also
for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22. While the two
criminal actions of estafa under Art.
315(2)(d) of the RPC and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Bilang 22 may refer to
identical acts committed by Rashid, the
prosecution thereof cannot be limited to
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
one offense, because a single criminal act
may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses
and where there is variance or differences
between the elements of an offense in one
law and another law, as in this case, there
will be no double jeopardy, because what
the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers
to identity of elements in the two (2)
offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for
the same act is not prohibited. What is
forbidden is prosecution for the same
offense.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa
case may be rooted from an identical set of
facts, they nevertheless present different
causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered “separate, distinct, and
independent” from each other. Both cases,
therefore, can proceed to their final
adjudication– both as to their criminal and
civil aspects. (Rimando v. Spouses Aldaba
and People, G.R. No. 203583, 13 October
2014)
b. YES. The presentation of the check beyond
the 90-day period would be of no
consequence per Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22.
The 90-day period is not an element of the
offense but merely a condition for the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds. That the check must
be deposited within ninety (90) days is
simply one of the conditions for the prima
facie presumption of knowledge of lack of
funds to arise. It does not discharge Rashid
from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in
the account.
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
(R.A. 9165) (1990, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1998,
2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2015,
2016, 2019 BAR)
Q:
a. Distinguish entrapment from
instigation. Discuss fully. (1990, 1995,
2003, 2015 BAR)
b. Suspecting that Juan was a drug pusher,
SPO2 Mercado, leader of the Narcom
team, gave Juan a P100-bill and asked him
to buy some marijuana cigarettes.
Desirous of pleasing SPO2 Mercado, Juan
went inside the shopping mall while the
officer waited at the corner of mall. After
15 minutes, Juan returned with ten sticks
of marijuana cigarettes which he gave to
SPO2 Mercado who thereupon placed
Juan under arrest and charged him with
violation of The Dangerous Drugs Law by
selling marijuana cigarettes. Is Juan guilty
of any offense punishable under The
Dangerous Drugs Act? Discuss fully. (1995
BAR)
A:
a. As to the criminal design, in entrapment, it
originates from and is already in the mind of
the lawbreaker even before entrapment. In
instigation, the idea and design to bring
67 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
about the commission of the crime
originated and developed in the mind of the
law enforcers;
In entrapment, the law enforcers resort to
ways and means for the purpose of capturing
the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto. In
instigation, the law enforcers induce, lure, or
incite a person who is not minded to commit
a crime and would not otherwise commit it,
into committing the crime; and
Entrapment will not bar the prosecution and
conviction of the lawbreaker while
instigation absolves the accused from
criminal liability (People v. Dante Marcos, 185
SCRA 154, 1990)
b. Juan cannot be charged of any offense
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Although Juan is a suspected drug pusher, he
cannot be charged on the basis of a mere
suspicion. By providing the money with
which to buy marijuana cigarettes, SPO2
Mercado practically induced and prodded
Juan to commit the offense of illegal
possession of marijuana. Set against the facts
instigation is a valid defense available to
Juan.
Q: Pat. Buensuceso, posing as a buyer,
approached Ronnie, a suspected drug pusher,
and offered to buy P300.00 worth of shabu.
Ronnie then left, came back five minutes later
and handed the aluminum foil containing the
shabu to him. Before Pat. Buensuceso was
able to deliver the marked money to Ronnie,
the latter spotted a policeman at a distance,
whom Ronnie knew to be connected with the
Narcotics Command of the Police. Upon seeing
the latter, Ronnie ran away but was arrested
thirty minutes later by other policemen who
pursued him. Under the circumstances, would
you consider the crime of sale of a prohibited
drug already consummated? (1996 BAR)
A: YES. The sale of prohibited drug is already
consummated although the marked money was
not yet delivered. When Ronnie handed the
aluminum foil containing the shabu to Pat.
Buensuceso pursuant to their agreed sale, the
crime was consummated. Payment of the
consideration is not an element of requisite of the
crime. If ever, the marked money is only
evidentiary to strengthen the case of the
prosecution.
The absence of the marked money will not create
a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence as long as
the sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately
proven and the drug subject of the transaction is
presented before the court. There was a
perfected contract of sale of the drug. (People v.
Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733)
Q: Obie Juan is suspected to have in his
possession an unspecified amount of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu”.
An entrapment operation was conducted by
police officers, resulting in his arrest
68
following the discovery of 100 grams of the
said dangerous drug in his possession. He was
subsequently charged with two crimes:
Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
for the possession of “shabu” and violation of
Section 15, Art. II of RA 9165 for the use of
marijuana.
a. Are the charges proper? Explain.
b. So as not to be sentenced to death, Obie
Juan offers to plead guilty to a lesser
offense. Can he do so? Why? (1998, 2004,
2005, 2016 BAR)
A:
a. The charge of possession of shabu is proper
as the mere possession of such drug is
punishable, but the charge of use of
marijuana is not proper as Section 15 of R.A.
9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002) expressly excludes penalties for
“use” of dangerous drugs when the person
tested “is also found to have in possession
such quantity of any dangerous drug”
provided for in Section 11 of such Act.
b. YES. Section 23 of R.A. 9165 which expressly
provides that “Any person charged under
any provision of this Act regardless of the
imposable penalty shall not be allowed to
avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.”
has already been struck down by the
Supreme Court as unconstitutional for it
encroaches on the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court (Estipona Jr v. Lobrigo G.R.
No. 226679 August 15, 2017). Thus, Obie
Juan can now plea to a lesser offense.
Q: After receiving a reliable information that
Dante Ong, a notorious drug smuggler, was
arriving on PAL Flight No. PR181, PNP Chief
Inspector Samuel Gamboa formed a group of
anti-drug agents. When Ong arrived at the
airport, the group arrested him and seized his
attaché case. Upon inspection the
Immigration holding area, the attaché case
yielded 5 plastic bags of heroin weighing 500
grams. Chief Inspector Gamboa took the
attaché case and boarded him in an
unmarked car driven by PO3 Pepito Lorbes.
On the way to Camp Crame and upon nearing
White Plains corner Edsa, Chief Inspector
Gamboa ordered PO3 Lorbes to stop the car.
They brought out the drugs from the case in
the trunk to and got 3 plastic sacks of heroin.
They then told Ong to alight from the car. Ong
left with the 2 remaining plastic sacks of
heroin. Chief Inspector Gamboa advised him
to keep silent and go home which the latter
did. Unknown to them, an NBI team of agents
had been following them and witnessed the
transaction. They arrested Chief Inspector
Gamboa and PO3 Lorbes. Meanwhile, another
NBI team followed Ong and likewise arrested
him. All of them were later charged. What are
their respective criminal liabilities? (2006
BAR)
A: Chief Inspector Samuel Gamboa and PO3
Pepito Lorbes incur criminal liability under Art.
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
11, Sec. 4 last par., RA No. 9165, otherwise
known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002”. They acted as “protector/coddler”
to the unlawful bringing into the Philippines of
the dangerous drugs. A “protector/coddler”
refers to any person who uses his power or
position in, inter alia, facilitating the escape of
any person whom he knows or believes, has
violated the Dangerous Drugs Law, in order to
prevent the arrest, prosecution and conviction of
the violator.
The two police officers are criminally liable for
violation of Sec. 27. RA 9165 of the same law for
misappropriation and failure to account for the
confiscated or seized dangerous drugs.
On the other hand, Dante Ong is criminally liable
for the illegal importation or bringing into the
Philippines of the dangerous drugs (Art. 11, Sec.
4, RA 9165).
Q: Tuburcio asked Anastacio to join their
group for a “session”. Thinking that it was for
a mahjong session, Anastacio agreed. Upon
reaching Tiburcio’s house, Anastacio
discovered that it was actually a shabu
session. At that precise time, the place was
raided by the police, and Anastacio was
among those arrested.
What crime can Anastacio be charged with, if
any? Explain. (2007 BAR)
A: Anastacio may not be charged of any crime.
Sec. 7 of RA 9165 on the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs of 2002 punishes employees
and visitors of a den, dive or resort where
dangerous drugs are used in any form. But for a
visitor of such place to commit the crime, it is a
requisite that he is “aware of the nature of the
place as such and shall knowingly visit the same.”
These requisites are absent in the facts given.
Q: Following his arrest after a valid buy- bust
operation, Tommy was convicted of violation
of Section 5, Republic Act 9165. On appeal,
Tommy questioned the admissibility of the
evidence because the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation failed to
observe the requisite "chain of custody" of
the evidence confiscated and/or seized from
him.
a. What is the "chain of custody"
requirement in drug offenses? What is its
rationale? (2009, 2016 BAR)
b. What is the effect of failure to observe the
requirement? (2009 BAR)
A:
a. “Chain of custody” requirement in drug
offenses refers to the duly recorded,
authorized movement and custody of seized
dangerous drugs, controlled chemicals,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, and
laboratory equipment of dangerous drugs
from the time of confiscation/seizure
thereof from the offender, to its turn-over
and receipt in the forensic laboratory for
examination, to its safekeeping and
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
eventual violation, and for destruction
(Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1
Series of 2001)
Its rationale is to preserve the authenticity
of the corpus delicti or body of the crime by
rendering it improbable that the original
item seized/ confiscated in the violation has
been exchanged or substituted with another
or tampered with or contaminated. It is a
method of authenticating the evidence as
would support a finding beyond reasonable
doubt that the matter is what the
prosecution claims to be.
b. Failure to observe the “chain of custody”
requirement renders the evidence
questionable, not trustworthy and
insufficient to prove the corpus delicti
beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, Tommy would be acquitted on
reasonable doubt.
Q: The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) had intelligence reports about the
drug pushing activities of Rado, but could not
arrest him for lack of concrete evidence. SP03
Relio, a PDEA team leader, approached Emilo
and requested him to act as poseur-buyer of
shabu and transact with Rado. Emilo refused,
saying that he had completely been
rehabilitated and did not want to have
anything to do with drugs anymore. But he
was prevailed upon to help when SP03 Relio
explained that only he could help capture
Rado because he used to be his customer.
SP03 Relio then gave Emilo the marked
money to be used in buying shabu from Rado.
The operation proceeded. After Emilo handed
the marked money to Rado in exchange for
the sachets of shabu weighing 50 grams, and
upon receiving the pre-arranged signal from
Ernilo, SP03 Relio and his team members
barged in and arrested Rado and Ernilo, who
were both charged with violation of R.A.
9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
a. What defense, if any, may Emilo invoke to
free himself from criminal liability?
Explain.
b. May Rado adopt as his own Emilo's
defense? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A:
a. Ernilo may invoke Section 33, Art. II of RA
9165 or the “Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002”. He may have violated Section 11 of
RA 9165 for possession of shabu but he is
immune from prosecution and punishment
because of his role as the poseur-buyer in the
entrapment operation. There was virtually
instigation. He is exempted from prosecution
or punishment because the information
obtained from him by the PDEA agents, who
had no direct and concrete evidence of
Rado’s drug-pushing activities, led to the
whereabouts, identity and arrest of Rado. So
long as the information and testimony given
are pleaded and proven, Ernilo cannot be
69 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
prosecuted for violation of RA 9165.
b. NO. First, an entrapment operation is a valid
means of arresting violators of RA 9165. It is
an effective way of apprehending law
offenders in the act of committing a crime. In
a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a
crime originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense. Second, the immunity
does not extend to violators of Section 5 of
RA 9165 or the sale of shabu (sec. 33, RA
9165). Lastly, he was the offender of the
crime and apparently the most guilty of
the offense.
Q: Dimas was arrested after a valid buy- bust
operation. Macario, the policeman who acted
as poseur-buyer, inventoried and
photographed ten (10) sachets of shabu in the
presence of a barangay tanod. The inventory
was signed by Macario and the tanod, but
Dimas refused to sign. As Macario was
stricken with flu the day after, he was able to
surrender the sachets to the PNP Crime
Laboratory only after four (4) days. During
pre-trial, the counsel de oficio of Dimas
stipulated that the substance contained in the
sachets examined by the forensic chemist is in
fact methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. Dimas was convicted of violating
Section 5 of RA 9165. On appeal, Dimas
questioned the admissibility of the evidence
because Macario failed to observe the
requisite "chain of custody" of the alleged
"shabu" seized from him. On behalf of the
State, the Solicitor General claimed that
despite non-compliance with some
requirements, the prosecution was able to
show that the integrity of the substance was
preserved. Moreover, even with some
deviations from the requirements, the
counsel of Dimas stipulated that the
substance seized from Dimas was shabu so
that the conviction should be affirmed. Rule
on the contention of the State. (2016 BAR)
A: The contention of the State is meritorious. The
rule is settled that failure to strictly comply with
Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 does not
necessarily render an accused’s arrest illegal or
the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible. The most important factor is the
preservation the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized item. Moreover, the issue of
noncompliance with Section 21 of RA 9165
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
(People v. Badilla, G.R. No. 218578, August 31,
2016)
Q: After a successful entrapment operation by
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Mr.
D, a known drug pusher, was arrested on
January 15, 2019 for having been caught in
flagrante delicto selling a pack of shabu, a
prohibited drug, to the poseur- buyer.
Consequently, Mr. D was frisked by the
arresting officer, and aluminum foils, plastic
lighters, and another plastic sachet of shabu
70
were obtained from him. The items were
marked immediately upon confiscation, and
they were likewise inventoried and
photographed at the place of arrest.
Throughout the process, a media
representative was able to witness the
conduct of the marking, inventory, and
photography of the seized items in the
presence of Mr. D.
Mr. D was then charged with the crimes of
Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs. In defense, he lamented
that the chain of custody procedure under
Section 21, Article II of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended,
was not followed because only a media
representative was present. In response, the
prosecution maintained that the said media
representative was a very credible reporter
and as such, the presence of any other witness
was unnecessary.
a. Was the chain of custody procedure
validly complied with in this case? If not,
was the deviation from such procedure
justified? Explain.
b. What is the consequence of an unjustified
deviation from the chain of custody rule
to the criminal case against Mr. D?
Explain. (2019 BAR)
A:
a. NO, the chain of custody was not validly
complied with. Under Sec. 21 of RA 9165, as
amended by RA 10640, the presence of at
least two insulating witnesses are required:
(1) an elected public official, and (2) a
representative from the media, or a
representative from the National
Prosecution Service. Here, only a media
representative was present to witness the
conduct of marking, inventory and
photography. Further, the credibility of the
media reporter as the lone witness in a buy-
bust operation is neither a plausible
explanation nor an unacceptable justification
for the PDEA’s non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule. The Supreme Court
listed the following acceptable justifications
in case of the absence of witnesses: (1) their
attendance was impossible because the place
of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety
was threatened by an immediate retaliatory
action of the accused; and (3) earnest efforts
to secure the presence of the witnesses
within the period required under Art. 125 of
the RPC prove futile through no fault of the
arresting officers (People v. Sipin, as cited in
People v. Lim, G.R. 231989, September 04,
2018)
b. The unjustified deviation from the chain of
custody rule would lead to Mr. D’s acquittal.
Well settled is the rule that the procedure
under Sec. 21 is a matter of substantive law
and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality. (People v. Año, G.R.
No. 230070, March 14, 2018)
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS (P.D.
1866, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 8294 AND
R.A. 10591) (1990, 2000, 2004 BAR)
Q:
a. Ka Jacinto, an NPA commander, was
apprehended with unlicensed firearms
and explosives. He was accordingly
charged with illegal possession of said
firearms and explosives. He now
questions the filing of the charges on the
ground that they are deemed absorbed
in a separate charge of rebellion filed
against him. Decide the issue.
b. Suppose Ka Jacinto, using one of the
unlicensed firearms, shot and killed his
neighbor in an altercation. May the
charge of murder and illegal possession
of firearms be deemed absorbed in the
separate charge of rebellion filed against
him? Resolve the matter with reasons.
(1990 BAR)
A:
a. The charge of illegal possession of firearms
and explosives is deemed absorbed in the
crime of rebellion, such possession being a
necessary means for the perpetration of the
latter crime. (Eliasv. Rodriguez, 107 Phil 659)
b. The charges here could not be absorbed in
the separate charge of rebellion as it is clear
that the act of murder, coupled with the
possession of an unlicensed firearm, was not
in furtherance of the rebellion.
Q: PH killed OJ, his political rival in the
election campaign for Mayor of their town.
The Information against PH alleged that he
used an unlicensed firearm in the killing of
the victim, and this was proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The
trial court convicted PH of two crimes:
Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms. Is
the conviction correct? Reason briefly. (2004
BAR)
A: NO. The conviction of PH for two crimes is not
correct. Under the new law on illegal possession
of firearms and explosives, RA 8294, a person
may only be criminally liable for illegal
possession of firearm if no other crime is
committed therewith; If a homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
PH therefore may only be convicted of murder
and the use of an unlicensed firearm in its
commission may only be appreciated as a special
aggravating circumstance, provided that such
use is alleged specifically in the Information for
Murder.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A.
4103, AS AMENDED) (1988, 1989, 1990,
1994, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2009,
2010, 2013, 2016, 2018 BAR)
Q: State the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. (1988, 2016 BAR)
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
A: The Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLaw)
applies in cases where the penalty imposed is
more than one year and the ISLaw shall apply
where there is a minimum penalty which is not
lower than the penalty next lower in degree
provided by law and the maximum not higher
than the maximum penalty provided by law in
cases of felonies but when it comes to statutory
offenses, it must be lower than the minimum
penalty provided by law and not higher than the
maximum penalty provided by law except in the
following cases as provided by Section 2 of Art.
4103:
1. Life imprisonment
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or
proposal to commit treason
3. To those convicted of misprision of
treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage
4. Those convicted of piracy
5. Those who are habitual delinquents
6. Those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence
7. Those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive
shall have violated the terms thereof
8. Those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year,
not to those already sentenced by final
judgment at the time of approval of this
Act, except as provided in Sec. 5 hereof
Q: Explain how the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is applied in crimes punished by special
laws (2017 BAR)
A: The indeterminate sentence in such cases shall
consist of a maximum term which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by the special law and
a minimum term which shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.
Q: Itos was convicted of an offense penalized
by a special law. The penalty prescribed is not
less than six years but not more than twelve
years. No modifying circumstance attended
the commission of the crime. If you were the
judge, will you apply the Indeterminate
Sentence Law? If so, how will you apply it?
(1994, 1999 BAR)
A: If I were the judge, I will apply the provisions
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as the last
sentence of Section 1 Act 4103, specifically
provides the application thereof for violations of
special laws. Under the same provision, the
minimum must not be less than the minimum
provided therein (six years and one day) and the
maximum shall not be more than the maximum
provided therein, i.e. twelve years.
Q: When would the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISLaw) be inapplicable? (1999, 2003
BAR)
A: The ISLaw is not applicable to:
1. Those persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua;
71 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or
proposal to commit treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition or espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents;
6. Those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence;
7. Those who having been granted conditional
pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof;
8. Those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year;
9. Those already sentenced by final judgment at
the time of the approval of this Act; and
10. Those whose sentence imposes penalties
which do not involve imprisonment, like
destierro.
Q: How are the maximum and the minimum
terms of the indeterminate sentence for
offenses punishable under the Revised Penal
Code determined? (2002 BAR)
A: For crimes punished under the Revised Penal
Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence shall be the penalty properly imposable
under the same Code after considering the
attending mitigating and/or aggravating
circumstances according to Art. 64 of said Code.
The minimum term of the same sentence shall be
fixed within the range of the penalty next lower
in degree to that prescribed for the crime under
the said Code.
Q: While serving his sentence, Macky entered
the prohibited area and had a pot session
with Ivy (Joy’s sister). Is Macky entitled to an
indeterminate sentence in case he is found
guilty of use of prohibited substances?
Explain your answer. (2007 BAR)
A: NO. Macky is not entitled to the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103, as
amended) for having evaded the sentence which
banished or placed him on destierro. Sec. 2 of the
said law expressly provides that the law shall not
apply to those who shall have “evaded sentence”.
Q: Bruno was charged with homicide for
killing the 75 year old owner of his rooming
house. The prosecution proved that Bruno
stabbed the owner causing his death; and that
the killing happened at 10 in the evening in
the house where the victim and Bruno lived.
Bruno, on the other hand, successfully proved
that he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities; that he pleaded guilty to the
crime charged; that it was the victim who first
attacked and did so without any provocation
on his (Bruno's) part, but he prevailed
because he managed to draw his knife with
which he stabbed the victim. The penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. Assuming a
judgment of conviction and after considering
the attendant circumstances, what penalty
should the judge impose? (2013 BAR)
A: Bruno should be sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence penalty of arresto mayor
72
in any of its period to prison correccional in its
medium period as maximum. Bruno was entitled
to two privileged mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense and the presence of at
least two ordinary mitigating circumstances
(voluntary surrender and plea of guilt) without
any aggravating circumstance under Art. 69 and
64(5) of the RPC respectively, which lowers the
prescribed penalty for homicide which is
reclusion temporal to prison correccional.
Q: Randy was prosecuted for forcible
abduction attended by the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism. After trial, the
court held that the prosecutor was able to
prove the charge. Nonetheless, it appreciated
in favor of Randy, on the basis of the
defense’s evidence, the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender,
uncontrollable fear, and provocation. Under
Art. 342 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
penalty for forcible abduction is reclusion
temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
what penalty should be imposed on Randy?
(2018 BAR)
A: Since he was found guilty of Forcible
Abduction with one aggravating circumstances
of recidivism, this aggravating circumstance is
off-set by one of the three mitigating
circumstances; so the penalty to be imposed is
still Reclusion Temporal (Art. 342, RPC) but
because there are two (2) more mitigating
circumstances left and the penalty is divisible, in
determining the maximum term, we have to
reduce to prision Mayor and because there is no
more mitigating and aggravating circumstances
to be considered, the maximum term shall
be prision mayor in its medium period that is
eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
The minimum, term shall be any range within,
that is from six (6) years and one (1) day to six
(8) years.
Thus Randy will suffer as Minimum term any
penalty ranging from six months and one (1) day,
and the maximum term will be, any range from
eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision Mayor.
What is now the age of doli incapax in the
Philippines? (2017 BAR)
A: Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), xxx states as
follows:
Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal
Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of
this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
to an intervention program, unless he/she has
acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act. The
exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws. (Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Larida, Jr., 718 SCRA 359,
11 March 2014)
doli incapax – incapable of criminal intention or
malice; not of the age of discretion; not
possessed of sufficient discretion and
intelligence to distinguish between right and
wrong to the extent of being criminally
responsible for his actions.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT (R.A.
NO. 9344, AS AMENDED, R.A. NO. 10630
AND IN RELATION TO P.D. 603) (1995,
2003, 2006, 2009, 2013, 2017 BAR)
Q: Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the
store of MangPandoy, Victor and Ricky
entered the store while Rod and Ronnie
posted themselves at the door. After ordering
beer, Ricky complained that he was
shortchanged although MangPandoy
vehemently denied it. Suddenly, Ricky
whipped out a knife as he announced “Hold-
up ito!” and stabbed MangPandoy to death.
Rod boxed the store’s salesgirl Lucy to
prevent her from helping MangPandoy. When
Lucy ran out of the store to seek help from
people next door, she was chased by Ronnie.
As soon as Ricky had stabbed MangPandoy,
Victor scooped up the money from the cash
box. Then Victor and Ricky dashed to the
street and shouted, “Tumakbona kayo!” Rod
was 14 and Ronnie was 17. The money and
other articles looted from the store of
MangPandoy were later found in the houses
of Victor and Ricky.
Are the minors Rod and Ronnie entitled to
suspended sentence under The Child and
Youth Welfare Code? Explain. (1995 BAR)
A: NO. Because the benefits of suspension of
sentence is not available where the youthful
offender has been convicted of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under
Art. 294 (1), RPC (People v. Galit, 230 SCRA 486)
Q:
a. A was 2 months below 18 years of age
when he committed the crime. He was
charged with the crime 3 months later.
He was 23 when he was finally convicted
and sentenced. Instead of preparing to
serve a jail term, he sought a suspension
of the sentence on the ground that he
was a juvenile offender. Should he be
entitled to a suspension of sentence?
Reasons.
b. Can juvenile offenders, who are
recidivists, validly ask for suspension of
sentence? Explain. (2003, 2013 BAR)
A:
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS
2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE
a. NO. A is not entitled to a suspension of
sentence because he is no longer a minor at
the time of promulgation of the sentence.
For purposes of suspension of sentence, the
offender’s age at the time of promulgation
of the sentence is the one considered, not
his age when he committed the crime. So
although A was below 18 years old when he
committed the crime, but he was already 23
years old when sentenced, he is no longer
eligible for suspension of sentence.
b. YES. So long as the offender is still a minor
at the time of the promulgation of the
sentence. The law establishing Family
Courts, RA 8369, provides to this effect: that
if the minor is found guilty, the court should
promulgate the sentence and ascertain any
civil liability which the accused may have
incurred. However, the sentence shall be
suspended without the need of application
pursuant to PD 603, otherwise known as
the “Child and Youth Welfare Code” (R.A.
8369, Sec. 5a). It is under PD 603 that an
application for suspension of the sentence is
required and thereunder it is one of the
conditions for suspension of sentence that
the offender be a first time convict: this has
been displaced by RA 8369.
PROBATION LAW (P.D. 968, AS AMENDED)
(1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993,
1995,2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2010
BAR)
Q: Who are the offenders disqualified from
availing themselves of the benefits of the
probation law (P.D. 968, as amended)? (1988
BAR)
A: The following offenders are disqualified from
availing of the benefits of the Probation Law:
1. Those sentenced to serve maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years;
2. Those convicted of any crime against the
national security (amended by R.A. 10707);
3. Those who have previously been convicted
by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of more than six (6) month
and one (1) day and or a fine of not less than
Php 1,000.00 (amended by R.A. 10707);
4. Those who have been once on probation
under the provisions of this decree; and
5. Those who are already serving sentence at
the time the substantive provisions of this
decree applicable pursuant to Sec. 33 of P.D.
968.
Q: A was charged with theft and upon
arraignment, pleaded guilty to the charge. He
was detained for failure to post bail. After two
(2) months, a decision was rendered
sentencing “A” to an indeterminate sentence
of six (6) months and one (1) day as a
minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) month
as maximum, and to pay the offended party
the amount of P700. On January 16, 1985, the
very day the sentence was read to “A”, the
Judge issued a Commitment Order addressed
to the Provincial Jail Warden. On January 28,
73 UST
BAR OPERATIONS
 Criminal Law
1985, “A” applied for probation but his
application was denied on the ground that the
sentence of conviction became final and
executory on January 16, 1985, when “A”
commence to serve his sentence. Is “A”
eligible for probation? (1989 BAR)
A: YES. A is still eligible for probation since he
filed his application for probation within 15 days
from the promulgation of the judgment. Under
the Probation Law, the accused may apply for
probation within the period for perfecting an
appeal which is 15 days from promulgation or
notice thereof.
The judge committed an error in issuing a
Commitment order on the same day of
promulgation. A commitment order for the
convict to begin serving his sentence can be
validly issued only if the period for perfecting an
appeal has expired with no appeal being taken.
The fact that in compliance with such order,
which is void, the accused commenced to serve
his sentence does not bar him from availing
himself of the benefits of the Probation Law.
While it is true under the Rules that a judgment
in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served or the accused has applied for probation
(Sec. 7, Rule 120), Sec. 9 of the same Rule
provides that “nothing in this Rule shall be
construed as affecting any existing provision in
the law governing suspension of sentence,
probation or parole.”
The probation law does NOT speak of filing an
application for probation before judgment has
become final. It only speaks of filing the
application WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR
PERFECTING AN APPEAL. There is nothing in the
Probation Law that bars an accused who has
commenced to serve his sentence from filing an
application for probation provided he does so
within the period for perfecting an appeal.
What the Probation Law provides is that no
application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal
from the judgment or conviction. It does not say
that no application shall be entertained if the
judgment has become final because the convict
has already commenced to serve his sentence.
Q: Boyet Mar was charged with consented
abduction by a 17-year old complainant. The
accused made wedding arrangements with
the girl, but her parents insisted on the
prosecution of the case. To avoid further
embarrassment of a court trial for him and
the girl, the accused entered a plea of guilty.
He then filed a petition for probation before
serving sentence, but the court denied the
petition on the ground that “it would be
better for the accused to serve sentence so
that he would reform himself and avoid the
scandal in the community that would be
caused by the grant of the petition. The
accused serve sentence but he brought the
74
matter to the Supreme Court in a petition for
certiorari. Did the trial court act correctly in
denying the petition for probation? (1991
BAR)
A: NO. The trial court acted incorrectly. In Balleta
v. Leviste (92 SCRA 719), the Judge precisely
denied the petition for probation on the same
excuse stated in the problem. The Supreme Court
held that an accused must fall within any one of
the disqualifications stated in Sec. 9 of PD 960 in
order to be denied probation.
Q: Johnny Gitara was convicted of the crime of
estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
He was imposed the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 3 years, 2 months and 1 day
as minimum and six years as maximum, both
of prison correccional and was ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P3,000.00. He filed an application for
probation upon the promulgation of the
judgment.
What is the legal effect of his application for
probation on the judgment of conviction?
Does said application interrupt the running
of the period of appeal? (1992 BAR)
A: The filing of the application for probation is
considered as a waiver of the right of the accused
to appeal; the decision has become final. In view
of the finality of the decision, there is no period
of appeal to speak of.
Q: On February 3, 1986, Roberto was
convicted of arson through reckless
imprudence and sentenced to pay a fine of
P15,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. On February 10, 1986, he
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Several
months later, he filed a motion to withdraw
the appeal on the ground that he is applying
for probation. On May 7, 1987, the Court of
Appeals granted the motion and considered
the appeal withdrawn.
On June 10, 1987, the records of the case
were remanded to the trial court. Roberto
filed a “Motion for Probation” praying that
execution of his sentence be suspended, and
that a probation officer be ordered to conduct
an investigation and to submit a report on his
probation.
The judge denied the motion on the ground
that pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1990, which took effect on July 16, 1986, no
application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Is the denial of Roberto’s motion
correct? (1994 BAR)
A: YES, even if at the time of his conviction,
Roberto was qualified for probation but that at
the time of his application for probation, he is no
longer qualified, he is not entitled to probation.
The qualification for probation must be
 QuAMTO (1987-2019)
determined as of the time the application is filed
in Court. (Bernardo v. Judge Balagot, et. al., G.R.
86561, Nov. 10, 1992)

Q: Juan was convicted of the Regional Trial

Court of a crime and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of
eight years. He appealed both his conviction
and the penalty imposed upon him to the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court
ultimately sustained Juan’s conviction but
reduced his sentence to a maximum of four
years and eight months imprisonment. Could
Juan forthwith file an application for
probation? Explain. (1992, 1995, 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003 BAR)

A: NO. Juan can no longer avail of the probation

because he appealed from the judgment of
conviction of the trial court, and therefore,
cannot apply for probation anymore. Section 4 of
the Probation Law, as amended, mandates that
no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the accused has perfected an appeal
from the judgment of conviction.

Q: May a probationer appeal from the

decision revoking the grant of probation or
modifying the terms and conditions thereof?
(2002 BAR)

A: NO. Under Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as

amended, an order granting or denying the
probation is not appealable.

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS 75 UST

2021 ACADEMICSCOMMITTEE BAR OPERATIONS