Ocampo v. Enriquez G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016 with former C.J.

Sereno’s Dissenting
Opinion

FACTS:

Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to

the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the
interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of
President Duterte.

Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army
(PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their
capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section
3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act
of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as
members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as
member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of
Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims
and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former
President Marcos, and several others, in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of
the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human
rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the
Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and
on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of

the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and

hierarchy of courts.

4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate
the Constitution, domestic and international laws.

RULING:

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or

governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for
judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.

Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries
the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.cralawred As they are
concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain
devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.

Locus standi

Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an

act complained of, such proper party has no standing.

Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their
capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and
taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have
suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB.

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is
essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement
of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by
either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of administrative
processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made
by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought.

For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners
failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.

Hierarchy of Courts

In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking
in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires
such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can
also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order
and injunction when proven necessary.

Constitutionality

The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the
effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an
authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby
violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-dictatorship charter” and
a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear
condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections
2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art.
XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history
as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the
LNMB.

Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing. Thus:

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.”
The counterpart of this article in the  1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the
nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as
aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws.

As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state
policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
xxx

The petitions must be dismissed.

Note:

DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, C.J.:

The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations’ enduring values, which this
Court must zealously protect.

Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987 Constitution embodies the
Filipinos’ enduring values. The protection of those values has consequently become the duty of
the Court. That this is the legal standard by which to measure whether it has properly
comported itself in its constitutional role has been declared in various fashions by the Court
itself.

See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the environment, women,
children, labor, the indigenous people, and consistently, those who have been or are in danger
of being deprived of their human rights.
Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively promulgate rules for the
protection of human rights, and how the Court in turn described this duty when it promulgated
the writs of  kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.

Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the part of this Court to protect
the cherished values of the Constitution would be a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is
designed to be passive relative to the “active” nature of the political departments is a given. But
when called upon to discharge its relatively passive role, the post-1986 Supreme Court has
shown zealousness in the protection of constitutional rights, a zealousness that has been its
hallmark from then up to now. It cannot, in the year 2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of
protective activism.
 Case Digest: G.R. No. L-25024. March 30, 1970. 32 SCRA 188

Teodoro C. Santiago, JR. minor, represented by his mother, Angelita C.

Santiago, petitioner-appellant, vs. Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas,
Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino, Luna Sarmago, Aurora Lorena, Soledad
Francisco and Mr. Flor Marcelo, respondents-appellees.

Facts: Appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the
"Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at
said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the
school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas,
Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as
members, the above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia
Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's
graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the
"third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel,
sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students."

Issue: Whether or not there is an actual cause of action for petition for certiorari.

Ruling: No. The court held to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part
of appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower
court's holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or
order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by
precedents as well.
 LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009 [Citizenship; Naturalization; C.A. No. 473]

FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to
run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District
of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is
not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of
Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner
and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen
because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the
proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to
procedural and substantial defects.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election
case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to
disqualification based on citizenship.

RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person should be
in accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the
State, through the Solicitor General or the representative designated by statute, that may question
in the appropriate denaturalization proceeding.

2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her
oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume
the jurisdiction over the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
in Section 2509 of the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction
over election contests relating to its members.

3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.
 DAZA VS SINGSON
G.R. No. 86344 December 21 1989

FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties
represented in that chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the
Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
CoA by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On
December 5th, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original
members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson as the additional member
from the LDP.

Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of
his seat by the Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with
preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from
serving in the CoA.

Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is
permanent. He claimed that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not
based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political
party and has not yet attained political stability.

ISSUE:  Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

RULING:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is
political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.    

The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would
still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955
Facts:
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities assailed the constitutionality of Act No.
2706, known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges
obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction.”

As contended by PACU,  the Act is unconstitutional because of the following reasons: 1) The act
deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and
property without due process of law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their natural rights and
duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of
Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards
unlawful delegation of legislative powers.

Additionally, the association contended that the Constitution guaranteed every citizen the right to
own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit
before such person could exercise the said right.

On the contrary, the Department of Education maintained that 1) the matters does not contain
justiciable controversy and thus does not need court decision or intervention; 2) petitioners are
inestoppels to challenge the validity of the said act; and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706 provides that “It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public
Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the
Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with
the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly-
authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and
colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same.”

Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional.

Held:
No, Act No. 2706 is constitutional.

The organic law provides that the state has the power to regulate private schools for the
development of morals, civic efficiency, and scientific aptitude of students. The court found no
justiciable controversy. The power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference. As such, judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.
Thus, the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question, such as that provided by the
petitioner. On this phase of the litigation, the court conclude that there has been no undue
delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda
issued by the Department of Education.
 Mariano Jr. vs. COMELEC GR 118577, 242 SCRA 211 [Mar 7, 1995]

Facts: RA 7854 is “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati in Into a Highly Urbanized
City xxx”. Sec 52 thereof provides that Makati, upon conversion into a Highly Urbanized City,
shall have at least two legislative districts xxx. The petitioners contend, among others, that the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law (it can only be made by a general
reapportionment law), and that Makati’s population xxx stands at only 450k hence it allegedly
violates Art VI, Sec 5(3) of the Constitution.

Issues:
(1) May Sec 52 of RA 7854, a special law, make reapportionment of the legislative districts?
(2) Does Sec 53 of RA 7854 violate Art VI, Sec 5
(3) of the Constitution?

Rulings:
(1) Yes. As thus worded [in Art VI, Sec 5(1)], the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing an increase in Makati’s
legislative district.
(2) No. Art VI, Sec 5
(3) provides that a city with a population of at least 250k shall have at least one representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati xxx stood at 450k, its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250k.
 DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3, 2006

TOPICS: Constitutional Law, PP 1017, Sec. 17, Article XII

FACTS:

Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon AFP and the to
prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. Permits to hold rallies
issued earlier by the local governments were revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The police
arrested petitioner David and Llamas without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed petitions with the SC, impleading Arroyo, questioning the legality of the
proclamation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution. However, the SC ruled that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-
owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No.
1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
 Pormento V. Estrada (G.R. No. 191988)

CASE DIGEST: Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph "Erap" Estrada and Commission on
Elections.

FACTS: Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph
Estrada for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The petition was denied by
COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE: Is Joseph Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections according
to the phrase in the Constitution which states: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any
reelection"?

Rulings: There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not win the second
time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be
premised on a person second election as President.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has
been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the
results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus,
any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no
useful or practical purpose.
 Macasiano vs. NHA (1993)
POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.), in his capacity as the consultant of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Task Force on Demolition and/or in
his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY
BOARD and NATIONAL MAPPING RESOURCES INFORMATION AUTHORITY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 107921 | July 1, 1993 | En Banc | Justice Davide, Jr. | 224 SCRA 236
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Judicial Power
A “proper party” is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a
result of the [governmental] acts complained of.

Macasiano vs. NHA

FACTS:
Petitioner Macasiano seeks to declare as unconstitutional Secs 28 and 44 of RA 7279 (Urban
Devt and Housing Act of 1992). Assailed Sections provide as a general rule that eviction or
demolition shall be discouraged, and that a moratorium of 3 years shall be provided on the
eviction of all program beneficiaries. Macasiano predicates his locus standi on his being a
consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and his being a taxpayer.
As to the first, he alleges that said Secs “contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as
a drawback” to his “tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures”.

ISSUE:
May Macasiano validly challenge the constitutionality of the foregoing provisions of law?

RULING:
No. The first two fundamental requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are absent. There is no actual controversy. Macasiano does not claim
that he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his
rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the
challenged sections of the said Act. He is likewise not a proper party. As a DPWH consultant, he
is not vested with any authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties of the
public domain, much less on private lands. Nor does the petitioner claim he is an owner of an
urban property whose enjoyment and use would be affected by the challenged provisions. “As
far as a taxpayer’s suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it
should be entertained.”
 Joya, et al. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 225 SCRA 568, G.R. No.
96541 August 24, 1993
10
JAN
En Banc

[BELLOSILO, J.]

FACTS: Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, requested then President Corazon C.
Aquino, for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie’s of
New York, or CHRISTIE’S) concerning the scheduled sale of eighty-two (82) Old Masters
Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and
cronies. Petitioners Dean Jose Joya, et al., question the possible alienation of “cultural treasure of
the nation” which is under the protection of the state pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and/or
“cultural properties” contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise known as “The Cultural
Properties Preservation and Protection Act”. Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers
and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth,
they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from
acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987
Constitution.

ISSUE: Did the petitioners comply with the requisite legal standing, particularly the personality
to sue, for the Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review?

HELD: NO.

The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party;
that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action
and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its
power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. “Legal standing” means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term “interest” is material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must
be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
related party.

Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)

Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern
in a special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City. The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of
legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of
petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at
bar.

Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of
adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in
regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government agency in custody
thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security.

The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of
public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit
and fitness while a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to
the people even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted
that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public
therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through
any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government
positions.
 DUMLAO, ET AL. VS COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-52245                JANUARY 22, 1980

FACTS:
Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya. He has already retired from his office and
has been receiving retirement benefits. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office.
Meanwhile, BP Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides that retirees from public office are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law avvering that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, he invoked equal protection of law. His petition was joined by Atty.
Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two, however, have different issues. The suits of
Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP Blg. 52
regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision
which bars person charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that
provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for the latter should have
never been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot and Salapantan. They have different
issues. Further, this case does not meet all requisites to be eligible for judicial review, namely:
(1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to
decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would
already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well
taken. The constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiation, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees
65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retriable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should
not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might
or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated a
good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our local
governments. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be reasonable disqualification for elective
local officials. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who has retired
from a provincial, city, or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the
same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
 Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest
G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989
Ponente: Regalado, J.:

Facts:
1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a
city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the
contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions.

2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay
Construction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a result, respondent
Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City assailing the validity of the lease contract
between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest

NO.

1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no disbursement
of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private party which will fund the
planned construction of the market building.
 GR No. 113375 | 232 SCRA 110 | May 5, 1994 | En Banc | Justice Davide, Jr.
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Judicial Power
Where the issue is of transcendental importance of paramount public interest, the
procedural barrier of the issue on a petitioner’s locus standi MAY be set aside.

Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.

FACTS:
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), with the approval of the President, entered into a
Contract of Lease with Phil. Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) which was organized through
the initiative of the Berjaya Group Berhad, a foreign company. This was executed despite
vigorous opposition from petitioner Kilosbayan on account of its alleged immorality and
illegality. Kilosbayan, an organization of “civic-spirited citizens,” filed the instant petition as
taxpayers and concerned citizens. Respondents challenge the petitioners’ legal standing to file
this petition.

ISSUE:
Must the action fail for the alleged lack of a legal standing?

RULING:
No. We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public, and the issues it
raised are of paramount public interest. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral wellbeing of the people even in the remotest barangays of the
country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery
system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. In the exercise of its sound
discretion, in keeping with its duty to determine whether or not the other branches of govt have
exercised grave abuse of discretion given them, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural
barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. The Court voted 7-6 on this issue. (The
Contract of Lease was eventually declared invalid for being violative of the charter of PCSO)
 PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ

G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of
Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the
pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and
2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer
to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to
transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.
 Tatad v. Garcia, Jr. (G.R. No. 114222)
Facts:

DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA (EDSA LRT III) to provide a
mass transit system and alleviate the congestion and growing transportation problem in the
metropolis. RA 6957 was enacted allowing for the financing, construction and operation of
government projects through private initiative and investment. Accordingly, prequalification and
bidding was made and EDSA LRT Corporation (organized under HK laws) was recommended to
be awarded with the contract. The President approved the awarding of the contract. Petitioners
are senators praying for the prohibition of respondents from further implementing and enforcing
the contract.

Issue:

Whether or not the EDSA LRT III, a public utility, can be owned by a foreign corporation.

Ruling: YES.

The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility.
However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a
public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.

In law, there is a clear distinction between the “operation” of a public utility and the ownership
of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. Ownership is defined as a relation in law
by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in
everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. The exercise of
the rights encompassed in ownership is limited by law so that a property cannot be operated and
used to serve the public as a public utility unless the operator has a franchise. The operation of a
rail system as a public utility includes the transportation of passengers from one point to another
point, their loading and unloading at designated places and the movement of the trains at pre-
scheduled times.

In sum, private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding
public. It will have no dealings with the public and the public will have no right to demand any
services from it. Even the mere formation of a public utility corporation does not ipso facto
characterize the corporation as one operating a public utility. The moment for determining the
requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other
form of authorization for that purpose.
 Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising

new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”
They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they
claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he
holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
 Kilosbayan Inc. vs. Morato Digest
Facts
The SC invalidated the Contract of Lease between PCSO and Phil Gaming Mgt Corp (PGMC)
on the ground of violation PSCO’s charter. Then, the parties negotiated a new agreement that
would be consistent with such a charter.

(Jan 1995) The parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) where PGMC leased
online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. Rental is 4.3% of the gross ticket sales of
PCSO. Term is 8 years.

A month after, this case was filed by Kilosbayan et al. that described themselves as “taxpayers
and concerned citizens.”, composed of civic-spirited citizens and religious people committed for
the truth and renewal.

They are seeking to declare ELA as invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the
Contract of Lease nullified in the first case – still violative of the PCSO’s Charter.

PCSO and PGMC questioned their standing to bring this suit.

Issue
Are Petitioners Kilosbayan Inc., and certain persons and politicians entitled to bring this suit or
to be a party to this case?

Ruling
No. Because the issue, in this case, is no longer about “standing” (which was the standing in the
previous case) but WON they are “real parties in interest” within the meaning of Section 2.

This case involves an action for annulment of contracts, hence, the parties must be those who
will be prejudiced in their rights with respect to the contract.
Parties in interest require that “Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party in interest.”

The question as to the real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefitted or
injured by the judgment or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’

The kind of interest that is concrete and will entitle him to recover (if the evidence is sufficient)
must be→present substantial interest.

Kilosbayan et al have legal standing but are not a real party in interest. The former is sufficient
legal interest and injury. The latter is present substantial interest (injury or benefit) in the
contract.
 Lozada vs COMELEC (G.R. No. L-59068)

FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to
hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their
contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises
in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on
Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to
elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging,
substantially, that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the
proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition;
and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan
Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill
vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s
decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New
Constitution which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a
copy thereof.” There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is
sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the
aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on
the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies
exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the
necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to
mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to
appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter
must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular
not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body,
the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the
provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in
the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.
 MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS VS CA

G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989        [Judicial Power]

FACTS:
MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel, where
it would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 months or until such time that the said properties
are sold to MSI or other 3rd parties by DBP.
The Bayview Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under Proclamation No. 50 and
was consequently transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust for disposition. The DBP
notified MSI that it was terminating the interim lease agreement to effect the disposition of the
property. The APT granted the President of MSI's condition an extension of 30 days within
which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Hotel to APT.
However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the property for
more than 1 year the agreement is long term in character and MSI have acquired preference in
buying the property, while emphasizing that MSI has a legal lien on the property because of its
advances for the hotel operations and repairs which amounted to P12 Million.
APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The bidding took place but
MSI did not participate. Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were
awarded the property as the highest bidder for P85 Million. MSI filed a complaint with
injunction on awarding and transfer of the property to the winning bidders. Trial court granted,
but the CA reversed the trial court ruling for being violative to Sec 1 of Proclamation No. 50:
"No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the
trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. Nor shall
such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent
such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him."
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it up held that
it continues to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by virtue of Section 3
Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not been deprived of its property rights since those rights
are non-existent and its only property right was the alleged reimbursable advances made to DBP,
which it may sue to collect in a separate action. It further held that the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction by the lower court against APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of
judicial power for MSI does not have a legally demandable and enforceable right of retention
over the said property.

ISSUE:
WoN the CA erred in not declaring unconstitutional Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50, prohibiting
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the TC.

RULING:
Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not
impair the inherent power of courts to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government". (Sec 1 Art. VIII). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of
its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Courts may not substitute their judgement for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the
discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency,
except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or
acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
 Malaga vs. Penachos (Digest)
Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995 03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues
of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory
Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-
qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and
opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best
Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in
the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on
December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their
documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers
of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the
list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and
the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been
conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their
complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting
the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on
the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D.
1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it
was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was
an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD

1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer
of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with
its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized
representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to
loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious
detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of
the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and
maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations
Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the
said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the
injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles
vs. Sucaldito).
 Bengzon v. Drilon

A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA | April 15, 1992 | En Banc | Justice Gutierrez, Jr. | 208 SCRA 133
Constitutional Law | Legislative Department | Approval of Bills
The President’s item-veto power in an appropriation bill does not grant the authority to veto a
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion. However, “inappropriate provisions” have
no place in an appropriations bill; it can thus be vetoed separately from an item [without doing
violence to the limitation on the President’s item-veto power]

Bengzon vs. Drilon

FACTS:
In 1957, RA 1797 was enacted and provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices.
Such privilege was extended to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by RA 3595 and
later to retired members of the Armed Forces by PD 578. In 1975, Pres. Marcos issued PD 644
which repealed the foregoing Acts. Shortly after, Pres. Marcos restored automatic readjustment
of pensions for retired Armed Forces officers only. The apparent unfairness led Congress to pass
HB 16297 in 1990 to restore the repealed provisions by PD 644. Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB.
Meanwhile in 1991, PD 644, upon petition of retired justices, was declared to be null and void
for lack of a valid publication pursuant to Tañada v. Tuvera. Pursuant to the ruling, Congress
included in the GAB of 1992 appropriations for the payment of adjusted pension rates of the
retired justices. Pres. Aquino vetoed all that referred to the payment of said pension for the
reason, among others, that it nullified her veto of HB 16297 in 1990. It resulted into the veto of
portions of two sections in the appropriations for the judiciary and of an entire section in the item
on General Fund Adjustments.

ISSUES:
(1) Did the President exceed her item-veto power accorded by the Constitution (Art VI, Sec
27(2))?
(2) Do the presidential vetoes contravene the constitutional provision on the Judiciary’s fiscal
autonomy?

RULING:
(1) Yes. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriation bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion. In this case, portions of
an item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Moreover, the vetoed portions are
not items. They are provisions.1 In addition, it turns out PD 644 never became law, so it follows
RA 1797 was not repealed and thus continued to be effective. Hence, it can be seen that when
Pres. Aquino made the vetoes in question, she was actually vetoing RA 1797 which of course is
beyond her power to accomplish.
She also in effect was vetoing this Court’s resolution in 1991 which, in fine, declared RA 1797
to be effective. Such a veto is also of course beyond her power to make. The President may not
repeal a statute nor may she set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court
through exercise of the veto power.

(2) Yes. Fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes
the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding
the highest rates authorized by law xxx and pay plans of the govt and allocate such sums as may
be provided by law and prescribed by them in the discharge of their functions. It means freedom
from outside control. In the case at bar, the veto of the subject provisions (which relate to the use
of savings for augmenting items for the payment of the pension differentials) of the GAA is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized. The veto impairs the
power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary’s appropriation, in
contravention of the constitutional provision on “fiscal autonomy”.

1 “Item” and “provision,” distinguished. An item in a bill x x x is an indivisible sum of money

dedicated to a stated purpose. [It] refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts x x x of the bill. [It is] in itself a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provision of law (Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133, 143)
2 Enjoyed also by the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman
 LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and NATIONAL BOOK STORE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 118509 | September 5, 1996 | Third Division | Justice Francisco | 261 SCRA 464
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Composition of the Supreme Court

FACTS:
After the Court rendered a unanimous decision in favor of the petitioner, the Divisions of the
Court underwent reorganization following the retirement of one of the Associate Justices. The
private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was deliberated upon by the newly
reorganized Third Division chaired by C.J. Narvasa. The previous decision was reversed by a
majority vote. Petitioner now argues the case should be referred to the Court en banc alleging
certain doctrines have been modified or reversed and challenging the present composition of the
Third Division. It is asserted that the First Division should have been chaired by C.J. Narvasa,
the Second by the next senior Justice and the Third by the third most senior Justice.

ISSUE:
May the petitioner validly challenge the reorganization of the SC?

RULING:
No. Reorganizations in the Supreme Court’s Divisions are purely an internal matter to which
parties have no business at all. It was also held that no doctrines have been reversed or modified
as alleged by petitioner.
 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL –
ARROYO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191002 | April 20, 2010 | En Banc | Justice Bersamin
[Consolidated Cases]⁵

Political and International Law | Constitutional Law | Executive Department | Appointing Power
The ban on making presidential appointments around the time of presidential elections in Section
15 is confined to appointments in the Executive Department. It does NOT extend to the
Judiciary. The filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period prescribed by Section 4
(1), Article VIII was made a true mandate for the President.

FACTS:
The 2010 presidential election is forthcoming. C.J. Puno is set to retire on 17 May 2010 or seven
days after the presidential election. January 2010, the JBC begun to take applications for the
position of C.J.

Meanwhile, strong objections to Pres. GMA’s appointing C.J. Puno’s successor arose.

The instant petitions were thus filed questioning her authority to appoint a new C.J. in the light
of the ban imposed on presidential appointments two months immediately before the next
presidential elections up to the end of the President’s term under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution. This view however seemingly conflicts with Section 4(1), Article VIII which
provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy, and Section 9, Article VIII which provides that the President shall issue appointments
to the Judiciary within 90 days from submission by the JBC of the list of nominees.

It is further argued that there is no imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice considering
that Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next
President appoint the successor. It provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of the C.J. or of
his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate
Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another C.J. is appointed
and duly qualified. It is also argued that there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint
during the prohibition period the successor of C.J. Puno because anyway there will still be about
45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4 (1), Article VIII remaining (the period that remains
of the 90 days counted from C.J. Puno’s retirement after the end of GMA’s term).

ISSUE:
Does the ban on making presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII extend to
appointments to fill vacancies in the SC and in the rest of the Judiciary?
Does Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 dispel the imperative need to appoint a new C.J.?
Does the fact that there will still be about 45 days after the prohibition period to comply with the
mandate of the President to fill vacancies in the SC dispel the need for Pres. GMA to appoint
C.J. Puno’s successor?
May the JBC be compelled by mandamus to submit to Pres. GMA a short list of nominees now?
RULING:
No. We reverse Valenzuela.¹ Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the SC, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. The exchanges
during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission further show that the filling of a vacancy
in the SC within the 90-day period was made a true mandate for the President. This was borne
out of the fact that 30 years hitherto, the Court seldom had a complete complement. Further, the
usage in Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the word “shall”—an imperative—should not be
disregarded. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII,
undoubtedly, the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in
the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in
the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary and
appointments to the Judiciary for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election,
or of satisfying partisan considerations. The fact that Sections 14 and 16 of Art VI² refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 of the same
also applies only to the Executive Department. This is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. If the framers intended Section 15 to
cover all kinds of presidential appointments, they would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition. To hold that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary undermines the
intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department for it will tie
the Judiciary and the SC to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the
Presidency in a presidential election.³
No. The express reference to a Chief Justice [in Section 4(1), Article VIII] abhors the idea that
the framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court.
Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely on
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the
next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain intent of the Constitution. Said Section 12 only
responds to a rare situation in which the new C.J. is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent
C.J. is unable to perform the duties and powers of the office.
No. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from
C.J. Puno’s retirement by 17 May 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4 (1) to every
situation of a vacancy in the SC.
No. For mandamus to lie, there should be unexplained delay on the part of JBC in performing its
duty; and there has been no delay on the part of the JBC in submitting the list of nominees for
C.J. to the President because the vacancy in the office has not yet occurred. The President is
constitutionally mandated to fill vacancies in the SC within 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancies. Thus, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees on or
before the occurrence of the vacancy in order to enable the President make the appointment
within the 90-day period therefrom. This is a ministerial duty of the JBC.⁴ JBC therefore has
until the date C.J. Puno retires, or 17 May 2010, to submit the list nominees to the President.
¹ In Re: Hon. M.A. Valenzuela and Hon. P.B. Vallarta, 298 SCRA 408.

² Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an
Acting President. Evidently, it refers only to appointments in the Executive Dept. It has no
application to appointments in the Judiciary because temporary or acting appointments can only
undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will [which is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution to safeguard independence of the Judiciary].
Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and appointments to the Judiciary do not require such
confirmation.

³ The Court further ruled that the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current
incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial
independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In
contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of
compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.

⁴ The Court contrasted, however, that selection of nominees is discretionary upon the JBC.
 ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, Respondent
G.R. No. 191618 • November 23, 2010 • En Banc Decision • Justice Nachura
Constitutional Law | Executive Department | The Supreme Court as PET

FACTS:
Atty. Macalintal filed an undesignated petition questions challenging the constitution of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,2
Article VII of the Constitution.

Arguments of Macalintal: (1) The creation of a “separate tribunal” complemented by its own
budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, violates Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution; (2) The constitution of the PET, with the designation of the
Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII
of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.

ISSUES:
(1)

Whether or not the creation of PET, with its own budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and
confidential employees, violates Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution;

(2)

Whether or not the PET performs judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

RULING:
(1)
No. The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions
peculiar only to the Tribunal. x x x x

The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full
authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions. x x x x

The PET, as a constitutional body, is independent of the three departments of government –

Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary – but not separate therefrom.

(2)
PET performs judicial functions.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral
contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. x x x x
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof.
The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of
law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. x x x x

The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court
Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts
the Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein,
it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court,
constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
 DRILON VS. LIM
GR No. 112497, August 4 1994

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code or the Procedure For Approval And
Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings, Secretary of
Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No.
7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.

In a petition, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained
the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. Instead, it
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in
the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy
of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring
on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. By
citing the distinction between control and supervision, the lower court’s concluded that the
challenged section gave the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested
by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only
of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is reversed insofar as it declared Section 187 of the
Local Government Code unconstitutional and affirmed the findings of the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of
the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon
did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the
Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its
annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it
was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code.
The Court finds that Secretary Drilon had performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself. While in supervision, it merely sees to it that the rules are followed,
but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform
to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
 LARRANAGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS Puno [March 13, 1998]

FACTS:
 Petitioner Francisco Juan Larranaga is charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention RTC Cebu City. He is presently detained at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation
Center.
 Represented by his mother, Margarita, he filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
 Larranaga alleged that he was denied the right to preliminary investigation and sought to annul
the informations as well as the warrant of arrest issued in consequence thereof. In the alternative,
he prayed that a preliminary investigation be conducted and that he be released from detention
pending the investigation. He filed a supplemental petition for habeas corpus or bail.
 The Solicitor General recommended that petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary
investigation and that he be released from detention during the pendency thereof.
 The Court issued a resolution: setting aside the inquest investigation of the Larranaga and
ordering the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary investigation;
ordering the immediate release of Larranaga pending his preliminary investigation; and ordering
Judge Ocampo to cease and desist from proceeding with arraignment and trial.
The counsels for the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Larranaga was
charged with a continuing offense, thus, he was lawfully arrested without warrant and only
entitled to an inquest investigation.

ISSUE/S AND RULING:

1. W/N Larranaga should be released pending the preliminary investigation – NO
 The records show that two informations were filed against petitioner for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention.
 Executive Judge Priscila Agana issued a warrant of arrest, and petitioner was arrested by virtue
of said warrant.
 The Court held in Sanchez v. Demetriou that the filing of charges and the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at
least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. o In Sanchez, the Court ruled that
the warrantless arrest of the petitioner was illegal; however, the trial court still lawfully acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued. o The
rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to
quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other
grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
 Therefore, the Court held that petitioners detention at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center
is legal in view of the information and the warrant of arrest against him. The absence of a
preliminary investigation will not justify
petitioners release because such defect did not nullify the information and the warrant of arrest
against him.

2. W/N Larranaga is entitled to a preliminary investigation – YES

 Inquest investigations applies only to those lawfully arrested without a warrant. The facts show
that some members of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Group (PNP CIG)
went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon City to arrest Larranaga, albeit without warrant.
 Sec 5, Rule 113 enumerates the circumstances when a warrantless arrest is deemed lawful. This
case at bar does not fall under any of those circumstances. o It does not appear that Larranaga
has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense when the police
officers tried to arrest him. In fact, petitioner was attending classes at the Center for Culinary
Arts at that time.
 The Court also rejected the prosecutors' argument that petitioner was actually committing a
crime at the time of the arrest since kidnapping with serious illegal detention is a continuing
crime. o One of the victims, Marijoy Chiong, was found dead in Sitio Tanawan, Barangay
Guadalupe, Carcar, Cebu while the other victim, Jacqueline Chiong, remains missing to date.
 The Court rejected also the assertion that petitioner is no longer entitled to a preliminary
investigation because he had waived his right when he failed to appear during the preliminary
investigation set by the City Prosecutor. o A waiver, whether express or implied, must be made
in clear and unequivocal manner. Mere failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear before the
City Prosecutor cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation,
considering that he has been vigorously invoking his right to a regular preliminary investigation
since the start of the proceedings.
 Case Dig: Dominador Bustos vs. Lucero
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS:

The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of Peace of
Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked if
he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel
moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In
view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of the
case be remanded to the justice of peace of Masantol, on order that the petitioner might cross-
examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The motion was
denied and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted. Petitioner
squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11 or Rule 108, on the ground that it
deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an infringement to the provision of
section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial
legislation that diminishes the right of the accused.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors is an adjective
law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and
the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights are a term which
includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied to
criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the
punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished Preliminary
investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal
prosecution.
As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which is the "the
mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified with and forms part of the
method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a
law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. The
entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear down
section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of
evidence embodied in these Rules. We do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an
accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence
for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have
said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It
may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly
enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a
preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his
constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation and at
the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of
due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. The degree of importance of a preliminary
investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived. It
is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the
Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the
accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a
limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to
compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's
approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure,
adding new and different rules without regard to their source.
 FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. V. CA
First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 110571. October 7, 1994.

Mendoza, J.

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division sustaining the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments
and, consequently, dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the Board of
Investments.

RULING:

Yes. The authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it by the BOI must be
deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91.
 Aruelo v. CA
G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993
Quiason, J.

Facts:

                Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the
respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the
petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed
his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars
is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the
filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a
new five-day period to file his answer.

Issue:

                whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-
day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

Held:

                No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose
proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall
apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings
brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases
cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it

provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests
or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec.
5 [5]).
 ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND LUIS T. SANTOS, SECRETARY, respondents. [G.R. No. 102549.
August 10, 1992.] GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:

Doctrine: Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and
doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any
occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members “may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours.” If there
are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the
practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

Facts: Private respondent filed an Administrative Case against Javellana for: (1) violation of
Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980
in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees,” and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority. The
basis of the Administrative case is the appearance of petitioner as counsel for a case against
respondent who is a public official.

Petitioner’s Claim: That DLG Memorandum Circular Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional
because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.
That they together with RA 7160 constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the
legal and medical professions for only sanggunian members who are lawyers and doctors are
restricted in the exercise of their profession while dentists, engineers, architects, teachers,
opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted.

Respondent’s Claim: That Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian
Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice
of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of
Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department. That Javellana also appeared as
counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, also without prior authority of the DLG
Regional Director.

Issue: Whether or not said Memorandum of the Department of Local Government and RA7160
as to the prohibition to practice profession are unconstitutional for being discriminatory against
legal and medical professions?

Held: The Court ruled on the negative. Complaints against public officers and employees relating
or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for
by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a
complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner
Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia, would actually
be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining
employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the
petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 prohibiting a government official from
engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests
adverse to the government. Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate
against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions
or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members “may
practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours.” If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the
professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public
service.
 Maceda vs. Vasquez Case Digest

"The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof." (Sec. 6, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts:

Respondent Abiera of the PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Judge Maceda, alleging that Judge Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by certifying
that he rendered decisions in all civil and criminal cases at a certain date, within the 90 day
period set by the Constitution and Rules, when in fact, he hasn’t.

Judge Maceda filed an ex-parte motion to refer the case to the Supreme Court but the
Ombudsman denied the motion. Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the Supreme Court. Maceda
contends that he had been granted an extension of 90 days to decide the aforementioned cases.
He also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case since the offense
charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes
an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior
courts.

Issues:

1. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court

2. Assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.

3. Can the Ombudsman subpoena the Supreme Court and its personnel?

Held:

1. The office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by a judge
even if the charged is unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of
service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

2. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination… In fine, where a
criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.

3. No. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to
submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is
evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been
granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his
certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this
Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the
resolution of said question?

Petition GRANTED. The Ombudsman directed to dismiss the complaint and refer it to the SC.
(Maceda vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993)
 ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA,
complaint,
vs.
DISTRICT JUDGE MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR., COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
PAMPANGA, BRANCH III,

respondent. Complainant Antonio V. Raquiza filed a petition to order the transfer of Special

Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga from the sala of respondent
judge, Hon. Mariano Castañeda to another branch and administrative complaint against the same
judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) rendering decision knowing it to be unjust and
illegal (3) extortion by means of oppression; and (4) bribery. After respondent judge had filed his
comment on said petition and administrative complaint, the Court resolved to refer the
administrative complaint to Justice Jose G. Bautista of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation. After the investigation and study of the cases, Justice Bautista
recommended that the charges against the respondent be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent judge was guilty of the charges filed against him by the complainant,
hence should be dismissed, and Special Proceedings No. 682 be transferred to another judge.

RULING:
The Court reviewed the record, including the part of the testimonies of the witnesses and the
other evidence submitted by the parties. After careful consideration thereof, the Court found the
conclusions of fact and the recommendations of the Investigator in the above report to be well
taken and fully supported by the evidence on record. Accordingly, the above-quoted report of
Justice Bautista is approved, the respondent judge is exonerated and the administrative case
against him is dismissal The petition to transfer Special Proceedings No. 6824 to another judge is
denied
 Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, Ong G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007 Citizenship, Naturalization
DECEMBER 4, 2017

FACTS:

Respondent announced an appointment in favor of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of the

Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the of Associate Justice R. J. Callejo, Sr.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and
incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners
contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive
Secretary is patently unconstitutional and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Is Sandiganbayan Justice Ong a natural born Filipino citizen?

RULING:

No. It is clear from the records of the Court that respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and
the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, no substantial change or correction
in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change
in citizenship status is a substantial change.

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s
ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court.
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his
citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot
accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this
reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
 FAMELA R. DULAY v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated JULY 3, 2012, which reads
as follows: 

"G.R No. 202143 (Famela R. Dulay v. Judicial and Bar Council and Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
as Executive Secretary.). - This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, filed by
petitioner Famela R. Dulay against the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., raising the following issues:

A. Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can legitimately, validly and constitutionally
accepts (sic) application for nomination and interview of nominees for the position of a
Chief Justice of the Honorable Court and, thereafter, submits (sic) short list of nominees
to the President of the Republic of the Philippines for the appointment of a Chief Justice
of the Honorable Court;
 
B. Whether the President of the Republic of the Philippines may legitimately, validly and
constitutionally appoint a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court, in replacement of the
removed and impeached Honorable Renato C. Corona;
 
C. Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can constitutionally be headed by a retired
Associate Justice of the Honorable Court, instead of an incumbent Chief Justice of the
Honorable Court.[1]

Petitioner claims that the President of the Republic of the Philippines cannot legitimately,
validly, and constitutionally appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, because the 1987
Constitution only empowers him to appoint members or Justices but not the Chief Justice. [2] She
adds that the Chief Justice should be replaced and designated exclusively from among their
peers.[3] Petitioner also contends that the JBC cannot be validly, legally and constitutionally
headed by a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, because the Constitution specifically
provides that it be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and no other.[4]

We dismiss the petition.

At the outset, we look into the locus standi of petitioner to institute the present petition.

As held in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:[5]  

xxx In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of
the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the
intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the
efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required,
therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.[6]

Indeed a liberal approach had been adopted in several notable cases. Petitioner may not be as
adversely affected by the action complained against as are others provided that she sufficiently
demonstrates in her petition that she is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the
vindication of a public right. The assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging an
official action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general.[7]

In this case, however, petitioner has not shown in her petition that she is entitled to protection or
relief from the Court. She did not even explain her capacity in instituting the present special civil
action for  certiorari and prohibition. Nowhere in her petition did she assert her right either as
citizen or taxpayer filing her petition on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the
issues. Accordingly, she is wanting in legal standing to institute the instant petition. Outright
dismissal of the present petition is, therefore, warranted.

Even if we ignore the technical defect and we look into the merits of the case, the petition is still
bound to be dismissed.

Simply stated, petitioner seeks the resolution of two substantive issues: (1) whether or not the
President of the Philippines has the constitutional power to appoint the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court; and (2) whether or not the JBC can validly be headed by a person other than the
incumbent Chief Justice.

We answer in the affirmative to both questions.

Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides for the appointment of Justices and Judges,
to wit: 

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court  and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In interpreting the above-stated constitutional provision, petitioner considers only the Associate
Justices as the "members of the Supreme Court" thereby excluding the Chief Justice from the
President's appointing power. Said interpretation is baseless.

A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial Department in Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution clearly shows that the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" and the words
"Members" and "Member" are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme Court
without distinction whether he be the Chief Justice or any of the Associate Justices or all fifteen
Justices.

Section 4 (l),[8] Article VIII thereof defines the composition of the Supreme Court, namely, "a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices" who may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in
divisions of three, five, or seven Members; Section 4 (2)[9] and (3)[10] describe the manner of
conducting business in the Court whether it be En Banc or in division; Section 7 (1)
[11]
 enumerates the qualifications of the Members of the Court and the other members of the
Judiciary; Section 11[12]  provides for the security of tenure in the Judiciary; Section 12 [13] states
the prohibition on non-judicial assignments of the Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts; and Section 13[14]  lays down the process of decision-making. In all of these provisions,
the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" was repeatedly used to refer not only to the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court but includes the Chief Justice. Thus, in Section 9 of the
same Article VIII on the appointment of Justices and Judges, the phrase "Members of the
Supreme Court" clearly refers to the fifteen Justices of the Court - one Chief Justice and fourteen
(14) Associate Justices - who are within the appointing power of the President. Although decided
under a different Constitution, we reiterate the Court's pronouncement in Vargas v.
Rilloraza[15] that "there can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required x x
x to compose the Supreme Court are the regular members of the Court."[16] 

We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner that the JBC can only be headed by the incumbent
Chief Justice and no other. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the JBC cannot perform its task
without an incumbent Chief Justice. To follow this logic would lead to an eventuality where a
vacancy in the Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy occurs in the JBC. We can likewise infer
from this argument that if the Office of the Chief Justice is vacated, the same will not be filled
because there will be no "incumbent Chief Justice" to act as Chairman of the JBC.

We definitely cannot sustain these arguments. The principal function of the JBC is to
recommend appointees to the Judiciary.[17] For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a
list of at least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list.
[18]
 Any vacancy in the Supreme Court is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90 days
from the occurrence thereof.[19]  This 90-day period is mandatory. It cannot, therefore, be
compromised only because the constitutionally-named Chairman could not sit in the JBC.
Although it would be preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still
operate to perform its mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if
the constitutionally-named ex-officio Chairman does not sit in the JBC. This intention is evident
from the exchanges among the Commissioners during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, viz.: 

MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the
Chief Justice, are only 11. 

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes. 

MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: "Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof." 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. 

MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy? 
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years, seldom
has the Court had a complete complement. 

MR. DE CASTRO. By that time, upon ratification of this Constitution, the Judicial and Bar
Council shall be in operation. 

MR. CONCEPCION. We hope so. 

MR. DE CASTRO. And one of the members thereof is a Member of Congress. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. 

MR. DE CASTRO. An ex officio member. By the time this is ratified, Congress is not yet
convened and there will still be an election; so there will still be a delay of more than 90 days.
Maybe before the vacancies occur in the Supreme Court, they will be filled up by the President. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is possible. 

MR. DE CASTRO. Therefore, it will take perhaps until November or December before the four
other justices will be appointed, if we follow the Judicial and Bar Council. Or can the Judicial
and Bar Council function without the presence yet of a member of Congress who is an ex-
officio  member? 

MR. CONCEPCION. It can operate without the ex-officio member because a majority
would be enough, although it would be preferable if it were complete. 

MR. DE CASTRO. So that upon ratification of this Constitution, it is possible, and the President
may do it by appointing the members of the Judicial and Bar Council without first a
representative from Congress. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct. 

MR. DE CASTRO. So that we can immediately fill up the four vacancies in the Supreme Court. 

MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct. 

MR. DE CASTRO. I am asking this just for the record, that the vacancies in the Supreme Court
be immediately filled up so that our backlog of cases can be immediately attended to. 

x x x (Emphases supplied)[20]

Considering, however, that complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its
supervisory power over the JBC, this Court should not be deprived of representation. The most
Senior Justice of this Court who is not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice should
participate in the deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said vacant post and preside
over the proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally-named Ex-Officio Chairman,
pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, to wit: 

Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief Justice.  - In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office,
they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is
removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to
every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice. (Emphasis supplied.)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we DISMISS the petition." (Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-

De Castro, Brion, Abad and Sereno, JJ., no part, Peralta, J., presiding, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., present)
 G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL,
G.R. No. 202242               April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP.
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17,
2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC
to be unconstitutional

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one
representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends
that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have
one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of
“congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective
powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art
VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of
congress” should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either
house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction
of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative
powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said
in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the
workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
 JARDELEZA v. SERENO
G.R. No. 213181
August 19, 2014
733 SCRA 279

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.

However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be
invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized
Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious.  Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that
due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of
discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for
the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in
cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.

RULING: Yes.  While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not
automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. 
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is
availing. 
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due
process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not
an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the
precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant,
who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is
presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from
making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of
fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic
tenets of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that
the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
 Aguinaldo V. Aquino

FACTS: On November 29, 2016, the Court En Banc DECLARED the clustering of nominees

by the Judicial and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of respondents
Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with the
four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as VALID.
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the
Inhibition of the Ponente) on December 27, 2016 and a Motion for Reconsideration-in-
Intervention (of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) on February 6, 2017.

The Court, in a Resolution dated February 21, 2017, denied both Motions.

Presently for resolution of the Court are the following Motions of the JBC: (a) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 (MR-Resolution), filed on March 17,
2017; and (b) Motion to Admit Attached Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated 21 February 2017 and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated 21 February 2017 (Supplement-MR-Resolution) filed on March 24, 2017.

The aforementioned MR-Resolution and Supplement-MR-Resolution lack merit given the

admission of the JBC itself in its previous pleadings of lack of consensus among its own
members on the validity of the clustering of nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies in the
Sandiganbayan, further bolstering the unanimous decision of the Court against the validity of
such clustering. The lack of consensus among JBC members on the validity of the clustering also
shows that the ponente's decision in this case did not arise from personal hostility - or any other
personal consideration - but solely from her objective evaluation of the adverse constitutional
implications of the clustering of the nominees for the vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice.

The JBC contends in its MR-Resolution that since JBC consultants receive monthly allowance
from the JBC, then "[o]bviously, JBC consultants should always favor or take [the] side [of] the
JBC. Otherwise, there will be conflict of interest on their part." While the ponente indeed
received monthly allowance from the JBC for the period she served as consultant, her objectivity
would have been more questionable and more of a ground for her inhibition if she had received
the allowance and decided the instant case in favor of the JBC.

It bears to stress that the Court also unanimously held in its Resolution dated February 21,2017
that there is no factual or legal basis for the ponente to inhibit herself from the present case.
Worth reiterating below is the ponente's explanation in the Resolution dated February 21, 2017
that there was no conflict of interest on her part in rendering judgment in this case, and even in
her voting in Jardeleza v. Sereno, considering that she had absolutely no participation in the
decisions made by the JBC that were challenged before this Court in both cases:
As previously mentioned, it is the practice of the JBC to hold executive sessions when taking up
sensitive matters. The ponente and Associate Justice Velasco, incumbent Justices of the Supreme
Court and then JBC consultants, as well as other JBC consultants, were excluded from such
executive sessions. Consequently, the ponente and Associate Justice Velasco were unable to
participate in and were kept in the dark on JBC proceedings/decisions, particularly, on matters
involving the nomination of candidates for vacancies in the appellate courts and the Supreme
Court. The matter of the nomination to the Supreme Court of now Supreme Court Associate
Justice Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), which became the subject matter of Jardeleza v. Sereno,
was taken up by the JBC in such an executive session. This ponente also does not know when
and why the JBC deleted from JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council," what was Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009, the former JBC Rules, which gave due weight
and regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court for vacancies in the Court. The
amendment of the JBC Rules could have been decided upon by the JBC when the ponente and
Associate Justice Velasco were already relieved by Chief Justice Sereno of their duties as
consultants of the JBC. The JBC could have similarly taken up and decided upon the clustering
of nominees for the six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice during one of its
executive sessions prior to October 26, 2015.

Hence, even though the ponente and the other JBC consultants were admittedly present during
the meeting on October 26, 2015, the clustering of the nominees for the six simultaneous
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was already fait accompli. Questions as to why
and how the JBC came to agree on the clustering of nominees were no longer on the table for
discussion during the said meeting. As the minutes of the meeting on October 26, 2015 bear out,
the JBC proceedings focused on the voting of nominees. It is stressed that the crucial issue in the
present case pertains to the clustering of nominees and not the nomination and qualifications of
any of the nominees. This ponente only had the opportunity to express her opinion on the issue
of the clustering of nominees for simultaneous and closely successive vacancies in collegiate
courts in her ponencia in the instant case. As a Member of the Supreme Court, the ponente is
duty-bound to render an opinion on a matter that has grave constitutional implications.
Since all the basic issues raised in the case at bar had been thoroughly passed upon by the Court
in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 and Resolution dated February 21, 2017, the Court
need not belabor them any further.

Considering the foregoing, the Court resolves to DENY for lack of merit the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 and Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 of the Judicial and Bar Council.
 Case Digest: G.R. No. 78780. July 23, 1987. 152 SCRA 284

David G. Nitafan, Wenceslao M. Polo, and Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., petitioners, vs.

Commissioner Of Internal Revenue and The Financial Officer, Supreme Court Of The
Philippines, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and
53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations
in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.

Issue: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

Ruling: Yes. The Court held that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a
general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax
by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of their
salaries during their continuance in office and the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon
the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs.
Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms
the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have
adopted.
 DE LA LLANA VS ALBA

GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982 

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to
enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of
Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA,
unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary.  It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of
this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution
has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as
provided for under the Constitution.

RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from
their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case
of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise.
 People vs Gacott Case Digest

The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon (Sec. 11, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)

Facts: 

For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge Gacott
dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the Second Division of the Supreme Court. Judge
Gacott was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of
law. He filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he questioned the competence of the Second
Division of this Court to administratively discipline him.

Issue:

Does the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to administratively

discipline respondent judge?

Held:

Yes. Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged
therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and
the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally
separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order
their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case
must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc,
on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. —
In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various Supreme Court Rules and
Resolutions," and providing inter alia:
  For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:

xxx xxx xxx

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the
Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more
than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.
xxx xxx xxx
This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted
provision was maintained.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters

or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters,
since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.
This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to
expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court or the
lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three,
five, or seven members.

Only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided

by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of
serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not
exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that
the administrative matter may be decided in division. (People vs Gacott GR No 116049 13 July
1995)
 DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS
NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE (A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC)

FACTS

On June 21, 1988, Ilocos Norte Gov. Rodolfo Farinas issued Executive Order RF6-04
designating Judge Rodolfo Manzano as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which was created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees.

Before accepting his appointment, however, Judge Manzano wrote a letter to the Supreme Court
seeking the following:

1. authorization to accept the appointment;

2. declaration from the Court that his appointment is not unconstitutional; and
3. declaration that his membership in the said Committee was part of the primary functions
of an Executive Judge.

RULING

The Court ruled that it would be unconstitutional for Judge Manzano to become part of the Ilocos
Norte Provincial Committee on Justice for two reasons.

First, the said Committee performs administrative functions. Administrative functions are those
which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence.

Among the Committee's administrative functions are to receive complaints against any
apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in
the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action; and
recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice.

Second, under the Constitution, members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by
law shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions.

Considering that the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the
Court decided to deny his request.
 PRUDENTIAL BANK, Complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY.
BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, Respondents.

The certification requirement that the conclusions of the SC was reached in consultation and the
mandate that no motion for reconsideration shall be denied without stating the legal basis
therefor are both NOT applicable in administrative cases.

Article VIII, Sections 13 and 14

FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed against respondent Atty. Grecia, and a Decision to disbar
him was subsequently rendered. He moved to reconsider but was denied in a Minute Resolution
“for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed
upon.” Grecia now prays that the Decision and the Resolution of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration be set aside. He challenges the Decision as violative of Art VIII, Sec 13 of the
Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for writing of the opinion
of the Court. He also avers that the Minute Resolution disregarded the constitutional mandate in
Art VIII, Sec 14.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the certification requirement in Art VIII, Sec 13 of the Constitution applicable to the case
at bar, an administrative case?

(2) Did the denial of the motion for reconsideration by minute resolution violate Art VIII, Sec 14
of the Constitution?

RULING:
(1) No. The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases.
From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not
been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity
in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the
collegiate composition of this Court. xxx
(2) No. The Constitutional mandate that “no xxx motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be xxx denied without stating the legal basis therefor” is inapplicable in
administrative cases. And even if it were applicable, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the
denial, and therefore adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. “Lack of merit” which
was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis.
 DR. and MRS. MERLIN CONSING, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARIDAD SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 78272 | 177 SCRA 14 | August 29, 1989 | Third Division | Justice Cortes
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Judicial Decisions

FACTS:
Santos filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for specific performance
with damages against the Consings. The CFI ruled in favor of Santos. Thus, The Consings
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the CFI with
modification as to the computation of the amount to be deducted from the purchase price. Hence,
from the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner-spouses filed this petition for review. They
contend that the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals inn this case does not comply with
the requirements of Article VIII, section 13, of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals must comply with the certification requirement under
Article VIII, Section 13, of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for
decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed
[Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision
would only serve as evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement and may be basis
for holding the official responsible for the omission to account therefor. Such absence of
certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
 Nicos Industrial Corp. v. CA
G.R. No. 88709 February 11, 1992
Cruz, J.

Facts:

                In the complaint filed by the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, it
was alleged that on January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of
P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment
thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The
mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff’s sale was
held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the
auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest
and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it for P3,558,547.64. On August 29, 1983,
UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co, who on the same day
transferred them to Golden Star Industrial Corporation, another private respondent, upon whose
petition a writ of possession was issued to it on November 4, 1983. On September 6, 1984,
NICOS and the other petitioners, as chairman of its board of directors and its executive vice-
president, respectively, filed their action for annulment of sheriff’s sale, recovery of possession,
and damages.

                After due hearing, the trial court issued an order as follows:

ORDER

Acting on the “Demurrer to Evidence” dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino P.
Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did
not file their comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the
plaintiff that the Sheriff’s Auction Sale conducted on July 11, 1983 was in complete accord with
the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under which the auction sale was appropriately held and
conducted and it appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13 of the plaintiff’s pleading and
likewise from plaintiff Carlos Coquinco’s own testimony that his cause is actually-against the
other officers and stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos Industrial Corporation “. . . for the purpose
of protecting the corporation and its stockholders, as well as their own rights and interests in the
corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants and devices of the responsible
officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust reposed upon them by the stockholders . . .” a
subject matter not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court, the court finds the same to be
impressed with merit.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed. The Defendants’ respective

counterclaims are likewise dismissed.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued is dissolved and set aside.

Issue:
                whether or not the assailed order is unconstitutional as it does not state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is base

Held:

                Yes. The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the
letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution. It is a requirement of due process
that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a
higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in
the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable
to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does not apply to
interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena,
because it refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving
incidental matters.

                As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment
on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein
the facts and the law on which it is based.

It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a

judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. However, the rule
would be applicable only if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and
not when some other additional ground is invoked.
 NORBERTO MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
GUMACA BRANCH, PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUAN
MONTECILLO, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF QUEZON PROVINCE,
respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-35612-14 | June 27, 1973 | 51 SCRA 369 | En Banc Resolution | Justice Fernando
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Decisions of the Court
There is no rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity
and distinctness only that the decision rendered must make it clear why either party prevailed
under the applicable law to the facts as established.

Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon

FACTS:
Mendoza filed petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus, but the court issued a
resolution dismissing said petitions for lack of merit. According to the court, the Mendoza failed
to discharge the burden of showing that his confinement was marked by illegality or that the
order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Mendoza
then filed for a motion for reconsideration objecting to, among others, the dismissal of the
petition through a minute resolution. It is his contention that there should be an extended
decision in consonance with the [now Art VIII, Sec 14] of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Does the issuance of a brief dismissal order violate Art VIII, Sec 14 of the Constitution?

RULING:
No. What is required “is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under
the applicable law to the facts as established. xxx [There is no] rigid formula as to the language
to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. xxx” What must then be
stressed is that under the [now Sec 14, Art VIII], the “decision” spoken of is the judgment
rendered after the previous presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a
stipulation of facts upon which its disposition is to be based. It refers only to decisions of the
merits, and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar.
 JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao,
respondents.
G.R. No. 82273 | June 1, 1990 | 186 SCRA 1 | En Banc | Per Curiam
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Decisions of the Court
The Court is not “duty bound [by virtue of Art. VIII, Sec. 14]” to render signed Decisions
all the time. It may dispose kf cases by Minute Resolutions provided legal basis is given.

Resolutions are not “decisions” within the constitutional requirement in Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par.
1]. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the constitution provision in Art. VIII, Sec. 14,
par. 2].

FACTS:
Borromeo charged the two court officials with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly
“maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional ‘Resolution’ and
‘Entry of Judgment’ in G.R. No. 82273.” However, this is not the first time that Borromeo has
filed charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several lettercomplaints, he repeatedly
claimed that he “suffered injustices” because of the disposition of the four cases he separately
appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sec
14, Art VIII of the Constitution, among others. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions
xxx do not bear the signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and
resolutions xxx. He likewise complains that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief
Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were
signed only by the Clerks of Court.

ISSUE:
Does the issuance of the minute resolution violate Art VIII, Sec 14 of the Constitution?

RULING:
No. The Court is not “duty bound [by virtue of Art VIII, Sec 14]” to render signed Decisions all
the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a
legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation. This is the only way whereby it can act on all
cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions.¹ The constitutional
requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is
based [in Sec Art VIII, Sec 14 par 1] refers only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions
fall under the constitutional provision [in Sec Art VIII, Sec 14 par 2]. When the Court, after
deliberating on a petition xxx decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the
questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court’s decision is shown or
for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement in Art VIII, Sec 14 [par 2]. In the case at bar, the subject minute
resolution is a 4-page resolution which more than adequately complies with the constitutional
requirements governing resolutions refusing to give due course to petitions for review. The
petition and its incidents were discussed and deliberated upon by the Justices of the 3rd Division.

¹ The Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature,
where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the
facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is
filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for noncompliance with the rules.
 KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and MAXIMO CONTRERAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 127682 | 289 SCRA 604 | April 24, 1998 | Second Division | Justice Regalado
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Decisions of the Court
Grant of due course to a petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial [through a minute
resolution]

FACTS:
A real property of petitioner Komatsu Industries (Phils), Inc. (KIPI) was extra-judicially
foreclosed. KIPI sought to declare the foreclosure null and void. It obtained favorable judgment
from the trial court but was reversed by the CA. KIPI filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the SC. SC resolved to deny the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the CA had
committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment. KIPI moved for reconsideration.
Since no additional and substantial arguments were adduced to warrant the reconsideration
sought, the SC resolved to deny the motion. In the instant second motion for reconsideration,
KIPI argues that the “minute resolutions” are violative of Sec 14, Art VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are minute resolutions violative of Art VIII, Sec 14 of the Constitution?

RULING:
No. The Court has discretion to decide whether a “minute resolution” should be used in lieu of a
full-blown decision in any particular case. A minute resolution of dismissal of a petition for
review on certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the controversy or subject
matter. The grant of due course to a petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial. For one thing, the
facts and law are already mentioned in the CA’s opinion. A minute resolution denying a petition
for review of a decision of the CA can only mean that the SC agrees with or adopts the findings
and conclusions of the CA, in other words that the decision sought to be reviewed and set aside
is correct. This Court is thus fully justified in handing down its minute resolutions in this case
because it “agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA” since “the decision
sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.”
 Oil and Natural Gas vs CA
293 SCRA 96 [GR No. 114323 July 23, 1998]

Facts: The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India
while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines. The present conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent has its
roots in a contract entered into by and between both parties on February 26, 1983 whereby the
private respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
(4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to
pay the private respondent the amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible, and
confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The oil well cement was loaded on board the ship
MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay and
Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the shipowner and the private respondent, the
cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point destination. Notwithstanding the fact
that the private respondent had already received payment and despite several demands made by
the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well cement. Thereafter,
negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that the private respondent will replace
the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class “G” cement cost free at the petitioner’s
designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class “G” cement did not conform to the
petitioner’s specifications. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was
referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract. On July 23, 1988, the
chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in petitioner’s favor setting forth
the arbitral award. Without responding to the above communication, the foreign court refused to
admit the private respondent’s objections for failure to pay the required filing fees, and thereafter
issued an Order on February 7, 1990.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign judgement may be enforced within the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily
affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was
rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This
Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal
law of the forum. Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a
valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator’s findings, then the same must be
accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order
of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the
courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our
rules provide otherwise.

The private respondent claims that its right to due process had been blatantly violated, first by
reason of the fact that the foreign court never answered its queries as to the amount of docket
fees to be paid then refused to admit its objections for failure to pay the same, and second,
because of the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator who was a former employee of the
petitioner.
Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense or stated otherwise, what is repugnant to due process is the denial of opportunity to be
heard. Thus, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the
party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so.

In the instant case, the private respondent does not deny the fact that it was notified by the
foreign court to file its objections to the petition, and subsequently, to pay legal fees in order for
its objections to be given consideration. Instead of paying the legal fees, however, the private
respondent sent a communication to the foreign court inquiring about the correct amount of fees
to be paid. On the pretext that it was yet awaiting the foreign court’s reply, almost a year passed
without the private respondent paying the legal fees. Thus, on February 2, 1990, the foreign court
rejected the objections of the private respondent and proceeded to adjudicate upon the
petitioner’s claims. We cannot subscribe to the private respondent’s claim that the foreign court
violated its right to due process when it failed to reply to its queries nor when the latter rejected
its objections for a clearly meritorious ground. The private respondent was afforded sufficient
opportunity to be heard. It was not incumbent upon the foreign court to reply to the private
respondent’s written communication. On the contrary, a genuine concern for its cause should
have prompted the private respondent to ascertain with all due diligence the correct amount of
legal fees to be paid. The private respondent did not act with prudence and diligence thus its plea
that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or
sympathy from this Court.

The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its
enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner merely prays for the remand of the case to the
RTC for further proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and enforceability of the
said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the RTC for the reception of
evidence to prove otherwise are no longer necessary.
 VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 81006 |173 SCRA 324 | May 12, 1989 | En Banc | Justice Cruz
Constitutional Law | Judicial Department | Judicial Power

Conditions to make a memorandum decision valid: (1) it should actually embody the findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable
part of the decision; and (2) it is resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted
by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications
involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved.

FACTS:
Francisco, the petitioner, filed a petition seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals
as it violates Article 8 section 14 of the constitution. The Petitioner leased his apartment to
Permskul, the private respondent. Both agreed on the terms of lease at a lease rate of 3000.00 per
month. The private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer
for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear
and tear. The private respondent vacated the property after a year. He requested the refund of his
deposit less of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his occupancy
after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner refused to give the deposit and instead said that
the respondent still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the
sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the apartment to restore it to its original condition. The
private respondent filed a case at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and won the case. The
petitioner was ordered to pay the private respondent the amount of P7,750.00, representing the
balance of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity charges, including the sum of
P1,250.00 as attorney’s fees in favor of the respondent. He appealed the decision all the way to
the Court of appeals and lost. Both, The RTC and the CA, took cognizance of his appeal and in
their decisions, they relied on the well-written decision of the MTC. The CA incorporated the
memorandum decision of the RTC in its decision. Hence, his petition citing that the
Memorandum Decision of the CA failed to comply with the provision of the constitution that
state that:

Art. 7 Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such incorporation by reference of Memorandum Decision was a valid act by the
RTC that effectively elevated the decision of the MTC for examination by the CA, in line with
Sec. 14 Article 8 of the Constitution.

RULING:
YES. The Court finds the action of CA valid. The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the
memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial
sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to
only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable by
the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended
discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple
litigations only, such as ordinarily collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and
deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

The Court said that the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129
should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an
annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision. It is expected that this
requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court
and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law
on which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such
an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being
adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

“It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a pair of scissors and a pot of paste as
if he were a mere researcher. He is an innovator, not an echo.

The appellate judge should prune the cluttered record to make the issues clearer. He cannot
usually do this by simply mimicking the lower court. He must use his own perceptiveness in
unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law. No less importantly, he
must use his own language in laying down his judgment. And in doing so, he should also guard
against torpidity lest his pronouncements excite no more fascination than a technical tract on the
values of horse manure as a fertilizer. A little style will help liven the opinion trapped in the
tortuous lexicon of the law with all its whereases and wherefores. A judicial decision does not
have to be a bore.”

The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the court
rendering the decision actually studied the case before pronouncing its judgment. But there are
more substantial reasons.

For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if
permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal.
For another, the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its
merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with
a useless appeal.
A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are
based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case
law that can serve as useful references;
and even as precedents (STARE DECISIS) in the resolution of future controversies.