THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN URBAN

MODELING
Britton Harris

Abstract

In these notes an effort is made to define or describe some of the scientific

and professional concerns with modeling the metropolitan system, and to
show how these interact and relate to each other, as well as to the sciences
and professions in general. There is an emphasis on the differences between
the social sciences and the hard sciences, between the practice of science
and of the professions, and between reductionist and holistic views of the
urban systems. This discussion is illustrated with some reference to scienti-
fic and practical developments.

Introduction

Three features of science and practices based on it need to be sket-

ched as a basis for the discussions in this paper.
First, there is a well-known distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’
science. Pure sciences are the province of disciplines, and applied
sciences of professions, but there is not a one-to-one correspondence
between them. The professions often draw upon multiple disciplines
and thus sometimes call for new sciences. The applied sciences iden-
tify new problems for science itself, conduct experiments, and even
generate theories.
Second, sciences are both experimental and observational. Even

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some hard sciences like astronomy and geology do not manipulate
their objects of study. Experiments are designed to enforce the rule of
ceteris paribus, keeping all but a very small set of influences con-
stant—first to find systematic variations, and then to test predictions
outside the range of previous findings. Observational sciences
attempt, using classification and statistical analysis, to clarify theory
by holding irrelevant factors constant, and to seek out difficult or
extreme observations, demanding explanation. In both pure and
applied science, and especially when knowledge must be based on
observation, some explorations are conducted in ‘paper experi-
ments’.
A third feature is that applications, or professional actions, do not
flow directly from scientific principles. Much scientific activity con-
tains ex post explanation of the success or failure of professional
devices: examples might include the transistor, penicillin, and the U.
S. Constitution. There is also no scientific methodology for judging
the correctness of professional activity whenever its goals include
social objectives and its practice is governed by ethical norms.
All this implies that observational sciences, and especially the
social sciences, cannot depend on verification in the Popperian sense
of the failure to find an experimental disproof of an hypothesis, but
rather are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and by rules
of somewhat elevated common sense, and disproved by the rare con-
trarian example for which all else is equal. Similarly, professional
actions can be said to be superior to existing or potential competitors
only by experience and informed intuition, since in principle it can-
not be proved that no better line of action exists; better practice may
simply not have been discovered.
Our interest in this situation will be limited to the contrasting roles
of the scientific investigation of the urban system, and the profession
or applied science of planning. These activities share a common pool
of knowledge, and interact in a variety of ways, yet in many respects
display differences which arise out their different uses of this know-
ledge.
There is a fourth but different aspect which has a special status: this
is the tendency in both pure and applied science to use reductionism
in an attempt to mitigate the problems of complexity. This will requi-
re special attention.

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Reductionism in Knowledge and Its Application

The essence of scientific theory-building, and often even more of

the applications of science, is a search for simplicity. This competes
however with a required realism in science, and effectiveness in its
application, whenever, as in the present case, the systems being stu-
died are complex. The reductionist tendency in science would ask us
to believe that ecology (including spatially-articulated society, or the
ecology of human-kind) can be reduced to biology, biology to che-
mistry, and chemistry to physics—while physics, at the most basic
level, seeks a single unifying theory which is sometimes called the
‘theory of everything’. We will shortly, in our description of tran-
sportation and land-use knowledge, abandon this approach, sugge-
sting that at each level the laws of the more basic level still hold, but
that with each increase in complexity new properties and rules appear
which are unique to that level. They cannot be fully explained by
more basic laws, and they cannot in themselves explain the behavior
of more complex systems. At each level, new properties are ‘emer-
gent;’ this here taken to be the distinguishing feature of complexity,
and is the reason why reductionism is incompatible with sound scien-
ce and its applications.
The denial of reductionism has various consequences for both the
science and the professions of urbanism. For the science, we must
first of all be distrustful of oversimplified laws or ‘models’. The name
of ‘gravity’ in a model of declining preferences for more distant
opportunities is merely a metaphor, and does not imply a true gravi-
tational attraction; staying too closely with any metaphor can distort
the analysis and understanding of the city. Similarly, the economic
‘model’ of a monocentric city will not support a valid description of
the real city, which may be monocentric as to banking headquarters,
but not as to grocery stores or—today—as to department stores. More
importantly, a purely economic depiction of household behavior (or
any single discipline applied to any particular behavior) fails to
explain many important phenomena. Still more importantly, the con-
catenation of diverse influences and cross-currents in the metropolis
leads to new kinds of behavior and to a new kind of complexity which

3
is difficult to define and to manage.e.
These aspects of managing complexity in science already have
manifestations in established sciences which prefigure some necessi-
ties for urban science. Consider three fields: astrophysics, meteoro-
logy, and human biology. Each field deals with a fairly high level of
complexity. Each has found it necessary to acquire mountains of
observational data. Each has simple rules for small or local pheno-
mena, but increasingly complex explanations for larger and more
general ones, as well as a general principle that local effects are not
additive nor independent of larger considerations. In the final analy-
sis, each of these sciences turns to more sophisticated methods of
observation, and often to computer-based simulations or ‘experi-
ments’ to test explanations and make predictions. Computer experi-
ments are less frequent in medical biology because the experimental
materials (mice, monkeys, men) are more numerous and more acces-
sible to manipulation, and because the basis for comprehending the
total system is at least partially based on extensive experience. Urban
systems are less numerous than any of the materials in these three
fields, and true experiments are much more rare than in biology, but
the systems are more accessible to a certain kind of introspection.
This may however create a different kind of reductionism, anthropo-
morphism—and the illusion that personal experience reflects all we
need to know about cities..
Roughly speaking, reductionism in urban science is reenforced by
the isolation of disciplines from each other, and their tendency to
study problems of reduced scope which will yield to their disciplinary
insights. Reductionism in the practice of urban planning is more
strongly influenced by the division of practice by area (city-suburb),
by jurisdiction (state-local), and by function (housing, retail trade,
manufacturing, utilities, transport, environmental protection, and so
on). The practice of planning, even in a single sphere, forces the plan-
ner to consider many disciplines together, and since this considera-
tion may be missing from the pure social sciences, the planner may
do an amateur job of constructing the necessary theory—while at the
same time maintaining a reductionist view which leads to trying to
find solutions to narrowly defined problems in isolation..
We can thus see that the effort to avoid reductionism in a science of

4
urbanism may require heroic measures—measures which are justified
by the self-evident need for more understanding to overcome the cur-
rent ineffectiveness of our knowledge. The profession of city plan-
ning suffers from the same kind of reductionism as does the science
of urbanism, but there is still another and more subtle reductionism
here, as to process rather than content. Both of these aspects of reduc-
tionism in practice will be discussed in the section dealing with the
applied science of urban planning..

The Science of Urbanism

There are only a few hundred large cities in the world, and most of
them have been examined as to their growth and form over decades
or centuries. Roughly speaking this growth and form constitute a
changing structure within which people and institutions perform the
social functions of living and reproducing, creating, producing, and
exchanging, and of organizing the economy, governance, and war.
The many observed similarities among cities and the systematic
variations among them lead to the assumption that urban agglomera-
tions are subject to a set of internal rules which are more or less uni-
versal—but also seen as contingent on history, culture, function, and
resources. The discovery, systematization, and verification of these
rules is the object of any science of urbanism..
Pursuing such a science encounters certain problems. First, it is an
observational science, conducting at most uncontrolled and partial
experiments, or paper experiments. Second, the urban system is com-
plex in many different ways: it involves economic, social, political,
and technical phenomena each of which is the subject of one or more
disparate disciplines; its internal processes are connected in a
network of long and branching links of cause and effect, which
extend over space, time, and function; and most particularly, it has
many ‘emergent’ properties which cannot be explained as merely
those of the sum of its parts. Third, the causal connections underlying
urban form and function are subject to modifications resulting from

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exogenous technological change, and from social and psychological
flux in culture and custom—all of which are less than wholly explai-
nable and predictable..
Various pre-existing disciplines, mainly in the social sciences, have
explored many aspects of urban interactions and change. Economics
and Geography have studied the location of economic activity, both
industrial and commercial, and more recently the economic aspects
of consumer choice in residential location. Sociology has attempted
to explain the shifting patterns of population groupings and clusters,
and has added to the understanding of family and household forma-
tion and decision making. These disciplines have engaged the imagi-
nation of statisticians in finding regularities in urban structure, often
without satisfactorily complete explanations. Disciplines more recen-
tly established like Operations Research, Computer Science, and
Optimization Theory have found effective ways of defining proces-
ses so as to bring specificity and regularity to concepts which were
once largely descriptive. Findings and concepts have been borrowed
from many other sciences and professions like geology, climatology,
epidemiology, civil engineering, and architecture.
What has proved essentially lacking in the progress of these disci-
plines in understanding urbanism more fully is a systematic mode of
making connections among their diverse findings. Such systematic
interaction is necessary because each discipline, proceeding on the
principle of other things being equal, necessarily ignores the ways in
which that principle is violated, because the violations occur in fields
reserved to other disciplines. For instance, Economics and Sociology
interact strongly at the level of the family and other social groups. At
the same time, some disciplines or professions are unable to solve
internal problems, often because they lack a comprehensive view of
the findings of other fields of study.
Land-use and transportation analysis provide many examples sup-
porting these observations. In the 1950’s, the profession of transpor-
tation planning faced numerous internal working difficulties to which
some solutions were found when the profession drew on other fields
of knowledge and at the same time operated in a scientific mode of
investigation and discovery. For instance, transportation analysis
required methods for finding measures of the separation of millions

6
of pairs of locations in a metropolitan region, and then for predicting
travel and its impact on all the various portions of the transportation
system. The first part of this problem was solved (at the Chicago Area
Transportation Study—CATS) by borrowing from Operations
Research, and the second was solved internally in an OR mode of
investigation..
Inter-zonal separation, modified by the congestion found through
simulation of the system’s behavior, has become an important input
to many kinds of locational analysis, outside of transport. On the
basis of many purposeful surveys of household behavior, transport
planners can now estimate trip-making from various origins by
various purposes, using different modes of travel to scattered desti-
nations—and then estimate the impacts of this demand on the tran-
sport system, bringing demand and (congested) supply into balance.
There remains an unfilled need for locational analysis which could
provide transport planners with sound estimates of future demand,
even as influenced by future transportation conditions under a tenta-
tive transport plan. While the potential for such projections exists in
theory, the scientific side of transport planning has not been able rea-
lize it internally, or to import it..
On the other side of this professional problem, land-use planning
faces an entirely different scientific situation. Many of the elements
of locational behavior have been thoroughly studied by different
disciplines, and many scientific innovations have been made in recent
years. Residential location has been restudied in the light of a broa-
der economic theory of consumer behavior, initiated in the late
1950’s by Wingo and Alonso, and this in turn has been substantially
strengthened by the use of gravity models and discrete choice theory
as introduced by Lowry and Putman, and used with economic models
by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Echenique, Anas and
others. The famous model of Central Place Theory, still favored by
some geographers, originally clarified the idea of a hierarchy in urban
places, but failed to recognize the diversity of consumer behavior
until partially corrected by Carroll and by Huff. A complete theory of
the formation of urban centers is still in the making. Industrial loca-
tion, once the centerpiece of locational theory, has lagged in its appli-
cation within cities, and remains somewhat descriptive.

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 These piecemeal improvements have proceeded on the basis of a
fruitful collaboration among Economics, Regional Science,
Geography, and Planning—involving considerable cross-fertilization
but little unification of the fields and even less joint treatment of the
objects of study. It is argued here that unified study, which is requi-
red for a complete scientific characterization of cities and their inter-
nal development, and which is stimulated by the professional needs
of planners both in transport and land-use, is best facilitated by an
integrated model of several aspects of the problem. Such models,
with various levels of specificity, exist in many relevant disciplines,
like the political science model of the nation-state, the economic
model of competitive markets, or the medical-biological model of the
human organism in health and in dysfunction. (These models are
flawed in many respects, and are given simply as examples of
unifying structures for conceptualizing complex systems.) We have
described how the profession of transport planning employs such a
scientific model, developed in parallel with professional practice, and
enjoying strong financial and institutional support. Similar models
are developing more slowly in the field of land-use, because this sup-
port has been lacking..
In unified transport and land-use analysis, the use of computer-
based models has become a necessity. There are of course talented
individuals who take a comprehensive mental view of the complex
urban system; but insightful as these views often prove to be, their
components have not been scientifically tested and may not even be
open to public discussion. This subjective mode of understanding is
not transferable and will not support future policy analysis of large
enterprises or forestall the possibility of failure of diverse plans for
urban development. Yet these expert insights seem to bring to bear a
type of thinking which is with difficulty captured in science. This is
a holistic view of the metropolis and it interacting parts, which is now
being approached through computer simulations using urban models.
The power, completeness, and accuracy of such models can be
tested against past events outside of the information needed to con-
struct them, and by newly-observed unusual circumstances which
they should be able to explain. Failures here are as important as suc-
cesses, because they lead to revisions of the underlying theory and to

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scientific advances. More experience in this mode of work will test
the potential limits of science, and the degree of reality in the con-
tention that a full scientific understanding of cities is impossible.

The Applied Science of Planning

The use of science in professional practice is quite different from

the pursuit of science itself, but the two are closely related. In scien-
ce, the purpose of experiments based on a theory is to test the theory;
in professional practice, the purpose is to solve some problem or
serve some purpose outside of the science. The science, if used at all,
is assumed to be correct, and it is then used to determine the connec-
tion between professional actions and their results—that is to deter-
mine whether a set of proposed actions will be successful, and perha-
ps whether there are actions better suited to the purpose..
Even the most scientifically inclined urban planner encounters three
areas where he will be likely to go beyond the science which is avai-
lable to him. First, there are actions whose effects cannot be fully
spelled out by the theory; here the planner may have to make deci-
sions which call for other forms of support. Second, the planner or his
clients may believe that they have knowledge which contradicts the
current scientific theories; here they substitute a new judgment for the
verdict of the science itself. In these two instances, the role of the
planning professional is directly complementary to that of the scien-
tist. The shortcomings of scientific models, and the planner’s basis
for a revised evaluation of actions, should be fed back into the scien-
tific explorations. An open debate could greatly clarify the areas of
deficient or disputed knowledge, to the benefit of both the science
and the profession.
The third difference between science and practice leads to the revi-
sion of a certain common conception of ‘applied science’. It is not
true that the scientific method as usually described can lead directly
to the solutions of professional problems. It may be that science can
affirm that certain hypothetical actions ought to have certain desired
results, but the scientific method cannot usually conjure up those

9
actions. Thus there is no fully ‘scientific planning’. By being poten-
tially unsuccessful because of its narrowness, and by appearing inhu-
man in its lack of imagination and creativeness, the technocratic pro-
position that planning can and should be wholly scientific gives a bad
name to both the profession and the science.
These two classes of difference are the basis on which it is possible
to distinguish two different kinds of reductionism in practice: an
abandonment of the system view and a belief that planning could be
reduced to a set of rules and deductions from science.
The fragmentation of practice in planning is largely responsible for
replacing a view of the system as a whole by the concatenation of
many competing subsystem views. This fragmentation follows seve-
ral different lines. In the United States at least, the separation of func-
tions leads to a disjointed kind of planning—especially between tran-
sportation and land-uses. The disjunction between public and private
action, not well-articulated, leads to conflicts and disharmonies.
Different levels of government may decouple their concerns with
similar problems, but the pursuit of local self interest may turn out to
be self-defeating. All of these are instances of failure to take adequa-
te account of the system properties of the metropolis, which give rise
to emergent properties, both benign and malign—properties which
are different from those of the smaller sub-systems considered in iso-
lation.n.
The reductionism which arises out of an overriding confidence in
the power of science is of a different nature. It consists in part of a
reductive redefinition of science as being purely logical, and in its
own methods entirely scientific, and in part in being reductive in iso-
lating science from society, and failing to recognize the contribution
of forms of experience which are not unscientific, but rather non-
scientific, or outside of science.
First, we should note that new theories and experiments in science
do not arise out of existing science, but are simulated by its shortco-
mings, and are achieved by creative imagination guided by scientific
rigor. This is why we can characterize experiments and theories as
clever, elegant, and even beautiful. For instance, the Foucault pendu-
lum, which provided a direct demonstration of the rotation of the
earth, not previously available, conforms exactly with the laws of

10
physics and celestial mechanics, but could not be invented by deduc-
tion from them. Indeed this is characteristic of most of the inventions
of applied science, whose existence cannot be rigorously deduced
from the laws of physics or chemistry, but which could be shown to
conform rigorously with these laws are of this nature—for example,
the transistor. Just as chemistry can partly explain but not produce
life, and physics can partly explain but not produce chemistry, so also
the ‘scientific method’ can help to validate, but not produce or itself
discover the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. Laws governing
celestial mechanics, gravity, quantized phenomena, the periodic
table, cells, and DNA were all discovered by scientific effort, and not
specifically predicted by prior laws.
Indeed, as the level of complexity of phenomena increases, the dif-
ficulty of forming a complete theory increases—because the deve-
lopment of the system under study has multiplied the number of
unpredictable products, and their discovery by purely deductive
means is increasingly difficult if not impossible. The sudden expan-
sion of organic chemistry opened a Pandoraa’s box of unpredictable,
or partially unpredictable, new compounds. Still more interesting,
nature itself, through evolution, has invented ever more intricate inte-
ractions and components in living organisms, and teasing out their
details is not a matter of deduction from scientific laws, but of obser-
vation and the creative discovery of new laws.
It follows a fortiori that even if we had a fairly complete and rigo-
rous science of urbanism, the applied science of urban planning could
not be treated as entirely the consequence of that science. All of the
comments about the need for humane content in the social sciences
apply here, but that is not the main point. Planning is difficult becau-
se new devices, like some sort of ‘social transistor’ or perhaps ‘cul-
tural DNA’, might be invented to facilitate the solution of urban pro-
blems, and even more difficult because in any urban future there are
many possible paths of development, some of which may be quite
different in content, but equally desirable in their effects. If we belie-
ve that ‘there is nothing new under the sun’, then supposedly new
inventions and new future plans are both combinations of what
already exists, but both require invention.
Urban science still has a most important role to play. The only affor-

11
dable experiment which can affirm any validity for a given plan or
social invention of any magnitude is a paper experiment—or in the
case of the urban system, a computer experiment. Great planners may
be a significant part of the answer, just as great surgeons are impor-
tant in medicine and great artists in architecture; but the idea that the
operation was successful though the patient died, or the design was
magnificent but the building collapsed, can not reasonably be applied
to cities. There are too few of them, and too many people involved in
each, to tolerate large and disastrously failed experiments..
It is thus apparent that applied science is science of a different kind.
It assumes that certain laws of science are correct, and uses them to
predict the outcome of contemplated ‘experiments’ on the body of the
urban complex. These contemplated experiments are more conserva-
tive than those of science itself: they do not contemplate the possibi-
lity of a failure of the experiment in such a way as to contradict the
given understanding of how the city works; they do contemplate the
possibility that the outcomes of a given experiment may not be accep-
table to a client being served (usually the public). The possibility of
finding undesirable outcomes is of course the reason why the experi-
ment must repeatedly be conducted ‘on paper’ before it is put into
effect. Public review serves the same purpose as a zoning board or a
building inspector, testing the logic of the proposal and its analysis,
and its conformity with a preexisting set of norms. (These are of cour-
se subject to revision, and this is another experimental process.)
There are interesting side-effects of public review which emphasize
the close relationship between pure and applied science. In the first
instance, the science may be unable to answer questions which the
public considers important. Today, transportation planning is unable
to deal with some issues of equity and discrimination, and with chan-
ges in lifestyle like the increased participation of women in the labor-
force; these issues require a deepened scientific understanding which
the public has every right to demand. At least equally important is the
fact that science can be mistaken, and that public knowledge of urban
life, which is the subject of that science, can be enlisted to correct
some mistakes and upgrade the science. Such feedback from, say,
engineers is well understood in science, but sometimes gets short
shrift in the case of radical engineering innovations, and in the pro-

12
fessions of medicine, architecture, and planning.
In the light of the enormous number of possible futures which plan-
ners might contemplate, it is impossible to certify that any particular
plan is the best possible, even given a clearly defined set of public
preferences. This is the reason why formal optimizing fails in the case
of large-scale planning—a reason which has received full recognition
in optimization theory. But it is possible to set out the assumptions
and decisions which have gone into a contemplated plan, and to state
their probable consequences. Both planners and clients can compare
these predictions with the existing situation, with the supposed out-
comes of other plans, and with the experience of other cities. All this
provides the plan-takers (that is, the clients and decision-makers)
with the planning equivalent of medical informed consent. The fact
that medical doctors are more often sued for malpractice than plan-
ners suggests that the requirement of informed consent is demanding
and dangerous to the practitioner. While this may account for the
reluctance of planners to embrace any system of urban science, it
seems more likely that the existing science and the means of utilizing
it still make it difficult to inform that consent..

Conclusion

In these notes there has perhaps been insufficient emphasis on the

role of computers in supporting the science and practice of urban
analysis. Computers, computerized models, and computerized infor-
mation systems are needed from the beginning because urban
systems are large and complex. If a major intervention in their func-
tion is attempted its effects will spread over space and time—brin-
ging the danger of unintended and adverse consequences. But there is
another and still more useful way of looking at the role of computer
models in this sphere of thought and action..
Urban development is the focus of numerous scientific disciplines
and professions. The latter include not only urban planning, but tran-
sport planning, infrastructure planning and management, environ-

13
mental protection, assessment, fiscal and capital planning, and so
on—all linked to numerous political and legislative activities, and
deeply embedded in the social and familial life of the population and
the activity of enterprises of all types in the region. These disciplines,
professions, and participants in urban life can and do share a certain
growing pool of information, and they interact through joint partici-
pation in a political, economic, and social environment. Reliance
only on information, without understanding, implies that this partici-
pation will be reactive, since a proactive system implies a knowledge
of the future—and this is found not in the information but in under-
standing it and its implications. Political interaction is continually
involved in the resolution of conflicts of interest, but lacks the cohe-
siveness and continuity of science and the professions. In urban
affairs, the relevant pure and applied sciences still need to develop the
necessary common ground for the growth of knowledge needed to
guide these modes of social interaction.n.
This common ground should be supplied by a common arena of
intellectual interaction, which should take many forms. One of the
most important of these will be improved urban models.

References

NOTE: Since these comments are both speculative and argumenta-

tive, detailed references are not altogether appropriate. The listing
which follows covers the core areas of pure and applied theory which
undergird much present knowledge in the field of urban modeling.
Some references are to review articles which provide additional refe-
rences.
Alonso, William, 1964, Location and Land Use, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Anas, Alex, 1975, “The Empirical Calibration and Testing of a
Simulation Model of Residential Location”, Environment and

14
 Planning A, 7 :899-920.
Anas, A, 1987, Modeling in Urban and Regional Economics,
Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur, Switzerland.
Carroll, J. Douglas, 1955, “Defining Urban Trade Areas”, Traffic
Quarterly, 9: 149-161.
CATS, 1959, Final Report, Volume 1, Chicago Area Transportation
Study, Chicago, IL.
Echenique, M and J Owers, 1994, eds. Special Issue of Environment
and Planning B, 21, 5, “Research into Practice: the work of the
Martin Center in urban and regional modeling”.
Goldner, W., 1971, “The Lowry Model Heritage”, Journal of the
American Institute of Planners, 37 :100-110.
Hansen, Walter G., 1959, “How Accessibility Shapes Land Use”,
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 25: 73-76.
Harris, Britton, 1963, “Linear Programming and the Projection of
Land Uses”, Penn- Jersey Paper No. 20, Philadelphia.
Harris, Britton, and Alan G. Wilson, 1979, “Equilibrium Values and
Dynamics of Attractiveness Terms in Production-Constrained
Spatial-Interaction Model”, Environment and Planning A, 10 :371-
388.
Herbert, John S., and Benjamin H. Stevens, 1960, “A Model of the
Distribution of Residential Activity in Urban Areas”, Journal of
Regional Science, 2 :21-36.
Huff, D. L., 1964, “Defining and Estimating a Trade Area”, Journal
of Marketing, 28: 4-38.
Ingram, Gregory K., John F. Kain, and J. Royce Ginn, 1972, The
Detroit Prototype of the NBER Urban Simulation Model, New
York, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lakshmanan, T. R., and Walter G. Hansen, 1965, “A Retail Market
Potential Model”, Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 31
:134-143.
Lowry, I. S., 1964, A Model of a Metropolis, RM-4035-RC, The Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
McFadden, Daniel, 1973, “Conditional Logit Analysis and
Quantitative Choice Behavior”, in Frontiers in Econometrics, Paul
Zarembka, ed., Academic Press, New York, 105-142.
Mills, Edwin S., 1972, Urban Economics, Scott Foresman, Glenview,

15
 IL.
Mitchell, Robert B., and Chester Rapkin, 1954, Urban Traffic: a
Function of Land Use, Columbia University Press, New York.
Moore, E. F., 1957, “The Shortest Path Through a Maze”,
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Putman, Stephen H., 1976, “The Interrelationships of Transportation
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Stouffer, Samuel H., 1940, “Intervening Opportunities: a Theory
Relating Mobility and Distance”, American Sociological Review, 5
:845-857.
Wheaton, William C., 1974, “Linear Programming and Locational
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Urban Economics, 1 :278- 287.
Wilson, Alan G., 1970, Entropy in Urban and Regional Modeling,
Pion, London.
Wingo, Lowdon jr., 1951, Transportation and Urban Land Use, The
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD.

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