GR 81561; January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDRE MARTI, Accused-

Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Reynaldo B . Tatoy and Abelardo E . Rogacion for Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Appellant Andre Marti went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send
parcels of boxes to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. He then filled up the contract
necessary for the transaction. Later on, Anita Reyes asked appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. However, appellant refused and assured Anita that
her packages simply contained books, cigars, gloves for his friend in Zurich.
Before the delivery of the appellants box and by virtue of following standard
operating procedure, the Bureau of Customs opened the boxes for final inspection unto
which a peculiar odor emitted therefrom.
The proprietor of Bureau of Customs forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples they
extracted from the boxes. They discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-
like dried marijuana leaves. An Information was filed charging appellant for violation of
RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Thus, accused appealed to the
court averring that his constitutional right to illegal searches and seizures is violated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure committed by the private individual
inviolate the constitutional right of the accused against unlawful searches and seizures.

HELD:
No, the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.
In the case at bar, the contraband in the case at bar having come into possession
of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant’s rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should
not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. If the search is
made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it
is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual,
not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring
it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
 Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras

Inter-American Court of Human Rights Judgment of July 29, 1988

FACTS:

Following the disappearance of Rodriguez who is a university student in

Honduras on the contention that he is involved in activities considered to be dangerous
to the national security of the country, the Honduran government denied any knowledge
or involvement in the said disappearance and denies hearing the family’s case.
Honduras’s lack of cooperation left the Commission with no option but to presume the
validity of the facts as alleged by the petitioner. The Commission’s report indicates that
Velasquez had been detained and most likely, subjected for investigations, harsh
interrogation, and torture.
The case of Velasquez caught the attention of The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights which submitted the instant case to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.

Later on, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights invoked Articles 50

and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights and requested the Court to
determine whether the State in question had violated Articles 4 (Right to Life), 5 (Right
to Humane Treatment) and 7 (Right to Personal Liberty) of the Convention in the case
of Velasquez.

ISSUE:

Whether a warrantless detention and a subsequent disappearance violated an

individual’s right to life, to human treatment, and to personal liberty under Articles 4,
5, and 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

HELD:

Yes. The rights of Velasquez are clearly violated by the Government of Honduras.
The American Convention does not explicitly criminalize disappearances. Nonetheless,
the Court ruled that forced disappearances constitute multiple and continuous
violations of the rights enshrined in the Convention.

The Court concluded that the practice of disappearances violated four articles of
the American Convention, specifically Articles 1 (duty to guarantee), 4 (right to life), 5
(right to personal integrity), and 7 (right to personal liberty). “The kidnapping of a person
is an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, an infringement of a detainee’s right to be taken
without delay before a judge and to invoke the appropriate procedures to review the
legality of the arrest, all in violation of Article 7 of the Convention which recognizes the
right to personal liberty.” The Court interpreted Article 5’s provisions regarding cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment, concluding that they prohibit incommunicado
detention. It also found that prolonged and isolated imprisonment harms the
“psychological and moral integrity of the person.”
a. On his right to life – the right of every person to have his life respected. It was
raised that the disappearances involved secret executions and concealment of
bodies.
In the case, Velasquez disappeared and his body was never discovered. This led
the Court to believe that he had been killed. In the State’s failure to take steps to
prevent such disappearances, the Court has ruled that the State violated the
Right to Life.

b. On the Right to Humane Treatment – every individual must have their physical,
mental, and moral integrity respected. This also recognizes the right to be free
from cruel, inhuman, or degrading torture, punishment and treatment.

In the case, despite the absence of clear evidence of Velasquez’ torture, the Court
was convinced that Velasquez had been subjected to cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment. Investigations into the practice of forced found victims
suggest that the victims are usually subject to cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment during their detainment. Thus, Velasquez, are deemed to have been
deprived of Right to Humane Treatment.

c. Right to Personal Liberty – The kidnapping of a person is an arbitrary

deprivation of life, and an infringement of right to be brought without delay before
a judge or to invoke appropriate procedures to review the legality of an arrest.
In the case, the Court envoked that Velasquez is a victim of arbitrary detention,
which deprived him of his physical liberty without cause.
 The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America

International Court of Justice, June 27, 1986

FACTS:

In 1984, Nicaragua had initiated proceedings against the United States of

America in the International Court of Justice alleging that the United States was using
military force against Nicaragua and intervening in Nicaragua’s internal affairs, in
violation of Nicaragua’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and
of the most fundamental and universally accepted principles of international law, with
the purpose of overthrowing Government of Nicaragua.

In particular, it was submitted by Nicaragua that the United States was violating
the prohibition of the use of force in international relations and the parallel rule on
prohibition of intervention. The Nicaragua Government aver that the US violated
international law, some of which were the principle that no State may resort to force or
the threat of force in its relations with other States; the principle that no State may
violate the sovereignty, the territorial integrity or the political independence of any other
State; the principle that no State may intervene in the international affairs of any other
State; the principle that no State may infringe upon the freedom of the seas or imped
peaceful maritime commerce and the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of
the Organization of American States. Nicaragua claimed that the US has incurred an
international responsibility and is bound to cease such activities forthwith and to pay
Nicaragua reparations for the damage and prejudice suffered.

The United States challenged the jurisdiction of the I.C.J when it was held
responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua.
Though a declaration accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court was deposited
by the United States in a 1946, it tried to justify the declaration in a 1984 notification
by referring to the 1946 declaration and stating in part that the declaration shall not
apply to disputes with any Central American State. The admissibility of Nicaragua’s
application to the I.C.J. was also challenged by the United States.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the United States violated its customary international law
obligation not to use force against another State;
2) Whether or not the United States has violated Article 2 of the UN Charter,
Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter on the Organization of the American States,
and Article 8 of the Convention on the rights and duties of the States.

HELD:
1) Yes. The prohibition on the use of force is found both in Article 2(4) of the Charter
of the United Nations (UN Charter) and in customary international law.
The Court laid that the United States violated its customary international law
obligation not to use force against another State when it directly attacked Nicaragua in
1983 and 1984. The Court further held that mere frontier incidents will not be
considered as armed attacks, unless, it would have been classified as an armed attack
had it been carried out by regular forces. Also, assistance to rebels by providing
weapons or logistical support did not constitute an armed attack. Instead, it can be
regarded as a threat or use of force or an intervention in the internal or external affairs
of other States.

Under Article 51 of the UN Charter and under CIL, self-defense is only available
against a use of force that amounts to an armed attack.

2) Yes. There was a clear violation of Article 2 of the U.N. Charter. In the case, the
members were refrained to use force against the political independence and
territorial integrity of any State. The United States government had taken
unauthorized military actions against Nicaragua and since this was not an act of
self-defense, thus, it was a clear violation of Article 18 and 20 of the Charter on the
Organization of the American States.
 OPOSA et al, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.

G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993

FACTS:
A class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against
Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of Department of Environment & Natural Resources
(DENR). They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to: (a) cancel all existing Timber
Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; and (b) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs
“such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn, opposed as they
complained that it violates their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR to safeguard the people’s right to a healthful environment, Section 3
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept
of man’s inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law.

On the defense of the respondents, they aver that failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary and that their
complaints are nothing but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
“environmental right” which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the “protection by the
state in its capacity as parens patriae.” And such allegations do not reveal a valid cause
of action. Further, they claim that the complaint is a matter of a political jurisdiction
and not a subject matter for the court. The trial court however dismissed the allegations
of the petitioners, and thus the case was brought before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state policy concerning the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology has been violated, amongst the other allegations.

HELD:
Yes. Under Article II, of the 1987 Constitution it explicitly provides in Section 16
that “the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” It is the petitioners’
right to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other
who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Wherefore when the respondent-Judge granted the Timber License
Agreements, it had been on the violation of the said policy. Moreover, the TLA’s are not
contracts and the non-impairment clause that the respondents used as defense cannot
be invoked.
 The Writ of Kalikasan, A.M. No. 09-6-8 SC Rule 7

In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1(1946)

FACTS:

Petitioner was the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the
Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands wherein he surrendered to the United
States Army and became a prisoner of war.

At that time, respondent was the Commanding General of the United States Army
Forceswhose command embraced the Philippine Islands. The latter then appointed a
military commission to try the petitioner on a charge of violation of the law of war for he
had failed in his duty as an army commander to control the operations of his troops,
"permitting them to commit" atrocities against the civilian population and prisoners of
war. Upon conviction, Yamashita applied for a writ of habeas corpus assailing lack of
jurisdiction among others. However, petitioner was found guilty of the crime charged
and was then sentenced to death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the military commission in question unlawfully created, thereby
warranting the grant of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court denied and the case was elevated to the US Supreme
Court which found Yamashita guilty and sentenced him to death. In its ruling the court
invoke that under the International Law on the law of war, violations of war have to be
avoided through the control of the operations of war by commanders who are
responsible for their subordinates. Yamashita, as the commander, was under an
“affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in
the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.
The court disagreed and denied the writ.

First, the commission was not only created by a commander competent to appoint
it, but his order conformed to the established policy of the government and was
in complete conformity with the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 1471-1593.

Second, there was authority to convene the commission, even after hostilities had
ended, to try violations of the law of war that were committed before the war's
cessation, at least until peace was officially recognized by treaty or proclamation.
Third, the charge against petitioner, which alleged that he breached his duty to
control the operations of the members of his command by permitting them to
commit specified atrocities, adequately alleged a violation of the law of war.
And finally, petitioner was not entitled to any of the protections afforded by the
Geneva
Convention, part 3, Chapter 3, § V, Title III, because that chapter applied only to persons
subjected to judicial proceedings for offenses committed while prisoners of war.