1. People vs Andre Marti GR No.

81561, January 18, 1991

Fact:

In 1987, the appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name,
passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER
FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland” Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine
and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant’s representation,
Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. Before delivery of appellant’s box to the
Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened
appellant’s box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, He made an opening on one
of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith
prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the
samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample of appellant’s
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the NBI and informed the them that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes’
office at Ermita. The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He
discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which
allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were
neatly stocked underneath the cigars. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and
of the contents thereof, after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereafter,
an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.

Issue:

Whether the search and seizure committed by the private individual inviolate the constitutional right of
the accused against unlawful searches and seizures?

Held:

No, The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed. Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may
only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights
should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd
interpretation of the constitution. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject
to protection.

2. Velasquez-Rodrigues vs Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, July 29, 1988, Series C,
No. 4 (1998)

Facts:

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission) brought this action in 1986 against the
Government of Honduras in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Commission alleged that
Honduras had violated Articles 4, 5 and 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights (Convention)
with respect to the 1981 detention and subsequent disappearance of a Honduran student, Angel
Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez.

Article 4. RIGHT TO LIFE. 1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be
protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.

2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be imposed only for the most
serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court and in accordance
with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the commission of the crime. The
application of such punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently
apply.

3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have abolished it.

4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or related common crimes.

5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was
committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be applied to pregnant
women.

6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or
commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be
imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the competent authority.

Article 5. RIGHT TO HUMANE TREATMENT. 1. Every person has the right to have his physical,
mental, and moral integrity respected.

2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or

treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person.

3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal.

4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted

 persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted
persons.

5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from adults and brought before
specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they may be treated in accordance with their
status as minors.

6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and
social readaptation of the prisoners.

Article 7. RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY. 1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and
security.

2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions
established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established
pursuant thereto.

3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.

4. Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the reasons for his detention and shall be
promptly notified of the charge or charges against him.

5. Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be
released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings. His release may be subject to
guarantees to assure his appearance for trial.

6. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in
order that the court may decide without delay on the law fulness of his arrest or detention and
order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful. In States Parties whose laws provide that
anyone who believes himself to be threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to
recourse to a competent court in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, this
remedy may not be restricted or abolished. The interested party or another person in his behalf is
entitled to seek these remedies.

7. No one shall be detained for debt. This principle shall not limit the orders of a competent
judicial authority issued for nonfulfillment of duties of support.

According to the petition filed with the Commission, and the supplementary information received
subsequently, Manfredo Velásquez, a student at the National Autonomous University of Honduras, "was
violently detained without a warrant for his arrest by members of the National Office of Investigations
(DNI) and G-2 of the Armed Forces of Honduras." The detention took place in Tegucigalpa on the
afternoon of September 12, 1981. According to the petitioners, several eyewitnesses reported that
Manfredo Velásquez and others were detained and taken to the cells of Public Security Forces Station
No. 2 located in the Barrio El Manchén of Tegucigalpa, where he was "accused of alleged political crimes
and subjected to harsh interrogation and cruel torture." The petition added that on September 17, 1981,
Manfredo Velásquez was moved to the First Infantry Battalion, where the interrogation continued, but
that he police and security forces denied that he had been detained.

Held:

The Court ruled for the Commission and unanimously held: (1) that domestic Honduran legal remedies
were ineffective and did not bar the Court’s jurisdiction; (2) that a systematic pattern of disappearances
was carried out or tolerated by Honduran government officials from 1981 to 1984; (3) that Honduras had
violated the victim’s rights as part of that practice; and (4) that Honduras must therefore compensate the
family of the victim and that any agreement on the form and amount of compensation must be
approved by the Court. The Court further held, by six to one, that it would decide the form and amount
of compensation if Honduras and the Commission were unable to negotiate an agreement within 6
months. Judge Piza filed a dissenting opinion.

3. Nicaragua vs USA, International Court of Justice, June 27, 1986

Brief Fact Summary.

Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United States (D) on the ground that the United States (D) was
responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice to entertain the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P)
application to the I.C.J. was challenged by the United States (D).

Facts.

The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of the I.C.J when it was held responsible for illegal
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (P) in the suit the plaintiff brought against
the defendant in 1984. Though a declaration accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court was
deposited by the United States (D) in a 1946, it tried to justify the declaration in a 1984 notification by
referring to the 1946 declaration and stating in part that the declaration “shall not apply to disputes with
any Central American State….”

Apart from maintaining the ground that the I.C.J lacked jurisdiction, the States (D) also argued that
Nicaragua (P) failed to deposit a similar declaration to the Court. On the other hand, Nicaragua (P) based
its argument on its reliance on the 1946 declaration made by the United states (D) due to the fact that it
was a “state accepting the same obligation” as the United States (D) when it filed charges in the I.C.J.
against the United States (D). Also, the plaintiff intent to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
I.C.J. was pointed out by the valid declaration it made in 1929 with the I.C.J’s predecessor, which was the
Permanent Court of International Justice, even though Nicaragua had failed to deposit it with that court.
The admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.J. was also challenged by the United States (D).
Issue.

(1) Is the jurisdiction to entertain a dispute between two states, if they both accept the Court’s
jurisdiction, within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice?

(2) Where no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, is the application of such a state to the
International Court of Justice admissible?

Held.

(1) Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a dispute between two states if each of the States
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction is within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Even
though Nicaragua (P) declaration of 1929 was not deposited with the Permanent Court, because of the
potential effect it had that it would last for many years, it was valid.

Thus, it maintained its effect when Nicaragua became a party to the Statute of the I.C.J because the
declaration was made unconditionally and was valid for an unlimited period. The intention of the current
drafters of the current Statute was to maintain the greatest possible continuity between it and the
Permanent Court. Thus, when Nicaragua (P) accepted the Statute, this would have been deemed that
the plaintiff had given its consent to the transfer of its declaration to the I.C.J.

(2) Yes. When no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, the application of such a state to the
International Court of Justice is admissible. The five grounds upon which the United States (D)
challenged the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application were that the plaintiff failed because there is
no “indispensable parties” rule when it could not bring forth necessary parties, Nicaragua’s (P) request
of the Court to consider the possibility of a threat to peace which is the exclusive province of the
Security Council, failed due to the fact that I.C.J. can exercise jurisdiction which is concurrent with that
of the Security Council, that the I.C.J. is unable to deal with situations involving ongoing armed conflict
and that there is nothing compelling the I.C.J. to decline to consider one aspect of a dispute just because
the dispute has other aspects due to the fact that the case is incompatible with the Contadora process to
which Nicaragua (P) is a party.

Discussion. Although the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility are primarily based on the principle
that the I.C.J. has only as much power as that agreed to by the parties, these can be quite complicated.
The 1946 declaration of the United States and the 1929 declaration of Nicaragua was the main focus of
the case on declaration and each of these declarations pointed out the respective parties’ intent as it
related to the I.C.J’s jurisdiction.
4. Oposan vs Factoran GR No. 101063, July 30, 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and
granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.”

They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act
of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently,
the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

5. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1(1946)

RULE:

Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred upon it by U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 to define and
punish offences against the Law of Nations, of which the law of war is a part, had by the Articles of War,
10 U.S.C.S. §§ 1471-1593, recognized the "military commission" appointed by military command, as it
had previously existed in United States Army practice, as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and
punishment of offenses against the law of war. Article 15 declares that the provisions of these articles
conferring jurisdiction upon courts martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions or
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by
the law of war may be triable by such military commissions or other military tribunals.

FACTS:

Prior to September 3, 1945, petitioner was the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of
the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands. On that day, he surrendered to the United States
Army and became a prisoner of war. Respondent was the Commanding General of the United States
Army Forces, Western Pacific, whose command embraced the Philippine Islands. Respondent appointed
a military commission to try the petitioner on a charge of violation of the law of war. The gist of the
charge was that petitioner had failed in his duty as an army commander to control the operations of his
troops, "permitting them to commit" specified atrocities against the civilian population and prisoners of
war. Petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to death. Petitioner, seeking a writ of habeas corpus,
contended that the military commission which tried him was unlawfully created and without jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Was the military commission in question unlawfully created, thereby warranting the grant of habeas
corpus in favor of petitioner?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

The court disagreed and denied the writ. First, the commission was not only created by a commander
competent to appoint it, but his order conformed to the established policy of the government and was in
complete conformity with the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 1471-1593. Second, there was authority to
convene the commission, even after hostilities had ended, to try violations of the law of war that were
committed before the war's cessation, at least until peace was officially recognized by treaty or
proclamation. Third, the charge against petitioner, which alleged that he breached his duty to control the
operations of the members of his command by permitting them to commit specified atrocities,
adequately alleged a violation of the law of war. And finally, petitioner was not entitled to any of the
protections afforded by the Geneva Convention, part 3, Chapter 3, § V, Title III, because that chapter
applied only to persons subjected to judicial proceedings for offenses committed while prisoners of war.

6. West Germany vs Denmark and West Germany vs Netherland, International Court of Justice,
February 20, 1969)

Brief Fact Summary.

The view that customary rules of international law determined the boundaries of areas located on the
continental shelf between their countries and the Federal Republic of Germany (D) was contended by
Denmark (P) and the Netherlands (P).

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

For a custom to become binding as international law, it must amount to a settled practice and must be
rendered obligatory by a rule requiring it.

Facts.

That the boundaries between their respective areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea and the
area claimed by the Federal Republic of Germany (D), should be determined by the application of the
principle of equidistance as set forth in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental
Shelf, which by January 1, 1969 had been ratified or acceded to by 39 states but to which Germany was
not a party, was the basis of Denmark’s (D) and the Netherland’s (P) contention.

Because the use of the delimitation method was not merely a conventional obligation, but a rule that
was part of the corpus of general international law and like other rules of general or customary
international law, which was binding automatically on Germany (D), independent of any specific assent,
direct or indirect, given by Germany (D), Denmark (P) and the Netherland’s (P) contended that Germany
(D) was bound to accept the delimitation on an equidistance basis.

Issue.

Must delimitation be the object of an equitable agreement between the states involved?

Held.

Yes. Delimitation must be the object of an equitable agreement between the states involved. As
stipulated in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, equidistance principle is not part of customary
international law. Article 6 makes the obligation to use the equidistance method a secondary one which
comes into play only when agreements between the parties are absent. Although the principle of
equidistance is not given a fundamental norm-creating character by Article 6, which is necessary to the
formation of a general rule of law.

In this case, after taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, the delimitation here is to be
excused by equitable agreement.

Dissent.

(Lachs, J.) not only the states who are parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf have accepted
the principles and rules enshrined in the Convention including the equidistance rule, but by other states
who that have subsequently followed it in agreements, or in their legislation, or have acquiesced in it
when faced with legislative acts of other affecting them. This can be seen as evidence of a practice
widespread enough to satisfy the criteria for a general rule of law.

Discussion.

The concept of opinion juris analyzed by the dissent is in consonance with the position taken by some
legal scholars who maintain that opinio juris may be presumed from uniformities of practice regarding
matters viewed normally as involving legal rights and obligations. A contrary position maintains that the
practice of states must be accompanied by or consist of statements that something is law before it can
become law

7. Belgium vs Spain, International Court of Justice, July 24, 1964

Brief Fact Summary.

Belgium (P) claimed Spain (D) should be held accountable for the injury to a Canadian corporation
operating in Spain.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based on general
international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory.

Facts.
 On behalf of Belgian nationals (P) who had invested in a Canadian corporation, Belgium (P) sued Spain
(D) on the premise that Spain (D) was responsible for acts in violation of international law that had
caused injury to the Canadian corporation and its Belgian shareholders (P).

Issue.

Does a state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based on general
international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory?

Held.

Yes. A state assumes an obligation concerning the treatment of foreign investments based on general
international law, once the state admits foreign investments or foreign nationals into its territory. It is
highly imperative to draw a distinction between those obligations of a state toward the international
community as a whole and those arising from the field of diplomatic protection. It is only the party to
whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim if a breach of an obligation that is the subject
of diplomatic protection occurs.

Discussion.

The basic right of all human persons was mentioned by the Court to be protected against slavery and
racial discrimination as deriving from basic general international law. Such rights may derive from
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character. Such obligations are obligations
erga omnes, that is, all states have a legal interest in their protection.

8. Kuroda vs Jalandoni GR No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

FACTS:

Shigenori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army, is charged before a
military commission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He seeks to establish the illegality of EO 68
on the grounds that it violates our Constitution and that the petitioners are not charged with crimes
based on the law since the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not EO 68 is unconstitutional; and

2) Whether or not Kuroda may be charged with violation of Hague Convention’s rules and regulations

HELD:

Executive Order 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office is valid and constitutional. The president
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted policies of international law which are also part of
the Constitution pursuant to the incorporation clause stipulated in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution. The rules and regulation of Hague Convention form part of and are wholly based on
generally accepted principles of international law and were even accepted by the United States and
Japan for they are signatories to the said convention. Such rules and regulations, therefore, form part of
the law of the Philippines regardless of whether or not it was a signatory to the same. Thus, Kuroda may
be charged for violation of its rules and regulations.

9. Pretty vs UK, (2346/02) European Court of Human Rights, 2002

2) Facts

The applicant, a British national, was paralysed as a result of a degenerative and terminal illness, and
sought a guarantee from the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) that her husband, if he helped her to
commit suicide, would be immune from prosecution. Her intellect and capacity to make decisions
remained unimpaired by the illness. She emphasised her determination to control how and when she
died, but her disease prevented her from committing suicide which is legal under UK law. She claimed
that the domestic law on assisted suicide infringed her rights under Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.

3) Law

The applicant alleged infringement of Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture and
degrading treatment), Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Article 14 (non-
discrimination).

The applicant sought to challenge the validity of the refusal of the DPP to assure her husband’s immunity
from prosecution, and Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, which made it a crime to assist another to
commit suicide.

4) Legal Arguments

The Applicant

The applicant submitted that Article 2 protected the right to life, not life itself, and protected an
individual from arbitrary deprivation of life by a third party, not from the individual’s own choice to die.
She argued that Article 3 encompasses a government’s positive obligation to protect people from
degrading treatment, which is what she believed the manner of her death if unassisted would amount
to; that Article 8 encompassed the right to make decisions about one’s own body and that the state’s
interference with this right was not justified; and that Article 9 protected her freedom to believe in the
notion of assisted suicide, and that the blanket ban in the UK allowed no consideration of the applicant’s
personal circumstances.

Concerning Article 14, the applicant alleged that she suffered discrimination by being treated in the
same way as those whose circumstances were completely different. She was prevented from enjoying
the right to end her own life as exercised by others because of her disability. The applicant submitted
that the Government justified the ban in terms of protecting the vulnerable, but as she was not
vulnerable there was no objective or reasonable justification for the difference in treatment.

The Government

The Government submitted that Article 2 imposed primarily a negative obligation, and expressly
provided that no one should be intentionally deprived of life save in very restricted circumstances which
did not apply to this case. It submitted that Article 3 was not engaged in this case as again it had been
found to comprise a primarily negative obligation except in three exceptional circumstances which did
not apply to this case, and that even if it were engaged it would not confer a legally enforceable right to
die.

Also that Article 8 in providing a right to family life did not provide a right to die, and even if it did then
the State was entitled, within its margin of appreciation, to determine the extent to which an individual
could inflict and injury on him/herself; and that the facts of the case did not fall within the ambit of
Article 9 as it did not confer a general right of an individual to engage in any activity in pursuance of their
beliefs. The Government argued that Article 14 did not apply as the applicant’s complaints did not
engage any of the substantive rights she relied upon. Further to this, it argued that even if Article 14 was
engaged there would still be no discrimination as the applicant was in the same position as others who
were unable to take their own lives without assistance, the Suicide Act 1961 conferred no right to
commit suicide, and there were clear and reasonable justifications for any alleged difference in
treatment.

5) Decision

The Court determined that the facts of the case fell within the ambit of Article 8, which was examined in
conjunction with Article 14, focussing on the claim that she was prevented from exercising a right
enjoyed by others who could end their lives without assistance because they were not prevented from
doing so by any disability. The Court emphasised that under the Convention, discrimination may entail
equal treatment of those in different conditions, but also reiterated that member states have a margin of
appreciation in their application of the convention. In this case, the Court found the Government had
reasonable justification for not creating different legal regimes concerning assisted suicide for those
physically able and those physically unable due to the risk of abuse and undermining of the protection of
life safeguarded by the 1961 Suicide Act. For these reasons, the Court unanimously found no violation of
Article 14 of the Convention, and no violation of Articles 2, 3, 8 and 9.

10. People vs Cayat GR No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.

FACTS:

Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe was found guilty
of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin)
which is not a native wine.

Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the non-Christian
tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called native wines.
Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.

Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies
the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise of police
power.

ISSUES:

Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?

RULING:

No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.

Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications. The
classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification rests on real and
substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the
geographical and more directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act
No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the
past and the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes
often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their
standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the
conditions exist. Legislature understood that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in
hand with it must go measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members
of same class.

11. Beltran vs Secretary of Health GR No. 133640; GR No. 133661 and GR No. 139147, November 25,
2005

FACTS:

RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) was enacted in 1994, seeking to provide an adequate supply of
safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. Section
7 thereof provided for the phaseout of all commercial blood banks within 2 years after its effectivity. The
Act was passed after studies showed that blood transfusions could lead to transmission of diseases, and
that blood sold by persons to commercial blood banks are three times more likely to have blood
transfusion transmissible diseases than those donated to the Philippine National Red Cross. Prior to the
expiration of the commercial blood banks’ licenses, they filed a petition assailing the constitutionality
and validity of RA 7719 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, for discriminating against
freestanding blood banks in a manner, which is not germane to the purpose of the law.

ISSUES:

1. W/N RA 7719 violates the equal protection clause.

2. W/N Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes unlawful deprivation of personal liberty and property.

HELD:

1. NO. One, RA 7719 is based on substantial distinctions. Nonprofit blood banks operate for purely
humanitarian reasons and as a medical service, and encourage voluntary blood donation. On the other
hand, commercial blood banks are motivated by profit and treat blood as a sale of commodity. Two, the
classification and the consequent phaseout of blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law, which
is to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This
necessarily involves the phaseout of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a
business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered
unsafe. Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not
solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to existing
conditions. Four, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

2. NO. In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature
deemed it necessary to phaseout commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners
and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to
serve a higher end for the interest of the public.

DOCTRINE:

Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited; but classification on a
reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.

12. Marcos et al. vs Manglapus GR No. 88211, October 27, 1989

FACTS:

On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos family to allow the return
of former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines. The Court held that
President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances
pose a threat to national interest and welfare.

The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal, fearing the
instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former President Marcos were to be
brought back to the country. In a statement, she said:

"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E.
Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under
this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide."

Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos' remains.

2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is tantamount to
dictatorship.

HELD:

1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power
is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which
are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are
not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the
result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-
in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the
President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and
promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty.

2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the
power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Whereas
the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution refers to an express grant of power.

13. American Bible Society vs City of Manila GR No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

Fact:

In the course of its ministry, Petitioner’s Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or
gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and
translating the same into several Philippine dialects. Respondent informed Petitioner that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the
necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license, in violation of the City Ordinances, and required
plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees. Plaintiff protested
against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay under protest.
To avoid the closing of its, paid the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees. In its
complaint plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinances illegal and
unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff paid under protest,
together with legal interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further praying for such other relief and
remedy as the court may deem just equitable. CFI Dismissed the Petition for lack of merit, which the
petitioner raised the issue to the CA which certified the case to SC for the reason that the errors assigned
to the lower Court involved only questions of law.

In the course of its ministry, Petitioner's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or
gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and
translating the same into several Philippine dialects. Respondent informed Petitioner that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since November 1945, without providing itself with the
necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of the City Ordinances, and required
plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees. Plaintiff protested
against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit and pay under protest.
To avoid the closing of its agency, they paid the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees.
CFI Dismissed the Petition for lack of merit, which the petitioner raised the issue to the CA which
certified the case to SC for the reason that the errors assigned to the lower Court involved only questions
of law.

Issues:

1. Whether the Selling activity of the Petitioner is exempted from Taxation?

2. Whether the Mayor’s Permit requirement impair Petitioner’s right to the free exercise and enjoyment
of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs?

Held:

1. Yes, It may be true that in this said case, the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said “merchandise” for profit. For the
reason that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to
appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

2. No, the Mandatory obtention of the Mayor’s permit before any person can engage in any of the
businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein do not imposes any charge upon the enjoyment
of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. That Ordinance No.
3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society.

14. Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance GR No. 115455, October 30, 1995

FACTS:

The case is a resolution of a motion of reconsideration filed by the petitioners in line with the decision
rendered by the Court En Banc on August 25, 1994 dismissing the original petition. Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act 7716 otherwise known as the ExpandedValue-Added Tax Law. They
assert that it is violative of the equal protection clause of theconstitution among other contentions. In
the first decision rendered by the Supreme Court, it heldthat there have been no notices of assessments
issued to petitioners and no determinations at theadministrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate
the actual operation of the law and enablethe Court to reach sound judgment regarding the
fundamental questions raised in the petition.There is a lack of empirical data on which the conclusion
that it will hit the poor and middle-income group in the society on which they could base the conclusion
regarding the arguments.

ISSUE:

Whether RA 7719 is violative of the equal protection clause.

HELD:
No. Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds ofproperty of the same
class be taxed at the same rate. To satisfy this, it is enough that thestatute or ordinance applies equally
to all persons, forms, and corporations placed insimilar situation. There is no fully developed record
which can show the actual impact of the E-VAT. Petitioners have no factual foundation to show the
concrete application of the law and theactual impact on property rights. There is a need for proof of
such persuasive character thatwould lead the Court to believe that such law is void on its face, absent
such a showing, thepresumption of constitutionality must prevail.

15. Sahin vs Turkey, No. 44774/98, EC+HR November 10, 2005

Brief Fact Summary.

A Turkish Muslim by the name Sahin (P) alleged that the Republic of Turkey (D) violated her rights and
freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by
banning the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in institutions of higher education.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Students rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms are not violated when a secular country places a ban on wearing religious clothing in
institutions of higher education.

Facts.

Sahin (P) had a traditional background of family practicing Muslims and considered it her religious duty
to wear the Islamic headscarf. When she was in her 5th year at the faculty of medicine of the University
of Istanbul in 1998, the Vice-Chancellor of the University issued a circular which stipulated that students
with beards and wearing the Islamic headscarf would be refused admission to lectures, courses and
tutorials. Sahin (P) was denied access to a written exam and the University authorities refused to enroll
her in a course and to admit her to various lectures and other written exams because of the Islamic
headscarf she was putting on. She later left the University to further her studies in Vienna and had lived
in Vienna since then. Before leaving Istanbul, Sahin (P) filed an application against the Republic of Turkey
(P) with the European Commission of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms alleging that her rights
and freedom under the Convention had been violated. A judgment was rendered by the European Court
after it heard the case.

Issue.
Are students’ rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms violated when a secular country places a ban on the wearing of religious
clothing in institutions of higher learning?

Held.

No. Student’s rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms are not violated when a secular country places a ban on wearing religious
clothing in institutions of higher education. Constitutionally, Turkey (D) is a secular state founded on the
principles of equality without regard to distinctions based on sex, religion or denomination. In 1989,
Turkey’s (D) Constitutional Court decided that granting legal recognition to a religious symbol such as the
Islamic headscarf was not compatible with the principle that the state education must be neutral and
might generate conflicts between students of different religions. The Vice Chancellor explained the
banning of the headscarf at the University School of Medicine in a memorandum which was circulated
that the ban was not intended to infringe on students freedom of conscience or religion, but to comply
with the laws and regulations in force and that such compliance would be sensitive to patients’ rights.
Hence, the ban did not prohibit Muslim students from manifesting their religion in accordance with
habitual forms of Muslim observance and it was not directed only at Muslim attire. So the view of the
Court should not be interchanged for that of the University who are better placed to evaluate local
needs. The right to behave in a manner governed by a religion belief is not guaranteed by Article 9 and it
also does not confer on people who do so the right to disregard rules that have proved to be justified. By
giving due regard to Turkey’s (D) margin of appreciation, the interference here was justified in principle
and proportionate to aim pursued. Hence, Article 9 was not contravened.

Dissent.

(Tulkens, J.) Religious freedom is necessary for the protection of a democratic society and not secularism
alone. Therefore, the Court should have established that the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf was
necessary to secure compliance with secularism and met a “pressing social need.” But a cogent example
supporting the Court’s view is not provided. Hence, the ban was not based on relevant or sufficient
reasons and therefore cannot be deemed interference that is “necessary in a democratic society” within
Article 9 S 2’s meaning. Sahin (P) right to freedom of religion under the Convention has therefore been
breached.

Discussion.

Margin of appreciation is the word-for-word English translation of the French phrase “marge
d’appreciation,” a concept used in a number of courts in Europe, among them the Strasbourg human
rights court and the European Union courts in Luxembourg. The Court is covered under the margin of
appreciation to account for the fact that the Convention will be interpreted differently in different
signatory states, so that judges are obliged to take into account the cultural, historic and philosophical
contexts of the particular nation in question.

16. Chaplinsky vs State of New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568 (1962)

Brief Fact Summary.

Chaplinsky was convicted under a State statute for calling a City Marshal a “God damned racketeer” and
a “damned fascist” in a public place.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

“Fighting words” are not entitled to protection under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution)

Facts.

A New Hampshire statute prohibited any person from addressing any offensive, derisive or annoying
word to any other person who is on any street or public place or calling him by any derisive name.
Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, called a City Marshal a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned fascist”
in a public place and was therefore arrested and convicted under the statute.

Issue.

Did the statute or the application of the statute to Chaplinsky’s comments violate his free speech rights
under the First Amendment of the Constitution?

Held.

No. The lower court is affirmed.

Considering the purpose of the First Amendment of the Constitution, it is obvious that the right to free
speech is not absolute under all circumstances. There are some narrowly defined classes of speech that
have never been protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. These include “fighting words,”
words that inflict injury or tend to excite an immediate breach of the peace. Such words are of such little
expositional or social value that any benefit they might produce is far outweighed by their costs on social
interests in order and morality.

The statute at issue is narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of
government power. Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, which is the ultimate arbiter of
the meanings of New Hampshire law, has defined the Statute as applying only to “fighting words”.
Therefore, the Statute does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the right of free speech.

Discussion.
 By holding that “fighting words” are not protected forms of speech the Supreme Court of the United
States (Supreme Court) announced a rare form of content based restriction on speech that is
permissible. The student should consider what characteristics distinguish a “fight word” from a bona fide
criticism. One difference may lie in the speaker’s intent. “Fighting words” are intended to inflict harm,
bona-fide criticisms are intended to communicate ideas. Another difference may lie in the differing likely
effects of each: “fighting words” are likely to provoke the average person to violence while bona fide
criticisms are not.

17. People vs Doriquez, GR No. L-24444-45, July 29, 1968

FACTS:

Accused Doriquez was charged with the offense of grave oral defamation before the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo. Six days later, Doriquez was indicted before the same court for discharge of firearm.
Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. Subsequently, he moved to dismiss
both information. One of his contentions is that the institution of criminal action for discharge of firearm
places him in double jeopardy for he had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad,
Iloilo which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the offense of alarm and
scandal based on the same facts. The court denied the motion to dismiss. The motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused Doriquez was placed in double jeopardy by charging the offense of discharge of
firearm.

HELD:

No. For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things, that there is
"identity of offenses." It is altogether evident, however, that the offense of discharge of firearm is not
the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be
asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could
the reverse situation be true, for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or
subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony. Although the indictment for alarm and
scandal filed under Article 155 of the Revised Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm
instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose
from the same factual setting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a common element), they are
definitely diverse in law. Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same felony - alarm and scandal
is an offense against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the
indispensable element of the former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or
danger to the public, while the grava men of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain
person, without intent to kill. The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the
two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be
connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only
for the same offense or identical offense. The instant appeal is premature, and the present appeal is
dismissed. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin for immediate trial on the merits.

18. Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec GR 119976 September 18, 1995

FACTS:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte. Cirilo Roy Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did not meet the
one-year residency requirement. Marcos then filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
claiming that her error in the first certificate was the result of an ―honest misrepresentation and that
she has always ―maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated
by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution

HELD:

Yes. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution‘s residency qualification
requirement (as intended by the framer‘s of the constitution). When she got married to the late
President, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article
110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husband‘s right to
transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or
intend to lose the wife‘s domicile of origin.