Estrada vs.

Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

Facts:

Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by
RA 7659.

On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of

pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves
at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal

prosecutions

3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under

The Revised Penal Code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate

Informations against petitioner.

Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary

investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to
prove lack of probable cause but was denied.

Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558
finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.

Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense
since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and
that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense.
Same was denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

2. Whether the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder leads to its violation of the right of
the accused to due process.

3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if

so, whether it is within the power of Congress to classify it as such.

RULE:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids

or requires the doing of an act in terms sovague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.

The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose may not

be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which

is overbroad because of a possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
This rationale does NOT apply to penal statutes.

HELD:

1. NO. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the
employment of general terms or the failure to define the terms used therein.
The validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law provides some
comprehensible guide as to what would render those subject to the said law
liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of
imprecise language.
2. NO. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in criminal
prosecutions to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Thus he is
entitled to an acquittal unless the State succeeds in demonstrating the guilt
of the accused withproof beyond reasonable doubt. The contention that Sec.
4 of RA 7080 does away with proof of each and every component of the
crime is a misconception. Rather than proving each and every criminal act
done, it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the crime as a whole.

3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The

legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as
constitutionally valid in a previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se.

DISPOSITIVE:

Premises considered, the Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known

as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
Thus, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

PEOPLE vs. HOLGADO

G.R. No. L-2809. March 22, 1950

Facts:

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the CFI of Romblon with slight
illegal detention. According to the information, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the
house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said
Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty."

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the information above

described without a counsel but the accused was only instructed to plead
guilty by one Numeriano Ocampo.

It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the

judgment, the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while
in the body of the judgment it is said that the accused "stands charged with
the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention."

In the information filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses

Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention."

The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense
charged is merely "slight illegal detention" as the offense is named therein or
the capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by
the trial judge in his judgment.

Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have

been presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the
capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information.

Issue:

Whether the accussed was sufficiently given the right to counsel.

Rule:

Under the provision of Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, when a
defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to
comply with: (1) It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have
attorney before being arraigned; (2) after giving him such information the
court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; (3) if he desires and
is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him; and 4) if the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own
the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.

Our Constitution guarantees is that "no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel."

Held:

No. The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea
of accused.

The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you have an
attorney or are you going to plead guilty?"

 Not only did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his right
to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question
was so framed that it could have been construed by the accused as a
suggestion from the court that he plead guilty if he had no attorney.

 And this is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause
contained in our Constitution.

The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo
was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to
the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on
this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of
determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may
vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became
satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo
and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of
the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the
fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But
above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by
counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be
assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by
him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the
court.

Dispositive:

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the
Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after the accused is
apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel. So ordered.

People vs. Liwanag

GR No. L-27683 October 19, 1976

Facts:

In June 1942, accused Silvestre Liwanag, who grew up from the fams of
Pampanga, fired by patriotic fervor, joined HUKBALAHAP. He held the
position of commander of Squadron 18-E with the station in Lubao,
Pampanga until 1944, when he was promoted to the rank of military
inspector, a position he held until liberation when the organization was
disbanded. Before the national elections of 1946, the Hukbalahap was
revived. The accused was designated provincial commander for Pampanga
and later as vice commander of the Central Luzon Regional Command
(CLRC).
In 1948, CPP held a conference in the mountains of Norzagaray, Bulacan
attended by the accused. In that conference, it was also agreed to change
the name of "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB. Being a member of
the Hukbalahap and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, the accused was designated as supervisor and adviser to
Squadron 18 of Field Command (FC) of the HMB operating in the province of
Bataan until early in 1956. Among his duties were to see to it that orders
and directives coming from the Regional Command (RECO) 2, comprising
the provinces of Bataan, Zambales, Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinan and
Bulacan, are obeyed and implemented. The accused upon orders of his
superior, planned and effected the capture of Orani, Bataan in 1949 and
Camp Makabolos in Tarlac on August 26, 1950.

In February, 1958, the accused and his men had an encounter with
Government forces in Magalang, Pampanga. The HMB sustained three
casualties, while the Government had two, including a P.C. lieutenant. The
HMB under the command of the appellant retreated to San Fernando,
Pampanga, where they stayed until about the last part of March 1958, when
they again had an encounter with the P.C. and had to retreat to Bataan.

After this encounter, the accused asked for, and was granted, leave to rest
and recuperate from his ailment which he spent in the mountain of Bataan.
Although on leave, his advice was sought after.

In the evening of June 21, 1960, a PC patrol led by then Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion captured the accused and his wife, Rosita Manuel, in their
hideout at Barrio Kalungusan, Orion, Bataan.

For violation of the provisions of RA 1700, Silvestre Liwanag was charged in

an information filed before the CFI of Bataan, for having unlawfully and
wilfully continued and remained as officer and/or ranking leader of the
outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, until his apprehension on June 21, 1960,
without having renounced his aforementioned leadership and/or membership
therein within the period prescribed by law, and, while remaining as such
leader or high-ranking member, has taken up arms against the Government
by making and conducting raids, ambuscades and armed attacks against
civilians, Philippine Constabulary, and local police forces.

On April 14, 1961, the appellant filed a motion to quash the information
upon the grounds that the defendant has been previously convicted of
rebellion based upon the same overt acts as in the instant case, and that RA
No. 1700 is an ex post facto law (bill of attainder) in that it changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment or penalty than that annexed
to the crime when committed. The court denied the motion on September
11, 1961.

At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the preliminary
investigation were recalled and were again cross-examined by counsel for
the appellant. To bolster their case, the prosecution presented 3 additional
witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented the appellant himself
who stated that after his apprehension, he was charged with rebellion before
the CFI of Pampanga and found guilty thereof; and he was also charged with
murder before the CFI of Tarlac and acquitted; and that he surrendered to
the PC patrol at Calungusan, Orion, Bataan on June 21, 1960.

On being cross-examined by the court, however, the appellant admitted

membership in the Hukbalahap, and later in the HMB, from 1948 to 1960,
and did not take advantage of the amnesty offered in 1948.

The trial court rendered the decision finding the accused guilty.

Issues:

1. Whether Liwanag was deprived of his fundamental right to confront the

witnesses against him.

2. Whether the "two-witness" rule on the same overt act has not been
observed and complied with in convicting him.

3. Whether Liwanag, since he had already been convicted of rebellion,

cannot now be prosecuted for subversion.

Held:

1. NO. The Constitution guarantees an accused person the right to meet

the witnesses against him fact of face. This provision "intends to secure
the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are
concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who
give their opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the
conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex-parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the
witnesses in the exercise of the right of cross-examination."

Here, the testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief

are not ex-parte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down
by question and answer during the preliminary investigation in the
presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected the said
witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination. The inclusion of said
testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to further cross-
examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduce and,
pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the
trial and again examined in the presence of the appellant. Upon the fact,
there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the accused to meet
the witnesses face to face.

2. The "two-witness" rule was observed. The law adverted to, Section 7
of RA No. 1700, provides that "No person shall be convicted of any of the
offenses penalized herein with prision mayor to death unless on the
testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession of
the accused in open court."

The offense is punishable by prision mayor to death if the offender is an

officer or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any
subversive association a defined in Section 2 of RA No. 1700; or if such
member takes up arms against the Government.

Here, appellant's being an officer or ranking leader of the Communist Party

of the Philippines and its military arm, the HMB, is borne out by the
testimony of Santos Miguel, Melencio Guevara, Pablo Guintu, and
Lazaro Esteban, former associates of the appellant in the CPP and
the HMB. In addition, there is his sworn statement wherein the appellant
admitted membership in the Central Committee of the CPP and recounted
his prismatic rise in the "Hukbalahap" and later in the HMB, as well as the
numerous armed clashed he and his men had with the Philippine
Constabulary and police forces. There is also the testimony of Pablo
Guintu, Melencio Guevara, and Sgt. Sales Cresencia as to the gun
battle between a PC patrol and a group of HMB men led by the
appellant on June 8, 1960, in Mt. Timak, Abucay, Bataan, and on June 21,
1960, in Calungusan, Orion, Bataan, where the appellant was captured along
with his wife.

Besides, appellant admitted in court that he was a member of the

"Hukbalahap" and later the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or
HMB and fought against the government.

3. Violation of RA No. 1700, or subversion, is a crime distinct from

that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising
publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes
specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion
Act (RA No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive
organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising
and the taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion,
mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient, and the taking up
of arms by a member of a subersive organization against the Government is
but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the
offender.

In the rebellion case, the appellant and several others were charged and
convicted of rebellion for having risen publicly and taken up arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing the allegiance of the Republic of
the Philippines or its law, the territory of the Philippines, and in furtherance
thereof, engaged in combat against the forces of the Government, destroyed
property, and committed serious violence during the period from May 28,
1946 to June 19, 1957.

In the instant case, however, the accused is prosecuted under RA No. 1700
for having remained a high ranking member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its military arm, the HMB, from January, 1946 to June 21,
1960, without having renounced his membership in said organizations; and,
being a member or officer of said subversive association, has taken up arms
against the Government.

Although the information charges the appellant with having taken up

arms against the Government, the same is not specific as to the
period covered by it. But, since the appellant is prosecuted for
violation of RA No. 1700 it is deducible that the period covered is
that from June 20, 1957, when the Act took effect, up to June 21,
1960, when the appellant was captured. Inasmuch as the rebellion case
covered the period up to June 19, 1957 and the period covered in the instant
case is from June 20, 1957 to June 21, 1960, the claim of having been put
twice in jeopardy for the same act cannot be sustained.

Dispositive:

UPON THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is,
hereby affirmed, with costs.

Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

GR No. 183871 February 19, 2013

Facts:

On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa

Gawa Adhikan, was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air
Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS) based in Lipa City while attending
a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and detained at
the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless
interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be a
military asset.

Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma,
Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She likewise
reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal
and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their
investigation.

Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation

which indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed
a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25 October
2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to
immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for
damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of
them on the case of Lourdes.

The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to
the Court of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At
the hearing conducted on 20 November 2007, the CA granted petitioner’s
motion that the petition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana,
Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped
the President as respondent in the case.

On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial

judgment, dismissing the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero,
Gomez, and Ombudsman.

Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as party respondent, should

be dropped from the case that was dismissed by CA.

2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an

amparo petition.

Held:

1. YES. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our
system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present
constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the
matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no
need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of
the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such.

The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other
respondents for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make
out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and
the threats and harassment that followed.

2. Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in

amparo proceedings - Command responsibility, as a concept defined,
developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in
amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine
finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats.
According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms,
means theresponsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.

The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command

responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for
failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.

There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under

the Doctrine of Command Responsibility – While there are several
pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that
provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be
contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the
command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international
law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation
clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to
have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual
respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of
amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any
issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed.

Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate

ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own
initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end – The right
to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the
government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations
of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind.
The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez
Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government.

The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted

judiciously – The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to
protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free
from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an
extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to
the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest
the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to
secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court partially granted the petition for review. It issued a
decision as follows:

(1) Affirming the dropping of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from

the petition;

(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the
command responsibility principle, to attach accountability and responsibility
to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the alleged
enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly
committed against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to
the Ombudsman is also affirmed for failure of the petition to allege ultimate
facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and

(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the
incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the
investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged
abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she
and her daughterswere made to endure are pursued with extraordinary
diligence as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule. The Chief of Staff of
the AFP and Director-General of the PNP are directed to order their
subordinateofficials, in particular, to do the following:

(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and
locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy
Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and
submit certifications of this determination to the OMBUDSMAN with copy
 furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court;

(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to

Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and

(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses,

cartographic sketches of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana,
Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid
inpositively identifying and locating them.The investigations shall be
completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of the Decision; and
within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of
Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the PNP are likewise directed
to submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the
CA,the OMB, and petitioners.

The Supreme Court accordingly referred the case back to the CA for the
purpose of monitoring theinvestigations and the actions of the AFP and the
PNP.

Bernat vs Sandiganbayan

GR No. 158018, May 20, 2004

Facts:

On August 14, 1991, petitioner, along with several co-accused, were

charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After arraignment and the presentation of the parties’ testimonial and
documentary evidence, the case was eventually submitted for decision on
August 23, 1994 before the Second Division. Thereafter, the case remained
pending and unacted upon until the reorganization of the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to Administrative Order 266-97, and the case was unloaded to the
newly created Fifth Division.

The case was originally assigned to Justice Godofredo Legaspi. Later, it was
re-assigned to Justice Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada on November 3, 1998.

Justice Cortez-Estrada was writing the decision of the case, she found out
that the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) was missing from the
records turned over to her.

Clerk of Court of the Fifth Division informed the parties and ordered them to
attend a conference to discuss on April 19, 2002

Petitioner filed a comment manifesting that he is strongly averse to any

further proceeding occasioned by the lack of stenographic notes, as he
should not be prejudiced by the fault or negligence of another

On September 4, 2002, petitioner filed his Motion to Dismiss but was

dismissed by Sandiganbayan

Issue:

Whether there was a violation of the constitutional prohibition against

unreasonable delay in the disposition of a criminal case which stands
undecided until May 2004 although submitted for decision on August 25,
1994.

Rule:

Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of all

persons to a “speedy disposition of their cases.” Nevertheless, this right is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays.
Moreover, the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is
relative and cannot be based on a mere mathematical reckoning of time.
Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case.

As a guideline, the Court in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan mentioned certain

factors that should be considered and balanced, namely: 1) length of delay;
2) reasons for the delay; 3) assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and 4) prejudice caused by the delay.

Held:

NO. the Court finds there was no violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy
disposition of his case.

It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right —
a situation amounting to laches. petitioner herein failed seasonably to assert
his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. During the 8-year
period, prior to the April 19, 2002 conference between the parties, petitioner
did not complain about the long delay in deciding his case. It was only after
the missing TSN’s were brought to his attention that petitioner showed an
interest in the termination of his case.

While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly
from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always
zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not
attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people’s equally
important right to public justice.
 Chavez vs CA

GR No. L-29169 August 19, 1968

Facts:

Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo

Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual,
Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses
alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.

An information was filed that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962,
in Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of
confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim,
in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not
been identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.

Trial Court:

On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City.

During the trial, the Fiscal Grecia (prosecution) asked Roger Chavez to be
the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends
that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state
witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client.
But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal on the grounds that: (1) the right
of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand
including the accused; (2) If there should be any question that is
incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection
and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer
of this witness to the question would incriminate him; and (3) Counsel has
all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer
 questions which would incriminate him.

Version of the prosecution of what happened:

Chavez saw Lee driving the thunderbird (car) and asked if it is for
sale. Lee answered yes. On November 12, Chavez met Sumilang and
informed about the car. The two went to Asistio and made a plan to
capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star,
introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the
deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would
then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a
car agent was included in the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee
who was selling his Thunderbird.

Chavez arranged the meeting with Lee on November 14. They agreed on
the price and went to Binondo to meet Dy Sun Hiok Lim which is the
registered owner of the car. Deed of sale was drawn and signed
by Sumilang. At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note
which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang
then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to
the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed
of sale of the car to the note bearer.

The two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. The two Chinese could
not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the
Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately
reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already
repainted car and impounded it. Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged
that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the
Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang
P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the
transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration of the car
was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three
days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.

Version of Romeo Sumilang:

In the last week of September 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a

 gas station. The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from
Clark Field for sale for a price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00.
Chavez said that it could be held for him with a down payment of
P10,000.00.

On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news

that the car was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the
money. So Sumilang got P9,000.00 from his mother and another
P4,000.00 from his aparador. He immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez,
intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery. It was then that
Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese who
would be the vendor.

At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang

accommodated. There, Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual
who warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that
Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. A certain Bimbo, a friend
of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign. After
Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his
fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez and also by
Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. This receipt was
offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang. Johnson Lee
turned over to Sumilang the deed of sale, the registration papers and the
keys to the car.

Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on

his way to a film shooting he saw Asistio who liked his Thunderbird parked
outside. Asistio offered to buy it from him for P22,500.00 and Sumilang
consented to the sale. Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the
balance he promised to pay the next day after negotiating with some
financing company. Before said balance could be paid, the car was
impounded.

Ruling of the trial court and CA:

The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, he was thus

cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere
buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was
discounted. As to the other accused, the court found no case against
Pedro Rebulloalias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". The accused
"Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not
identified by Johnson Lee in court.

As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez
does not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as
witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a self-confessed culprit"

Chavez filed an appeal. The counsel of Chavez, Atty. Marquez, was

ordered to file brief but she failed. Instead she sent filed a written detailed
information and also stating that if she were allowed to file appellant's
brief she would go along with the factual findings of the court below but
will show however that its conclusion is erroneous. CA dismissed
said appeal.

On June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, directed the City Warden of
Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued
by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons
pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the
case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.

Hence the petition for habeas corpus.

Issues:

1. Whether the constitutional right of the accused against self

incrimination was violated.

2. Whether the petition for habeas corpus is the right recourse of the
accused.

Held:

1. YES. The Court held that such right is "not merely a formal
technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of
the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and
substantive right. Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's
own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as
much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts
usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which
is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand —with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free,
genuine will. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily
connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational
judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending
to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.

In the case, petitioner was called by the prosecution as the first witness in
that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof.
Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This
he broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But
petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic
statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to
act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that
defense counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the
witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that accused-
petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create
evidence against himself. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused
as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him.

With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was

forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he
has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in
his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on
the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify.
If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of
being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance
cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To
him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in
proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him
under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape
testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least
on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day
of the trial. There is no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a
waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably,
and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has
been fully accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to
have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain evidence.

2. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpusis a

high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional
remedy to release a person whoseliberty is illegally restrained such as
when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect
results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the
trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental
right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by
collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This
writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective maybe
availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his
appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the
writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger
Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a
constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends
the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto. The Court stated that: "A void judgment is in legal effect
no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be
obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are
equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed
under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to
enforce it may be responsible as trespassers... "

Dispositive:

Petition granted. The Court rendered judgment directing the respondent

Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other
officer or person in custody of petitioner to discharge him from custody.
 Herrera vs Sandiganbayan

GR Nos. 119660-61 February 13, 2009

Facts:

Pat. Edgardo Herrera and Pat. Redentor Mariano, together with Pat. Roberto
Barrera andPat. Rodolfo Alcalde, all members of the Paranaque Police
Station, were charged with 2 countsof murder, for killing Shi Shu Yang and
George Go, before the Sandiganbayan (SB).

(NOTE: The other two accused, Barrera and Alcalde, did not file any more
pleading after they were convicted that’s why they are not part of the case.)

That on or about December 28, 1989 in Paranaque, Herrera and Mariano

who werelighting firecrackers near Chow Chow which is the restaurant
owned by Go, and when Go camedown with his pistol, he was apprehended
by Pat. Barrera who introduced himself as apoliceman, asked for the license
of the .45 caliber pistol, and told Go that he will bring the firearmto the
police station for verification.

Barrera ordered Go and his Taiwanese friend Shi Shu toboard their jeepney.
(In short, kinda like entrapment/instigation). The police officers also ordered
the Go and Yang to undergo medical examination and thus they were taken
to theParanaque Community Hospital (PCH). Thereafter, Go and Yang were
brought to Timothy Street, Multinational Village where they were killed. The
defense on the other hand claims that Herreraand Mariano were just
assisting Barrera in bringing some persons for medical examination. Priorto
the shooting incident, they were informed that George Go was previously
arrested by Barrerafor illegal possession of firearm. They brought Go and
Yang to the PCH and on the way back tothe police station, they heard a
struggle ensue at the back of the patrol van as Alcalde said, “George,
bitawan mo ang baril ko.” And then they heard successive shots. When they
looked back, they saw Go grappling for the possession of a firearm (later on,
they said it was an armalite)with Alcalde, they stopped the car and alighted
to pacify the trouble but alas there were moreshots and they found Go and
Young bloodied. (Basically, Herrera and Mariano testified individually but
they said almost the same things.) The defense also presented Dr. Soliven’s
findings that Go was positive for alcohol and that Go had no signs of physical
injuries.

What really happened: Mariano parked the patrol van along Timothy Street
which wasa practically deserted area, isolated from traffic and pedestrians.
Alcalde, Barrera,and petitioner Herrera brought out the two handcuffed
victims from the back portion of thepatrol van in order to eventually salvage
them. Petitioner Mariano appeared to be faking analleged interrogation and
was trying to get the name of Shi Shu Yang, whose identity was thennot yet
immediately known. Later, petitioner Mariano also participated in shooting at
theunarmed victims. The SB convicted Herrera and Mariano each for 2
counts of murder, and denied petitioners’ Joint Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, Herrera and Mariano filed a petition for review on certiorari

Issues:

1. Whether the amended informations placed the petitioners in double

jeopardy.

2. Whether the petitioners' counsel is allowed to conduct further cross-

examination on prosecution-witness Winterhalter.

3. Whether the testimony of Winterhalter is wanting in credibility

4. Whether the petitioners acted in self-defense.

5. Whether there was no absolute evidence to support conspiracy.

6. Whether petitioners are entitled to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official acts.

7. Whether the petitioners are guilty of Murder.

Held:

1. NO. Public respondent Sandiganbayan ordered the amendment of the

informations and made it of record that the evidence adduced during the
pre-trial of the case and the hearing on the petition for bail shall be deemed
automatically reproduced as evidence during the trial of the case on the
merits. Double jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioner's plea of not
guilty under the amended information. For a claim of double jeopardy to
prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4)
the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or
terminated without his express consent.

In the present case, petitioners and the other accused pleaded not guilty to
the original informations. Thereafter, at the instance of the petitioners,
through a joint petition for bail, they raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
on the ground that the prosecution failed to allege in the informations that
the crimes were committed "in relation to their office." On the same day,
respondent court ordered the amendment of the informations accordingly.
Thus, the first requirement for double jeopardy to attach, that is, that the
informations against the petitioners were valid, has not been complied with.

Likewise, the fourth element was lacking. Petitioners cannot be validly

convicted on the basis of the original information as the prosecution failed to
allege in the informations that the crimes were committed "in relation to
their office." Petitioners were thus not placed in danger of being convicted
when they entered their plea of not guilty to the insufficient information.
Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case against
petitioners.

Furthermore, it was well-within the power of public respondent

Sandiganbayan to order the amendment of the information under Section 4,
Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that if the motion
to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which
can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

2. YES. Rule 132, Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-
examined by the adverse party as to any matter stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to
test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. The cross-
examination of a witness is a right of a party against whom he is called.
Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution states that the accused shall
have the right to meet the witnesses face to face. Rule 115, Section 1(f) of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also states that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him. Indeed, petitioners' counsel has conducted an
extensive cross-examination of witness Winterhalter on the scheduled dates
of hearing. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim there has been any
procedural infirmity in the proceedings.

Moreover, the trial court has the power to direct the course of the trial either
to shorten or to extend the direct or cross examination of a counsel. Under
Rule 133, Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court may stop
the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the
evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point
cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power
should be exercised with caution. Thus, it is within the prerogative of the
trial court to determine when to terminate the presentation of the evidence
of the prosecution or the defense.

3. YES. The trial court had the opportunity to observe first-hand the
demeanor and deportment of the witnesses, and, therefore, its findings that
the witnesses for the prosecution are to be believed over those of the
defense are entitled to great weight. Winterhalter recognized the petitioners
as the ones who cooperated with Pat. Barrera in killing the victims. She saw
the events unfolding with the use of her binoculars 80-90 meters away. She
established the identity of the petitioners as the companions of Pat. Barrera
when he effected the killing. It has been ruled that findings of fact of the
trial court on credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect.
The Court has refrained from interfering with the judgment of the
trial court in passing on the credibility of witnesses unless there
appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which as been
misapprehended or misinterpreted. None exists in this case.

After the incident, Winterhalter's neighbor, who was also a foreigner, has
been receiving death threats. She herself has been getting death threats
too, yet she voluntarily testified in order to shed light on the commission of
the crime. In fact, she did not even know the two victims. Indeed, where
there is nothing to indicate that a witness was moved by improper
motives, his positive and categorical declarations on the witness
stand, made under solemn oath, should be given full faith and
credence. It has not been shown that Winterhalter has any reason to
falsely implicate petitioners.

Winterhalter narrated that Pat. Barrera and Pat. Alcalde, together with
petitioners, were responsible for the death of the victims. This was
confirmed by the post mortem report prepared by Dr. Roberto Garcia,
medico legal officer of the NBI, showing the gunshot wounds on the different
parts of the victims' body.

4. NO. By invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, petitioners

assume the onus of proving: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Petitioners failed to discharge this burden.

To proceed with the argument that there was unlawful aggression by the two
deceased who tried to get the pistol tucked in the waist of one of the police
officers, petitioners should prove that they used reasonable means in
repelling the aggression. Considering that both deceased where
handcuffed and unarmed and had restricted movements, it could
only mean that the perceived threat to petitioners' lives were not
sufficiently serious, in which case they were not justified in shooting
the hapless victims who were unarmed. Petitioners could have
simply subdued the two victims in a manner as to engage them in a
fight without necessarily killing them. Moreover, the autopsy reports
showing the extent of the wounds sustained by George Go and Shi Shu Yang
tend to discredit the version of the defense.

5. NO. Conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly
manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a
crime. The familiar rule in conspiracy is that when two or more persons
agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible, when the
conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
conspiracy.

In this case, petitioner Herrera drove the vehicle along Timothy Street to a
place which was less conspicuous to passersby. There, Pat. Alcalde, Pat.
Barrera, and petitioner Mariano brought out the two victims from the back
portion of the van in order to perpetuate the killing. Petitioner Mariano
alighted from the right front seat of the van and stood beside Pat. Alcalde
and Pat. Barrera who began shooting the victims. According to Winterhalter,
petitioner Mariano even appeared to be writing something on a sheet of
paper immediately before the shooting, although it cannot be determined
with certainty as to whether he was making an inquiry or merely noting the
names of the victims. While it was Pat. Barrera who actually shot the
two victims, the evidence showed a common design on the part of
both petitioners as they did not do anything to prevent him from
killing the victims, thus, indicative of the fact that they are in unison
with the criminal design of the Pat. Barrera. Petitioner Herrera alighted
form the van without doing anything to prevent the killing, and worse, after
the killing took place along the street, petitioner Herrera even helped carry
the two victims into the van while petitioner Mariano, the driver, remained in
the vehicle during the incident. Consequently, applying the rule that the
act of one is the act of all, petitioners are thus as guilty as Pat.
Barrera and Pat. Alcalde. In fact, conspiracy need not be established
by direct evidence but may be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances.

6. NO. In order to consider the defense of fulfillment of a duty, it must be

shown that: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of a right or office.

There was no showing that petitioners should resort to inflicting

injuries and even to the extent of killing the victims as there was no
resistance at all from them when they were apprehended. The two
victims were handcuffed and unarmed while the petitioners and the other
police officers were armed with pistols and a rifle. Aida Veloria Magsipoc,
Supervising Forensic Chemist of the NBI conducted the paraffin test
on George Go and Shi Shu Yang which yielded negative results, thus
showing that the victims never fired a gun and were totally
defenseless in the face of the fully armed police officers.

Moreover, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused

are constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia
which disprove a plea of self-defense or defense of stranger because
they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just
defend oneself. The victims were repeatedly shot at close range and on
vital parts of their bodies, thus indicia that the police officers really intended
to kill them. Clearly, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties on the part of the petitioners and the other police officers does
not apply.

7. YES. The killing of the two victims was proved to have been committed
with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The essence of treachery is a
deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. Frontal attack can be
treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.
What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for
the victim to defend himself/herself or to retaliate.
Clearly, the elements of murder have been proven: 1). that the two victims
were killed; 2). that petitioners and the two other accused killed the victims;
3). that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery
committed by the petitioners and the two other accused who conspired
together in killing the victims; and 4). that the killing was not parricide or
infanticide.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of showing that public

respondent Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error. The Decision of
public respondent Sandiganbayan, dated December 13, 1994, finding
petitioners Pat. Eduardo Herrera y Baltoribio and Pat. Redentor Mariano y
Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals for two (2) counts
of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the time of
their sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification for public office is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Additionally, petitioners are ORDERED to
pay the heirs of Shi Shu Yang and George Go y Tan each in the amount of
P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, P11,500 for actual
damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages. Costs against the
petitioners.

Robertson vs Baldwin

165 US 75 January 25, 1897

Facts:

Robert Robertson and three other seamen contracted with a shipping

company to serve on a voyage of the barkentine Arago from San Francisco
to Washington State and then to Valparaiso, Chile. By the time the ship
reached Astoria, Oregon, the men had become dissatisfied with the work.
They departed the ship without permission.

The master of the Arago sought and obtained a warrant for their arrest
pursuant to the Shipping Commissioner’s Act of 1872. U.S. Marshal Barry
Baldwin jailed them pending the Arago’s departure date, and then forcibly
returned them shipboard.

With help from the Seamen’s Union of the Pacific, they challenged the
constitutionality of the Shipping Commissioner’s Act.

Issue:

Whether sections 4598 and 4599 conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment,
forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude.

Held:

NO. the Supreme Court rejected their suit, holding that merchant seamen
under contract could be legally compelled to work notwithstanding
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary
servitude.

Justice Henry Billings Brown, writing for a majority of eight, offered several
justifications for the ruling. First, he reasoned that the Thirteenth
Amendment was not intended to change the law with regard to
“services which have from time immemorial been treated as
exceptional,” and that seamen had been legally prohibited from
“deserting” (quitting their jobs) since the days of ancient Rhodes. By
itself, this criterion could not do the work of distinguishing exceptions from
prohibited practices. The Thirteenth Amendment was enacted precisely to
abolish practices that had been recognized in law from time immemorial.
There could be no time-honored exceptions to a ban on slavery and
involuntary servitude until and unless there was such a ban in effect. When
Congress first provided for the forcible return of deserting seamen in
1792, for example, most states permitted slavery, indentured
servitude remained lawful, and the Constitution provided for the
return of any person “held to Service or Labour” who escaped across
state lines. In that legal context, a seaman’s contract would have
looked more like a short-term indenture—lawful in any trade—than
an occupational exception to a general ban on slavery and
involuntary servitude. On the criterion of origins in “time
immemorial,” then, seamen’s contracts could not be distinguished
from numerous other instances of coerced labor.

Second, Brown warned that if a sailor could not be coerced to work,

then he could “abandon his ship at any intermediate port or landing,
or even in a storm at sea.” Brown held that even if the Amendment did
generally prohibit such enforcement, seamen were excluded from protection.

To distinguish seamen from other workers, Brown offered a third

justification. Sailors could be denied the right to quit work because,
like children and wards, they required the guidance and protection
of others. In particular, Brown suggested that seamen were “deficient in
that full and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is
accredited to ordinary adults.” He found supporting evidence in what he
considered to be “very careful provisions” of law protecting seamen against
“the frauds and cruelty of masters, the devices of boarding-house keepers,
and, as far as possible, against the consequences of their own ignorance and
improvidence.”

Dispositive:

The judgment of the court below is, therefore, affirmed.

 Fajardo vs CA

GR No. 128508, February 1, 1999

Facts:

In 1981, Fajardo was charged with violation of BP 22. At the time he

committed the offense, PD No. 968 allows an accused who appeals his
conviction to still apply for probation.

In 1988, the trial court convicted Fajardo of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty PD No. 968, became effective (in 1986),
providing that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Fajardo, however, still appealed his conviction.

When he lost the appeal, he filed motion for probation before the trial court
contending that he was eligible for probation because at the time he
committed the offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction
was still qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred an
application for probation of an accused who had interposed an appeal was ex
post facto in its application and hence, not applicable to him. The trial court
denied Fajardo’s motion for probation and so did CA.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether petitioner could qualify to apply for probation under Presidential

Decree No. 968.
Held:

NO. At the time of the commission of the offense charged--violation of Batas

Pambansa Bilang 22--in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted
and still availed himself of probation. However, petitioner was convicted on
May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, petitioner no longer had the
option to appeal and still apply for probation if unsuccessful in the appeal.
Presidential Decree No. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence, he could no
longer apply for probation since he had appealed.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41447. Costs against
petitioner.