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Conflict in Afghanistan

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Conflict in Afghanistan
Research Paper: James P. Welch

Afghanistan is a failed state. The U.S. military incursion brought a temporary respite in the cycle
of violence, but this grace period was short-lived. The United States failed to balance military
power and authority with indispensable diplomatic nation building. Today Karzai’s government
holds little sway in the remote tribal areas and is unable to offer, much needed, security and
services. Drug lords and warlords continue to hold sway. There has been a resurgence of Islamic
fundamentalism often tolerated or even sported by Pakistan’s powerful ISI.

University of Oklahoma
Graduate Program in International Relations: IAS 496
Professor: Major Bruce Barnes.
 The Conflict in Afghanistan: 10 years on.

It has been 10 long difficult, costly and bloody years since the U.S. defeated the Taliban, in

2002, and returned to Afghanistan for a second time. The situation has not changed radically and

life for the average Afghan has remained virtually the same. While marginal advances in areas

such as education and women’s rights have made progress; poor, inept leadership, government

corruption and faulty strategy have combined to maintain a hostile environment and leaving

Afghanistan as poor and helpless as it had ever been. On the side of ISAF many young military

personnel have sacrificed, and lost life, limb and “soul.” No invading army, regardless how

powerful, has ever tamed Afghanistan. It would be fair to wonder whether the incursion was

justified at all based upon such an imbalanced cost benefits ratio.

There are three problems, which have auxiliary effects, which we will examine in the course

of this research. The first lies in the failure of western nations, in general, and the United States

in particular to honor their obligations for democratic nation building in the state of Afghanistan.

Empire building requires support to control endemic corruption and bribery so rampant in

Afghans politics. Secondly, there was a sense of complacency which settled in, following the

rapid victory in 2002, after the dust had fallen. Finally, there is the long standing contentious

dispute over the vague line, drawn in 1893, known as the Durand line, which effectively split the

Pashtun nation in two. According to Tanner the Pashtun are “The world’s largest remaining

tribal-based society.”

These are the primary problems facing Afghanistan and the efforts to stabilize and modernize

the state. There are other, less obvious but no less important, problems bubbling below the

1
surface. In the litany of possible woes we can consider (in no specific order of importance); A

high rate of illiteracy, high infant mortality rate, low life expectancy, innumerable minefields,

widespread governmental corruption, reliance upon opiate poppy harvest instead of sustainable

agriculture, geographic isolation, and the lack of proper institutions[hospitals, schools police],

infrastructure and security. It would unfortunately be, perhaps, easier to say what is right with

Afghan government and society [if something could be found] than to list the numerous faults.

The problems facing Afghanistan are staggering. If Afghanistan is ever to become a modern

thriving democracy and a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism, then there will have to be far

greater resource appropriation and economic support from the rest of the international

community. According to the Author Martin Ewans: “Afghanistan is the most densely mined

country in the world….[M] eanwhile nearly 500,00 Afghans, up to half of them women and

children, have been killed or wounded by mines.”1 In addition to this dubious distinction

Afghanistan holds the record for the highest infant mortality rate in the world as well as one of

the lowest in life expectancies. Malaria, polio and tuberculosis are all prevalent among the

population. The schools and universities have trouble reestablishing themselves after having

been closed down by the Taliban. Rashid points out some pretty startling statistics in his book:

“…while fifteen thousand women died every year from pregnancy-related illnesses. The country

had the highest rate of infant mortality in the world, with 165 infants out of 1000 dying at birth,

while 250 or a quarter died before they reached the age of five. Life expectancy for women was

just forty-four years, one year less than for men.” 2

Ewans, Martin. Afghanistan; A Short History of its People and Politics. New York: Harper
Collins, 2002.
2

2
Failed diplomacy = Failed state

The primary problem, and the essence of failure in Afghanistan lies in failing to have applied

a balanced, two prong policy approach of military power and security with diplomatic nation

building. Essentially the U.S. went in and crested a peg leg strategy based uniquely upon

military might. While U.S. military might have made quick work of the Taliban there was no

follow up nation building which is a vital component to any major conflict. As Rashid notes in

his seminal work; there was brave talk about a “Marshall plan for Afghanistan”, 3 but this was

the empty rhetoric of shallow leadership. This was lost soon after with much scaled down

assistance plans referred to jocularly as “nation building lite” 4 (p.74-75). Robert Crews supports

Rashid’s affirmations when he states “Despite early White House pronouncements about a

‘Marshall Plan for Afghanistan,’ the American commitment to democratization and

reconstruction ultimately followed a minimalist design that privileged military power over

diplomatic and other strategies.” 5

Another area of complex difficulty lies in the fact that the western nations have attempted to

apply their policy visions of ideal government to a tribal oriented society. The central

government has never exercised authority outside the capital, Kabul. Whereas western societies

Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into chaos. London, UK: Penguin Books, 2009. p.130

After Bush tried to push nation building into the shoulders of the UN, Colin Powell assured them that is would not
be a large scale, Marshall Plan-like commitment.
4

Term first coined by Richard Haass describing the [inadequate and shortsighted] future strategy.
5

Crews, Robert D., and Amin Tarzi, . The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. Canbridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008.

3
function on pyramidal top to bottom hierarchy, Afghans society functions in a reverse fashion

with the power emanating from the base of the tribal structure upward.

U.S. diplomatic relations, in Central Asia, were nonexistent, partly in fact due to the Cold

War political landscape. Political unrest in the region was further enhanced by Washington’s

support of non-democratic dictatorships such as that of the disreputable, dictator Islam Karimov

in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, the CIA plied the warlords with arms and bundles of cash, thus

empowering them, in an ill-conceived, divide and conquer, strategy to extend control to the

outlying provinces of Afghanistan. These same warlords would come back to haunt them and

would be responsible for civil unrest and violence throughout Afghanistan. The U.S. stood idly

by while ruthless warlords, such as Rashid Dostum, committed brutal atrocities against their own

people.

The fact of the matter is, that with the slipshod arrangements involved with the Invasion of

Iraq, on March 4, 2003, many of the most vital and essential elements needed to stabilize

Afghanistan were drawn of in favor of the elusive neocon fantasy is Iraq. Broken promises

would become the currency of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Today the reconstruction remains

scant and insufficient. Crews, once again asserts as much when he states:

“Beginning in 2001, Washington issued numerous promises about remaking

Afghanistan. Yet six years on, these vows have yielded few concrete changes
in the lives of most Afghans. They are significant insofar as such pledges raised
expectations that the United States, the International Community and the Karzai
government proved unable to meet. As of mid-2007, electricity supplies to Kabul
remained sporadic, despite the capital’s status as the power base of Hamid Karzai
and the hub of essential international aid organizations. Opium dominated the
economy, and armed militias including many recently backed by the United States,
governed most of the country.”6

4
Failed strategy = Loss of credibility and life.

How general Tommy Franks got his stars is anyone’s guess. It may be he was more concerned

about politics than with running the show on the ground. Regardless he was an inept and

irresponsible commander according to most accounts and reports. His own words betrayed his

ignorance as well. Many missed opportunities, such as at Tora Bora, to capture al Qaeda’s

leadership (including bin Laden) were lost due to his vacillating as whether or not to commit

troops. His failures to commit follow up and engage the enemy could make a commanders

handbook of how not to conduct operations. Poor strategy and communication, were evident in

the deceitful and secret Bush-Cheney plot which allowed not only ISI officers from Pakistan

(who had been fighting NATO forces alongside the Taliban) to escape through a secret air-

corridor, but allowed hundreds (perhaps as many as a thousand) Taliban and Al Qaeda fighter

flee as well. Pakistan manipulated the U.S. military and political structure like a wizard. Shortly

after having left the door to Waziristan open, and thus once again allowing Taliban fighters to

flee and fight another day, Musharraf visited Washington with his hat in hand. The world’s great

political buffoon, George W. Bush declared “’President Musharraf is a leader with great courage

and vision [was Bush blind?] …I am proud to call him my friend,’ Bush told a beaming

Musharraf.”7 Of course this political courtship was accompanied by lavish gifts, grants and

donations. Other strategic blunders were created do to an over-reliance upon air superiority.

Crews, Robert D., and Amin Tarzi, . The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. Canbridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008. p. 317-318

Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into chaos. London, UK: Penguin Books, 2009. p. 148

5
Many innocent civilian casualties were created through the transmission of faulty intelligence

and coordinates. Much of this can be related to a lack of ‘boots on the ground’” while General

Franks kept his troops on ships offshore. The essence of the problem was that the entire

operation, including the diplomatic aspect had been taken out of the hands of the state

department and taken over by the neocon clique of madmen in the white house. surely, it is no

exaggeration to say that inestimable damage was done and countless lives uselessly sacrificed by

the likes of Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Franks and the ineffiective Condoleezza Rice and

Colin Powell.

Foundations of Terrorism

It might be reasonable to wonder why an impoverished nation would turn to terrorism, in the

first place. Many of the Afghans, who fled the onslaught of the Russians and their Afghan

puppet regime, were taken in by madrassas along the Afghan – Pakistan border. These madrassas

were, and still are, sponsored with funding from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. They recruited from

within the desperate refugee camps along the border region. In turn, many of these wretched

souls first became students or “Talib” then later mujahidin, trained and equipped by the ISI and

the CIA and finally, became “terrorists or insurgents as the protagonists changed roles.”

Furthermore, as Author Martin Ewans points out, there were already precipitating dynamics,

already in place:

“The other point is that the bin Laden brand of terrorism, however much the product of
twisted minds and a subculture of religious fanaticism, would not find a “sea in which to
swim” [sic], were it not for a growing resentment, verging on despair, among
the“wretched of the earth.” This is inspired by a world order under which a minority,
mainly in Europe and North America, live in unprecedented affluence while the great

6
 majority, not only in the Muslim world but in the world at large, are compelled to lead
lives of abject poverty.”8

Today the situation is little improved. Roving bands of armed militia continue to harass the

population and extort large fees for a right of passage, much like bandits from the middle ages.

Karzai’s government has been unable to stem the violence or intercede and provide security of

his people. As Seth Jones points out “In areas of eastern Afghanistan, such as Kunar and

Nangarhar provinces, some tribes have lost faith in local police forces that they perceive as

corrupt and incompetent.”9

“… [A]fghanistan faces an unenviable future. At the most fundamental level, it has severe
environmental problems. There is widespread soil degradation, deforestation and
desertification…[S]uch commerce and industry as it possessed during the 1970s had
disappeared, its infrastructure has been devastated and less than two-thirds of its
agricultural land is cultivated. Kabul is a mass of ruins, while Kandahar has been
extensively damaged, as have parts of Herat.10

Pakistani Interference

Pakistan and more particularly the malefic ISI are nemesis of our own making. This twisted

relationship dates back to the Reagan administration and his support of the dictator Zia al Haq.

One of the essential points underscoring the writing of Ahmed Rashid is to place blame squarely

Ewans, Martin. Afghanistan; A Short History of its People and Politics. New York: Harper
Collins, 2002. p. 299

Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires; America's War in Afghanistan. London: W.W.
Norton & Company Ltd., 2010. p. 340

10

Ewans, Martin. Afghanistan; A Short History of its People and Politics. New York: Harper
Collins, 2002.p. 294

7
where it belongs, regardless of affinity or position. He gives a scathing account of Pakistan’s

military regime and the misadventures of Kashmir. The all-powerful ISI and the Pakistan’s

Frontier Corps have not only turned a blind eye to terrorist activities; they have also trained,

supported and directly assisted the Taliban. How is this possible it is logical to ask? How can the

U.S. stand idly by and not only accept, but condone as well the acts of the successive

undemocratic dictatorships of Pakistan? The answer is that everything has a price and the price

for Pakistan’s assistance was that the government of the United States placed the head of

democracy on a chopping block in exchange for Pakistani collusion. Jones recounts “In October

2009, Pakistan Frontier Corps forces halted the movement of nearly 800 trucks along highway 4

from Quetta, Pakistan, to Spin Boldak, Afghanistan, because of the possibility of U.S. airstrikes

in Baluchistan. ‘I interpreted this as a signal from the Pakistan government that it was

demonstrating leverage over the United States, and wasn’t afraid to use it,’ one senior U.S.

military official told me.” 11 Pakistan has, in fact, a good reason for supporting terrorism.

Enjoying a special relationship with the U.S. in the fight against terrorism has been very

profitable for Pakistan. Thus, no terrorists= no funding. This was a self-perpetuating relationship

established under the shortsighted policies of Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and General Tommy

franks, to support the autocratic regime of Musharraf in exchange for logistic support in its

campaign in Afghanistan. So what was the outcome of this diabolical cooperation pact between

Islamabad and Washington? Despite plying an unstable Pakistan with countless billions of aid

and assistance and besides building up their arms and weapons systems the power of democracy

11

Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires; America's War in Afghanistan. London: W.W.
Norton & Company Ltd., 2010.p. 336

8
inevitably called out to be heard and Musharraf fell from grace. As Author Stephan Tanner

indicates:

“America’s carefully cultivated ally in the conflict, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf,
had fallen from power and Afghanistan itself had become a veritable narc-state, supplying
ninety percent of the world’s opium. Local drug lords shared with the resurgent Taliban a
resistance both to the government in Kabul and its high- minded foreign backers. Western
aid projects in the countryside had stalled and in many provinces ceased because
humanitarian workers and contractors could not be protected from violence.” 12
The Fragile Future?

The expression “the more things change the more they stay the same,” seems to have been

ideally crafted to describe the current condition of Afghanistan. The previous

Pashtun/Uzbek/Tajik/Hazara/ intertribal resentment have remained intact and there is no true,

cohesive Afghan union in sight. Once again Martin Ewan enlightens when he states “Hamid

Karzai called for an end to ‘warlordism,’ [fermented from ethnic regional rivalry] but there were

few signs of this becoming a reality. The sad fact was that after the traumas of the past two

decades, the personal and ethnic antipathies across the nation discussed earlier, were at a pitch of

intensity –just as effective cooperation was needed more than ever.”13

Despite the many shortcoming and setbacks there are a few bright points. PRTs (Provincial

Reconstruction Teams) have attempted to create an intermediate nation building bridge between

military enforcement and civilian-type diplomacy and nation building. According to Author

Robert Kemp:

12

Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan; A Military Hstory. revised. Philidelphia, PA: De Capo Press,
2009. p. 321

13

Ewans, Martin. Afghanistan; A Short History of its People and Politics. New York: Harper
Collins, 2002.p. 292

9
 “Provincial reconstruction teams help provide what the Taliban
and other insurgent groups cannot offer—development projects,
including major road projects, and a steady stream of improvement
to infrastructure. This gives the coalition an “asymmetric” advantage,
given the stark poverty of many areas. Small-scale projects carried out
immediately after combat operations are also important COIN tools.
More important, the PRTs have helped with some stability and
“breathing room” as local government establishes itself and begins
to function. They were a relatively low cost presence in eastern Afghanistan
until more resources were shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan.14

Finally, there is a question of the Afghans wanting to help themselves. The west cannot impose

its philosophy of right and wrong, good and bad, upon a people who have been living sedentary

noncompetitive life styles since the time of the Mongol invasions. As Andrew Skinner explains

in his pertinent article: “…the United States and its NATO allies should reflect on what exactly it

is that the West feels it has to offer to a people that have survived for centuries in harsh

environments, without ‘modernizing’.”15 It is difficult, if not impossible, in 10 pages, to fully

cover and treat the different aspects of the problems facing Afghanistan over the past 10 years.

entire books have been written on the subject and the conflict has been covered exceptionally

and in depth in many of these fine works. Surely the Afghans deserve more than they received.

What they received in return for their support of democracy was an empty chest filled with

broken promises and empty dreams waiting to be fulfilled.

14

Kemp, Robert, E. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Eastern Afghanistan." Military Review

28 (September -October 2011): 10. p. 9
15

Skinner, Andrew. "Why do they fight." Undercurrent 7, no. 1 (2010): 23-29. p. 27

10
 AFGHANISTAN PAPER REFERENCES

Bearden, Milt, and James Risen. The main enemy: the inside story of the CIA's final showdown
with the KGB. New York: Random House, 2003.

Crews, Robert D.. The Taliban and the crisis of Afghanistan: ed. by Robert D. Crews and Amin
Tarzi. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2008.

Englehart, Neil A. 2010. "A Tale of Two Afghanistans." Asian Survey 50, no. 4: 735.
MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 3, 2011).

Ewans, Martin. Afghanistan: a short history of its people and politics. New York: HarperCollins,
2002.

Frederic. 2011. "Are the reasons for the failure of statebuilding in Afghanistan specific to the
country or characteristic of South Asia more generally?." Asian Affairs (London) 42, no. 1: 70-
82. Social Sciences Abstracts (H.W. Wilson), EBSCOhost (accessed November 3, 2011).

Jones, Seth G. 2008. "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad."
International Security 32, no. 4: 7-40. Social Sciences Abstracts (H.W. Wilson), EBSCOhost
(accessed November 3, 2011).

Jones, Seth G.. In the graveyard of empires: America's war in Afghanistan. New York: W.W.
Norton, 2010.

Kemp, Robert E. 2011. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Eastern Afghanistan." Military

Review 28. MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 3, 2011).

Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into chaos: the U.S. and the disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Central Asia. New York: Penguin Books, 2009.

Skinner, Andrew. 2010. "Why Do They Fight? : The Political Economy of the Failure of Peace
and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, 2001-." Undercurrent 7, no. 1: 23-29. Academic Search
Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 3, 2011).

Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: a military history from Alexander the Great to the fall of the
Taliban. 2009 ed. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002.

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 PHOTO CREDITS

All photos reproduced under Title 17 of the USC, Fair Usage stipulation.

http://harpers.org/media/image/blogs/misc/bush-musharraf.jpg

http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/images/cheney1_001.jpg Cheney and Karzai

http://media.ft.com/cms/1a20e9d0-6cfb-11dd-857b-0000779fd18c.jpg Rumsfeld and Musharraf

http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/data/upimages/masoud-gul.jpg Hikmetyar and Massoud

http://geopoliticalmonitor.com/dyn/images/3/2904.jpg Afghan Warlord soldiers

http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4079/4915630020_9ef4df5ebb.jpg Ruined buildings, Kabul

http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4079/4915629320_29cd49a823.jpg landmine victims

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