WEEK # 1

LECTURE 1 - EFFECTS OF LAWS

CASE TOPIC and CASE TITLE CASE DOCTRINE GIST OF SPECIAL LAW
NO. RELEVANT and
LAWS PONENTE

A. When law
takes effect Revised Administrative Code (RAC)

- NCC 2 Sections 18-24 of the Revised Administrative

Code provides for the operation and effectivity of
- Revised
laws. Under such law, it is stated that laws shall
Administrati
ve Code take effect after fifteen days following the
(RAC) Sec. completion of their publication in the Official
18-24 Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation,
unless it is otherwise provided. This affects the
- Exec. Order provision in Civil Code, particularly Article 2
200, Sec. 2 which provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. The provision in the Revised
Administrative Code offered another medium
wherein laws may be published and such is the
newspaper of general circulation.
 As a requirement for effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette as stated under
Article 2 of the New Civil Code. However,
Executive Order 200 provided for another avenue
for publishing laws. As stated under Section 2 of
EO 200, Article 2 of the New Civil Code and
other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. As
such, laws may now also be published in
newspapers of general circulation.

E.O 200

Executive Order 200, section 2 or provides for the

repeal of Article 2 of RA no. 386 to reflect that
Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be
amended so the laws to be effective must be
published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country

1. Tañada v. Laws shall be published in the Official

Tuvera 136 Gazette and shall take effect after fifteen
SCRA 27 days following the publication, unless a
different effectivity date is provided. The
PONENTE:
ESCOLIN, J. purpose of publication is to give notice to
the public in order for them to have
By: Aclan, knowledge of the laws. Laws must be
Charisma C. published because of the conclusive
presumption of knowledge of the laws. It
would be prejudicial to the people if they
will be punished or be burned for violation
of a law that has not been published since
they have no notice or knowledge of the
same.

As stated in the case at bar, publication is a

requirement of due process, whether it is a
presidential issuance of a public nature or
of general applicability. Petitioners sought
to publish in the Official Gazette various
Presidential Decrees, executive orders,
general orders, proclamations, letter of
implementation and administrative orders,
invoking their right to be informed on
matters of public concern. The Court held
that all laws must be published except
Administrative and Executive Orders and
those which only affect a particular class of
persons. Prior publication of laws before
they become effective cannot be dispensed
with, hence, presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect.
2. Garcillano v The Supreme Court granted the Petition for Executive Order 200, Sec. 2
House of Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Representativ a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987,
es, G.R. No. Preliminary Injunction which sought to bar modifying Article 2 of the Civil Code, provides
170338, the Senate from conducting its legislative for the publication of laws either in the Official
December 23, inquiry. In a nutshell, the Court ruled that Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
2008 the Senate cannot be allowed to conduct the in the Philippines as a requirement for effectivity.
questioned legislative inquiry without In its amended form, Article 2 provides that,
PONENTE: publishing the rules of procedure in unless otherwise provided, laws shall take effect
NACHURA, J. violation of Section 21 of Article VI of the after 15 days following the completion of the
1987 Constitution. publication in the Official Gazette (Art. 2, Civil
By: Agpaoa, Code) or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Princess The Senate or the House of Representatives,
Monique or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. In this case, there was no
compliance of the constitutional
requirement. Citing Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, the Senate of
each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it in the conduct of its day-to-day
business transactions. Stated differently, the
Senate is not a continuing body because less
than majority of the Senators continue in the
next Congress. Hence, there is a need to
publish the Rules of Procedure after every
expiration of the term of the twelve
Senators.

Moreover, the Court in this case ruled that

 publication of the rules of procedure is
mandatory whether or not the rules were
amended or revised. Such publication must
strictly comply with the ruling in Tañada v.
Tuvera, i.e., publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. Hence, publication in
the website of the Senate or in pamphlets
available at the Senate, although available
for viewing to the public, is procedurally
infirm.

3. B. Ignorance Kasilag vs.

of the law Rodriguez, 69 The doctrine on ignorance of law is not
PHIL 217 absolute, considering that sometimes,
- NCC 3 ignorance of the law may be based upon an
PONENTE: error of fact. The rule is that clear, manifest,
IMPERIAL. J.
and truly inexcusable ignorance is that
By: Agustin, which does not excuse a person from
Nathan compliance therewith, but when such
Raphael D.L. ignorance arises due to the inability to fully
understand complex legal principles, the
rule is relaxed. As such, the excusable
ignorance in the latter situation may be a
basis of good faith.
 Applied in this case, the petitioner was
declared in good faith despite his ignorance
of law, with the Court considering the he
was not conversant with the laws because he
is not a lawyer and he did not know the
concept of a contract of antichresis as
clearly as a jurist would. Thus, despite the
fact that the possession and enjoyment of
fruits as a lien in a contract of antichresis is
prohibited by law, the petitioner may be
excused and considered in good faith.

C. Retroactivi Revised Penal Code

ty of laws
Section 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides
- NCC 4, cf. that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
NCC 2252 – insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
2269 felony, who is not a habitual criminal.

- Revised Family Code

Penal Code
(RPC) 22 Article 256 of the Family Code states that the
Family Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
- Family as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
Code (FC) acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
256 or other laws.
 - Mandatory
or
Prohibitory
Laws

- NCC Art. 5
with NCC
Art. 17 (3)

D. Waiver of
rights

- NCC Art. 6

- NCC Art.
2035

4. DM Consunji
vs. CA, G.R. The Supreme Court cited the case of
No. 137873, Floresca vs. Philex Mining on the issue as to
April 20, 2001whether or not an injured worker or his
heirs in case of death may select between
PONENTE:
availing the benefits of the worker’s right
GAERLAN, J.
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and
suing under the regular court under the
By: Alfonso, Civil Code for higher damages on the
Angela May S. ground of the employer’s negligence or
availing both at the same time.
The Court provided that the claimants may
invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation
Act or the Civil Code but the choice of one
remedy will exclude the other and
acceptance thereof will preclude a claim for
additional benefits under the other remedy.
An exception to this rule is the occurrence of
supervening facts or developments after
selecting one remedy. In this case, there is
no valid waiver to file an action for
damages after her prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund
because she was unaware of the petitioner’s
negligence as an employer when she filed
her claim for death benefits.

The rule under Art. 3 which provides that

ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith is applicable only to
mandatory and prohibitory laws.
Accordingly, the ignorance of the claimant
in this case cannot be held against her
because the rule in Floresca allowing a
choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor
prohibitory.
5. Dela Cruz v. The requisites of a valid waiver are that the
Dela Cruz, person making the waiver is capacitated to
G.R. No. make the waiver; the person waiving must
192383, actually have the right to which he is
December 4, renouncing; the waiver must be made
2013. knowingly; it must be made clearly; it must
not be contrary to law, public order, morals,
PONENTE: public policy, or good customs; and the
ABAD, J. waiver must not prejudice third person with
a right recognize by law.
By: Amancio,
Mark Joshua In this case, Lucila have executed waiver
waiving all her interest in a land, bought by
her and her brother, in favor of her brother.
The Court ruled that she cannot rescind her
waiver since it was absolute and has no
precondition. She also used the phrase
“hereby waive”instead of using future
action such as “promise to waive.” As an
effect, she have already effectively waived
her upon executing her waiver.

6. Dona Adela v For a waiver to be valid, it must not only be

Tidcorp, G.R. voluntary, it must also be positively
No. 201931, demonstrated either by express stipulation
February 11,
or acts admitting no other reasonable
2015
explanation. Mere silence on the part of the
 PONENTE: holder of the right should not be construed
VILLARAMA, as a surrender thereof.
JR. J.
In the case herein, there was no written
By: Aquino,
consent given by petitioner or its
Marie
representative as required by the Law on
Angelique M.
Secrecy of Bank Deposits. Further, an actual
intention to relinquish the right cannot be
clearly and convincingly inferred, from
petitioner’s silence or failure to interpose
objections during the proceedings. Verily,
there was no valid waiver and petitioner
cannot be bound by the subject Agreement.

7. Otamias v. Waiver of rights extends to rights and

Republic, G.R. privileges of any character. It covers every
No. 189516, conceivable right. The advantage of a law
June 08, 2016
or rule made solely for the benefit and
PONENTE: protection of the individual in his private
LEONEN, J. capacity can be waived by him provided that
it can be done so without infringing on any
By: Arenas, public right, and without detriment to the
Gissela M. community at large.

Thus, in this case, the Court ruled the

waiver of Colonel Otamias’ right to claim
that his retirement benefits are exempt from
execution is valid for the reason that the
right to receive retirement benefits belongs
 to him. His decision to waive a portion of
his retirement benefits does not infringe on
the right of third persons, but even protects
the right of his family to receive support.

8. Anaban v The divorce between Virginia and Pedrito

Anaban, G.R. was obtained during the effectivity of Act
No. 249011, No. 2710. Under the law, the grounds for
March 15,
divorce were adultery and concubinage
2021
PONENTE: only. In this case, the ground used for the
LAZARO-JAVI divorce was the alleged insanity of Virginia.
ER, J.: Thus, the divorce was contrary to the
grounds allowed by the law.
By: Areta,
Karen M. The Court cited the case of People v. Bitdu
where it held that customs and practices
cannot be recognized during the effectivity
of Act No. 2710. Divorce may only be had in
courts where the state has conferred
jurisdiction, and only for those causes and
with those formalities which the statute has
prescribed. As in this case, the ground of
insanity cannot be allowed.

9. E. Repeal of Thornton vs. 1987 Constitution

laws Thornton, There could be an implied repeal when the
Aug. 16, 2004 two laws are incompatible with each other, Section 3 of the Transitory Provisions provide
 - NCC 7 cf. and a clear finding must be shown. that all existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
1987 PONENTE: However, there is a presumption that the proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
CORONA, J. legislature should have known the existing executive issuances not inconsistent with this
- Constitution Constitution shall remain operative until
By: Atok, laws over the subject matter and would not
, Art. XVIII amended, repealed, or revoked.
Sec. 3 Jerome Fosh V. enact conflicting statutes therefore, implied
repeal is not favored and all doubts must be Family Code
- FC 254 construed against implied repeal. In this
case, RA 8369, gave the family courts Article 254 of the Family provides for the repeal
exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for of all laws, decrees, executive orders,
habeas corpus, while RA 7092, gave the CA proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the Code.
the jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus. RA 8369 did not effectively repeal
RA 7092 because it did not expressly
prohibit the CA from issuing writ of habeas
corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Therefore, the family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the CA in
petitions for habeas corpus in cases
involving the custody of minors.

10. F. Judicial Pesca vs.

Decisions Pesca, G.R.
No. 136921. Article 8 of the Civil Code contemplates the
- NCC 8 April 17, 2001
doctrine of stare decisis which means
PONENTE: judicial decisions applying or interpreting
VITUG, J.: the law shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines. Moreover, the interpretation
 By: Basa, of written law by a competent court and its
Lance legislative intent also constitutes a part of
Bernadette F. the law. It is only when a prior ruling is
overruled that the new doctrine may be
applied prospectively.

The case of Santos v. Court of Appeals gave

life to the term psychological incapacity. It
was not overturned in the case of Republic
v. Molina. The latter only set forth
procedural guidelines to assist the courts
and the parties in trying cases for
annulment of marriages on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the case of
Molina has strengthened the term
psychological incapacity and not overturned
the doctrine espoused in the case of Santos
v. Court of Appeals.

11. De Castro v The doctrine of stare decisis requires that

JBC, G. R. lower courts follow the rules established in
No. 191002, prevailing decisions of the Supreme Court.
April 20, 2010

PONENTE: However, the Supreme Court, as the highest

BERSAMIN, J. court of the land, is not controlled by a
precedent but merely guided by it. Thus, it is
By: Bautista, not incumbent upon the Court to follow or
Josemaria adhere to its previous ruling especially in
Enrique T. the event that it encounters controversies
 which either warrants its abandonment or
modification. Precedents cannot prevail
when constitutionalism demands otherwise.

12. UCPB v Uy, Stare decisis applies only to

GR 204039, pronouncements of the Supreme Court to the
Jan. 10, 2018 exclusion of lower courts. At most, decisions
of lower courts are only persuasive.
PONENTE:
MARTIRES, J.
In this case, decisions of the CA should not
By: Berame, have the effect of stare decisis.
Julius Ernhest
P.

13. Henson v
UCPB, GR In accordance with Article 8 of the Civil
223134, Code, the interpretation of a written law by
August 14, the Supreme Court becomes part of the law
2019 of the land. As such, the interpretation shall
also be applied as of the date the statute was
PONENTE:
PERLAS-BER enacted. However, when the Court's
NABE, J. interpretation was later abandoned and a
different one was made, the new
By: Bordeos, interpretation must be applied prospectively
Renz Rumer M in favor of parties who relied on the old
interpretation by the Court.

In this case, the Court abandoned the

doctrine in Vector v. American Home
 regarding the prescriptive period of the
cause of action of an insurer against the
wrongdoer. If the new interpretation is to be
followed, then the respondent's cause of
action in this case should have been
prescribed. However, since the prevailing
doctrine at the time of the events of the case
was the Vector doctrine, the Court relied
upon it in ruling that the cause of action has
not yet prescribed.

14. Aquino v
Aquino, G.R. The Court has repeatedly invoked the UN
No. 208912, Convention of the Rights of Children to
Dec. 7, 2021 promote the welfare of children. These
decisions, having referred to the UN CRC,
PONENTE:
are part of the legal system in accordance
LEONEN, J.
with Article 8 of the Civil Code that states
By: Borra, that: "Judicial decisions applying or
Filipino interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.”

In this instance, should children's

successional rights be at stake, then the best
interest and welfare of the child should be of
paramount consideration. Thus, the Court
now liberally constructs Article 992 that
 makes children, legitimate or not, qualified
to inherit from their direct ascendants-such
as their grandparent-by their right of
representation. Here, therefore, an
illegitimate child like Angelak can inherit
from her grandparent by her right of
representation, regardless of the
grandparent's marital status at the birth of
her parent.

15. G. Duty to Magat v.

render Tantrade, Section 1 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Par. 1 of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code is
judgment G.R. No. Procedure provides that the period to based on the legal maxim “nullum crimen, nulla
- NCC 9, 10 205483, appeal may be extended upon proper motion poena sine lege”. Furthermore, even if there is no
August 23, and the payment of the full amount of the law punishing a particular act, the Judge cannot
- RPC 5 2017 docket and other lawful fees and the deposit just refuse to render a judgment. He is mandated
for costs before the expiration of the to render the proper decision.
PONENTE: reglementary period.
LEONEN, J. The second paragraph recognizes that there may
It enables not just one (1) but two (2) be circumstances attendant to a crime which may
By: extensions of 15 days each subject to the render the penalty provided by law as excessive.
Buencamino, discretion of the Court of Appeals. Despite such, a Judge is duty bound to strictly
Pio Vincent R. impose the penalty provided by law. However, he
Generally, the periods set forth by the Rules may recommend to the President actions that it
must be strictly complied to ensure speedy deems appropriate such as the grant of executive
administration of justice. Therefore, every clemency.
plea for a liberal construction of the Rules
must at least be accompanied by an Therefore, the policy of the law is to ensure that a
explanation of why the party-litigant failed proper decision be made in every case. This may
to comply with the rules and by a be done by deciding a case on the merits even if
justification for the requested liberal there is non-compliance with procedural rules
construction. instead of dismissing it on technical grounds.

It is a settled principle that the Court looks

with disfavor the dismissal of cases on
purely technical grounds. Disposition of
cases on the merits is preferred in order to
give effect to justice for both parties,
especially if the rights of any of the parties
will not be prejudiced.

In the present case, the heirs of Juliana

Magat were able to overcome the burden of
proving compelling reasons to justify the
grant of extensions to their favor.

The heirs had the problem of financing the

appeal of the case because of the financial
burden imposed by the hospitalization
expenses and the death of Juliana. All the
requirements for a plea for extension were
complied with. They were able to file the
proper motion before the reglementary
period and were able to pay the full amount
of the docket and other lawful fees.

Furthermore, their motions were made in

good faith and were not meant to delay the
disposition of the case.

Therefore, justice and equity demand that

the case be tried and heard on the merits.
16. Piedad v.
Bobilles, G.R. The Courts in the Philippines are both
No. 208614, courts of law and courts of equity.
November 27, Exercising both legal and equitable
2017 jurisdictions, courts should take the
principle of equity in consideration if strict
PONENTE: adherence to the law would result in
LEONEN, J. manifest wrong or injustice.
By: Cabaltera,
Neil In this case, the respondents deliberately
delayed the execution of a final and
executory judgment. The motion for
execution by the petitioner was made
beyond the prescriptive period due to the
malicious acts done by the respondents. In
light with these facts, the Supreme Court
ruled that if manifest wrong or injustice
would result with the strict adherence to the
statute of limitations or doctrine of laches, it
would be better for courts to rule under the
principle of equity,

This case emphasized that a liberal

interpretation of the rules of procedure
should be resorted to where a literal and
strict adherence will most likely result in
miscarriage of justice.

17. People v It is a fundamental rule in statutory

Tulagan, G.R. construction that when statutes appear to be
No. 227363, conflicting, the court has the duty to first
March 12,
harmonize and reconcile the laws before
 2019 ruling on its invalidity. This is for the
purpose of establishing a uniform system of
PONENTE: jurisprudence. If the statutes are
PERALTA, J.
irreconcilable, the earlier statute must yield
to the statute that was enacted later for the
By: Cabatu,
later law is the latest expression of the
Ma. Andrea D.
legislative will.

In this case, Salvador Tulagan was charged

with sexual assault and statutory rape. He
was found to force sexual intercourse with a
9-year-old minor. The Supreme Court in this
case reconciled the provisions under the
Revised Penal Code with regard to Acts of
Lasciviousness, Rape and Sexual Assault, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353 in relation to
Sexual Intercourse and Lascivious Conduct
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. It
ruled that reconciling the applicability of
the provisions is to carry out the intent of
the legislative to provide stronger
deterrence and special protection against all
forms of child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination.

H. Presumptio The 1987 Constitution, under Article XII Section

n and 5 provides that the State, subject to the provisions
Applicabilit of this Constitution and national development
 y of policies and programs, shall protect the rights of
Custom indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands to ensure their economic, social, and
- NCC 11 -
cultural well-being. The Congress may provide
12 cf. 1987
for the applicability of customary laws governing
- Constitution property rights or relations in determining the
, Art. XII ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Sec. 5
Under Section 2 of Rule 129, A court may take
- Rules of judicial notice of matters which are of public
Court Rule knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
129 (2), (3)
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.

Moreover, the succeeding section states that

during the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention
to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon. It may also be that,
after the trial, and before judgment or on appeal,
the proper court, on its own initiative or on
request of a party, may take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if
such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case.
18. Martinez v.
Van Buskirk, Under the circumstances revolving around
18 Phil. 79 the case, the driver cannot be said to be
guilty of negligence in leaving his horses
PONENTE: while assisting in unloading his wagon. The
MORELAND, act of the defendant was not proven to be a
J. negligent act.

By: Acts which have not been proven as

Calumpang, destructive or injurious and which have
Karen Regina been generally permitted in by society for so
B. long a time as to have ripened into a
custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable
or imprudent. In the first place, an act
which has already become a custom or one
that is accepted by society is more likely to
be beneficial than prejudicial. Because
otherwise, why would society permit such
acts?

19. Anaban v Laws are superior to the habits, customs, Old Civil Code and IPRA-IRR
Anaban, G.R. dogmas and doctrines of people and
No. 249011, religions. As such, laws that govern the Both the old Civil Code and the IPRA-IRR
March 15, solemnity of marriage and the incidents ofprovisions limited the State recognition to
2021 which take precedence because it relates to
"marriages performed" in accordance with
public policy and cannot be made inferior to
customary laws, rites, traditions, and practices.
PONENTE: tribe’s customs. There is no mention of the recognition of
Lazaro-Javier, dissolution of marriage in accordance with the
J; Applying this to the case at bar, the IP's customs
dissolution of the marriage of Pedrito to
 Virginia, although allowed by their customs,
By: Castillo, cannot be legally recognized in the eyes of
Pamela Alexia, the law because divorce is not allowed
D. regardless of religion. Hence, his
subsequent marriage to Pepang is void for
being bigamous.

I. Legal E.O 292, RAC, Section 31 defines the legal

periods periods which differentiates year, month, and day.
Under said law, a “year” refers to twelve calendar
- EO 292,
months. A “month” refers to thirty days, unless it
RAC Sec.
31 refers to a specific calendar month which shall be
considered according to the number of days for
- Rules of that month. Lastly, a “day” refers to a day of
Court twenty-four hours and “night” from sunset to
(ROC) Rule sunrise. As a more recent law, E.O. 292 impliedly
22 repealed Article 13 of the New Civil Code which
states that a year is to be understood as 365 days,
as both laws refer to the same subject matter
which is the computation of legal periods.

Under Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, in

computing the period prescribed by the rules,
court order or by applicable statute, the day of the
act or event from which the designated period of
time begins is excluded and the date of
performance included. However, if the last day
falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday in the
place where the court sits, the time shall run until
 the next working day. The said exception in
computing the legal periods is not expressly
stated under Article 13 of the NCC.

According to Tolentino, the computation of a

period when the last day falls on a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday as provided under the
Rules of Court applies only to a period of time
prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, court
order, or applicable statute. Therefore, this
exception finds no application when the act to be
performed within the period arises from a
contractual relationship as a contract is considered
the law between the parties.

20. Internal The computation of legal periods is

Revenue v provided in Article 13 of the Civil Code and
Primetown, in Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
GR 162155, Administrative Code of 1987. Under the
August 28, Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
2007 whether it be a regular year or a leap year.
On the other hand, under the Administrative
PONENTE:
Code of 1987, a year is composed of 12
CORONA, J.
calendar months which means the number
of days is irrelevant. A law may be repealed
By: Castro,
Czarina Ann when it is expressly provided that the old
M. law is repealed or when there exists an
irreconcilable incompatibility between the
 conflicting laws, the older law is deemed
impliedly repealed.

In this case, the Supreme Court found that

there is a manifest incompatibility between
the above-mentioned provisions and the
resolution of the issue calls for the
determination of the applicable law. Due to
this incompatibility, the Court held that
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 shall prevail
being the more recent law following the
principle of lex posteriori derogat priori.
Therefore, in computing legal periods,
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code shall be applied.

21. Commr. v.
Aichi Forging, The claim for refund/credit for unutilized
G.R. No. input VAT for Zero-rated or effectively
184823, Zero-rated sales under Section 112 of the
October 6, Tax Code provides that the claim be within 2
2010 years after the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales are made. The 120+30 day
PONENTE: period applies. First, upon filling of the
DEL claim, the CIR has 120 days to decide,
CASTILLO, J. reckoned from the date of the submission of
the complete documents supporting the
taxpayer’s claim. Second, in case of full or
 By: partial denial, the remedy of the taxpayer is
Concepcion, to file an appeal with the Court of Tax
Precious appeals within 30 days from the receipt of
Dianne A. the CIR’s denial. Third, if CIR failed to act
within the 120 days, the remedy is to appeal
(judicial claim) the inaction with the CTA
within 30 days after the lapse of the 120-day
period. The 120-day is crucial in the filling
of the appeal with the CTA, otherwise the
case is premature and the CTA will not
acquire jurisdiction over the case for non
compliance with the Principle of Exhaustion
of Administrative Remedies.

In this case, since the administrative and

judicial claims were filed on the same day.
Herein, the taxpayer did not wait for the
lapse of the 120 day period nor wait for the
decision of the CIR, this makes the filing of
the judicial claim premature, hence the CTA
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, the case was dismissed.

22. Marubeni v Applying the doctrine of verbal legis, the

CIR, G.R. No. Supreme Court ruled that Section 112 of the
198485, June Tax Code expressly provides that a taxpayer
05, 2017 can file his administrative claim for refund
or credit at any time within two years after
PONENTE: the close of the taxable quarter when the
CAGUIOA, J. sales were made. Hence, there is already a
two-year prescriptive period for filing
By Corpus, administrative claims for refund or credit
Rebecca R. starting to run from the time after the close
of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made.

Also, the 120+30 day periods expressly

provided under Section 112 (C) of the 1997
Tax Code are mandatory and jurisdictional.
Therefore, failure of a taxpayer to comply
with such periods renders the appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeals premature and
therefore fatal to the petition. Under the law,
the Commissioner has 120 days from the
filing of administrative claim to decide and
the taxpayer shall have 30 days to appeal
the decision of the Commissioner to the CTA
to be counted from the time of the receipt of
said decision. However, the inaction or
failure of the Commissioner to decide on the
claim filed within the said 120-day period
shall entitle the taxpayer to a 30-day period
from the expiration of the 120-day period to
file his judicial claim with the CTA.
 In this case, Marubeni’s judicial claim for
refund with the CTA was premature because
the administrative claim was filed on March
27, 2002 and in just a span of 29 days after
or on April 25, 2002, Marubeni already filed
its judicial claim. As a result, the CTA
lacked jurisdiction over Marubeni’s claim
because of its failure to comply with the
120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional
periods as required by Section 112(C) of the
1997 Tax Code. The Supreme Court did not
support the argument of Marubeni that the
Atlas Ruling is applicable instead of the
Aichi Ruling simply because the Court
already settled the issue as to the mandatory
and jurisdictional periods under Section
112(C) of the 1997 Tax Code in the case of
Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership v.
CIR. Hence, the applicability of the Tax
Code provision still stands because both
administrative and judicial claims of
Marubeni were filed years before the Atlas
Ruling in June 8, 2007 was in effect and
during such time when the claims were filed,
the 1997 Tax Code was already in effect.

23. CIR v All taxpayers may rely upon a BIR Ruling,

Sibulan, G.R. as a general interpretive ruling, from the
No. 209306, time of its issuance until its effective
September 27, reversal by the Honorable Court.
2017
On December 10, 2003, BIR Ruling No.
PONENTE: DA-489-03 was issued which explicitly
CAGUIOA, J. declared that the taxpayer-claimant need
not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period
By: Dazo,
before it could seek judicial relief with the
John Xavier L.
CTA by way of petition. Subsequently, on
October 6, 2010, the Court held in CIR v.
Aichi that compliance with the 120-day
period granted to the CIR, within which to
act on an administrative claim for refund or
credit of unutilized input VAT, as provided
under the Tax Code, is mandatory and
jurisdictional in filing an appeal with the
CTA. As a result, the aforementioned
pronouncements created confusion among
the taxpayers.

In order to reconcile the Aichi case and BIR

Ruling No. DA-489-03, the Court held in
this case that before and after December 10,
2003 to October 6, 2010, the observance of
the 120-day period is mandatory and
jurisdictional to the filing of a judicial claim
for refund of excess input VAT before the
CTA. On the contrary, during the period
 December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010,
taxpayers-claimants need not observe the
120-day period before it could file such
claim.

LECTURE 2 - CONFLICT OF LAWS and HUMAN RELATIONS

CASE TOPIC and CASE TITLE CASE DOCTRINE GIST OF SPECIAL LAW
NO. RELEVANT LAWS and PONENTE

24. A. CONFLIC Del Socorro v The doctrine of processual presumption Article 14 of the New Civil Code
T OF Van Wilsem, provides that if the foreign law involved is
LAWS GR 193707, not properly pleaded and proved, our ​Article 14 of the NCC provides that all
Dec. 10, 2014 individuals who live or sojourn in Philippine
courts will presume that the foreign law is
- NCC 14 territory shall be bound by the penal laws and
the same as our local or domestic or laws on public security and safety of the country.
PONENTE: internal law. While the Territoriality
- Art. 2, The exception to this are the principles of public
PERALTA, J. Principle in criminal law, in relation to
Revised international law and treaty stipulations.
Penal Code Article 14 of the New Civil Code provides
By: Dela Cruz, Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code
that penal laws and those of public security
Nuvi Maecy H
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
Article 2 of the RPC may be considered as
live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
another exception to the general rule under Article
subject to the principle of public 14 of the New Civil Code as it provides instances
international law and to treaty stipulations. where penal sanctions may be applicable even
while outside the Philippine jurisdiction.
In the present case, as respondent Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem failed to It provides for the enumeration of the application
properly plead and prove the laws of the of the provisions of the Code, wherein it stated
 Netherlands as to the obligation to support,
there is a presumption that the said laws
are the same with the Philippines. Thus, the
Court ruled that the Philippine courts had
territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against Van Wilsem considering
that his refusal to support his child was
contrary to the laws of the Philippines as to
the obligation of the parent to support their
child.
that except as provided in the treaties and laws of
preferential application, the provisions of this
Code shall be enforced not only within the
Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere,
its interior waters and maritime zone, but also
outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: (1)
Should commit an offense while on a Philippine
ship or airship; (2) Should forge or counterfeit any
coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) Should
be liable for acts connected with the introduction
into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the presiding number; (4) While
being public officers or employees, should
commit an offense in the exercise of their
functions; or (5) Should commit any of the crimes
against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

25. - NCC 15 Tenchavez v. The spouses, both Filipino citizens, sought

- FC 26 par. 2 Escaño 15 and obtained a decree of absolute divorce
- NCC 16, 2nd SCRA 355 in a foreign country.
par.
PONENTE: However, article 15 of the Civil Code of the
REYES, J.B.L., Philippines expressly provides that: Laws
J. relating to family rights and duties or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of
By: Estreller,
persons are binding upon the citizens of the
Conrado S. III
Philippines, even though living abroad.
 Further, Philippine law does not provide
for absolute divorce.

Thus, Philippine Courts will not give effect

to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens because it is
contrary to the declared public policy of the
state.

26. Board of Since Philippine law follows lex loci

Commissioner celebrationis, it adheres to the rule that a
s vs. de la marriage formally valid where celebrated
Rosa, 197 is valid everywhere unless the marriage is
SCRA 853 void under Philippine law. By virtue of the
Doctrine of Processual Presumption, in the
PONENTE: absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
BIDIN, J.
laws on a particular subject are presumed
to be the same as those of the Philippines.
By:
Since the State favors the solidarity of the
Evangelista,
Angela Isabel family, any person who assails the validity
C. of marriage has the burden of proving the
applicable foreign law.

Here, the Doctrine of Processual

Presumption applies because there was a
failure to present evidence that the said
marriage was validly contracted in China.
 This only leads to the presumption that
such law which governs the said marriage
is the same as that of Philippine Law.
Hence, the children must follow the
citizenship of their father. There being no
doubt as to the citizenship of Santiago, as
provided in the order of the Board of
Commissioners, Francisco, being his
legitimate child, follows his citizenship.
Hence, William follows the same in
accordance with Section 1, Article IV of the
Constitution, making him a Filipino citizen.

27. San Luis vs. While the Court has decided in a plethora
San Luis, G.R. of cases that in case of mixed marriages
133743, Feb. 2, where the foreign spouse validly obtained a
2007 divorce decree to dissolve the marriage, the
Filipino spouse should be considered no
PONENTE: longer married to the foreign spouse and
YNARES-SANT thus capacitated to remarry under the
IAGO, J.
Philippine law as a necessary consequence
of upholding the validity of a divorce
By:
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. If the
Fajilagutan,
Filipino spouse contracts a subsequent
Dainiele Renee
marriage, there must be sufficient evidence
R.
to prove the validity of the divorce decree
obtained by the foreign spouse following
the rule that the Court does not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and Rules on
Evidence, otherwise the subsequent
marriage cannot be recognized by the
Court.

Even assuming that the Filipino spouse is

incapacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage, the subsequent spouse may still
have legal personality to file a petition for
letter of administration by virtue his/her
co-ownership as regards the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation. The property
acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.

For purposes of fixing venue under the

Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person
is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place
and domicile in another.
 While it was established that Felicisimo
was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, it was
also proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from
1982 up to the time of his death. From the
foregoing, the Court finds that Felicisimo
was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the
subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa.

28. Amos v Bellis, In this case, the Supreme Court stated that
20 SCRA 35 in any case that public policy or good
customs may be involved in our law on
PONENTE: legitimes, Congress has not intended to
BENGZON, extend the same to the succession of foreign
J.P.J., J. nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, among other things, the amount of
By: Lavarias,
successional rights, to the decedent's
Hailord N.
national Law. This is in consona nce with
the rule on statutory construction that
specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
 Accordingly, looking at the case at hand,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined by the national
law of Bellis which is Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

29. NCC 16, 1st par. Tayag v

Benguet Philippine laws shall govern cases
Consolidated, involving shares of stock of a domestic
GR L-23145, corporation, even if the owner is outside
Nov. 29, 1968 the Philippines.
PONENTE: Principal or ancillary administration
FERNANDO, J.
extends to the assets of a decedent found
By: Liban, within the state or country where it was
Clarisse M. granted. In this case, the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines is entitled
to the possession of the shares of stock of
Benguet Consolidated owned by the
decedent. Benguet Consolidated is a
domestic corporation therefore the situs of
shares of stock thereof is the Philippines.

30. Vda de Choice of law rules invariably consist of a

Alcañeses v factual relationship (such as property right,
Alcañeses, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
G.R. No. point of contract, such as the situs of the
187847, June res, the place of celebration, the place of
30, 2021 performance, or the place of wrongdoing.

PONENTE: In this case, the Saudi Arabian Airlines

LEONEN, J. stated that the “lex loci delicti commissi”
(the law of the place where the tort is
By: Magpili, committed) is not relevant and instead
Airish A. applied the state of the most significant
relationship rule in order to keep abreast
with the modern theories on tort liability. In
this case, records show that Kenya had the
“most significant relationship” to the
conflict presented. This is further evidenced
by the fact that even though the parties to
the case are Filipinos, the Kenya Air is a
foreign corporation, with principal place of
business in Kenya, and the tort was
committed aboard one of its planes and it
granted the disputed amount of money to
petitioner as settlement. Thus, the Kenyan
Law must be applied in the transaction and
that the only “point of contact” with
Philippine law was that Efren (petitioner)
and respondents, happened to be a
Filipino. Accordingly, our courts of law do
not take judicial notice of foreign law.
However, the SC finds that petitioner
properly pleaded and proved the applicable
Kenyan law, hence,
31. NCC 17 Kazuhiro NCC 17
Hasegawa vs. Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of Article 17. The forms and solemnities of
NCC 18 Kitamura, the place of the ceremony" or the law of the contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
G.R. No. place where a contract is made. be governed by the laws of the country in which
149177, they are executed.
November 23, On the other hand, the doctrine of lex
2007 contractus or lex loci contractus means the When the acts referred to are executed before the
"law of the place where a contract is diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
PONENTE: executed or to be performed." This controls the Philippines in a foreign country, the
NACHURA, J. the nature, construction, and validity of the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall
contract and it may pertain to the law be observed in their execution.
By: Marallag, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or
Ellaine Denice the law intended by them either expressly Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
H. or implicitly. property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
In this case, the SC explained that in order not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
to ascertain what state law to apply to a promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
dispute, the court should determine which agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
state has the most substantial connection to
Explanation: The first paragraph of the Article
the occurrence and the parties.
lays down the rule of lex loci celebrationis insofar
Since the only issue in this case is that of as extrinsic validity (forms and solemnities) is
concerned. Thus, a contract entered into by a
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not
Filipino in China will be governed by Chinese law
only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
insofar as form and solemnities of the contract are
Therefore, the motion to dismiss by the concerned. Thus also, if a power of attorney is
executed in Texas, Texan laws and not the
petitioners in this case is not proper
Philippine Civil Code should determine its formal
because the RTC is vested by law with the
validity.
power to entertain and hear the civil case The second paragraph speaks of the extension of
filed by respondent. Philippine formal laws to acts executed before
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country. It is as if such
acts were made in the Philippine Islands and,
therefore, solemnities under our laws will govern.

The last paragraph talks about the effect of

foreign laws, foreign decisions, treaties, etc. on
Philippine prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property.

NCC 18
Article 18. In matters which are governed by the
Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of
this Code. (16a)

Explanation: The Civil Code of the Philippines, a

part of civil law, contains provisions on contracts,
obligations and damages. These are matters not
foreign to commercial law. For example, an
insurance policy is a contract between the insurer
and the insured; therefore, the general civil law
principles on contracts should apply.

In case of conflict with the Code of Commerce or

special laws, the Civil Code shall only be
suppletory, except if otherwise provided for under
the Civil Code. In general, therefore, in case of
 conflict, the special law prevails over the Civil
Code, which is general in nature.

32. Raytheon v
Rouzie, GR There is difference between the two
162894, concepts of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law.
February 26, Jurisdiction, on one hand, considers the
2008 fairness to cause a defendant to travel to
this state. While choice of law on the other,
PONENTE: asks the further question whether the
TINGA, J. application of a substantive law, which will
determine the merits of the case, is fair to
By: Martin, both parties. The stipulation regarding the
Dominic choice of law will only be relevant once the
substantive issues in the instant case
develop after hearing on the merits
proceeds before the trial court.

In conflicts-of-laws cases, a court may

refuse impositions on its jurisdiction under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens if it is
not the most "convenient" or accessible
forum, and the parties are free to seek relief
elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the
foreign elements in the instant case are not
sufficient to oust the trial court of its
 jurisdiction over civil case and the parties
involved.

Moreover, factual determination is

necessary to determine whether dismissing
a matter on the grounds of forum non
conveniens is appropriate. Although it is at
the trial court's discretion to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should only do so after vital facts have been
proven to see if any special circumstances
call for the court’s desistance.

33. Anaban v Article 78 of the old Civil Code

Anaban, G.R. Under Act No. 2710, divorce can be
No. 249011, granted only on two grounds, i.e., adultery
March 15, and concubinage. Applying the foregoing
2021 to the present case, the Ibaloi council of
elders granted the divorce on ground of
PONENTE: Virginia’s alleged insanity. Neither of the
LAZARO-JAVI two grounds was the reason for Pedrito and
ER, J. Virginia’s divorce. The divorce, therefore,
is contrary to law and cannot be
By: Mojica, recognized.
Robinson S.
Further, in People vs. Bitdu, the Court held
that customs and practices cannot be
recognized during the effectivity of Act No.
Article 78 of the old Civil Code states that
marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who
live in the non-Christian provinces may be
performed in accordance with their customs, rites
or practices. No marriage license or formal
requisites shall be necessary. Said law only
referred to celebration of marriage. There was
nothing therein implying that the framers also
intended to include the validity of divorce decreed
in accordance with non-Christian rites or customs.
Republic Act No. 8371
Section 8, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and
2710. Divorce may only be had in courts
where the state has conferred jurisdiction,
and then only for those cause and with
those formalities which the statute has
prescribed.
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IRR) also limits the State’s
recognition of marriages to be solemnized
pursuant to the non-Christian’s rites and customs.
It does not mention anything about the State
recognition of dissolution of marriages in
accordance with non-Christian practices.
Executive Order No. 141
Under EO 141, absolute divorce may be granted
on these grounds: (a) adultery and concubinage;
(b) attempt on the life of one spouse by the other;
(c) a subsequent marriage by either party before
the previous one was dissolved; (d) loathsome
contagious diseases contracted by either spouse;
(e) incurable insanity; (f) impotency; (g)
repeatedly bodily violence by one against the
other; (h) intentional or unjustified desertion
continuously for at least one year; (i) unexplained
absence from the conjugal abode continuously for
at least three years; and (j) slander by deed or
gross insult by one spouse against the other.
Act No. 2710
Under Act No. 2710, or An Act to Establish
Divorce, divorce can be granted only on two
grounds, i.e., adultery and concubinage.
34. Ambrose v
Ambrose , G.R. In this case, the Supreme Court elucidated
No. 206761, on when the conflict of law principle of lex
June 23, 2021 loci celebrationis finds applicability. It is
stated that when certain material issues of
PONENTE: the contract are celebrated in any other
GAERLAN, J. place than that of the place of citizenship of
the parties, lex loci celebrationis shall
By: Pigar, Kyra
Frenel H. apply. As in the present case, petitioner,
notwithstanding his foreign nationality,
married respondent in the Philippines,
therefore, Philippine laws shall govern. It
follows that the same laws shall also
govern the incidents and consequences of
such act. Thus, all matters relating to the
validity of the contract of marriage, such as
the presence or absence of requisites,
forms, or solemnities are to be judged in
relation to the law in which it has been
celebrated or performed.

However, even if the marriage is deemed

valid under foreign law, it may still be
declared invalid if such marriage falls
under the instances provided under Article
26 of the Family Code (ex. Bigamous
marriages)
35. HUMAN Wassmer v.
RELATIONS Velez 12 SCRA A breach of promise to marry is not an
648 actionable wrong there being no provision
- NCC 19 – in the New Civil Code authorizing an
action for such. The exception is when
21 PONENTE:
there was already a formal preparation of
BENGZON, J.
the wedding then the breach of promise to
marry is actionable for damages being
By: Resus, contrary to good customs and public policy
Jarvin David E. in accordance with Article 21 of the New
Civil Code which provides that "Any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage".

In this case, Wassmer and Velez have

already gone through the preparation of
marriage. They have already been issued a
valid marriage license, there was already a
date for the wedding, invitations have been
distributed, apparel and dresses for all
participants were all ready. Two days prior
the wedding, Velez disappeared never to be
heard again leaving only a note postponing
the wedding. Thus, the sudden
disappearance of Veleze despite having
gone through the preparation for the
wedding renders him liable for damages
under Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
36. Tanjanco v. Article 21 of the Civil Code which
CA 18 SCRA prescribes that any person who willfully
994 causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good
PONENTE: customs or public policy shall compensate
REYES, J.B.L., the latter for the damage, can be a cause of
J. action for moral damages in seduction and
not in case of breach of promise to marry,
By: Reynaldo,
because in seduction there is abuse of
Hark
confidence where the woman yielded to the
Emmanuelle
Joaquin B sexual intercourse because of the
inducement. Consequently, the repeated act
of sexual intercourse negates the claim for
moral damages on the ground of seduction
since there is the presence of voluntariness
and mutual passion.

Applying the foregoing, the private

respondent cannot claim damages as it was
shown that she did not stop having sexual
intercourse with the petitioner albeit
knowledge that the latter will not and has
not fulfilled his promise to marry.
37. Baksh v. CA, As a general rule, a breach of promise to
219 SCRA 115 marry is not an actionable wrong. The
exception to this is if such promise is made
PONENTE: only to have sexual congress with the
DAVIDE, JR., woman. Such act could justify the award of
J.: damages pursuant to Article 21. It is
essential, however, that such injury should
By: Riñoza, have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy.
Michael Dave
C. Here, the Court awarded damages in favor
of respondent. It was proven during the
trial that petitioner indeed promised to
marry respondent to enable the former to
have sexual congress with the latter.
Petitioner violated the Filipino's concept of
morality.

38. Abanag v. Sexual relations between two unmarried

Mabute, AM and consenting adults do not consitute a
P-11-2922, disgraceful and immoral conduct which
April 4, 2011 warrants administrative sanctions.

PONENTE: The court emphasized in this case that

BRION, J. voluntary intimacy between an unmarried
man and woman who are not under any
By: Salazar,
impediment to marry, and where there is no
Angelynn C.
deceit, is not a criminal or an unprincipled
act that warrants disbarment or
disciplinary action.
39. Metroheights
Subd. v CMS In the similar case of case of MWSS v. Act
Construction, Theater, Inc. the Court applied Article 19 of
G.R. No. the Civil Code. It held that the former’s act
209359, Oct. of cutting the respondent’s water service
17, 2018 connection without prior notice was
arbitrary and injurious. In relation to the
PONENTE: case at bar, the directors were not held
PERALTA, J. liable but only the corporation. The
corporation was held liable for damages
By: Sapugay, due to the principle of abuse of rights. In
Bianca
principle of abuse of rights, damages are
Katthryne A.
given even if the act is not illicit.

40. Jhonna A mere breach of a promise to marry is not

Guevarra, et al. an actionable wrong, as long as it is not of
Vs. Jan Banch, such extent as would palpably and
G.R. No. unjustifiably contradict good customs. In
214016. any case, the party seeking to recover
November 24, damages must have acted in good faith.
2021
In the earlier case of Wassmer v. Velez,
PONENTE:
while the Supreme Court reiterated that a
LEONEN, J.
mere breach of a promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong, it ruled that walking out
of a wedding two days prior, after all had
By: Yusi, been prepared, is an act deemed "palpably
Jonathan and unjustifiably contrary to good
Vincent U. customs," for which the award of damages
was proper.

Thus, in the case at bar, respondent aims to

recover P500,000.00 based not on a breach
of promise to marry, but on unjust
enrichment.

However, the Court ruled that human

relations provisions in the New Civil Code
presuppose that the party seeking damages
must have acted in good faith. Unlike in
Wassmer, petitioner in this case called off
the engagement after she had discovered
respondent's lies and deception.
Respondent's actions were tainted with
fraud and deceit; he did not have the purest
intentions in marrying petitioner. He lied
about his marital status, and even hid his
true name from petitioner. These acts
suffice to justify the wedding's cancellation.
Finding out that one's betrothed is still
married to another person, and that they
are not who they say they are, are reasons
enough to conclude bad faith.
41. PERSONS Catalan vs. Donor’s capacity to give consent at the time
Basa, G.R. No. of the donation is important in order for
- Capacity To 159567, July donation of property to be valid. The
Act 31, 2007 burden of proving incapacity rests upon the
person who alleges it and if there is no
- NCC 37 - 39 PONENTE: sufficient proof of such incapacity, capacity
PUNO, C.J. will be presumed.
- Presumptio
n of By: Aclan,
In the case at bar, petitioners contended
capacity Charisma C.
that the donation is void because when
Feliciano made such donation to Mercedes,
he was already suffering from
schizophrenia. The Court ruled that mere
allegation is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was competent
when he donated the property in question to
Mercedes. Moreover, a person suffering
from schizophrenia does not necessarily
lose his competence to intelligently dispose
of his property, hence, Feliciano was of
sound mind at that time and that this
condition continued to exist until proof to
the contrary was adduced.

42. Restrictions on Mercado v. The Court held that the sale of the real
capacity to act Espiritu 37 estate entered into by minors who R.A. 6809
Phil 215 represented themselves to be of legal age is
 - NCC 38 - valid and binding upon them. Hence, they
39, cf. NCC PONENTE:TO cannot seek the annulment of such contract R.A. 6809 amended Art. 234 and Art. 236 of the
1327 RRES. J. and excuse themselves from complying with Family Code, lowering the age of majority from
their obligations therein. 21 years old to 18 years old. Emancipation takes
(a) Minority, R.A. By: Agpaoa, place by the age of majority, which commences at
6809, FC 5; 45 (1); Princess
In this case, the Court did not grant the the age of 18 years old. Hence, persons at the age
cf. R.A. 6809, NCC Monique
prayer of the plaintiffs for the annulment of of at least 18 years old have the capacity to enter
1327, NCC 1390
the contract entered into by them when they into a contract and give their consent thereto.
(par. 1), 1403 (par.
were actually 18 and 19 years old. They
3), NCC 1397, Art. 5 of the Family Code provides that persons at
sought the annulment of the contract on the
1399, NCC 1489, least eighteen years may contract marriage.
NCC 1426 - 1427 ground of minority. At that time of the
execution of the contract, two of the parties Art. 45 (1) of the Family Code is a ground for
(b) Insanity, FC were 18 and 19 years old and have not yet annulment where one contracting party is at least
45 (2), NCC 1327 attained the age of majority which is 21 eighteen and below twenty one at the time of
(1), 1328 years old according to Act No. 1891, the marriage and the required consent of the
prevailing law in 1910. They stated in the enumerated persons therein was not given.
(c) Deaf-Mutism, document that they were of legal age at that
NCC 1327 (2), 807 time and on that account, the Court ruled Under Rule 92, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court,
& 820 that the contract is perfectly valid. prodigals are considered as incompetent for
purposes of venue.
(d) Prodigality,
ROC Rule 92 Sec. The Court in this case applied the doctrine Under Art. 31 of the RPC, the penalties of
2 of estoppel which provides that a minor perpetual or temporal special disqualification for
who deceitfully represents itself in an public office, profession or calling result to the
(e) Civil instrument to be in the age of majority and deprivation of the office, employment, profession
Interdiction, RPC when the other contracting party believes or calling affected; the disqualification for holding
31, 34, 41
him to be of that age, he is later estopped similar offices or employments either perpetually
from asserting the defense of minority in
(f) Family order to be released from his obligation or or during the term of the sentence according to the
Relations, FC liability. extent of such disqualification.
150-151; cf. FC 87,
NCC 1490, NCC Civil interdiction under the RPC deprives the
2035, cf. NCC offender during the time of his sentence of the
963-967 rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either
as to the person or property of any ward, of
(g) Alienage, cf. marital authority, of the right to manage his
Art. IV, Secs. 1-5, property, and of the right to dispose of such
1987 Constitution property by any act or any conveyance intervivos.

(h) Absence, NCC The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion

381 – 396, FC 41 temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the
(i) Insolvency and sentence as the case may be.
Trusteeship, NCC
1381, 1491, 2236 Art. 150 of the FC sets forth what relationship
constitutes Family Relations.
(j) Gender, Art. II,
Sec. 14, 1987 Art. 151 of the FC exemplifies the policy of the
Constitution; cf. state to strengthen family solidarity by making it a
NCC 403 requirement that there be first earnest efforts
See also: Rule 3
toward compromise before a suit between
Section 4, 1997
members of the same family shall prosper.
Rules of Civil
Procedure Art. 87 of the FC prohibits donations between
spouses. Furthermore, it also applies to persons
(k) Physical
living together as husband and wife without a
Incapacity/Disease,
valid marriage.
FC 45(5), 45(6), 46,
NCC 820 Art. IV, Secs. 1-5 of the 1987 Consitution sets
forth the provisions applicable to Citizenship. It
must be emphasized that what is prohibited by the
Constitution is dual allegiance, not dual
citizenship.

Art. 41 of the FC which provides for judicial

delcaration of presumptive death applies only for
purposes of remarraige. There must be a well
founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead and that the spouse is absent for four years,
or two years if there is danger of death under Art.
391 of the Civil Code.

Art. II, Sec. 14 of the 1987 Constitution

recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and ensures the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men. Therefore, the Legislative
Department continues enact laws such as the
Maternity Leave Act, Violence Against Women
and Children Act, and others, in order to promote
the welfare of women.

Under Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the 1997 Rules of

Proceudre, generally, the husband and wife shall
sue or be sued jointly. However, the law may
provide otherwise.
Art. 45 (5) provides that physical incapability (or
impotency) may be a ground for annulment.
Physical incapacity imports a total want of power
of copulation, and only as necessary incident
thereto the inability for proceation, it does not
contemplate bareness or sterility itself. Impotency
is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse.

Art. 45 (6) provides Sexually Transmissible

Disease as a ground for annulment. The requisites
are: a) the sexually-transmissible disease must
have existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage; b) it is found to be serious; c) it appears
to be incurable; and d) it must be unknown to the
other party at the time of marriage.

Art. 46 of the FC enumerates what constitutes

fraud in relation to par. 3 of Art. 45. The
following constitutes fraud:

(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by

final judgment of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude;

(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the

time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband;
 (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible
disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the
time of the marriage; or

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual

alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism
existing at the time of the marriage. No other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage.

43. Heirs Of Favis,

Sr. v Gonzales, In proving the mental incapacity of a party
et al., GR. No. as a ground of assailing the intrinsic
185922, Jan. validity of a contract, the mental state or
15 2014 condition of the said party at the time of its
execution must be taken into account.
PONENTE: Other factors must also be considered, such
PEREZ. J. as the age, health and environment.
By: Agustin,
Nathan
Raphael D.L. In this case, when Dr. Favis, Sr. executed
the deed of donation, he was already 92
 years old and afflicted by numerous
illnesses such as Hiatal hernia, Parkinsons’
disease, and pneumonia, among others.
Furthermore, the Court also considered the
fact that he was made to execute the deed
at the time when Dra. Favis was not
present, when it could have been executed
in her presence.

44. Ambrose v
Ambrose , Under Art. 17 (1) of the Civil Code, the
G.R. No. forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
206761, June and other public instruments shall be
23, 2021 governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed. In this case, the
PONENTE: marriage was celebrated in the Philippines
GAERLAN, J. rendering the validity of the marriage to be
governed by Philippine laws.
By: Alfonso, Accordingly, a marriage celebrated abroad
Angela May S. and held valid therein, may be rendered
invalid in the Philippines under the
grounds provided under Art. 26(1) such as
those contracted with no legal capacity,
bigamous or polygamous marriages, or
mistake in identity. In this case, the action
assails the psychological incapacity of the
respondent and the result of the action
would have an effect on the personal status
 of the respondent. Thus, petitioner has the
right to institute the instant petition for
nullity of marriage

45. Natural Persons De Jesus v

Syquia, G.R. As provided under Art. 40, birth determines
- NCC 40 - 41 No. L-39110, personality but a conceived child shall be
Nov. 28, 1933 considered born for all purposes that are
- NCC 42 favorable to it.
PONENTE:
- NCC 43, STREET, J. In this case, Syquia has made several
Rule 131, letters to which showed his paternal
Sec. 33, By: Amancio, interest over the conceived child of
ROC Mark Joshua Antonia. The court have pronounced that a
child that is unborn can acquire legal
rights and can be dealt with as a living
person. Hence, the letters made by Syquia
shows his intent to acknowledge the child.
Such acts favorable to the unborn child
gives rise to a civil personality which gives
it right to be recognized as natural child of
Syquia.

46. Geluz v. CA 2 Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits

SCRA 801 the provisional personality of an unborn
 child by imposing the condition that the
PONENTE: child should be subsequently born alive.
REYES, J.B.L, Since an aborted child did not acquire
J. personality, no action for damages can be
instituted on its behalf on account of any
By: Aquino, injury it received. In this case, the father
Marie cannot institute a derivative action since no
Angelique M.
transmission to anyone can take place from
one that lacked juridical personality.

However, he may still be entitled to collect

any damages pertaining to those inflicted
directly upon him (e.g. moral damages for
his loss and the disappointment of his
parental expectations), as distinguished
from the injury or violation of the rights of
the deceased (aborted fetus), its right to life
and physical integrity.

47. Continental Life is not synonymous with civil

Steel vs. personality. One need not acquire civil
Montano, GR personality first before he/she could die.
182836, Even a child inside the womb already has
October 13, life.
2009
In this case, the Court need not establish
PONENTE:
the civil personality of the unborn child
CHICO-NAZAR
herein since his/her juridical capacity and
IO, J.
 capacity to act as a person are not the
By: Arenas, issue.
Gissela M

48. Quimiging v The provision under Article 40 of the New

Icao, 34 SCRA Civil Code, "provided it be born later with
134 the conditions specified in the following
article", should not be treated as a
PONENTE: condition precedent to the right of the
REYES, J.B.L., conceived child. Otherwise, the first part of
J.: Article 40, "the conceived child shall be
born for all purposes that are favorable to
By: Areta,
it", would become entirely useless and
Karen M.
ineffective.

In this case, the support was denied

because the child was not yet born. The
lower court's theory that Article 291 of the
New Civil Code does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn violates
Article 40. The conceived child, although
as yet unborn, has a right to support from
Felix Icao.

49. Limjoco v. A human being is a natural person while an

Intestate artificial person comprises a collection or
Estate of Pio succession of natural persons consisting a
corporation, or a collection of property to
 Fragante 80 which the law attributes the capacity to
Phil 776 have rights and duties. The estate of a
deceased person shall be considered as an
PONENTE: artificial or juridical person in order to
HILADO, J. settle and distribute his estate. The estate,
represented by the executor or
administrator shall perform the rights and
By: Atok,
obligations of the deceased.
Jerome Fosh V.

50. Dumlao v. A person’s juridical capacity, which is the

Quality fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
Plastics 70 lost through death. Hence, a deceased
SCRA 472 person, having no more civil personality,
could not be validly served summons.
PONENTE:
AQUINO, J.: Verily, the ruling of the lower court is not
applicable to Oria who was already dead at
By: Basa,
the time when the case was instituted.
Lance
There could be no valid service of summons
Bernadette F.
towards Oria because his death
extinguished his civil personality.
Subsequently, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Oria.

51. Eugenio v. Death extinguishes civil personality. Its

Velez 185 effect concerning the rights and obligations
SCRA 425 of the deceased is determined by law, by
contract, and by will. The remedy of habeas
 PONENTE: corpus is availed of in the event of illegal
PADILLA, J. confinement and detention of living
persons. The application of the writ
By: Bautista, becomes moot and academic by reason of
Josemaria the death of the person who is allegedly
Enrique T. restrained. Nevertheless, the deceased is
still entitled to a proper burial by those
who have rightful custody over the dead
body.

52. Berot v.  A decedent does not have the capacity to be

Siapno, G.R. sued and thus may not be made a defendant
No. 188944, in a case. The reason is, considering that
July 09, 2014 capacity to be sued is correlative to
capacity to sue, a decedent who does not
PONENTE: have capacity to be sued may not be named
SERENO, J. a party defendant in a court action.
By: Berame,
In this case, upon Macaria Berot’s death,
Julius Ernhest
her legal personality ceased, and she could
P.
no longer be impleaded as respondent in
the foreclosure suit.

53. Gaffney v
Butler, G.R. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised
No. 219408, Rules of Court, only natural or juridical
November 08, persons, or entities authorized by law may
2017 be parties in a civil action. When a person
 dies, his legal personality ceases, and he
PONENTE: could no longer be a party in a court
CAGUIOA, J. action. Neither can his estate bring an
action or be impleaded as a defendant in a
By: Bordeos,
civil action since an estate also lacks legal
Renz Rumer M.
personality.

In this case, the petitioner named the estate

of the deceased spouse of respondent as an
additional defendant in the complaint. The
Court dismissed the complaint against the
deceased spouse because he cannot be a
party in a civil action, having no legal
personality.

54. Joaquin v.
Navarro 93 The statutory presumption provided under Disputable assumption under Sec 3(jj), Rule 131
Phil 257 Sec 33 (now Sec 43 of the NCC) and Sec. (formerly found in Sec 69 of Rule 123): Except
69 of Rule 123 (now Sec. 3 of Rule 131) is for purpose of succession, the following
applied when there is no specific evidence presumption applies when it cannot be determined
PONENTE:
as to the time of death, or it is assumed that who perishes first:
TUASON, J.
no evidence can be produced, or the facts
are unknown or unknowable. 1. If both were under the age of fifteen (15) years,
By: Borra,
the older is deemed to have survived;
Filipino However, where there are known or
knowable facts from which a reasonable 2. If both were above the age of sixty (60), the
conclusion can be made, the presumption younger is deemed to have survived;
does not apply, and the parties shall now
present evidence to prove his allegations. 3. If one is under fifteen (15) and the other above
Here, as there is evidence that the mother
 was able to outlive his son, the presumption sixty (60), the former is deemed to have survived;
that “both perished at the same time” shall
not apply. 4. If both be over fifteen (15) and under sixty
(60), and the sex be different, the male is deemed
to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older;
and

5. If one be under fifteen (15) or over sixty (60),

and the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived;

Sec 3(kk) of Rule 131 is the same with Sec 43 of

the NCC: in the absence of proof of who perished
first as between 2 persons who are to succeed
from each other, it is presumed that they perished
at the same time.

Juridical Persons
Arts. 50-54

Citizenship And
Domicile Art. IV, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution
- Art. IV, Sec. enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines.
1, 1987 Certain rights such as the right to vote and the
Constitutio practice of a profession are only granted to
n Filipino citizens.

- NCC 50 The husband and wife are obliged to live together,

observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
- FC 68-69, render mutual help and support. The marriage
cf. NCC relationship creates certain personal rights and
110, cf. FC duties as between the husband and wife. These
55, 101, 152 rights and obligations ordinarily continue as long
as the marriage endures.

Under the Family Code, the fixing of the domicile

of the spouses shall be made by both spouses.
Previously, it was the husband who had the right
to fix the domicile. However, under the case of
Ilusorio v. Bildner, the Court is powerless to
enforce Article 69 because marital rights
including coverture and living in conjugal
dwelling may not be enforced through a court
action.

Article 55 sets forth the grounds that may be

invoked in a petition for legal separation.
Abandonment in legal significance is the act of
one spouse voluntarily separating from the other,
with the intention of not returning to live together
as husband and wife, that continues for the length
of time required by statute.

Article 101 sets forth the effect of abandonment to

the property relations of the spouses. In addition
to the effects mentioned, if a separation de facto is
attended by abandonment, the following are also
produced: a) the spouse who leaves the conjugal
home or refuses to live therein, without just cause,
shall not have the right to be supported; b) the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property or
for authority to be the sole administrator of the
absolute community or of the conjugal
 partnership, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose; c) the
aggrieved spouse may petition for legal separation
if the abandonment lasts for more than one year.

The family home is the dwelling place of a person

and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and
repository of cherished memories that last during
one’s lifetime. Its constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of
a family. It is also defined a real right which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land
on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such
properties, which must remain with the persons
constituting and his heirs. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases.

55. Romualdez-M
arcos vs Settled is the principle that for the purposes
COMELEC, of election law, residence is synonymous
248 SCRA 300 with domicile. Domicile, in election law, is
considered as “legal residence” while
residence, in its ordinary conception, only
PONENTE:
concerns itself with the actual physical
KAPUNAN, J. presence of a person in a certain place at a
certain time.
By:
Buencamino, Domicile includes the twin elements of "the
Pio Vincent R. fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.

Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To

successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change

of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the

former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof

based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. To
effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's
former domicile with an intent to supplant
the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

A minor follows the domicile of his parents.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Imelda) was

born in Manila. However, when she was 8
years old, her family moved to Tacloban,
Leyte. Thus, Tacloban Leyte became her
domicile of origin by operation of law. It
continues as such in the absence of both a
different actual residence coupled with an
animus manendi, that is, an intention to
remain to the new actual residence, and an
intention to abandon the domicile of origin.
Nothing in Imelda’s case shows her
abandonment of her domicile of origin.

She did not lose her domicile of origin

when she married the late President
Marcos. It must be emphasized that while
the law obliges the husband and wife to live
together, the spouse does not necessarily
lose his or her domicile of origin, rather, he
or she only gains a new home, that is, a
new actual residence, which again, must be
distinguished from legal residence or
domicile.

Furthermore, it is admitted that Imelda

held various residences for different
purposes during the past four decades,
some of which being a politician, or by
virtue of marrying the late President
Marcos. However, none of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte.

It must be emphasized that Imelda has

continually manifested her intention to
return to Tacloban, Leyte even if she was
married because she celebrated her
birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting
 well-publicized projects for the benefit of
her province and hometown.

Therefore, even if Imelda held various

actual residences prior to her filing of her
certificate of candidacy in First District of
Leyte, she has substantially complied with
the residency requirement in the
Constitution because residency, for
purposes of election laws, is considered to
be domicile. Having established that the
domicile of Imelda was Tacloban, Leyte
because of certain unequivocal acts and
absence of the intention to abandon her
domicile of origin, she is considered to be a
resident of such from the very beginning,
thus complying with the one year
requirement prescribed by the Constitution.

56. Llamanzares
vs. The case enunciates the doctrine that
COMELEC, foundlings are natural born citizens of the
G.R. No. countries where they are found.
221697etc.,
April 5, 2016 This case pertains to the two petitions to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of then
PONENTE: presidential Candidate Mary Grace
PEREZ, J. Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (Grace Poe)
on the ground of misrepresentation for
By: Neil claiming in her COC that she was a
 Cabaltera Natural Born Filipino.

The Supreme Court ruled that foundlings

cannot be denied Filipino citizenship and
render them stateless just because there is a
minute possibility that the foundling is a
child of two foreigners. In fact, the silence
of the 1935 Constitution as to the Filipino
Citizenship of Foundlings does not mean
they are excluded from such citizenship.
The silence of the constitution was merely
for the purpose of avoiding redundancy.
This inclusive policy was adopted by the
1973 and 1987 Constitution.

Surnames Under R.A. No. 9255 which amended Article 176

- NCC of the Family Code, an illegitimate child has the
364-380 right to use the surname of the father. This Act
provides that illegitimate children may use the
- RA 9255
surname of their father under the following
- FC 176 circumstances: first, if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by the latter through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register; or
second, when an admission in a public document
or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father.
 As a general rule, Article 176 provides that the
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or
her mother. The exception would be found under
R.A. No. 9255, wherein illegitimate children have
the right to use the surname of their father under
the above-mentioned circumstances. If the father
intends to prove non-filiation, during his lifetime,
he has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts.

57. Naldoza v The Supreme Court ruled that under Article

Republic, G.R. 364 of the Civil Code, minors who are
No. L-55538 presumably legitimate must principally use
March 15, their father’s surname. Change of name is
1982 allowed if there are proper and reasonable
causes of such change of name. It is the
PONENTE: duty of the court to determine whether the
AQUINO, J.
change of name of the minors in their
petition would redound to their welfare or
By: Cabatu,
would prejudice them.
Ma. Andrea D.
In this case, Naldoza, the mother of the two
minor children, filed a petition to change
the surname of the said children from his
husband’s surname to that of her own
surname on the grounds that her husband is
a swindler and that he abandoned them
after she confronted him with his previous
 marriage with another woman. The Court
denied the petition for allowing the change
of surname would cause confusion as to the
minor's parentage and would be
inconsistent with their legitimate status as
indicated in their birth records.

58. Yasin v. Hon.When a woman marries a man, she need
Judge Shari’anot seek judicial authority to use her
Court G.R. husband's name. The law automatically
No. 94986 grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil
(1995) Code). Similarly, when the marriage no
longer exists as in the case of death of the
PONENTE: husband or divorce as authorized by the
BIDIN, J.
Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need
not seek judicial confirmation of the change
By:
in her civil status in order to revert to her
Calumpang,
maiden name. When a wife uses her former
Karen Regina
husband's name, it is merely optional and
B.
not obligatory for her to do so (Tolentino,
1983 ed). In other words, what is not
required in the first place cannot be
subsequently made as a requirement.
Thus, in this case the petition to use again she may choose to continue employing her former
of maiden name filed by petitioner before husband's surname, unless:
the respondent court is an unnecessary
proceeding since her former husband is
Article 370 of the NCC, in relation to Article
371
It is provided for under Article 370 that A
married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname
and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her
husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing
a word indicating that she is his wife, such
as "Mrs.”
Under Article 371, it is stated that in case of
annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
party, she shall resume her maiden name and
surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may
resume her maiden name and surname. However,
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
 already married another woman after
obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.
To make Rule 103 of the Rules of Court (on
change of name) applicable to the judicial
confirmation of the right of a divorced
woman to resume her maiden name and
surname is burdensome. Instead, where
sufficient facts and evidence exist, such a
petition must be given due course and
summarily granted.
(2) She or the former husband is married
again to another person.
In both articles, the word "may'' is used. Such is
indicative that the use of the husband's surname
by the wife is permissive rather than obligatory.
Thus, she has an option, but not a duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways
allowed by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil Code of
the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724, 1983 ed.)

59. In re: The law is silent as to the regulation of the Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
Stephanie middle name, likewise, to what middle Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An
Garcia, G.R. name an adoptee may use. However, as Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
No. 148311, discussed by Justice Caguioa, regarding Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what
March 31, the use of surnames; it should be made middle name a child may use.
2005. mandatory that the child uses the surname
of the father, but it is permissive in the case
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only
of the surname of the mother. considered in Article 375(1) – in case there is
PONENTE:
identity of names and surnames between
SANDOVAL-G Applying now to this case, Stephanie was ascendants and descendants, in which case, the
UTIERREZ, J. allowed to use “Garcia” as her middle middle name or the mother’s surname shall be
name as there is no law prohibiting an added.
By: Castillo, illegitimate child adopted by her natural
Pamela Alexia father to use as middle name the surname
D. of her mother.
60. Remo v DFA, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides for
March 5, 2010 the options of a married woman with
regard to the use of her husband’s name.
PONENTE: The provision made use of the word “may”
CARPIO, J. which indicates that the use of the
husband’s surname by the wife is only
permissive and not obligatory. Thus, a
By: Castro,
married woman has an option and not a
Czarina Ann M.
duty to use the surname of the husband in
the ways provided by the said provision.

RA 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of

1996 also allows a married woman
applying for a passport for the first time to
use her maiden name. In case of renewal,
such married woman may either adopt her
husband’s surname or continuously use her
maiden name. However, once she chooses
to adopt her husband’s surname in her
passport, she will be prohibited from
reverting to the use of her maiden name.
Such reversion will only be allowed in
cases falling under the enumeration in
Section 5(d) of RA 8239.

The Supreme Court stated that there is no

conflict between Article 370 and the
provision in RA 8239, contrary to
petitioner’s argument. Article 370 provides
for the option of the wife to use either her
maiden name or her husband’s surname in
any of the ways enumerated by law while
the provision in RA 8239 states that a
 married woman may use her maiden name
or her husband’s surname in applying for a
passport for the first time and may continue
using her maiden name in case of renewal.
In the event that she chooses to adopt her
husband’s surname, she would not be
allowed to go back to using her maiden
name in her future passport renewals,
except in cases provided under Section 5(d)
of RA 8239. Even assuming RA 8239
conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions
of RA 8239 which is a special law must
prevail over the provisions of the Civil
Code which is the general law. A basic
tenet in statutory construction is that a
special law prevails over a general law.

61. Grande v
Antonio, G.R. The use of the word “may” in Article 176
No. 206248, of the Family code in relation to R.A. 9255
February 18, shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
2014 child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word
PONENTE: “may” in statutory construction is only
VELASCO JR., permissive. Hence, the discretion for the
J. use of surname is conferred upon the
illegitimate children.
By:
Concepcion, In this case, the father cannot compel his
Precious illegitimate children to use his surname.
Dianne A.
 The Illegitimate children have the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of
their father. It is not the father or the
mother who is granted by law to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.

Emancipation RA 6809 lowered the age of majority from twenty

RA 6809 one to eighteen years.

A. Cause of Emancipation takes place upon reaching the age

emancipation of majority, that is, at the age of eighteen years
- FC 234 as old.
amended
Upon the attainment of the age of majority, a child
B. Effect of acquires full civil capacity and may now enter
emancipation into contracts without the assistance of his parents
- FC 236 as or guardians. Emancipation terminates the
amended cf. parental authority over the person and property of
FC 15, NCC the child.
2180, FC
221 However, by express provision of law, an
emancipated child but below 21, still requires
parental consent before such child contracts
marriage. Furthermore, the consent of the person
mentioned in Art. 14 of the Family Code must
give their consent to a marriage settlement of the
emancipated child below 21.

Parents are civilly liable for quasi-delicts of their

minor children under Art. 221 of the Family Code
provided that: a) the minor is living in the
company of the parents; b) the minor is under
 their parental authority; c) the parents failed to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.

Rules Governing Under Art. 96 of the Family Code, one spouse is

Persons Who Are authorized by law to assume sole powers of
Absent administration if the other spouse is incapacitated
or otherwsie unable to participate in the
NCC 381-383, administration of the common properties.
384-389, FC 96, However, it must be emphasized that these powers
101, 124, NCC do not include the powers of disposition or
390-396, FC 41 encumbrance without the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse.

Article 101 sets forth the effects of abandonment

to the property relations of the spouses. In
addition to the effects mentioned, if a separation
de facto is attended by abandonment, the
following are also produced: a) the spouse who
leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right
to be supported; b) the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property or for authority to be the
sole administrator of the absolute community or
of the conjugal partnership, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose;
c) the aggrieved spouse may petition for legal
separation if the abandonment lasts for more than
one year.

The family home is the dwelling place of a person

 and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and
repository of cherished memories that last during
one’s lifetime. It is constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of
a family. It is also defined as a real right which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land
on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such
properties, which must remain with the persons
constituting and his heirs. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases.

Art. 124 of the Family Code has the same effect

of that of Art. 96, that is, one spouse may be
authorized to assume sole powers of
administration. However, Art. 124 governs
Administration and Disposition of Conjugal
Property while Art. 96 governs Absolute
Community Property.

62. Reyes v. The Supreme Court has already ruled in

Alejandro, 141 Jones v. Hortiguela that the judicial
SCRA 65 declaration of absence of a person
pursuant to the Civil Code is only for the
PONENTE: purpose of taking the necessary precautions
PATAJO, J. for the administration of the absentee’s
estate. Also, it is worthy to note that Rule
By: Corpus,
107 of the Rules of Court on absentees is
Rebecca R.
actually based on the provisions of the New
Civil Code on Absence. Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that the provisions of
the NCC specifically under Title XIV from
Articles 381 to 396 on the rules to be
considered for absence of persons are all
related or connected with the effects of such
absence to property. Without property to
consider, there is no necessity for the courts
to judicially declare a person as an
absentee as the law is clear that such is
only for purposes of the administration of
estate of the absentee.

Pursuant to the Civil Code effective at the

time of the promulgation of this decision,
the Supreme Court reiterated instances
when judicial declaration of an absentee is
necessary. First is provided under Article
384, when there are properties to be
administered by a court-appointed
representative. Second is under Article 191,
when the present spouse wants to have
separation of property. Third as provided in
Article 196, is when the present wife would
want to be the administrator of certain
properties. Lastly, the Court noted that it
can rule on the issue of judicial declaration
of the absent spouse in one and the same
 case as the petition to solely manage the
conjugal properties.

In this case, the petition for declaration of

absence of Roberto L. Reyes, who was
found not to have any right, interest, or
property in his name in the Philippines,
was denied by the Supreme Court. There is
no need for Roberto L. Reyes, who was
claimed to be an absentee by petitioner, to
be judicially declared an absentee because
he has no properties to be administered.
Being the sole purpose of the absentee’s
wife or herein petitioner in filing this
petition is to declare her husband as an
absentee and considering that no property
is owned by them during their marriage,
the Supreme Court did not find any valid
and lawful reason to declare Roberto L.
Reyes an absentee.

63. Eastern As a general rule, Article 391 (1) of the Article 391 of the New Civil Code
Shipping v. New Civil Code provides that a person on
Lucero, 124 board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or The presumption of death under Article 391 of the
SCRA 425 New Civil Code is a rebuttable presumption. It is
an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
only applicable only if there is no existing
been heard of for four years since the loss evidence, otherwise, the rule on preponderance of
PONENTE: of the vessel or aeroplane shall be evidence prevails.
ESCOLIN, J. presumed dead for all purposes, including
By: Dazo, John the division of the estate among the heirs. In relation to the Rules on Evidence, the court can
Xavier L. However, where there are facts, known or presume that a person is dead upon the
knowable, from which a rational can be establishment of certain facts related to the
circumstances provided in Article 391 of the New
made, the presumption of death does not
Civil Code.
step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls. Moreover, a person is presumed dead under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 391 of the
In this case, there is a moral certainty that New Civil Code because of the substantial
Capt. Lucero already died because of an possibility that the said person, who had been
existing danger: the sea water was entering missing for four (4) years, already died from the
time of the loss of the vessel or aeroplane, or other
the hatch; the vessel was listing 50 to 60
catastrophe.
degrees port; and that the crew was
preparing to abandon the vessel at any
time. It is to be noted that Eastern Shipping
Lines only received three (3) messages from
Capt. Lucero, the last of which was
received at 9:50 pm. Afterwards, there was
no radio message of any kind from Capt.
Lucero. In connection, there is credible and
material evidence that the vessel had sunk
and that Capt. Lucero, including the
members of the crew, had died. Based on
the set of circumstances, the rule on
presumption of death under Article 391(1)
of the Civil Code is not applicable and that
the rule of preponderance of evidence must
prevail.
64. Manuel vs. The presumption of death of the spouse who Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code; Article
People, G.R. had been absent for seven years, it being 41 of the Family Code
No. 165842, unknown whether or not the absentee still
Nov. 29, 2005 lives, is created by law, and arises without Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involves the
any necessity of judicial declaration. ordinary presumptive death and qualified
PONENTE: However, as explained by this Court in presumptive death respectively. However, for the
CALLEJO, SR. Armas v. Calisterio, Article 41 of the purpose of remarriage, Article 41 of the Family
J.
Family Code amended the foregoing rules Code provides that the period before a person is
on presumptive death as it provided a presumed dead for all purposes is the person’s
By: Dela Cruz,
reduction of the period from seven years absence of four consecutive years or a person’s
Nuvi Maecy H.
under the first paragraph of Article 390 of absence of two years for the instances provided
the Civil Code to four consecutive years, as for under Article 391 of the Civil Code.
well as the period of four years under
Article 391 of the Civil Code to an absence Under the Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code,
of two years. Thus, before the spouse there is no need for a court proceeding to consider
present may contract a subsequent a person presumptively dead. However, under
marriage, he or she must institute summary Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for
proceedings for the declaration of the a summary proceeding to raise the presumption of
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, death of a person to allow the remaining spouse to
without prejudice to the effect of the acquire a subsequent marriage.
reappearance of the absentee spouse. In the
present case, the failure of petitioner
Eduardo Manuel to provide evidence of a
decision of a competent court of the
declaration of presumptive death of his first
wife as required by Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article
14 of the Family Code raises the
 presumption that he had acted with malice
or evil intent when he had a subsequent
marriage with complainant Tina
Gandalera-Manuel.

65. Pantollano v The surviving spouse cannot file her claim

Korphil, GR for death benefits since the person missing
169575, March cannot be legally considered dead until the
30, 2011 lapse of the period fixed by law on
presumption of death.
PONENTE:
DEL Under article 391 of the Civil Code, the
CASTILLO, J.
following shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, including the division of the
By: Estreller,
estate among the heirs; (1) A person on
Conrado S. III
board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or
an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss
of the vessel or aeroplane; (2) A person in
the armed forces who has taken part in war,
and has been missing for four years; (3) A
person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four
years. In this case, the person was reported
missing on August 2,1994.

Thus, he is presumed legally dead only on

August 2, 1998. It is only at this time that
 the rights of his heirs to file their claim for
death benefits accrued.

66. Rep. vs
Granada, GR For the purpose of contracting a
187512, June subsequent marriage, the surviving spouse
13, 2012 must institute a summary proceeding for
the Declaration of Presumptive Death
PONENTE: under Article 41 of the Family Code. A
SERENO, J. judgment on the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death shall be immediately
By: final and executory which is not subject to
Evangelista, an ordinary appeal. The remedy, therefore,
Angela Isabel of the aggrieved party is to file before the
C.
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. After the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court with the Supreme Court.

In this case, the ruling of the RTC

regarding the issue on whether respondent
was able to prove her "well-founded belief"
that her absent spouse was already dead
prior to her filing of the Petition to declare
 him presumptively dead is already final and
executory. It becomes immutable and can
no longer be modified.

67. Rep. vs The Family Code provides that for the

Narceda, GR purpose of contracting the subsequent
192760, April marriage where: 1) the prior spouse had
10, 2013 been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded
PONENTE: belief that the absent spouse was already
SERENO, CJ. dead and 2) an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient in case of disappearance
By:
where there is danger of death under the
Fajilagutan,
circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Dainiele Renee
Article 391, the spouse present must
R.
institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.

Republic v
Hon. Estrada, Under the Family Code, a marriage
G.R. No. contracted by any person during the
214792, March subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
18, 2015 null and void, unless before the subsequent
marriage is commenced, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years
 By: Lavarias, and the spouse present has a well-founded
Hailord N. belief that the absent spouse was already
dead.

It is important to note however that for the

purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage, the present spouse must first
institute a summary proceeding as required
by law for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee. This proceeding,
however, may still be affected by the
possible reappearance of the missing
spouse.

68. Funerals Valino v Art. 195 of the Family Code provides the persons
NCC 305-310, FC Adriano, GR The right and duty to make funeral who are responsible for support and to whom they
195 182894, April arrangements is limited to the members of are obliged to give support. It must be emphasized
22, 2014 the family to the exclusion of one’s common that the right to support does not arise from the
law partner. In this case, the law gives the mere fact of relationship but from imperative
PONENTE: necessity without which it cannot be demanded,
right and duty to make funeral
and the law presumes that such necessity does not
MENDOZA, J. arrangements to Rosario, the surviving exist unless support is demanded
legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that
By: Liban,
she was living separately from her husband
Clarisse M.
and was in the United States when he died
did not divest her of such right and duty.
Entries in the Civil R.A. No. 9048 vests the Local Civil Registrat or
Register Consul General the jurisdiction to correct clerical
- NCC and typographical errors in the entry and change
407-413
of the first name without the order of the court
- RA 9048, as except in changes in nationality, age, status, or sex
amended by of the petitioner. The change of first name may
Rep. Act onlu be allowed if the first name or nickname is
No. 101752 tainted with dishonor or difficult to write or
pronounce, the new first anime or nickname is
- Rule 108, used by the petitioner consistently where he/she is
Rules of
publicly known, and if the change will certainly
Court
avoid confusion.

R.A. No. 10172 widens the coverage of the

jurisdiction of the Local Civil Registrar or Consul
General to include errors in the day and month in
the date of birth or sex, provided that the error is
apparent and obvious. Still, the law limits only to
the mentioned entries and does not include the
change of nationality, age, or status of the
petitioner.

Rule 108 governs the cancellation or correction of

entries which requires judicial order vesting the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance)
with jurisdiction to dismiss or grant petitions for
cancellation or corrections of births, marriage,
 deaths etc. Here, there is a need for a notice and
publication of the order once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation where any person who claims interest
under the entry may file his opposition within
fifteen days from the said notice or from the last
publication date.

69. Dela Cruz v Article 176 of the Family Code, as

Gracia, G.R. amended by R.A. 9255, permits an
No. 177728, illegitimate child to use the surname of
July 31, 2009 his/her father if the latter had expressly
recognized him/her as his offspring through
PONENTE: the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or through an admission made in a
CARPIO
public or private handwritten instrument.
MORALES, J.
The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act
By: Magpili, of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity;
Airish A hence, no separate action for judicial
approval is necessary.

In this case, even though the autobiography

presented as evidence is unsigned by
Dominique, the Court still directs the City
Civil Registrar of Antipolo City to enter the
surname of the late Christian Dominique
Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of
petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his
Certificate of Live Birth, and record the
 same in the Register of Births because the
Court believes that the quoted statements in
Dominique’s Autobiography have been
made and written by him hence, an
admission. This is in consonant with the
relevant facts that during his lifetime,
Dominique and Jenie were living together
as common-law spouses at his parents
house, and that Jenie was pregnant when
Dominique died, after which Jenie gave
birth two months after his death. Hence,
there is sufficient establishment that the
child of Jenie is Dominique’s.

70. Braza v Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the

Registrar, G.R. It is true that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
No. 181174, vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code
Dec. 4, 2009 charts the procedure by which an entry in
the civil registry may be cancelled or
PONENTE:
corrected.
CARPIO
MORALES, J. It is used to for clerical errors - one which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
By: Marallag, understanding; an error made by a clerk or
Ellaine Denice a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
H. writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly
misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent.
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry. The proceedings may either
be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary.
A petition for correction or cancellation of an
entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws.
 However, the rule is not the applicable to
substantial or contentious alterations.
These may only be allowed in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties
are impleaded and due process is properly
observed.

In this case, petitioners' cause of action is

actually to seek the declaration of Pablo
and Lucille’s marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy,
which causes of action are governed not by
Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003, and
Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively,
hence, the petition should be filed in a
Family Court.

71. Corpus v Sto. Although the law mandates that the divorce
Tomas, GR decree be entered in the civil registry, it
18671, Aug. 11, does not necessitates that the law and the
2010 submission of the decree by themselves,
ipso facto authorize the decree's
PONENTE: registration. With this said, the law should
BRION, J. be interpreted in light of the necessity that
a foreign judgment be recognized judicially
By: Martin, before it can be considered final and
Dominic conclusive.
Moreover, it must be noted that the RTC's
recognition of the Canadian, or any
nation’s divorce decree does not, in and of
itself, authorize the cancellation of the
entry in the civil registry. Furthermore, the
Rules of Court does not consider a petition
for recognition of a foreign judgment to be
the appropriate procedure for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides for

the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry.

Before a judgment that authorizes the

cancellation or correction is annotated in
the civil registry, the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements enshrined in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court must first be
complied with.

Moreover, it is also required that: (1) the

verified petition must be filed with the RTC
of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located, (2) that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings, and (3) that the time and
place for hearing must be published in a
 newspaper of general circulation.
All these requirements should be followed
and met before the judgment that
authorizes the cancellation or correction is
annotated in the appropriate civil registry.
72. Iwasawa vs Before a valid subsequent marriage can be
Gangan, G.R. contracted, a judicial declaration of nullity
No. 204169, of prior marriage is required; otherwise,
Sept. 11 2013 there would be a bigamous marriage,
which is void from the beginning as
PONENTE: provided in Article 35 (4) of the Family
VILLARAMA, Code of the Philippines.
J.
Applying the foregoing to the present case,
By: Mojica,
the documentary exhibits prove the nullity
Robinson S.
of marriage of petitioner to private
respondent on the ground of bigamy.
Indeed, there was no judicial declaration of
nullity of the prior marriage of private
respondent with Arambulo at the time she
married petitioner, which rendered the
second marriage bigamous.
Article 410 of the New Civil Code provides that
the books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered
public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained. As public
documents, they are admissible in evidence even
without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness.
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code provides that
those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
falling under Article 41 shall be void from the
beginning. Corollary thereto, Article 41 thereof
provides that a marriage contracted by any person
during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case
of disappearance where there is danger of death
 under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.

73. Republic v
Olaybar, G.R. It must be kept in mind that a petition for Rule 108 of the Rules of Court prescribes the
No. 189538, correction or cancellation of an entry in the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries
Feb. 10, 2014 civil registry cannot substitute for an action in the civil registry. It is a special proceeding
which may be summary or adversary. If the
to invalidate a marriage. There must be a
petition under Rule 108 only involves clerical
PONENTE: direct action filed in keeping with the errors, it shall proceed summarily. But, if it
PERALTA, J. substantive and procedural safeguards of involves substantial correction, like the change to
marriage. To put it simply, marriage cannot a person’s civil status or nationality, it shall be an
By: Pigar, Kyra
Frenel H. simply be dissolved by reason of changing adversary proceeding. When all the procedural
the entries in the civil registry. The requirements under Rule 108 is satisfied, it is the
Supreme Court also noted that Rule 108 of appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries
the Rules of Court is unavailing to
sought
determine validity of marriage where trial
already ensued and the parties were given
opportunities to bring up defenses. As in
this case, respondent was not seeking to
nullify the said marriage but to correct the
records showing the truth that there was no
marriage to begin with. In sum, what the
trial court in this case did was to allow the
correction of the said marriage certificate
and not declare the marriage void because
 there was really no existing marriage in the
first place.

74. Barcelote v
Republic, G.R. In the registration of the birth of an
No. 222095, illegitimate child in the Civil Registry, it is
Aug. 7, 2017 mandatory that the mother of an
illegitimate child signs the birth certificate
of her child regardless of whether the father
PONENTE:
recognizes the child or not because the
CARPIO, J. mother has the parental authority and
custody of the illegitimate child as provided
By: Resus, by law. Otherwise, the entry in the Civil
Jarvin David E. Registry is considered void and cancellable
for being incomplete.

In this case, the Supreme Court declared

the birth certificates of the illegitimate
children of Barcelote and Tinitigan as void
and ordered their cancellation because
such were registered by Tinitigan without
the knowledge, consent, and signature of
Barcelote as the mother.
75. Republic v Pursuant to Republic Act 9048 as amended Republic Act No. 9048
Gallo, GR by Republic Act 10172, clerical error may
207074, Jan. be corrected notwithstanding the fact that it R.A. No. 9048 vests the Local Civil Registrat or
17, 2018 is not typographical provided that it is Consul General the jurisdiction to correct clerical
obvious to the understanding despite no and typographical errors in the entry and change
PONENTE: showing that said entry in the Certificate of of the first name without the order of the court
LEONEN, J. Live Birth was ever used. Further, the except in changes in nationality, age, status, or sex
Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled of the petitioner. The change of first name may
By: Reynaldo,
doctrine that changing of name under Rule onlu be allowed if the first name or nickname is
Hark
103 can only be granted on those ground tainted with dishonor or difficult to write or
Emmanuelle
Joaquin B provided by law while change of name pronounce, the new first anime or nickname is
under Rule 108 includes clerical, used by the petitioner consistently where he/she is
typographical, spelling, and other publicly known, and if the change will certainly
innocuous errors, and changed the avoid confusion.
jurisdiction to the Civil Registrar according
to the above-stated law. The same law also Republic Act No. 10172
vests jurisdiction to the Civil Registrar for
cases of change of day and month of birth R.A. No. 10172 widens the coverage of the
as well as sex. Inelectubly, Rule 103 and jurisdiction of the Local Civil Registrar or Consul
108 are now amended by Republic Act General to include errors in the day and month in
9048 as amended by Republic Act 10172. the date of birth or sex, provided that the error is
apparent and obvious. Still, the law limits only to
These were applied in this case thereby the mentioned entries and does not include the
allowing the Civil Registrar in correcting change of nationality, age, or status of the
respondent’s name, sex, middle name, and petitioner.
middle names of her parents and their
marriage, as it was proven that these Rule 108, Rules of Court
 entries are typographical error and not Rule 108 governs the cancellation or correction of
substantial in character.
entries which requires judicial order vesting the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance)
with jursidiction to dismiss or grant petitions for
cancellation or corrections of births, marriage,
deaths etc. Here, there is a need for a notice and
publication of the order once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation where any person who claims interest
under the entry may file his opposition within
fifteen days from the said notice or from the last
publication date.

76. Republic v
Tipay, GR The Court ultimately recognized that R.A. No. 9048
209527, Feb. substantial alterations in the civil registry
14, 2018 are allowable in an action filed under Rule This law provided an administrative recourse for
108 of the Rules of Court, as long as the the correction of clerical or typographical errors,
PONENTE: issues are properly threshed out in essentially leaving the substantial corrections in
REYES, J. appropriate adversarial proceedings. the civil registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
By: Riñoza, Thus, it was held in this case that the
Michael Dave Republic incorrectly argued that Rule 108 R.A. No. 10172
C. is limited to changes involving clerical
This law expanded the authority of local civil
errors.
registrars and the Consul General to make
changes in the day and month in the date of birth,
as well as in the recorded sex of a person when it
 is patently clear that there was a typographical
error or mistake in the entry.

77. Morisono v Pursuant to the case of Republic v. Manalo,

Morisono, GR foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify
No. 226013, marriages between a Filipino and alien
July 2, 2018 citizen may already be recognized in this
jurisdiction. This is without regard as to
PONENTE: who between the spouses procured or
PERLAS-BERN initiated the divorce.
ABE, J.
However, it was emphasized that the
Filipino spouse petitioning for the
By: Salazar,
recognition of such foreign divorce decree
Angelynn C.
must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.

78. Miller v Miller, In this case, what petitioners sought was

GR 200344, the correction of respondent’s surname in
August 28, her birth certificate issued by the Local
2019 Civil Registrar. Hence, the change, being a
non-clerical one, it affects her status and
PONENTE: will affect her identity, and successional
LEONEN, J. rights. In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
By: Sapugay,
the Supreme Court pointed that "legitimacy
Bianca
and filiation can be questioned only in a
Katthryne A.
direct action seasonably filed by the proper
 party, and not through collateral attack.
Hence, the action questioning the
legitimacy of a child should make reference
to the Family Code, and not the Rules of
Court.

79. Falcis v. Civil Petitioner Falcis claims that Respondent

Registrar, GR Civil Registrar General should be
217910, Sept. impleaded because it is the instrumentality
3, 2019 [en of the government that is tasked to enforce
banc] the law in relation to marriage.

PONENTE: However, Petitioner’s choice of the Civil

LEONEN, J.
Registrar General as respondent is
manifestly misguided. No factual
By: Yusi,
antecedents existed prior to the filing of the
Jonathan
Vincent U. Petition apart from the passage of the
Family Code. Falcis has never applied for
a marriage license, nor has he ever visited
the premises of respondent's office, or of
anyone acting under its authority. He has
never bothered to show that he himself
acted in any way that asked respondent to
exercise any kind of discretion. Indeed, no
discretion was ever exercised by
 respondent. Without an exercise of
discretion, there could not have been abuse
of discretion, let alone one that could
conceivably be characterized as "grave."

80. Republic v Under Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and

Lao, G.R. No. 923, naturalization extends to the alien wife
205218, and minor children of the person
February 10, naturalized upon the wife's showing that
2020 she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under Letter of
PONENTE: Instructions No. 270, and that she and her
LEONEN, J.
minor children reside permanently in the
Philippines at the time of her husband's
By: Aclan,
naturalization.
Charisma C.
Respondents’ father was naturalized and
conferred with Philippine citizenship under
PD No. 923. As such, respondents filed a
petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court to correct the nationality of their
parents, which was granted by the lower
court. As provided for under Article 412 of
the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. Rule 108 is used
in correcting substantial corrections in an
entry in the civil registry and the petition
 must be filed with the Regional Trial Court
where the civil register is located, hence,
there must be a judicial order first.
Respondents resort to Rule 108 was
appropriate considering that such rule
allows the change of substantial errors
such as nationality as entered in the civil
register.

81. Eduardo
Santos vs. A petition for correction of entry under
Republic of the Rule 108 of the Rules covers clerical errors
Philippines and substantial changes. The only
G.R. No. difference lies in the procedure to be
221277. March adopted. If the correction is clerical, then
18, 2021 the procedure to be adopted is summary
whereas if the rectification affects the civil
PONENTE: status, citizenship or nationality of a party,
CARANDANG. it is deemed substantial, and the procedure
J. to be adopted is adversary.
By: Agpaoa,
Princess
Monique The Court denied the petition for correction
of entries and cancellation of annotation of
certificate of live birth filed by Eduardo
under Rule 108. In denying the petition, the
Court ratiocinated that the correction of his
nationality from “Chinese” to “Filipino”,
his filiation from “legitimate” to
“illegitimate” and his mother’s status from
“married” to “single” are substantial
changes that affect his status, filiation,
citizenship and successional rights.
Accordingly, such may only be resolved
through the appropriate adversary
proceedings under Rule 108 which requires
that the proper parties be impleaded and
reasonable notice and publication be made.
Hence, the failure to implead all affected
parties and simply alleging in the petition
that he is impleading “all persons who
shall be affected” without showing that he
exerted earnest efforts in bringing to court
all possible interested parties is not
sufficient compliance with Rule 108.

Nevertheless, the Court stated that Eduardo

may still file another petition under Rule
108 to change his surname from “Cu” to
“Santos” because as a legitimate child, the
law allows him to use the surname of either
of his parents.
82. Francis Luigi
G. Santos v. As the State has an interest in the names Application of Rule 103, Rules of Court
Republic, G.R. borne by individuals and entities, a change
No. 250520, of such name is not a matter of right but is Rule 103 does not necessarily result in a change
May 05, 2021 a privilege. Therefore, there must be proper of a petitioner’s status, such as from legitimate to
and reasonable cause which the courts illegitimate.
PONENTE: may, in its discretion, determine. This
CAGUIOA. J. Not being adversarial like Rule 108, Rule 103
requires judicious evaluation of the
By: Agustin, only requires that the order reciting the purpose of
sufficiency and propriety of the
Nathan the petition and the date and place of the hearing
justifications, mindful of the consequences
Raphael D.L. be published that any interested person be allowed
it may bring once granted.
to appear and oppose the petition.

R.A. 8552 – Domestic Adoption Act of 1998

Here, the reasons provided by the petitioner
Under the Domestic Adoption Act, the adopter is
does not fall under any jurisprudential
vested with all legal ties pursuant to parental
ground. The mere fact that petitioner was
authority, and the adoptee shall be considered the
using the name in showbusiness, and the
legitimate son/daughter of the adopters for all
fact that he is the biological son of Bong
intents and purposes. In this case, petitioner was
Revilla, is not sufficient considering that he
adopted by Santos, and is thus the legitimate son
was already legally adopted by Patrick
of the latter by virtue of the adoption. With this
Santos, and there is no showing that his
existing legal tie, change of name cannot be
original name is causing confusion.
allowed on the mere basis of being the biological
son of Bong Revilla and wanting to be associated
with the latter’s family.

NOTE: R.A. 11642 is the prevailing adoption law.

83. Belleza v. CivilThere is a presumption of regularity in the RA 8239 otherwise known as the Philippine
Registrar of issuance of the passport in favor of Passport Act of 1996
Tacloban, GR Adelaida. The execution of an affidavit
218354, Sept. Among the requirements for the issuance of a
instead of submitting a birth certificate will
15, 2021 Passport under Sec. 5 of the Act is a birth
not overcome such presumption. The OSG certificate of the applicant duly issued or
did not submit any evidence to overcome authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar
PONENTE: this presumption. The passport of Adelaida General.
HERNANDO,
was issued in 1988, long before the
J.
Philippine Passport Act of 1996 was made
into effect. The certificate of live birth of
By: Alfonso, Adelaida’s brother stated that she is a
Angela May S Filipino citizen. There would be
inconsistencies in the natal circumstances
of the siblings if correction would not be
allowed. Lastly, the testimony of Adelaida
regarding her illegitamcy and the
citizenship of her mother was never
questioned by the petitioner. The
requirement of electing Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority provided
under Art. IV, Sec. 1 of the 1935
Constitution and Sec. 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 625, the prevailing law during
Adelaida’s birthdate on November 24,
1942, applied only to legitimate children.
Adelaida, being an illegitimage child, she is
not required to comply with the
constitutional and statutory requirements to
 become a Filipino citizen because she
automatically became a Filipino upon
birth.

84. Johansen Vs.

Office of the Rule 108 of the rules of court pertains to a
Civil Registrar special proceeding wherein the venue is
General, G.R. jurisdictional. It provides that a verified
No. 256951. petition for cancellation or correction of an
November 29,
entry in the Civil Registry must be filed
2021
with the Court of First Instance of the
PONENTE: province where the civil registry is located.
CARANDANG,
J. In this case, the petition was denied by the
RTC of Bulacan due to lack of jurisdiction
By: Amancio, since the Report of Marriage is with the
Mark Joshua DFA or Office of the Civil Registrar
General which is in Pasay City or Quezon
City, respectively. As such the petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the
Civil Registry should have been filed with
the RTC of Pasay City or Quezon City

85. Rivera Vs. Woo Before a foreign divorce decree can be Rule 132 Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of
Namsun, G.R. recognized by our courts, the party Court
No. 248355.
 November 23, pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
2021  and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it pursuant to Sections
PONENTE:
24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
LOPEZ, J.
To prove the foreign judgment and the law on
which it was based, the above Sections require
proof, either by (1) official publications; or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents.

By: Aquino, Herein, petitioner merely presented Should the copies of official records be proven to
Marie notarized copies of the foreign judgment be stored outside of the Philippines, they must be
Angelique M. and a copy of the law of South Korea with (1) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
confirmation from the Embassy of the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Republic of South Korea in the Philippines Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept; and (2)
signed by the consul, and an Authentication
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Certificate from the DFA. Clearly, a consul
or counselor is not the legal custodian as If copies are offered into evidence, the attestation:
contemplated by the Rules. (1) must state that it is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof; and (2) must be
However, even with such failure or under the official seal of the attesting officer, or if
insufficient compliance with the rules on he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
such seal of said court.
proof, the case may be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of additional evidence in the
interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, especially here where
what is involved is a matter affecting lives
of families.

86. In Re: Petition A change of a person’s civil status must be

for recognition filed in the civil registry under Rule 108.
of foreign There are underlying objectives and
Judgment of
interests that the State seeks to protect in
 divorce with imposing requirements under Rule 108. The
prayer to Court cannot simply disregard such
change civil requirements in favor of expediency.
status of
Janevic Orteza
Ordaneza Vs. In this case, while it is true that the change
Republic of of Janevic’s civil status is an expected
Philippines, consequence of the judicial recognition of
G.R. No. her foreign divorce, it does not
254484. automatically follow that the Petition she
November 24, filed is the petition contemplated under
2021
Rule 108. The Court cannot take
PONENTE: cognizance of Janevic’s prayer for the
CARANDANG, cancellation or correction of her civil
J. status from "married" to "single" as this
may only be pursued and granted in the
By: Arenas, proper petition filed in compliance with the
Gissela M. specific requirements of Rule 108.

87. Ordoña Vs.

The Local Civil The petition for the change of Alrich Paul’s
Registrar of last name and deletion of the paternal
Pasig City, information in the Certificate of Live Birth
G.R. No. must be dismissed for being a collateral
215370. attack on filiation. As provided under
November 9, Article 165 of the Family Code, children
2021 born or conceived during the marriage of
the parties are legitimate. Since the
PONENTE: petitioner is married to Ariel at the time
INTING, J.
 Alrich Paul was conceived and born, the
By: Areta, latter is considered legitimate.
Karen M.
Even assuming that Rule 108 may be used
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, the
case still failed to satisfy the requirements
under Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule. As
required, all persons who stand to be
affected by the change or correction must
be impleaded as an indispensable party.
Here, Ariel was not impleaded as a party to
the case. As the presumed father of Alrich
Paul, his hereditary rights may be
adversely affected by the declaration of
Alrich Paul as Allan's illegitimate child.
 WEEK # 2

OVERVIEW OF MARRIAGE

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

MARRIAGE The concept of and nature of marriage, FC 1 cf. NCC 52, FC 149

● The concept of and nature of marriage, FC 1 cf. By: Magpili, Airish A.

NCC 52, FC 149
Article 52 onwards of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriage, legal separation,
● Special Law: Rep. Act 115961, prohibiting child and other laws providing for matters relating to Family Relations were repealed by
marriages Executive Order No. 209 or known as “Family Code of the Philippines.”

Pursuant to Article 1 of the Family Code, the concept of marriage must be treated
as a special contract of permanent union that binds a man and a woman in order to
establish a legally recognized conjugal and family life. However, marriage is not an
ordinary contract. It is a contract sui generis hence, rules that are applicable to
ordinary contracts are not ordinarily applicable to contract of marriage because the
latter involves marital relations and upholds public policy.

As a special contract, parties in marriage are bound by the laws and obligations
regulated by the State. Being so, the nature of civil marriages involves three (3)
parties: two willing spouses and the State. The State as a party interested treats
marriage as the foundation of the family, thus, it is an inviolable social institution,
guided by laws and not subject to any stipulation. However, there can be only one
exception that can be a subject of agreement and that is their property relations. In
such an agreement, the parties under the Family Code can enter into marriage
settlements that will govern their property relations but this freedom is limited
because the nature of the marriage settlement must still be within the limits
provided by this Code.
 In relation to Article 149 of Article 1 of the same Code, family relations are also
governed by law and no customs, traditions, practice, or any agreement shall be
recognized that will lead to the destruction of the family. This is because family
under the law is treated as the foundation of the nation, and it is protected in the
same manner as marriage is protected under our laws.

Special Law: Rep. Act 11596, prohibiting child marriages

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Republic Act No. 11596 or An Act Prohibiting the Practice of Child Marriage and
Imposing Penalties, was signed on December 10, 2021. In its declaration of State
Policy, marriage should only be entered into with the presence of free and full
consent of capacitated parties. It renders child marriage void ab initio.

According to the Act, child marriage refers to any marriage which are entered into
by one or both parties which are under eighteen (18) years of age, or any person
eighteen (18) years of age or over but who is unable to fully take care and protect
oneself. It may be solemnized in civil or church proceedings, or in any recognized
traditional, cultural or customary manner. It shall also include an informal union or
cohabitation outside of wedlock between an adult and a child, or between children.

Child marriage is considered by the State as child abuse for it debases, degrades,
and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of children. As such, the following are
considered as public crimes, and are penalized by the act: first, the facilitation of
child marriage; second, the solemnization of child marriage; and third, cohabitation
of an adult with a child outside wedlock.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.
1. ELOISA GOITA DE LA CAMARA, Petitioner -versus – JOSE CAMPOS
RUEDA, Respondent. G.R. No. 11263 , November 2, 1916, Trent, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

Pursuant to the Family Code in terms of rights and obligations between the
husband and wife, this case provides that the extent of separation resulting from a
decree for a separate support between husband and wife is not an impeachment of
the public policy by which marriage is regarded as sacred and inviolable in its
nature, but such separation is only tolerated as a means to preserve public peace
and morals. However, it does not in any manner impair the marriage contract or for
any purpose place the wife in the situation of being a single woman.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda, 35 Phils 252
In this case, the wife (Eloisa) left their conjugal abode due to the repugnant desires
and cycles of maltreatment of his husband (Jose) and then the latter filed an action
for support outside their conjugal domicile against her husband. The Court held
that the mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of Jose to support his
wife and the judgment favoring the wife for a separate maintenance shall not be
treated as payment for damages or as a penalty, nor a debt in strict legal sense but a
judgment made for the performance of a duty mandated by the State. The purpose
of this is to maintain and preserve public peace and the purity of the wife, in this
case, Eloisa, from the assaults that he receives from his wife.

2. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, Petitioner -versus – REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007,
Corona, J.

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Article 5 and Article 35, paragraph 1 of the Family Code provided for the
requisites of legal capacity for the purpose of contracting marriage. Among the
essential requisites of legal capacity are the age requirement and the sex of the
Silverio vs Republic, October 22, 2007 parties. Under the provisions mentioned earlier, the contracting parties must be a
 male and a female who are at least 18 years old. The Supreme Court in this case
emphasized that a person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations; it is part of his or her legal capacity and civil status. However, there is no
special law in the Philippines which governs sex reassignment and its effects to
support the cause of the petitioner.

In this case, Rommel Silverio filed a petition to change his first name and sex in his
birth certificate. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio,"
and his sex was registered as "male" on his birth certificate. He attempted to
transform himself into a "woman" and underwent sex reassignment surgery. The
Supreme Court held that the changes sought by Silverio in his petition would result
in severe and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. The trial court
found that the petition of Silverio was made as his first step toward eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, it is expressly stated in the law that marriage
is one of the most sacred social institutions, and is defined as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman. If Silverio's petition is granted, it
would substantially alter the laws of marriage and family relations as it will
validate the union of a man with another man who underwent sex reassignment.

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. VICTORIANO DELA CRUZ

y LORENZO, Appellant. G.R. No. 187683, February 11, 2010, Nachura J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

People v De La Cruz, G.R. No.187683,
February 11, 2010
The victim sustained a fatal stab wound resulting in her death caused by Victoriano
- her husband. The essential element in the crime of parricide as defined in Art. 246
of the RPC is the relationship of the offender to the victim. In a case of parricide of
a spouse, there must be a valid subsisting marriage at the time of the killing.
Moreover, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
is the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of Victorino that he was
married to the victim is also ample proof of such a relationship as the testimony
may be admitted against him
4. RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, Complainants, Vs.
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Respondent. A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011,
CARPIO, J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

Extrajudicial dissolutions of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval and

other similar documents are void. A notary public is not allowed to notarize
contracts that allow spouses to extrajudicially dissolve their marriage relations. A
lawyer may be sanctioned by the courts for preparing and notarizing such a
document, for the violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In this case, the Court suspended Atty. Omana for the commission
Espinosa v Omana, AC No. 9081, October 12, of the act. It likewise did not accept the allegation of Omana that it was her office
2011 staff who notarized the contract.

5. PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner -versus – TECLA

HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent. G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014, PEREZ,
J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

The law leans towards legalizing matrimony. Cohabiting persons are presumed to
be married in the absence of any impediment to marry because such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.

Avenido v Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, Jan 22
2014
In the presentation of evidence with the issue of validity of marriage, the Supreme
Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.
The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to
the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The
person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an
eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
 While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union,
it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

6. ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, Petitioner -versus – WENIFREDA

BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, Respondent,
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015, Del Castillo, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

Common-law relationships are not recognized by Philippine Law, except in Article

147 of the Family Code which provides for the rule that shall govern the properties
acquired by a man and woman living together without the benefit of marriage, but
are not incapacitated to marry each other. The Supreme Court held that the
provisions of the Civil Code pertain to a lawfully wedded spouse when referring to
a spouse, unless expressly provided to the contrary.

In this case, petitioner’s name cannot be included as Adriano’s spouse in the

Tambuyat v. Tambuyat, G.R. No. 202805,
March 23, 2015
certificate of title due to the fact proven by a preponderance of evidence that
Adriano had a subsisting marriage with another woman and petitioner had a
subsisting marriage with another man during the time of the acquisition of the
property and issuance of the certificate of title. Petitioner’s argument that such
property was acquired during their cohabitation is untenable for they could not
have been common-law spouses as they both had subsisting marriages during the
time the property was acquired.

7. VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner -versus – HEIRS OF MACAPAZ,

Respondent. G.R. No. 191936, June 1, 2016, Reyes, J.

Calimag v Heirs of Macapaz, GR No. 191936, By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

June 1, 2016
 As a general rule, the best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage
contract. However, jurisprudence also states that one of the proofs of marriage that
can be presented and given due regard is the couple’s public and open cohabitation
as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock. Furthermore, our laws support the
legal maxim “semper praesumitur pro matrimonio” or “always presume marriage”
which is why persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed to be
in fact married, absent proof to the contrary.

Thus, in this case, the Supreme Court found that the Heirs of Acapaz have
sufficiently established their filiation and the validity of the marriage of their
parents, and consequently, their legal claim to the subject property, by presenting
their certificates of live birth which show that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly
cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years.

8. JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, Petitioner -versus – CIVIL REGISTRAR

GENERAL, Respondent, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019 , Leonen, J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca

In relation to the concept of marriage, the Supreme Court held that the plain text of
the 1987 Constitution does not define or restrict marriage based on a person’s sex,
gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or expression. However, the Court
refused to rule on the substantive issue raised allowing state recognition of
same-sex marriage in the present petition seeking to declare Article 1 and 2 of the
Family Code unconstitutional, as well as to nullify Articles 46(4) and Article 56(6)
because it might lead to even more confusion and might otherwise cause
disadvantage to the LGBTQI+ community.

There needs to be a deliberation among the members of the LGBTQI+ community

and the political branches of government to ensure that a proper policy is to be
made that will tailor-fit same-sex relationships. Allowing same-sex couples to be
Falcis v Civil Registrar, GR 217910, Sept. 3, governed by the present laws relating to marriage and its legal consequences would
2019 [en banc] serve as a restriction against certain freedoms that the former freely enjoys. In this

TOPIC
REQUISITES
● FC 2-3; FC 5; FC 45 cf. NCC 53
1. Essential requisites
2. Formal Requisites
A. Difference in Sex – FC 2 (1), 4 (1), 39.
B. Some Form of Ceremony – FC 3 (3), 4 (1), 6, 8
C. Legal Capacity – Art. 2(1)
1. Age (Articles 5, 35(1), 39, 45(1), 37(1))
2. Relationship (Articles 37, 38 (1-8), 39)
3. Prior Marriage Articles 35 (4), 35 (6), 40, 41, 42, 43,
44, 52, 53 & 39, NCC 390-391, FC 55 (9), FC 101
case, the petitioner failed to prove that the LGBTQI+ community gave their
consent to be represented. Furthermore, nullifying the subject provisions of the
Family Code would affect several other laws which are based on the basic
requisites of marriage and do not recognize same-sex marriages, which would in
effect be impliedly amended if the Supreme Court grants the petition. Such is not
within the powers of the Judiciary and lies with the Legislative branch of
government.
GIST OF SPECIAL LAW
FC 2-3; FC 5; FC 45 cf. NCC 53
By: Estreller, Conrado S. III
As a rule, the validity of a marriage is determined by the law effective at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. The Family Code which took effect on August
3, 1988 provides for the rules on marriages celebrated in the Philippines which
must be strictly complied. Thus, Art. 53 of the NCC is supplanted by Art. 2 and 3
of the Family Code which provide for the essential and formal requisites of a valid
marriage respectively. Generally, any absence of the essential or formal requisites
render a marriage void ab initio, the only exception being that provided by
Art.35(2).
In relation to Art. 2 regarding legal capacity to contract marriage, Art. 5 further
provides that the parties (who must be male and female and at least 18 years of
age) shall lack any of the legal impediments as mentioned in Art. 37 and 38 of the
same code. Art. 37 and 38 are concerned with incestuous marriages and those void
marriages by reason of public policy. Notably, the cases mentioned in said articles
are exclusive. Thus, marriages not falling within the enumeration shall remain
valid.
On the other hand, Art. 3 speaks of the formal requisites of a valid marriage - a.) a
marriage ceremony in relation with Art. 6, b.) a valid marriage license except for
those mentioned in Art. 27-34, and c.) authority of the solemnizing officer under
Art. 7 in relation with Art. 8. Notably however, if such marriage was contracted
with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had
the legal authority to do so, the marriage is considered voidable as provided under
Art. 35(2).

Lastly, Art. 45 provides for the grounds for annulment of voidable marriages which
must exist at the time of the marriage. A voidable marriage produces all civil
effects until the same is set aside by final judgment of a competent Court in an
action for annulment. In relation to this, Art. 47 provides for the persons who may
file an action for annulment within the prescribed period.

Difference in Sex – FC 2 (1), 4 (1), 39.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

The sex of a person is an essential factor in marriage and family relations (Silverio
v. Republic). According to Article 2 of the Family Code, a marriage must be
between a male and a female.As such, same-sex marriages are not legally
recognized by our Philippine laws. Pursuant to Article 4 of the same code, absence
of any of the essential and formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio. Hence, by implication, a union entered between same sexes cannot be
considered a marriage in contemplation of the Family Code.

Some Form of Ceremony – FC 3 (3), 4 (1), 6, 8

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

The law does not require a specific ceremony nor does it require specific words or
symbols. Article 3, par. 3 of the Family Code only requires the compliance of the
barest minimum requirement for a valid marriage ceremony: 1) personal
appearance of parties before the solemnizing officer; and 2) the declaration that
they take each other as husband and wife. The intent or the declaration to take each
other as husband and wife may be manifested in any form. Non-compliance to the
barest minimum requirement of a valid marriage ceremony may render the
marriage void ab initio as stated in Article 4 of the same code. Article 6 also
provides that there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
marriage. Despite this, it reiterates the requirement provided for by Article 3 that
the solemnization of the marriage must be done personally by the contracting
parties before a solemnizing officer and that they have to make their declaration
which shall be contained in the marriage certificate signed by the parties, witnesses
and the solemnizing officer. On the other hand, Article 8 requires that the marriage
shall be solemnized publicly meaning there should be at least two witnesses to the
marriage.

Art. 2(1), Family Code – Legal Capacity

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

The law considers marriage as one of the most sacred and basic social institutions.
It is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a
male and a female, as expressly provided under Article 2 (1) of the Family Code.
Legal capacity to marry means that each of the contracting parties, who must be
male and a female, is at least 18 years of age and is not barred by any legal
impediment to marry as enumerated in Article 37 and 38 of the Family Code.

Age (Articles 5, 35(1), 39, 45(1), 47(1))

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

The legal capacity of the contracting parties is one of the essential requisite of a
valid marriage. In line with this, Article 5 of the Family Code states that any party
at the age of eighteen (18) or above who are not under any impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38 of the Family Code may contract marriage.

Thus, should an individual below eighteen (18) years of age contract marriage,
even with the consent of his or her parents, such marriage is void ab initio pursuant
to Article 35(1) of the Family Code.

Article 39 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 8533, provides that the action
or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage does not prescribe.
However, a reading of Articles 45(1) and 47(1) shows that in the case of a voidable
marriage on the ground of lack of parental consent where the contracting party is
between eighteen (18) to twenty-one (21) years of age, the parent who did not give
the necessary consent may seek the annulment of the marriage only before the
child reaches the age of 21. Additionally, the said child may seek annulment of the
marriage within five (5) years after attaining the age of twenty-one (21).
Furthermore, the child may ratify the marriage by cohabitation with his or her
spouse only after such child reaches the age of twenty-one (21).

Relationship (Articles 37, 38 (1-8), 39)

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

Article 37 of the Family Code provides for marriages which are void from the
beginning by reason of being incestuous, whether it be legitimate or illegitimate.
Under said provision, marriages between (1) ascendants and descendants of any
degree and (2) those between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood
are incestuous and are null and void.

Article 38 of the Family Code provides for void marriages from the beginning by
reason of public policy. The provision enumerates said void marriages as follows:
(1) between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
4th civil degree; (2) between step-parents and step-children; (3) between
parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) between the adopting parent and adopted
child; (5) between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted
child; (6) between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7)
between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) between the
adopted children of the same adopter; (9) between parties where one with the
intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own
spouse.

Article 39 of the Family Code provides for the imprescriptibility of the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. This is without any
exception as R.A.8533 removed the exception as to marriages celebrated before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, those marriages before August 3, 1988 can
now be made subject of an action for declaration of nullity even after said date.

Prior Marriage Articles 35 (4), 35 (6), 40, 41, 42

By: Martin, Dominic

Art. 35(4) of the Family Code in connection to Art. 41 of the Family Code and
Art. 391 of the New Civil Code

A bigamous or polygamous marriage is null and void from the very beginning. A
bigamous or polygamous marriage refers to any person that contracts another
marriage during a subsisting one. However, a subsequent marriage is valid if it was
celebrated when the prior-spouse had been absent for 4 consecutive years, and the
present-spouse has a well-founded belief that the former already died. It must be
noted that the rules on the declaration of presumptive death must be complied with
by the present-spouse, without prejudice to the reappearance of the absent spouse.

The 4 year period, may be shortened in to 2 years when the case of disappearance
of the prior/absent-spouse involves circumstances of danger of death, as that of
being on board a vessel or an airplane, being in the armed forces and partaking in
war, being in danger of death under other circumstances and existence of the
prior/absent spouse has not been known.

Art. 35(6) of the Family Code in connection to Art. 53 and 52 of the Family
Code.

A subsequent marriage is null and void from the very beginning if the following
has not been recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property:

o The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage

o The partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and
o The delivery of the children’s presumptive legitime

It is only after compliance with the requirements of the abovementioned should

either of the former spouses may marry again.

Art. 40 of the Family Code

A subsequent marriage that was contracted is null and void when there is no final
judgment that declares the previous marriage to be void. The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is a requirement to contract a subsequent valid marriage.

Art. 41 of the Family Code in connection to Art. 391 of the New Civil Code

A marriage that was contracted during a subsisting one is null and void from the
very beginning. However, a subsequent marriage is valid if before the marriage
was celebrated, the prior-spouse had been absent for 4 consecutive years, and the
spouse-present has a well-founded belief that the former already died. It must be
 noted that the rules on the declaration of presumptive death must be complied with
by the present-spouse, without prejudice to the reappearance of the absent-spouse.

The 4 year period, may be shortened in to 2 years when the case of disappearance
of the prior/absent spouse involves circumstances of danger of death, as that of
being on board a vessel or an airplane, being in the armed forces and partaking in
war, being in danger of death under other circumstances and existence of the
prior/absent-spouse has not been known.

Art. 42 in connection to Art. 41 of the Family Code

There is automatic termination of a subsequent marriage when the sworn affidavit

of reappearance of the absent-spouse has been recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage. This may be made at the
instance of any interested person. However, there must be due notice to the spouses
of the subsequent marriage. The fact of reappearance may be disputed and may not
be prejudiced from being judicially determined.

A subsequent marriage that was validly celebrated during the 4 year absence of the
prior-spouse, where the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the former
has already died, or 2 years for that matter, where the prior spouse’s disappearance
was due to circumstances of danger of death involving being on board a vessel or
an airplane, being in the armed forces and partaking in war, being in danger of
death under other circumstances shall be automatically terminated by the recording
of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent-spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.
9. SILVERIO, Petitioner -versus – REPUBLIC, Respondent. G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007, CORONA, J

By: Martin, Dominic

Silverio vs Republic, G.R. No. 174689,
October 22, 2007
Sex reassignment does not alter one’s legal capacity and civil status in connection
to marriage and family relations, where a person’s sex is an essential factor. There
is no special law in the Philippines that allow such sex reassignment to change
one’s legal status from male to female. This case exemplifies the Philippine law on
marriage, where one of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who should be a man and a woman only.

10. ROSALIA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-appellant, -versus- ANGEL TAN,

Defendant-appellee, G.R. No. L-4904, February 5, 1909, WILLARD, J.

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

Section 6 of General Order No. 68 provides that there is no required particular

Martinez v. Tan 12 Phil 731 COMPARE TO:
Morigo v People, 422 SCRA
form of marriage ceremony but the parties must declare that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of the solemnizing officer. Hence, a certificate of
the justice of the peace which was signed by both contracting parties gives rise to
the presumption that the contracting parties declared before the solemnizing officer
that they take each other as husband and wife and that the officer authorized the
marriage in due form. This presumption will prevail, unless the contrary is proven.
In this case, Rosalia’s petition to have their marriage certificate cancelled cannot be
granted because she failed to overturn the presumption that the marriage was
solemnized in due form. The evidence clearly shows that she was aware that she
married the defendant. There was an admission on her part that she signed the
document before the justice of the peace, the contents of which she understood,
agreeing to unite in marriage. It can only lead to the conclusion that there was an
intent to marry and that intent was made in writing. There being no evidence to the
contrary, the presumption will prevail.
 COMPARE TO:

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004,
QUISUMBING, J.

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

There is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage when the parties
merely signed the marriage contract since it cannot be deemed a valid marriage in
the eyes of the law. It produces no legal effect for purposes of holding a person
liable for bigamy because an element of bigamy, which requires that the offender
has been legally married, is absent.

In the case, there was no ceremony performed by the duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Lucia Barrete and the petitioner Morigo merely signed the marriage
contract on their own. The act of signing the marriage contract on their own cannot
be deemed to constitute a valid marriage for which Morigo may be held liable for
bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity prior to contracting a
subsequent marriage.

COMPARISON:

In the case of Martinez v. Tan, the act of the parties in signing the certificate of the
justice of the peace which states that they take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of the solemnizing officer and that there are witnesses to the marriage
is enough to prove that they mutually agreed to be married. On the other hand, in
the case of Morigo v. People, the mere act of signing a marriage contract, without
more, cannot be deemed a valid marriage.

11. CRISTITA ANABAN, Petitioner -versus – BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER,

Anaban v Anaban, G.R. No. 249011, March Respondent. G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021, Lazaro-Javier, J.
15, 2021
 By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

The laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they
are laws relating to public policy. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas
and doctrines of a religion cannot be superior to or have precedence over laws
relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to marriage and its
incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy.

The marriage and subsequent divorce between the parties occurred before the
effectivity of the old Civil Code. Thus, the law in effect at that time was the
Spanish Civil Code, Article 5 of which stated that, “Laws are abrogated only by
other subsequent laws, and the disuse or any custom or practice to the contrary
shall not prevail against their observance.”

In this case, the divorce between Pedrito and Virginia took place in 1947, when
only two (2) grounds were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage.
However, neither was the reason for their divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders
granted the divorce on ground of Virginia's alleged insanity. The divorce, therefore,
is contrary to law, hence, cannot be recognized.

THE VOID MARRIAGES

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

1. Age (Articles 5, 35(1), 39, 45(1), 37(1)); NCC 54 Age (Articles 5, 35(1), 39, 45(1), 37(1)); NCC 54

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

Article 5 of the Family Code and Article 54 of the New Civil Code both deal with
the required age of the husband and wife for a valid marriage. The former
provides that any male or female of the age of eighteen years or over may contract
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

marriage. On the other hand, the latter provides that any male of the age of sixteen
years or over, and any female of the age of fourteen years or over may contract
marriage. Basically, the Family Code now requires that both male and female
must be at least eighteen years of age in order to contract a valid marriage. In
effect, the new rule provides that those marriages contracted by any party below
eighteen years age shall be considered void ab initio as provided under Article 35
(1) of the Family Code.

Similarly, Article 45 of the Family Code changed the age of the contracting
parties as to the annulment of marriages solemnized without the consent of the
parents or guardian. Compared to the New Civil Code, it is now eighteen years of
age or over but below twenty-one and not the ages of sixteen and twenty years, if
male, or between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if female.

Currently, Article 39 of the Family Code provides that the action or defense for
the declaration of absolute nullity shall not prescribe. However, for marriages
celebrated during the New Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after the effectivity of the
Family Code.

Under Article 37 (1) of the Family Code, marriages between ascendants and
descendants of any degree are incestuous and void from the beginning. Unlike in
the New Civil Code, these forms of marriages are void not from their performance
but from the beginning.

2. Relationship (Articles 37, 38 (1-8), 39); NCC 81, 82 Relationship (Articles 37, 38 (1-8), 39); NCC 81, 82

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Art. 37 of the Family Code provided what relationship constitutes incestuous

marriages which the law considers as void from the very beginning, regardless
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

whether the relationship is legitimate or not. They are the following: a) between
ascendants and descendants of any degree; and b) between brothers and sisters,
whether of the full or half blood.

It must be noted that under Art. 81 of the Civil Code, the relationship of collateral
blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree,
was considered as incestuous. However, under the Family Code, such relationship
is no longer considered as incestuous, rather, it is violative of public policy and
thus void also from the beginning.

Art. 38 enumerates the relationships of the marriage of which the law considers as
void by reason of public policy. They are the following: a) Between collateral
blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; b)
Between step-parents and step-children; c) Between parents-in-law and
children-in-law; d) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; e)
Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; f)
Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; g) Between an
adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; h) Between adopted children
of the same adopter; and i) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry
the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or his or her own spouse.

Art. 82 of the Civil Code was essentially reproduced in Art. 38 of the Family
Code. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the previously, marriages between
Step-brothers and step-sisters were considered void under Art. 80 (7) of the Civil
Code. However, the same is no longer true in the Family Code, therefore, such
relationship is no longer an impediment for marriage. It must also be noted that
the prohibition of marriages between the child of an adopter and an adopted child
applies only to the legitimate child of the adopter. Therefore, the adopted child
can marry the illegitimate child of the adopter.
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

3. Prior Marriage Articles 35 (4), 35 (6), 40, 41, 42, 43,

44, 52, 53 & 39, NCC 390-391, FC 55 (9), FC 101 Prior Marriage Articles 43, 44, 52, 53 & 39

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

Article 39 of the Family Code talks about the imprescriptibility of an action or

defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In the case of Ninal v.
Bayadog, the Supreme Court stated that the rule that an action or defense based on
the absolute nullity of marriage is imprescriptible is now absolute.

Article 43 and Article 44 of the Family Code enumerates the effects of

termination of subsequent marriage referred to in Article 41 of the same code. If
the affidavit of reappearance of the absentee spouse is recorded, the status of the
children of such marriage are considered legitimate, provided they are conceived
prior to its termination. Moreover, the property regime of the subsequent marriage
will also be dissolved and liquidated and donation propter nuptias will remain
valid, with the exception of a marriage contracted in bad faith. The innocent
spouse may also revoke the irrevocable beneficiaries in an insurance policy.

The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
However, if both parties of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, the
donation propter nuptias, as well as the testamentary dispositions made by one in
favor of the other, are revoked by operation of law.

Article 52 of the Family Code requires that the judgment of annulment or the
judicial declaration of nullity must be recorded in the appropriate civil registry.
This refers to the LRC of the city or municipality where the court that issued the
decision is functioning and also the LRC of the city or municipality where the
marriage is solemnized. The registries of property referred to under Article 52
refer to the registries of properties where the properties are located. It is a rule,
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

however, that if there are many properties located in various places, registration
must be made in each of the registries of properties where the property is located.
This is necessary in order to bind third persons and for the parties to be able to
validly contract a subsequent marriage.

If either of the former spouses wishes to remarry, Article 53 of the Family Code
mandates that the requirements under Article 52 of the Family Code must be
complied with. Otherwise, the subsequent marriage will be null and void.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

12. ENGRACIO L. VALMONTE, Petitioner -versus –PEDRO VILLAROMAN,

Respondent, G.R. No. L-28394 , October 22, 1998, Villa-Real, J.

By: Dazo, John Xazier L.

​ nder Section 334, No. 24 of Act. No. 190, it is disputably presumed that a person
U
not heard from in seven years is dead. Similarly, Article 390 of the New Civil Code
provides that after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.

Valmonte v Villaroman, G.R. No. 28394,
October 22, 1928
In this case, Ambrosio Advincula went to America and left his wife Dionisio Marin
and his two minor sons Ricardo and Marcos Advincula in the Philippines.
Consequently, the family of Ambrosio was unaware of his whereabouts. Since
there was no word from Ambrosio since 1917, it is presumed that he died on
December 31, 1924, that is seven years after the receipt of the last news of him.
Hence, Ambrosio Advincula had no longer any right of action to transmit to his
heirs when it is presumed that he died.
13. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES -versus – GREGORIO NOLASCO, G.R.
No. 94053, March 17, 1993, Feliciano, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

The 4 four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code are the following: a) That the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code; b) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; c) that the present spouse
has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and d) that the present spouse
files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.

It must be noted that Art. 41 of the Family Code superseded Art. 83 of the Civil
Code. Under the Family Code the period is either four or two years, in contrast
with the Civil Code requiring seven years. Furthermore, it must be noted that the
present spouse is now mandated by law to secure a decree of presumptive death,
therefore, he is not ipso facto allowed to remarry. Additionally, and most
importantly, a stricter standard was imposed by the Family Code with respect to the
absence of the spouse, that is, there must be a well founded belief that the absent
spouse has been dead.

A well founded belief presupposes that there was a reasonable and diligent search
on the part of the present spouse on the whereabouts of the absentee spouse, The
absence of which negates any finding that there is a well founded belief that the
absentee spouse is already dead.

In the present case, Gregorio Olasco (Olasco) failed to show that he had a well
founded belief that Janet Monica Parker (Parker) was already dead because he did
not perform any reasonable diligent search. He did not invoke the aid of the local
Republic v Nolasco, 220 SCRA 20 authorities in London, Liverpool or of the British Embassy on the whereabouts of
 Parker. What he did instead is to find her on his own in London, a place with many
millions of inhabitants. He failed to give an explanation on why he did not do so.
What is even worse is that he met her in Liverpool, a place different from London.
Furthermore, there are serious doubts as to whether Olasco indeed made reasonable
inquiries from their friends on the whereabouts of Parker.

14. GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.

REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent. G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.
Panganiban, J

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Garcia vs. Recio, 365 SCRA 437
Our Courts of Justice cannot grant absolute divorce because Philippine Law does
not provide for it. Likewise, a marriage contracted between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved although the divorce was obtained abroad. A divorce decree may be
recognized when it is obtained by the foreign spouse abroad, provided that it is
consistent with the latter’s national law. In the instant case, the Court held that
Respondent Recio merely presented an interlocutory decree where absolute divorce
proceeds from the absence of reconciliation after the lapse of a prescribed period.
Thus, it did not establish his legal capacity to remarry.

15. Arthur Te, Petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Liliana Choa, Respondents
G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000, KAPUNAN, J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

Te vs. Choa, G.R. No. 126746, Nov. 29, 2000
Article 40 of the Family Code provides that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Applying the foregoing to the
present case, the reliance of the petitioner to the fact that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio was
misplaced. The rule is clear that a previous marriage, even if it is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise judicially.
16. ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent, G.R. No. 191425, SECOND DIVISION, September
7, 2011, CARPIO, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

One of the exceptions to a prosecution of bigamy is Article 180 of the Code of

Nollora v People, GR 191425, September 7,
2011
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines which prohibits the application of the
Revised Penal Code on the crime of bigamy on a person married in accordance
with the Muslim law. However, a Muslim may only be permitted to contract a
subsequent marriage upon completing certain requirements as having plurality of
wives is merely torelated and not encouraged. Before contracting a subsequent
marriage, he should notify first the Shari'a Circuit Court and a notice shall be given
to the wife or wives to obtain their consent.
In this case, the accused did not comply with the following requirements due to the
mistaken belief that his conversion to the Muslim faith would entitle him to marry
anybody again.

17. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA.

DE BAILON, Respondent. G.R. No. 165545. March 24, 2006. CARPIO
MORALES,J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.

SSS vs Jarque vda. De Bailon, G.R. No.
165545, March 24, 2006
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
 Here, the first marriage happened between Bailon and Alice. Thereafter, Alice was
declared presumptively dead. Then, a subsequent marriage occured between Bailon
and Teresita Jarque. For purposes of claiming SSS Benefits after the death of
Bailon, the second marriage was assailed to determine the beneficiary as it turns
out that Alice is alive. The Supreme Court ruled that the action for annulment
should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. As no step
was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and Jarque's marriage prior
to the former’s death in 1998, Jarque is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary
of Bailon.

18. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. YOLANDA CADACIO

GRANADA, Respondent. G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012, SERENO, J:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B,

In this celebrated case, the Court emphasized the plain text of the family code
providing that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of
remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding. Since it is summary in nature, the
Decision of the RTC shall be final and executory upon notice to the parties and
cannot be subject to ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. Here, the OSG erred in filing a notice of appeal to the RTC as the
declaration of presumptive death is a summary judicial proceeding. Consequently,
the remedy of the adverse party, such as in this case the Republic through the
Office of the Solicitor General, is to file a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals under Rules 65 if there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

In addition, the Court also had an instance to clear that the requirement of the
Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of “well-founded belief”
must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
Republic v Granada, GR No. 187512, June 13, ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is
2012 still alive or is already dead. In the present case, the Supreme Court did not disturb
 the ruling of the RTC on the basis that the said ruling is final, immutable, and
unalterable.

19. CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014. LEONEN, J.

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

A subsequent bigamous marriage may be valid if:

1. The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2. The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead;
3. There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse; and
4. There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.

However, if such subsequent marriage was contracted in bad faith, even with the
existence of a court declaration of presumptive death, it cannot be said that there is
a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. In such case, the subsequent
marriage is considered bigamous and void. The proper remedy in cases where the
judicial declaration of presumptive death was obtained by extrinsic fraud, is an
action to annul the judgment.

Santos vs. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October
08, 2014
In this case, Celerina chose to file an action for annulment of judgment for the
purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also to nullify the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death. For if the judgment declaring
presumptive death was not nullified, the children born of the subsequent marriage
would have been considered legitimate and such judgment would have been a
defense against prosecution for bigamy of the spouse in bad faith.

20. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LUDYSON C. CATUBAG,

Republic v Catubag, GR 210580, April 18, Respondent. G.R. No. 210580, 18 April 2018, REYES, JR., J.
2018
 By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

Time and time again, the Supreme Court has ruled that under Article 41 of the
Civil Code, deciding on the requisite of “well-founded belief” depends on the
attendant circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has laid out the standard for
establishing a “well-founded belief”. In this case however, the Court ruled that
respondent fell short of the degree of diligence required stated in several
jurisprudence. It is an elementary rule that a person who alleges a fact has the
burden to prove such fact through evidence. Respondent in this case was not able
to substantially corroborate his so-called “earnest efforts” in ascertaining whether
his wife was still alive or not for his petition for declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Civil Code to prosper. Respondent failed to present the
alleged friends or relatives of his wife that he inquired from, he failed to seek help
from other government agencies and his bare allegations remained uncorroborated.

21. ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 230751, April 4, 2018, VELASCO, JR., J.

By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

A petition for declaration of presumptive death for any purpose other than intention
to remarry is not a valid petition and should be dismissed. A declaration for
presumptive death is only required for purposes of remarriage because it is required
by Art. 41 of the Family Code. A declaration of presumptive death based on Article
390 or 391 of the Civil Code is not required for all intents and purposes. This is
because a petition with the sole objective of declaring a person presumptively dead
under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority
to take cognizance of the same. Articles 390 and 391 only provides rules of
evidence wherein a person, upon presentation of evidence, can be declared
presumptively dead to contribute in the resolution of a case.

Matias v Republic, GR 230751, April 25, In this case, petitioner Matias seeks to have her missing husband declared
2018 presumptively death for the purpose of obtaining death benefits, anchoring her
 petition on Article 41 of the Family Code. The Supreme Court dismissed the
petition because the purpose of the petition is not to remarry but to acquire death
benefits. A declaration of presumptive death is not required if it is based on
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The declaration is only required for the
purpose of remarriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. Articles 390 and 391 is
not conclusive but merely provides a prima facie or disputable presumption of the
death of a person.

22. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEILANIE DELA CRUZ FENOL.

G.R. No. 212726, June 10, 2020, REYES, J. JR., J.

By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article

41 is summary in nature. The decision is final and executory and is not subject to
an appeal. The proper remedy if for one to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 to the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Subsequently, the remedy from the Court of Appeals
to the Supreme Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

Republic v Fenol, G.R. No. 212726, June 10,
2020
To satisfy the well-founded belief requirement, the present spouse should prove
that despite having exerted diligence, active reasonable efforts exerted to locate the
absent spouse, he or she believes that the absent spouse has already passed firm
conviction of death is not enough. Belief is a state of the mind established by direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence. Locating one’s absent spouse twice, inquiring
about his or her whereabouts to their family members, and even the allegation of
working abroad in the country where the absent spouse was employed to look for
the latter there does not satisfy the requirement.

23. LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V.

Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986) SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
 Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents. G.R. No.
L-53703 August 19, 1986. PARAS, J.:

By: Neil Cabaltera

A marriage where the consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation
is not void but merely voidable. The private respondent in this case seeks the
declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground that the petitioner had a prior
subsisting marriage. The petitioner admits that she had a prior marriage but
contends that it was null and void as she was merely forced to enter the marital
union.
The Supreme Court ruled that even if the prior marriage was defective because it
was obtained through force or intimidation, it is merely a voidable marriage. It
remains valid until annulled. Hence, the subsequent marriage entered into by the
petitioner is void as her marriage with her first husband remained valid.

24. DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, v. ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992 PER CURIAM:

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

The Supreme Court ruled that respondent was not worthy to be a member of the
Philippine bar due to his gross immoral conduct. In this case, it was found that the
respondent contracted a second marriage even though petitioner supported and
financed the former’s education at the College of Law at Lyceum University of the
Philippines. Moreover, the respondent made petitioner believe that her previous
marriage was void ab initio because petitioner and her prior husband were
allegedly first cousins.

However, the Court found that respondent, as a lawyer, should have known that in
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 judicial declaration declaring the first marriage void ab initio was essential.
25. IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, Petitioner -versus – ISAGANI D. BOBIS,
Respondent, G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO. J.

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a

previous marriage is required before a party may be allowed to remarry in cases of
void marriages. The determination of the validity of a marriage is not up to the
parties, but up to the Court. Thus, a person cannot, in a case of bigamy filed against
him, bring up the defense of void marriage when there has been no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted.
In this case, the respondent failed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. Thus, his second marriage cannot be held valid. For all intents and
purposes, he was a married man at the time he contracted the second marriage.
Bobis v Bobis, GR 139509, July 31, 2000
26. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Vincent G. Mercado, petitioner, vs. Consuelo
Tan, respondent.
G.R. No. 137110, 01 August 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

Mercado vs Tan, 337 SCRA 122
subsequent one can be contracted. While the Supreme Court had previous rulings
that provided that there is no need for a declaration of nullity of a void marriage
before contracting a second marriage, Article 40 of the Family Code had set this
aside and mandated that a declaration of nullity of a previous marriage be made
before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. Failure to acquire such
declaration before contracting a subsequent marriage shall result to one being
charged and convicted of bigamy. In application to the present case, as the initial
marriage was in 1976 while the subsequent marriage was in 1991, the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage to Olivia in 1992 was only made a month after
 the bigamy case was already filed. Thus, Mercado is already liable for bigamy
under the law.

27. LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004 QUISUMBING,
J.:

By: Borra, Filipino F.

The elements of Bigamy are as follows: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3)
he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would have
been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Morigo vs Morigo, 422 SCRA
One who enters into a second marriage without first obtaining a judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage is guilty of bigamy even if the prior marriage is
subsequently declared as “void”. However, this does not apply when in the first
place, there was no first marriage to speak of. Here, as there was no ceremony and
no solemnizing officer was present in the first marriage, such marriage is void ab
initio, hence, Lucio could not be found guilty of bigamy even if he contracted a
second marriage without a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage.
The first element is not present; hence Lucio did not commit bigamy.

28. VERONICO TENEBRO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, Respondent. G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

In cases where Philippine penal laws are concerned, the declaration of the second
Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February marriage as void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity is of no
18, 2004 importance and it may still produce legal consequences. Such as when a marriage
 contracted by an individual during the subsistence of a valid existing marriage then
he or she would be held criminally liable for bigamy as Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code penalizes the mere act of anyone who would contract a second or a
subsequent marriage before the previous marriage has been legally dissolved.

In this case, the court ruled that petitioner’s second or subsequent marriage with
Ancajas is null and void ab initio regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity
or incapacity, since such marriage was contracted while he was still validly married
to Villareyes. The criminal liability for bigamy had already been consummated
when the petitioner married Ancajas during the subsistence of the valid marriage.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not indicate that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity because they were able to prove that all
the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage are present.

29. MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant, vs. LOURDES

TAJOLOS CIPRIANO, Respondent, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012,
PERALTA, J.:

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

Once a person contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of

a valid marriage, the offence of bigamy is already consummated and he shall be
held criminally liable therefor. A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage is immaterial, and such declaration cannot be used to evade
prosecution. Otherwise, the provision on bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code would be rendered nugatory.

Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was
still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. The subsequent judicial
Montanez vs Cipriano, GR 181089, October declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she
22, 2012 contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus,
 respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential
elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.

30. JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, Respondents. G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013,
PERALTA, J.:

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

A subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in

nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.In this
case, the court held that as long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the
second marriage was celebrated even if there is a declaration of nullity of the
second marriage, the accused can still be charged with bigamy. The parties are not
the one to judge if the marriage is null and void, it must be submitted for judgment
with a competent court to declare the marriage void. Absent such declaration,
validity of such marriage is presumed.

Herein, bigamy was committed by petitioner when contracted a second marriage

with Shirley without his first marriage with Karla being dissolved or annulled.
Moreover, the finality of the declaraton of nullity of the second marriage of the
Capili v People, GR 183805, July 3, 2013 petitioner does not impede the filling of the criminal case of bigamy.

31. SYED AZHAR ABBAS , petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS , respondent,
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013, VELASCO, JR., J.:

By: Areta, Karen M.

The absence of a marriage license renders a marriage void ab initio. The

presentation of the actual marriage license cannot be replaced by the presence of
the marriage contract and testimonies of the witnesses who have seen the license.
See: Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, Although a marriage contract was executed and a wedding ceremony was
January 30, 2013 conducted, the same did not cure the absence of the marriage license. Further, the
 Court did not consider the motive of Syed in seeking for annulment to make up for
the failure of Gloria to present the marriage license.

32. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN,

Respondent. G.R. No. 191566, July 17,2013, PERALTA J.:

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage. The Court has ruled, in a long line of
cases, that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is a requirement
before a subsequent marriage can be contracted. Otherwise, the second marriage is
bigamous.

People v Odtuhan, GR 191566, July 17, 2013
In this case, Odtuhan was indicted for Bigamy when he married Eleanor Alagon
during the subsistence of his first marriage with Jasmin Modina. Odtuhan filed a
motion to quash the information for the reasons that it did not charge the crime of
bigamy and that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. The
Supreme Court ruled that RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
denied Odtuhan’s motion to quash. The Supreme Court stated that a person who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

33. YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER, vs.FELISA CUSTODIO

GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA
GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY
CITY, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 204169, Sept. 11 2013, VILLARAMA, JR., J

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

All records and entries made by the civil registrar are considered as public
Iwasawa vs Gangan, , G.R. No. 204169, Sept. documents as provided for under Article 410 of the Civil Code, hence, the
11 2013 certificate of marriage and certificate of death are public documents.

34.
Republic v Cantor, G.R. No. 184621,
December 10, 2013 [en banc]
Being public documents, the certificate of marriages and certificate of death which
were presented by the petitioner are admissible in evidence and there is no need to
prove further its due execution. More importantly, there is no need for the
custodian of the National Statistics Office who issued the documents to testify on
its authenticity and due execution since such are considered as public documents.
The documentary evidence must also be given evidentiary weight as they constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained as stated under Article 410. The
Court held in this case that the marriage between petitioner and private respondent
must be declared void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one and that
the documentary evidence presented by the petitioner sufficiently establish such
nullity.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA
CANTOR, Respondent, G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013, BRION, J.
By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.
The Supreme Court enumerated the four essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death as follows: 1) that the absent spouses has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where
there is danger of death; 2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3) that the
present spouse has well founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4) that the
present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death.
In this case, the present spouse was not able to discharge the burden of proving the
additional and more stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” that the absent
spouse is already dead. “Well-founded” belief has no exact definition under the
law. Notably, the determination of such belief depends on a case-to-case basis. To
be able to comply with this stringent requirement, such belief must be the result of
 diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse. Mere
passive-search does not suffice.

The present spouse alleged earnest efforts to locate the absent spouse, which
consisted of making inquiry about the absent spouse’s whereabouts from her
in-laws, neighbors and friends, and by looking through the patients’ directory
whenever she visited a hospital. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the
foregoing acts of the present spouse are insufficient to comply with the requirement
of making a diligent, active and earnest effort to search for the absent spouse.

The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of observing the strict standard
approach required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code. This is to ensure that such a petition is not used to
circumvent the laws given the summary nature of the proceeding. Moreover, this is
consistent with the policy of the State to protect and strengthen marriage and
family as basic social institutions.

35. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus- HON. BENJAMIN P.

ESTRADA and TERESITA J. OLEMBERIO, Respondent G.R. No. 214792
March 18, 2015, JARDELEZA, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

Republic v Hon. Estrada, G.R. No. 214792,
March 18, 2015
The Supreme Court reiterated the rules regarding the judicial declaration of
presumptive death for purposes of remarriage. Under Art. 41 of the Family Code, a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid if the
surviving spouse has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead;
the prior spouse has been missing for four consecutive years or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances provided in Art. 391 of the Civil
Code namely, on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage or a missing aeroplane
who has not been heard of for four years, in the armed forces who has taken part in
war who has been missing for four years, and exposed to danger of death under
other similar circumstances whose existence has not been known for four years;
 and the surviving spouse files a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse.

In this case, Teresita may validly file for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
of her absent spouse, Diego, having been missing for thirty-two years. Her
well-exerted efforts to locate her husband constitute a well-founded belief that
Diego is dead.

36. LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015, SERENO, C.J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

This case is a reiteration of what was decided by the Supreme Court in the case of
People v. Archilla, where it ruled that knowledge of the second wife of the fact of
her spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the
commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice and not a
mere co-accused.

In this case, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts findings that
Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July petitioner Santiago indeed knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
15, 2015 circumstances surrounding the case.

37. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 207406 January 13, 2016, LEONEN, J.

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, January contract, or at least supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
13, 2016 marriage license was issued.
 In this case, a statement by the local civil registrar that there was “no record of the
marriage license found” does not categorically state that the marriage license is
inexistent. Further in this case, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature
appearing on the marriage contract which is a positive evidence as to the existence
of the first marriage. The marriage contract should be given greater credence than
documents testifying merely as to the absence of any record of the marriage.

38. RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, VS. LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016, SERENO, C.J.:

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

It is true that with the passing of the Family Code, it is already a matter of policy
that the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of mere perception of two parties that their
marriage is a defective one. To allow such a thing would be a mockery to the
Constitution. It is expressly declared by the Constitution that Marriage is an
inviolable social institution and is the foundation of family, and thus must be
protected.

However, it is important to take note of the date of the celebration of Marriage.

Validity of marriages and its incidents must be accordingly determined. In this
case, the first marriage of the respondent was in 1979, or before the effectivity of
the Family Code. During this time what was effective was the Civil Code, which
provided that “in void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary”. The provisions of the Family Code may not apply retroactively since it
would prejudice the vested rights of the respondent and her children.

Castillo vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, Apr. Therefore, in this case, there was no need for a judicial declaration of the nullity of
18, 2016 marriage before the respondent could contract a second marriage.
39. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. REMAR A. QUIÑONEZ,
respondent.
G.R. No. 237412. January 6, 2020. CAGUIOA, J.:

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

Well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse was already dead
is one of the requisites for a declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of
remarriage. Well-founded belief was not defined by law and thus its determination
remains on a case-to-case basis. To comply with this requisite, diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries must be exerted actively by the present spouse to
locate the absent spouse.

In this case, respondent fall short of the said requisite. Respondent failed to prove
Republic v. Quiñonez, G.R. No. 237412, the extent of search he conducted, and he never sought the help of authorities to
January 06, 2020 locate the absent spouse.

40. Robaina Sumagka, petitioner v. Abdulgani Sumagka, respondent. G.R. No.

200697. June 10, 2019, CARANDANG.:

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

The Muslim Code governs the marriage and divorce of parties who are both
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is the Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or the Muslim Code. If the male party
is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code,
then the said law shall govern their marriage. However, when the parties married
under Muslim law and later married again in a civil law marriage, the law
governing the first marriage prevails.

Sumagka v Sumagka, GR 200697, June 10, In this case, the parties' first marriage under Muslim law takes precedence even if
2019 they had a subsequent civil law marriage. Considering that the Muslim Code
 governs the marriage of the parties, the male party may legally avail of divorce by
Talaq under the said Code.

41. LUISITO G. PULIDO, Petitioner -versus – PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. G.R. No. 220149 , July 27, 2021, Hernando, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

After a careful scrutiny of applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court in this case
abandoned the earlier pronouncement that a judicial declaration of the absolute
nullity of a prior void ab initio marriage secured prior to remarriage is required
before a prior void ab initio marriage may be considered a valid defense in the
prosecution of bigamy. Now, the Court holds that a void ab initio marriage is a
valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity.

Article 40 of the Family Code requires for a judicial declaration of nullity of prior
marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage. In this case, Pulido and Baleda
was charged of bigamy for contracting subsequent marriage even though there is
still subsisting marriage between Pulido and Arcon. However, the Court allows
Pulido to raise the defense of a void ab initio marriage in the bigamy charge against
him since it is proven that there is no valid marriage license between Pulido and
Arcon, a formal requisite of a valid marriage. Since the first marriage acquired by
Pulido is void ab initio, the Court declares that there is no marriage to begin with,
hence, the parties are not required to obtain a judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of a void ab initio first and subsequent marriages in order to raise it as a defense in
a bigamy case. And this rule shall be applicable to all marriages celebrated under
Pulido v People, GR No. 220149, July 27, the Civil Code and the Family Code but the same is not applicable as a defense in
2021 cases where the first marriage or second marriage is merely voidable.

42. FRANCIS D. MALAKI AND JACQUELINE MAE A.

Malaki v People, G.R. No. 221075, Nov. 15, SALANATIN-MALAKI, Petitioner -versus – PEOPLE OF THE
2021 PHILIPPINES, Respondent, G.R. No. 221075, November 15, 2021, Leonen, J.
 By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Muslim Code expressly provides that the Civil Code
governs marriages where either party is non-Muslim and which were not
solemnized in Muslim rites. Thus, a party to a civil marriage is guilty of bigamy
even if he subsequently converts to Islam and contracts another marriage despite
the existence of the first marriage. The subsequent conversion to Islam is
immaterial and will not absolve parties of the subsequent marriage from criminal
liability.

In this case, Francis Malaki, Sr. and Jacqueline Salanatin were charged with
bigamy. They admitted that they were married despite the subsistence of Francis’
first marriage with Nerrian. Francis and Jacqueline argued that they both converted
to Islam and were married under Muslim rites which absolves them from criminal
liability. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Code as well as the Revised Penal
Code governs the nature, consequences, and incidents of Francis’ prior and
subsisting marriage to Nerrian. The fact that Francis subsequently converted to
Islam before or after his marriage to Jaqueline is immaterial, and the crime of
bigamy is consummated. Francis cannot invoke Article 180 of the Muslim code as
both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with Presidential
Decree No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

4. Crime – FC 38 (9) 4. Crime - FC 38 (9)

5. Non-Compliance with Article 53, see Arts. 50-52
6. Absence of Consent By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Article 38, paragraph 9 of the Family Code provides that a marriage is considered
void ab initio where one of the parties who has the intention of marrying the
other, kills the spouse of the latter, or his or her own. It does not require that both
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

parties be engaged in a conspiracy in killing the spouse who is considered a

hindrance to their contemplated marriage. The marriage continues to be void
notwithstanding the fact that the other party was without knowledge of the killing
or even if the subsequent marriage is celebrated abroad and is considered valid as
such. This provision of law is grounded on the principles of ethics, wherein pure
sentiments of love cannot be justified by criminal acts. Thus, it is void for being
violative of public policy.

This impacts Article 80, paragraph 6 of the New Civil Code wherein one or both
parties must be found guilty of the killing to render the marriage void. It does not
proceed from the intention of marrying the other party to the contemplated
marriage.

The Family Code deliberately forgoes the requirement of criminal conviction in

order to render the marriage void ab initio. What is imperative is that the killing
be done for the purpose of removing a spouse deemed a hindrance to the
subsequent marriage. This may be established in a civil case wherein mere
preponderance of evidence is required to declare the marriage void.

5. Non-Compliance with Article 53, Family Code

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

For purposes of remarriage, the Family Code under Article 53 provides that either
of the former spouses may remarry after compliance with the indispensable
requisites stated herein; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
In relation thereto, these requisites must be complied with: first, the judgment of
annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage; second, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses; and third, the delivery of the
children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property.
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

Upon compliance with these requisites, either of the former spouse is capacitated
to remarry. Non-compliance therewith shall be a cause for the non-issuance of a
decree of nullity or annulment.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

43. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS,

Respondent. G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013, Mendoza, J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Republic v Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October
16, 2013
The Court is presented with the question whether a marriage contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring foreign citizenship is void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent. Here, a “freely given consent” requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into marriage. It must be conscious or intelligent
and free from any vice. Based on this criteria, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. Their consent is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring foreign citizenship through marriage. Neither can the marriage be
voidable because only those circumstances under Art. 46 may constitute fraud.
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes than that declared by law remain
valid.

44. Compared to: Rosario D. Ado-An-Morimoto Vs. Yoshio Morimoto and the
Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 247576. March 15, 2021, Leonen, J

By: Castillo

Compare to: Morimoto v Morimoto, G.R. No. Consent, being an essential requisite, must be given freely in the presence of a
247576. March 15, 2021 solemnizing officer. Likewise, the lack of bona fide intention of becoming spouses
 renders their marriage void for lack of consent. In this case, there was no genuine
intention of entering into marriage relations nor was there a marriage ceremony
that took place, the parties were not even issued a marriage license. The
registration of the marriage between Rosario and Yoshio Morimoto was totally
fictitious and inexistent.

COMPARISON:

Comparing now to the case of Republic v. Albios, a glaring difference is that

Article 2(2) was not fulfilled in this case. Rosario admitted to signing a blank
marriage certificate with no solemnizing officer present. It was also proved that
there was no collusion between the parties in obtaining the favorable ruling of the
court.

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

7. Psychological Incapacity - FC 36, 68-73 Psychological Incapacity - FC 36, 68-73

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

Under Article 36 of the Family Code, a marriage may be declared void if a party
to such marriage was found to be psychological incapacitated from the inception
of the marriage to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All
characteristics of psychological incapacity shall be proven. First, it should be
grave, wherein the party cannot perform the essential marital duties and
obligations. Second, it should have antecedence, wherein it must be rooted in the
history of the party even though it only manifested after the celebration of
marriage. Lastly, it should be permanent, wherein it is incurable or the cure is
beyond the means of the party. In the case of Mendoza vs Republic, the court ruled
that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage, expert opinions of psychologists
are not required to establish psychological incapacity. However, there should still
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

be a presence of evidence that would adequately sustain the finding of the party's
psychological incapacity.

The rights and obligations between the husband and wife are stated in Articles 68
to 73 of the Family Code. These rights and obligations continue as long as
marriage persists. The spouses should (1) live together unless there are valid
compelling reasons. (2) observe mutual love, respect, fidelity, and (3) render
mutual help and support. The spouses shall fix the family domicile however in
case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The spouses shall also be jointly
responsible for the financial, emotional, and moral support of the family.
Moreover, the spouses should both manage the household. In an instance wherein
one of the spouses fails to comply with his marital obligations, the aggrieved party
may resort to the courts for appropriate reliefs thereof. Lastly, either spouse may
validly exercise his or her profession without the consent of the other spouse
unless there is a valid, serious and moral ground therein.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

45. LEOUEL SANTOS, Petitioner -versus – THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

and JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, Respondent, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995, VITUG, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

Santos v. CA 240 SCRA 20
Article 36 of the Family Code should be construed in conjunction with the existing
precepts in our law on marriage. "Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
 Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state
of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every

circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

46. CHI MING TSOI, Petitioner -versus – COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent,

G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997, Torres, Jr., J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

Private respondent alleged that in the span of 10 months that she was married to
petitioner, not once did they have sexual intercourse nor was there an attempt to do
so. Petitioner’s continuous refusal to have sexual intercourse since the day of their
marriage drove the private respondent to institute a case for annulment of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The Supreme Court ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of either spouse
to “procreate children”, an essential marital obligation under the law, is considered
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA G.R. No. 119190, Jan. psychological incapacity on the part of the refusing spouse because such marital
16, 1997 obligation ensures the continuation of family relations in a marriage and requires
 participation of both spouses. The admission that there has been no coitus since the
beginning of the marriage indicates a serious personality disorder which affects
one’s capacity to fulfill one of the basic marital obligations contemplated under the
law.

47. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus – COURT OF

APPEALS and RORIDEL OLIVIANO MOLINA, Respondent. G.R. No.
108763, February 13, 1997, Panganiban, J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

Pursuant to the rulin in the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, the court ruled that
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental incapacity and that
the intention of the law is to confine the meaning to the most serious cases of
personality disorders which clearly demonstrates an insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Republic v. Olaviano Molina (1997)
In this case, the Court ruled that a mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” is not tantamount to the psychological incapacity
contemplated in the Family Code. Additionally, the Court held that it is essential
that the parties must be shown to be incapable of doing their marital
responsibilities because of some psychological illness.

48. LEONILO ANTONIO, Petitioner -versus – MARIE IVONNE F. REYES,

Respondent, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2005, Tinga, J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca

Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, Mar.
10,2005
The Molina Case was promulgated in 1997 and it provided seven guidelines for the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Supreme Court
relied primarily on the Molina Guidelines and found that the totality of the
evidence presented sufficiently satisfies said guidelines.
First, the petitioner was able to overcome the burden in proving that his wife was
psychologically incapacitated based on the evidence he presented such as his own
testimony corroborated by witnesses proving the behavior of his wife, as well as
two expert witnesses who both concluded such psychological incapacity.

Second, the root cause of the psychological incapacity has been medically
identified, alleged, and explained in the RTC decision. The evidence showed that
the wife constantly lied, made misrepresentations about her income, job, education,
and even her own illegitimate child. Both expert witnesses connected the wife’s
behavior to medical causes.

Third, the psychological incapacity of the wife existed at the time of and even
before the marriage as proven by evidence showing that she made up stories and
fabricated friends before she married petitioner.

Fourth, the psychological incapacity of the wife is proven to be grave and hence,
she cannot assume the essential marital obligations of marriage. The behavior
exhibited by the wife shows that she cannot distinguish truth from fiction and she
would also be unable to know the meaning of the marital bond between husband
and wife, much more to comply with the obligations of marriage.

Fifth, the wife is unable to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage as provided in Article 68 to 71 of the Family Code.

Sixth, the CA erred in not giving great respect to the decision of the Catholic
Church to annul the marriage of the parties, although it is not controlling or
decisive.

Lastly, the Supreme Court ruled that it would be insensible to mandate that the
petitioner show by expert witness that the psychological incapacity of his wife be
permanent or incurable. There will be no impelling cause for petitioner to present
 evidence on this matter which was decided by the RTC more than ten years prior to
the case before the SC. Hence, based on the totality of evidence, the SC still ruled
that the psychological incapacity was sufficiently proven to be incurable. In so
ruling, the SC gave consideration to the decision of the Catholic Church that said
incapacity was incurable as a basis in granting annulment.

49. EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner -versus – ROWENA ONG

GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent. G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009,
NACHURA, J

By: Martin, Dominic

For a marriage to be declared null and void, the root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.

As such in this case, when both spouses are afflicted with grave, severe and
incurable psychological incapacity, like dependent personality disorder and
antisocial personality disorder, the marriage that they contracted will be declared
null and void because they will not be able to assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support.

In psychological incapacity, it is the seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of

the disorders which is considered. Moreover, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

Expert testimony is important to establish the precise cause of a party’s

psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. However, it must be noted that the personal examination by a physician
is not required when the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
Te vs Te, GR No. 161793, Feb. 13, 2009 finding of psychological incapacity.
 Presentation of expert witness presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity, and it will assist the
courts to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case.

In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological

incapacity, the Court is protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to
allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond.

50. MARIETA C. AZCUETA , Petitioner, -versus- REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents, G.R. No.
180668, May 26, 2009, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

By: Evangelista

It must be noted that in the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity of

marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code,
while expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists, it may be dispensed with if the totality of evidence proves the
incapacity. More so when the material points of the case are given credence by a
close relative of the spouse. The totality of evidence matters and must be
considered in establishing and identifying the psychological illness. Moreover, its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained.

Azcueta vs RP, G.R. No. 180668, May 26,
2009
In this case, Rodolfo was diagnosed with a severe dependent personality disorder.
It must have existed prior to the marriage since it is a product of his upbringing and
family life which interfered with his normal functioning. A person who cannot
make independent decisions and give support even regarding basic matters that
spouses face each day clearly establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations. Hence, the declaration of nullity of
the parties’ marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper.
51. LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner -versus – CHONA M.
SANTOS-HALILI, Respondent. G.R. No. 165424, June 09, 2009, Corona, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

Courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis — guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and
by decisions of church tribunals. By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite
having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential
the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court relied upon the psychological report of Dr.
Dayan to conclude that petitioner’s personality disorder was grave and incurable
and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. Dr.
Dayan was able to trace petitioner’s personality disorder to his dysfunctional
family life.

Since petitioner was proved to be suffering from psychological incapacity that

Halili v Halili, GR 165424, June 9, 2009 effectively rendered him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage,
(Motion for Recon) his marriage to respondent should be declared null and void.

52. DIGNA A. NAJERA, Petitioner -versus – EDUARDO J. NAJERA,

Respondent, G.R. No. 164817 , July 3, 2009, Peralta, J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

Najera v Najera, July 3, 2009
Article 36 of the Family Code requires the presence of credible evidence that can
adequately establish that the party was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. Basically, it must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. The root cause of such psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and proven in court.
Significantly, the actual medical examination of the person may be dispensed with,
 provided that the totality of evidence is materially sufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.

In this case, petitioner Digna contends that respondent Eduardo is psychologically

incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. She further contends
that the root cause of the psychological incapacity of respondent Eduardo was the
latter’s dysfunctional family background. However, respondent Eduardo’s alleged
psychological incapacity was not proven to be incurable on the ground that the
psychological condition of respondent was not adequately established in court. As
a matter of fact, the psychological findings of Psychologist Cristina Gates
regarding the psychological incapacity of respondent was not based on her personal
knowledge and evaluation of respondent. It was merely based only on facts
transmitted to her by petitioner Najera which makes it unscientific and unreliable.
Thus, the totality of evidence failed to sufficiently prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

53. MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES -versus – RAMON REYES, G.R. No.

185286, August 18, 2010, Nachura, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for nullifying a marriage provides the

following requisites: a) gravity; b) juridical antecedence; and c) incurability.

To elaborate, the incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

Camacho v Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August All of the three expert witness were of the opinion that Ramon Reyes (Ramon)
18, 2010 suffered psychological incapacity as manifested by: a) sporadic financial support;
 b) chronic indifference with his wife and children; c) chronic irresponsibility; d)
extra-marital affairs; e) substance abuse; f) failed business attempts; g) unpaid
money obligations; h) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family
businesses; and i) criminal charges of estafa. This was given credence by the
Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that their testimonies cannot be invalidated by the mere
fact that Ramos was not personally examined and interviewed. The behavior of
one spouse is usually witnessed by the other. In the present case, the assessment
made by the expert witnesses was based on the narration of facts given to by his
spouse, Ma, Socorro Camacho-Reyes (Socorro). Furthermore, the expert witnesses
also interviewed their children, siblings and in-laws, and the sister of Socorro.

The Court also had the occasion to rule that a recommendation for therapy does not
ipso facto negate the incurability of a disorder. Rather, therapy is used as a means
to mitigate and manage undesirable behavior.

Lastly, it must be emphasized that the fact of psychological incapacity must be

proven independently from the expert testimony. Therefore, expert testimony, by
itself, is insufficient to give rise to a finding of psychological incapacity. In the
present case, Socorro, independently of the expert witness’ findings, through the
narration of her facts in her pleadings and during trial established that Ramon was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

54. VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ,

respondent. G.R. No. 166357. January 14, 2015. Bersamin, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Expert opinions on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties ought
not be discounted, but regarded as decisive evidence. The Court had the occasion
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, 14 Jan. to discuss in the instant case that the courts are not endowed with expertise in the
2015 field of psychology. It is therefore imperative that they rely on the opinions of the
 experts to have a firm grasp on the matter, which in turn, would allow them to
arrive at a proper judgment. The Court held that the experts were able to describe
the psychological incapacity of Respondent Fernandez sufficiently and
competently within the standards propounded by Article 36 of the Family Code.
The experts established their opinions based on case records and affidavits and
therefore must not be disputed after the Regional Trial Court had accepted the
veracity of the Petitioner’s factual premises.

55. Robert F. Mallilin, Petitioner vs. Luz G. Jamesolamin and the Republic of the
Philippines, Respondents. G.R. No. 192718, 18 February 2015, MENDOZA, J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that psychological incapacity as a ground

to nullify a marriage should refer to no less than a mental incapacity that causes a
party to be incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage, which include their mutual obligations to
live together; observe love, respect, and fidelity; and render help and support.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, judicial antecedence
and incurability. The incapacity must be grave such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.

Mallilin v Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, 18
Feb. 2015
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the evidence presented failed to
establish the psychological incapacity of the respondent. The petitioner failed to
overcome the burden of proof to show the allegedly incapacity of respondent.
Further, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent was
not medically identified and sufficiently proven during trial. More, sexual infidelity
or perversion and abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.

56. MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner, -versus- RODOLFO

De la Fuente v De la Fuente, G.R. No. DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent. G.R. No. 188400, SECOND DIVISION,
188400, March 8, 2017 March 8, 2017, LEONEN, J.
 By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

One form of psychological abuse is coercive control wherein an individual controls

another through physical, sexual, emotional, economic abuse. This form of
psychological abuse shows a lack of comprehension of what marriage is which
would constitute a sufficient ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

In this case, it was sufficiently established that the husband’s repeated behavior of
physical violence, intimidating, stalking, isolating his wife from her relatives and
friends shows that he lacks comprehension of what marriage is and is unfit to
perform his marital obligations.

57. ABIGAEL AN EPINA-DAN, Petitioner vs MARCO DAN, Respondent

G.R. No. 20903. APRIL 16, 2018. DEL CASTILLO, J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

Psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the

Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical -
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
To prove this, it should be established by the totality of evidence presented during
trial.

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the

psychological incapacity. Here, with the declared insufficiency if the testimonies of
petitioner and her witness, the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to
Dr. Tayag’s expert findings. Hoever, the determinations made by Dr. Tayag was
Dan v Dan, GR 209031, April 16, 2018 solely based on personal accounts of petitioner alone. Hence, the conclusion that
 his husband, Marco, was suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder does not
suffice since it is based only from her testimony and her mother, not Marco.

58. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. MARTIN NIKOLAI

Z. JAVIER AND MICHELLE K. MERCADO-JAVIER, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018, REYES, JR., J:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B,

The case prescribed the doctrine that psychological incapacity cannot be

Republic v Javier, GR 210518, April 18, 2018
established by information from other people or spouse alone since juridical
antecedence must be proven. Meaning, the psychological incapacity must exist at
the time of celebration of marriage. In this case, the juridical antecedence of the
incapacity is only proven on Martin where apart from circumstances that prove his
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with sadism tendencies, it was shown that the said
disorder was the result of the traumatic experiences he experienced in his
childhood where his father frequently abused her mother. However, juridical
antecedence was not established in Michelle due to absence of any evidence to
support that the Narcissistic Personality Disorder occurred before the marriage.
Reiterating the doctrine in Santos vs. CA, the psychological incapacity of a spouse
must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence; and incurability.

59. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERATO P. MOLA

CRUZ, Respondent. G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018. Gesmundo, J.

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

In a declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the

totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that the spouse's psychological
incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.

Republic v Mola Cruz, GR 236629, July 23, In this case, it was Liezl's histrionic personality disorder that caused her inability to
2018 discharge her marital obligations to love, respect and give concern, support and
 fidelity to her Liberato. The gravity of the disorder was shown through the totality
of Liezl’s action after the marriage. The court found that Liezl’s disorder began
when Liezl was an adolescent and continued well into adulthood. Such disorder
manifesting only after the celebration of marriage does not mean that there is no
psychological incapacity.

Her acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment are actual manifestations of her
histrionic personality disorder, and should not only be considered in this case as
grounds for legal separation. A person with such a disorder was characterized as
selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate gratification.These were evidenced
by her acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital abode, sharing
the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and introducing her husband as her
elder brother.

60. ANACLETO ALDEN MENESES, * Petitioner, v. JUNG SOON LINDA

LEE-MENESES, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 200182, March 13, 2019 CAGUIOA,
J.

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

In actions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the Court’s decision is bound by

law and evidence presented and not on whether love exists or not in said marriage.
It is worth stressing that when dealing with psychological incapacity under Article
36, it must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In
this case, the petitioner anchored his arguments merely on the findings of a
psychiatrist based on the interview with the petitioner, his secretary and the family
driver. What is appalling is that none of these people actually knew the respondent
since childhood which greatly affected the said findings. While the Court
Meneses v. Meneses, G.R. No. 200182, March recognized that there were indeed grounds to nullify the marriage, such grounds
13, 2019 were not sufficiently established by the evidence presented.

61. Tan-Andal v Andal. G.R. No. 196359, May ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL, Petitioner, v. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL,
11, 2021 Respondent. G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021, LEONEN, J.
 By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

The Supreme Court reevaluated and modified the Molina guidelines on

psychological incapacity in the annulment of marriage. First, the quantum of
evidence required to prove psychological incapacity in the annulment of marriage
must be clear and convincing evidence. Second, psychological incapacity in the
context of annulment of marriage is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality
disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. It is not a medical condition
but rather a "legal" condition. Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of
dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance
with one's essential marital obligations. Third, the psychological incapacity that is
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable not in the medical sense
but in its legal meaning. Psychological incapacity must be so enduring and
persistent with respect to a specific partner and contemplates a situation where the
couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that
the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of
the marriage. Fourth, with respect to gravity, it must not be a simple refusal,
neglect, difficulty, or ill will to perform marital obligations but it must be caused by
a genuinely serious psychological cause.

In this case, Mario Andal is declared psychologically incapacitated to comply with

his marital obligations with his wife Rosanna Tan. It was proven by clear and
convincing evidence that Mario possessed chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity, and
drug addiction. These established behaviors manifests dysfunctionality to comply
with his marital obligations

62. IRENE CONSTANTINO DATU v. ALFREDO FABIAN DATU. G.R. No.

209278, September 15, 2021, Leonen, J.

By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

Datu v Datu, GR 209278, Sept. 15, 2021
 Following the doctrinal ruling in the case of Tan-Andal v. Andal, psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a legal concept and not a medical
one. A person suffering from a certain kind of psychosis like schizophrenia does
not automatically render such person psychologically incapacitated to satisfy their
marital obligation. Psychological incapacity is now deemed as an aspect of one’s
personality manifested through dysfunctional acts which, in result, undermines the
sanctity of the family because the spouse can no longer comprehend and comply
with marital obligations. A spouse may be psychologically incapacitated relative to
a specific partner but not to another, rendering this not incurable.

Alfredo’s belief that he is the son of God, that not providing for his family and not
living with them is God’s will, and his belief that he can have as many wives as he
desires is a clear manifestation of his psychosis being a part of his personality
structure. These seriously undermined his wife, Irene, and their family.

63. PAUL AMBROSE, Petitioner, v. LOUELLA SUQUE-AMBROSE,

Respondent. G.R. No. 206761, June 23, 2021, GAERLAN, J.

By: Neil Cabaltera

A foreigner has a legal capacity to institute a petition for nullity of marriage with
respect to their marriage that was celebrated in the Philippines. In this case,
petitioner was a foreigner who was married in the Philippines to the Filipina
respondent. Petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of Psychological incapacity but the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
same.

Ambrose v Ambrose , G.R. No. 206761, June
23, 2021
The Supreme Court ruled that the law does not distinguish between the Foreign and
the Filipino spouse as to who may file the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The marriage was celebrated in the Philippines and the action of the
petitioner also pertains to the psychological incapacity of the spouse. It is
indubitable that the action will affect the personal status of the respondent, hence
the Regional Trial Court should not have dismissed the same.
64.
Republic of the Philippines Vs. Angelique
Pearl O. Claur and Mark A. Claur, G.R. No.
246868. February 15, 2022
65.
Janice Maristela-Cuan Vs. Marcelino A. Cuan,
Jr., and the Republic of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 248518. December 7, 2021
Republic of the Philippines Vs. Angelique Pearl O. Claur and Mark A. Claur,
G.R. No. 246868, February 15, 2022, LAZARO-JAVIER, J:
By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.
In Tan-Andal v. Andal, the Court ruled that a medical expert’s testimony is no
longer required to establish psychological incapacity on the part of the husband and
the wife as a legal concept. This is due to the fact that the Court declared
psychological incapacity as a legal concept, and not a medical concept. Hence, the
testimony of ordinary witnesses who were present in the life of the spouses is
sufficient to prove the presence of psychological incapacity.
Tan-Andal v. Andal also set three main parameters to determine the presence of
psychological incapacity which are the following: a) gravity, b) incurability, and c)
juridical antecedence.
The issue was whether or not Mark can also be declared as psychologically
incapacitated despite the absence of a medical examination from Dr.
Castillo-Carcereny. In this case, Dr. Castillo-Carcereny was only able to examine
Angelique personally, but the former still found that Mark was also psychologically
incapacitated. However, Dr. Castillo-Carcereny found them both to be
psychologically incapacitated. Further, the Court ruled that, the non-examination of
husband does not result in the inadmissibility of evidence to show psychological
incapacity on his part. Therefore, psychological incapacity being present in both
spouses, their marriage may be declared as void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity.
JANICE MARISTELA-CUAN, Petitioner -versus – MARCELINO A. CUAN,
Respondent, G.R. No. 248518, December 7, 2021, LAZARO-JAVIER. J.
By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

66.
Raphy Valdez De Silva Vs. Donald De Silva
and Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
247985. October 13, 2021
Pursuant to the ruling of Tan-Andal v. Andal, the evidence needed for psychological
incapacity was democratized, that an expert testimony is no longer necessary. A lay
person may prove psychological incapacity by adducing evidence of: (1) the
reputation of the incapacitated spouse being psychologically incapacitated; (2) the
character of the incapacitated spouse relevant to or indicative of such incapacity;
(3) the everyday behavior, acts, or conduct of the incapacitated spouse, and (4) the
offended spouse’s own experience of neglect, abandonment, unrequited love, and
infliction of mental distress, among others. However, an expert testimony may still
be given weight despite it no longer being necessary
.
In this case, the Court found that petitioner was able to prove psychological
incapacity in the legal sense with clear and convincing evidence of Judicial
Antecedence, Gravity, and Incurability. The Court also considered the expert
testimony of Dr. Tayag, holding that his findings support psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the petitioner’s evidence would have already been sufficient pursuant
to the rule laid down by Tan-Andal.
Raphy Valdez De Silva v. Donald De Silva and Republic of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 247985, 13 October 2021, LOPEZ, J.
By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.
As the Molina guidelines served as the definitive guidelines for the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code for years, the said guidelines were
later found by the Court to be too rigid and mechanical in application. Following
the recent decision of the Court in the Tan-Andal case, the Court made emphasis
that the standard of proof for nullity of cases is clear and convincing evidence as
marriages are considered as civil and sui generis in nature. The Supreme Court
even gave a reminder to the courts, reiterating that in dealing with cases involving
psychological incapacity, each case must be decided based on the totality of
evidence that would prove that the incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing
prior to the time of the marriage.
 In application to the present case, the Court recognized that petitioner Raphy De
Silva was able to establish upon clear and convincing evidence. The statements of
witnesses and expert testimony of Dr. Tayag as well as documentary evidence
reflected that respondent Donald De Silva had a history of psychological incapacity
which existing at the time of the celebration of their marriage. Thus, the Court
found him to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital
obligations at the time of his marriage to petitioner Raphy De Silva.

67. Rommel M. Espiritu, petitioner v. Shirley Ann Boac-Espiritu, respondent.

G.R. No. 247583. October 6, 2021 LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

By: Borra, Filipino F.

To prove psychological incapacity, the person alleging the same must demonstrate,
through clear and convincing evidence, that the spouse’s “personality structure”, as
manifested by clear acts of dysfunctionality, renders such spouse impossible to
perform his marital obligations.

Although the Tan-Andal vs Andal case has revisited this concept and concluded
that expert opinion is not required to prove psychological incapacity as it is not a
medical but a legal concept, evidence of psychological incapacity must still be
taken as a whole.

Rommel M. Espiritu Vs. Shirley Ann
Boac-Espiritu, G.R. No. 247583. October 6,
2021
Here, the totality of the evidence presented was not able to prove the clear acts of
dysfunctionality that renders the spouse unable to perform her marital obligations.
Petitioner was not able to prove the juridical antecedence and gravity of the
spouse’s psychological incapacity. As to juridical antecedence, the testimonies of
the petitioner and his witness were not able to prove that the incapacity existed
prior to marriage as they did not grow up with the respondent. As to gravity, the
pieces of evidence were not able to prove that the personality structure of the
spouse is the proximate cause of her non-performance of marital obligation; they
were not even able to prove the makeup of the spouse personality structure and its

68.
Ma. Virginia D.R. Halog Vs. Wilbur Francis
G. Halog and the Republic of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 231695. October 6, 2021
effect. Therefore, petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of his
spouse.
MA. VIRGINIA D.R. HALOG, Petitioner, v. WILBUR FRANCIS G. HALOG
and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. G.R. No. 231695.
October 06, 2021. LAZARO-JAVIER, J.
By: Arenas, Gissela M.
In proving that psychological incapacity exist, expert testimony is not the only
mode that parties may present as evidence, as there may now be proof of the
durable aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which is
manifested through acts that undermines the family and acts of dysfunctionality,
wherein, the spouse’s personality structure make it impossible for him or her to
understand and concomitantly comply with the essential marital obligations due to
psychic causes. Proof of these aspects of personality can be given by ordinary
witnesses and an expert opinion is not required because this is not a medical illness
that must be clinically and medically identified. Provided, that these ordinary
witnesses before the spouses have contracted their marriage have been present in
their life and they may testify on the behaviors that they have consistently observed
from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, it would be the judge who
would decide if such behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity that
prohibits the incapacitated spouse to assume the essential marital obligations.
Lastly, such psychological incapacity must be caused by a durable aspect of one’s
personality structure, and must have been in existence before the parties married.
In this case, there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s condition or
behavioral pattern and his personality structure, was present even before he
celebrated his marriage to Virginia, which renders their marriage as void ab initio.
As he failed to fulfill his obligations as a husband to Ma. Virginia and father to
their three children, when respondent subjected his wife to repeated acts of
infidelity before and after marriage, several counts of physical and verbal abuse,
and by neglecting and eventually abandoning his wife and his children, as he
 contracted another marriage and had another child when he was in Qatar. All of
these acts manifest psychological incapacity in the legal sense and such were
corroborated in the testimony of the petitioner’s brother and the close friend of the
spouses. Thus the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence on record and it
sufficiently supported the petition of Ma. Virginia D.R. Halog for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Wilbur Francis G. Halog.

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

8. Absence of Authority of the Solemnizing Officer Absence of Authority of the Solemnizing Officer Articles 3 (1), 4 (1), 7, 10, 31,
(Articles 3 (1), 4 (1), 7, 10, 31, 32, 35 (2), R.A. 7160 32, 35 (2)
(1991 Local Government Code), Secs. 444(b)(1)(xviii),
445 (b)(1)(xviii) By: Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B. Reynaldo

Under these articles, the authority of the solemnizing officer is a formal requisite
of marriage. Consequently, absent this authority renders the marriage void ab
initio. To be clear, only the following persons may be allowed to solemnize a
marriage under the Family Code: a) member of the judiciary provided that the
marriage is within their jurisdiction, b) any priest or minister of any church or
religious sect authorized by their sect and civil registrar general provided that at
least one of the parties belong to the priest’s or minister’s religion or sect, c) any
ship captain or airplane pilot in marriage in articulo mortis between passengers
and crew members while at sea or in flight or even during stopovers, d) any
military commander where the chaplain is absent during military operation and in
articulo mortis between members of the armed forces and civilians, and e) any
consul-general, consul or vice-consul when the marriage between Filipino citizens
is celebrated abroad.

R.A. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code), Secs. 444(b)(1)(xviii), 445

(b)(1)(xviii)

By Ellaine Denice H. Marallag

 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

Under the Local Government Code, specifically Secs. 444(b)(1)(xviii) and 445
(b)(1)(xviii), the Municipal Mayor is given the power to solemnize marriages.
This power is also extended to the Acting Mayor.

In the case of Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32, the Supreme Court held that yhe
vice mayor of a municipality acting as Acting Mayor has the authority to
solemnize marriages. This is because if the vice mayor assumes the powers and
duties of the office of the mayor, he discharges all the duties and wields the
powers appurtenant to said office.

However, since it is the Local Government Code (LGC) that granted for this
authority, it must be noted that this authority does not exist before January 1, 1992
(effectivity of the LGC). Hence, from the time of effectivity of the Family Code
which is August 3, 1988 up to the time of the effectivity of the LGC on Jan. 1,
1992, mayors do not have the authority to solemnize marriage.

Furthermore, it is a requirement that one of the contracting parties in the marriage

must be a resident where the marriage will take place. The ceremony can be held
either inside the Mayor’s Office or within its vicinity.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

69. MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.

OCCIANO, respondent., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11, 2002 PUNO, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

Aranes vs Occiano, 380 SCRA 402

70.
Navarro v. Domagtoy S.C. A.M.
MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996
Judges have no authority to officiate or solemnize marriages outside their areas of
jurisdiction. When a marriage is solemnized by a judge outside his court's
jurisdiction, an irregularity results in the formal requisite laid down in Art. 3 of the
Family Code which, while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. 
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant v. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent. AM No. MTJ-96-1088, Jul 19, 1996, ROMERO, J:.
By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.
Article 3 of the Family code provides one of the formal requisites of marriage is
the "authority of the solemnizing officer." And under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction.”
In this case, the respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar and
Arlyn outside the jurisdiction of his court. Worse, he also solemnized such
marriage knowing that Gaspar is merely separated from his first wife, nor was there
any declaration of presumptive death since it was alleged that there was an affidavit
stating that the first wife left the conjugal dwelling and has never returned nor does
Gaspar heard of any news regarding her for almost seven years. The judge has
jurisdiction that covers the municipality of Sta. Monica and Burgos but he was not
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. There is
then an irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3. This irregularity
which may not affect the validity of the marriage can still subject the officiating
official to administrative liability, specifically, as in this case, gross ignorance of
the law. With regard to the marriage between Gaspar and Tagadan, the marriage is
 void for being bigamous. Hence, the court suspended Judge Domagtoy for six
months.

71. ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent, 323 SCRA 566, January
28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

By: Areta, Karen M.

The authority of a judge to solemnize marriage is confined within his jurisdiction.

However, a judge may solemnize marriage outside his chambers in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article
29 of the Family Code; and (3) upon the request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. In this case, the judge solemnized the marriage of
Beso and Yman under the theory that the law may be liberally interpreted to allow
the citizens to get married in a cheaper and easier way. The judge also believed that
Beso, being an accredited Filipino overseas worker, deserved more than an
ordinary official attention under the present Government policy.

The Court held Judge Juan Daguman administratively liable for solemnizing the
marriage. As a presiding judge, he must only apply or interpret the law but he must
Beso v Daguman, 323 SCRA 566 (2000) also abide by it.

72. RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014, BRION, J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

Article 4 of the Family Code provides that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites of marriage is shall render the marriage void from the beginning.
One of the formal requisites of a valid marriage, as provided for under Article 3 of
Ronulo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. the same code, is the authority of the solemnizing officer. However, a solemnizing
182438, July 2, 2014 officer with the authority to solemnize a marriage may be punished with
 performance of illegal marriage when such solemnizing officer solemnizes a
marriage without a valid marriage license.

In this case, the Court have declared Rene Ronulo guilty of performance of illegal
marriage when he allowed himself to solemnize the marriage between Joey
Umadac and Claire Bingayen, even though they have informed Rene that they have
no marriage license.

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

9. Absence of a Marriage License (Articles 3 (2), 4 (1), 4 Absence of a Marriage License (Articles 3 (2), 4 (1), 4 (3), 35 (3), 27 – 34)
(3), 35 (3), 9 – 21[refers to the administrative
requirements], 27 – 34) By: Liban, Clarisse M.

A marriage license is a formal requisite of marriage. The general rule is that if the
marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage license, the same is void.
However, certain marriages are exempt from the marriage license requirement.
These marriages are in cases of: 1) Marriages in articulo mortis, 2) marriages in
remote places, 3) marriages among Muslims and ethnic cultural communities, and
4) Legal ratification of marital cohabitation.

If there is only an irregularity with the marriage license, the marriage is still valid
because such does not affect the validity of the marriage.

Administrative Requirements in obtaining a Marriage License (Articles 9-21)

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel

The following rules are for obtaining a marriage license:

1. A marriage license is issued locally by the local civil registrar of the city
or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides. If issued
abroad, it is issued in the office of the consular officials.
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

2. The validity of a marriage license is for a period of 120 days from date of
issue and is deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said
period.
3. Parental consent is needed for parties below 21 years old and must be
exhibited to the local civil registrar.
4. Parental advice is required for parties between 21 and 25 years old.
5. The certificate of marriage counseling is required if any party is 25 and
below.
6. The application of marriage license must be published for 10 consecutive
days and the issuance of the license shall be after the completion of the
period of publication.
7. If either or both parties are citizens of a foreign country, a certificate of
legal capacity to contract marriage must be submitted.
8. A certificate of compliance issued by the Local Family Planning Office is
needed for the issuance of a marriage license.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

73. ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. G.R. 133778, Mar. 14,
2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

Before the effectivity of the Family Code, as a general rule, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code and the
Niñal vs. Bayadog, G.R. 133778, Mar. 14, absence of such will render the marriage null and void  as stated under Article
2000 80. Marriage license is needed because it is the way of the government of
 protecting the sanctity of marriage especially since it involves public interest.
However, there are exceptions to such rule, one of which is under Article 76 of the
same code. It provides that if a man and a woman had lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage, marriage license can be disposed
of. It must be noted that the five-year common-law cohabitation period should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.

In the case at bar, Pepito and respondent’s cohabitation is not the cohabitation
contemplated by law because from the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
The time of cohabitation of Pepito and respondent when they started living with
each other although Pepito’s first marriage was not yet dissolved cannot be
counted. The Court held that the subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".

74. REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE

ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, Respondent, G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008,
TINGA. J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique

De Castro v De Castro, G.R. No. 160172,
February 13, 2008
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential and formal requisites
render a marriage void ab initio. The law dispenses with the formal requisite of
marriage license when a man and woman has been living together exclusively as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years,
provided there is no legal impediment to marry each other. The purpose of this
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation and embarrassment from
scandalous cohabitation.
 In this case, the Supreme Court found that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was celebrated without a marriage license. The Court ruled that the
false affidavit presented by petitioner and respondent stating that they have been
cohabiting for more than five years is a mere scrap of paper and cannot be
considered a mere irregularity in the formal requisite. Consequently, petitioner and
respondent are not excused from obtaining a marriage license. For their failure to
obtain a marriage license, the Court declared their marriage void ab initio.

75. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus- JOSE A. DAYOT,

Respondent. G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

The marriage between Jose and Felisa, having been celebrated prior the effectivity
of the Family Code, is governed by the provisions of Art. 53 of the Civil Code
which laid down the requisites for the solemnization of a marriage specifically the
legal capacity of the contracting parties, consent freely given, authority of the
person performing the marriage, and a marriage license except those with
exceptional character. Under Chapter 2 of the Family Code, the marriages of
exceptional character are marriages celebrated in articulo mortis, marriages in
remote places, consular marriages, ratification of marital cohabitation, religious
ratification of a civil marriage, Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and mixed
marriages.

Republic v Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March
28, 2008
Although the case of Jose and Felisa pertains to the ratification of marital
cohabitation, the affidavit executed by the parties in lieu of the marriage license
declaring that they have attained the age of majority and that being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, is tainted with falsity
rendering the marriage to be void ab initio. For the application of the exception of a
marriage license under Art. 76 of the Family Code, the parties must have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. Jose and Felisa falsified such
statement in their affidavit only having been living together barely five months
 before the celebration of their marriage. The action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible, thus, Jose’s action for nullity of marriage has not yet prescribed.

76. SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013, VELASCO JR., J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

A marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage license.

In this case, the marriage between Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage
license should be declared null and void. A certification issued by the civil registrar
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. The certification likewise enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and such presumption may only be rebutted upon proof of the claimant
that no diligent search was made or that the certification did not categorically state
that no such marriage license was made or found.

Abbas vs Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January
30, 2013
In this present case, not only did Gloria fail to explain why she procured a marriage
license in Carmona, Cavite, where neither party resides. There is also proof that
diligent search was made by the Municipal Civil Registrar to find Syed and
Gloria’s marriage license since they were able to trace the marriage license written
at the marriage certificate, albeit registered in another couple’s names.

77. FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents. G.R. No.
127263 April 12, 2000, QUISUMBING, J.

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

A marriage license is a formal requisite of marriage and its absence renders the
Sy vs. CA, G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000 marriage void.
 In this case, the date of marriage is November 15, 1973 whereas the date of
issuance of the marriage license is September 17, 1974. Thus, it cannot be said that
the marriage was celebrated with a valid marriage license. Further in this case, the
marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite. However, none of the contracting
parties ever resided in Carmona. Hence the marriage license is invalid.

78. RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, vs. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA

and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. G.R. No. 167746, August 28,
2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

By:Calumpang. Karen Regina B.

It is provided for in the law and in various cases decided by the Court that for a
void marriage on the ground of absence of a marriage license be considered, it
must be first apparent on the marriage contract, or at least be supported by the fact
that no marriage license was in fact issued to the parties.

In this case, the marriage contract of the parties indicates a marriage license
number. Moreover, there was certification issued by the local registrar identifying
the parties in this case to be the persons whom the marriage license was issued for.
This certification enjoys the presumption of regularity and may only be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Moreso, mere irregularities do not affect the validity of the marriage. Semper
Alcantara vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of
Aug. 28, 2007 marriage.

79. RAQUEL G. KHO, petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and

VERONICA B. KHO, respondents. G.R. No. 187462. June 1, 2016. PERALTA,
J.:

Kho v Republic, GR No. 187462, June 1, 2016 By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.
 The governing law in this case is the CC as the FC was not yet in effect at the time
of the parties’ marriage. It was stated under Art. 53(4) CC that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. The license is the essence of the marriage contract. Absent the requisite
marriage license, the marriage shall be rendered void ab initio (Art. 80 CC vis-à-vis
Art. 4 (1) FC).

Here, petitioner was able to present a certification that there is no record nor copy
of any marriage license ever issued in favor the contracting parties. On this score,
the presumed validity of the marriage has been overcome and the burden to prove
such validity shifts to respondent which she failed to do so.

80. LUCILA DAVID and THE HEIRS OF RENE F. AGUAS, namely:

PRINCESS LUREN D. AGUAS, DANICA LANE D. AGUAS, SEAN
PATRICK D. AGUAS, SEAN MICHAEL D. AGUAS and SAMANTHA *
D. AGUAS, petitioners, vs. CHERRY S. CALILUNG, respondent. G.R. No.
241036, January 26. 2021, DELOS SANTOS J.:

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M

Absence of a marriage license renders the marriage as void. The validity of such
void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same as long as it is essential in the determination of the
case.

David v Calilung, G.R. No. 241036, Jan. 26.
2021
In this case, the heirs of the deceased Rene from his previous marriage were
allowed to collaterally attack the validity of their father's second marriage in the
Settlement Proceeding of his estate. As for Lucila, the first spouse of Rene, the
nullity of their marriage renders her as a stranger in the estate proceedings who has
no right to succeed as an heir of Rene and cannot participate in the Settlement
Proceeding.
 81.
Lovelle S. Cariaga Vs. the Republic of the
Philippines and Henry G. Cariaga, G.R. No.
248643. December 7, 2021
TOPIC
10. Absence of a Marriage Ceremony, FC 2, 3, 4, 6, 8
LOVELLE S. CARIAGA, Petitioner -versus – REPUBLIC AND HENRY G.
CARIAGA, Respondent. G.R. No.248643 , December 07, 2021, Caguioa J.
By: Magpili, Airish A.
Article 4 of the family Code provides that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio (void from the beginning)
except in cases provided under Article 35 (2), and for marriage to be considered
void for lack of a marriage license, such absence of marriage license must be
apparent to the marriage contract or at least be supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no marriage license was issued.
In this case, the marriage of Lovelle and Henry is declared void ab initio for having
been solemnized without a valid marriage license. This is despite the fact that their
case does not fall within any of the exceptions provided under Article 35. Lovelle
hinges on the fact that there is Certification which states that the issuance of the
Certificate of Marriage between Henry and her was issued not to them but to
another couple. For this, the Court ruled that it is unavoidable for the Republic,
considering its power, to verify within the civil registry the records and prove that
the license necessary for the validity of marriage of Lovelle and Henry had been
issued, an act the Republic failed to do. Hence, the marriage between Lovell and
Henry was declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license.
GIST OF SPECIAL LAW
10. Absence of a Marriage Ceremony, FC 2, 3, 4, 6, 8
By: Resus, Jarvin David E.
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female;
and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age. (53a, 55a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage
is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.
This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be
signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the
solemnizing officer.

In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is
unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be
attested by the solemnizing officer.

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the

judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere,
except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request
the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized
at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

A marriage ceremony is a formal requisite for a valid marriage as indicated in

Article 3 of the Family Code. The marriage ceremony takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer where they
offer their personal declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age. Article 4 provides that absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites renders the marriage void ab initio. Thus, the absence of a marriage
ceremony makes the marriage void. The absence contemplated in Article 4 does
not refer to irregularities in the marriage ceremony such as lack of witnesses or
witnesses who are not of legal age.

THE VOIDABLE MARRIAGES AND PROCEDURE AND EFFECT OF DEFECTIVE MARRIAGES

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

a. Consent A. Consent FC 45, 35 (5), 39

FC 45, 35 (5), 39
b. Insanity (Articles 45(2), 47(2)) By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.
c. Fraud (Articles 45 (3), 46)
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

d. Duress – force, intimidation or undue influence Article 49 of the Family Code mirrors the court’s obligation to designate support
(Articles 45 (4), 47 (4)) of the spouses and their common children, including the custody of the latter and
e. Disease – FC 45 (6), 47 (5) visitation rights of the other parent. This duty of the court arises when an action
f. Impotency – FC 45 (5) for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is still pending in
g. Others re Consent court and when there is no written agreement between the spouses providing for
such. The court shall bear in mind that the moral and material welfare of the
children and their choice of parent should be of utmost priority.

Article 35 (5) of the Family Code espouses that marriages contracted because of a
mistake of identity of one party renders the marriage void ab initio.

Article 39 of the Family Code states that prescription does not lie in actions or
defenses for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage.

B. Insanity (Articles 45(2), 47(2))

By: Neil Cabaltera

Under Article 45, Paragraph 2, Insanity or Unsoundness of the mind is a ground

for the annulment of marriage. Where, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, either party was of unsound mind, the marriage is voidable.

The mental incapacity should specifically relate to the contract of marriage. The
insanity must likewise exist at the time of the marriage. Therefore, the true test of
unsoundness of the mind is whether the person is capable of understanding the
nature and consequences of entering into the contract of marriage.

It is the sane spouse who may file the action for annulment and he or she may
only file the same before the death of either party. However, action for annulment
may be filed by any relative or guardian of the insane; or by the insane spouse
himself or herself during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity.
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

The ground of insanity for the annulment of marriages is capable of being ratified.
It is the insane spouse who may ratify the marriage and not the sane spouse.

C. FRAUD (Articles 45 (3), 46)

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

In Leonilo Antonio v. Marie Reyes G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, the
Supreme Court differentiated Art. 45(3) and Art. 46 of the Civil Code which are
pertinent provisions in relation to Fraud.

Art. 45(3) of the Family Code

A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time
of the marriage:

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

Art. 46 of the Family Code

Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3

of the preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party
of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature,
existing at the time of the marriage; or
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or

lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage.

In Antonio v. Reyes, the Court ruled that Art. 45(3) of the Family Code merely
states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either part was obtained
through fraud. Further, the fraud referred to under this article vitiates only the
consent of the spouse who was lied to.

To differentiate, Art. 46 of the Family Code is an enumeration of the situations

which are to be construed as the fraud referred to in Art. 45(3) of the Family
Code.

The fraud contemplated in the above articles may be ratified through cohabitation
of the spouses succeeding the full knowledge of acts which constitute fraud.

D. DURESS
ARTICLE 45(4), 47(4), Family Code

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Under the Family Code, one of the grounds to annul a marriage is that the consent
of either party was obtained by duress - that is, by force, intimidation, or undue
influence.
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

Violence is present when, in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is

employed. Intimidation is present when one of the contracting parties is
compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil
upon his person or property, or upon that of his spouse, descendants, ascendants,
or ascendants, to give his consent. There is undue influence when one exercises
control over another’s will.

The marriage may nonetheless be ratified when, after the same had disappeared or
ceased, the party whose consent was obtained by duress freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife (Art. 45(4), Family Code). An action for annulment on
the ground of duress must be filed by the injured party within five years from the
time such duress disappeared or ceased (Art. 47(4), Family Code).

E. Disease
(Article 45(6), Article 47(5) of the Family Code)

Paragraph 6 of Article 45 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be

annulled in case either party was afflicted with a sexually transmitted disease that
is found to be serious or is incurable. This new ground for annulment of marriage
introduced by the Family Code ensures that the purpose of marriage is to ensure
the procreation of children and promotion of family life be protected from any
harm to the spouses and their offspring’s health.

In applying this ground as cause for annulment of marriage, the requisites are as
follows: (1) that the sexually transmissible disease exist at the time of the
marriage; (2) that the disease is found to be serious; (3) that the disease appears to
be incurable; and (4) that the disease was unknown to the other party when the
marriage was solemnized. Such that, in connection with paragraph 5 of Article 47
of the Family Code, the injured party must file for the action for the annulment of
marriage within five years after the marriage was solemnized.
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

Impotency – FC 45 (5)

By: Borra, Filipino F.

Only impotency is a ground for annulment, not sterility. Impotency refers to one’s
ability to copulate, while sterility refers to one’s ability to procreate. Therefore,
the test is not the capacity to reproduce, but the capacity to copulate. The law
presumes potency.

Requisites for impotency to be a ground for annulment of marriage:

1. Exists at the time of the Celebration of marriage;
2. Permanent (does not have to be absolute);
3. Incurable;
4. Unknown to the other spouse; and,
5. The other spouse must not also be Impotent.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

82. GODOFREDO BUCCAT, Plaintiff and appellant -versus – LUIDA

MANGONON DE BUCCAT, Demanded and appealed, G.R. No. 47101, April
25, 1941, Horrilleno, J.

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Marriage is considered as the foundation of family life and an inviolable social

institution that is protected by the State. It remains in force until it is dissolved
under the law. One of the grounds for annulment of a voidable marriage is fraud or
vitiation of consent. In order to prove fraud, there must be clear and irrefutable
Buccat v. Buccat 72 Phil 49 evidence of such ground.
 In this case, Godofredo seeks to annul his marriage with Luida on the ground of
fraud, as he consented to their marriage by the assurance of Luida that she was
virgin. After 89 days of cohabiting, Luida gave birth to a child. Luida is already in
the advanced stage of pregnancy at the time of her marriage with Godofredo. Given
that Godofredo was a first-year law student at that time, it seemed improbable that
such pregnancy was not noticeable. Hence, there is no fraud.

83. AURORA A. ANAYA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN,

Defendant-Appellee, G.R. No. L-27930. November 26, 1970, Reyes, J.B.L, J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Fraud, as a vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds enumerated

Anaya vs Palaroan, Nov. 26, 1970
under Art. 46 of the Family Code as to cause the annulment of a marriage.
Congress has limited the circumstances as the last paragraph of the same article
expressly states that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank,
fortune, or chastity shall constitute fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." Thus in this case, the non-divulgement of the pre-marital
relationship of the husband with another woman several months prior to their
marriage cannot constitute a ground for annulment.

84. ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents. G.R. No. 132955, October
27, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

Villanueva vs CA, 505 SCRA 564
An annulment of marriage on the ground that consent was not freely given must
not rely on the weakness of evidence of the other spouse but rather, the petitioner
must show proof that he was coerced or tricked into marriage. Here, the Court was
not convinced that his apprehension of danger was so overwhelming as to deprive
him of his will to enter voluntarily into a contract of marriage.
85. MANUEL G. ALMELOR, Petitioner -versus – THE HON. RTC LAS PINAS
and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, Respondent, G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008,
REYES, R.T., J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

Homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. while it is concealment

that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage. Concealment in this case is not
simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental
element that Leonida failed to prove.

Almelor v RTC, Aug. 26, 2008
In this case, the Leonida failed to prove that Manuel was homosexual and that this
fact was concealed to Leonida at the time of their marriage. Even assuming, ex
gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it
as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may
be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as
concealment of homosexuality. It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not
homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such
concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving
consent to the marriage.

86. JOEL JIMENEZ, Petitioner -versus – REMEDIOS CANIZARES,

Respondent, G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960, Padilla, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

Philippine laws regarding family relations are committed to the policy of

Jimenez v. Cañizares 109 Phil 27
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. It is based on the policy that
marriage is not an ordinary contract but a special contract in which the State is
vitally interested. Certain safeguards are enacted into laws in order to maintain the
continuity and permanence of a marriage. Article 45 of the Family Code
specifically enumerates the grounds upon which a marriage may be annulled and
such grounds must be proven by a preponderance of evidence.
 In this case, the Supreme Court held that the annulment decree was based solely
on the testimony of the husband seeking to have the marriage annulled alleging that
the wife was and is impotent. However, the wife never appeared in court nor did
she undergo the medical examination ordered by the court. As such, the impotency
of the wife has not been satisfactorily established. The Court ruled that the
presumption is in favor of potency. Impotency should not be presumed as it is an
abnormal condition. The testimony of the husband alone is not sufficient to prove
the impotency of the wife as to render a decree annulling the marriage between
them.

87. VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner -versus – REY C.

ALCAZAR, Respondent. G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009, Chico-Nazario, J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

Pursuant to Article 45(5) of the Family Code, a marriage may be annulled when
either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other,
and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable. Incapacity to
consummate the marriage, as contemplated in Article 45(5), means the permanent
inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse. The non-consumation may be on the part of either of the spouses and
may be caused by a physical or structural defect in their anatomy or it may be due
to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising from psychophysical conditions. It
can also be due to psychogenic causes, where mental blocks or disturbance results
to the spouse being physically incapable of performing the marriage act.

Alcazar v Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, Oct. 13,
2009
In this case, the Court found no evidence to establish that Rey Alcazar was in any
way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner Veronica
Alcazar. It was also admitted that they had sexual intercourse after their wedding
and before Rey left for abroad. Thus, there being no physical incapacity on Rey’s
part, there is no ground for annulling their marriage in accordance with Article
45(5) of the Family Code.
88. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus – MELVIN T.
VILLACORTA, Respondent, G.R. No. 249953, June 23, 3021, GESMUNDO,
CJ.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

Article 45 of the Family Code provides for the grounds for annulment of marriage.
One of the grounds is that the consent of either party was obtained by fraud. Article
46 of the same Code provides for the exclusive circumstances that shall constitute
fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage, one of which is the concealment by
the wife at the time of marriage that she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband. The Supreme Court ruled that this circumstance of fraud as a ground of
annulment of marriage which vitiates consent requires that the wife must be
pregnant at the time of the marriage by another man, and that she concealed her
pregnancy from her husband. As provided in the last paragraph of Article 46, there
is no other misrepresentation or deceit that will constitute fraud as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity.

Republic v Villacorta, G.R. No. 249953, June
23, 2021
In this case, the child who was proven to be not of the husband was already three
years old when the marriage was celebrated, and the wife was not pregnant at the
time of marriage. The concealment of the wife as to her chastity before the
marriage is not one of the circumstances contemplated by Article 46 of the Family
Code and therefore cannot be considered as fraudulent concealment which would
vitiate the consent of the husband to the marriage. Hence, the petition for
annulment of marriage filed by the husband was denied.

89. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus – LIBERTY D.

ALBIOS, Respondent. G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013, MENDOZA, J.

By: Martin, Dominic

Republic v Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October “Limited purpose marriages”, for the purpose of immigration, continues to be valid
16, 2013 and subsisting so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law
 are present, and when the marriage is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. Love is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations that are not precluded by law, like the acquisition of foreign
citizenship, may validly support a marriage since there is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares.

Moreover, only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the Code may
constitute fraud, and no other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, the ground of fraud may only be brought by the
injured or innocent party. Fraud may not be imputed when both of the contracting
parties conspired to enter into the sham marriage. Finally, unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes.
They should not be allowed again abuse it to themselves out of an inconvenient
situation.

90. Compare to:

ROSARIO D. ADO-AN-MORIMOTO, Petitioner, -versus- YOSHIO

MORIMOTO AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents,
G.R. No. 247576, March 15, 2021, LEONEN, J.

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

One of the essential requisites of a marriage is consent. Consent, in marriage, must

be freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. A defect in any of the
essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45 of
the Family Code. It should also be remembered that a marriage should not be used
as an artifice for acquiring a visa. A marriage solemnized in order to illicitly obtain
Compare to: Morimoto v Morimoto, G.R. No. benefits should be considered as simulated and totally inexistent since there was no
247576. March 15, 2021 real intention to enter into martial relations.

TOPIC
Effect of Defective Marriages on The Status of
Children
A. If marriage is voidable – FC 54
B. If marriage is terminated – FC 43
C. If marriage is void – FC 165, 54
(i) Exceptions: FC 36, 53
In this case, the petitioner Rosario, despite the need for a visa, never intended to
marry respondent Yoshio when she signed the blank marriage certificate. To her
surprise, she found out that a Certificate of Marriage was registered indicating that
she married respondentYoshio. The categorical declaration of Rosario that her
marriage with the respondent was totally simulated was considered by the court as
an admission against interest. There being no bona fide intention to enter into
marital relations, the marriage is void for want of consent even if a marriage
ceremony was duly conducted.
On the other hand, in the case of Morimoto v. Morimoto, the Court looked into the
intention of the parties in entering into the marriage. The marriage was attended
with fraud since it was only used as a front for illicitly obtaining benefits, which in
this case, in order to obtain a visa. In the end, if they never truly meant to be
husband and wife, their registered marriage is a nullity.
GIST OF SPECIAL LAW
Effect of Defective Marriages on the Status of Children
If marriage is voidable – FC 54
By: Arenas, Gissela M.
Article 54 of the Family Code states that children are considered legitimate when
they are born or conceived before the finality of the judgment of annulment of a
voidable marriage under Article 36. They are also considered legitimate if they
are born or conceived from a subsequent marriage under Article 53.
If the marriage is terminated – FC 43
By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

Unlike the Civil Code which does not provide for the effects of the termination of
the defective marriage on the status of children, the Art. 43 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before
its termination shall be considered legitimate, and their custody and support shall
be decided by the courts in the proper proceeding in case of dispute in accordance
with the Code’s provisions on custody of children and support.

If marriage is void – FC 165, 54 (i) Exceptions: FC 36, 53

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A, and Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

Status of Children if marriage is void. Generally, children born outside a valid

marriage or born inside a void marriage are considered illegitimate

However, an exception is provided under Article 54 where children who are a)

conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or b) before the judgement
of absolute nullity of marriage has become final where the ground is
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the FC are considered as legitimate.
Also under Article 54, children born from a subsequent void marriage due to
failure to comply with the mandatory requirements under Article 52 and 53,
referring to record the decree of nullity of annulment shall likewise be considered
legitimate.

Marriage Certificate Marriage Certificate FC 22 and 23

FC 22 and 23
By: Areta, Karen M.

The marriage certificate is not a mere declaration between the parties as to their
marriage. Article 22 of the Family Code adds as a requirement to state the parties’
identification (i.e. full name, age, sex, citizenship, religion, and habitual
residence) and the date of the celebration of marriage. The certificate must also
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

provide whether the marriage license was properly issued, the requirements on
parental consent or advice was complied with, and marriage settlement if it was
executed.

On the other hand, Article 23 of the Family Code governs the marriage certificate
copies that must be issued by the solemnizing authority. He is expected give the
copies to the contracting parties and to the local civil registrar. He must also keep
a copy of the marriage certificate, the original copy of the marriage license, and in
proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of
the marriage in accordance with Article 8 of the Code. The affidavit is used in
cases where the marriage is solemnized at a house or place designated by the
parties.

Additional Requirements for Annulment or Additional Requirements for Annulment or Declaration of Nullity
Declaration of Nullity
FC48, 53 By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

The States have frowned upon annulments. The Constitutions does not consider
marriage as a mere contract but as an inviolable institution that is the foundation
of family and it is the duty of the State to protect it. One of the steps it had
provided for the protection of the institution of marriage is Art. 48 of the Family
Code. It provides that the Court shall order the prosecutor to take steps in order to
prevent collusions between parties and make sure that evidence are not fabricated
or suppressed. This added requisite for annulment or declaration of nullity of
Marriage makes it harder for spouses to collude with each other in order to have
their marriage annulled.

Another step that the law provides for the protection of the sanctity of marriage is
Article 53 of the Family Code. It provides that either spouse, in order to remarry,
must record in the appropriate civil registry the judgment of annulment, the
partition and distribution of property, and the delivery of presumptive legitimes,
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

as provided under Article 52. It prevents separated husbands and wives from
remarrying without compliance therewith. It also makes the subsequent marriage
void.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

91. LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner -versus – HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO

MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI, Respondent. G.R.
No. 173614, September 28, 2007, Chico-Nazario, J.

By: YusI, Jonathan Vincent U.

Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, it is the sole right of an
aggrieved or injured spouse to file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed
by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.

Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.

In the case at bar, the Heirs of the Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli cannot
validly file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and
Enrico vs. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, Lolita. Their remedy is to question the validity of the said marriage in a proceeding
September 28, 2007 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse.
92. JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, Petitioner -versus – FELICIDAD SANDOVAL,
Respondent, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, REYES, R.T., J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
either by the husband or wife, provided that the marriage was solemnized during
the effectivity of the Family Code. However, a real party-in-interest may file such
action for marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the New Civil Code and for
nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriage (A.M. No. 02-11-10 SC). Notably, the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. On the other hand, A.M. No. 02-11-10 SC took effect on March
15, 2003.

In this case, Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval were married on May 14, 1962.
In effect, the law that would govern their marriage is the Civil Code due to the fact
that such marriage was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos contends that the marriage between
his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was void ab initio because of the
absence of the required marriage license. He further contends that respondent
Teofilo Carlos II was neither the natural nor the adoptive son of his late brother.
Petitioner then filed an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage against
respondents in 1995. It must be emphasized that for marriages celebrated during
the New Civil Code and prior the effectivity of the Family Code, a real
party-in-interest may file action to sever the marital bond of married spouses.
However, petitioner was not proven to be a real party-in-interest. Thus, the case
Carlos v Sandoval, GR 179922, December 16, must be remanded in order to determine whether or not petitioner is a
2008 real-party-interest.

93. ISIDRO ABLAZA -versus – REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.

Ablaza v Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August 158298, August 11, 2010, Bersamin, J.
11, 2010
 By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule

on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003, limits the parties who can file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage to the husband or wife.
However, such rule being prospective in application, does not apply to marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and those of the Family Code
prior to March 15, 2003.

In the present case, the marriage between Cresenciano Ablaza (Cresenciano) and
Leonila Honato (Leonila) was celebrated on December 26, 1949, thus, the Civil
Code applied. Therefore, the above rule should not apply to the present case.

Similar to the well-entrenched principle of procedural law that a case should be

prosecuted and defended by a real party in interest, any person is not necessarily
allowed to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of another person.
While there is no provision in the Civil Code that expressly provides who can file
such a petition, it is settled that the petitioner must be a real party in interest, that is,
he has a material interest in the case and stands to be benefitted or injured in the
resolution of the case.

In the present case, Isidro Ablaza (Isidro) filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Cresenciano, his brother, and Leonila. The Supreme Court held
that it was an error for the lower courts to immediately dismiss the case because
there was an allegation that he is the only surviving heir of Cresenciano. Therefore,
he is a real party in interest in such a way that if the marriage is indeed void, and
that there are no remaining ascendants or descendants of Cresenciano, Isidro would
be entitled to the whole estate of Cresenciano.
 The Court however emphasized that Leonila, and Leila, the child of Cresenciano
should have been joined as parties because they are indispensable parties whose
rights may be prejudiced by a judgement in favor of Isidro.

94. DANILO A. AURELIO, petitioner, vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO,

respondent. G.R. No. 175367. June 6, 2011. Peralta, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Aurelio v Aurelio, GR 175367, June 6, 2011
The Molina Guidelines provide that no decision shall be entered into unless a
certification is issued by the Solicitor General stating therein his agreement or
opposition to the petition. However, pursuant to Administrative Matter No.
02-11-10, the certification requirement is now dispensed with for the purpose of
avoiding delay. Nonetheless, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates the presence
of the prosecuting attorney or the fiscal assigned on behalf of the State inasmuch as
to prevent collusion between parties and to ensure that evidence is neither
fabricated nor suppressed.

95. Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals
(Ninth Division) and Eduardo C. de Quintos, Respondents. G.R. No. 159594,
12 November 2012, BERSAMIN, J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

Psychological incapacity as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code must

be such incapacity to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations,
not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. Applying the foregoing to the present case, the evidence failed to
prove such purported psychological incapacity as well as the gravity, root cause,
and incurability of such. The testimony presented was self-serving and would have
no serious value as evidence upon such matter. Further, the expert testimony
Republic v CA, G.R. No. 159594, November presented did not present the gravity and incurability of psychological incapacity.
12, 2012 Hence, given the insufficiency of evidence proving the psychological evidence of
 Catalina, the Court is not persuaded to grant the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage.

96. ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner, -versus- REPUBLIC OF THE

Mendoza v Republic, GR 157854, November
12, 2012
PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondent. G.R. No. 157649,
FIRST DIVISION, November 12, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.
By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.
In cases of declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is required in the
proceedings. He must appear as counsel for the State to ensure that only deserving
cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage shall succeed.

97. LUCILA DAVID AND THE HEIRS OF RENE F. AGUAS, NAMELY:

PRINCESS LUREN D. AGUAS, DANICA LANE D. AGUAS, SEAN
PATRICK D. AGUAS, SEAN MICHAEL D. AGUAS AND SAMANTHA* D.
AGUAS, PETITIONERS, VS. CHERRY S. CALILUNG, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 241036. January 26, 2021. DELOS SANTOS, J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not
mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under
the law. They can still protect their successional right. Therefore, the compulsory
or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in
a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.

Here, the Aguas heirs can certainly amply protect their successional rights by
David v Calilung, G.R. No. 241036, Jan. 26.
2021 collaterally raising the issue on the validity of Rene and Cherry's marriage in the
 settlement proceedings since the same is for purposes of succession and not of
remarriage. However, Lucila has no right to succeed as an heir of Rene because her
marriage with Rene has been declared null and void. Thus, she has no standing to
participate in the Settlement Proceeding.

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

Effects of Defective Marriage on Property Relations
FC 43, 52, 53, 50, 147, 148, 63
Rules on Forfeiture of The Share of the Guilty Spouse
FC 43 (2), 50 (1), 63 (2), 147, 148
When There Is Delivery of Presumptive Legitimes
Ar. 50 - 53
Effects of Defective Marriage on Property Relations
By: Aclan, Charisma C., Agpaoa, Princess Monique M., and Alfonso, Angela May
S.
Article 43 of the Family Code

As provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code, a spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage provided that prior to the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the other spouse had been absent for four consecutive years or two years
if there is danger of death, and the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. There must be a prior declaration of
presumptive death before one may contract a subsequent marriage, otherwise, the
subsequent marriage will be void for being a bigamous one. However, such
subsequent marriage will be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. Moreover, there
must be a sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance which
must be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage, and notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage is also
needed.
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

The termination of the subsequent marriage will produce an effect on the property
relations of the spouses of such marriage. Under Article 43 of the Family Code, 
the property relation of the spouses, whether it is absolute community of property
or conjugal partnership, will be dissolved and liquidated. However, if either of the
spouse contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith, the share of such guilty
spouse will be forfeited in favor of the common children, if any, and if there is
none, it will be forfeited in favor of the children of the guilty spouse in the
previous marriage, and if there are still none, it will be in favor of the innocent
spouse.

Article 50 of the Family Code

Article 40 provides that a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary to

render a subsequent marriage valid. Failure to observe the mandate in Art. 40 will
result in a subsequent void marriage. In such cases, Art. 50 provides that
properties will be dissolved and liquidated as if there is conjugal partnership of
gains or an absolute community of property. Similarly, this applies in marriage
annulled by final judgment under Art. 45.

In case either of the spouses in a subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, the law
provides that his share of the net profits shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children, or if none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage, or in
default thereof, the innocent spouse. If both spouses are guilty in contracting the
subsequent marriage, the law renders the marriage void ab initio.

Since judgment of annulment or nullity of marriage dissolves the conjugal or

absolute property regime of the parties, necessarily, judgment in such cases shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the children, and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, except when such matters are adjudicated in previous judicial
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

proceedings or the parties agreed in their marriage settlement that the regime of
separation of property shall govern their marriage.

Article 52 in relation to Article 53

The recording in the appropriate local civil registries and registries of property of
the judgment of annulment based on Art. 45 or absolute nullity of marriage under
Art. 40, the partition and distribution of the properties, and the delivery of
presumptive legitimes are necessary to bind third persons. Non-compliance
therewith shall render the subsequent marriage null and void, as provided under
Art. 53.

Effects of Defective Marriage on Property Relations: Property Regime of

Unions Without Marriage
The special co-ownership under Art. 147 of the Family Code

Art. 147 of the Family Code governs the property relations between a man and a
woman capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife, the union is nevertheless without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void such as the absence of a  marriage license or by reason of
psychological incapacity. 

Under Art. 147 of the Family Code, the properties acquired during cohabitation
shall be distributed among the parties in equal shares with respect to their wages
and salaries even if only one earned such wages; the property acquired by both of
them through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership and in absence of proof to the contrary, it shall be presumed to have
been acquired by their joint efforts and shall be owned by them in equal shares,
but a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto provided that such party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household; and the share of
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default by the common children, it shall proceed to
the surviving descendants. In default thereof, such share shall be received by the
innocent party. 

The limited co-ownership under Art. 148 of the Family Code

Art. 148 of the Family Code governs the property relations of persons legally
impeded to marry each other such as in cases of bigamous marriages, adultery and
concubinage, homosexual relatonships, or do not live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife. 

Under this property regime, the wages and salaries earned by each party shall
belong exclusively to each; the parties must prove their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry such that mere cohabitation without proof of
contribution will not result in co-ownership; share of the party validly married to
another shall accrue to the property regime of such existing marriage; and the
rules on forfeiture in Art. 147 of the same Code shall likewise be applied if both
parties are in bad faith. 

Article 63 of the Family Code

Either of the spouse may file for legal separation based on any ground provided
for under Article 55 of the Family Code. Unlike in declaration of nullity of
marriage, the grounds in legal separation may only manifest during the marriage.
Moreover, in legal separation,  marital bonds are not severed, however, the
spouses may now live separately from each other.

If a decree of legal separation is issued, the property relation of the spouses,

whether it is absolute community or conjugal partnership will be dissolved and
liquidated. It must be noted however that the guilty spouse or the spouse who
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

caused the ground for legal separation shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned and it will be forfeited in favor of the common children, if any, and
if there is none, it will be forfeited in favor of the children of the guilty spouse in
the previous marriage, and if there are still none, it will be in favor of the innocent
spouse. Once the decree of legal separation is issued, the  dissolution of the
property relation shall be automatic. The decision in legal separation cases will
never attain finality because of possible reconciliation.

Rules on Forfeiture of The Share of the Guilty Spouse FC 43 (2), 50 (1), 63

(2), 147, 148

By: Lavarias, Hailord N., Berame, Julius Ernhest P., and Calumpang, Karen
Regina, B

FC 43 (2)

Under Article 43, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, if either spouse who is
involved in the subsequent marriage referred to in Article 42 of the same Code
contracted the said union in bad faith, the share of such spouse in the absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership shall be given to the common
children. However, if there’s none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage shall receive it, and in the absence of the former, the innocent spouse.

FC 50 (1)

The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code states that the effects
provided in paragraphs 2 to 5 of Article 43 may also be applied in void ab initio
marriages or marriages annulled by final judgment under Article 40 and 45 of the
same code.

FC 63 (2)
TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

Under Article 64 paragraph 2 of the Family Code, in the liquidation of the

absolute community of property or conjugal partnership due to the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall have no share in the net profits.
The net profits shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there be
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse. For purposes of computing the net profit, the said
profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the
time of its dissolution.

FC 147, 148

Under Article 147 of the Family Code, the treatment of the properties of
common-law partners or live-in partners is provided. Two requisites must concur
for the said article to apply: first, that both parties must be capacitated to marry
each other; second, that there is no marriage or the marriage is void. In other
words, if a married woman cohabits with a single man, the said article will not
apply.

Co-ownership applies when a man and a woman live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage but are capacitated to marry each other or
under a void marriage. Under the rules of Co-ownership, the share of the
co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their
respective interests. Meanwhile, donated, or inherited properties are not
considered co-owned.

However, purchased properties are considered co-owned if it was bought through

the common-law partners’ salaries or was in exchange of a previous property
acquired by either or both of the couple through their work.
 TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

Meanwhile, under Article 148, the relationships contemplated under this article
are those which do not fall under Article 147—parties are not capacitated to
marry. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution. Actual contribution is required under this
article, thus, if a contribution is not proven, then there will be no presumption of
equal shares between the parties.

When There Is Delivery of Presumptive Legitimes Articles 50 – 53

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

A final judgment declaring a marriage either void ab initio or annulled by final

judgment under Articles 40 and 45 shall provide for the distribution and delivery
of presumptive legitimes, to be delivered in cash, property, or sound securities,
unless the distribution and delivery has already been adjudicated in a previous
judicial proceeding. Said delivery is without prejudice to the successional rights of
the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents but it shall be
considered as advances on their legitime.

The delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the

appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not
affect third persons. Said delivery is a requisite before either of the former spouses
may remarry; otherwise the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.

CASE CASE TITLE and PONENTE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

98. ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

Valdez v QC RTC, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ,
1996 respondents. G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996, VITUG., J.
 By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B,

The dissolution of property regimes in void marriages shall be made pursuant to

Article 147 or the rules of co-ownership where it will be presumed that all
properties acquired by both parties during their marriage have a presumption to be
obtained jointly and on equal shares. On the contrary, the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership and absolute community of property provided for under
articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code,
applies only on voidable marriage except in article 40 where the declaration of
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void. In this case, the marriage was declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. Ineluctably, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code.

99. VIRGINIA OCAMPO, Petitioner, v. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 198908, August 03, 2015. Peralta, J.

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

The requisites for Article 147 of the Family Code to be applicable are that the man
and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void.

Under this provision, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry are governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 198908, August efforts.
03, 2015
 In this case, the parties will share on equal shares because Virginia failed to prove
that the subject properties were acquired solely through her own efforts. The
businesses of Virginia and Deogracio were actively undertaken by the former and
the seed money for said business was provided by her mother, but the presumption
applies that the properties are acquired during the marriage through joint efforts.
The court noted that even a housewife taking care of the household, while the
husband has lucrative activities, is entitled to a share in the same proportion the
husband is to the properties acquired by the marriage. In the same way, Deogracio
must be considered to be entitled to the same extent.

100. Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4,

2012
101. ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent. G.R.
No. 178044, January 19, 2011, CARPIO, J.

By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages

which provides that a decree declaring a marriage as void can only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties only apply to
marriages declared void under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code and not
Article 36. Article 40 provides that for the purposes of contracting a second
marriage, a final judgment declaring a previous marriage as void should be
secured. Article 45 contemplates marriages which are voidable by reasons provided
in Article 45. Marriages declared void under Articles 40 and 45 are governed by
absolute community of property as their property relations. Thus, there is a need to
liquidate, partition, and distribute the properties before a decree is made by the
Court. The same is not true for void marriages under Article 36 because such are
governed by ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, Alain Dino filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
Dino v Dino, GR 178044, January 19, 2011 against Caridad Dino on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36.
 The trial court ruled however that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued only after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties.
The Supreme Court however ruled that the trial court erred stating that the
requirement of liquidation applies only to void marriages under article 40 and 45
not article 36 there being different property regimes between the marriages.

102. NICXON L. PEREZ, JR., PETITIONER, VS. AVEGAIL

PEREZ-SENERPIDA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND MR. SENERPIDA,
RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021, CAGUIOA, J.:

By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

The property regime that governs marriages declared as void ab initio is Article
147 and not Article 89 of the Family Code. It follows that the properties acquired
during cohabitation of a man and woman as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage is governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This being so, the disposition of a party’s share or the whole property without the
consent of the other is void.

The judgement rendering the marriage of Adelita and Eliodro as void ab initio
effectuated the application of the rules on co-ownership on their properties. The
Perez v Senerpida, G.R. No. 233365, March donation made by Eliodoro of the property acquired during their cohabitation
24, 2021 absent Adelita’s consent is void.
 WEEK # 3

FOREIGN MARRIAGES AND FOREIGN DIVORCES

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

(a) As to Form, NCC 17 (1) and (2)

Foreign Marriages and By: Magpili, Airish A.
Foreign Divorces Lex Loci Celebrationis
Article 17, 1st paragraph of the New Civil Code applies the principle of Lex Loci Celebrationis that formal
● (a) As to form, requirements of contracts, wills and public instruments should be governed by the country in which they are
NCC 17 (1) and executed. However, this paragraph only deals with the extrinsic validity of the documents while the article is
(2) silent when it comes to laws that shall govern its intrinsic validity. It must also be noted that this principle does
not apply to contracts of marriage involving Filipinos solemnized abroad, especially when such marriages are
● (b) As to considered void in the Philippines.
substantive
requirements, Principle of Extraterritoriality
NCC 15 & 17 (3) Paragraph 2 or Article 17 recognizes the principle of extraterritoriality where it provides that acts referred in the
1st paragraph before government officials carrying the Philippine jurisdiction in a foreign country such as
● FC 26; FC 21,
consular or diplomatic officials in their office abroad, the solemnities provided by the Philippine law shall be
FC 10, FC 35(1),
observed in the execution of such public instruments or documents because such officials are considered
35(4), 35(5), 36,
extensions of the Philippine territory.
37 & 38

● OCA Circular (b) As to substantive requirements, NCC 15 & 17 (3)

No. 157-2022-A By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Nationality Principle
Article 15 of the New Civil Code applies the Nationality Principle wherein it provides that laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. As a rule, if citizens of the Philippines are involved with matters which
 WEEK # 4

PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

1.
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA , plaintiff-appellant, -versus- JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. 11263, EN BANC, November 2, 1916, TRENT, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

Marriage creates an obligation on the husband to support his wife either by paying her a pension or maintaining her in his own
home. However, the wife, in this case may still claim support from the husband even outside the conjugal home if the former was
driven away from the conjugal home due to the wrongful acts of the latter.

2.
MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, v. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921, STREET, J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

Where the wife is forced to leave the marital home by ill-treatment from her husband, he can be compelled to provide for her
sepa­rate maintenance, without regard to whether a cause for divorce exists or not. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well
as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance
 of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the anomalous de facto separation of the spouses. From this consideration it
follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

3. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner v. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,
respondents.
G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000, PARDO, J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

A spouse cannot compel his/her partner to live with him/her nor visit him/her through a writ of habeas corpus most particularly
when the spouse allegedly being unlawfully restraint is with full mental capacity as this will violate his/her freedom of choice and
constitutional right of privacy. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.

4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997. Panganiban. J.
By: Liban, Clarisse M.

Psychological incapacity must relate to the disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of spouses as embodied in
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. In this case, the mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities was
not sufficient to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. Further, the respondent did
not prove that the failure to assume such obligations was due to some psychological illness of her husband.

CAS CASE DOCTRINES

E
No. BASIS FOR PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES
 5. ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioners, vs.BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now
deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN,
respondents.
x----------------------------x
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY
LOCQUIAO, respondent.
G.R. No. 122134, October 3, 2003
By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

The donation propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument specifically describing the said property donated. Acceptance is
not necessary to the validity of such gifts or donations. It was enough that there was the celebration of the marriage and compliance
with the prescribed form amounting to an implied acceptance giving effect to the donation.

CAS CASE DOCTRINES

E
No. DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS

6. FORTUNATA SOLIS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMA BARROSO ET AL., defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. 27939, October 30, 1928
By: Resus, Jarvin David E.
Donation propter nuptias is governed by the rules established by the Civil Code on donations. Therefore, a donation propter nuptias
involving real property must be made in a public instrument for it to be valid.

7. MATEO vs. LAGUA

G.R. No. L-26270, October 30, 1969, REYES, J.B.L., J.:
By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

Donation propter nuptias is considered as an onerous donation. Therefore, in the event that the donation propter nuptias infringes the
legitime of a forced heir, such donation may be subject to reduction by reason of officiousness.
 8.
SPOUSES JUAN AND ANTONINA CANO, ROLANDO CANO AND JOSEPHINE "JOSIE" CANO¬AQUINO,
PETITIONERS, V. SPOUSES ARTURO AND EMERENCIANA CANO, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 190750, December 14, 2017, Sereno, C.J.:

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T.

Donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are governed by the rules on ordinary donations. Hence, a public
instrument indicating the express acceptance by the Donee is required for Donations of Immovables as provided under the Family
Code.

CAS CASE DOCTRINES

E
No. PARTIES TO A MARRIAGE, LAW GOVERNING PROPERTY RELATIONS, VOID DONATIONS

9.
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971, FERNANDO, J.

By; Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

Art. 133 of the Civil Code which provides for the prohibition between spouses during their marriage also applies to common-law
relationships or those living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

10 CIRILA ARCABA, Petitioner -versus – ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, et. al., Respondents.
 G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001, MENDOZA. J.

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Cohabitation does not always entail proof of repeated sexual intercourse, as at the very least, it may be proven by public assumption
by a man and a woman of the marital relation – dwelling together as man and wife and holding themselves out to the public as such.
In this case, the circumstances between Cirila and Francisco establish cohabitation, as it is very possible that they consummated their
relationship – repeated therapeutic massages and sleeping in the same bedroom, publicly showing the conduct of husband and wife.
Furthermore, there were documents showing that Cirila saw herself as Francisco’s common-law wife, having used Francisco’s
surname.

11
FRANCISCO C. DELGADO, REPRESENTED BY JOSE MARI DELGADO, petitioner, vs. GQ REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORP., MA. ROSARIO G. MEYER, KARL KURT EDWARD MEYER, AND THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MAKATI
CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 241774, 25 September 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

The failure of the spouse to reduce his intention to preserve his interest over the subject property into writing and place protective
measures to secure the same in any document was deemed to be contrary to human experience. It is elementary that any ambiguity in
a contract whose terms are susceptible of different interpretations must be read against the party who drafted it, who in this case was
petitioner Francisco as the agreement was drafted by him through his counsel. As the Ante-Nuptial Agreement was executed after the
purchase of the subject property, the stipulations that any gift he gave to Victoria shall become her exclusive property shall be
construed to include the properties given through her holding company, GQ Realty Development Corporation.

12 EDGARDO SANTOS, ZENAIDA SANTOS HERRERA, CORAZON SANTOS CANTILERO, ARMANDO SANTOS,
SONIA SANTOS MAGPAYO, CIELITO SANTOS BALMEDIANO, EVELYN SANTOS NICOLAS, FELIXBERTO
 SANTOS, MARIA BETTINA DIAZ SANTOS, REUBEN JOSEPH SANTOS, JEROME SANTOS DE GUZMAN, AND
JERICK SANTOS DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. MARIA D. SANTOS AND/OR HER SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST,
respondent,
G.R. No. 250774, June 16, 2021, CARANDANG, J.:

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

Donations or gratuitous transfers made between the spouses during the marriage are null and void pursuant to Article 87 of the
Family Code. The surviving spouse cannot claim to be the sole owner of a property donated to her by her husband before his death
because it is based on a void donation.

Comparing the ACP and the CPG

How do the CPG cases apply to the ACP is also the issue here

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

Absolute community of property Conjugal partnership of gains

(ACP) – FC 88, 91, 92, 93

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, petitioner, vs RITA C. QUIAO,

KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C.
QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, respondents.
GR 176556, July 4, 2012, REYES, J

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Under the rule on legal separation, a guilty spouse is not entitled to
any share in the net profits earned by the couple’s common property
during the marriage. The court in this case examined the definition
of net profits as provided for under Article 102 (4) of the Family
Code, and ruled that such definition applies to both the absolute
community regime and conjugal partnership regime under Article
63, No. (2) of the same code, relative to the provisions on Legal
Separation. Thus, in marriages covered by the ACP and CPG, the
guilty spouse is not entitled to anything because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in his or her favor.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, v.

TARCILA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.; DALMIRO SIAN,
THIRD PARTY, Respondent. G.R. No. 173134, September 02,
2015, Briones, J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Under CPG, the spouses place in a common fund the proceeds and
fruits acquired through their efforts or chance. It is upon dissolution
of marriage that they may divide the common fund equally between
them unless another manner is agreed in their marriage settlement.

HEIRS OF ROGER JARQUE, Petitioners, v. MARCIAL

JARQUE, LELIA JARQUE-LAGSIT, AND TERESITA
JARQUE-BAILON, Respondents. G.R. No. 196733, November
21, 2018, JARDELEZA, J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

 The wife in this case died in 1946, prior to the effectivity of the
New Civil Code. Under the Old Civil Code, the default property
regime of the spouses is the conjugal partnership of gains. When
either of them dies, the conjugal partnership is deemed dissolved
and the surviving spouse is entitled to his or her ½ share in the
partnership, while the other half belongs to the estate of the
deceased. Absence of a partition between the estates will result in a
co-ownership between the living spouse and the children over the
properties. This continued even when the NCC took effect. Hence,
the provisions of the NCC on co-ownership will govern the rights
of the parties.

SPOUSES ROMEO ANASTACIO, SR. AND NORMA T.

ANASTACIO, Petitioner -versus – HEIR OF THE LATE
SPOUSES JUAN F. COLOMA AND JULIANA PARAZO,
Respondent. G.R. No. 224572, August 27, 2020, CAGUIOA, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

According to Article 105 of the Family Code, the provisions on

Conjugal Partnership of Gains in Chapter 4 of the same code
equally applies to conjugal partnership of gains already established
before the effectivity of the Family Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
and other laws. Article 116 provides that all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses,
is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Hence, the
property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed
to be governed by CPG until the contrary is proved.

1. When applicable, FC 75, 103 (3); 130 (3); 92 (3)
2. Commencement, FC 88
3. Waiver during marriage, FC 89
4. Waiver after marriage, FC 89 par. 2 cf NCC Art. 168
5. Suppletory rules:
Co-ownership, FC 90; of NCC 484-501
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner, vs. HELMUT
MULLER, Respondent.
Therefore, the property acquired by the spouses whose property
regime is governed by CPG cannot be validly disposed of by one
spouse without the consent of the other according to Article 124 of
the Family Code.
MARYLINE ESTEBAN, petitioner, vs. RADLIN CAMPANO,
AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HIM,
respondents. G.R. No. 235364, April 26, 2021, CARANDANG, J.
By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.
Articles 96 and 124 of the Family Code shall be applicable only to
marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code.
These provisions state that the administration and enjoyment of the
community property and conjugal partnership, respectively, shall
belong to both spouses jointly.
1. When CPG commences and applies
(a) Marriages under FC, FC 107 cf. FC 88, FC 89
(b) Marriages before FC, FC 105(2) of FC 256
(c) Suppletory rules, FC 108 cf. NCC 1767-1768
SPOUSES EULALIO CUENO AND FLORA BAUTISTA,
petitioners v. SPOUSES EPIFANIO AND VERONICA
BAUTISTA, SPOUSES RIZALDO AND ANACITA
BAUTISTA, SPOUSES DIONILO AND MARY ROSE
BAUTISTA, SPOUSES
 G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. ROEL AND JESSIBEL B. SANSON, AND SPOUSES
CALIXTO AND MERCEDITAB. FERNANDO, respondents.
By: Filipino Borra G.R. No. 246445, March 02, 2021, CAGUIOA, J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

Art 92 of the FC provides that properties acquired by a spouse in the Sales of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership made by
course of marriage through gratuitous title exclusively belong to the husband without the consent of the wife is merely voidable. The
him. Should the property be sold, the property acquired from the remedy of the wife is the right to annul the transaction.
proceeds shall belong to such spouse. However, this rule shall not
apply to an alien who acquires land in violation of the Constitution.
As such, the alien acquires no right to this property even if he uses
his exclusive property to purchase said land and house.

WILLEM BEUMER, petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES,

respondent.
G.R. No. 195670. December 3, 2012. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

Article 168 of the New Civil Code provides that the wife may
administer the conjugal partnership property, provided that the
express authority of the husband is embodied in a public instrument.
Hence, when a foreign spouse and a Filipina wife execute a joint
affidavit with the attestation that the Filipina spouse shall administer
and pay for the lands, the foreign spouse cannot acquire any right
over the parcels of land due to the constitutional prohibition for
aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines, but it would not apply to
any improvements thereon, notwithstanding his knowledge of the
ban, nor can he seek reimbursement of the value of the lands on the
ground of equity.
SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B.
ABRENICA Petitioners,vs. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA,
TUNGOL and TIBAYAN, ATTYS. ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN
and DANILO N. TUNGOL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012, SERENO, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

Art. 92 (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community

property those properties, as well as its fruits and income, which
were acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage. Since the motor vehicles and
house and lot were purchased before the second marriage of Erlando
with Joena, the latter’s assertion that they formed part of the
absolute community regime cannot be given merit.

SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO ,

Petitioners -versus- THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO NICOL,
Respondents,

G.R. No. 145222. April 24, 2009, TINGA, J.

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

The conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal

obligation contracted by one spouse (in this case for the civil
obligation in the crime of slander), unless some advantage or benefit
is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership as provided in
Article 122 of the Family Code.

MR. & MRS. RONNIE DAR, MR. & MRS. RANDY

ANGELES, MR. & MRS. JOY CONSTANTINO and MR. &
MRS. LIBERTY CRUZ, Petitioners - versus - HON. ROSE
MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO, in her capacity as the Presiding
Judge in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch
41, Quezon City and NENITA CO BAUTISTA, represented by
VICTORIO A. BAUTISTA, Respondents,

G.R. No. 143016, August 30, 2000, KAPUNAN, J.

By: Areta, Karen M.

There is substantial compliance even if only one of the spouses

signed in the Certification for Non-Forum Shopping because the
petitioners were sued jointly as “Mr. and Mrs.” over a property
where they have common interest. Here, only Ronnie Dar, Randy
Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the petition and
not their respective spouses. Although the Circular No. 28 -91 must
be strictly complied with, the same does not prevent substantial
compliance under justifiable circumstances.

AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES

ALFREDO AND THE HEIRS OF PAZ REVILLA,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 190901, November 12, 2014, LEONEN J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

Art. 96 provides that the administration of community properties
shall belong jointly to both spouses. However, in case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail. In this case, the
Court ruled that the signature of Paz Revilla alone in the Kasulatan
ng Bilihan ng Lupa will not bind the subject property, it being a
conjugal property and the sale of the subject property was done
without the consent of Paz’s husband, Alfredo.

PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner, vs.BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR

and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents.

G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009, NACHURA, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, aliens are absolutely not

allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save
only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. As such, the
Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino
wife without the consent of her British husband is valid. Moreover,
the British husband has no capacity or personality to question such
lease of the land.

THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA,

namely: LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO,
BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION,
LEONORA and ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented by
LEONORA B. GO, Petitioner -versus – ESTER L. SERVACIO
and RITO B. GO, Respondents,
 G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011, BERSAMIN. J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

The provisions on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains under

the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnership of gains
established before the effectivity of the Family Code and still
subsisting at the time of its effectivity provided it does not impair
any vested rights.

MELECIO DOMINGO, Petitioner -versus- SPOUSES

GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA, substituted by
ESTER MOLINA, Respondents,

G.R. No. 200274 April 20, 2016, BRION, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

The properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership shall be governed

by the rules on co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition.
Accordingly, the co-owner may freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest but not the interest of his co-owners.

RAFAEL C. UY (CABANGBANG STORE), Petitioner, v.

ESTATE OF VIPA FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 200612, April 05, 2017, REYES, J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and

wife are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due
to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual and
vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not
consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation
and partition of the conjugal partnership. With respect, however, to
the deceased spouse's share in the conjugal partnership properties, an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensues among the surviving spouse
and the other heirs of the deceased.

LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner, vs. JON DE YSASI,

respondent.
G.R. No. 130623. February 29, 2008.
CARPIO, J.

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

A court order approving the spouses separation of property results in

the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains pursuant to Art.
175 of the Family Code.

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, VS. HEIRS OF JUAN

LUCES LUNA, REPRESENTED BY GREGORIO Z. LUNA
AND EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

Properties acquired during a bigamous marriage are governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In such a situation, whoever alleges
co-ownership carries the burden of proof to confirm such fact.

Moreover, the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval —approval of the Agreement by a competent court is
required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code.

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner -versus- LETICIA T.

NOVERAS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014, PEREZ, J.

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community of

property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime.
(Art.99 [4], FC)

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner v. RITA C. QUIAO, et al.,

represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents,
G.R. No 176556, July 4, 2012, Reyes, J.

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

“Net profits” under Art. 102 of the Family Code refers to the
increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
market value at the time of its dissolution. From the totality of the
market value of all the properties, we subtract the debts and
obligations of the absolute community and this result to the net
assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community,
from which we deduct the market value of the properties at the time
of marriage, which then results to the net profits.

ALAIN M. DIÑO, Petitioner vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO,

Respondent,
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011, CARPIO, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

In instances where the marriage is declared void ab initio or

annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 (bigamous marriage)
and 45(voidable marriage) of the Family Code, Article 50 of the FC
in relation to Section 19 (1) of the Rule provides that property
relations governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains needs to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed before a decree of annulment could be issued.

6. Presumption of ACP, FC 93 of NCC 160 2. Presumption of CPG, FC 116

TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.

MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID,
Respondents,
G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

Article 116 of the Family Code provides for the presumption that
all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted, or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is conjugal unless the contrary is proved. It
need not be shown that conjugal funds were used to purchase the
property because the presumption applies although the manner of
acquisition does not appear.

EVANGELINE D. IMANI,* Petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN

BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondent,
G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010, NACHURA, J.

By: Martin, Dominic

There is a presumption that all properties during the marriage is

conjugal. The presumption stands if the person who invokes it
successfully proves that the acquisition of the property was made
during the marriage. Thus, the time of acquisition of the property is
material because it is a condition sine qua non for the presumption
to be operative.

ELENITA M. DEWARA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,

FERDINAND MAGALLANES, Petitioner, – versus –
SPOUSES RONNIE AND GINA LAMELA and STENILE
ALVERO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, NACHURA, J.:

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code states that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. However, it does not follow that a conjugal property may be
automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts,
obligation, fines, or indemnities of a spouse since it must first be
shown that such debts redounded to the benefits of the conjugal
partnership. Nevertheless, if the spouse who is obliged to pay debts
or obligations has no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient, such may be imposed upon the partnership assets
subject to the provision of Article 161 of the New Civil Code,
which was the situation in this case because the husband has no
property in his name.

FRANCISCO LIM, Petitioner, vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 183918, January 15, 2014, Del Castillo, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of

the husband and wife. However, this presumption cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved.

SPOUSES CARLOS vs. TOLENTINO

G.R. No 234533, June 2, 2018, Velasco, Jr., J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

The property relations of a man and a woman who are married

before the effectivity of the Family Code shall be governed by the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains provided that they have not
adopted a different property regime.

HEIRS OF ROGER JARQUE, Petitioners, v. MARCIAL

JARQUE, LELIA JARQUE-LAGSIT, AND TERESITA
JARQUE-BAILON, Respondents
GR 196733, Nov. 21, 2018, Jardeleza, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Under the Civil Code, in the absence of a marriage settlement, the

conjugal partnership of gains shall govern the property relations
between the married couple. However, under the Art. 75 of the
Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1998, the default
property regime is Absolute Community Property. Therefore, the
default property regime of all marriage solemnized before 03
August 1988 is conjugal partnership of gains, afterwards it is the
absolute community of property.

MELINDA M. MALABANAN, petitioner vs. FRANCISCO

MALABANAN, JR., SPOUSES RAMON and PRESCILA
MALABANAN, and SPOUSES DOMINADOR III and GUIA
MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. 187225. March 06, 2019. Leonen, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Pursuant to the Civil Code, where the property was acquired during
the marriage, there arises a presumption that it is conjugal property.
It is only necessary to prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage. This presumption may only be rebutted when there is
 clear, categorical, and convincing proof that the property pertains to
the exclusive ownership of either of the spouses.

RUFINA S. JORGE, petitioner vs. ALBERTO C. MARCELO,

JOEL SAN PASCUAL, ROMEO SALEN, CELSO SANTOS,
HIGINO DALANGIN, JR., EDUARDO A. GARCIA, JULIUS
FRONDA, ROGELIO VERGARA, LARRY P. TORRES,
RODEL L. ZAMORA, ALEXANDER F. SUERTE, EDISIO G.
CASEBO, FERNANDO ENORME, NOEL ALMAZAN,
REGINO CRUZ, RONALD ALLAM, LOLITO DIZON,
CECERON S. PENA, JR., RENATO M. ZONIO, ROBERTO F.
LAYUSON, CRISTOSI S. ALNOR, ROGER TIBURCIO, AND
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(THIRD DIVISION), respondents
G.R. No. 232989, 18 March 2019, Peralta, J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

The presumption of conjugal nature of property lies when the

subject property was acquired during the marriage, unless it can be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership.

7. What constitutes ACP, FC 91 3. Inclusions: CPG, FC 106, 117, 115, 118, 119, 120
Memorize!
(a) All property at time of marriage

(b) Property acquired subsequently

(c) Winnings from gambling, FC as of NCC 164

 PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and
PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioners, -versus- COURT OF
APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA,
respondents.

G.R. No. 143286, FIRST DIVISION, April 14, 2004, CARPIO, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

The provisions on conjugal partnership in the Family Code also

applies to marriages celebrated even before the effectivity of the
Family Code without prejudice to the rights acquired from the Civil
Code. If the property is acquired during the marriage, it is presumed
to be conjugal.

EFREN R. MENDOZA and INOCENCIA R. DE MENDOZA,

Petitioners, vs.
PONCIANO S. REYES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. L-31618 and G.R. No. L-31625, August 17, 1983,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

The theory that the property bought from personal funds of wife is
negated by fact that the funds were also invested by husband and
wife in other business. Further, a property acquired during a
marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the fact that the land is
later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not
destroy its conjugal nature.
 ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA
PEÑA, Petitioners, vs.
GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA and FAR EAST BANK &
TRUST CO., Respondents.
G.R. No. 187490, February 8, 2012, PEREZ, J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non

for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.This presumption can only be rebutted by a strong and
convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of property.

8. Exclusions from ACP, FC 92; FC 95 4. Exclusions from CPG, FC 109

9. Management of exclusive property 4. Administration of exclusive property

FC 143-146
(a) By the spouse-owner, FC 110

(b) By the other spouse, FC 110 2nd par; FC 142, 75, 227

ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR. v. RAMON L. KATIGBAK

G.R. No. L-16991. March 31, 1964. Regala, J.
By: Liban, Clarisse M.

The legal presumption that all properties acquired during the

marriage are conjugal is rebuttable. In this case, the presumption
was rebutted because: the disputed land is in the name of the wife;
the husband then by himself could not have afforded to buy such
expensive property; the purchase price was furnished by the wife's
mother; it was a practice of the wife's parents to so provide their
children with money to purchase realties for themselves; and, the
husband expressly acknowledged in the deed of sale that he did not
have any interest in the property.

TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA
EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA;
ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY
MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO
FRANCISCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 102330, November 25, 1998
By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

The properties belonging and already owned by the spouse prior to

the marriage and brought into the marriage are the separate and
exclusive property of such spouse. Properties acquired by lucrative
title pertains to those acquired gratuitously and including those
acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance,
devise, legacy, or donation.

TAN v. ANDRADE
GR 171904, Aug 7, 2013
By: Resus, Jarvin David

For the presumption in favor of conjugal partnership to apply, the

party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Lack of proof when the
property was acquired does not warrant the application of the
presumption. The subject property was established by strong and
clear evidence that it was acquired after the death of the husband
which terminated the conjugal partnership thus it is considered
exclusive property

MARIANO VELOSO v. LUCIA MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 8715, October 24, 1914, JOHNSON, J.
By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

Jewelry inherited by the wife from her parent forms part of her sole
and separate property. As a part of her paraphernal property, she has
dominion, exclusive control, and management over such jewelry.
She cannot be deprived of such without her consent. In case of sale
of the jewelry by her husband without her consent, the wife has the
right to recover the possession of the jewelry.

BERCILES v. GSIS

G.R. No. 57257. March 5, 1984, GUERRERO, J.:

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T

In the absence of proof that retirement premiums are paid from the
exclusive funds of the deceased spouse, such premiums are
presumed as part conjugal property. One-half of the retirement
premiums will be owned by the wife as part of her property in the
conjugal partnership while the other half belongs to the estate of the
deceased to be distributed among the heirs.

AMALIA PLATA v. HON. NICASIO YATCO

G.R. No. L-20825, December 28, 1964, REYES, J.B.L, J.
 By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

A property which a single woman acquired and later sold to a third

person, which she subsequently re-acquired from such third person
several months after when she was allegedly married, cannot be
transformed from paraphernal property to conjugal property absent
proof that the money used to pay the vendor came from the
conjugal fund.

MARIANO VELOSO v. LUCIA MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 8715, October 24, 1914, JOHNSON, J.

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

When records show that jewelry is under the sole and separate
property of the wife, and in the absence of any further proof, the
Court presumes it as part of the wife’s paraphernal property. To
prove otherwise, the wife must, before a notary public, deliver it to
her husband with the intent that the husband might administer it
properly. In this case, there is no evidence that the wife delivered
her jewelry to her husband, thus she cannot be deprived of the same
without her consent.

MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner, -versus- THE HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE MADLANGAWA,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-45038, 30 April 1987, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

 By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H..

Pursuant to Articles 136 and 137 of the Civil Code, the wife is
presumed to have an exclusive control and management of the
paraphernal properties, until and unless she had delivered it to her
husband, by means of a public instrument, with the intent that the
husband would administer these properties properly. In the present
case, as there was no showing that the husband was made
administrator of the paraphernal properties during the lifetime of
the wife, the sale made between the husband and subject occupant
is void ab initio.

​RAMON C. ONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

FRANCISCO BOIX and ARSENIO CAMINO AS DEPUTY
SHERIFF OF CAMARINES NORTE, respondents,
G.R. No. L-63025 November 29, 1991, PARAS, J.:

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

If the husband has consented to the business of his wife, or if he has

knowledge of it and did not pose his objection, both the conjugal
partnership and the paraphernal properties of the wife shall be held
liable to pay for the personal debts she has incurred in the course of
her business.

10. Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property 5.Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property,

FC 143-146, NCC 1490 FC 111 as amended by RA 10572, FC 112, NCC 1490

SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO

JOSON, JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and
CONRADO LAGMAN, petitioners, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO HENSON,
respondents. G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991 FERNAN, C.J.:

By: Filipino Borra

In CPG, the conjugal properties cannot be held liable for an

obligation which is exclusively incurred by one of the spouses if: it
is incurred without the consent of the husband, they were not for
the daily expenses of the family and they did not redound to the
benefit of the family. Here, as the debtors are not able to prove that
the indebtedness belongs to the conjugal partnership, and it is not
among the above mentioned instances, they cannot levy the subject
properties.

6. Property bought on installment, FC Art. 118, 119

WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY

JOVELLANOS-MARTINEZ and JOSE HERMILO
JOVELLANOS, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
and ANNETTE H. JOVELLANOS, for and in her behalf, and
in representation of her two minor daughters as natural
guardian, ANA MARIA and MA. JENNETTE, both surnamed
JOVELLANOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 100728. June 18, 1992. REGALADO, J.

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

Pursuant to Article 118 of the Family Code, any amount advanced

on a property bought on installment using partly the conjugal funds
and partly the exclusive funds of either or both the spouses, if full
ownership is vested before or during the marriage, any amount
which was advanced must be reimbursed by the owner upon
liquidation of the partnership. Therefore, any property which was
purchased on installment by a deceased spouse during his first
marriage only bestowed him an inchoate and expectant right
because it is only when he accomplished his contractual obligations
and the deed of absolute sale be given that such right would ripen
into a vested right.

SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, Petitioners,

vs. ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA
B. DE LEON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

In accordance with Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, which was
the governing provision at the time of the parties’ marriage, a
property which, although purchased through installment before the
marriage, was only fully paid more than 2 years after the marriage,
is in effect, acquired during the existence of the marriage since title
over the same only passes to the buyer upon full payment. Thus,
ownership thereof is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership.

7. Improvements on CPG property, FC 120

FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., Petitioner -versus- ERLINDA

RAMIREZ and ELISEO CARLOS, Respondents,

G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010, BRION, J.

 By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

As a general rule all properties acquired during the marriage,

whether the acquisition was contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary
is proven. Where the property was acquired by gratuitous title,
during the marriage, it shall be excluded from the community of
property and be the exclusive property of each spouse (Article 92
and 109 of the Family Code). In relation, since the residential
property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of the wife,
written consent of the other spouse is not necessary before she can
enter a contract with a third person, with the said property as the
subject matter.

In re testate estate of NARCISO A. PADILLA. CONCEPCION

PATERNO VDA. DE PADILLA, Widow-appellee, - versus -
ISABEL BIBBY VDA. DE PADILLA, Executrix - appellant,

G.R. No. L-48137, October 4, 1943, BOCOBO, J.

By: Areta, Karen M.

The value of the paraphernal buildings which were demolished for

the construction of new ones, at the expense of the conjugal
partnership, should be reimbursed to the widow. The conjugal
partnership gained a positive advantage from the demolition
regardless of the value of the old buildings.
 TESTATE ESTATE OF NARCISO A. PADILLA, deceased.
ISABEL B. VDA. DE PADILLA, Executrix-Appellant, v.
CONCEPCION PATERNO, administratrix-appelle.

G.R. No. L-8748. December 26, 1961. REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

The last paragraph of Art. 120 of the Family Code provides that the
ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In this case, the
Court ruled that the improvements made in the R. Hidalgo property
made by a lessee shall become part of the property upon the
expiration of the lease. Such improvements shall be the basis of the
additional shares of the administratrix.

IGNACIO M. COINGCO, petitioner, vs.ROBERTA FLORES,

respondent.
G.R. Nos. L-2147 and L-2148, December 9, 1948, FERIA, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

The buildings or other improvements erected on the lands which

were paraphernal personal property during the marriage and such
buildings or improvements were destroyed by reason of war,
before liquidation of the conjugal partnership of both spouses, such
land remains as paraphernal property.

9. Charges upon ACP, FC 94 8. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122, 123
 LOURDES MARIANO, Petitioner -versus – COURT OF
APPEALS, and DANIEL SANCHEZ, Respondents,

G.R. No. L-51283 June 7, 1989, NARVASA. J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

The husband of a judgement debtor cannot be a stranger to the suit

adjudged against his wife for an obligation that had actually
redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal
assets may be held liable for the obligations of the wife.

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and

ABELARDO MAGSAJO, Petitioners -versus- COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION
CHING, Respondents

G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

The conjugal partnership shall not answer for the payment of

personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage except insofar as it has redounded to the benefit of the
family. However, when the husband or wife acted as a surety or a
guarantor in favor of another person or entity, it cannot be said that
the contract falls within the context of obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership because they are not the principal obligor.
ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, Petitioners
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004,
CALLEJO, SR., J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should

appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some
advantages accrued to the spouses.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal
partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf
of PBMCI.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner, v.

MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents,
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005,
TINGA, J.:

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on

co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements.
 PAQUITO V. ANDO, Petitioner, v. ANDRESITO Y. CAMPO,
ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 184007 , February 16, 2011, NACHURA, J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

A property registered not only in the name of a husband who is

sued in his representative capacity (not his personal capacity), but
also to his wife, could not be made to answer for the judgment
obligation of the corporation. To allow otherwise would amount to
deprivation of property without due process since the wife may lose
the property subject of execution without ever being a party to the
case.

SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner

-versus- MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C.
MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and RICARDO A. LOPA,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 143382, November 29, 2006, CORONA, J.

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

The NCC limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to

debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, a surety agreement entered into by
the husband in favor of his employer is an obligation not chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.
 PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA,
Petitioners vs.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE , for herself and in behalf of
INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, et al., Respondents, G.R.
No. 160708, October 16, 2009, QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

A person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied

by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted by Article 124 of
the Family Code must show that he inquired into the latter’s
capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in
good faith. Such sale may be annulled when the consent of the
other spouse is absent, and the selling spouse is liable to return the
value of the consideration for the property sold.

HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, SR., namely: SERGIA

V. HERNANDEZ (Surviving Spouse), DOMINGO V.
HERNANDEZ, JR., and MARIA LEONORA WILMA
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, vs. PLARIDEL MINGOA, SR.,
DOLORES CAMISURA, MELANIE MINGOA AND
QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 146548, December 18, 2009, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

If the sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code (FC),
any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is
void. However, if the sale is made before the effectivity of the FC,
Civil Code (CC) shall apply and under Article 173 of CC, any
disposition of conjugal property without the wife's consent is not
void but merely voidable.

ANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, petitioners,

vs CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE
MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO,
respondents.
GR No. 178902, April 21, 2010, ABAD, J

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

The provisions of the Family Code will govern the sale of conjugal
property made a few months after the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988, despite the fact that the spouses got married before
its effectivity. When the Family Code took effect, its provisions
were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships
without prejudice to vested rights. As opposed to Article 173 of the
Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide for a
prescription period upon which the wife who gave no consent may
assail her husband's sale of the real property— it only provides that
the sale would be void in the absence of written consent made by
the other spouse or a court order allowing the sale.

JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, Petitioners, vs.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH,
Respondent. G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011, Carpio, J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Payment of personal debts contracted by one spouse before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
unless they are beneficial to the family. No actual benefit is
required to be proved. In a contract of loan, the family already
stands to benefit from the loan despite the chances of the loan's
success in benefiting the family.

EFREN PANA, Petitioner,vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR.

and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.,
G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012, ABAD, J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

The spouses were married when the Civil Code was still the
operative law, absent any evidence to the contrary, they were
married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. The
transitory provision under the Family Code does not automatically
modify the marriage settlement. Automatically changing marriage
settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code would
impair their acquired or vested rights to separate properties.

Since it was not disputed that the wife has no exclusive property of
her own, the civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case
imposed on the wife may be enfroced against the conjugal assets as
allowed by Article 121 of the Family Code.

CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN, Petitioner -versus – BANCO

DE ORO, Respondent. G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017,
VELASCO, JR., J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

In this case, Carmelita, the wife of Eliseo, signed a surety
agreement on behalf of Tancho Corporation. The surety agreement
was the basis for BDO’s claim and foreclosure of the spouses’
conjugal property. Article 122 provides that that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Moreover, there is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is
benefited when a spouse enters into a contract of surety. Thus, not
having been benefited by the surety agreement, the subject property
cannot be foreclosed on the basis of the surety agreement signed by
Carmelita, it being a conjugal property and there was no evidence
to prove that the family benefited from the said agreement.

JAIME BILAN MONTEALEGRE AND CHAMON'TE, INC.,

petitioners, v. SPOUSES ABRAHAM AND REMEDIOS DE
VERA, respondents.
G.R. No. 208920, July 10, 2019, JARDALEZA, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

A property forming part of the conjugal partnership cannot be

levied upon by virtue of a writ of execution imposed on one of the
spouses unless there is a showing that the obligation redounded to
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Absent the showing of such
benefit, the writ of execution shall be null and void.

Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 173946,
June 19, 2013, Perez, J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

 The written consent of the other spouse is required for an
encumbrance on a conjugal property in a Real Estate Mortgage to
be valid. Absent such consent, the mortgage is void and legally
inexistent. It must be noted that only the Real Estate Mortgage is
void and the principal obligation such mortgage guaranteed is still
void.

FRANCISCO C. DELGADO, represented by JOSE MARI

DELGADO, Petitioner, vs. GQ REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORP., MA. ROSARIO G. MEYER, KARL KURT EDWARD
MEYER, and THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MAKATI
CITY, Respondents,

G.R. No. 241774, September 25, 2019, CAGUIOA, J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

Under the Ante-nuptial Agreement, the spouses agreed that their

properties shall be owned by them separately and any gift which
one of them may bestow on the other shall become the latter’s own
and exclusive property, the former discharging any and all interest
therein. Hence, the subject property, although paid for using the
funds of the husband, was in fact a gift to the wife and therefore
shall consist of her exclusive and separate property, the former
waiving, abandoning, and discharging any and all interests therein.

10. Administration and enjoyment of ACP 9. Ownership, administration and enjoyment (a) Joint
(a) Joint administration, FC 96; FC 90 administration, FC 124 cf. FC 96, 142
(b) Sole administration
(1) incapacity, FC 96 (2) – no court order
(2) separation in fact FC 100 (3) – with court order
(3) abandonment, FC 101 – with court order
(4) pendency of legal separation proceeding, FC 61 – with court
order
(c) Disposition and encumbrance, FC 96-98
10. Effect of separation de facto, FC 100; 101; cf. FC 239 –
summary proceedings for court authority to dispose
11. Effect of abandonment, FC 101, FC 72 – damages,
rescission/nullity of a contract
(b) Sole administration
(1) Incapacity, FC 124, 253
(2) Separation in fact, FC 100 (3), 127(3), 253
(3) Abandonment, FC 101, 128, 253
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61
10. Disposition and encumbrance, FC 124-125; FC 97, 121, 122
11. Effect of separation de facto, FC 127, FC 100 cf. FC 239
12. Effect of abandonment, FC 128 cf. FC 101
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner, v.
MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents,
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005, TINGA, J.
By: Martin, Dominic
With regard to the ownership, administration and enjoyment of a
property under the regime of CPG, Art. 124 stands. Any disposition
or encumbrance of the conjugal property in the absence of (court)
authority or written consent of the other spouse shall be void. Thus,
a REM entered into by the husband on the conjugal property,
without the consent from his wife (or without authority from the
court) is void. Moreover, there is no legal basis to make Art. 493 of
the NCC as an exemption to Art. 124 of the FC, since the
provisions in co-ownership only apply to ACP.
SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO ALINAS, Petitioner, –
versus – SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 158040, April 14, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
 By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

While it is true that the petitioner spouses were married before the
enactment of the Family Code, the sale in question happened in
1989 which makes their property relations governed by the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code. Hence, pursuant
to Article 124 of the Family Code, the sale of their conjugal
property without the consent of his wife is entirely void.

ANTONIO DOCENA and ALFREDA DOCENA, Petitioners,

vs. HON. RICARDO P. LAPESURA, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 140153, March 28, 2001, GONZAGA-REYES, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

Joint management or administration under Article 124 of the

Family Code does not require that the husband and wife always act
together. The consent of both spouses is not necessarily required.

Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone,

subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases as provided
under Article 124.

AGGABAO v. PARULAN
G.R. No. 165803, Sept. 1, 2010, Bersamin, J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

A spouse may assume sole powers of administration provided that
the other spouse is incapactated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal partnership property. However,
the disposition or encumbrance of any conjugal property, without
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse,
shall be void.

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.

JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000, Pardo, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

The incapacity contemplated under Art. 124 of the Family Code

where summary proceedings apply are limited only to the
following: a) the spouse is absent; b) spouses separated in fact; c)
one spouse has abandoned the other: d) or consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained. Therefore, the propepr remedy of the
petitioning spouse is guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the
Rules of Court when the ground relied upon is that the
non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent.

The same rule applies to Art. 96 of the Family Code.

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 74833. January 21, 1991. Narvasa, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Where the property was acquired by a Filipino spouse and an alien
spouse, such property cannot be considered as part of the conjugal
property inasmuch as doing so would be an indirect contravention
of the constitutional prohibition against aliens to acquire residential
lands. Accordingly, the alien spouse does not have the legal
standing to inquire into the sale of the property entered into by the
Filipino spouse.

ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner vs. EDERLINA P.

CATITO, respondent
G.R. No. 143958, 11 July 2003, CALLEJO, SR., J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

Notwithstanding his capacity to marry a Filipino, the fact remains

that a foreign national is disqualified to own properties in the
Philippines jointly with his Filipino spouse, pursuant to the rule that
ownership of any land in the Philippines is exclusive and limited to
Filipino citizens.

SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO ALINAS, petitioners,

-versus- SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS,
respondents.

G.R. No. 158040, THIRD DIVISION, April 14, 2008,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

The administration of the properties belonging to the conjugal

partnership belongs to both spouses. The disposition of a conjugal
property without the consent of the other spouse shall render the
sale null and void.

MARIO SIOCHI, petitioner, vs.

ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE,
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., and ELVIRA
GOZON, respondents.
G.R. No. 169900 and G.R. No. 169977, March 18, 2010,
CARPIO, J..

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

The absence of the consent of one of the spouses renders the entire
sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the spouse who contracted the sale—even if the other spouse
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that
other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for
its validity.

Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the

conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending
spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by
the conjugal partnership. It is only the offending spouse’s share in
the net profits which is forfeited.

JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, Petitioners, vs.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH,
Respondent. G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011, CARPIO, J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

The debts incurred by the spouse in the course of his/her
employment in the business or profession through which he/she
supports the family cannot be considered to be his/her own and
private debts.

ARTURO FLORES v. SPOUSES ENRICO LINDO AND

EDNA LINDO

G.R. NO. 183984. April 13, 2011. Carpio. J.

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

Acts of ownership on conjugal property by one spouse requires the

written consent of the other spouse, otherwise it is void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part
of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon acceptance by the other spouse before
such offer is withdrawn by either party. In this case, the execution
of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making
the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

BENJAMIN A. KO v. VIRGINIA DY ARAMBURO

G. R. No. 190995, August 9, 2017
By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

Alienation or encumbrance of any real property belonging to the

conjugal partnership requires consent of the other spouse except
when there is showing of incapacity of the other spouse. Without
the other spouse's written consent or a court order allowing the sale,
such alienation or encumbrance would be void.
 CARLOS v. TOLENTINO
GR No. 23533, June 27, 2018
By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

Under conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife are

considered as the absolute owners of their undivided interest over
1/2 of the conjugal property. Each may validly exercise rights of
ownership but only with respect to their 1/2 share in the property.
Therefore, the Deed of Donation allegedly executed by the husband
and the wife, when in fact only the wife consented thereto and the
signature of the husband is forged, is valid only to the extent of 1/2
share in the conjugal property of the consenting spouse. On the
other hand, with respect to the share of the spouse whose signature
was forged, the donation is deemed void.

Tuazon vs. Fuentes

G.R. No. 241699, August 04, 2021, Inting, J:
By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

Disposition of a common property by the husband acting as an

administrator requires the written consent of the wife or the
authority of the court, otherwise, the disposition is void. This
applies in lease contracts where the subject property of the lease is
a common property. Knowledge of the spouse of the transaction is
immaterial, written consent is necessary for it to be valid.
Knowledge or being aware of the transaction does not equate to
consent.

ESTEBAN V CAMPANO
 G.R. No. 235364, April 26, 2021, CARANDANG, J.:
By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T.

Under the Family Code, any alienation or encumbrance of the

conjugal partnership property made by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void. Under the Civil Code, the
transaction is merely voidable and the remedy of the wife is to file
an action for the annulment of the contract during the marriage and
within ten years from the questioned transaction. 

TURLA VS. HEIRS OF PATROCINIO N. DAYRIT,

G.R. No. 205743. October 6, 2021. CARANDANG, J.

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

In Sps. Cueno v. Sps. Bautista, the Court settled the conflict

regarding the transfer of conjugal property without the consent of
the wife as voidable, not void. Further, an annulment of a contract
which involves the sale of conjugal property made without the
consent of the wife must be brought before the court by the wife
during the marriage and within ten years from the sale of the
conjugal property.

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner -versus – LETICIA T.

NOVERAS, et. al., Respondent, G.R. No. 188289 August 20,
2014, PEREZ. J.

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Generally, modification in marriage settlements should be made
prior to the celebration of marriage, except when the modification
approved pursuant to the instances under Articles 66 and 67
(reconciliation in legal separation), 128 (abandonment without just
cause), 135 and 136 (judicial separation of property) of the Family
Code. In this case, none of the exceptions were proven, as there was
no evidence of separation in fact or abandonment – thus, the
spouses are still governed by the regime of Absolute Community of
Property.

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG, with aliases JOSE JO
and CONSING, respondents.

G.R. No. 82606, 18 December 1992, CRUZ, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

For abandonment to exist there must be an absolute cessation of

marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation. In the present case, as early as 1942, the private
respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied
admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she
returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that Jo did not accept her
demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal
relationship. From 1968 until 1988, the physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give
 support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

12. Dissolution of ACP, FC 99, 102, 104. 147, 148 13. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126, 129, 130, 147, 148

AMPARO ROBLES CABREZA, petitioner, VS. CEFERINO S.

CABREZA, JR., JUDGE PABLITO ROXAS, SHERIFF
RONBERTO VALINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 70 PASIG CITY, respondents, G.R. No. 171260,
September 11, 2009, PERALTA, J.:

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

Article 129(9) of the Family Code only applies when there are other
assets or properties in the conjugal partnership to be divided
between the spouses. It does not apply when there is only one
property in the conjugal partnership.

THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA,

namely: LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR.,
ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA,
CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all surnamed
GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners, vs. ESTER
L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011 BERSAMIN, J

by: Filipino Borra

If vested rights are already acquired prior to the effectivity of the
FC, non-compliance with the liquidation requirement under Art 130
of the FC, shall not prejudice such vested right.

Here, as a third person has already purchased the subject property

prior to the effectivity of the FC, the FC’s subsequent effectivity
prescribing the liquidation procedure should not prejudice the third
person even if the procedure was not complied with.

LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner, vs. JON DE YSASI,

respondent.

G.R. No. 130623. February 29, 2008. CARPIO, J.

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, now Article 126 of the Family
Code the conjugal partnership of gains terminates in cases of
judicial separation of property during the marriage under Article
191 of the Civil Code, now Article 134 and 138 of the Family
Code. Therefore, the finality of the Order in the Amicable
Settlement (Civil Case No. 4791) approving the parties' separation
of property resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains between petitioner and respondent.

ALAIN M. DIÑO, Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO,

Respondent.
GR No. 178044, January 19, 2011, CARPIO, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

It is clear from Art. 50 of the Family Code that Sec. 19(1) of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages applies
only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled
under Arts. 40 and 45 of the same Code. It does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Art. 36, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties. Marriages declared void under Art. 36
shall be governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership, and
pursuant to such rules, it is not necessary to liquidate the properties
of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner -versus- RITA C. QUIAO,

KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C.
QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO,
Respondents

G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012, REYES, J.:

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

Article 129 in relation to Article 63(2) and Article 256 of the

Family Code is the applicable law for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership assets and liabilities when at the time of
dissolution of said marriage the operative law is the Family Code,
the latter provision provides that the Family Code shall have
retroactive effect in so far as it does not. prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights The properties of the spouses are part of conjugal
partnership (pursuant to the Civil Code) and the same should be
equally divided among them or their respective heirs but if it be
proven that petitioner is the guilty guilty spouses (as in this case),
his share from the net profit is forfeited in favor of his common
children, (Article 63(2), FC).

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner - versus - LEONARDO

V. NONATO, Respondent,

G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014, PERALTA, J.

By: Areta, Karen M.

In dissolution of conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 of the

Family Code may be applied because the provision specifically
covers the effects of a void marriage. The rules on liquidation for
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages are
irrelevant in the liquidation of co-ownership for spouses of void
marriages.

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS,

Respondent
G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014. PEREZ, J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

Art. 99 of the Family Code provides grounds for termination of the

Absolute Community regime, one of which is the judicial
separation of property. In this case, the Court has granted the
judicial separation of property between David and Leticia due to
their separation in fact for more than 1 year and the subsequent
decree of divorce obtained by Leticia with the California Court. As
a result thereof, the property relationship between David and
Leticia is terminated.

RAFAEL C. UY (CABANGBANG STORE), Petitioner, v.

ESTATE OF VIPA FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 200612, April 05, 2017, REYES, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

The sale by the surviving spouse of a conjugal property prior to

liquidation is not necessarily void. Although the share of the
surviving spouse does not consist of determinate and segregated
properties until liquidation, the surviving spouse is a co-owner and
could sell his undivided share. In this case, Levi had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, making the buyer,
Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property.

NICOMEDES AUGUSTO, GOMERCINDO JIMENEZ,

MARCELINO PAQUIBOT, AND ROBERTA SILAWAN,
Petitioner -versus – ANTONIO CARLOTA DY AND MARIO
DY, Respondents,

G.R. No. 218731 February 13, 2019, REYES, J. JR. J.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

The death of either spouse dissolves the conjugal partnership and

the interest of the surviving spouse therein becomes vested in him.
Hence, a sale of the conjugal property is valid only to the extent of
the surviving spouse’s pro-indiviso share in the co-ownership
which was formed upon the death of the other spouse.
 SIMON R. PATERNO, Petitioner, vs. DINA MARIE
LOMONGO PATERNO, Respondent,
G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020, J.C. REYES, JR., J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

Article 147 of the Family Code did not make any distinction or
make any qualification in terms of the manner the property must be
acquired before the presumption of co-ownership shall apply. Thus,
"acquired" must be taken in its ordinary acceptation. For as long as
the property had been purchased, whether on installment, financing,
or other modes of payment, during the period of cohabitation, the
disputable presumption that they have been obtained by the parties'
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares, shall arise.

NICXON L. PEREZ, JR.,• Petitioner, v. AVEGAIL

PEREZ-SENERPIDA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND MR.
SENERPIDA, Respondent,

G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021, CAGUIOA, J

. By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

In this case, the Court ruled that if a disposition of a party’s share in

the property under special co-ownership created by virtue of Article
147 without the consent of the other party is proscribed by law,
then, and with more reason, should the disposition of the entire
property under such special co-ownership by a party without the
 other party’s consent be considered void as well.” The reason for
this prohibition, the Court noted, is that if the parties are allowed to
dispose of their shares in said properties like in an ordinary
co-ownership, then it will destroy their relationship.

HEIRS OF THE LATE APOLINARIO CABURNAY,

NAMELY, LYDIA CABURNAY, LETECIA NAVARRO,
EVANGELINE CRUZ, JERRY CABURNAY, ZENAIDA C.
ANCHETA, LIWAYWAY C. WATAN, GLORIA GUSILAN,
APOLINARIO CABURNAY, JR., petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF
TEODULO SISON, * NAMELY, ROSARIO SISON, OFELIA
SISON, TEODULO SISON, JR., BLESILDA ** SISON,
ARMIDA SISON, CYNTHIA SISON, JESUS SISON AND
PERLA *** SISON, respondents.
G.R. No. 230934, December 2, 2020
CAGUIOA J.

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

When the marriage is terminated by death, Article 130 of the

Family Code provides for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership within one year from the death of the deceased spouse.
If no liquidation is effected: (1) any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void, and (2) should the surviving spouse contract
a subsequent marriage, a mandatory regime of complete separation
of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.

SEPARATION OF PROPERTY AND PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

CAS CASE DOCTRINES
E
No. REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY

13 LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner, v. JON DE YSASI, respondent.

G.R. No. 130623, February 29, 2008, CARPIO, J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

In accordance with Article 175 of the Civil Code, the finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties’ separation of
property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership gains. Thus, the conjugal partnership between spouses ceases to exist
upon approval of the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains by the court
14
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner -versus- LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent,

G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014, PEREZ, J.

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

Separation in fact for at least one year coupled with highly improbable reconciliation is a sufficient cause for a judicial separation of
property. (Art. 135 [6] FC)

15 ESTRELLA ABID-BABANO , Petitioner vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondent, G.R. No. 201176, August 28, 2019,
BERSAMIN, J.

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

The property relations between Muslim spouses, in the absence any stipulation to the contrary, shall be governed by the regime of
complete separation of property. Under this property regime, each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or
her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other.
 In this case, it was held that petitioner, a public official, cannot be held liable for her failure to include her husband's exclusive
properties in her SALN since their property relations are governed by the regime of complete separation of property. As such,
properties held by each spouse is exclusively his or her own and can only be counted towards his or her own "wealth.”

CAS CASE DOCTRINES

E
No. PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

16 ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M.
GOMEZ-VALDEZ, Respondents,
G.R. No. 122749, FIRST DIVISION, July 31, 1996, VITUG, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

The term “capacitated” in the first paragraph of Article 147 of the Family Code refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage. Hence, a particular kind of co-ownership operates when a man and a woman with no illegal impediment to marry each
other exclusively live together as husband and wife even if it is under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. In such
instances, their property regime will be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership as provided in Article 147.
17 SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
GR No. 132529, February 2, 2001, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

The Supreme Court held that the Cariño-Nicdao marriage is void ab initio on the ground of lack of marriage license, and the property
relations of the spouses is governed by Article 147 of the Family Code. Article 147 applies to unions of parties legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of
a marriage license. On the other hand, the second marriage of Cariño with respondent Yee is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which was declared to be a bigamous marriage under Article 40 of the Family Code.
18 FRANCISCO L. GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. ERMINDA F. GONZALES, Respondents,
G.R. No. 159521, December 16, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Art. 147 enumerates two instances where the property relations are governed by the rules on co-ownership: (1) when a man and
woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2)
when a man and woman live together under a void marriage.

Here, there is a presumption that properties acquired during cohabitation are acquired through joint efforts. Thus, the property shall
be owned by the parties in equal shares. Moreover, a party who did not participate in the acquisition shall nevertheless be deemed to
have contributed jointly through the care and maintenance of the family.

19 ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011, CARPIO, J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

Compliance with Article 50 and 51 is not needed in case the marriage is dissolved under Article 147 of the Family Code, it can be
declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Article 50 of the Family Code states that Section
19(1) of the Rule applies to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Article 40 or 45 of the
Family Code. Hence, this does not apply when the marriage is declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

20 JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., Petitioner -versus – EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013, CARPIO, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

 In the case of Diño vs. Diño, the Court held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36
of the Family Code. Article 147 provides that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

In this case, the marriage between Salas and Aguila was nullified on the ground of psychological incapacity. Following the ruling in
Diño vs. Diño, the property regime governing the properties acquired during the marriage of Salas and Aguila, is co-ownership
because of the prima facie presumption that the properties were obtained through the couple’s joint efforts.

21
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014, PERALTA, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

The law governing the liquidation of an ACP or a CPG for valid marriages is different and does not find any application to the
liquidation of a co-ownership between spouses under a void marriage or common-law spouses. Article 147 of the Family Code
governs the liquidation of a co-ownership between spouses whose marriage has been declared void for psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the same Code. Absent any proof of the due execution and authenticity of the conveyance of the subject property
to the common children, it remains to be owned in common by the spouses and shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

22 People v XXX, GR 240441, Dec. 4, 2019, Reyes, A. Jr. J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

The terms “common-law-spouse” and “step-parent” are distinct terms that cannot be used interchangeably. An allegation in the
information that the accused is the common-law spouse of the victim's mother must be sufficiently established. Even if it was proven
that therein accused-appellant was indeed the common-law spouse of the victim's mother, this cannot be appreciated, since the
information did not specifically allege it as a qualifying circumstance.
 23 SIMON R. PATERNO, Petitioner, vs. DINA MARIE LOMONGO PATERNO, Respondent,
G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020, J.C. REYES, JR., J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

The term “acquired” in Article 147 of the Family Code does not distinguish or qualify as to the manner of acquisition of the property
before the presumption of co-ownership shall apply. As long as the property was purchased during the cohabitation of the parties,
regardless of the mode of payment, the disputable presumption that it was obtained by the joint efforts, work or industry of the parties
shall apply and the property must be divided in equal shares.

24
NICXON L. PEREZ, JR.,• Petitioner, v. AVEGAIL PEREZ-SENERPIDA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND MR.
SENERPIDA, Respondent,

G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021, CAGUIOA, J.

By: Martin, Dominic

Exclusive cohabitation under a void marriage is governed by special co-ownership as regards their common properties. However,
provisions on co-ownership must yield to, and not supersede Art. 147 of the FC. This meant that as long as the cohabitation lasts,
neither party may encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of their share in their common property without the consent of the other.
Thus, a donation of any property owned in common without the consent of the other is void. To be valid, the disposition must be
made with the consent of the other party, or after the termination of the cohabitation.

CAS CASE DOCTRINES

E
No. UNIONS

25 JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO, Petitioner, – versus – THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 89667, October 20, 1993, VITUG, J.:
 By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

When one of the parties to a relationship is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. Hence, the land, although titled to the common-law
wife, is only held in trust by the husband and shall therefore belong to the conjugal property of the husband and the legal wife.
26 ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, Petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997, ROMERO, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

Article 148 of the Family Code provides that only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Under this
provision, actual contribution is required, in contrast to Article 147, which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or
work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.

27 GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000, Panganiban, J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

In case of cohabitation between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, only the properties acquired by both
of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Hence, if the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.

28 LUPO ATIENZA, PETITIONER, VS. YOLANDA DE CASTRO, RESPONDENT

 G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006, Garcia, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Article 148 of the Family Code applies to the following relations: a) bigamous marriages; b) adulterous relationships; c) relationships
in a state of concubinage d) relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons; and e) multiple alliances of the
same married man.

29 YOLANDA SIGNEY, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, and GINA
SERVANO, representative of GINALYN and RODELYN SIGNEY, respondents.
G.R. No. 173582. January 28, 2008. Tinga, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Where one seeks to claim the entitlements of a benefit provided by law, he or she must be able to establish his or her right by
substantial evidence. To be classified as a dependent under the SSS Law, the spouse must be the legitimate spouse who is entitled by
law to receive support and the illegitimate child must not be married, not gainfully employed, and below the age of 21 years. A
common law wife is disqualified and therefore cannot be entitled to insurance benefits.

30 CAMILO F. BORROMEO, petitioner vs. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR , respondent

G.R. No. 159310, 24 February 2009, PUNO, C.J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

As a general rule, co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. As an exception, if one party was still legally married to another, no co-ownership exists between the parties. In
such a case, it is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property to be able to
assert his or her claim to any portion of it.
31
HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA PANGILINAN MARAMAG, petitioners,
 -versus- EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE GUZMAN
MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT
PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 181132, THIRD DIVISION, June 5, 2009, AUSTRIA- NACHURA, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

The prohibitions on donation under Article 739 of the Civil Code also applies to insurance policies. However, an illegitimate child
may be designated as a beneficiary as there is no legal proscription regarding such.

32
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, petitioner, v. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., respondent.

G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

Any property acquired during the cohabitation can only be considered common property if two (2) conditions are met:

1. there must be evidence showing that the properties were acquired by the parties during their cohabitation; and
2. there must be evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry.

On the contribution aspect of these elements, mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code, without proof of contribution,
will not result in a co-ownership.

33 SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013, CARPIO, J.:
 By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

In case of cohabitation and any representation of being married absence the benefit of marriage, absence any proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, no co-ownership exist pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code. Further, the words
"married to" preceding the name of a spouse in the Transfer Certificate of Title are merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner.

34 SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, respondents.

G.R. No. 171914. July 23, 2014. Bersamin, J.
By: Liban, Clarisse M.

A subsequent marriage is void for being bigamous on the ground that the first marriage is not dissolved by a foreign divorce decree
obtained by Filipino spouses. Properties acquired during a bigamous marriage are governed by Article 148, which provides: only the
property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed
to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. Here, the petitioner’s mere allegation
of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, did not discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership.

35 ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, Petitioner, vs.

WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, Respondent
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

Case law dictates that co-ownership in common law marriages requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way
be incapacitated to contract marriage. Seeing as there is a valid subsisting marriage of Banguis to Nolasco and Adriano to Winefreda,
it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other nor do they have a common law relationship at all.
Banguis was not able to adduce sufficient evidence proving her contribution to the acquisition of said property therefore, she could
not have been a co-owner of the subject property with Adriano.
36 REBECCA FULLIDO, PETITIONER, v. GINO GRILLI, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016
By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

Void contracts have no force and effect from the beginning and cannot be the source of any rights. A lease contract made in favor an
alien stipulating that the Filipino cannot sell or dispose of the property, rights constituting ownership, amounts to virtual transfer of
ownership to the alien therefore violating the Constitutional prohibition against alien ownership of Philippine real property. Thus, the
lease made during their cohabitation in favor of an alien for a period of 50 years and strictly prohibiting the Filipino from disposing
the property is void.

37 Canada v. Baclot
G.R. No. 221874, July 07, 2020, REYES, A., JR., J.:
By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

Ownership of the properties jointly acquired by cohabitating parties who have legal impediment to marry is relative to their
respective contributions and actual proof is required. Absent proof of quantifiable actual contribution, their contributions are deemed
equal but co-ownership will not arise. The subject properties were solely under the name of Cresencia. Sancho’s failure to establish
that he made actual contributions in the purchase of the properties renders Cresencia as the exclusive owner of the subject properties.
relate to marriage, its annulment or nullification, as well as legal separation, among others, the Philippine Laws
shall govern even if such citizens are living abroad.

Principle of Sovereignty
Article 17, paragraph 3 of the New Civil Code refers to the Principle of Sovereignty. The provision states that
prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The Philippines, as a sovereign nation, must not
be liable or obliged to take cognizance of laws or decisions of foreign nations.

FC 26, FC 21, FC 10, FC 35(1), FC 35(4), FC 35(5), FC 36, FC 37 & FC 38

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III, Castillo, Pamela Alexia D. and Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

Marriages between Filipinos solemnized abroad in accordance with the law in force in said country
Article 26 paragraph 1 of the Family Code provides that, as a general rule, all marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines which are in accordance with the law in force where they are solemnized shall be considered valid
under Philippine laws.

As an exception to the rule, it shall still remain void, even if it is valid in the foreign country where the marriage
was celebrated, under any of the circumstances stated in Articles 35-38 of the Family Code.

Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Family Code provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him/her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall also have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018), the Court held that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code shall only require that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad.
The rationale is that the letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Marriage License from Diplomatic or Consular Offices

Article 10 of the Family Code provides for marriages between Filipino citizens abroad which are solemnized by
a consul-general, consul, or vice-consul of the Philippines. In this case, the duties of the local civil registrar and
the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of the marriage will be performed by such consular official.

The following are additional requirements for foreign national applicants

Article 21 of the Family Code states that where either or both of the contracting parties are foreign citizens, it
shall be necessary that they acquire a valid marriage license and submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract
marriage issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officer.

As for stateless persons or refugees, they are instead required to submit an affidavit stating such circumstances
giving them capacity to contract marriage.

An exception to such rule, however, are the following:

1. Marriages in articulo mortis.
2. Location of residence, such that either party has no means of transportation to enable them to readily
appear before their civil registrar.
3. Marriages among Muslims or marriages among members of ethnic cultural communities, provided they
are solemnized in accordance with their customs.
4. Couples living together as husband and wife for at least 5 years, provided further that they have no legal
impediment to marry each other during the period of cohabitation.
Void ab initio marriages
Article 35 of the Family Code enumerates marriages that shall be void from the beginning including 35(1) that
makes void marriages contracted when any party is below eighteen years of age, even if consent by the parents;
35(4) bigamous or ploygamous marriages not falling under Article 41; and 35(5) when contracted through
mistake as to the identity of one of the contracting parties.

Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligation of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage and even if it manifested only after its
solemnization renders the marriage void. The Court provided for three characteristics of psychological incapacity
to stoll the exploitation of this provision which was deemed to be the most convenient way to end a marriage.
These are gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. These characteristics shall determine whether the
psychological incapacity in question is sufficient to render the marriage void.

Incestuous Marriages
Article 37 enumerates the instances of incenstuous ad void marriages. A marriage between two parties who are
relatives in direct line and in any degree is incenstuous, thus void from the very beginning, as well as a marriage
between two parties who are collateral relatives by 2nd degree regardless of legitimacy and whether of full or
half-blood.

Void Marriages by reason of Public Policy

On the other hand, Article 38 enumerates the instances of void marriage for reasons of public policy.

OCA Circular No. 157-2022-A

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

The Department of Foreign Affairs has furnished the Office of the Court Administrator with a compilation of
several foreign laws on marriage and divorce upon request of the latter due to the influx of requests for certified
true copies of divorce laws of foreign countries. This influx of requests is brought about by the growing number
of petitions for recognition of a foreign divorce decree filed before the Philippine courts. The said compilation is
now accessible through the official website of the Supreme Court for use and for reference, subject to prevailing
 jurisprudence and court issuances, in the resolution of petitions for recognition and enforcement of foreign
divorce decrees.

CASE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

1. SALUD R. ARCA and ALFREDO JAVIER JR., plaintiffs-appellees, versus. ALFREDO JAVIER, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-6768 , July 31, 1954 , BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T

In this case, a foreign divorce decree was rendered ineffective in the Philippine jurisdiction because the foreign court that rendered
the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff. A court acquires jurisdiction over a divorce case when the plaintiff is
domiciled in the State where the petition was filed. The Supreme Court ruled that the husband never acquired legal residence in the
US since he never had any intention of residing there. Residing in another country for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce cannot
be considered a bona fide residence and is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.

It is important to highlight that the facts of the case took place during the time of the American Colonial Rule. R.A 2710, which was
passed by the Philippine Legislature in 1917, allowed divorce on the ground of criminal convictions for adultery or concubinage. A
divorce decree predicated on any other ground cannot be enforced in the Philippines as the Sovereignty Principle was already
adopted under Article 11 of the Old Civil Code. Desertion, which was the ground for the divorce decree in this case, was not
considered a valid ground by the Supreme Court as it would have rendered nugatory our prohibitive laws concerning the status of
persons.

2. PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant v. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees

G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, REYES, J.B.L, J:

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

 The Supreme Court ruled that there subsisted a valid marriage between plaintiff and defendant despite the issuance of the divorce
decree in the United States, this was due to the fact that defendant was still a Filipino citizen at the time the decree was issued.
Hence, Art. 15 of the Civil Code which provides that, “laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad”. Therefore, the defendant, still being
a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce decree was issued, was governed by Philippine laws by virtue of the Nationality Principle.
3.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, Petitioner -versus – HON. MAUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. and RICHARD UPTON, Respondents,

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985, MELENCIO-HERRERA. J.

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Pursuant to the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil Code, the policy against absolute divorces cover only Philippine
nationals. Aliens, however, may obtain divorces abroad for as long as it is valid according to their national law. Therefore, private
respondent in this case, who is an American citizen, validly obtained a divorce pursuant to the law of Nevada.

4.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

G.R. No. 80116, SECOND DIVISION, June 30, 1989, REGALAGO, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides that the crimes of adultery and concubinage can only be legally filed by
the offended spouse. The Court, applying the doctrinal rule in the Loftus case, emphasized that the status and capacity of the
complainant indubitably exists as of the time he initiates the action and is an indispensable element for the case to prosper. However,
in the present case, the Court cited the case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, jr., et.al. wherein it explained that a spouse who successfully
acquired a foreign decree of divorce cannot subsequently file a case for adultery or concubinage against the accused spouse. Thus,
 the severance of the marital bond entails that there is no longer any spousal relationship between the petitioner and the respondent
which can be the basis of the latter’s complaint for adultery.

5.
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998| BELLOSILLO, J.:

By: Filipino Borra

Aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided that they are valid in their national law. This
also applies to a Filipino who later loses his Filipino citizenship and acquires a foreign citizenship. He shall be considered as an alien
hence, the divorce he obtains abroad shall be binding in the Philippines. In this case, in order to determine whether or not Petitioner
is entitled to a hereditary share as a spouse, the issue of her citizenship at the time the divorce was decreed arose: If she is still a
Filipino at the time of the divorce decree, the divorce is not valid, hence she is entitled to inherit as a spouse; if she is no longer a
Filipino, the divorce is valid, hence she is not entitled.

6. PAULA T. LLORENTE, Petitioner -versus- COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, Respondent. G.R. No.
124371, November 23, 2000, PARDO, J.:

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

In view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons under Art. 15 NCC, divorce obtained abroad by an alien
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as such alien is concerned provided, however, that such divorce is valid according to the
alien’s national law.

In this case, the deceased alien obtained a valid divorce abroad. Thus, the same shall be valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity.
7. GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001, PANGANIBAN, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

 Our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments. Thus, a divorce decree obtained abroad by a foreigner may
only be recognized in our jurisdiction when such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner, and both the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it are alleged and proven as facts in accordance with our rules on evidence, specifically Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Respondent did not comply with our rules on proof. Consequently, he failed to establish
the validity of the divorce decree according to Australian marital laws, and his legal capacity to marry petitioner as a result of said
divorce decree cannot be ascertained without a remand of the case to the trial court to receive further evidence.

8. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus- CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, Quisumbing, J.

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

Paragraph of 2 of Article 26 of the FC should be interpreted to include parties who are filipino citizen at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, but later on, one of them became a naturalized foreign citizen and that foreign citizen obtained a divorce decree in his
or her country. The legislative intent is to avoid a situation where a Filipino spouse remains married to an alien spouse, where in truth
the alien spouse is no longer married to the Filipino. The reckoning point of citizenship in consideration with Par. 2 article 26 is the
time the valid divorce was obtained abroad by the alien spouse which capacitates the filipino to remarry. However, like all foreign
law and foreign divorce decree obtained abroad, it must be offered as evidence and be proven in court for it to be applicable to the
filipino spouse.
9. EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, - versus - FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007, Ynares-Santiago, J.

By: Areta, Karen M.

Marriage must be a mutual and shared commitment. It cannot produce an effect where one is released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Following the case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., where the divorce obtained by the alien spouse is
considered valid and capacitates the Filipino spouse to remarry, Felicisimo was allowed to remarry his third wife. Felicidad, as the
third wife, holds legal personality to petition for letters of administration. She is an interested party to the estate by virtue of her
cohabitation with the deceased.
 Since the divorce and subsequent marriage were governed by foreign laws, the same must be alleged and proved before the court. If
Felicidad can only prove the validity of the divorce, then Art. 144 of the Old Civil Code shall be applied. The properties acquired
during cohabitation are considered shared in equal portions. If she fails to prove both the divorce and marriage, then Art. 148 of the
Family Code shall be applied. It shall be a limited co-ownership where co-ownership only extends to the actual contribution of
money, property, or industry.

10. . GERBERT R. CORPUS, Petitioner, -versus- DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
respondents.
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, Brion J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua C.

Article 407 of the Civil Code provides that acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of a person shall be recorded
in the civil register. Article 408 provides a list of events which must be entered into the civil registry. Additionally, Article 412, as
amended by R.A 9048, provides that no entry of in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court provides for a proceeding which can be used to simultaneously address the issue of recognition of a foreign
judgment and the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

In this case, Gerbert Corpus, a naturalized Canadian Citizen, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Gerbert left for Canada soon after their
wedding. When he returned to the Philippines, he was shocked that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Thus he
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce, which was granted. Sometime after, he found another Filipina woman to whom he
wanted to marry. He, then, went to the Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the divorce decree he obtained from Canada.
The Civil Registrar, despite registration, informed that the divorce decree must be first judicially recognized by a competent court.
The RTC, however, denied Gerbert’s petition
.
The Supreme Court ruled that despite Articles 407 and that the divorce decree must be entered in the civil registry, the submission of
the decree to a civil registry does not ipso facto authorize the registration of said decree. It must first be judicially recognized before
it can be enforced in the Philippines.
 Additionally, the court pronounced that a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding for cancellation
of entries in the civil registry. With that said, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides for the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements needed before a decree may be annotated in the civil registry.

However, the Court have clarified that there is no need for 2 separate proceeding for recognition of foreign decree and another for
cancellation of entry under Rule 108. The Court stated that the recognition of a foreign decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
since the object of said proceeding is the establishment of the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Additionally, it serves as a
proper adversarial proceeding.

11. DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014, PEREZ, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

It is an elementary rule that courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments, thus, the same must be duly alleged and
proved as facts under the rules on evidence. Without a valid recognition of the divorce decree, the parties to such marriage remain to
be legally married in the Philippines. In this case, only the divorce decree was presented without the required certificates to prove its
authenticity and the California law on divorce was not presented as well, thus, the parties are still considered married in the
Philippines.

12.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus – MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221029 , April 24, 2018, J. Peralta.

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

The Supreme Court in this case ruled that a Filipino spouse who initiated and filed for divorce abroad from an alien spouse has the
right to remarry and such foreign divorce decree may be recognized in our jurisdiction. The rationale behind this is to prevent the
anomaly when the Filipino spouse remains married while the foreign spouse has the right to remarry under his national law. Hence,
 Article 26 (2) shall not make any distinction whether the divorce proceeding is initiated by the foreign spouse or the Filipino spouse
as both situations would produce the same result upon the Filipino spouse.

Justice Caguioa’s dissenting opinion: Justice Caguioa, in his dissenting opinion, opined that Article 26 (2) of the Family Code should
not be construed liberally as to allow a Filipino spouse to initiate and obtain a divorce decree against his or her foreign spouse. To do
so and thereafter allow recognition of such foreign divorce decree in Philippine jurisdiction would violate the standing public policy
against absolute divorce and the nationality principle under Article 15 of the New Civil Code.

Justice Leonen’s concurring opinion: Justice Leonen, in his concurring opinion, agrees that Article 26 (2) of the Family Code does
not distinguish whether the divorce was initiated by the Filipino or foreign spouse. Regardless of who obtained the divorce decree
abroad, upon the issuance of the divorce decree, the foreign spouse is deemed to have obtained a divorce which capacitates him or
her to remarry.
13. STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner -versus- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 224015 July 23, 2018, PERALTA, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

Art. 26(2) of the Family Code is an exception to the Nationality Principle found under Art. 15 of the New Civil Code providing that
all Filipino citizens are covered by the prohibition against absolute divorce and a divorce decree obtained by a Filipino abroad finds
no recognition under Philippine Law. Under Art. 26(2) of the Family Code, the divorce decree obtained by a foreigner abroad may be
extended to the Filipino spouse provided that the divorce decree and personal law of the foreign spouse allowing such decree is
properly pleaded and proved.
While Justice Caguioa concurs with the result of the case, he does not agree that Republic v. Manalo is on all-fours applicable in this
case because in the cited case, it was the Filipino spouse who initiated a divorce decree before a Japanese court to which was granted,
unlike in this case where both of the parties obtained a divorce decree by virtue of an agreement before a Japanese court. He posits
that Art. 26(2) is merely for the benefit of Filipino spouses who would be unjustifiably stuck in a marriage with a foreign spouse who
becomes capacitated to marry by virtue of the foreign divorce decree. Accordingly, he does not agree that there should be no
distinction as to whether the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding.

14.
IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE BETWEEN MINURO TAKAHASHI AND JULIET
 RENDORA MORAÑA, JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, Petitioner, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
GR No. 227605, December 5, 2019, LAZARO-JAVIER,J.

By: Lavarias, Hailord N.

A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized in the Philippines although it was the Filipino spouse who obtained the same.

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that even assuming that petitioner Moraña, the Filipino spouse, was the one who secured the
divorce decree, the same does not militate against her, as denying her petition would run counter to the spirit of Art. 26 of the Family
Code, which is to prevent a situation where the Filipino spouse of a foreign national who was granted divorce would remain married
under Philippine law.

15. CYNTHIA A. GALAPON, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020, CAGUIOA, J.
By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

In this case, the sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of said divorce decree and the governing
national law of her husband Park was not put in issue.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that it becomes unnecessary to delve into the admissibility and probative value of Abigail's testimony
claiming that Cynthia had been constrained to consent to the divorce.

16.
EDNA S. KONDO, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, LUZVIMINDA S. PINEDA, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL, Respondent.

G.R. No. 223628, March 04, 2020, LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

 The court emphasized that in matters affecting lives of families, procedural rules should not override substantial justice. The court
again granted liberality as it did in cases involving the recognition of foreign decrees to Fiilipinos in mixed marriages and free them
from one which they remain as the sole party. Jurisprudence provides that a Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry
once it is proven that the foreign divorce was validly obtained and that the foreign spouse's national law considers the dissolution of
the marital relationship to be absolute. The Filipino spouse (Rancho v. Tanaka). Moreover, the court held that a person’s status is in
rem and thus, res judicata cannot apply. The petitioner should simply refile the case if dismissed.

17. CRISTITA ANABAN, CRISPINA ANABAN, PUREZA ANABAN, CRESENCIA ANABAN-WALANG, and ROSITA
ANABAN-BARISTO, Petitioner -versus- BETTY ANABAN-ALFILER, MERCEDES ANABAN, and MARCELO ANABAN,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 249011, March 15, 2021, LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

A valid divorce can be granted only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710 i.e. adultery and concubinage. Thus,
when a divorce is based on customs and practices, it cannot be legally recognized as it is not among the grounds provided for in Act
No. 2710.

In this case, the divorce was granted by the elders of the indigenous tribe on the grounds of insanity. Consequently, the same cannot
be recognized for the same is contrary to law. Thus, the subsequent marriage is void for being bigamous.
18. Paul Ambrose, Petitioner -versus- Louella Suque-Ambrose, Respondent,
G.R. No. 206761, June 23, 2021, J. Gaerlan
By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

Section 2 of the “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) states that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
It does not make a distinction whether such petition may be filed by a citizen of the Philippines or a foreigner.

In this case, the Court ruled that petitioner, a citizen of the United States, has the legal capacity to file the petition for declaration of
 nullity of marriage. Either of the contracting parties may file a petition to declare the marriage void, even if the one filing said
petition is a foreigner.

19. Raemark S. Abel, Petitioner, vs. Mindy P. Rule, Office of the Civil Registry General-Philippine Statistics Authority, and The
City Civil Registry Office of Manila, and All Other Persons Having or Claiming Any Interest, Respondents.
G.R. No. 234457, May 12, 2021, Leonen, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

Article 26 does not provide that there is an additional requirement for an alien spouse to solely obtain the divorce. Moreover, when
there is a foreign divorce between a Filipino and an alien, it is irrelevant which spouse initiated the divorce proceeding giving light to
the equality of women and men. Thus, once a divorce decree is issued by a competent foreign court, the alien spouse is deemed to
have obtained the divorce as required in Article 26(2) of the Family Code.

LEGAL SEPARATION

TOPIC GIST OF SPECIAL LAW

1. Grounds for legal separation – Art. 55 FC, RA 9262

Legal Separation
1. Grounds for By: Salazar, Angelynn
legal separation
– Art. 55 FC, Article 55 of the Family Code provides that a petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
RA 9262 grounds:
1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or
a child of the petitioner;
2. Defenses in 2. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
actions for legal 3. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
separation – FC engage in propstitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
56, 60 4. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
 5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(a) Consent - FC 56(2); 6. Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
NCC 100 7. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(b) Condonation - FC 9. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
56(1) 10. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
(c) Recrimination - FC In instances 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9, the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
56(4) Children Act of 2004 (VAWC) will be applicable. Particularly, the Cooling-Off Period is not applicable, pursuant
to the VAWC. Likewise, the VAWC provisions state that there must be no attempt at reconciliation.
(d) Collusion/Mutual
Consent - FC 60, FC
As to the ground of concubinage, it must be noted that criminal conviction is not necessary, and only
56(3), (5), compare with
preponderance of evidence is required. Additionally, a civil action for legal separation may proceed ahead of or
NCC 101 and 221(3)
simultaneously with a criminal action.
(e) Prescription, FC Art.
57 2. Defenses in actions for legal separation - Article 56 of the Family Code and Article 60 of the Family Code

3. Court By: Corpus, Rebecca

procedure in
legal separation Article 56 of the Family Code provides that no petition for legal separation shall be granted when any of the
grounds are present:
FC 58-60
(1) Condonation - when there is condonation of the offense or act complained of by the aggrieved party
Sec 19, RA 9262 (2) Consent - when there is consent on the part of the aggrieved party to the commission of the offense or act
complained of. According to People v. Schneckenberger, consent is given prior to the act.
No confession of (3) Connivance - when the parties connived with each other in the commission of the offense or act constituting
judgment, FC 48; cf. legal separation
NCC 2035 (4) Recrimination - when both parties committed an offense or act constituting legal separation
(5) Collusion - when the parties colluded with each other to obtain the decree of legal separation
4. Effect of (6) Prescription- when the action is barred by prescription.
pendency of the
petition Article 60 of the Family Code provides another defense in legal separation. According to said provision, legal
 separation shall not be decreed based on stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
(a) cooling-off period,
FC 58 Legal Separation: (2) Defenses in actions for legal separation
(a) Consent - Art. 56 of the Family Code and Art. 100 of the New Civil Code
(b) right of consortium,
FC 61 par. 1 By: Martin, Dominic
(c) administration of Art. 56 of the Family Code
property, FC 61 par. 2 When the aggrieved spouse gives his or her consent to the guilty spouse in the commission of adultery or
concubinage, the former may not file a petition for legal separation. Meaning to say, when the wife allowed her
(d) Support and custody
husband to have a mistress, to whom the latter lives and begets a child, the former may not file a petition for legal
pendente lite
separation because she gave her consent to such misconduct.
5. Effects of decree of
legal separation Art. 100 of the NCC
Only an innocent spouse who does not condone or consent to the adultery or concubinage of the guilty spouse
(a) On personal may claim legal separation. However, neither of the spouses may claim legal separation if both of them are
relations, FC 63 offenders of adultery or concubinage. The action for legal separation must be dismissed if there is collusion
between the spouses with regard to the procurement of the decree of legal separation. Thus, where both spouses
(b) On the custody of cohabit and/or beget a child with another person other than his/her spouse shall be barred from claiming legal
children, FC 63(3); FC separation because only an innocent spouse may obtain a decree of legal separation. The same consequence shall
213 be met if there is collusion between them in obtaining such decree.

(c) On property (b) Condonation - Article 56(1) of the Family Code

relations, FC 63(2), FC By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.
64, FC Art. 102 (4), 129
(7) Condonation is a conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife, of a matrimonial offense, which the
other has committed. It is conditional since it is subject to an implied condition that the party forgiven will abstain
(d) On support, FC 198 from the commission of the like offense thereafter. It is forgiveness after the commission of the offense or act
complained of and not before. Condonation may be express or implied. It is express when it is manifested in
(e) On the use of words or writing and it is implied when it can be deduced from the conduct of the offended spouse showing
surname, NCC 372 intention to forgive.
 (c) Recrimination - FC 56(4)
(f) On hereditary rights,
FC 63(4) By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

8. Reconciliation, FC Recrimination under Article 56, Paragraph 4 of the Family Code is an instance when a petition for legal separation
65 should be denied where both parties have given ground for legal separation. It is a defense in a suit for legal
separation, claiming that the complainant is likewise guilty of an offense that is a ground for legal separation.
9. Effects of
reconciliation, FC 65, However, the case of Ong v. Ong provides that recrimination does not apply if the complainant spouse, for
66, 67 instance, abandons the family and such abandonment is done for a justifiable cause. In this case, the wife left the
family due to the husband’s abusive conduct. Thus, since her abandonment is for a justifiable cause, it is not a
ground for legal separation and, consequently, cannot be used to avail of the defense provided in Article 56(4) of
the Family Code.

d) Collusion/Mutual Consent - FC 60, FC 56(3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 221(3)

By: Dazo, John Xavier L. and Buencamino, Pio Vincent

Article 60 of the Family Code and Article 101 of the New Civil Code

Both Article 60 of the Family Code and Article 101 of the New Civil Code are emphatic that no decree of legal
separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In fact, Art. 221 (3)
shows that the law recognizes as void every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of
marriage.

According to Tolentino, when a decree of legal separation is promulgated because of the collusion of the parties,
the Court is defrauded and its decision is contrary to public policy. Therefore, the decree of legal separation in that
case is void.

With respect to collusion, Article 60 of the Family Code provides that the prevention of collusion between the
parties is always mandatory in any case, even if both parties are present during trial. This provision is broad
enough to authorize the prosecuting attorney to oppose the application for legal separation if, in his opinion, the
evidence is fabricated or suppressed. On the other hand, Article 101 of the New Civil Code provides that the
inquiry as to whether or not collusion exists shall only be ordered by the court in case of the non-appearance of
the defendant.

With respect to evidence, Article 60 of the Family Code provides that it is mandatory for the prosecuting attorney
to ensure that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. On the contrary, Article 101 of the New Civil Code
provides that the prosecuting attorney shall ensure that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated only in case
there is no collusion between the parties.

(e) Prescription, FC Art. 57

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Article 57 of the Family Code provides that an action for legal separation ought to be filed within five (5) years
from the time of the occurrence of the cause. This impacts Article 102 of the Civil Code where a double
prescription is provided. Under the latter, the action must be filed within one (1) year from the discovery of the
cause but not later than five (5) years from its occurrence. It would thus, by way of discovery, serve to shorten the
period rather than lengthen it. The Family Code now effectively provides for an absolute prescriptive period of
five (5) years regardless of the knowledge of the cause as the law seeks to preserve marriage. This, however,
makes the stability of marriage precarious, as it entails that one ought to maintain vigilance during the course of
marriage.

Legal Separation; Articles 58-60, Family Code

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

The law provides for a “cooling-off” period before an action for legal separation can be tried. The Family Code,
specifically under Article 58, dictates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.” From the import of the law, it is clear that the court
where the action is pending is precluded from hearing the suit and should take steps toward reconciliation of the
parties. However, by way of exception, the requirement of six months cooling-off period shall not apply in cases
of legal separation where violence, as specified in R.A. No. 9262 is alleged. In such cases, the court shall proceed
on the main case and other incidents of the case as soon as possible, and the hearing on any application for
protection order filed by petitioner must be conducted within the mandatory period provided under the law.

The law also prohibits the decree of legal separation based on stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
Such prohibition is grounded on the fact that the institution of marriage and of the family are sacred, such that the
law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State to uphold the integrity and sanctity
of marital bonds. However, the Court shall in any case order the prosecuting attorney to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties.

Sec. 19, Republic Act No. 9262

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

After filing an action for legal separation, it shall not be tried for a period of six months for the purpose of
possible reconciliation of the parties under Article 58 of the Family Code. However, under Sec. 19 of Republic
Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, the six-month period does not
apply wherein violence was alleged in the action for legal separation.

No confession of judgment, FC 48; cf. NCC 2035

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denise H.
Article 48 of the Family Code talks about the possibility of stipulation of facts (facts agreed upon and signed by
both the husband and wife) or a confession of judgment (a statement by the erring spouse to the effect that he or
she is not against the annulment.) These are strictly prohibited and no judgment shall be based upon such. Thus,
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated nor suppressed. This is
because the State has interest in the marriage as the foundation of the family. The fact that marriage is not a mere
contract but an inviolable social institution, the State must protect and preserve the marriage.

This is further provided under Art. 2035 of the New Civil Code which states that no compromise upon the
following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
 (5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)

In the case of Ocampo v. Florencio, the SC held that even though there is confession of judgment or stipulation of
facts, the Court may render a judgment annulling the marriage if sufficient evidence is presented.

Effect of pendency of the petition

(a) cooling-off period, FC 58

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

Under this article, the spouse filing legal separation shall wait for six (6) months before their case be tried. This
cooling-off period as a general rule does not apply if the ground of the petition constitutes violence under R.A.
No. 9269 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004) where the court must immediately hear the
case. Further, this period will not prevent the court from hearing a motion for preliminary injunction preventing
respondent from managing the exclusive property of a petitioner nor effect custody, support and other remedies
(de la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil 13). As a consequence of this cooling off period, the defendant cannot be defaulted
before the 6-month period.

(b) right of consortium, FC 61 par. 1

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

The spouses’ right of consortium or of the companionship of the spouses stops after the filing of the petition for
legal separation. Hence, during the pendency of the petition, the spouses are entitled to live separately from each
other.

(c) administration of property, FC 61 par. 2

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

An administrator of the absolute community or conjugal partnership property shall be appointed by the court in
the absence of a written agreement between the spouses. The administrator may be either of the spouses or a third
person. The said court appointed administrator shall have the same powers and duties as that of a guardian under
the Rules of Court.
 Effects of decree of legal separation

( a ) On personal relations, FC 63

By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

The decree of legal separation entitles the spouses to live separately from each other but the marriage between
them is not severed by the decree. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage, authorizing the parties to
remarry. A spouse will still be held criminally liable for bigamy, concubinage, or adultery because the marriage
bond exists despite the decree of legal separation.

( b ) On custody of children, FC Art. 63(3), FC Art. 213

By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

It is the innocent spouse who has the right of custody over minor children. However, under the tender age
doctrine, a child under seven years of age shall be under the custody of his or her mother unless the court finds
compelling reason to grant otherwise. The court should give utmost consideration to the circumstances which will
be most beneficial for the children when designating the parent who shall exercise parental authority.

( c ) On property relations, FC 63(2), FC 64, FC Art. 102 (4), 129 (7)

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T., Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A. and Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

FC 63(2)

With respect to the effects of a decree of legal separation on property relations, Article 63 Paragraph 2 of the
Family Code mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property regime. The dissolution and liquidation of
the property regime automatically takes effect upon the decree of legal separation. The automaticity of the
dissolution is a necessary consequence of legal separation.

The offending offense shall have no right to any share of the net profits of the community property or the conjugal
partnership property. The share of the offending spouse is instead forfeited in favor of the common children. In the
absence of which, it will be forfeited to the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage. In default of
children, the innocent spouse will be entitled to such shares.

FC 64

Art. 64 of the Family Code talks about the revocation of the innocent spouse which he or she made in favor of the
offending spouse, together with the designation of the offending spouse as a beneficiary in any insurance policy,
even when the designation is expressly stipulated to be irrevocable. This can be done once the decree of legal
separation is already final. Moreover, this revocation must be recorded in the registries of property in the place
where the properties subject of the donation are located.
This must be read together with Art. 86(4) of the Family Code which talks about donation propter nuptias made
by a third party. Such donation may be revoked by the donor when the donee is the guilty spouse in case of legal
separation.

FC Article 102 (4)

When an absolute community of property governs the property regime of the spouses, the net remainder of which
refers to the net assets. The net assets will be divided between the spouses equally, unless the marriage settlement
provides for another division or unless there is a voluntary waiver such share. To compute the net profits, the
following steps must be taken:
a) At the time for the absolute community’s dissolution, the market value of the same should be obtained.
b) Deduct all debts and obligations of the absolute community from the total market value of all
properties
c) The result of the preceding procedures will be the net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community otherwise known as “net assets”
d) Get the net profits by deducting the market value of the properties at the time of marriage

FC Article 129 (7)

As part of the procedure of liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership, after all debts and obligations have been paid
and the exclusive property and all necessary reimbursements have been paid from the conjugal funds, the net
remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall be considered as profits. Such profits must be divided
equally between the spouses, unless a different proportion or division is indicated in the marriage settlement or a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such shares was made as provided in the Family Code.

(d) On Support, FC 198

By: Borra, Filipino

The obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases after final judgment granting the petition.

In case of legal separation, however, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent
one. The terms of such order must be specified.

(e) On the use of surname, NCC 372

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

It is mandated that the wife still continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.

(f) On hereditary rights, FC 63(4)

fangon
By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

The guilty spouse is disqualified to succeed the innocent spouse. Thus, he cannot inherit from the innocent spouse
in both testate and intestate succession, and he is not even entitled to the legitime. Testamentary dispositions in his
favor contained in a will executed by the innocent spouse before the decree of legal separation becomes ipso jure
inoperative. However, if the will is executed by the innocent spouse after the decree, the disposition in favor of the
guilty spouse shall be valid.

8. Reconciliation, FC 65

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

 Article 65 of the Family Code provides that after a decree of legal separation has been decided and the parties
decide to reconcile, the parties shall file a joint manifestation under oath and duly signed by them. The same shall
be filed in the same court which heard the proceeding for legal separation.

9. Effects of reconciliation, FC 65, 66, 67

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua C. and Areta, Karen M.

Art. 65 of the Family Code requires a joint manifestation under oath and duly-signed by the parties to be filed
with the court in the proceedings for legal separation. This entails that resumption of marital relations or conjugal
life cannot be implied by living together again. For reconciliation to produce effect, a joint manifestation must be
filed with the court.

With the filing of a joint manifestation, Art. 66 of the Code provides an effect of terminating the proceedings for
legal separation. If the joint manifestation for reconciliation is filed while the proceeding is pending, then it shall
be terminated. If the same is filed after the final decree of legal separation, then the decree shall be set aside. As a
general rule, all orders included in the decree shall produce no effect. As an exception, the property relations
between the spouses will subsist unless the parties agree to revive their former property regime.

In the event that spouses agree to revive the former property regime, an agreement must be filed with the same
court. Art. 67 of the Family Code requires the agreement to specify the properties to be contributed to the former
property regime and those that will remain as separate. The names of all known creditors, with their addresses and
amount owed, must be specified as well. Before deciding on the agreement to revive the former property regime,
the court must take the necessary measures to protect the interests of the creditors. Nonetheless, the law provides
that creditors not listed or notified in the order will not be prejudiced.

CASE CASE DOCTRINE

No.

20. VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, respondent.

GR 166357, September 19, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.
 By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Respondent’s alleged habits which exhibits her immaturity and irresponsibility, her frequent neglect in performing her essential
marital and familial obligations, her sexual infidelity per se, and the acrimony which transpired between her and her husband, do not
sufficiently prove her psychological incapacity. The Supreme Court ruled that while there may be grounds for legal separation, there
is no sufficient basis to prove psychological incapacity which voids their marriage.

However, a motion for reconsideration was filed and the ruling in this case was reversed. In 2015, a declaration of nullity was
declared which renders the marriage of Kalaw and Fernandez null and void ab ibitio. The Court ruled that expert witnesses have
sufficiently and competently proved psychological incapacity of Fernandez utilizing the standards pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.

21. BBB,* Petitioner, vs. AAA,* Respondent.

G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015, Reyes, J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

AAA had a first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy named CCC. BBB and AAA then bore two more children, DDD and
EEE, and later married to legalize their relationship.

Citing economic and psychological abuse under RA 9262, AAA filed an application for the issuance of a TPO which became a PPO.
The Court now seeks to solve the issues whether or not the custody and support of DDD and EEE may be subject of a compromise
agreement, and whether or not CCC is entitled to support from BBB despite the latter not being his father.

Cases filed under the provisions of RA 9262 cannot be the subject of compromise agreements. Sec. 23(d) - A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20
expressly prohibits the compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against women. The rationale of which is that the
process of mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is at fault.
 Lastly, CCC is entitled to receive support from BBB. Here, the parties did not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s biological
father. Thus, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after AAA and BBB’s marriage. Under Art. 177 of the FC - "only children
conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated." However, for the purpose of resolving the issue, the principle of estoppel finds
application and now bars BBB from evading responsibility and thus, is bound by his previous representations.

22. CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias
EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972 REYES J.B.L., J.:

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

Marriage is a personal status. Death dissolves the marriage relations between the spouses and likewise, a petition for legal separation
cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it happens prior to the decree. Article 106(4) states that the offending party shall be
disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Even so, since these are mere effects of the decree of a legal separation,
without the decree these rights are inexistent.

In this case, the Court held that the petition for legal separation was deemed abated following the death of the plaintiff before the
issuance of the decree. Likewise, the petition for a declaration of the marriage as void ab initio is moot and academic upon the death
of Carmen.

23. SOCORRO MATUBIS, Petitioner -versus – ZOILO PRAXEDES, Respondent.

G.R. No. L-11766, October 25, 1960, PAREDES, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

Article 100 of the New Civil Code provides that legal separation may only be claimed by the innocent spouse, provided that there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. However, in this case, it was aptly proven that the parties entered
into an agreement which expressly consented to the commission of concubinage of the spouse, thus, the complaint for legal separation
 on the grounds of concubinage cannot be granted.

24. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS,
defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933 BUTTE, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

A husband who has been absent for a long period of time and has knowledge of the adulterous act of his wife but failed to take any
action against the latter during the said period is barred from instituting a criminal action for adultery. The words “do whatever you
want” signifies consent and consent given prior to the act is a valid defense in a legal separation case, as provided under Article 56 of
the Family Code.

25. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL .,

defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 48183 | November 10, 1941 | Moran, J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

The grounds for legal separation, as enshrined in Art. 55 of the Family Code include contracting a bigamous marriage and sexual
infidelity. Bigamy and concubinage are two distict offenses, the former being an offense against civil status, and the latter being an
offense against chastity. Consequently, the defense of double jeopardy in the case of concubinage is not tenable.

However, it must be noted that the agreement of the spouses to live separately “in complete freedom of action at any act and in all
concepts”, although illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes express consent which in turn relieves the guilty
spouse of any liability in the crime of concubinage.

26. BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, v. LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-10033. December 28, 1956 FELIX, J.
 By: Corpus, Rebecca

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. Under Article 100 of the Civil Code,
now Article 56 of the Family Code, the petition for legal separation shall be denied when the aggrieved party has condoned the
offense or act complained of. The husband’s act of sleeping with his wife for two nights despite his alleged belief that she was
unfaithful to him is tantamount to condonation. According to American Jurisprudence, the general rule provides that there is
conclusive evidence of condonation when there is cohabitation with the guilty party after the commission of the offense with the
injured party’s knowledge or belief of said commission.

27. WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant, v. JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957 REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Martin, Dominic

Collusion - There is collusion in procuring a decree of legal separation between married persons when they mutually consent it by
means of (1) preconcerted commission of a matrimonial offense, or (2) by an agreement not to defend the divorce proceeding. The
wife being in default, and the fact that both of them are guilty of concubinage/adultery, gave rise to the circumstantial evidence of
collusion in procuring legal separation. In cases of uncontested proceeding for legal separation, it is the policy of Art. 101 of the NCC
that the fiscal intervenes to shed light upon any relevant matter that may help the court to fully justify the grant or denial of the decree
for legal separation.

Prescription - The lapse of 10 years bars a person from filing a petition for legal separation. The prescriptive period under Art. 102 of
the NCC only allows the plaintiff to file a petition for legal separation 1 year from having knowledge of the cause, and 5 years from
when the cause occurred. Moreover, the failure to raise the defense of prescription by the other spouse, is of no moment because the
courts may raise it on its own since an action for legal separation involves public interest.

28. JOSE DE OCAMPO, Petitioner – versus – SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, Respondent.

G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960, Bengzon, J.:

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

 Articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code provides that there will be no decree of legal separation granted upon condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage or upon stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

The admission of adultery to the fiscal, in the existence of adultery other than the confession, is not the confession defined under the
above mentioned provisions. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment which usually happens in court or through a pleading. If
there is evidence of adultery independent of the confession, the separation decree should be granted since it would not be based on the
confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is the judgment based solely on the defendant’s
confession. The Court further ruled that the failure of the husband to actively search for his wife does not constitute condonation or
consent to adultery since it was the wife who left him. Hence, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home.

29. JAIME ARAZA Y JARUPAY , Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 247429, September 08, 2020, Peralta, C.J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of
emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the
psychological violence done by her abuser. The law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish
emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such
experiences are personal to this party.

In this case, the Court ruled that marital infidelity – a form of psychological violence – is the proximate cause of AAA's emotional
anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was adversely affected. Thus, Araza is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.
30.
ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.
GR 157854, November 12, 2012, Bersamin, J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, a judgment must always be based on the totality of evidence
adduced and not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties. The totality of evidence must sufficiently prove that the
psychological incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing prior to the time of the marriage. In relation, it must further be able to
show that the psychological affliction indicates a total incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations.

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by petitioner was insufficient to prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations. The expert testimony on respondent’s psychological profile was solely
based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him provided by petitioner and her witnesses. Nevertheless,
the alleged emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual infidelity, and criminal offenses of respondent did not constitute a case of
psychological incapacity. Hence, the expert evidence presented in court neither established the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity nor proved that it existed prior to the time of the marriage.

31. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent. Republic vs. Encelan, 688 SCRA 215,
G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013, Brion, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Primarily, unfaithfulness and abandonment as provided under Art 55 (8) and (10), respectively, of the Family Code (FC) are grounds
for legal separation. Sexual infidelity, per se, and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the FC as a
ground for the declaration of nullity of marriage. For the foregoing to constitute psychological incapacity, the unfaithfulness or
abandonment must be the symptoms of a condition suffered by the erring spouse that prevents him or her to comply with the
fundamental marital obligations.

In the present case, the allegation of unfaithfulness and abandonment of Cesar Encelan against his wife, Lolita Castillo-Encelan was
 not shown to have prevented the latter from complying with the fundamental marital obligations.

32. BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO,
represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 176556. July 04, 2012. Reyes, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Where the marriage was celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, in the absence of a marriage settlement or when the
same is void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governs the property relations between the husband
and wife. Where such marriage was dissolved during the effectivity of the Family Code, the same law is given a retroactive effect
with respect to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities under Article 129 insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair the vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.

33. DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent

G.R. No. 188289, 20 August 2014, PEREZ, J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Before our courts can recognize a foreign judgment, its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our Rules on Evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law.

Therefore, a copy of the foreign divorce judgment must be proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. However, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence, and the required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce
decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
 WEEK # 5

THE FAMILY AND PATERNITY AND FILIATION

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
THE FAMILY

1.
EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, - versus - LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent

G.R. No. 137359, September 13, 2004, CARPIO, J.:

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T.

A Barangay Certification to File Action serves as substantial compliance to the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code
which requires that earnest efforts at a compromise be made before a suit between family members can prosper.

In this case, the petition for habeas corpus filed by the wife failed to allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings before
filing the same. She nevertheless attached a Barangay Certification to File Action in her petition and the Supreme Court considered
the same as sufficient.

2. HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner, v. HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUÑA and ALBERTO MORENO

G.R. NO. 154132, August 31, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J:

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

 Art. 151 of the Family Code should be applied only in cases between and among members of the same family, and such provision
may be invoked only by a party who is a member of the same family involved in the same case.

3.
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR., Petitioner -versus – JUANA GONZALES, et. al., Respondent

G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014, PEREZ. J.

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Article 151 of the Family Code was introduced to avoid the tragic spectacle of a litigation between members of one and the same
family, necessitating efforts to reach a compromise. However, the same provision is subject to the rule on deemed waiver, and
failure to allege earnest efforts is merely a defect in the statement of the cause of action. Therefore, such defect may be deemed
waived if no seasonable objection was made, such as in this case, when the proceedings had already ran the full course before the
trial court without any motion to dismiss, and with the defendants failing to invoke any objection in their answer to the complaint.

4.
JOSE Z. MORENO, petitioner, -versus- RENE M. KAHN, CONSUELO MORENO KAHN-HAIRE, RENE LUIS PIERRE
KAHN, PHILIPPINE KAHN, MA. CLAUDINE KAHN MCMAHON, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MUNTINLUPA CITY, respondents.

G.R. No. 217744, SECOND DIVISION, July 30, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

Article 151 of the Family Code shall be applicable to suits filed exclusively between or among the “members of the same family”
and inapplicable to cases that cannot be subject to compromise under the Civil Code. In consideration of Article 151 of the Family
Code being an exception to the general rule, this provision must be construed strictly in every case. Such that any person having a
collateral familial relation with the plaintiff other than those enumerated under Article 150 of the Family Code is considered as a
stranger who, if included in a suit between and among family members, would no longer require the earnest efforts towards a
 compromise requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code.

5. GAW CHIN TY, VICENTE GAW CHUA, ROBERT GAW CHUA, MANUEL GAW CHUA, ALEJANDRO GAW CHUA,
MARIO GAW CHUA, and JACQUELINE GAW CHUA , petitioners, vs. ANTONIO GAW CHUA, respondent

G.R. No. 212598, September 29, 2021, FIRST DIVISION, J.Y. LOPEZ, J.

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

Article 151 provides for a condition precedent that an earnest effort towards compromise must be made before a suit may prosper
against members of the same family. However, this rule will not apply to cases not subject to compromise under Article 2035 of
the New Civil Code. Petitioners cannot compromise on the validity of the new owner’s duplicate title because it was issued and
granted by the RTC, and pursuant to Article 2035(5) of the Civil Code, the jurisdiction of the courts cannot be subject to a
compromise. Therefore, it is not fatal if they fail to allege compliance with Article 151.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
FAMILY HOME

6.
PERLA G. PATRICIO, Petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Second Division, Respondents.

G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

By: Filipino Borra

Art 159 states that Family Home shall continue for 10 years despite the death of both spouses or the unmarried head of the family,
or while there is a minor beneficiary still living therein. 3 requisites must concur for a minor to benefit from Art 159: 1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the FC; 2) they live in the family home; 3) they are dependent for support upon the head of
 the family. Here, the 1st two requisites are present as the minor is a grandchild living in the Family Home. However, the minor is
not dependent on the head of the family -the surviving grandmother, but on his own father, hence, the third requisite is not present.

7.
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA , petitioners, -versus- JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA,
respondent.

G.R. No. 177703, THIRD DIVISION, January 28, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

A family home is automatically instituted from the time of its occupation as a family residence. (Art. 153 FC) As such, it is
shielded from immediate partition. (Art. 159 FC) The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot
subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.

8. JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER
ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.

G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, GANCAYCO, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

Family homes are deemed constituted by operation of law upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. However,
Arts. 152 and 153 of the Family Code will not apply retroactively to residences constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Code. Thus, if the debt or liability serving as the basis of a money judgment arose or was
incurred prior to August 3, 1988, the family home will not be exempt from execution.

9. SIMEON CABANG, VIRGINIA CABANG and VENANCIO CABANG ALIAS "DONDON", petitioners -versus- MR. &
MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY, respondents.
 G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

By: Concepcion Precious Dianne A.

The family home is generally exempt from execution, provided that it was duly constituted as such. As what happened in this case,
the family home cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third persons. The family home must be established
on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with
the consent of the other.

10. JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R. ROTHMAN, SONIA
R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, petitioners, -versus- DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO
SUMANG, LUCERO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO ANTENOR, respondents.

G.R. No. 185920, July 20, 2010, CARPIO MORALES, J.

By: Areta Karen M.

As a rule, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. However, for
debts incurred prior to the said date, the alleged family home must be shown to be constituted judicially or extrajudicially pursuant
to the Civil Code. In this case, the family home was constituted as early as 1944 but there was no proof that the Pandacan property
was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as family home. Thus, the exemption from execution cannot be availed of by the
petitioners.

11.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC., Petitioner vs. OJ-MARK TRADING AND SPOUSES OSCAR AND EVANGELINE
MARTINEZ, Respondents,

G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua.

 A mortgaged property owned by a family corporation cannot be exempted through a claim that said property is a family home. It
still cannot be exempted from claims, assuming that it is a family home, because Art. 155(3) allows execution or forced sale of a
family home for debts secured by mortgages on the said property before the constitution of the family home.

12.
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, Petitioner,
vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and
REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012, REYES, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

Although a family home is exempt from execution, such fact must still be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction. As such, the petitioners should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.

13. SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA , Petitioners, -versus- SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and
RONA LAPITAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 178288, FIRST DIVISION, August 15, 2012, DEL CASTILLO, J.
By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

Article 155(3) provides that a family home shall not be exempt from execution for debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution. Such exemption must be claimed by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a
reasonable time but certainly not after the expiration of the one-year period of redemption.

14. ENRICO S. EULOGIO and NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO, Petitioners -versus- PATERNO C. BELL, SR., ROGELIA
CALINGASAN-BELL, PATERNO WILLIAM BELL, JR., FLORENCE FELICIA VICTORIA BELL, PATERNO
 FERDINAND BELL III, and PATERNO BENERAÑO BELL IV, Respondents

G.R. No. 186322, FIRST DIVISION, July 08, 2015, SERENO, C.J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

The Family Code under Art. 153 and Art. 160 expressly provides that a family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment subject to the exceptions enumerated under Art. 155 such as non-payment of taxes, debts incurred by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution and others.

15. FLORANTE VITUG, Petitioner -versus- EVANGELINE A. ABUDA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016, LEONEN, J.

by: Lavarias, Hailord N.

In this case, even though petitioner's property has been constituted as a family home, it is not exempt from execution. Article 155
of the Family Code explicitly provides that debts secured by mortgages are exempted from the rule against execution, forced sale,
or attachment of family home.

16. FELICITAS L. SALAZAR, Petitioner, v. REMEDIOS FELIAS, ON HER OWN BEHALF AND REPRESENTATION OF
THE OTHER HEIRS OF CATALINO NIVERA, Respondents.
GR No. 213972, Feb 05, 2018, REYES, JR., J.

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

It is imperative that the claim for exemption from execution by reason of the property being a family home must be proven. There
must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It
 must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of
the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's
consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law
explicitly mandates that the occupancy of the family home, either by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be
actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or that which is merely
presumptive or constructive

CASE CASE DOCTRINE

No.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11767, May 06, 2022

AN ACT PROMOTING THE RIGHTS OF AND PROVIDING GREATER PROTECTIONS TO DESERTED OR

ABANDONED CHILDREN WITH UNKNOWN PARENTS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 276 AND
277 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND SPECIAL LAWS, RECOGNIZING THEIR STATUS AS
NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES, PROVIDING PENALTIES AGAINST ACTS INIMICAL TO
THEIR WELFARE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

R.A. No. 11767, also known as Foundling Recognition and Protection Act, provides that a foundling which is found in the
Philippines and/or in Philippines consulates and territories abroad is presumed a natural-born Filipino citizen regardless of the
status or circumstances of birth. Furthermore, this law must be read in relation to R.A. No. 11642, also known as Domestic
Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act, such that when the biological parents of the foundling cannot be
identified and located, the latter shall be declared legally available for adoption and the proceedings for such shall be governed
by the mentioned law. Lastly, once adopted, a foundling shall be considered for all intents and purposes as the legitimate child
of the adopter.
17. BELEN SAGAD ANGELES v. ALELI 'CORAZON' ANGELES MAGLAYA
GR NO. 153798, September 02, 2005, GARCIA, J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a legitimate child is a product of a valid and lawful marriage. However, this presumption
of legitimacy provided for under this provision may only be availed upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefore. Thus,
the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fied by law itself. Otherwise stated, it cannot be made dependent on a mere
declaration of an attending physician or even the mother of the child.
18.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, -versus- ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H.
AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS , respondents.

G.R. No. 165546, FIRST DIVISION, February 27, 2006, CALLEJO, SR., J.

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This
presumption is buttressed by the child’s birth certificate bearing the signature of his or her father. A birth certificate signed by the
father is competent evidence of paternity.

19. HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS, et al., Petitioners, v. RICARDO BASBAS AS REPRESENTED BY EUGENIO
BASBAS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014, PEREZ, J.:

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

The status of legitimate children cannot be assailed directly or indirectly, except by the husband or his heirs in accordance with
 Article 262 of the Family Code. In this case, the records bear that respondents’ status as legitimate children which petitioners
cannot assail. Neither can they demand respondents to prove their filiation.

20. VOLTAIRE ARBOLARIO, LUCENA ARBOLARIO TA-ALA, FE ARBOLARIO, EXALTACION ARBOLARIO,

CARLOS ARBOLARIO, and Spouses ROSALITA RODRIGUEZ and CARLITO SALHAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, IRENE COLINCO, RUTH COLINCO, ORPHA COLINCO and GOLDELINA COLINCO , respondents.

G.R. No. 129163. April 22, 2003, PANGANIBAN, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

Mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not give rise to a presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children
born of the second union, until and unless there be convincing proof that the first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the
second, lawfully entered into.

21.
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner -versus – ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and HON. GREGORIO S.
SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents

G.R. No. 132524, December 29, 1998, MARTINEZ, J.

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

The status of children born under a voidable marriage is governed by Article 89, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, now Article 54 of
the Family Code, which provides that children conceived and born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the
marriage are considered legitimate children. If a marriage is annulled on the ground of the unsound mind of either spouse under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code, those children conceived and born before the court’s decree setting aside their marriage are
considered legitimate.

22. ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS HI, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND
HON. GREGORIO Y. DE LA PENA III, PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 12, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
 ZAMBOANGA CITY, RESPONDENTS,
G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020, LEONEN, J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Courts must ensure equality among women and men before the law. Thus, where the law allows for an interpretation that treats
women and men more equally, that interpretation shall follow. Here, the RTC erred in holding that legitimate children cannot use
their mother’s surname. Art. 364 of the Civil Code provides that legitimate children shall “principally” use the surname of the
father. “Principally” is not equal to “exclusively”.

23 Amadea Angela K. Aquino Vs. Rodolfo C. Aquino and Abdulah C. Aquino/Rodolfo C. Aquino Vs. Amadea Angela K.
Aquino
G.R. No. 208912/G.R. No. 209018. December 7, 2021, LEONEN, J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

A child whose parents did not marry each other can inherit from their grandparent by their right of representation, regardless of
the grandparent's marital status at the birth of the child's parent. Article 982 of the Civil Code stated that “The grandchildren and
other descendants shall inherit by right of representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions' '. It does not make any distinction or qualifications
as to the birth status of the grandchild and other descendants. The non-inclusion of non-marital children in intestate succession in
Article 992 is born out of the presumption that they are children from extra-marital affairs and hence there is hostility and
resentment, the Court held that it should be construed to account for other circumstances of birth and family dynamics.

23. AMALYON ENDE AND QUEZON ENDE, et.al., Petitioner -versus – ROMAN CATHOLIC PRELATE OF THE
PRELATURE NULLIUS OF COTABATO, INC., et. al., Respondent.
G.R. No. 191867, December 06, 2021, HERNANDO, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

 Article 913 of the Spanish Civil Code provides that in default of testamentary heirs, the law gives the estate to the legitimate and
natural relatives of the deceased, the widow or widower and tot eh State subject to the rules set forth in the Code. It also provides
that legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction of sex or age, even
though they spring from different marriages. Only in the default of the legitimate children and their descendants, ascendants, and
acknowledged natural children, if any, may the collateral relatives and the surviving spouse inherit from the descendants.

The filiation of Amaylon and Quezon was sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the witnesses before the Court, thus, the
Court ruled that Amaylon and Quezon are the heirs of Spouses Ende. Since the decedent has legitimate children, Amaylon and
Quezon, this fact excludes Damagi, Butas’s widow to inherit from him.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

24.
ARTURIO TRINIDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD
G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998, PANGANIBAN, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

Article 265 and 266 of the Civil Code (now under Article 172 of the Family Code) provide for the proof that may be used as
evidence to prove filiation. Nonetheless, it is also provided that in the absence of the evidence enumerated in the law, filiation may
be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court. Family pictures and a baptismal certificate, although not conclusive
proof of filiation, are among the “other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree, as ruled in the
case of Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals.

25. JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A.
DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS
DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP.,
QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION &
 INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001, VITUG, J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

Children born during the marriage of their parents are presumed legitimate. This presumption is conclusive absent proof that there
is a physical impossibility of access between their parents during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes
the birth of the child. Such presumption defeats a declaration in a public document of the illegitimacy of the children.

26. ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs. Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and
Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.
G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

The burden to prove paternity is upon the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. Aside
from establishing the legitimate or illegitimate filiation of a child as provided under Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code, the
Supreme Court held that DNA testing may be resorted to determine with reasonable certainty whether the putative father is the
biological father of the minor and the death of the putative father will not bar the conduct of DNA testing as long as there are
biological samples that may be utilized.

27. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA
DOMINGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997, REGALADO, J.

By: Martin, Dominic

 A declaration about pedigree is the testimony of the decedent during her lifetime, declaring his/her filiation with the petitioner. It is
an admissible evidence and may be used as proof to ascertain their relationship. It is an exception to the hearsay rule under Section
39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. To be applicable, the following conditions must be met:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the
subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

28. RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, petitioner, -versus- EDNA G. SIASAT, respondent.

G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015, DEL CASTILLO, J.:

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

Jurisprudence dictates that filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation either in a public instrument or in the
absence of the same, a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. Both acts are considered complete acts of
recognition without need of court action. Hence, SSS Form E-1 is treated as an express recognition of filiation in a public
instrument under Article 172 of the Family Code.

29. INGRID V. HILARIO, Petitioner, vs. THELMA V. MIRANDA AND IRENEA BELLOC, Respondents.
G.R. No. 196499, November 28, 2018, JARDELEZA, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

The law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Proof of filiation is necessary only when the
legitimacy of the child is being questioned. This rule also applies to illegitimate children.
CASE CASE DOCTRINES
No. GROUNDS TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY

30. MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEÑAS, plaintiffs, v.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
89 Phil 165, 30 May 1951, Bautista Angelo, J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

A putative father who was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak to hardly move and get up from his bed is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was physically
or naturally impossible for the husband and wife to indulge in carnal intercourse.

31.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005, Corona, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

Art. 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, as a ground to impugn the legitimacy of a child because of physical impossibility by virtue of
the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is impossible, is a personal right,
therefore, it can only be invoked by the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Citing Tolentino, it must be proven that the
separation must make marital intimacy impossible because sexual intercourse is presumed. This may take place when they reside
in different countries, or when the husband is in prison during the period of conception, unless the sexual intercourse was done in
violation of prison regulations.

32.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, -versus- Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, represented by Her Mother and
 Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.
G.R. No. 171713. December 17, 2007. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

Although it is required by law that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy, such presumption is not
conclusive as it may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.

Paternity can be determined with reasonable certainty by DNA testing. As long as there exists appropriate biological samples of
DNA, such as blood, saliva and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones, the death of the putative father does not preclude its
application.

33. JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent

G.R. No. 190710, 6 June 2011, NACHURA, J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

Before a court can order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish
a reasonable possibility of paternity. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result
would only be corroborative, the court in its discretion may disallow a DNA testing.

34.
RICHELLE BUSQU ORDOÑA, Petitioner, -versus- THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY an ALLAN V.
FULGUERAS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 215370, EN BANC, November 2, 2021, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be collaterally attacked. It may only be challenged by a direct action solely for that purpose.
 The husband is the only one who can contest the legitimacy of a child born by his wife; however, the heirs are allowed to contest
such legitimacy under exceptional cases.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY, EFFECT OF A MOTHER’S DECLARATION, IN SUBSEQUENT
MARRIAGES AND PRESUMPTIONS

35. EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M.
REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES,, petitioners, v. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F.
MAURICIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010, PEREZ, J.

By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within
the periods fixed in Articles 170 and 171. The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. Here, the case is originally an annulment of contract when petitioner averred that respondent is merely a ward.

36.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.
G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011, CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

The petition of changing the surname to the surname of his/her mother and the deletion of the entry on the date and place of
marriage of his/her parents will affect his legal status in relation to his parents from legitimate to illegitimate.
37.
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, petitioner, v. KAREN SANTOS, respondent.
G.R. No. 197099. September 28, 2015. VILLARAMA, JR. J.
By: Liban, Clarisse M.

Proof of legitimacy under Article 172 of the Family Code should only be raised in a direct and separate action instituted to prove
the filiation of a child. However, this rule does not apply when the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is not at issue, such as
when it is alleged that the child is not the child of the spouses at all. In this case, the trial court and appellate court correctly
admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Article 172 of the Family Code in an action for annulment of
document and recovery of possession. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the irregularities and the totality of the facts
surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to respondent's birth
certificate. In addition, the secondary evidence did not sufficiently establish that the respondent is the child of the deceased
spouses.

38. GLENN M. MILLER, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SURVIVING LEGAL HEIRS, NAMELY: [1] EVELYN L. MILLER; [2]
JENNIFER ANN L. MILLER; [3] LESLIE ANN L. MILLER; [4] RACHEL ANN L. MILLER; AND [5] VALERIE ANN
L. MILLER, Petitioners, v. JOAN MILLER Y ESPENIDA A.K.A. JOHNLYN MILLER Y ESPENIDA AND THE LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GUBAT, SORSOGON, Respondents
GR 200344, August 28, 2019

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

A petition for correction of entries in the certificate of live birth cannot be a means to collaterally attack or impugn the legitimacy
and filiation of children.

39. Ordoña Vs. The Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, G.R. No. 215370. November 9, 2021
By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

The presumption of legitimacy of a child is based from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception.
To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that it
 was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 clays of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make
marital intimacy impossible. In effect, the presumption of legitimacy of Ordona's child subsisted absent any impugnation by the
proper party.

40. People v Quitoriano, January 20, 1997

By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

A woman having her first pregnancy can go beyond the normal gestational period of 40 weeks or 280 days. Verily, a baby
delivered beyond 10 months from the purported commission of rape does not discredit the private-complainant’s testimony of
being raped.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

41.
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner, - versus- . JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 183965 : September 18, 2009 , CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T

A compromise agreement whose subject matter is the status and filiation of an illegitimate child and a waiver of future support and
future legitimes is void for being contrary to law and public policy. The petitioner in this case settled her status and filiation with
the respondent, renouncing her claim as an illegitimate child of the latter. The Supreme Court struck down the same for being void.

42. Amadea Angela K. Aquino Vs. Rodolfo C. Aquino and Abdulah C. Aquino/Rodolfo C. Aquino Vs. Amadea Angela K.
Aquino
 G.R. No. 208912/G.R. No. 209018. December 7, 2021, LEONEN, J.

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

Illegitimate children may inherit from their grandparents through their right of representation, this is in furtherance of the principle
that the protection of the interest of children applies to all children without any distinction or classification as to their status.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No. RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

43.
HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, Petitioner -versus – EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, et. al., Respondent,

G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014, PEREZ. J.

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

No legal prohibition exists to deny the naming of illegitimate children born of illicit relationships as beneficiaries in an insurance
policy. Thus, legitimate heirs, if not named as beneficiaries, cannot claim any proceeds from the insurance policy and divest the
illegitimate children named therein of their share. In this case, the legitimate heirs cannot claim the proceeds of Loreto’s insurance
policy by succession as the illegitimate children were validly named in the policy. Even if Eva, Loreto’s concubine, were to be
disqualified as a beneficiary, the illegitimate children remain entitled as they were also designated as beneficiaries.

44.
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ “AQUINO,” represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
CRUZ, petitioners, -versus- RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, respondent.

G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009, CARPIO- MORALES, J.

 By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, grants an illegitimate child the right to use the surname of his/her father if
the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an
admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity. Therefore, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.

45. CHARLES GOTARDO, petitioner, vs. DIVINA BULING, respondent

G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012, SECOND DIVISION, VILLARAMA, J.

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

Article 175 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way as
provided under Article 172. As the Supreme Court held in previous cases, the significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face are a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child. There is a prima facie case when the petitioner shows corroborative proof
that she had sexual relations with the putative father, and by this time, the burden of evidence to prove otherwise is shifted to the
putative father. Since the putative father was not able to contradict the petitioner’s statements, he must give support to the child.

46.
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.

By: Filipino Borra

Art 176 of the FC as amended by RA 9255 provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. They may use
the surname of their father if their filiation is expressly recognized by the father through a record of birth, or admission in a public
 document or private handwritten instrument made by the father. The right to decide to use the surname of their father or not rests
on the illegitimate child.

47.
RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO MASBATE AND MARLYN MASBATE , petitioners, -versus-
RICKY JAMES RELUCIO, respondent.

G.R. No. 235498, SECOND DIVISION, July 30, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

Mothers are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child
unless the mother is shown to be unfit or unsuitable.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
PROOF OF FILIATION

48. FRANCISCO L. JISON, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998, DAVIDE, JR., J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

For a birth certificate to be a competent evidence of paternity, the putative father must have intervened in supplying information
thereon. Otherwise, the LCR is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person. Likewise, lack of participation in the baptismal certificate and school records render such documents incompetent to prove
paternity. They can however, as in this case, be admitted as part of the child’s testimony to corroborate her claim of recognition.
49. JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO, petitioners, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, MARY JANE DY
CHIAO - DE GUZMAN, and BENITO DY CHIAO, JR., represented by his uncle HENRY S. DY CHIAO, respondents.

G.R. No. 141273, May 17, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

Proof of paternity and filiation cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties, like the compromise agreement to recognize
filiation of an illegitimate child. Paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established,
and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence.

50. HEIRS OF GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO
GABATAN, NILA GABATAN and JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN,
petitioners, -versus- HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, respondents.

G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

By: Areta, Karen M.

To support the respondent’s claim as sole heir of Juan Gabatan, she must convincingly prove the filiation of her mother to her
alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. Even assuming that the birth certificate presented was a reliable document, it could only prove
that Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is the respondent’s mother. It was not able the relationship of Hermogena Gabatan to Juan
Gabatan.

51.
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ “AQUINO,” represented by JENIE SAN JUAN
DELA CRUZ, Petititoners vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City,
Respondent. G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009. CARPIO MORALES, J.
 By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

The Civil Code provided that illegitimate children shall establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children, that is an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned. However in this case, the Supreme Court has adopted new rules with respect to the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in a private handwritten instrument wherein admission of filiation is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the LONE piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that it must be signed by the acknowledging parent;

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim
of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it merely corroborative of
such evidence.

52.
JESSE U. LUCAS, petitioner, vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 190710, June 06, 2011, NACHURA, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

In a hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility
of paternity in order to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. It is important to note that the issuance of a DNA
testing order remains discretionary upon the court, hence, the court must consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA
testing.

53.
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, -versus- DIVINA BULING, Respondent.

G.R. No. 165166, SECOND DIVISION, August 15, 2012, BRION, J.

 By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

To overcome a prima facie case of filiation, the putative father may raise two affirmative defenses: 1) incapability of sexual
relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or 2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at
the time of conception. In this case, the woman was able to establish through testimony that she had been sexually involved with
one man at the time of her conception. On the other hand, the putative father did not deny such sexual encounters.

54. ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner -versus- MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents

G.R. 172471, SECOND DIVISION, November 12, 2012, DEL CASTILLO, J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

Among the requirements under Art. 172 and Art. 175 of the Family Code as to proof of filiation of legitimate and illegitimate
children is a public document duly acknowledged before a Notary Public with the proper formalities recognizing the child therein
and a private document executed in the very handwriting of the maker and duly signed by him. A Certificate of Live Birth as a
proof of filiation has no probative value if the same is not signed by the purported father.

55. VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, -versus- HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY

ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR., Respondents.

G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016, REYES, J.

by: Lavarias, Hailord N.

The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be a competent evidence of legitimate
filiation does not find support in law and jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's reliance on Roces v. Local Civil Registrar of
Manila is misplaced considering that what was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not
 legitimate filiation.

56. GLORIA ZOLETA-SAN AGUSTIN, Petitioner, v. ERNESTO SALES, Respondent.

G.R. N0. 189289, August 31, 2016
REYES, J.

By: Julius Ernhest P. Berame

A thumb mark has been repeatedly considered as a valid mode of signature to prove filiation.

57. IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES OF LIVE BIRTH OF YUHARES JAN
BARCELOTE TINITIGAN AND AVEE KYNNA NOELLE BARCELOTE TINITIGAN JONNA KARLA BAGUIO
BARCELOTE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RICKY O. TINITIGAN, and LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, DAVAO CITY,
Respondents

G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017, CARPIO, J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

RA 9225 provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. Moreover, they shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. However, they may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth. In line with the provision of law, it is mandatory that the mother must sign and agree stated
in the birth certificate, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the said child.

58.
MARIA T. CALMA, petitioner, -versus- MARILU C. TURLA, respondent.
 G.R. No. 221684, SECOND DIVISION, July 30, 2018, PERALTA, J.

By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

A DNA test may be ordered to prove a child’s paternity.

59. ROMEO F. ARA AND WILLIAM A. GARCIA, Petitioners, v. DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO AND HENRY ROSSI,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017, LEONEN, J.

By: Bordeos, Renz Rumer M.

Birth certificates are accorded high evidentiary value of filiation. However, a delayed registration of birth, made after the death of
the putative parent, is tenuous proof of filiation. In this case, the Court did not accord petitioner’s delayed registration of birth the
same evidentiary weight as regular birth certificates.

60. SOFIA TABUADA, NOVEE YAP, MA. LORETA NADAL, AND GLADYS EVIDENTE, Petitioners, v. ELEANOR
TABUADA, JULIETA TRABUCO, LAURETA REDONDO, AND SPS. BERNAN CERTEZA & ELEANOR D.
CERTEZA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 196510, September 12, 2018, BERSAMIN, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

Competent proof of a legal relationship is not limited to documentary evidence. Object and testimonial evidence may be admitted
for the same purpose. Indeed, the relationship may be established by all the relevant facts and circumstances that constitute a
preponderance of evidence.
 61.
MIGUEL D. GOCOLAY, petitioner -versus – MICHAEL BENJO GOCOLAY , respondent

G.R. No. 220606, January 11, 2021, LEONEN, J

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Article 175 of the Family Code provides that for illegitimate children, filiation may be established in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children. False information in the birth certificate of a child, such that the mother was married to the
father, does not defeat the child’s claim for paternity and filiation. It is not a supervening event that could modify the final and
executory order to conduct DNA testing.

62. Amadea Angela K Aquino v. Rodolfo C. Aquino and Abdulah C. Aquino, G.R. No. 208912, December 7, 2021,
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

Under the Family Code, an action for recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent.
However, the Family Code also provides that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced. Thus,
an illegitimate child, still a minor during the effectivity of the Family Code and whose putative parent died during their minority,
may seek recognition under Art. 285 of the Civil Code - gives the right to file a petition for recognition within 4 years from
attaining majority age (21 years old)

Since consideration of the child’s welfare is paramount, there is now a liberalization of the rule on investigation of paternity and
filiation. DNA testing is now a valid method of determining paternity and filiation. The rule permits the use of any biological
sample (including bones) in DNA testing. In the absence of other biological samples of the putative father, DNA testing may be
used as corroborative evidence of two or more persons’ exclusion or inclusion in the same genetic lineage.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
 COMPULSORY RECOGNITION

63. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RAYMUNDO MAGTIBAY y BACHOCO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 142985. August 6, 2002, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

Magtibay was found guilty of rape and the act resulted to the victim bearing child. The offender is liable for indemnification,
acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law prevents him from doing so and to support the offspring. (Article 345, RPC).
Since the Family Code already eliminated the classification of natural children and natural children by legal fiction, they now all
fall under the specie of illegitimate children, as such no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for
the status. The accused-appellant was ordered to indemnify the victim, and to provide support.

64. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner -versus – MARLON BARSAGA ABELLA, Respondent. G.R. No. 177295,
January 6, 2010, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

The Court rendered judgment ruling that the accused Abella is indeed guilty of raping the victim, AAA and ordered that the
accused is the biological father of the two-year old daughter of AAA as a result of the rape incident and because of their “striking
facial similarities and features.” The order to acknowledge and support the accused offspring is in accordance with Article 345 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code which states that persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall also be sentenced to acknowledge
the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so.

65.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NONIETO GERSAMIO
G.R. No. 207098, July 08, 2015, PEREZ, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

In the absence of evidence that would establish the filiation of the child to the defendant, the latter cannot be compelled to
 recognize and support the child. The victim in this case was already five and a half months pregnant when she was examined in
September of 2002, therefore, it is impossible for the pregnancy to be caused by the rape that occurred on August of the same year.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN

66. MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan
and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716, October 25, 1995, PER CURIAM

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

Only natural children, or those are conceived and born outside of wedlock to parents who were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other at the time of the conception of the children, may be legitimated. Children born of adulterous relations cannot
be legitimated.

CASE CASE DOCTRINES

No.
ADOPTED CHILDREN

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11642, January 06, 2022

AN ACT STRENGTHENING ALTERNATIVE CHILD CARE BY PROVIDING FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCESS OF DOMESTIC ADOPTION, REORGANIZING FOR THE PURPOSE THE INTER-COUNTRY
ADOPTION BOARD (ICAB) INTO THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CHILD CARE (NACC), AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11222, AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10165,
REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552, AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9523, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
 THEREFOR

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

R.A. No. 11642, otherwise known as the Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act, is now the
governing law both for domestic and inter-country adoptions. It repealed, among others, R.A. No. 8552, the Domestic Adoption
act, and amended R.A. No. 8043, the Intercountry Adoption Law. Under the two laws, petitions for domestic adoption were to be
filed before the Family Court, and for inter-country adoption, before the Inter-Country Adoption Board, however, by virtue of
R.A. No. 11642, adoption is now administrative and adoption proceedings shall be handled by the National Authority for Child
Care (NACC). It also provided in Sec. 56 that all judicial petitions for domestic adoption pending in court may be withdrawn and
the parties therein may avail of the benefits under the law.

REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 9858

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW MARRYING
AGE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P.

R.A. No. 9858 amended Art. 177 of the Family Code by adding the phrase: “or were so disqualified only because either or both
of them were below eighteen (18) years of age”. Therefore, if the only impediment of the husband and wife at the time of
conception or birth was their age, their subsequent valid marriage will make the child a legitimate child.

A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC dated April 19, 2022

By: Resus, Jarvin David E.
A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC sets forth the guidelines to be observed by the Court by virtue of the enactment of R.A No. 11642,
otherwise known as the Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act. Among others, it provides that
starting January 28, 2022, courts may no longer receive or accept petitions for domestic adoption because the jurisdiction to such
 now belongs to the National Authority for Child Care (NACC) therefore making adoptions proceedings are now administrative.
However, parties to judicial adoption proceedings have the option to immediately withdraw their petitions and avail of the
benefits under the law.

67. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C.
CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES AND ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES , petitioners, vs. GINA CARREON
FAJARDO AND CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1989, PADILLA, J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

The paramount consideration of the Court in any question as to the custody of minors, is the moral, physical, and social welfare of
the child, taking into account the resources and the moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. A decree of
adoption dissolves the parental authority of the natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the
spouse of the natural parent of the adopted child, to which they shall have joint parental authority and shall exercise the right to the
care and custody of the adopted child.

68. BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

By; Martin, Dominic

Parental authority of the biological parents are severed once a child is adopted. However, parental authority should be deemed
reverted to the biological parents when the adopter dies. This application is analogous to that of recission of adoption under Sec.
20 of RA 8552. However, in this instance, there is retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee,
while simultaneously restoring the parental authority of the biological parents. This is to ensure that the adoptee, who is still a
minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age. After all RA 8552 takes paramount consideration of the best interest of
the child. As such, biological parents may be considered as secondary beneficiaries in lieu of the adopter who is the primary
beneficiary to receive the death benefits of an adopted child.
69. BERLINDA ORIBELLO, petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER TENTH DIVISION), AND
REMEDIOS ORIBELLO, respondents.
G.R. No. 163504, August 05, 2015, BERSAMIN, J.:

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

An adoption decree cannot be collaterally attacked in an action for partition. To set aside a judgment or final order of a court of
law, it is necessary that a direct attack be commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction. Although the adoption might have
suffered from infirmities, the Regional Trial Court is bereft of authority to annul the decree of adoption issued by the Court of First
Instance of Mindoro since both courts are of equal rank. To rule otherwise would lead to confusion and hinder the proper
administration of justice.

70.
SPOUSES JOON HYUNG PARK AND KYUNG AH LEE , Petitioners, vs. HON. RICO SEBASTIAN D. LIWANAG
Respondent.
G.R. No. 248035, November 27, 2019, HERNANDO, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

An alien may adopt under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 if he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered. In
the case at bar, petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing and have been gainfully employed in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, as required by the Domestic Adoption
Act. Therefore, Judge Liwanag erred in referring the Petition for Adoption to the Inter-country Adoption Board (ICAB).

71.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009, Carpio, J.

 By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

Generally, Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 provides that husband and wife shall jointly adopt. In this case, petitioner,
having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, cannot adopt since she filed the petitions for adoption only by
herself without joining her husband.

72.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE
and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents.

G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994, Puno, J.

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent

Art. 185 of the Family Code expressly requires joint adoption by the husband and wife. This emanates from the fact that both
spouses will exercise joint parental authority over the adopted child. Furthermore, the joint adoption requirement must be read
along with Art. 184 of the Family Code enumerating the persons who are not qualified to adopt such that if either spouse is
included in the enumeration, adoption is not allowed.

73.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF JAN AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO WITH APPLICATION FOR CHANGE
OF NAME OF ADOPTEE FROM “JAN AUREL MAGHANOY BULAYO” TO “JAN AUREL BULAYO KIMURA,”
SPOUSES MARY JANE B. KIMURA AND YUICHIRO KIMURA, PETITIONERS . G.R. No. 205752. October 01, 2019.
BERSAMIN, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

An illegitimate child is a relative within the first civil degree of consanguinity of his biological mother. In contrast with a nephew
or a niece, an illegitimate child is linked to the direct material lineage, one which is always certain.
 The word “child” set forth under Article 966 of the New Civil Code is used in general and without qualification. It does not pertain
to status but blood relation. The law does not distinguish between the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of the relatives; thus, neithr
must the interpreter distinguish. Section 7 (b) (i) and (iii) of RA 8552 extends to illegitimate children.

74. DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 164948, 27 June 2006, CALLEJO SR., J.

By: Mojica, Robinson S.

A written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the adoption decree. However, to dispense with this
requirement, the abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child must be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.

75.
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, Petitioners, -versus- HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and
CLARA BUNDOC, Respondents. G.R. No. 85044, THIRD DIVISION, June 3, 1992, FELICIANO, J.

By: Atok, Jerome Fosh V.

The retroactive application given to a decree of adoption does not apply in a case to impose liability upon the adopting parents
under the principle of vicarious liability of parents wherein at the time of the incident which gives rise to the liability, the adopting
parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.

76. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C.
CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES and ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES, petitioners, v. GINA CARREON
FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1982, PADILLA, J.
 By: Marallag, Ellaine Denice H.

Where the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners and a decree of adoption dissolved the authority of the natural parents
over the adopted child, parental authority over the adopted child shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. Here, the natural
mother has no authority over the child. She cannot take the minor back. Since the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners
with the full knowledge andconsent of respondents, a decree of adoption dissolved the authority of the natural parents over the
adopted child.

77. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

By: Reynaldo, Hark Emmanuelle Joaquin B.

No law prohibits the use by an adopted child of her mother's name as her middle name.

78. HILARIA BAGAYAS, petitioner, vs. ROGELIO BAGAYAS, FELICIDAD BAGAYAS, ROSALINA BAGAYAS, MICHAEL
BAGAYAS, and MARIEL BAGAYAS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517. September 18, 2013. PERLAS-BERNABE. J.

By: Liban, Clarisse M.

The declaration of the trial court that petitioner is the legally adopted child of Maximino and Eligia, on the strength of the order of
adoption, did not amount to a declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which petitioner may institute an action for the
amendment of the certificates of title covering the subject land. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary
civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely
for the purpose of determining such rights.

79. ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"),
 respondent.
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003

By: Pigar, Kyra Frenel H.

The Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 or RA 8552 has withdrawn or abrogated the right of the adopter to rescind the adoption.

81 Suzuki v. Office of the Solicitor General, G.​R.​No. 212302, 2 September 2020

By: Resus, Jarvin David E.

It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious subject to presentation of evidence as required by our Rules of Court.

Thus, a foreign judgment relating to the status of adoption of a Filipino by a Japanese national can be recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction contrary to the claims of the RTC that it cannot recognize adoption based on foreign laws.

TOPIC
A.M. No. 21-03-02-SC,
Rules on Action for Support
and Petition for Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign
Decisions or Judgments on
Support
RA 9231, Secs. 12-B and
12-C
WEEK # 6
SUPPORT UP TO SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
GIST OF SPECIAL LAW
By: Aclan, Charisma C.
This Rule was issued in line with the Philippines’ possible accession to The Hague Convention on Child Support
(HCCS), which will benefit many Filipinos seeking cross-border child support and spousal support. The objective
of this Rule is to expedite procedure in actions for support and petitions for recognition and enforcement of
foreign decisions.
As such, under the Rules, the court shall not review the merits of the foreign decision as the court is bound by the
findings of fact on which the said judicial or administrative authority based its jurisdiction. Moreover, no motion
for reconsideration or new trial shall be entertained.
AGPAOA, PRINCESS MONIQUE & ALFONSO, ANGELA MAY
Section 12-B - Ownership, Usage, and Administration of the Working Child’s Income
As a rule, the wages, salaries, earnings and other income of the working child shall be owned by him and be used
primarily for his support, education, or skills acquisition, and secondarily, for the collective needs of his family,
provided that no more than 20% of the child’s income may be used for the collective needs of his family. The
same provision likewise provides that administration of the property of the child and/or the property acquired
through his work shall be administered by both parents.
 Sec 12-C - Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the Working Child’s Income

If the salary or income of a working child is at least Php 200,000.00 annually, his or her parents or legal guardians
shall set up a trust fund of the child for at least 30% of his or her’s annual income to which he or she shall have
full control over the trust fund upon reaching the age of majority.

Suspension or termination of By: Berame, Julius Ernhest P. & Lavarias, Hailord N.

PA, RA 6809
Emancipation which under such law is 18 years of age shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.

CAS CASE DOCTRINES

E
No. SUPPORT

1.
ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
By: Basa, Lance Bernadette F.

It is the husband and not the mother in law who has the obligation to pay for all medical expenses regardless of the fact that it was the
mother-in-law who called for a physician. In case of illness, rendering of medical assistance is among the mutual obligations to which
spouses are bound by way of mutual support.

2.
FELICIANO SANCHEZ, petitioner - versus - FRANCISCO ZULUETA, Judge of First Instance of Cavite, respondent

G.R. No. L-45616, May 16, 1939, AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

By: Cabaltera, Neil Zigmund T.

 Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support. A child born out of the adulterous relationship is
likewise not entitled for support. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant father in this case should have been given an opportunity
to allege and prove the fact of adultery and the illegitimate filiation of the child who was claiming for support.

Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite.

3. MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, KALOOKAN CITY
and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents

G.R. No. 127578, February 15, 1999, PURISIMA, J:

By: Sapugay, Bianca Kathrynne A.

There must first be a court declaration establishing the presence or absence of paternity or filiation before one can claim support.
Further, a previous action for support which was terminated upon compromise of the parties, cannot bar the filing of another action for
support against the same defendant.

4.
VICTOR RONDINA, Petitioner -versus – PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 179059 June 13, 2012, DEL CASTILLO. J.

By: Agustin, Nathan Raphael D.L.

Upon the passing of the Family Code, no further act is required from a parent for a child to be declared illegitimate, as the said code
has already done away with the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction. Thus, in this case,
where petitioner was found guilty for rape, the Supreme Court held that he shall be liable for support of the offspring born out of the
act, as such offspring is considered as his illegitimate child. However, he has no more parental authority as pursuant to Article 176 of
the Family Code, an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise such authority.
5.
CHARLES GOTARDO, petitioner, -versus- DIVINA BULING, respondent.

G.R. No. 165166, 15 August 2012, BRION, J.

By: Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

There is a prima facie case of paternity action if the woman declares, supported by corroborative proof, that she had sexual relations
with the putative father. Such that the burden of evidence to prove the contrary of such declaration shifts to the putative father.

In the present case, respondent Buling was able to establish a prima facie case through testimony that she had been sexually involved
only with one man, the petitioner Gotardo, at the time of her conception. This assertion was corroborated by the testimony of the
petitioner’s uncle who testified that the petitioner and respondent indeed had an intimate relationship.

6. ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents
G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.

By: Fangon, Beatrice Rose V.

For an illegitimate child to receive support, the filiation of the putative father shall be established with sufficient certainty. Since the
Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the father was not signed by the latter, it has no probative value and his
filiation with Randy as his illegitimate child cannot be established pursuant to Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code.

7.
TEODORO E. LERMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCEPCION DIAZ, respondents.

G.R. No. L-33352, December 20, 1974, MAKALINTAL, C.J.

By: Borra, Filipino

Art 292 of the NCC provides that, while the action for legal separation or annulment is pending, the spouse and children are entitled to
 support pendente lite. However, if it is the guilty spouse who filed for legal separation for the purpose of availing the support provided
in Art 292, the court may rule, provisionally, that the action shall fail. Hence, Art 292 shall not operate. Therefore, the guilty spouse
shall not be entitled to support pendente lite in the legal separation case.

8. MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner - versus - HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, respondents

G.R. No. L-48219, February 28, 1979, FERNANDEZ, J.:

By: Arenas, Gissela M.

It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support. However, the alleged adultery of the wife must be
established by competent evidence. The mere allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right to receive
support pendente lite. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action.

9.
EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR JEMWEL M. OTAMIAS, REPRESENTED BY
THEIR MOTHER EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
COL. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PENSION AND
GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC) OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES , Respondent.

G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016, LEONEN, J.

By: Aquino, Marie Angelique M.

Retirement benefits are exempt from execution so as to ensure that the retiree has enough funds to support himself and his family.
However, the benefit of exemption is a statutory right that may be waived. Thus, when Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of
Assignment waiving a portion of his retirement benefits in favor of his family, he did not violate any law nor infringe on the right of
third persons, but even protected the right of his family to receive support.
 10. MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA
ISABEL DELGADO, petitioner, -versus- HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge, RTCMakati, Branch 149, FEDERICO C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO C. DELGADO, respondents

G.R. No. 125041. June 30, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

By: Concepcion, Precious Dianne A.

The grandfather, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their
parents (Art. 199 of the FC), provided that it is established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his
granddaughters' education. In relation, the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support; he
may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling (Article 204 of the
FC). Herein, the former option is the one applied by the court due to the relationship between the grandfather and granddaughters
turning sour after the filing of this case.

11. SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, petitioners, - versus - MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her
minor children LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III, respondents

G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009, CARPIO, J.:

By: Areta, Karen M.

The partial concurrent obligation of the grandparents extends only to their descendants, commonly understood to refer to relatives, by
blood of lower degree. The wife’s right to receive support extends only to her husband. Here, only the grandchildren is entitled to
support from their grandparents.

CAS CASE DOCTRINES

E
No. PARENTAL AUTHORITY & CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

12. ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO, petitioner-appellant, -versus- DRA. VENANCIA L.
MAKABALI, respondent- appellee

G.R. No. L-26953, March 28, 1969, REYES, J.B.L., J.

By: Amancio, Mark Joshua

It is a basic principle that in matters of care, education, custody, and property of a child, the welfare of the child is paramount. As a
result, the right of a parent to the custody of a child is merely ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the child
with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development.

In this case, the Court affirmed the lower court’s order that the child be left with his foster mother as the real mother was proven to
have remiss her duties to provide the child with love and care and have deserted the child by not visiting him even once.

13. MIGUEL R. UNSON III, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO

AND EDITA N. ARANETA, respondents.

101 SCRA 183, GR No. 52242, November 17, 1980, BARREDO, J.

By: Aclan, Charisma C.

In determining who shall exercise custody of children or minors, the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned must be considered. Moreover, it must also be taken into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of
the contending parents.

14.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY
VINGSON@ SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP, petitioner, - versus - JOVY CABCABAN, respondent
 UDK No.14817, January 13, 2014, ABAD, J.:

By: Agpaoa, Princess Monique M.

The writ of habeas corpus is an available remedy in cases involving the rightful custody over a minor. Through writ of habeas corpus,
the State intervenes when parents, rather than care for their children, treat them cruelly and abusively, thereby impairing their growth
and well-being.

15. Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner, -versus- ATTY.
MARIJOY D. SEGUI, ATTY. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents

G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014, VILLARAMA, JR., J.

By: Alfonso, Angela May S.

The direct accusation by the mother of forcibly being separated from her child and placing up the latter for adoption, supposedly
without complying with the necessary legal requisite to qualify the child for adoption, indicates that she is not searching for a lost child
but is asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him. The issue involved is the issue of of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the
State, the rules for a Writ of Amparo will not apply.

16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee v. XXX, Accused-Appelant

GR No. 240441, December 4, 2019, REYES JR., J.

In this case, the Supreme Court said that the terms “stepfather” and “common-law spouse” are two distinct terms that may not be used
interchangeably. As such, the allegation that the victim is the stepdaughte of the accuses requires competent proof and should not be
easily accepted as factually true.
 Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the instant case, the qualifying circumstance of relationship cannot be used against XXX.
The allegation in the Information that he was AAA’s stepfather was not given during the trial, and hence, shall not be used against him.

17. ​TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondents.
G.R. No. 1116773, January 16, 1997, TORRES, JR., J.

By: Berame, Julius Ernhest

The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law
and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship. Therefore, when Maria entrusted the custody of Angelica to Teresita, what she gave to the latter
was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. The law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution.

18. MIGUEL R. UNSON III, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO AND EDITA N. ARANETA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-52242, November 17, 1980, BARREDO, J.

By: Calumpang, Karen Regina B.

In awarding the custody of a minor child, the primary consideration of the court are the physical, education, social and moral welfare
of the child. Thus, the custody of a minor child is not granted to a person who has an immoral influence on the child since it is not it is
not in the best interest of the child. Moreover, the custody of a child is not subject to a separate proceeding after the decision on
separation of properties between the parents but may nonetheless be brought to court by petition or as an incident to other proceedings.

19.
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners - versus - COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA
MASAUDING, respondents

G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995, MELO, J.:

 By: Riñoza, Michael Dave C.

The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted. The presumption under the
second paragraph of Article 213 FC no longer applies to children over seven years old.

20. LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA,
respondents-appellees
G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995, ROMERO, J.:

The father’s right of custody over his child prevails over the wealth of the grandparents which is not a deciding factor for custody. The law
considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable
may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority.

21. DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995, MENDOZA, J.

By: Magpili, Airish A.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving
him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

22.
JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner – versus – MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL ,
respondents

G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004, PANGANIBAN, J

By: Cabatu, Ma. Andrea D.

Parental authority over illegitimate children shall be vested in the mother, and in exercising such authority, the mother is entitled to
keep the child in her company. In this case, a Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by the father of an illegitimate child to obtain
 custody of the child from his mother and her relatives. The Court shall not deprive the mother of the custody of the child absent any
compelling reasons showing her unfitness to exercise parental authority and care.

23. JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner, vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent. G.R. No. 154994,
June 28, 2005, PANGANIBAN, J.

By: Estreller, Conrado S. III

The “tender-age presumption” rule may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. Sexual preference or
moral laxity does not prove neglect nor incompetence. The husband must clearly establish that her moral lapse has an adverse effect on
the welfare of the child or will distract the offending spouse from exercising parental care.

24. MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Petitioners,
vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents
G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006; QUISUMBING, J.

By: Castillo, Pamela Alexia D.

According to Article 211 of the Family Code, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over their common
children. When the rightful custody is withheld, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to. A separation de facto by a couple does not warrant
the deprivation of parental authority of one, when the issue of custody is yet to be adjudicated by the court. When the cause of action is
the deprivation of a parent’s right to see his child, a remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

25. GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner -versus – PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent. G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014,
VELASCO, JR., J.

By: Fajilagutan, Dainiele Renee R.

 Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 stating that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. Since parental authority is given to
the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

26.
CHERITH A. BUCAL, Petitioner, v. MANNY P. BUCAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206957, June 17, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

By: Castro, Czarina Ann M.

A grant of visitation rights that was not manifested in any pleading is an act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by the court. Due process substantiates the well-settled rule that courts cannot grant a relief that is not prayed for in the
pleadings or is in excess of what is being sought by a party.

27. BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs. HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.

G.R. No. 13223, June 19, 2001, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

By: Salazar, Angelynn C.

The natural mother or father has the preferential right to be the guardian of a minor. A surviving grandparent can only exercise
substitute parental authority in case of death, absence, or unsuitability of the natural parent of the minor child. If the natural parent is
still alive and has exercised continuous parental authority over the minor child, the grandparent must prove the unsuitability of the
former.

28. ST. MARY'S ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES
DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002, PARDO, J.

By: Corpus, Rebecca R.

Article 218 of the Family Code provides for persons who shall have special parental authority over a minor child under their
 supervision, instruction or custody as follows: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care. Said special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities inside or outside of the
premises of the school, entity, or institutions, which includes field trips, excursions and other school affairs of its students whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers. Article 219 of the FC provides for the principal and solidary liability of those having special
parental authority for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the minor while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
However, for the school to be liable, the act or omission considered as negligent should be the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.

29. CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S. LIMON, Petitioners, v.
TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005, AZCUNA, J.

By: Martin, Dominic

The injuries sustained by the student was not due to his own negligence because the proximate cause of the injury originated from the
negligence of the school administration in failing to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its students. The
defense of due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees is only applicable when the
liability of the employer arises from the negligence of others under Art. 2180 of the NCC. Hence, the school is held liable.

30. SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or SR. CRISPINA A. TOLENTINO, S.Sp.S., petitioners, - versus
- CORAZON P. TAGUIAM, respondent.
G.R. No. 165565, July 14, 2008, QUISUMBING, J.:

By: Evangelista, Angela Isabel C.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, it states that the teachers shall have parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody. As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have
made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her company. Hence, the teacher was grossly negligent when the
 majority of the pupils were left unsupervised and when she failed to coordinate with school to ensure that proper safeguards such as
adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel were present during their activity in the pool which led to the drowning of one student.

31. AQUINAS SCHOOL, Petitioner, vs. SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA S. INTON, on their behalf and on behalf of their
minor child, JOSE LUIS S. INTON, and SR. MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP, Respondents.
G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011, ABAD, J.

By: Yusi, Jonathan Vincent U.

Applying the four-fold test, no employer-employee relationship exists between a nun assigned by a congregation to teach a religion
class. Here, it was not the school that chose Sister Yamyamin to teach the class, but her religious congregation. Aquinas had no control
over Sister Yamyamin’s teaching methods.

32.
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, v.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-24101, September 30, 1970, MAKALINTAL, J.

By: Dazo, John Xavier L.

The vicarious liability of the father or the mother is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted upon proof of the observance of
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

33. FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.:

By: Buencamino, Pio Vincent R.

 Art. 233 of the Family Code expressly prohibited the infliction of corporal punishment by the school administrator, teacher of
individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority. Any physical maltreatment committed by them against a student
may constitute child abuse which is punished under Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.

34.
AMELIA B. HEBRON, petitioner, vs. FRANCO L. LOYOLA, ANGELO L. LOYOLA, RAFAEL L. LOYOLA, ARMANDO L.
LOYOLA, SENEN L. LOYOLA, MA. VENUS L. RONQUILLO, PERLA L. ABAD and the Intestate Estate of EDUARDO L.
LOYOLA, CARMELITA A. MANABO, HERMINIA AGUINALDO-ROSAS, DIGNA AGUINALDO-VALENCIA, ROGELIO
AGUINALDO, MILA AGUINALDO-DIAZ, BABY AGUINALDO, RUBEN LOYOLA substituted by Josefina C. Loyola,
Glesilda A. Legosto, Evelyn C. Loyola, Marina C. Loyola, Aure C. Loyola, Corazon C. Lugarda and Joven Francisco C.
Loyola, Corazon C. Lugarda and Joven Francisco C. Loyola, LORENZO LOYOLA, CANDELARIA LOYOLA, NICANDRO
LOYOLA, FLORA LOYOLA, TERESITA L. ALZONA, VICENTE LOYOLA, ROSARIO L. LONTOC, SERAFIN
LOYOLA, ROBERTO LOYOLA, BIBIANO LOYOLA, PURITA LOYOLA, ESTELA LOYOLA, ESTER DANICO,
EDUARDO DANICO, EMELITA DANICO, MERCEDITA DANICO, HONESTO DANICO, DANTE DANICO, ERLINA
DANICO-DOMINGUEZ represented by Teodoro Dominguez and Beverly Anne Dominguez, EFREN CABIGAN and ISIDRO
CABIGAN, respondents, ALBERTO L. BAUTISTA represented by Felicidad G. Bautista, Agnes B. Zulueta, Ayreen B. Alba,
Joseph Anthony G. Bautista, Ann-Janet G. Bautista and ALFREDO L. BAUTISTA, unwilling respondents.
G.R. No. 168960. July 05, 2010. DEL CASTILLO, J.

By: Bautista, Josemaria Enrique T.

The powers which are given to parents, by operation of law, that concern the property of their children pertains only to matters of
administration, and not to the power of disposition. It is incumbent upon the parent to secure the permission of the court before
alienating the property belonging to the minor children. Otherwise, the alienation or disposition is void.