10 1093@isr@viaa025

International Studies Review (2020) 0, 1–24
ANALYTICAL ESSAY
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Subordinate-State Agency and US Hegemony:
Colombian Consent versus Bolivian Dissent
Q U I N T I J N B . K AT
University College London
The strategies of subordinate states in hegemonic or asymmetrical rela-

tions have been widely studied by international relations scholars. Such
works generally focus on how a subordinate state can influence the hege-
mon’s behavior so as to address and further the interests of the sub-
ordinate state. The relation between subordinate-state agency and the
hegemonic system, the makeup of the hegemonic order, itself receives less
attention. Through analysis of two cases of US hegemony in Latin Amer-
ica, this article examines how subordinate-state agency may strengthen or
weaken the hegemonic system and, as such, makes a case for subordinate-
state agency as an underpinning element of hegemony. It explores Colom-
bian agency in the design phase of Plan Colombia as contributing to US
hegemony, while Bolivian agency under the presidency of Evo Morales is
examined as a challenge. In both instances, it was the United States, rather
than the Latin American states, that took on a passive role, leaving the ini-
tiative with Colombia and Bolivia. Therefore, instead of reaffirmations of
active one-way US hegemony versus passive subordinate states, the paper
proposes to understand both cases as demonstrating the importance of
subordinate-state agency in the configuration of the hegemonic system.
Keywords: hegemony, US–Latin American relations, subordinate-

state agency
Introduction
Hegemony is a two-way street. While relations between hegemonic and subordinate
states are highly asymmetrical, without the latter’s perception of benefits obtained
through the hegemonic order, hegemony will weaken or cease to be truly hege-
monic. This article furthers existing understandings of hegemony in International
Relations (IR) as based on consent and links this to subordinate-state agency. Build-
ing on works that demonstrate how agency equips subordinate states with strate-
gies for influencing the hegemon’s behavior, this work examines the effects of such
agency on the hegemonic order itself. In doing so, it makes a case for subordinate-
state agency as an underpinning element of hegemony and presents an analysis of
how subordinate states oppose or support hegemons, or “preeminent powers,” a
topic of research thus far underdeveloped and demanding of scholarly attention in
the currently commencing “third phase of interstate-hegemony studies” (Ikenberry
Kat, Quintijn B.. (2020) Subordinate-State Agency and US Hegemony: Colombian Consent versus Bolivian Dissent. International
Studies Review, doi: 10.1093/isr/viaa025
© The Author(s) (2020). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
2 Subordinate-State Agency and US Hegemony
and Nexon 2019, 421). Here, it is posed that consenting states will apply agency to
uphold or even intensify hegemony, while dissenting states will actively challenge

the hegemonic order.
The article develops this main argument by looking at two cases of US hegemony
in Latin America, namely the inception of Plan Colombia under the Pastrana and
Clinton administrations (1998–2000) and the deterioration of diplomatic relations
between Bolivia and the United States under the Morales and Bush administrations
(2005–2008). The cases are united by the element of counternarcotics policy as the
kernel of US interest in both states. However, their outcomes could hardly be more
different. Colombia willfully sought deeper dependence on the United States in ex-
change for perceived benefits, while Bolivia rejected all US interference, decidedly
moving out of the US sphere of influence.
The paper consists of four main sections. The first provides a concise overview of
hegemony theory in IR and the strategies subordinate states may apply to influence
hegemonic or dominant states to act in their interest. The section ends by point-
ing to the gap in the literature, i.e., the relation between subordinate-state agency
and the strength of hegemonic order. The second section examines Plan Colombia
and particularly highlights both the important role of Colombian agency in its de-
sign and eventual approval in the United States and the intrusive US demands that
Colombia had to accept. The section argues the case provides an excellent example
of hegemony by pointing at the combination of asymmetry and subordinate-state
consent that defined its outcome. The third section discusses the deterioration of
relations between Bolivia and the United States. For decades, Bolivian governments
quietly consented to US demands, notably with little Bolivian agency. This abruptly
changed with the election of Morales, who actively and successfully challenged US
hegemony once in power. The concluding section advances the main argument that
hegemony thrives on subordinate-state consent, precisely because consenting states
actively support hegemony. Conversely, dissent mobilizes subordinate-state agency
against hegemony. The section also indicates how future research may expand on
these findings.
Importantly, hegemonic order is understood to have a certain makeup, referred
to here as the hegemonic system. This system functions through the production
of opportunities and constraints, benefits and costs for actors within the order
that ultimately generate its legitimacy, i.e., the recognition by other states of the
hegemon’s leadership. The hegemonic system, as such, is a constantly changing
configuration of “bargaining, contestation, and cooperation” between the hege-
mon and subordinate states (Ikenberry and Nexon 2019, 398). As Clark (2011,
61–3) observes, hegemony is no static one-size-fits-all phenomenon but varies in
terms of composition, relating to the management of the hegemonic order and
ranging from singular (one state) to collective (several states), and in terms of
scope of constituents, relating to legitimacy of the order and ranging from inclusive
(all states recognize the hegemon) to coalitional (only some states recognize
the hegemon and obtain benefits from hegemony). The way the configuration
of the hegemonic system changes, and particularly the role in such change of
subordinate-state agency, is a generally understudied topic in hegemony studies in
IR. This is surprising because it is precisely these changes that produce or corrode
the hegemon’s legitimacy. Examination of subordinate-state agency and its effects
on the hegemonic system thus needs to be brought into the analysis of hegemony.
Subordinate-State Strategies in Hegemonic Order

Others have pointed out that most works on hegemony focus their attention al-
most exclusively on the hegemon, neglecting the role or motivations of subordi-
nate states (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1991, 393; Jesse et al. 2012, 2). Hege-
monic stability theory, first developed by Kindleberger, argues that the presence of a
QUINTIJN B. KAT 3
powerful hegemon provides for stability within the open economic system and thus
benefits subordinate states within this system (Kindleberger 1973, 302). Krasner

places a nuance here, differentiating between small states and medium-sized states.
The former likely support the hegemonic system because it provides them with ad-
vantages while, small as they are, they hardly stand to lose significant political power.
Medium-sized states, on the other hand, need to be enticed or compelled to accept
the open trading system through “symbolic, economic, and military capabilities” of
the hegemon (Krasner 1976, 322).
Nye (2002, 15) explains that whether subordinate states tolerate the US hege-
mon depends on its use of “soft power” and behavior that benefits others, while
a challenge to hegemony may arise when the hegemon “defines its interests nar-
rowly and uses its weight arrogantly.” Earlier, Gilpin maintained the United States
has assumed its leadership role not particularly for the greater good of other states
but out of “enlightened self-interest and security objectives” (Gilpin 1987, 88). Keo-
hane, meanwhile, argued that US hegemony has provided the world with interna-
tional regimes that, even after US hegemony, may persist and facilitate cooperation
between states, thus keeping the system in place in spite of the absence of the hege-
mon (Keohane 1984, 244).
However, what makes subordinate states follow, or not, and in what way do they
follow, challenge, or restrain the hegemon? As Cox (1987, 7) noted in his applica-
tion of the works of Gramsci to the study of IR, hegemony “means dominance of a
particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a
broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact
ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading social
classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the
less powerful.” In this order, Cox maintained, an interconnected world economy of
global systems of production enables the development of transnational classes that
are connected by mutual interests and shared ideologies. Such ideological concor-
dance Ikenberry and Kupchan call “socialization,” which they conceptualize as “the
process through which national leaders internalize the norms and value orienta-
tions espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into the
community formed by the hegemon and the other nations accepting its leadership
position” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 289). Through such socialization, hege-
monic leadership acquires a certain “oughtness” that leads to a consolidation of the
hegemon’s position and incentivizes followers to support the hegemonic order.
Socialization may be promoted by the hegemon through active foreign policy, as
convincingly argued by Robinson with respect to US hegemony in the Philippines
and several Latin American states where, he maintains, the United States promoted
“polyarchy,” or “low-intensity democracy,” by marginalizing social movements and
fostering transnational elites that adhere to US-promoted ideologies and accom-
panying policies. Particularly novel about Robinson’s work is his suggestion that
hegemonic transnational domination can only be achieved through the ideological
incorporation, not only of dominant elites, but also of subordinate groups, both
within the hegemonic center and at the periphery (Robinson 1996, 30). This in-
corporation, Robinson argues, the United States achieves through “democracy pro-
motion” programs in combination with “overall US and transnational elite policy,
including coercive and other forms of diplomacy, economic aid or sanctions, inter-
national media and propaganda campaigns (‘public diplomacy’ and psychological
operations or Psy-Ops), military or paramilitary actions, covert operations and so
on” (Robinson 2013, 231). The result is a kind of controlled democracy with po-
tential winners of elections hardly indistinguishable one from another, and each
of which, once elected, will support and implement the policies preferred by the
hegemon, in the case of the United States, neoliberal policies.
However, even with (elite) consent, socialization, or US-promoted polyarchy,
states may wish to limit the hegemon’s power over them. To do this, they can engage
in so-called hard or soft balancing. The former relates to the adoption of strategies
to improve military capabilities as well as the establishment and maintenance of

counteralliances with the aim of restraining the hegemon. The overwhelming mili-
tary might of the United States makes hard balancing an unviable option for states
that feel threatened by it. Therefore, soft balancing is a favored alternative that in-
volves “limited arms build-up, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in re-
gional or international institutions” (Paul 2004, 3). As Walt observes, soft balancing
primarily differs from hard balancing in that it does not seek an alteration to the ex-
isting distribution of capabilities or balance of power. Instead, soft balancing aims to
obtain outcomes within the existing balance that are more preferable to the weaker
states. He defines soft balancing as the “conscious coordination of diplomatic action
in order to obtain outcomes contrary to US preferences—outcomes that could not
be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support”
(Walt 2005a, Ch. 3, paragraph 51). Paul (2005, 47) contends that since the end
of the Cold War, what he calls “second-ranking states” (China, France, Germany,
India, and Russia) have begun to engage in soft balancing in the face of possible
excessive US dominance. Krahmann (2005, 540) provides an example with respect
to opposition to the 2003 military intervention in Iraq. Similarly, Pape (2005, 10)
uses this example to illustrate that international institutions, economic statecraft,
and diplomatic arrangements are all tools that can be used to soft balance.
Critique of soft balancing comes from Lieber and Alexander (2005, 125), who be-
lieve its existence is not supported by persuasive evidence. Second, they argue that
soft balancing cannot effectively be distinguished from normal diplomatic friction
between states and therefore conclude that criteria for detecting soft balancing are
inherently flawed. Likewise, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005, 74) critique the theory
based on its proponents’ failure to consider alternative explanations for the be-
havior identified as soft balancing. Economic interests, regional security concerns,
policy disputes, and domestic political incentives may cause states to go against the
United States without this being the primary objective, as soft balancing implies.
Contributing to the debate on different forms of balancing, Layne (2006, 9) coins
the term “leash-slipping.” By this, he means the building up of subordinate states’
military capabilities, not to prevent attack by the hegemon, but to maximize their
ability to conduct independent foreign policy. Leash-slipping differs from hard bal-
ancing for not being explicitly directed at a current threat of the United States to
the subordinate state’s existence but instead at a threat to its general position in
the international arena (Layne 2006, 30). Importantly, all forms of balancing are
generally assumed to be available only to second-tier states, who are in the position
to balance, whereas weaker states must resort to other means.
Walt offers several other possible strategies available to a wider array of subor-
dinate states. First, there is the option of blackmailing, or formulating a credi-
ble threat to the United States that it cannot easily defend itself against accom-
panied by reasonable demands it can comply with (Walt 2005b, 115). Another
strategy is balking, or simply refusing to comply with US demands. Even if the
United States is extremely powerful, its means are limited, and it cannot force
every country to comply all the time (Walt 2005b, 116). As demonstrated later,
when Bolivia increased its maximum limit of legally grown coca, it balked at US
demands. Third, states can bandwagon with the United States. For Waltz (1979,
126), the anarchic nature of international relations means states would naturally
choose acts of balancing over bandwagoning. Similarly, Walt (2005a, Ch. 4, para-
graph 9) argues bandwagoning behavior is rather rare because it is practically a
strategy of appeasement, not resistance but support for the dominant power, and,
consequently, is only practiced by very weak and small states. Second-tier states re-
gard bandwagoning as risky because it increases the power of the dominant state.
Ikenberry, however, argues a strong institutional order can change this. Credi-
ble commitments to binding institutions mitigate extreme forms of exploitation
QUINTIJN B. KAT 5
or dominance by the dominant power, making a combination of balancing and

bandwagoning more attractive (Ikenberry 2001, 37). Among bandwagoning tactics

is the establishment of pacts of restraint that aim to limit unilateral action by the
hegemon and influence its policy from within an alliance (Press-Barnathan 2006,
274). Lastly, bonding is a strategy in which foreign leaders attempt to establish a
close relationship with US leaders with the hope of gaining influence in Washing-
ton over policy initiatives (Walt 2005a, Ch. 4, paragraph 25). Colombian leaders
applied bonding strategies in the case of Plan Colombia, discussed later.
Ikenberry (2003, 18–22) adds several more possible strategies for subordinate
states vis-à-vis US hegemony. Buffering is the practice of developing “alternative
regional political spheres,” thereby reducing exposure to the dominant state’s poli-
cies. Baiting, or the development of “principles and institutions that establish inter-
national standards or best practices that over time will become universal in scope,”
creates rules and goals that the hegemon may find increasingly difficult to discard,
particularly if large groups of states support these. Additionally, states can resort
to regular bargaining through a combination of incentives and threats of nonco-
operation. Lastly, states can work to establish a division of labor, acquiring niche
specialties in military or economic areas and making cooperation between them
and the hegemon indispensable for both. As such, they protect themselves from
entrapment under the hegemon’s unrestrained leadership as well as from possible
abandonment by it (Press-Barnathan 2006, 274).
In establishing categories of power for small states, Long (2015, 223–25; 2017,
194–200) distinguishes between derivative, collective, and particularistic/particular-
intrinsic sources of foreign-policy power through which such states can influence
the dominant power. Derivative power, which encompasses bandwagoning and
bonding, enables a weaker state to compensate for its limited capabilities through
close association with the dominant power or other great powers, deriving power
from these. Collective power relates to the formation of alliances with other weaker
states and support for multilateral institutions, thereby grouping together soft bal-
ancing, baiting, and buffering. Particularistic power is based on specific qualities or
characteristics of the weaker state that give it a certain importance to the dominant
state and, as such, is reminiscent of Ikenberry’s notion of the establishment of a
division of labor and the acquisition of niche specialties.
Obvious from most of the strategies and categories discussed here is that, from
the subordinate state’s perspective, consensual leadership is preferable to coercively
imposed leadership. To explain leader–follower relations, Cooper et al. differenti-
ate these from relations based on subordination through dominance. They point
out that “submission to the dominance of a greater power is in all respects less
palatable than the consensual dynamic of followership and will surely drive the
dominated to seek ways of defecting at the first pragmatic opportunity” (Cooper,
Higgott, and Nossal 1991, 399). From this, they conclude that a system of follower-
ship through leadership instead of dominance is also less costly to the leader.
The works just discussed address two things. On the one hand, they look at the
agency of the US hegemon in maintaining its leadership role within the hegemonic
system. On the other hand, they examine ways in which subordinate states can re-
spond to the United States to protect their interest. The primary object of study
is the US hegemon and the effect of US hegemony on the behavior, motivations,
and strategies of subordinate states. What has not received much attention is how
the agency of the subordinate states affects not only their own situation within the
hegemonic order, but also the configuration of the hegemonic system. The question
then is not how do subordinate states maintain themselves vis-à-vis the US hegemon,
but how does their agency, as an expression of either consent or dissent, directly
contribute to, or weaken, US hegemony.
An answer to this question, first, requires a conceptualization of agency. For IR,
this is problematic, and no clear agreed-upon conceptualization of the term ex-
ists within the discipline (Acharya 2018, 12; Wight 2006, 178). This is particularly
troubling because IR scholarship, nonetheless, generally regards the state as an

agent, which raises issues related to individual and collective agency. For this rea-

son, Wendt (1999, 215) personifies the state, claiming quite literally that “states are
people too.” An agent, according to Wendt (1987, 359), possesses three intrinsic
characteristics, namely a theoretical understanding of its activities, meaning it can
supply reasons for its behavior; the ability to monitor and adapt its behavior; and
the ability to make decisions. Wight finds Wendt’s personification of the state prob-
lematic and provides an alternative way to accept the state-as-agent thesis. For him,
state agency forms on three different levels: the individual level or “freedom of sub-
jectivity”; “the socio-cultural system into which persons are born and develop” or the
manner in which individuals of the first level become agents of social groups they
belong to; and these individuals’ social role, e.g., diplomat or general (Wight 2006,
213). From this, Wight concludes that neither is a state a person, nor is state agency
simply linguistic shorthand for the actions of individuals. Instead, it is a complex
ensemble subject to different levels of agency that results in a collective of indi-
viduals that act as a unitary state agent. An embrace of this definition allows for a
synthesis with Wendt’s useful characteristics of agents while sidestepping his state
personification. Acharya adds one more important quality of state agency, namely
the capability “of bringing about a change in something” (2018, 13).
Combining these three insights, we may conceptualize state agency as a complex
ensemble of different levels of agency (individual, social systemic, and social role)
that results in representatives of that state, while both constrained and enabled by
these levels of agency, to, as a collective, have a theoretical understanding of the
state’s activities, be able to monitor and adapt these activities, make decisions, and,
as such, be capable of bringing about change to the state’s situation or role in the
international arena or to international order itself. The last condition is particularly
important. If a state cannot bring about change, broadly conceived, then it is merely
a passive object and thus lacks agency. The following sections assess the role of
subordinate-state agency, following the above definition, in two case studies of US–
Latin American relations.
Plan Colombia: Colombian Agency for US Hegemony

The majority of scholarly work on Plan Colombia assumes a dictating role of the
Clinton administration in the design of Plan Colombia in the late 1990s. With the
US presidential election of 2000 approaching, Democrats, afraid of being seen as
soft on drugs, seized on Colombian President Andrés Pastrana’s original plan and
intensified counternarcotics operations in Colombia (Pardo 2000; Crandall 2008,
32). This leads many to conclude the final version of Plan Colombia focused primar-
ily on counternarcotics (Leogrande and Sharpe 2000, 5; Crandall 2001, 96; Pardo
2001, 45; Arnson 2007, 149; Jones 2009, 354; Kline 2009, 23; Rosen 2014, 25). This
focus went counter to Colombian wishes, but in the face of US demands the Pas-
trana administration complied (García 2001, 211; Pardo 2001, 46; Restrepo 2001,
329; Kline 2007, 80). While works differ in perceptions of the intensity of US lead-
ership and dictation, most follow the narrative of US agency and Colombian passive
acceptance. Some works insist Pastrana was presented with a take-it-or-leave-it choice
on inclusion of a strong counternarcotics element (Crandall 2001, 114; Tickner
2001, 223; Ramírez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh 2005, 142; Crandall 2008, 119). No
strong counternarcotics element meant no US support. Others claim the United
States pushed for a refocus on military efforts, receiving docile approval from Pas-
trana (Brohy and Ungerman 2003; Dugas 2005, 241; Stokes 2005, 93; Palacios 2012,
200; Dugas 2014, 153). Another group argues the Pastrana administration essen-
tially gave away control of Plan Colombia, and by extension of Colombia’s internal
affairs, to Washington (see various chapters in Estrada Álvarez 2001a; Godoy 2003,
2). Lastly, several analysts see the eventual Plan Colombia as entirely “made in USA”
QUINTIJN B. KAT 7
(Pardo 2000; Estrada Álvarez 2001b, 36; Sweig 2002, 129; Livingstone 2003, 185;
Crandall 2008, 124; Tokatlian 2008, 98; Livingstone 2009, 118; Tickner and Pardo

2011, 239; Villar and Cottle 2011, 109; Rosen 2014, 31).
The following paragraphs question such assertions and propose a more nuanced
understanding of the inception and design of Plan Colombia. An attempt is made
to demonstrate that a strong counternarcotics element was already present in Pas-
trana’s original plan, that militarization was from the beginning a policy priority for
the Pastrana administration, and that the initiative and push for Plan Colombia lay
mostly in Bogotá. This is not to say the relationship was not one of asymmetry. I
explain how Colombian consent and agency in Plan Colombia’s inception and de-
sign phase provide a good example of the link between consent and agency and the
maintenance of US hegemony.
When taking office in August 1998, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana was
well aware of the many challenges facing his country. As he would recall in his
memoirs, Colombia confronted further intensification of its internal armed con-
flict, a legitimacy crisis of state institutions, a rapidly deteriorating economy, poverty,
weak international relations, and the drug trade, which Pastrana identified as the
“nucleus of Colombia’s problems” (Pastrana Arango and Gómez 2005, 39). The im-
portance of counternarcotics received much attention during Pastrana’s election
campaign. The campaign brochure presented narcotics as one of Colombia’s fun-
damental problems, stating that the drug trade was at the root of the wide array of
the country’s issues. It also mentioned the fight against drug trafficking as a prin-
cipal goal, stressing “Colombia needs to be willing to be an important ally” in this
fight while continuing to “take care of its national interest” (Pastrana Arango 1998a,
32, author’s translation). Pastrana explicitly proposed a counternarcotics policy in
collaboration with the international community, arguing both suffered from the
effects of international drug trafficking, emphasizing the shared responsibility be-
tween producer and consumer countries, and hinting at the need for a combined
supply-and-demand-side solution. This internationalization would later materialize
in Pastrana’s plea to the international community to provide billions of dollars in
funding for Plan Colombia, a large part of which he hoped to obtain from the
United States.
Like counternarcotics policy, the campaign brochure mentioned military reform
and professionalization, stating that both were needed to recuperate state author-
ity over the entire Colombian national territory (Pastrana Arango 1998a, 46). The
strengthening of the Colombian Armed Forces (CAF) was thus not a particular US
initiative, which is further confirmed by the Pastrana administration’s immediate
push for more US military aid after taking office (discussed later). At his inaugura-
tion, Pastrana reiterated his commitment to counternarcotics policy when he said
he saw “a Colombia, proud and with enough authority to challenge other nations
to control their demand for drugs because we were able to combat the supply (. . .)
inside our own country,” adding that he would “recuperate (. . .) for the state the
monopoly of force” (Pastrana Arango 1998b, author’s translation).
While campaign brochures and inauguration speeches may give an indication of
an administration’s objectives, both could equally be seen as rhetoric for the masses
and should not be taken as actual policy proposals. Such proposals can be found in
the Pastrana government’s National Development Plan (NDP), which provided an
outline of the entire policy plan for the next four years and was sent for approval by
the Colombian Congress.
The NDP showed remarkable similarities in terms of prescribed policies with the
later Plan Colombia, produced in conjunction with the United States. Although the
NDP had a strong focus on Pastrana’s peace process, it also explicitly addressed
issues such as impunity and corruption, education, youth and health policy, agri-
culture (including illegal crop substitution policies), justice reform, strengthening
Colombian defense and security capabilities (including the explicit mention of the
need for helicopters and improved intelligence capabilities), and policies aimed at

boosting foreign trade (Departamento Nacional de Planeación de Colombia 1998).
All these were present as well in the final Plan Colombia. In fact, the NDP contained
a subchapter titled “Plan Colombia,” which focused on economic development and
social policies. This first formulation of the term “Plan Colombia” has led many to
claim the plan was later militarized by US involvement at the expense of the social
and economic components present in this original version (Brohy and Ungerman
2003; Dugas 2005, 241; Stokes 2005, 93; Palacios 2012, 200; Dugas 2014, 153). How-
ever, instead of a militarization of the plan, what seems to have happened is that
the military component already present in the NDP under a different chapter was
moved to the final version of Plan Colombia. Instead of a policy change, the differ-
ence between the NDP’s subchapter “Plan Colombia” and the final Plan Colombia
points to a policy reallocation. This should not be surprising as both the NDP and
Plan Colombia for a long time were works in progress. As Jaime Ruiz, author of both
documents, insisted in an interview with one scholar, “all the aspects of the eventual
Plan Colombia were present in the government’s early plans” (Long 2015, 192).
Pastrana understood how important US support would be to execute his plans.
One of his first actions after being elected was to contact the White House to ar-
range for a meeting with US President Clinton, which took place in early August
1998. This meeting can be seen as an attempt to bond with the hegemon, one of
the behaviors discussed earlier. Pastrana was very successful in establishing rapport
with Clinton, forming a close relationship with the US president (Patterson 2017;
Romero 2017). After the meeting, Pastrana returned to Colombia with a commit-
ment from Clinton to work with Colombia (Méndez 2017, 88). It was the first step
toward an eventual US$1.3 billion aid package.
During the years before Plan Colombia’s implementation, Pastrana embarked on
a troublesome and ultimately unsuccessful peace process with Colombia’s largest il-
legal armed group, the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). While he
gave the FARC de facto control over a large swath of Colombian territory and was cer-
tainly keen on reaching a political settlement of the decade-long conflict, it would
be a mistake to think his administration did not also pursue the strengthening and
reform of the CAF. Pastrana had two reasons to improve the Colombian military.
First, the CAF needed to be better trained and equipped to confront the FARC if
peace talks would at some point fail as well as other illegal armed groups with whom
no peace talks were held. Second, strengthening the Colombian military was an es-
sential component of the peace talks. The stronger the CAF, the likelier the FARC
would remain at the table. In 1998, the guerrillas were stronger than they had ever
been, and Pastrana understood he needed to tilt the balance in favor of the state.
As he put it himself, “[t]he armed forces that I command can be armed forces for
peace or for war. In both cases they need to be efficient. Paradoxically, that is the
point of departure for serious negotiations” (Pastrana Arango and Gómez 2005,
77).
Pastrana’s Defense Minister, Rodrigo Lloreda, immediately commenced the re-
organization of the military, appointing General Fernando Tapias as new chief of
the army and announcing a professionalization scheme that aimed to add 10,000
new professional soldiers specifically trained in counterinsurgency operations (El
Tiempo 1998). In need of funding, Lloreda requested military aid from the United
States. He started explicitly linking the guerrillas with the drug trade, knowing the
US Congress would be more likely to support overseas counternarcotics operations
than counterinsurgency (Méndez 2017, 89). To the US embassy Colombian offi-
cials confided the peace talks were necessary to buy the government time to create
a more effective military in which the United States could play a vital role (Kamman
1998a).
Colombian officials would continue requests for military aid from the United
States throughout the years leading up to Plan Colombia. In July 1999, US
QUINTIJN B. KAT 9
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Rand
Beers had a meeting with Tapias and Lloreda’s successor, Luis Fernando Ramírez,

in which he acknowledged Colombia’s need for better air mobility, offering them
eighteen Huey helicopters (instead of Black Hawk helicopters that the Colombians
preferred). Beers also explained that getting any meaningful military aid package
through Congress would be “tied to the movement against illicit coca fields in [the
department of] Putumayo and expanding aerial interdiction” (Kamman 1999). The
focus on counternarcotics clearly came from the United States. However, the push
for more military aid came from the Colombians who rather than being forced to
“militarize” faced restrictions on the use of military aid. Ramírez even felt necessary
to mention he had received an attractive offer for helicopters from Russia, adding
Colombia preferred US equipment (Kamman 1999). The meeting thus provides a
picture not of a hegemon pushing its demands on a passive subordinate state but
rather of an active subordinate state requesting aid from a reluctant hegemonic
state.
US commitment to Plan Colombia came with conditions, particularly a stronger
focus on counternarcotics. US Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering made
this clear to Pastrana when he traveled to Colombia in August 1999 (Washington
Post 1999, A01). According to Pickering, Pastrana did not need much convincing
and easily accepted (Pickering 2017). Here, US and Colombian objectives came
together in a policy plan that served both. Pastrana sought a stronger military as
a counterweight to the FARC, while the United States wished to intensify coun-
ternarcotics operations. Military aid would strengthen the CAF, negatively affect the
FARC’s revenue from the drug trade, and supposedly lead to a decline in cocaine
supply to the United States. Some US officials stated that the counternarcotics ele-
ment was mostly a condition for US Congressional support. They dispute the notion
of the United States imposing its terms on Colombia. For example, Rand Beers
[did not] feel we ever dictated anything other than to say that the way we would
be able to get the money is with stronger counternarcotics policy. You’ve seen what
we’re talking about, we’ve seen what you’re talking about. We seem to be on the same
wavelength. But we will have to show, in order to keep it going, that progress is being
made (Beers 2017).
The eventual document that came to be Plan Colombia was written by Pastrana
confidant Jaime Ruiz, who combined the Pastrana administration’s objectives as ar-
ticulated in the NDP with the only issue the United States really pressed Colombia
on, a strong counternarcotics element (Méndez 2017, 112). The fact that Ruiz wrote
the plan in English led to much speculation as to whether the plan may have been
written in Washington instead (Arnson and Tickner 2010, 172). Such speculation
was later convincingly refuted. Ruiz, a perfect English speaker who holds a degree
from a US university, wrote the plan in English to save time and speed up US govern-
mental approval (Marcella 2001, 7; Pastrana Arango and Gómez 2005, 204; Méndez
2017, 113).
Many scholars argue that the final plan represented a refocus on the military
component while moving away from the Pastrana government’s original socioeco-
nomic development emphasis (Vacius and Isacson 2000; Palacios 2012, 185). Evi-
dence of this shift, such works claim, can be found in the fact that roughly 75 per-
cent of US funding for Plan Colombia went to the CAF or the Colombian National
Police (García 2001; Ramírez 2001, 103; Williams and Jawahar 2003, 163; Dugas
2005, 241; Stokes 2005, 93; Tickner 2007a, 336; Dugas 2014, 153; Rosen 2014, 34).
This assertion is misguided for a number of reasons. First, there is a clear differ-
ence in the costs of military hardware and social development programs. Inevitably,
this will lead to a larger allocation of funds toward the acquisition of, for example,
Black Hawk helicopters, which cost millions of dollars each. The fifty-eight heli-
copters that Colombia received under the initial US$1.3 billion aid package from
Washington plus other expenses on military training and equipment would thus
logically tilt the balance financially toward military spending (Marcella 2003, 33).

Financial share, however, is not a proper measure of priority. Additionally, Pickering
(2017) explained it was agreed the United States would handle most of the high-end
technological equipment, while the Colombians themselves would focus on other
areas.
This relates directly to the second reason the 75 percent security focus should not
be interpreted as an indication of “militarization,” namely that the US aid package
was only one part of the entire Plan Colombia funding, which Pastrana had envi-
sioned to total US$7.5 billion right at the start of his presidency. In September 1998,
in front of the United Nations General Assembly, he asked the world to contribute
to his plan through “Diplomacy for Peace” (Pastrana Arango 1998c). Colombia it-
self contributed US$4 billion, mostly obtained in credit from international financial
institutions, while Pastrana had hoped to receive roughly US$2 billion from partic-
ularly the European Union and Japan (eventually, he received slightly more than
US$1 billion). Specifically, the funding from these countries was intended to cover
the “softer” components of the plan (Arnson 2007, 151).1 The importance of Euro-
pean funding for the plan is evidenced by repeated trips Colombian officials made
to Europe to secure contributions (Méndez 2017, 144).
Besides US funding being only one part of the total budget, the US militarization
claim is further contradicted by the fact that the Colombians from the beginning
had to push the United States for more military aid. Besides the requests for military
hardware described earlier, other interactions between Colombian and US officials
confirm this. As early as December 1998, Defense Minister Lloreda presented US
Secretary of Defense William Cohen with a Colombian plan for “the creation of a
dedicated counterdrug battalion and proposal for wide-ranging investment in mili-
tary hardware to expand the fight against narcotrafficking.” Lloreda furthermore
laid out a series of specific requests for US assistance [asking for] help in reform-
ing and restructuring Colombian intelligence collection, analysis, and assimilation
capabilities, and in developing mechanisms for intelligence cooperation among the
services and the national police. He requested US training and planning assistance
in order to help make the transition to an all-volunteer force and to increase the ef-
fectiveness of the troops. Finally, he repeated the request for AH-1 Cobra helicopters,
emphasizing that the UH-60s are still vulnerable and do not fulfil the need for mobil-
ity and air coverage during combat (Kamman 1998b).
This cable by US Ambassador Curtis Kamman clearly demonstrates the Colom-

bian government actively requested military aid. Particularly telling is the fact that
Lloreda repeated his request for helicopters. Some have argued this Colombian fo-
cus on military strengthening was a consequence of recent defeats the CAF suffered
against guerrillas in 1997 and 1998 (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 101). Together with
mentions of the need to strengthen the military in Pastrana’s NDP, the above gives
reason to question the assertion that the United States was responsible for a refocus
on the military component of Plan Colombia.
What did happen, however, is that Washington stipulated security assistance could
only be used in counternarcotics operations. This was a consequence of so-called
Vietnam syndrome, or the fear of the US Congress to get stuck in another coun-
terinsurgency quagmire (Cook 2004, 134). The restriction greatly frustrated the
Colombians because they were very aware of the overlap between counternarcotics
and counterinsurgency in their country, something Pastrana would later recall in
his memoirs and which is also confirmed by US Ambassador Anne Patterson who
1
That the Colombians had from the start planned to obtain funding for the military component of Plan Colombia
from the United States was also confirmed in an author’s interview with a senior Colombian official involved at the time
who wished to remain anonymous.
QUINTIJN B. KAT 11
was often at the end of Colombian complaints on the matter (Pastrana Arango and
Gómez 2005, 264; Patterson 2017).

A final argument in favor of Colombian agency in the lead up to Plan Colombia is
found in the impressive lobbying campaign the Colombian government launched
in the US Congress. This has been described in great detail by Méndez in his study
of Colombian agency and US foreign policy. Among other ways, the Colombians ac-
tively invited US congressional representatives to visit Colombia, receiving around
120 of them between August 1998 and summer 2000, for which they established
a routine, catering tours after the specific interests of each individual US legisla-
tor, thereby maximizing the chances of gaining their support (Méndez 2017, 138).
In the words of US Ambassador Kamman, “Pastrana would generally bend over
backwards to treat visitors right and to make sure they had a positive impression”
(Kamman 2017).
In Washington, Colombian Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno soon excelled in
“soft diplomacy.” The embassy held a large gala attended by influential figures in the
US capital and began to host salsa lessons and parties aimed at junior congressional
staffers to gain access to their superiors (Méndez 2017, 98). Another tactic Moreno
and his deputy Juan Esteban Orduz adopted was to ride the Capitol Subway, which
moves people between the Senate and House chambers, back and forth, pretending
to bump into members of Congress and taking the opportunity to quickly make
their case to them face to face (Méndez 2017, 137).
Colombian agency thus clearly played an important role in the inception, design,
and eventual approval in the US Congress of Plan Colombia. Counternarcotics and
a strong military component from the beginning formed part of Pastrana’s plan
and the Colombians had an important part in securing the funding. However, this
does not mean Plan Colombia was not hegemonic or that there was no asymmetry
between the United States and Colombia. First, there was the greater emphasis on
counternarcotics and the issue of restrictions on the use of military aid that came
with US involvement. Both were hard conditions and Colombia had to respect these
or risk losing US support. A second issue was the US focus on human rights. In or-
der to receive funding, Colombia was forced to comply with a vetting process of
Colombian military units carried out by US officials. This vetting was highly intru-
sive of Colombian sovereignty and largely resented (Kamman 2017). In spite of this,
the Colombians seem to have made a cost–benefit analysis and ultimately accepted
(Grossman 2017). The process is exemplary of the asymmetrical relationship be-
tween the Colombian request and the US demand, between subordinate state and
hegemon.
Because of this combination of Colombian agency and clear asymmetry, Plan
Colombia has been labeled “intervention by invitation” by Tickner (2007b, 92).
As she points out, the level of intervention in Colombia was so substantial that it
led to a loss of national autonomy and even a deterioration of relations with other
states, something the Pastrana administration knowingly accepted (Tickner 2007b,
105). Nonetheless, Méndez insists we should not speak of US hegemony in this
case. By pointing out that Colombia pushed for more US intervention than it even-
tually got while highlighting instances of Colombian agency, he concludes that for
Colombia “accommodating the United States consisted of settling for less interven-
tion than the Colombian state and people preferred,” which, he maintains, “leads
the investigator farther from, not nearer to hegemony” (Méndez 2017, 133, empha-
sis in original). Méndez makes this assertion on the basis that small-state agency is
“theoretically invisible” in hegemony theory (Méndez 2017, 190).
In doing so, he denies the importance of consent in hegemony theory. Consent
(or dissent) with the hegemonic order already implies agency on the part of the
subordinate state. To consent or dissent is an action in itself—otherwise consent
or dissent would be meaningless terms—which makes subordinate-state agency a
vital factor in the configuration of the hegemonic system. Does a state perceive
opportunities and benefits emanating from hegemony, then it will bargain to se-
cure these and seek cooperation. In cases of consent, hegemony is supported. In

cases of dissent, on the other hand, perceptions of constraints and costs lead to the
bargaining for better terms or outright contestation. What follows may be either
hegemonic correction that leads back to consent or a weakening of legitimacy, i.e.,
of the configuration of the hegemonic system.
In cases of consent, the subordinate state pushes for closer proximity with the
hegemon, such as in the examples of bandwagoning and bonding discussed earlier.
Russell and Tokatlian, specifically discussing Latin American foreign policy mod-
els toward the United States, use the term “coupling,” which in their explanation
is practically identical to bandwagoning. They provide as an “emblematic case” of
coupling the foreign policy of Pastrana’s successor, Uribe, who was responsible for
most of the implementation of Plan Colombia (Russell and Tokatlian 2011, 130).
Here, it is argued that Pastrana’s foreign policy toward the United States with regard
to Plan Colombia was similarly emblematic of bandwagoning or coupling behavior.
Therefore, contrary to Méndez’s assertion, this work regards Plan Colombia as a
perfect example of hegemony. The Pastrana government willingly approached the
United States asking it for help, consented in a trade-off between such help and
a loss of sovereignty (vetting of military units, restrictions on the use of military
equipment), and had to settle for what the United States was prepared to do. The
relationship was clearly asymmetrical, but Colombians perceived they stood to gain
more from close proximity to the hegemon than they stood to lose. If hegemony
rests on subordinate-state consent, Plan Colombia is a textbook case.
Similarly, seen from the US perspective, Plan Colombia clearly increased its hege-
mony in the region. Through its funding to the Colombian government, the coun-
try became highly dependent on the United States, giving Washington more influ-
ence in Bogotá and turning Colombia into its closest ally in South America.
The Rise of Morales: Bolivian Agency against US Hegemony

After Evo Morales became president of Bolivia in 2005, relations between the An-
dean country and the United States deteriorated at a steady pace. Several scan-
dals, many of which were blown out of proportion or made up, while others had
some factual basis, made Morales and his Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party
extremely suspicious of the United States, ultimately leading to the expulsion of
both the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and US Ambassador Philip
Goldberg in 2008. Five years later, the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) followed and at no point during Morales’s presidency were relations fully
restored. With Morales in power, Bolivia quickly shifted from a state with heavy US
involvement and that had been compliant with US demands for decades to one of
the main challengers of US hegemony in Latin America. The following paragraphs
explain this shift by examining US policy in Bolivia before Morales came to power
as well as Morales’s reaction once he was in office. Particular attention is given to
Bolivian consent and dissent and how this translated into Bolivian agency.
Although the story of strong US influence in Bolivian politics goes back to at least
the 1950s, it was with the “War on Drugs” and the neoliberal economic policies
of the 1980s that US involvement truly intensified. Between 1985 and 2003, Boli-
vian government consent with US hegemony was practically a constant. In 1985,
President Víctor Paz Estenssoro issued Decree 21060, an embrace of neoliberal
economic stabilization policies (Klein 2011a, 244). His Planning Minister, Gonzalo
Sánchez de Lozada, developed a New Economic Policy (NEP), consisting of “small
government” and “open economy” measures, which would be continued by Boli-
vian governments for the next eighteen years (Crabtree 2013, 276). While largely
successful at stabilizing the economy, the NEP led to hardship for most Bolivians.
Tens of thousands lost their jobs thanks to state mine closures and the shrinking of
QUINTIJN B. KAT 13
government, while small-scale farmers and the textile industry suffered from foreign
competition (Buxton 2008, 156; Klein 2011b, 51).

With unemployment rising to 25 percent, many Bolivians were pushed below the
poverty line. As a consequence, thousands moved to the Chapare coca-growing re-
gion to find employment in the coca and cocaine industries. Between 1967 and
1987, the region’s population increased roughly tenfold, from 24,000 to around a
quarter million people (Crabtree 2005, 35). This migration accelerated after the
implementation of the NEP. Hurt by neoliberal policies, in coca many poor Bo-
livians found a solution to their economic hardship. This, however, soon placed
them at odds with the United States, which, in 1982, under President Ronald Rea-
gan had launched its War on Drugs. In 1983, agreements made US aid to Bolivia
conditional to cooperation in counternarcotics policy (Gamarra 1994, 31). In 1991,
under President George H.W. Bush, the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) fur-
ther solidified this conditionality. The act gave Andean states preferential access to
the US market while allowing the United States to unilaterally “certify” them on
the basis of their cooperation in the War on Drugs. “Decertification” would lead
to a revoking of the trade preferences and the withholding of aid and support in
international financial institutions (Crabtree 2005, 36). The effects were twofold.
On the one hand, the link between trade and economic assistance and the War on
Drugs would make Bolivian administrations increasingly dependent on the United
States, leading them to almost continuously comply with US demands. On the other
hand, a large segment of the Bolivian population, which had already been hit by the
policies of the NEP and had found a solution in the coca industry, now became the
United States’ opponents in the War on Drugs.
Soon, the United States began to beef up Bolivian counternarcotics capabilities.
One measure was the creation of the Mobile Unit for Rural Control (UMOPAR)
in 1983, a drug-control police unit that worked in close collaboration with DEA
agents. UMOPAR units soon moved into the Chapare to forcefully eradicate coca
crops, leading to violent clashes with cocaleros, or coca growers, whose livelihoods
depended on the plants. Similarly, in 1986, the United States planned and com-
manded Operation Blast Furnace in which 160 US troops participated on Bolivian
soil. Together with UMOPAR, they set out to destroy cocaine laboratories in the
Bolivian jungle and arrest traffickers. The operation was a massive failure (Menzel
1996, 18). Traffickers heard of it in advance and moved out of the area dismantling
cocaine labs before the operation started. A side effect of Operation Blast Furnace
was the polarization and violence it caused in the Chapare (Menzel 1996, 14). The
participation of US troops meanwhile constituted a violation of the Bolivian con-
stitution, which does not allow for the presence of foreign troops within Bolivian
territory without explicit authorization of the Bolivian Congress. Such authoriza-
tion had not been requested (Ledebur 2005, 149). Nonetheless, the Paz Estenssoro
administration had consented with the operation.
In 1988, the Bolivian Congress approved the “Law to Regulate Coca and Con-
trolled Substances,” commonly referred to as Law 1008. Written by US officials
and lobbied for by the US embassy in La Paz, the law was a complete US project
(Conzelman et al. 2008, 190). Reportedly, the United States temporarily withheld
economic assistance to convince Bolivian legislators to pass it (Ledebur 2005, 151).
Law 1008 provided a legal framework for coca eradication, setting a maximum
amount of legally grown coca, while the United States provided compensation
payments and development assistance to peasants who voluntarily destroyed their
plants and transitioned to other crops (Lehman 1999, 204).
Additionally, the law established a US-funded team of prosecutors for counternar-
cotics cases and stipulated that anyone suspected of drug offenses be held in prison
with no possibility of bail before trial. Because a backlog soon developed, many poor
Bolivians ended up behind bars on the sole presumption of their guilt (Conzelman
et al. 2008, 190). Protest against Law 1008 soon erupted and often turned violent.
In one instance, UMOPAR and DEA agents were attacked by cocaleros in the town of
Villa Tunari ending with the UMOPAR opening fire on the crowd, killing five and

wounding many more (Gamarra 1994, 65).
In 1989, Bush announced the Andean Initiative, a comprehensive, multinational
drug-control policy that would greatly increase counternarcotics assistance to drug-
producing states Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. The strategy of the Andean Initiative
was to first beef up Andean militaries to combat the drug trade and then, once
cocaine production decreased, shift the focus to economic development aid. This
shift, however, never took place because cocaine production did not decline as an-
ticipated (Isacson 2005, 23).
Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora complied with the Andean Initiative, signing
an agreement for a US$32.2 million assistance package in exchange for a commit-
ment to deploy the Bolivian military in counternarcotics operations (Lehman 1999,
206). What is particularly noteworthy is that Paz Zamora kept the agreement secret
and denied its existence on several occasions. When the agreement finally became
public, many in Bolivia were outraged by the lack of any proper civilian oversight
in the military’s involvement (Conzelman et al. 2008, 190). The backlash was huge,
with protest and opposition coming from many segments of society (Malamud-Goti
1992, 73). The incident is illustrative of the level of US involvement in Bolivian
domestic affairs. The Paz Zamora administration seemed to be relatively power-
less in deciding on its own counternarcotics policy, which was designed and im-
posed on it by Washington. Dependent as the government was on US assistance, Paz
Zamora saw no other option but to comply. Knowing the political backlash would
be severe, the president decided to deny the deal and effectively lie to the Bolivian
people, which, when the deal became public, understandably made him look like
Washington’s puppet.
Sánchez de Lozada, the author of the NEP, became president in 1993 and con-
tinued Bolivian government allegiance to the US War on Drugs. Violent scuffles
between UMOPAR units and coca farmers regularly occurred. This put the presi-
dent in the same difficult position as his predecessors: How to meet US eradication
targets to avoid “decertification” and risk a stop of US assistance without engaging
in combat with the Bolivian state’s own citizens? At one critical point, Sánchez de
Lozada backed down, pulling back Bolivian armed forces from a stand-off to avoid
a massacre. For lack of results on counternarcotics, Bolivia would later for the first
time be “decertified” by the United States (Gamarra 2016, 189).
Sánchez’s successor in 1997 was former dictator Hugo Banzer, who revived Boli-
vian counternarcotics efforts and steered the country on a course completely com-
pliant with US demands. His “Plan Dignidad” (Plan Dignity) had been written in
Washington, although Banzer presented it as his own (Hylton and Thomas 2007,
100). The plan signified a further intensification of the drug war in Bolivia with a
strong focus on forced eradication. Approximately 5,000 troops were sent into the
Chapare to eradicate 38,000 hectares of coca. Soon, Banzer ended compensation
payments, which left coca farmers no other option than to militantly defend the
plants on which they depended for their livelihoods (Lehman 1999, 222).
An unforeseen effect of the War on Drugs was the political organization that
happened among cocaleros in direct reaction to repressive counternarcotics poli-
cies. While consecutive Bolivian governments, from Paz Estenssoro in the 1980s
to Banzer in the 1990s and early 2000s, clearly consented with US hegemony and
chose close alignment with the United States, inside the Chapare and elsewhere in
Bolivia dissent against US interference was growing.
The fact that the cocalero movement, which would later become the MAS and pro-
pel Morales to the presidency, was a direct reaction to US counternarcotics demands
has been well documented (Healy 1991; Harten 2011). The MAS rose to promi-
nence by constructing a diverse narrative of defiance and belonging that combined
nationalism, anti-“imperialism,” and the marginalization of Bolivia’s indigenous
QUINTIJN B. KAT 15
majority (Postero 2017, 29). Within this narrative, the coca leaf was cleverly linked
to Bolivian culture, turning the War on Drugs into an attack on Bolivia’s cultural

heritage. This message had powerful resonance with Bolivians outside the Chapare
who consume coca leaf in daily life, thereby extending the cocaleros’ support base
(Healy 1991, 94). In the MAS narrative, the coca growers became both the victims
of a foreign oppressor and the champions of the defense of Bolivian sovereignty.
Dissent with US hegemony thus was a vital, if not the pivotal, motivation behind the
political movement.
As one MAS founder recalled, from its inception, the MAS viewed the US as an
imperial oppressor from which Bolivia needed to free itself (Peredo 2017). Imperi-
alism was seen as the cause of the economic and political status quo in Bolivia and
became conflated with neoliberalism that MAS members soon also associated with
US interference (Aboy Carlés 2009, 267). Bolivians saw consecutive governments
comply with US demands for constant attacks on the “sacred” coca leaf and at the
same time implement the neoliberal, “imperial” economic policies that they per-
ceived to be detrimental to their livelihoods. As Harten observed, essentially there
was a crisis of representation in Bolivia in which many Bolivians did no longer per-
ceive the political establishment to further their interests but, instead, those of the
United States (Harten 2011, 96). Instead of such consenting politicians, Bolivians
began to support the dissenting voices of Morales and the MAS.
This support was almost enough to win Morales the presidency in 2002, when
he lost only narrowly to Sánchez de Lozada. After Sánchez resigned amid social
protests that turned violent in 2003, followed within a year by the resignation of
his Vice President and successor to the presidency, Carlos Mesa, new elections were
held in December 2005. Morales won by a landslide, receiving nearly 54 percent of
the vote in the first round. That US counternarcotics policy had backfired could not
have been clearer. As one analyst put it, “[t]he leader of the very target of US crop
eradication programs was now the democratically elected head of state with the
largest margin of victory since the transitions to democracy in the 1980s” (Gamarra
2016, 192). Only days before taking office, a defiant Morales called himself the
United States’ worst nightmare (Kohl 2010, 117).
With Morales in power US–Bolivian relations changed significantly, the initia-
tive decidedly shifting from the United States to Bolivia in what has been coined
the “Bolivianisation of Washington–La Paz relations” (Sivak 2011, 161). The United
States opted for caution and indicated it wished to work constructively on issues of
mutual interest. For a “breaking the ice” meeting on January 2, 2006, US Ambas-
sador David Greenlee received Morales in his residence. According to Greenlee,
the meeting went reasonably well with both sides expressing interest in a construc-
tive dialogue. However, Greenlee also immediately continued the decade-long US
custom of threatening the Bolivian government when he pointed out that inter-
national financial institutions were heavily dependent on the United States, saying
“[w]hen you think of the [Inter-American Development Bank], you should think of
the U.S. This is not blackmail, it is simple reality” (US Embassy La Paz 2006a).
Despite this reasonable start, the first of many diplomatic scandals had already
erupted. It concerned the destruction by the United States of supposedly old and
dysfunctional Bolivian MANPAD missiles. The US maintained it operated at the
request of the Bolivian military but neither Bolivian interim-President Rodríguez
Veltzé nor his defense minister was informed. Most evidence points at a glitch in
the Bolivian chain of command and no bad US intentions, but the incident allowed
Morales to accuse the United States of robbing Bolivia of its air defense capabilities.
Besides such inflammatory rhetoric, Morales soon distanced Bolivia from the
United States in policy, too, while cozying up to antagonists of Washington, such
as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Cuba’s Fidel Castro. In April 2006, he joined the
Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America, an intergovernmental orga-
nization established by Venezuela and Cuba that sought to be an alternative to the
US-pursued Free Trade Area of the Americas. Economic assistance from Venezuela
to Bolivia soon increased, approaching US levels (Romero 2007, 3). This gave

Morales more space to maneuver against the United States and what he perceived
as US-controlled financial institutions, an understandable perception after Green-
lee’s threat. In early 2007, Bolivia opted out of the World Bank’s International Cen-
ter for the Settlement of Investment Disputes over supposed bias favoring transna-
tional corporations (Kohl 2010, 118). Such moves provided Morales more agency
than previous Bolivian administrations had enjoyed. The commodities boom of the
2000s also made him more independent.
On the issue of counternarcotics, Morales oscillated between collaboration with
the United States, be it on different terms, and resistance to US policy. On the one
hand, he allowed the DEA to continue operating in the Chapare, while, on the
other hand, he appointed fellow cocaleros to the most important counternarcotics
posts in government. In late 2006, Morales announced that Law 1008 would be
reformed, increasing the limit of legally planted coca to 20,000 hectares, a form
of balking at US power. In response, the United States immediately decreased US
counternarcotics assistance (Gamarra 2007, 29).
A highly polemic issue developed with regard to the quest for autonomy in the
so-called Media Luna departments in North and East Bolivia. The MAS govern-
ment began accusing Greenlee’s successor, US Ambassador Philip Goldberg, as well
as USAID of siding with the Media Luna opposition while also blowing a range
of minor, unrelated incidents out of proportion by labeling them US provocations
(Miami Herald 2006; US Embassy La Paz 2006b). MAS portrayals of US “democracy
promotion” as serving to destabilize the Morales presidency may have been justi-
fied, as argued by Robinson (2013, 231). Allegations of a conspiracy between Gold-
berg and the Bolivian opposition, however, were based on flimsy evidence such as
a photo taken at a public event in which Goldberg posed with a supposed Colom-
bian paramilitary who, according to Goldberg, was a stranger who had asked him
for a picture (US Embassy La Paz 2007). After another public meeting between
Goldberg and opposition leader Ruben Costas in September 2008, which the MAS
dubbed “clandestine,” Morales declared Goldberg persona non grata, dealing a mas-
sive blow to US–Bolivian relations (US Embassy La Paz 2008). A day earlier, he had
expelled the DEA from the Chapare.
The Bush administration responded by suspending Bolivia’s trade preferences
under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA, the suc-
cessor of the ATPA). In retaliation, Morales completely expelled the DEA from Bo-
livia, after which the United States “decertified” Bolivia on December 15, 2008.
Trade and counternarcotics, the two issues that had dominated US–Bolivian rela-
tions for years and that had been tied together by the United States in the ATPDEA
with such success under previous Bolivian administrations, now stood at the cen-
ter of the deterioration of relations between both countries. The negative effects
of suspension of the ATPDEA were real, and the MAS government certainly wished
to maintain preferential market access. However, under Morales, it was clear that
threats on behalf of the US government, both those only perceived and those that
were real, would not be tolerated. In spite of real attempts by Morales and the new
Obama administration to improve relations, disagreement over counternarcotics
policy remained an obstacle in the way of recertification of Bolivia under the AT-
PDEA or the exchange of ambassadors.
It is clear that with the rise of Morales and the MAS the United States lost a great
deal of influence in Bolivia, a country in which for decades it had practically run the
show. At the same time, Morales’s election increased the power of anti-American
voices in Latin America, such as those of Chávez and Castro, who gained a new ally.
Bolivian perceptions of constraints and costs emanating from US hegemony led
to Bolivian agency that affected US hegemony, which became delegitimized and
weakened. Unlike previous Bolivian governments that consented with US policy
QUINTIJN B. KAT 17
prescriptions and demands, Morales dissented and openly and actively defied US
policy, took the initiative, and effectively pulled Bolivia out of the US hegemonic

system.
Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

Hegemony largely depends on consent of the subordinate state. Such consent is
based on the perception that benefits of remaining within the hegemonic order are
greater than the costs. Security, aid, trade relations, and many other considerations
may play a role in the subordinate state’s judgement in this regard. If the subordi-
nate state perceives the costs of hegemony to be greater than the benefits, it will
dissent, producing three possible outcomes. First, when the subordinate state re-
jects the hegemonic state’s leadership, the latter may respond with repression and
coercion. This would lead to a shift in the relationship from being hegemonic to
one of domination. In the contemporary context of US–Latin American relations,
this is mostly a theoretical possibility. Second, the hegemon may convince the sub-
ordinate state to remain within the hegemonic order by demonstrating the benefits
of doing so, in a way changing the subordinate state’s mind. This may be done with
a carrot-and-stick strategy that highlights to the subordinate state what it will lose or
risk by rejecting the hegemon. Third, the hegemon may decide to allow the subor-
dinate state to leave the hegemonic order, out of either impotence or indifference.
This last possibility is what happened in the relation between the United States
and Bolivia after Morales came to power. Colombia, on the other hand, did not
dissent. On the contrary, the Pastrana administration not only consented with US
hegemony but actively pursued it, bandwagoning and bonding to derive power from
association with the United States, thereby increasing Colombia’s national power.
As this article demonstrates, in both cases agency played a vital role. Consent and
dissent imply some sort of action on behalf of their subject. Without such action,
to consent or dissent would lose all meaning and significance. If hegemony is thus
dependent on, and strengthened by, consent (or jeopardized by dissent), then the
study of subordinate-state agency is vital for our understanding of hegemony.
To be clear, consent or dissent of one subordinate state likely has a modest effect
on the hegemonic order, especially if and when it concerns a particularly weak state
in terms of military, economic, and political power. The effect of consent or dissent
should also not be taken to significantly affect the absolute or relative power of the
hegemon, which, instead, is dependent on its own military, economic, and political
strength. Simply put, when Bolivia defied the United States, neither US hegemony
in Latin America nor US power in the region crumbled. Bolivia’s influence is insuf-
ficient to cause such effect. However, the hegemonic system—hegemony’s makeup,
i.e., the management of the hegemonic order and the scope of constituents or
recognition of the hegemon—clearly was affected. By defying Washington, Morales
openly withdrew Bolivian recognition of US hegemony and, thus, modestly altered
the configuration of the hegemonic system. Colombia’s embrace of US hegemony
had the precise opposite effect. Again, the shifting of individual subordinate states
between consent and dissent is unlikely to seriously affect the hegemonic order.
However, a shift from consent to dissent may be an indication of a weakening hege-
monic system. As more states shift from consent to dissent, the hegemon’s legiti-
macy decreases. Such configurational change potentially affects the hegemon too.
After all, as hegemony’s scope of constituency shrinks, the nature of the hegemon’s
relations with the states that leave changes. In essence, the hegemon ceases to be a
hegemon over states that retract their recognition of it, instead becoming to them
a mere dominant and powerful state.
Whether or not a subordinate state consents or dissents logically depends on
that state’s overall situation. Each state is different, and these differences may, in
part, account for the divergence between cases. Colombia and Bolivia are both
cocaine-producing states. However, the history and effects of coca cultivation in

each are starkly dissimilar. Up until the 1990s, coca cultivation in Colombia had

been modest and far below levels in neighboring Peru and in Bolivia. The coca plant
did not form a part of daily Colombian life, and large-scale production only took off
when drug-trafficking organizations moved cultivation practices to Colombia in the
1990s. This lucrative business then became an important source of revenue for vari-
ous illegal armed actors within the Colombian territory that took part in Colombia’s
decade-long civil war and that led to Colombia being on the brink of becoming a
failed state by the late 1990s. Coca cultivation, specifically for cocaine production,
was thus a relatively novel phenomenon in Colombia that directly influenced and
financed the continuation of the Colombian armed conflict.
In Bolivia, on the other hand, coca cultivation is a centuries-old tradition. The
plant has been grown by indigenous people in this region of the Andes for about
1000 years. It is a part of daily life in a variety of ways, ranging from medicinal use
to tea and the chewing of the leaf, and, as such, coca (not cocaine) is consumed
by millions of people every day (Harten 2011, 25). In other words, coca is part of
the cultural heritage of a large proportion of the Bolivian people. Moreover, unlike
Colombia, Bolivia did not experience a domestic insurgency that seriously threat-
ened to overthrow the state at any point during the second half of the twentieth
century. In Bolivia, coca did not finance civil war.
These differences heavily influenced both states’ responses to US hegemony.
Colombia faced a crisis and requested US help to resolve it. It stood to gain a lot, ar-
guably the preservation of the Colombian state, and was prepared to pay the price
of deference to the United States. The US War on Drugs was, for the Colombian
government, also a war against insurgency. Bolivia’s gains from decades of consent
with the War on Drugs were not as clear. US counternarcotics policy harmed sig-
nificant portions of the population through violence and the destruction of their
livelihoods, attacked the “sacred” coca leaf, and did not seem to provide any tan-
gible benefits to the country, while the costs of loss of sovereignty and hardship
for Bolivia’s poor were high. Morales capitalized on popular discontent with this
situation and defied the United States once in power.
Domestic conditions thus play a large part in the divergence between consent and
dissent between both states. Because hegemony rests particularly on the consent of
subordinate states, the hegemon’s first and foremost task is to safeguard consent
through the offering of benefits through its leadership. To Colombians, the benefits
were obvious; to Bolivians, they were not. This translated into Colombian agency
that embraced US hegemony and Bolivian agency that contested it.
The relationship between Colombia and the United States was highly asymmet-
rical and clearly hegemonic, but, again, also highly beneficial to the Colombians,
who faced a massive security crisis. Colombia applied bonding strategies when it
courted members of the Clinton administration and members of the US Congress,
and it bandwagoned on US power in its domestic fight against insurgents and ille-
gal armed groups. Speaking in Long’s categories of small-state power, through close
association with the United States, the Pastrana government increased its derivative
power through support for US hegemony.
In Bolivia, a very different scenario played out. Although for a large part of the
second half of the twentieth century consecutive Bolivian governments bandwag-
oned with the United States, the real gains for ordinary Bolivians were modest.
Therefore, when Morales won the presidency, he was able to change course and
apply buffering and balking strategies. First, he increased ties with Venezuela and
Cuba, which made his government less dependent on US funding and provided
him with a buffer and room for maneuver. As such, he essentially soft-balanced and
increased Bolivia’s collective power vis-à-vis the US hegemon. Second, he simply
refused to defer to US demands in terms of counternarcotics policy. Bolivia thus
balked and, as it turned out, Washington was not capable, or prepared, to do much
QUINTIJN B. KAT 19
about it. Apparently, the benefits of the ATPDEA did not outweigh the costs of the
Washington-prescribed drug war. The US lost a great deal of influence in Bolivia

and, by extension, in Latin America with Morales’s presidency. Washington’s re-
action can best be described as passive acceptance, stemming from impotence to
change the situation in an acceptable manner, indifference, or a combination of
both.
Both cases confirm the applicability and relevance of some of the subordinate-
state strategies proposed in other works. These behaviors were deemed the appro-
priate means to achieve the goals that both the Bolivian and Colombian govern-
ments set within the context of their nations’ interests. Bonding, balking, buffering,
and bandwagoning can, in practice, indeed be successful, the cases show. The case
of Bolivia, furthermore, demonstrates that soft balancing is not necessarily limited
to second-tier states but may be applied by smaller and weaker states, too. This is not
to say that the other strategies discussed earlier are less viable or effective. In the two
case studies, these were simply not available nor deemed appropriate by policymak-
ers. Because each case is unique, empirical analysis of other cases may find examples
of leash-slipping, blackmailing, baiting, bargaining, or the establishment of a divi-
sion of labor that enhances a state’s particularistic/particular-intrinsic power. The
findings of this article are therefore not necessarily generalizable to Latin American
states or to subordinate states elsewhere. Applicability of subordinate-state strate-
gies is context dependent. Further research into similar cases (one could think of
Venezuela under President Chávez as a case comparable to Bolivia and US security
aid to the Northern Triangle states in Central America as comparable to Colom-
bia) may be helpful in this regard. Furthermore, scholars may assess whether cases
of dissent could be connected to one another. An interesting direction of research
may be the possible demonstrating effect of cases of dissent. One state’s dissent may
inspire other states to do the same, depending on the perceivable consequences to
the first dissenter.
More broadly, revisionist empirical studies that examine subordinate-state agency
in other cases may result in a deeper understanding of the relations between domi-
nant and weak states and question the prevalent view of dominant-active and weak-
passive states. Such research could produce new perspectives on US–Latin Ameri-
can relations in general and on specific events or countries but need not be limited
to US hegemony in Latin America. Subordinate-state agency is likely observable vis-
à-vis any dominant state, and further study of its potential impact may change ex-
isting views on a broad range of debates in IR. After all, the cases discussed earlier
reveal the limited utility of the wide variety of suggested observable subordinate-
state behaviors that currently exists. Why do states choose one kind of behavior
over another? To what extent do some suggested strategies go together well with
others? What are the larger objectives that a combination of behaviors may serve?
Grouping different behaviors together on the basis of subordinate-state agency that
seeks to either support or contest US hegemony enables the formulation of more
elaborate answers to these questions and provides for a much more workable model
for analysis and explanation of subordinate states’ roles in, and influences on, the
hegemonic system. Instead of the existing and confusing mix of subordinate-state
strategies, this may lead to the development of a theory on subordinate-state agency
toward which this article is a first step.
Lastly, future scholarly work on hegemony should seek to resolve further ques-
tions about the workings of the hegemonic system. What elements and actors af-
fect change to this system’s configuration? If the configuration constantly varies,
in terms of composition between singular and collective hegemony, and in terms
of scope of constituency between inclusive and coalitional hegemony, what are the
sources of such change? It is not for the hegemon alone to decide on the com-
position or scope of constituency. Subordinate states play an active role in this re-
gard and, as such, produce or contest hegemony’s legitimacy. Because legitimacy is
a foundation of hegemony, understanding its production or contestation through

the hegemonic system should be an essential objective of hegemony studies.

As the cases discussed earlier demonstrate, one important factor in this regard is
consent translated into subordinate-state agency. The consenting subordinate state
will apply agency to uphold or even strengthen the hegemonic order. A dissenting
state, on the contrary, will do the opposite and use agency to challenge its sub-
ordinate position. The relation between subordinate-state agency and hegemony,
therefore, merits more attention from IR scholars.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to express his gratitude to Kevin Middlebrook, Sharmila
Ray, two anonymous reviewers, and the editors of ISR for their helpful and
valuable comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2019
Latin American Studies Association International Congress and the 2019 British
International Studies Association Annual Conference.
References
ABOY CARLÉS, GERARDO. 2009. “Nacionalismo e indigenismo en el gobierno de Evo Morales: hacia una
radicalización del populismo?” In Autoritarismo o democracia? Hugo Chávez y Evo Morales, edited by
Julio Aibar and Daniel Vázquez. Mexico City: FLACSO.
ACHARYA, AMITAV. 2018. Constructing Global Order. Agency and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
ARNSON, CYNTHIA J. 2007. “The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy.” In Peace, Democracy, and Human
Rights in Colombia, edited by Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallón. Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press.
ARNSON, CYNTHIA J., AND ARLENE B. TICKNER. 2010. “Colombia and the United States: Strategic Partners
or Uncertain Allies?” In Contemporary U.S.–Latin American Relations. Cooperation of Conflict in the 21st
Century? edited by Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro. New York: Routledge.
BEERS, RAND. 2017. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(1998–2002). Author’s interview. Washington, DC, November 20.
BROHY, AUDREY, AND GERARD UNGERMAN. 2003. Plan Colombia: Cashing In on the Drug War Failure. Chico, CA:
Free-Will Productions.
BROOKS, STEPHEN G., AND WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH. 2005. “Hard Times for Soft Balancing.” International
Security 30 (1): 72–108.
BUXTON, NICK. 2008. “Economic Strings: The Politics of Foreign Debt.” In Dignity and Defiance. Stories
from Bolivia’s Challenge to Globalization, edited by Jim Schultz and Melissa Crane Draper. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
CLARK, IAN. 2011. Hegemony in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
CONZELMAN, CAROLINE S., COLETTA A. YOUNGERS, JIM SHULTZ, CAITLIN ESCH, LENY OLIVERA, AND LINDA FARTHING.
2008. “Coca: The Leaf at the Center of the War on Drugs.” In Dignity and Defiance. Stories from Bolivia’s
Challenge to Globalization, edited by Jim Shultz and Melissa Crane Draper. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
COOK, DEAN A. 2004. “U.S. Southern Command: General Charles E. Wilhelm and the Shaping of U.S. Mil-
itary Engagement in Colombia, 1997–2000.” In America’s Viceroys. The Military and U.S. Foreign Policy,
edited by Derek S. Reveron. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
COOPER, ANDREW FENTON, RICHARD A. HIGGOTT, AND KIM RICHARD NOSSAL. 1991. “Bound to Follow? Leader-
ship and Followership in the Gulf Conflict.” Political Science Quarterly 106 (3): 391–410.
COX, ROBERT W. 1987. Production, Power, and World Order. Social Forces in the Making of History. New York:
Columbia University Press.
CRABTREE, JOHN. 2005. Patterns of Protest. Politics and Social Movements in Bolivia. London: Latin America
Bureau.
———. 2013. “From MNR to the MAS: Populism, Parties, the State, and Social Movements in Bolivia
Since 1952.” In Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Carlos de la Torre and
Cynthia J. Arnson. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
CRANDALL, RUSSELL. 2001. “Explicit Narcotization: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia During the Samper
Administration.” Latin American Politics and Society 43 (3): 95–120.
QUINTIJN B. KAT 21
———. 2008. Driven by Drugs. US Policy Toward Colombia. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACIÓN DE COLOMBIA. 1998. Cambio para Construir la Paz, 1998–2002. Bogotá:

Plan Nacional de Planeación.
DUGAS, JOHN C. 2005. “The Colombian Nightmare: Human Rights Abuses and the Contradictory Effects
of U.S. Foreign Policy.” In When States Kill. Latin America, the U.S. and Technologies of Terror, edited by
Cecilia Menjívar and Néstor Rodríguez. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
———. 2014. “Old Wine in New Wineskins: Incorporating the “Ungoverned Spaces” Concept into Plan
Colombia.” In US National Security Concerns in Latin America and the Caribbean, edited by Gary Prevost,
Harry E. Vanden, Carlo Oliva Campos and Luis Fernando Ayerbe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
El Tiempo. 1998. “Otros 10.000 soldados contra la insurgencia.” August 20.
ESTRADA ÁLVAREZ, JAIRO. 2001a. Plan Colombia. Ensayos críticos. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
———. 2001b. “Elementos de economía política.” In Plan Colombia. Ensayos críticos, edited by Jairo
Estrada Álvarez. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
GAMARRA, EDUARDO A. 1994. Entre la droga y la democracia. La cooperación entre Estados Unidos-Bolivia y la lucha
contra el narcotráfico. La Paz: ILDIS.
———. 2007. “Bolivia on the Brink.” Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations.
Accessed May 5, 2019. https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/book_pdf/BoliviaCSR24.pdf.
———. 2016. “U.S.–Bolivia Relations in Times of Change.” In The Obama Doctrine in the Americas. Security
in the Americas in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Hanna S. Kassab and Jonathan D. Rosen. Lanham,
MD: Lexington Books.
GARCÍA, ANDELFO. 2001. “Plan Colombia y Ayuda Estadounidense: Una Fusion Traumática.” In El Plan
Colombia y la Internacionalización del Conflicto, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Interna-
cionales. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana S.A.
GILPIN, ROBERT. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
GODOY, HORACIO. 2003. “Plan Colombia’s Strategic Weaknesses.” Presented at the 2003 Meeting of the
Latin American Studies Association, Dallas, TX, March 27–29.
GROSSMAN, MARC. 2017. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (2001–2005). Author’s interview.
Washington, DC, October 20.
HARTEN, SVEN. 2011. The Rise of Evo Morales and the MAS. London: Zed Books.
HEALY, KEVIN. 1991. “Political Ascent of Bolivia’s Peasant Coca Leaf Producers.” Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs 33 (1): 87–121.
HYLTON, FORREST, AND SINCLAIR THOMAS. 2007. Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics.
London: Verso.
IKENBERRY, G. JOHN. 2001. After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major
Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2003. “Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of
Unipolarity.” National Intelligence Council. Accessed April 10, 2019. https://www.belfercenter.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/files/strategic_reactions.pdf.
IKENBERRY, G. JOHN, AND CHARLES A. KUPCHAN. 1990. “Socialization and Hegemonic Power.” International
Organization 44 (3): 283–315.
IKENBERRY, G. JOHN, AND DANIEL H. NEXON. 2019. “Hegemony Studies 3.0: The Dynamics of Hegemonic
Orders.” Security Studies 28 (3): 395–421.
ISACSON, ADAM. 2005. “The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs.” In Drug and Democracy in Latin America.
The Impact of U.S. Policy, edited by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin. London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
JESSE, NEAL G., STEVEN E. LOBELL, GALIA PRESS-BARNATHAN, AND KRISTEN P. WILLIAMS. 2012. “The Lead-
ers Can’t Lead When the Followers Won’t Follow. The Limitations of Hegemony.” In Be-
yond Great Powers and Hegemons. Why Secondary States Support, Follow, or Challenge, edited by
Kristen P. Williams, Steven E. Lobell and Neal G. Jesse. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
JONES, JAMES C. 2009. “U.S. Policy and Peace in Colombia: Lost in a Tangle of Wars.” In Colombia. Building
Peace in a Time of War, edited by Virginia M. Bouvier. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace
Press.
KAMMAN, CURTIS. 1998a. “The Colombian Peace Process: Implications for U.S. Policy.” Digital National
Security Archive. Diplomatic Cable, September 9.
———. 1998b. “Pastrana Breakfast and Colombia Bilateral.” Digital National Security Archive. Diplo-
matic Cable, December 22.
———. 1999. “A/S Beers Meets with MOD and Armed Forces Chief.” Digital National Security Archive.
Diplomatic Cable, July 27.
———. 2017. US Ambassador to Colombia (1998–2000). Author’s interview. Washington, DC, November
13.

KEOHANE, ROBERT O. 1984. After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
KINDLEBERGER, CHARLES P. 1973. The World in Depression, 1929–1939. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
KLEIN, HERBERT S. 2011a. A Concise History of Bolivia, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2011b. “The Historical Background to the Rise of the MAS, 1952–2005.” In Evo Morales and the
Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia. The First Term in Context, 2006–2010, edited by Adrian J. Pearce.
London: Institute for the Study of the Americas.
KLINE, HARVEY F. 2007. Chronicle of a Failure Foretold. The Peace Process of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana.
Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
———. 2009. Showing Teeth to the Dragons. State-Building by Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 2002–
2006. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
KOHL, BENJAMIN. 2010. “Bolivia Under Morales: A Work in Progress.” Latin American Perspectives 37 (3):
107–22.
KRAHMANN, ELKE. 2005. “American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing Visions of International
Security.” International Studies Review 7 (4): 531–45.
KRASNER, STEPHEN D. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” World Politics 28 (3):
317–47.
LAYNE, CHRISTOPHER. 2006. “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States.”
International Security 31 (2): 7–41.
LEDEBUR, KATHRYN. 2005. “Bolivia: Clear Consequences.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America. The Im-
pact of U.S. Policy, edited by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
LEHMAN, KENNETH D. 1999. Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership. Athens, GA: University of
Georgia Press.
LEOGRANDE, WILLIAM M., AND KENNETH E. SHARPE. 2000. “Two Wars or One? Drugs, Guerrillas, and Colom-
bia’s New ‘Violencia’.” World Policy Journal 17 (3): 1–11.
LIEBER, KEIR A., AND GERARD ALEXANDER. 2005. “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing
Back.” International Security 30 (1): 109–39.
LIVINGSTONE, GRACE. 2003. Inside Colombia. Drugs, Democracy and War. London: Latin America Bureau.
———. 2009. America’s Backyard. The United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on
Terror. London: Zed Books.
LONG, TOM. 2015. Latin America Confronts the United States. Asymmetry and Influence. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
———. 2017. “Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collec-
tive Power.” International Studies Review 19 (1): 185–205.
MALAMUD-GOTI, JAIME. 1992. Smoke and Mirrors: The Paradox of the Drug Wars. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
MARCELLA, GABRIELA. 2001. Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives. Carlisle, PA: US Army
War College, Strategic Studies Institute.
MARCELLA, GABRIEL. 2003. The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity.
Carlisle, PA: US Army War College.
MÉNDEZ, ÁLVARO. 2017. Colombian Agency and the Making of US Foreign Policy. Intervention by Invitation. New
York: Routledge.
MENZEL, SEWALL H. 1996. Fire in the Andes. U.S. Foreign Policy and Cocaine Politics in Bolivia and Peru. New
York: University Press of America.
Miami Herald. 2006. “Morales Upset After U.S. Rejects Allies’ Travel Visas.” April 25.
NYE, JOSEPH S., JR. 2002. The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
PALACIOS, MARCO. 2012. “A Historical Perspective on Counterinsurgency and the “War on Drugs” in
Colombia.” In In the Wake of War, edited by Cynthia J. Arnson. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press.
PAPE, ROBERT A. 2005. “Soft Balancing Against the United States.” International Security 30 (1): 7–45.
PARDO, RODRIGO. 2000. “El Plan Washington.” El Tiempo, March 20.
———. 2001. “Relaciones Internacionales y Proceso De Paz. Proyecciones sobre Escenarios.” Colombia
Internacional 51: 28–50.
PASTRANA ARANGO, ANDRÉS. 1998a. El Cambio Es Ahora. Author’s translation.
———. 1998b. Inauguration speech, Bogotá, Colombia, August 7.
———. 1998c. Speech at the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 23.
PASTRANA ARANGO, ANDRÉS, AND CAMILO GÓMEZ. 2005. La Palabra Bajo Fuego. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta
Colombiana S.A.
QUINTIJN B. KAT 23
PATTERSON, ANNE. 2017. US Ambassador to Colombia (2000–2003). Author’s interview. Washington, DC,
November 9.

PAUL, T.V. 2004. “Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contempo-
rary Relevance.” In Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, edited by T. V. Paul, James
J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
———. 2005. “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.” International Security 30 (1): 46–71.
PEREDO, OSVALDO. 2017. Author’s interview. Santa Cruz, Bolivia, May 12.
PICKERING, THOMAS. 2017. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1997–2000). Author’s interview.
Washington, DC, October 18.
POSTERO, NANCY. 2017. The Indigenous State. Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia. Oakland,
CA: University of California Press.
PRESS-BARNATHAN, GALIA. 2006. “Managing the Hegemon: NATO Under Unipolarity.” Security Studies 15
(2): 271–309.
RABASA, ANGEL, AND PETER CHALK. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its
Implications for Regional Stability. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
RAMÍREZ, SOCORRO. 2001. “La Internacionalización del Conflicto y de la Paz en Colombia.” In El Plan
Colombia y la Internacionalización del Conflicto, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Interna-
RAMÍREZ LEMUS, MARÍA CLEMENCIA, KIMBERLY STANTON, AND JOHN WALSH. 2005. “Colombia: A Vicious Circle
of Drugs and War.” In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America. The Impact of U.S. Policy, edited by Coletta
A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
RESTREPO, LUIS ALBERTO. 2001. “El Plan Colombia: Una Estrategia Fatal para una Ayuda Necesaria.” In El
Plan Colombia y la Internacionalización del Conflicto, Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Interna-
ROBINSON, WILLIAM I. 1996. Promoting Polyarchy. Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
———. 2013. “Promoting Polyarchy: 20 Years Later.” International Relations 27 (2): 228–34.
ROMERO, PETER. 2017. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (2001). Author’s inter-
view. Washington, DC, October 25.
ROMERO, SIMON. 2007. “Venezuela Rivals U.S. in Aid in Bolivia.” New York Times, February 23, 3.
ROSEN, JONATHAN D. 2014. The Losing War. Plan Colombia and Beyond. Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press.
RUSSELL, ROBERTO, AND JUAN GABRIEL TOKATLIAN. 2011. “Beyond Orthodoxy: Asserting Latin America’s New
Strategic Options Toward the United States.” Latin American Politics and Society 53 (4): 127–46.
SIVAK, MARTIN. 2011. “The Bolivianisation of Washington–La Paz Relations: Evo Morales’ Foreign Policy
Agenda in Historical Context.” In Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia. The First Term
in Context, 2006–2010, edited by Adrian J. Pearce. London: Institute for the Study of the Americas.
STOKES, DOUG. 2005. America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia. London: Zed Books.
SWEIG, JULIA E. 2002. “What Kind of War for Colombia?” Foreign Affairs 81 (5): 122–41.
TICKNER, ARLENE B. 2001. “La ‘guerra contra las drogas’: las relaciones Colombia – Estados Unidos durante
la administración Pastrana.” In Plan Colombia. Ensayos críticos, edited by Jairo Estrada Álvarez. Bogotá:
Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
———. 2007a. “U.S. Foreign Policy in Colombia. Bizarre Side Effects of the ‘War on Drugs.’” In Peace,
Democracy, and Human Rights in Colombia, edited by Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallón. Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
———. 2007b. “Intervención por Invitación. Claves de la política exterior colombiana y de sus debili-
dades principals.” Colombia Internacional 65: 90–112.
TICKNER, ARLENE B., AND RODRIGO PARDO. 2011. “En busca de aliados para la “Seguridad Democrática.”
La política exterior del primer año de la administración Uribe.” In Relaciones Internacionales y Política
Exterior de Colombia, edited by Sandra Borda and Arlene B. Tickner. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes.
TOKATLIAN, JUAN GABRIEL. 2008. “La construcción de un ‘Estado Fallido’ en la política mundial: el caso de
las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Colombia.” Análysis Político 64: 67–104.
US EMBASSY LA PAZ. 2006a. “Initial Meeting with Evo Morales: Brass Tacks.” Digital National Security
Archive. Diplomatic Cable, January 3.
———. 2006b. “Morales Accuses U.S. of Being Behind Deadly Bombings.” Digital National Security
Archive. Diplomatic Cable, March 23.
———. 2007. “Evo Accuses Ambassador of Coup Plotting and Paramilitary Links.” Digital National Se-
curity Archive. Diplomatic Cable, November 5.
———. 2008. “Bolivia: Violence Erupts, Govt Installations Taken, Govt Accuses Ambassador.” Digital
National Security Archive. Diplomatic Cable, September 10.
VACIUS, INGRID, AND ADAM ISACSON. 2000. “Plan Colombia”: The Debate in Congress. Policy Brief. Washington,
DC: Center for International Policy.

VILLAR, OLIVER, AND DREW COTTLE. 2011. Cocaine Death Squads and the War on Terror. U.S. Imperialism and
Class Struggle in Colombia. New York: Monthly Review Press.
WALT, STEPHEN M. 2005a. Taming American Power. The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, e-book ed. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company.
———. 2005b. “Taming American Power.” Foreign Affairs 84 (5): 105–20.
WALTZ, KENNETH N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Com-
pany.
Washington Post. 1999. “U.S. Ready to Boost Aid to Troubled Colombia.” August 23, A01.
WENDT, ALEXANDER E. 1987. “The Agent–Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” Interna-
tional Organization 41 (3): 335–70.
———. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
WIGHT, COLIN. 2006. Agents, Structures and International Relations. Politics as Ontology. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
WILLIAMS, MARK ERIC, AND VINAY JAWAHAR. 2003. “When Rational Policy Making Fails: Plan Colombia and
the Approaching ‘Commitment Trap’.” International Journal of Politics and Ethics 3 (2): 159–72.

10 1093@isr@viaa025

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

10 1093@isr@viaa025

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

International Studies Review (2020) 0, 1–24

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

The strategies of subordinate states in hegemonic or asymmetrical rela-

Keywords: hegemony, US–Latin American relations, subordinate-

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Subordinate-State Strategies in Hegemonic Order

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

or dominance by the dominant power, making a combination of balancing and

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

troubling because IR scholarship, nonetheless, generally regards the state as an

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Plan Colombia: Colombian Agency for US Hegemony

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

This cable by US Ambassador Curtis Kamman clearly demonstrates the Colom-

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

The Rise of Morales: Bolivian Agency against US Hegemony

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

cocaine-producing states. However, the history and effects of coca cultivation in

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

a foundation of hegemony, understanding its production or contestation through

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isr/viaa025/5823275 by University of New England user on 26 April 2020

You might also like