522863

research-article2014
EMR0010.1177/1754073914522863Emotion Review Vol. 6 No. 3Jasper Emotions and Protest Movements

Emotion Review
Vol. 6, No. 3 (July 2014) 208–213
© The Author(s) 2014
ISSN 1754-0739
DOI: 10.1177/1754073914522863
Constructing Indignation: Anger Dynamics er.sagepub.com

in Protest Movements

James M. Jasper
Department of Sociology, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, USA

Abstract
In recent years sociological research on social movements has identified emotional dynamics in all the basic processes and phases
of protest, and we are only beginning to understand their causal impacts. These include the solidarities of groups, motivations for
action, the role of morality in political action, and the gendered division of labor in social movements. Anger turns out to be at
the core of many of these causal mechanisms.

Keywords
anger, collective identity, emotions and protest, emotions and social movements, gender and emotions, indignation, moral
shocks

In the last 20 years emotions have returned to the sociological Most sociologists who have incorporated emotions into their
study of social movements, as part of a paradigm shift from accounts of protest have adopted a cultural approach compatible
macrolevel structures such as state formations and economic with most versions of cognitive-appraisal theory, reflecting the
inequality to microlevel processes such as cultural framing and dominant cultural constructionism of sociology as a whole.
identification with groups. Protest has proven a useful site for Anger and indignation, the morally grounded form of anger,
studying emotions because organizers self-consciously use are crucial to many aspects of protest. They not only motivate
emotion displays to coordinate action, to attract and retain par- participation (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013), but
ticipants, and to pressure other strategic players with whom they they direct blame for social problems, create sympathy and
interact. They “experiment” with emotional images and words admiration for protestors, and guide strategic choices. Yet anger
much as social scientists do in their laboratories. Because we is tricky, often linked to aggression generally disapproved of in
can observe emotional transformations in natural settings, we modern societies. I examine several arenas in which strategic
should find lessons for the study of emotions in other areas of action occurs—both internal and external arenas—to summa-
social life. rize a few of the emotional mechanisms described in recent
Research on protest movements poses distinct questions (in years (Jasper, 2011, provides a lengthier review).
this article I use the terms social movement, protest movement,
and protest interchangeably): Why do individuals join or drop
Solidarities
out? Why do new movements and themes emerge? How are
strategic decisions made? How do opponents, authorities, and Collective identity has come to play a central role in sociologi-
other players react? What impacts do movements have? cal theories of social movements, as it has in many other fields
Explanations that include emotions have been given especially throughout the social sciences and humanities (McGarry &
for the first of these questions, regarding motivations for par- Jasper, 2014), including social identity theory in social psychol-
ticipation (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013), but emo- ogy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Its central explanatory role has
tions are important for the other topics as well. Emotional been to help explain why individuals engage in collective action
factors have forced themselves on a generation of researchers on behalf of their group: they love and are proud of their group,
whose training and presuppositions never allowed them to and wish to advance its respect and other advantages, even inde-
expect or look for emotions among the protestors they studied. pendently of their personal gains (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer,

Author note: I thank Lynn Smith-Lovin, Peggy Thoits, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, and anonymous reviewers for comments; Marisa Tramontano for assistance; and the
Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study for support.
Corresponding author: James M. Jasper, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, Department of Sociology, 365 Fifth Avenue, Sixth Floor, New York, 10016, USA.
Email: jjasper@gc.cuny.edu

& Leach, 2004). But collective identity is not always purely an
advantage: it imposes dilemmas on organizers. Solidarity with
one grouping may conflict with solidarity with others. Loyalty
to an organization may undermine it to one’s family, and vice
versa (Goodwin, 1997; Klatch, 2004). Efforts to arouse solidar-
ity with an entire movement may instead result in allegiance to
a small subgroup, such as a cell or affinity group, in the “band
of brothers dilemma” (Jasper, 2004, p. 13), adapted from the
intense loyalty that members of combat units feel toward each
other. (Protest often feels like combat.)
Queer theorists and others have attacked each and every col-
lective identity as a distortion of individual needs, on the
Foucaultian assumption that all such subject positions result
from systems of power (Beltrán, 2010; Butler, 1990). But all
collective solidarities contain both advantages and disadvan-
tages. Internally, they can generate pride and a sense of agency,
and they can strengthen networks and trust; externally they
allow a group to project strength and make demands. On the
negative side, internal risks include an imperfect fit with indi-
vidual identities and the reification of existing identities; exter-
nal risks include the restriction of solidarities with outsiders,
prevention of individual assimilation to the broader society, and
the creation of overly strong leaders who are seen as represent-
ing the group. The combination of advantages and disadvan-
tages poses an “identity dilemma” for organizers over how and
how strongly they should promote a movement’s collective
identity (McGarry & Jasper, 2014).
Two kinds of emotions help keep groups together (Jasper,
1998). Reciprocal emotions are what group members feel
toward each other, including love, respect, trust, but also poten-
tially envy, jealousy, or betrayal. Members of a group also expe-
rience shared emotions, toward objects outside the group. Every
demonstration of shared anger or hatred toward a policy or a
group reinforces the reciprocal emotions: they feel the same
way I do, they must be good people. Even negative shared emo-
tions, such as fear, can reinforce positive reciprocal emotions:
we have survived this together (Eyerman, 2005, p. 43; Whittier,
2009). A successful collective identity fuses reciprocal and
shared emotions by imagining an object of attachment (the
group) consisting of its individual members taken as a whole.
They love both the group and its members (Rupp & Taylor,
1987), often fused into a feeling of home and community
(Duyvendak, 2011).
Because scholars of movements tend to study groups they
admire or belong to, they have been reluctant to acknowledge
the binding power of unsavory emotions such as anger, hate, or
revenge. These emotions play a motivating role in murder-
suicides such as the Palestinian bombers (Brym, 2007). The
pleasure of revenge, particularly after a long series of humilia-
tions, may be a sufficient motivation for individuals, especially
when they are encouraged and aided by political organizations.
Honor is one of the oldest of recognized motivations, promi-
nent in the founding document of Western culture, the Iliad,
and it motivates international relations and politics even today
(Lebow, 2008). It is often acknowledged in the form of the
need for recognition (Honneth, 1995).
Jasper Emotions and Protest Movements 209
Social psychologists have traced the impact of group-based
emotions (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Identities become political
when an external enemy can be blamed for a group’s problems
and the struggle moves into political arenas (Simon &
Klandermans, 2001). Some scholars see group efficacy and
anger as the link between identities and action: “People who
perceive the in-group as strong are more likely to experience
anger and desire to take action; people who perceive the in-
group as weak are more likely to feel fearful and to move away
from the out-group” (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013,
p. 8). Other scholars see group-based anger and group efficacy
as two distinct pathways to collective action (van Zomeren
et al., 2004).
Mobilization
People attend protest events because they expect a “positive”
experience. Collins’s (2004) interaction ritual model is a theory
of emotional energy, created in face-to-face situations, that in
turn provides a sense of group solidarity and the joys of crowds
that can motivate recurring participation. By describing the
“emotional entrainment” of successful interactions—a shared
focus of attention, bodies oriented toward each other, synchro-
nized locomotion and singing—he can also posit the causes and
consequences of failed interaction rituals. The good or bad
moods created in interactions accompany us to our next interac-
tions, affecting them in turn. The confidence and good moods
that come from successful rituals are vital for political action,
raising energy and activity levels, and probably boosting a feel-
ing of group efficacy (Smith & Kessler, 2004).
Emotions can also work to prevent mobilization. As men-
tioned, alternative commitments, especially to one’s family,
often prevent participation. Adumbrating the band of brothers
dilemma, Goodwin (1997) demonstrates how the Huk rebels in
the Philippines struggled to contain the romantic dyads that
formed in the jungle as well as the commitments to families that
often drew participants away from the struggle. We also find
emotions at work in avoidance and denial, as Norgaard (2011)
shows in an ethnography of a small Norwegian town whose ski-
ing industry was harmed by global warming. To acknowledge
global warming, and by extension other social problems, would
entail unpleasant emotions that most people try to avoid: feel-
ings of helplessness; guilt over their own role in global warm-
ing; fear that their physical surroundings are no longer safe and
dependable; and an unsettling threat to their own individual and
collective identities. Her subjects deflected these emotions
through irony, teasing humor, and cynicism, steering conversa-
tions to safer, more mundane topics. They were unable to sus-
tain anger by finding someone to blame.
Emotions are also part of demobilization. Many disagree-
ments over strategic dilemmas grow more accusatory when a
movement is declining, as different factions attribute blame for
failures. In his study of the collapse of the Amsterdam squatters’
movement, Owens (2009) shows how sadness, anger, and
despair led to mutual recriminations. When turned against com-
rades, anger can destroy a movement. The despairing mood also
210 Emotion Review Vol. 6 No. 3
exacerbated several kinds of fear, he says, and the factions arose
around these: existential fear, fear of violence, and fear of isola-
tion.
Just as group honor motivates political action, so does a
desire for individual honor, in the form of dignity. Even in situ-
ations where success seems unlikely, people often join move-
ments simply to assert their dignity as human beings who are
suffering and can make some noise. Dignity can motivate even
high-risk activities such as revolutionary warfare. “Through
rebelling,” remarks Wood (2003, p. 18), “insurgent campesinos
[in El Salvador] asserted, and thereby constituted in their own
eyes, their dignity in the face of condescension, repression, and
indifference.” The very act of rebelling improved their self-
reputation (and reduced their reputation for passivity, at least, in
the eyes of others); it was a goal in itself, as well as a means to
additional demands. Some protestors have nothing left to lose
except their humanity, having lost loved ones, been frustrated or
attacked by their own governments, and been driven to passion-
ate outrage (Fisher, 1989, p. 28).
Moral Shocks
Protestors must create and sustain a sense of moral obligation
and justice. They use a variety of emotional processes to pro-
mote their own moral visions, suggesting that morality affects
human action partly or primarily through emotions. Scholars of
movements have implicitly or explicitly begun to rely on a neo-
Aristotelian view of morality as character training, which
guides our actions intuitively, in contrast to a Kantian view of
morality as a calculation of universally desirable choices
(Monroe, 2004). Our morality is more likely to be intuitive
than to consist of explicit principles, although one of the tasks
of movements is to develop and articulate principles from those
intuitions (Jasper, 1997).
Moral shocks help explain initial and continued participa-
tion, consisting of a visceral unease in reaction to information
and events which signal that the world is not as it seemed,
thereby demanding attention and revaluation (Jasper, 1997).
Political scientists have used anxiety in the same way: “gener-
ated when norms are violated; the more they are violated, and
the more strategically central those norms are to people, then the
greater the anxiety” (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000,
p. 138). Moral shocks were originally used to account for initial
recruitment in the absence of strong network ties (Jasper &
Poulsen, 1995), and a number of studies have used the concept
in this way to explain recruitment to the movement for peace in
Central America (Nepstad & Smith, 2001), abolitionism
(Young, 2001), antiracism (Warren, 2010), and the Madres of
Buenos Aires (Risley, 2011).
Other studies have found that moral shocks can rekindle or
radicalize the commitment of those already active in a protest
movement. Gould (2009) describes the moral shock—the
Hardwick decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986—that
produced radical direct action out of the desperate mood that
gays and lesbians had initially felt under the onslaught of the
AIDS epidemic. They formed ACT UP, based on explicit anger,
when they concluded that their own government was against
them, and complicit in the deaths (on the similar generation of
anger by ACT UP in France, see Broqua & Fillieule, 2009).
With a new attribution of blame, AIDS was no longer an epi-
demic but a genocide. “If you believed that AIDS was a holo-
caust, then ‘business as usual’ in the political realm, which by
then was clearly ineffective, was not much of a response”
(Gould, 2009, p. 170). Fear and grief developed into anger, out-
rage, and indignation. Moral emotions came to the fore.
Groups are often most shocked when something is taken
away that they take for granted (Heirich, 1971). For instance
Taylor, Kimport, van Dyke, and Anderson (2009) found that
same-sex marriage became a much more central issue for the
LGBTQ community in California when the right was suddenly
rescinded by the courts in 2010, generating moral shock and
anger.
This view of emotions as embedded in flows of action, stabi-
lized by resources, organizations, and routines, appears implic-
itly in Munson’s (2009) account of recruitment to the U.S.
antiabortion movement. He shows that new recruits do not usu-
ally have a well-developed ideology or moral system, but only
develop these once they have begun to participate. Instead, they
are drawn into protest activities through their social networks,
which are themselves a combination of structural opportunities
and emotional solidarity with selected others.
Massed demonstrators are always playing with or against tra-
ditional images of crowds as angry, dangerous, and irrational.
Most groups wish to undermine this image through displays of
calm and purpose and a commitment to nonviolence, but some
hope to appear threatening enough to be taken seriously.
According to Piven and Cloward (1977), poor people only attain
concessions when they disrupt activities valued by elites, through
riots, sit-down strikes, and other aggressive activities. They have
to frighten and not just inconvenience their targets. Although
Piven and Cloward were writing in a period when scholars
denied the emotions of protestors, the insurgent mood they
describe can only be explained on the basis of anger and outrage.
Gender and Indignation
Because the women’s and LGBTQ movements challenged emo-
tion rules in political arenas, they encouraged scholars to reevalu-
ate the emotions of protest. In the 1970s and 1980s, feminist
scholars criticized liberal theories of autonomous individuals,
modeled on market transactions, in favor of models of humans as
emotionally connected to others, inspired instead by the paradigm
of nurturing family ties (Ruddick, 1989). At the same time femi-
nist activists battled against the norms by which women were not
supposed to express anger, realizing that anger is essential to
demanding rights and fighting in political arenas (Hochschild,
1975). As we saw, queer activists formed ACT UP to overcome
similar constraints. Anger is a pathway to indignation, pride, and
other ingredients of self-assertion. A lesbian separatist group from
the early 1970s, the Furies, used its own name to both acknowl-
edge the importance of political anger and to play on classical
stereotypes demeaning angry women.

Feminists fought against other emotion norms that con-
strained and damaged women, including forms of shame that
had traditionally been attached to women’s bodies, as during
menstruation. The bestselling Our Bodies, Ourselves (Boston
Women’s Health Book Collective, 1973), for instance, was
meant to demystify women’s bodies in their own eyes. Taylor
(1996) attacked the norm of the happy mother in examining the
politics of postpartum depression, as mothers formed self-help
groups to deal with having the “wrong” feelings. In research on
survivors of child sexual abuse, Whittier (2009, p. 68) observed
their efforts to deal with shame by making abuse a public prob-
lem, so that “undertaking emotional work in self-help groups
and speaking publicly about one’s experiences was not simply
psychological change, but social change.” Campbell (1994)
observes that women’s anger is often framed by others as bitter-
ness, inappropriate to public arenas.
In many cases women remain reluctant to express anger.
Research has documented a gendered division of labor in many
social movements, which implies an emotional specialization as
well. Women especially provide the glue for social-movement
networks through their emotion work (Robnett, 1997), while
men are more likely to deploy their anger in militant tactics
(Fillieule & Roux, 2009) and angry public rhetoric (Roberts,
2013, p. 119). In a classic work on an alternative health organi-
zation, Kleinman (1996) found that men were more likely than
women to be rewarded for expressing their emotions, breaking
gender role expectations, although it seems likely that women
are still punished for being too “masculine” when they display
anger.
Combinations and Sequences
We rarely experience a single emotion at a time, so that research
has begun to examine combinations of emotions in protest. For
purposes of clarity, the focus has been on pairs of emotions.
Jasper (2011, 2012) suggests that pairs of positive and negative
emotions form “moral batteries” that indicate a direction for
action, away from the unattractive state and toward the attrac-
tive one. These batteries might be nothing more than a condem-
nation of the status quo combined with a utopian hope for an
alternative future, a pair that defines protest for Castells (2012).
The most studied moral battery is the combination of shame
and pride: groups with stigmatized identities often form move-
ments to replace one with the other. Although identified in other
groups as well (Jasper, 2010), this dynamic has been most thor-
oughly studied in the lesbian and gay rights movements, where
“coming out” has been a dramatic and empowering transition
from the passivity of shame to more active pride (Whittier, 2012).
Gould (2009) shows how unacknowledged shame first led to an
assimilative politics of respectability, but was replaced after the
moral shock of Hardwick with an angry, defiant, often separatist
assertion of pride. American “dreamers” (whose parents brought
them to the US illegally when they were young) also speak of
“coming out” in their efforts to transform shame into pride
(Nicholls, 2013). Britt and Heise (2000) show that anger can aid
the transition from shame to pride.
Jasper Emotions and Protest Movements 211
Pride often depends on externalizing instead of internalizing
anger and blame for a group’s plight. In a study of women incar-
cerated for infanticide, Taylor and Leitz (2010, p. 267) show
that writing to pen pals helped the women to blame an illness,
postpartum depression, for their actions. This “allowed women
to minimize their shame and emotional distress and to shift
blame for their actions to the medical and legal systems, ena-
bling them to remake their identities as mothers.” Whether indi-
viduals internalize or externalize their anger has broad
implications for their mental health (Rosenfield, Phillips, &
White, 2006).
Some combinations of emotions resolve themselves into
sequences, often carefully orchestrated by activists who under-
stand how to recruit and retain participants. Lively and Heise
(2004) discuss emotional segues, including the important trans-
formation of shame or fear into anger. Williamson (2011) exam-
ined “emotion chains” deployed by a feminist New Age religious
group to ensure that members returned to future events. Initial
confusion, followed by understanding and hope, increased the
odds of someone’s returning. Those who ended with hope were
more likely to return, those who ended up feeling fear were less
likely. The transformation of frustration into the joy of accom-
plishment, even in simple tasks, is an example that applies far
beyond protest (Walby & Spencer, 2012).
Some of the most important emotions of protest arise out of
interactions with authorities (Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina,
1982). Government repression of protest (through police inepti-
tude as well as regime policies) can infuriate more participants
than it intimidates, and can draw newcomers who are angrier
about governmental actions than about the original grievance
(Brockett, 2005). These “procedural grievances” can be power-
ful, as they involve a sense of betrayal by one’s own govern-
ment, the same agent that is supposed to protect citizens and
process complaints (Gordon & Jasper, 1996; Tyler & Smith,
1998). In such cases blame shifts from third parties to govern-
ment (Hess & Martin, 2006). Much protest involves a standard
cycle of interaction: public protest, police repression, even more
protest, and so on, reflecting waves of indignation over proce-
dural grievances (Kurzman, 2004, Chapter 6).
Conclusions and Challenges
Attention to emotions, and especially to combinations and inter-
actions among emotions, challenges the means-end models that
have dominated research on protest movements. There is a con-
stant stream of emotions in any flow of action, and the balance
between positive and negative emotions largely determines
whether the action is continued. It is difficult to distinguish
between the emotions involved in the efforts to attain certain
goals and those that come from their accomplishment. The abil-
ities to express righteous anger and to avoid debilitating shame
are ends in themselves, but also the means to further political
activity. Each victory yields a good mood of confidence, upon
which the next round of action can build.
Anger is the core of many of the processes we have observed.
Shame must be transformed into pride in order to allow oppressed
212 Emotion Review Vol. 6 No. 3
groups to feel indignant; the paralysis of shock must become
activating anger; inchoate anger must be directed at someone to
blame; and anger must take on a moral basis, becoming indigna-
tion. Activists deploy apparatuses to create anger during interac-
tions, and to display it to audiences (Broqua & Fillieule, 2009).
But we need to know far more about the many forms that anger
can take, the many ways it can be displayed.
Scholars of protest can incorporate the study of emotions
into most of the techniques they already use: depth interviews;
ethnographic fieldwork; surveys, often conducted at protests;
the interpretation of texts and other artifacts; and participant
introspection. In addition, there are innumerable video record-
ings of crowds and protests, allowing careful scrutiny of facial
expressions and other signs of mutual entrainment, often
through slowing the videos down to capture and code relatively
fleeting emotion displays (Collins, 2004).
Even though most sociologists of protest work in natural set-
tings, other social scientists have successfully reproduced a
number of emotional dynamics in experimental settings (e.g.,
Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), and con-
ducted sophisticated analyses of surveys completed by protes-
tors (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). This young field
needs dialogue with these other traditions so that our concepts
can be made more rigorous and our insights from the field can
better inform experiments and surveys.
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