BRIEFING

ECON in focus

Monetary Dialogue - November

2022
Summary of parliamentary scrutiny activities
This briefing provides a summary of all scrutiny activities of the European Parliament related to euro area
monetary policy in the period between the September and November , along with a recap of the key monetary
policy decisions taken by the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Governing Council in that period. These kind of
summaries are published regularly after each Monetary Dialogue with the ECB.

1. Background: monetary policy decisions (September-November 2022)

In October 2022, the inflation rate of the euro area hit historic highs, with the headline harmonised index of
consumer prices (HICP) inflation reaching 10.6%, the first time inflation in the euro area was at double digits.
Nevertheless, the flash estimate provided by the Eurostat on 30 November showed a slight deceleration of
headline inflation with HICP inflation standing at 10%. Core HICP inflation (excluding energy and food) was
more than two times higher than the inflation target, at 5%. Based on this background, between the
September and November MD, the ECB’s Governing Council made decisions to tighten its monetary policy
stance further to ensure that inflation stabilises at its 2% target over the medium term.

1.1 Interest rates

The ECB uses three key interest rates to conduct monetary policy in the euro area: the deposit facility rate,
the main refinancing operations (MRO) rate, and the marginal lending facility rate. On 27 October, the
Governing Council decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 75 basis points (bps), enforcing the
third major policy rate increase in a row to withdraw monetary policy accommodation1.
It is mentioned in the press release that “[t]he Governing Council took today’s decision, and expects to raise
interest rates further, to ensure the timely return of inflation to its 2% medium-term inflation target.”
Table 1 shows the changes to the three key ECB interest rates over the past two Governing Council meetings.
Currently, the deposit facility rate, which banks may use to make overnight deposits with the Eurosystem,
stands at 1.5%. The MRO rate, which provides the bulk of liquidity to the banking system, stands at 2%, and
the marginal lending facility rate, which offers overnight credit to banks from the Eurosystem, stands at
2.25%. This is the highest level since 2009 when the ECB started loosening its monetary stance in response
to the global financial crisis.
In addition, on 27 October, the Governing Council decided to set the remuneration of minimum reserves2
at the ECB’s deposit facility rate, to align the remuneration of minimum reserves held by credit institutions
with the Eurosystem, more closely with money market conditions. Before 27 October, the minimum reserves

Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV)

Authors: Vasileios PSARRAS, Drazen RAKIC
Directorate-General for Internal Policies
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held by credit institutions with the Eurosystem had been remunerated at the ECB’s MRO rate. The change
will become effective at the beginning of the reserve maintenance period starting on 21 December 2022.
Table 1: Key ECB interest rates

Governing Council meetings

Key ECB interest rates
8 September 27 October
Deposit facility 0.75% 1.5%
Main refinancing operations 1.25% 2.0%
Marginal lending facility 1.5% 2.25%
Source: ECB.

Based on the information provided in Table 1 and the announcement by the Governing Council that further
increases are expected, we can assume that, from 21 December, the remuneration of minimum reserves will
be above 1.5%, thus significantly higher from 0.5%, where it stood until the middle of September. At the
same time, the decision to set the remuneration at the depnosit facility rate, instead of the MRO rate as it is
now, provides a lower level of compensation. The MRO rate is already 75 bps above the deposit facility rate,
and that interest rate differential is expected to last in the future, so the decision to adapt the level of
remuneration from the MRO rate to the deposit facility rate provides a lower burden for the ECB.

1.2 Asset purchase programmes

Based on the consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem as of 25 November, the total amount of
securities held for monetary purposes stood at EUR 4.944 trillion, with the vast majority of these assets
deriving from the temporary Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) and the standard Asset
Purchase Program (APP).
While net asset purchases have ended under the PEPP (as of March) and the APP (as of July), the Governing
Council decided to continue reinvesting principal repayments for maturing securities. On 27 October, the
Governing Council reiterated its decision “to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from
maturing securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time past the date when it started
raising the key ECB interest rates and, in any case, for as long as necessary to maintain ample liquidity
conditions and an appropriate monetary policy stance”.
Regarding the PEPP, the Governing Council “intends to reinvest the principal payments from maturing
securities purchased under the programme until at least the end of 2024. In any case, the future roll-off of
the PEPP portfolio will be managed to avoid interference with the appropriate monetary policy stance”.
Finally, the Governing Council will “continue applying flexibility in reinvesting redemptions coming due in
the PEPP portfolio, with a view to countering risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism related
to the pandemic”.
When reinvesting APP redemptions, the Eurosystem in general adheres to the principle of market neutrality
via a smooth and flexible implementation. For corporate bond reinvestments, from October 2022 the
Eurosystem tilts these purchases towards issuers with better climate performance. To allow for a regular and
balanced market presence, reinvestments of principal redemptions are distributed through time. Table 2
presents estimated monthly redemptions for the next 12 months, as provided by the ECB.

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Table 2: Estimated monthly redemptions for the next 12 months (EUR million)

Date ABSPP CBPP3 CSPP PSPP APP

Nov-22 489 2,167 1,031 14,669 18,356

Dec-22 885 1,487 1,243 12,016 15,631

Jan-23 2,133 4,786 2,784 19,469 29,172

Feb-23 706 6,050 2,182 13,624 22,561

Mar-23 665 5,631 4,219 31,965 42,480

Apr-23 1,220 2,937 2,388 23,712 30,256

May-23 798 1,874 2,579 30,554 35,805

Jun-23 549 3,112 2,557 16,619 22,837

Jul-23 501 1,170 3,033 26,317 31,022

Aug-23 392 0 986 16,445 17,824

Sep-23 1,102 3,346 3,358 13,272 21,079

Oct-23 877 4,465 2,606 44,745 52,693

Total 10,317 37,025 28,966 263,407 339,716

Source: ECB
Notes: Asset-backed securities purchase programme (ASBSPP), Covered bond purchase programme 3 (CBPP3), Corporate sector
purchase programme (CSPP), Public sector purchase programme (PSPP). Figures may not add up due to rounding.

Finally, during the 28 November MD President Lagarde stated, “In December, we will also lay out the key
principles for reducing the bond holdings in our asset purchase programme portfolio. It is appropriate that
the balance sheet is normalised over time in a measured and predictable way.” Therefore, interest rate
increases are expected to be accompanied next year by quantitative tightening in order to facilitate the
achievement of the ECB’s price stability mandate.

1.3 Targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs)

The TLTRO III programme started in September 2019 with 10 quarterly operations having a maturity of three
years. These operations provide financing to credit institutions, with incentives based on their loans to non-
financial corporations and households. Initial conditions applicable under TLTRO III were eased on several
occasions: in September 2019, and then in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in March, April, and
December 2020. Banks that fulfilled lending benchmarks could borrow at interest rates as low as 50 basis
points below the deposit facility rate (not lower than 1%) during the “special interest rate period” between
June 2020 and June 2022 and from June 2022 until maturity at the deposit facility rate.
The amount of long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) in the weekly financial statement of the
Eurosystem of 23 September (i.e. before the September MD) was equal to EUR 2.1 trillion, with the vast
majority of these operations related to TLTROs. In addition, the weekly financial statement of the Eurosystem
as of 25 November (i.e. before the November MD) indicated that the outstanding amount of LTROs was
equal to EUR 1.819 trillion. The total allotted amount under the 10 operations was equal to EUR 2.339 trillion,
with the biggest operation being TLTRO III.4 in June 2020, having an allotted amount above EUR 1.3 trillion.

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Finally, in Table 3, the outstanding amount of each operation is presented for September-October and
November. The last column shows data related to the early voluntary repayments of 23 November.
Table 3: Overview of TLTRO III operations and outstanding amounts

Allotted Amount
TLTRO III Maturity Date Outstanding Amount (EUR bn) Repayment
(EUR bn)

September-October November 23 Nov.

1 28/09/2022 3.40 0 0 0

2 21/12/2022 97.72 63.06 51.91 -11.15

3 29/03/2023 114.98 87.83 75.48 -12.35

4 28/06/2023 1,308.40 1,194.24 981.83 -212.41

5 27/09/2023 174.46 158.63 137.42 -21.21

6 20/12/2023 50.41 48.42 47.03 -1.39

7 27/03/2024 330.50 323.85 300.16 -23.69

8 26/06/2024 109.83 97.37 85.64 -11.73

9 25/09/2024 97.57 93.41 91.83 -1.58

10 18/12/2024 51.97 46.52 45.74 -0.78

Total 2,339.25 2,113.33 1,817.04 -296.29

Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.

Notes: The outstanding amounts refer to the end of each month. Figures may not add up due to rounding.

On 27 October, the Governing Council took decisive steps regarding TLTROs and the normalisation of
monetary policy. The initial conditions were amended on 27 October to address unexpected and
extraordinary inflation increases by reinforcing the transmission of policy rates to bank lending conditions.
Therefore, the Governing Council decided that “[f}rom 23 November 2022 until the maturity date or early
repayment date of each respective outstanding TLTRO III operation, the interest rate on TLTRO III operations
will be indexed to the average applicable key ECB interest rates over this period.”
The ECB pointed out that “linking the TLTROs III interest rate to the average deposit facility rate or the
average MRO rate for the remaining maturity of the respective TLTRO III is suitable to induce an acceleration
in the normalisation of financing conditions and reduce the Eurosystem balance sheet and to achieve the
objective of maintaining price stability”. This measure is expected “to increase banks’ funding costs,
therefore contributing to timely restoring price stability in the current inflationary environment”.
Furthermore, the Governing Council decided to introduce three additional voluntary early repayment
periods to provide TLTRO III participants with additional opportunities to partly or fully repay their respective
TLTRO III borrowings before maturity. Absent that decision, the next voluntary early repayment date was
scheduled for 21 December, which refers to the maturity date of TLTRO III.2 operation.
The three additional voluntary early repayment dates are presented in the updated version of the indicative
calendar. The first additional early repayment date was on 23 November 2022, referring to operations 2-10,
coinciding with the start of the new interest rate calculation method. The second early repayment will be

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on 25 January 2023, and the third is scheduled for 22 February 2023. Both early repayments of 2023 refer to
TLTROs III. 3-10.
As of today, three early voluntary repayments have taken place. The first repayment date when all rates were
applied and included all operations was 29 June 2022. On 29 June 2022, a total amount of EUR 74.04 billion
was repaid early. The second date for early repayment was 28 September, the same date as the maturity of
TLTRO III.1. During that time, we saw a significant drop compared to the first early repayment, with EUR 6.49
billion being repaid.
The third date was 23 November 2022, and more than 10% of the outstanding amount of TLTROs III was
repaid early on that date. In total, more than EUR 296.29 billion were repaid early, referring to operations 2-
10. More than 70% of the voluntary repayments, EUR 212.41 billion, corresponded to TLTRO III.4. It is worth
mentioning that although the November early repayment accounted for 14% of the outstanding amount of
TLTROs, the final outcome was less overwhelming compared to some market estimations 3, and the main
reason behind that is that still the conditions remain favourable for the banks, despite the new interest rate
calculation method 4.

1.4 Other central banks

As background information, on 22 November, the ECB published the monthly balance of payments data,
providing evidence on the current account of the euro area and the balance of its sub-components. Chart 1
presents the evolution of the balance of payments in the euro area for 2022. The current account has
systematically been in deficit since March 2022, reaching a peak of EUR 27 billion in August, while narrowing
in September to EUR 8 billion. As shown in Chart 1, the most prominent change happening in 2022 is related
to the balance of goods, which had a surplus of more than EUR 8 billion in January and a deficit of EUR 22
billion in August. A current account deficit and a negative balance for goods provide evidence of imported
inflation.
Chart 1: Euro area current account balance (EUR million)

30000

20000

10000

-10000

-20000

-30000

-40000

Goods Services Primary Income Secondary Income Current Account

Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.

In the UK, the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 11.1% in October 2022, up from 10.1% in September. The
Bank of England (BoE) decided on 2 November an additional increase of 75 bps, getting the current bank
rate at 3% and aiming to normalise monetary policy further. Since February, the BoE has decided to reduce
its stock of government bonds. Nevertheless, on 28 October, the BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee decided

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to introduce temporary purchases of long-dated government bonds to restore market functioning and
reduce any risks from contagion to credit conditions for UK households and businesses. The temporary gilt
market operations were introduced because of a fiscal policy shock and lack of coordination. On 10 October,
it was also expanded to index-linked government bonds, with daily operations equal to GBP 10 billion. The
temporary program ended on 14 October, and a temporary collateral repo facility was introduced from 10
October until 10 November.
Although the inflation rate in the euro area and the UK stands at double digits, the most recent inflation
data for the US, using the Fed’s preferred measure (Personal Consumption Expenditure [PCE] index), points
to a further deceleration of inflation. In October 2022, the headline PCE inflation rate was 6%, at the lowest
level so far in 2022 and following 6.3% in September. . Core PCE (excluding food and energy) remains high,
at 5% in October. Against this background, the Federal Reserve’s (Fed’s) Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) decided unanimously on 2 November to increase the target range by 75 bps for the federal funds
rate to 3.75-4% to tighten monetary policy further.
In addition, quantitative tightening remains an important tool for US policymakers. Overall, the amount of
USD 95 billion per month balance sheet reduction is operated, referring to Treasury securities up to USD 60
billion, and mortgage-backed securities up to USD 35 billion. As of 20 September, the total assets in the Fed
balance sheet were equal to USD 8.8 trillion, while on 15 November, the total assets stood at USD 8.6 trillion,
showing a decrease of around USD 200 billion.
The prospect of global recession because of the synchronised tightening remains high. In Chart 2, we
present the recession probability in the euro area, the UK, and the US as provided in the 16 November
Financial Stability Review. In the euro area and the UK the probability of a recession in 2023 stands at 80%,
while for the US is significantly lower, but still very high at 60%. In part a of Chart 2, it is also visible that since
February, financial conditions have tightened extensively in the euro area, while in the case of the US, the
fluctuations seem milder and closer to zero.
Chart 2: Financial conditions (a) and probability of recession (b)

Source: Financial Stability Review

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2. Monetary Dialogue - November 2022

2.1 President Lagarde’s introductory remarks

On 28 November, President Lagarde attended the MD with Members of the ECON Committee. Since this MD
was the last one for 2022, President Lagarde briefly looked back on the past year and focused on the critical
actions taken by the ECB and the EU more broadly to address ongoing policy challenges. In addition, the
President commented on the two topics selected by the ECON Committee regarding inflation as a global
challenge and inflation differentials within the euro area.
To begin with, President Lagarde mentioned the Russian invasion of Ukraine that created both an economic
and security shock. On the economic side, higher energy costs have been the key driver of the euro area
inflation. Moreover, the current inflationary shock disproportionately affects people of lower income.
Currently, the gap between the effective inflation rate experienced by the lowest and highest income
groups is at its highest level on record in the euro area. The recent Eurobarometer survey shows that one-
third of citizens find the rising cost of living to be the most important issue facing the EU.
Considering inflation divergence, President Lagarde argued that differentials among Member States are at
historic highs and the ECB monitors “these divergences carefully and expect(s) them to normalise as the
impact of these shocks fades over time.” The high level of inflation reduced people’s real incomes and
dampened spending and production. Extensive uncertainty, tighter financial conditions, and weakening
global demand also weigh on economic growth.
Referring to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Lagarde pointed out that the EU provided essential
assistance to Ukraine but also took necessary steps to enhance resilience and energy independence.
In addition, she emphasised the importance of fiscal policy in the current high inflationary environment.
President Lagarde mentioned that fiscal support “should be targeted, so that the size of the fiscal impulse is
limited and benefits those who need it most; tailored, so that it does not weaken incentives to cut energy
demand; and temporary, so that the fiscal impulse is not maintained longer than strictly necessary.” The ECB
President also welcomed the European Commission’s proposal regarding the reform of the EU economic
governance framework.
Chart 3: Supply and demand factors of core inflation

Source: Annex “Introductory statement in three charts”, provided by the ECB President to the members of the ECON Committee and
available online.

Inflationary pressures in the euro area were mainly driven by supply-side shocks, but tight conditions in the
labour market and other demand factors currently affect inflation. In Chart 3, President Lagarde presented

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the decomposition of different factors of core inflation, and in the past year, demand-side factors have
become much more significant, with the pass-through of supply-side inflation to the demand-side. Finally,
President Lagarde summarised the actions taken by the ECB to normalise monetary policy. The main steps
are the fastest interest rate increase ever seen and the recalibration of TLTROs. Furthermore, the Governing
Council will present the main principles for quantitative tightening in December. The ECB Governing
Council’s decisions will continue to be “data-dependent and follow a meeting-by-meeting approach”.

2.2 MEP questions

In the November MD, 17 Members of the ECON Committee participated in the question and answer session
with President Lagarde. Chart 4 shows the main points of each intervention (through questions and follow-
up questions raised by each Member), sorted into 15 categories. More than half of MEP interventions
emphasised price stability and interest rates. In addition, seven interventions focused on the European
Monetary Union (EMU) governance or fiscal policy and six on forecasts or expectations.
Chart 4: MEP interventions, by category

Price stability
Interest rates
EMU governance/fiscal policy
Forecasts/expectations
Inequality/cost-of-living/redistributive effects
Growth/unemployment
Asset purchases
Energy crisis
Member-State-specific
Money supply
Financial stability/banking
Exchange rates/other central banks
Digital euro/cryptocurrency regulation
Climate change considerations
Refinancing operations

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Notes: The interventions were categorised by the authors of this briefing based on the EN-language transcript of the MD of 28
November. These results should be interpreted as indicative as they are subject to interpretations and assumptions of the authors.

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2.3 Monetary Dialogue papers prepared by the Monetary Expert Panel

Table 4: MD papers on the first topic

Inflation differentials: consequences for monetary policy

Authors Title Key Findings

Headline inflation differentials among euro area Member States are

currently at the highest level ever since the start of the monetary
Inflation union, mostly driven by energy price increases.
K. J. Gern,
divergence in the
N. Sonnenberg & Core inflation, by contrast, does not yet signal a concerning level of
euro area: nature
U. Stolzenburg divergence, with the exception of the Baltic countries.
and implications
Diverging trends in inflation have to be kept in check by national
policymakers and market forces.
In theory, even in the best possible conditions, monetary policy
would not necessarily be well suited to address underlying inflation
Heterogeneity of heterogeneity.
inflation in the euro
C. Blot, J. Creel,
area: After we weight inflation dispersion across euro area countries for
F. Geerolf &
more complicated their relative size, inflation dispersion appears more limited and
S. Levasseur
than therefore mostly driven by small countries.
it seems
Nominal wage inflation and minimum wage inflation are positively
correlated to headline consumer inflation, but not one-for-one.

Countries that are net importers of raw materials will experience a

worsening of their terms-of-trade.

Maintaining If the credibility of the inflation target becomes endangered, the

J. Baumgartner,
credibility is central bank would have to send a strong signal of determination to
M. Scheiblecker &
currently market participants.
T. Url
the top priority
Options for the ECB in high dispersion: 1) change the weights used
to compute the average inflation rate 2) fine tuning that could use
macroprudential instruments.

Table 5: MD papers on the second topic

Inflation as a global challenge

Authors Title Key Findings

The synchronised upward trends in inflation and interest rates around

the world hide a fairly differentiated environment across the areas.
L. Bonatti, Tackling global
A. Fracasso inflation at a time of Central banks face risks of both under- and over-tightening.
& R.Tamborini radical uncertainty
These circumstances call for greater efforts to coordinate the policy mix
within and across countries.

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The euro area is exposed to a mix of inflationary and contractionary

Managing global forces as a result of the Fed’s tightening.
monetary spillovers:
How the Fed's The historical record shows that a degree of coordination can indeed
M. Moschella & P. interest rate hikes be beneficial.
Polyak and
uncoordinated
tightening affect the Three suggestions: 1) avoid a “race to the top”, 2) fostering information
euro area exchanges, and 3) cooperation in strengthening financial safety nets.

The evidence suggests that the increase in food and energy prices due
to the war in Ukraine is the main factor driving euro area inflation.
Global factors and It is possible that there is going to be too much tightening of global
K. Whelan
ECB monetary policy financial conditions.

The ECB needs to tighten monetary policy to address high inflation.

The energy price surge is far more extreme in the euro area, compared
with that in the US.

Global energy price Empirical evidence suggests that US monetary tightening has a
D. Gros &
inflation with a negative impact on demand and inflation abroad, especially on
F. Shamsfakhr
European twist emerging markets.

Explicit coordination of monetary policies is unlikely to bring large

benefits because central banks are aware of one another’s actions.

2.4 Monetary Dialogue Preparatory Meeting

The two topics chosen for the November MD were “Inflation differentials: consequences for monetary
policy” and “Inflation as a global challenge”. On 24 November, a Preparatory Meeting was organised in
Strasbourg with the members of the ECON committee, with three experts presenting their papers on the
two topics and Hyun Song Shin, Economic Adviser and Head of Research at the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) participating as a discussant.
The first topic discussed in this Preparatory Meeting was “Inflation as a global challenge” and the first paper
was prepared by L. Bonatti, A. Fracasso, and R. Tamborini. Mr Tamborini presented the paper’s main findings,
pointing out the differences between aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks that have hit the
global economy and how they affect the euro area disproportionally. The major problem identified in Mr
Tamborini’s presentation is the existence of spillovers within and across countries that exacerbate the
sacrifice ratio, and they can be resolved only by implementing monetary and fiscal policy coordination at a
national and international level.
Mr Shin discussed his ideas regarding this topic and commented on Mr Tamborini’s presentation. Mr Shin
pointed out that the real US dollar index, representing the exchange rate, has followed a W-shaped pattern
since the 1980s, and although we have witnessed a significant increase this year, the index has yet to reach
the peak of the mid-1980s. In addition, he argued that divergent exchange rate movements had caused a
decline in the terms of trade of the euro area, and the combination of the unusual types of shocks affected
core inflation.
These unusual shocks have also affected the relationship between the US dollar and commodity prices,
which has traditionally been negative. Nevertheless, we now witness a positive relationship between the US
dollar and commodity prices, implying that commodity prices are increasing with the US dollar appreciating.

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Finally, commenting on the first presentation, Mr Shin emphasised domestic and international policy
coordination to deal with high inflation and the recession prospects, and he mentioned the UK example of
late September that required the intervention of the BoE because of ineffective coordination.
During the second part of the Preparatory Meeting, inflation differentials were discussed. The first paper was
written by K.-J. Gern, N. Sonnenberg, and U. Stolzenburg assessing the nature and implications of inflation
divergence in the euro area. Mr Gern presented the main evidence of this paper, arguing that headline
inflation dispersion is at historic highs, but using standard deviation as an effective measure of dispersion;
he concludes that headline inflation divergence is mainly driven by the Baltic Member States and Slovakia.
Core inflation, by contrast, still needs to signal a concerning level of divergence, being half the level of
headline inflation dispersion and not yet above its previous high seen in 2008-09, except for the Baltic
countries. Mr Gern, in his final remark, stated that inflation differentials cold be self-reinforcing, leading to
divergence of economic trajectories, and temporary inflation divergences should be kept in check by market
forces and fiscal and structural policies in the Member States.
The final presentation of the Preparatory Meeting was prepared by Mr Geerolf regarding inflation
heterogeneity in the euro area. This paper was co-written by C. Blot, J. Creel, and S. Levasseur. They
incorporated standard deviation to account for inflation dispersion and applied weighted and unweighted
measures, concluding that core inflation dispersion is not as significant as headline inflation and that
weighted measures are almost half the unweighted ones. Mr Geerolf points out that inflation dispersion is
mainly driven by smaller countries, particularly the Baltic Member States, explaining the difference between
weighted and unweighted measures.
Furthermore, in his presentation, Mr Geerolf argues that inflation comes mainly from high inflation in energy
and food and is also affected by the level of nominal rigidities. The evidence he provides does not show any
immediate reason for concern regarding a price-wage spiral. However, he stated that data about indexation
and bargaining power are unavailable, and there is a gap in the literature. The main conclusions by Mr
Geerolf are that monetary policy cannot address on its own the energy and food inflation, that Member
States are affected differently by the monetary tightening because of floating or fixed interest rates, and
that the level of heterogeneity is primarily driven by the Baltics, who generally have effective price
adjustment mechanisms.

3. Questions for written answer

From 26 September to 28 November, the period between the two most recent MDs, the ECB replied to six
written questions from MEPs in accordance with Rule 140 of the EP Rules of Procedure. From these six
questions, two are related to climate change, three are related to monetary policy, and one is related to
economic policies. As presented in Table 6, the reply by the ECB President for seven questions is still
pending.
Table 6: Questions for written answer

Political Date of Date of

MEP Subject ECB Category
Group Question Response

Impact of the ECB’s climate-related

E. Jurzyca ECR 19/09/2022 - -
policies on inflation

The relation between climate policies Climate

E. Jurzyca ECR 19/09/2022 11/11/2022
and the price stability objective change

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Climate change considerations in Climate

M. Ferber EPP 27/09/2022 11/11/2022
corporate bond purchases change

D. Ruiz Monetary
S&D Studies on helicopter money 17/10/2022 25/11/2022
Devesa Policy

Increased interest rates and borrowing

Monetary
E. Kaili S&D costs for EU Member States and the 25/10/2022 25/11/2022
Policy
European economy
The ECB’s official position on the taxation
Economic
M. Aubry The Left of the wealthiest individuals and of 28/10/2022 25/11/2022
Policies
companies making super-profits

Eurozone banks are seeing super-profits

to the tune of several billion euros, linked Monetary
M. Aubry The Left 28/10/2022 25/11/2022
to the third targeted longer-term Policy
refinancing operation (TLTRO III)

Financial stability risk stemming from low

P. Canfin Renew 08/11/2022 - -
energy efficiency of real estate collateral

B. Eickhout Verts/ALE The greening of ECB’s monetary policy 18/11/2022 - -

Has the gradual abolition of the EUR 500

G. Beck ID note actually led to a reduction in 18/11/2022 - -
crime?

Letter from the Portuguese Prime

Minister, António Costa, to the President
N. Mello EPP 21/11/2022 - -
of the ECB and to the President of
Commission

Letter from the Portuguese Prime

Minister, António Costa, to the President -
N. Mello EPP 21/11/2022 -
of the ECB and to the President of
Commission II

Climate change considerations in

M. Ferber EPP 23/11/2022 - -
corporate bond purchases

1
The account for monetary policy meeting referred to the discussion between Governing Council members, with some of the them pointing to a 50
bps interest rate increase showing prudence regarding the pace of adjustment and taking into account that the rate hike would be accompanied by
a signal on the need for further future rate hikes.
2
Minimum reserves are the average funds that credit institutions are required to hold in their reserve accounts at their national central bank over a
maintenance period.
3
Mendez-Barreira (2022), in his article, points out that the November amount of early repayments was below market expectation, referring to market
expectations ranging from EUR 200 billion to EUR 1.5 trillion and the median scenario being equal to EUR 600 billion.
4
On 27 October, in an ING publication, Kosonen (2022) presented her thoughts about the early repayments of TLTLROs, explaining why she does
not anticipate a significant drop in the outstanding amount with the early repayment on 23 November.

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