Tantuico - Legal Ethics

LEGAL ETHICS
2022 BAR SYLLABUS
ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 1

THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
To society (Canons 1 to 6)
To the legal profession (Canons 7 to 9)
To the courts (Canons 10 to 13)
To the clients (Canons 14 to 22)
Lawyer’s Oath

SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND
DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
Rule 139
Rule 139-B

THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
TO THE SOCIETY (CANONS 1 TO 6)

Canon 1
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND PROMOTE AND
RESPECT LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS

Zaldivar v. Gonzales
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578, October 7, 1988, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
DOCTRINE: Freedom of speech and expression is not absolute and needs, on occasion, to
be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests.
FACTS: Gonzales, Tanodbayan, filed criminal charges against Zaldivar for violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The court issued a TRO against the Office of the
Tanodbayan, ordering the latter to cease and desist the investigation and filing of criminal
charges. Gonzales, however, continued the proceedings and disobeyed the court’s orders. He
also issued statements in the media besmirching the integrity of the court.
RULING: Gonzales is guilty of contempt and gross misconduct, and should indefinitely be
suspended from the practice of the law.

RULE 1.01
NO UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST, IMMORAL, DECEITFUL CONDUCT

Piatt v. Abordo
58 Phil. 350 (1933)
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its
officers for misconduct alleged to be committed in his private capacity. As an exception, an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which show him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
FACTS: Atty. Abordo intended to buy opium from a third party but was sold fake opium with
sand. Abordo reported to the Luneta Police Station that he had been robbed of P600 for which
two individuals were later arrested and convicted for estafa.
RULING: Despite there being no consummation of the crime, in the eyes of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, the act is as reprehensible if it were consummated.

Ui v. Bonifacio
A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 38 (2000)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Gross immoral conduct is that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows immoral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community.
FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Bonifacio for having an immoral and
illicit relationship with Ui, the husband of complainant. Bonifacio claimed that she met Mr. Ui
believing him to be single. They got married and had two children. Upon her knowledge of Mr.
Ui’s true civil status, Bonifacio left him.
RULING: There was failure to prove immoral behavior. Bonifacio acted in good faith in entering
the relationship. Bonifacio showed that she was imprudent in managing her personal affairs, but
this does not constitute grossly immoral behavior.

Figueroa v. Barranco
SBC Case No. 519, July 31 1997, 276 SCRA 445 (1997)
DOCTRINE: To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral but grossly immoral.
FACTS: Figueroa filed an administrative complaint against Barranco, a successful bar candidate in
the 1970 Bar, praying that the latter be denied admission to the legal profession. Figueroa
averred that they had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them, and that
Barranco failed to fulfill her promise to marry her after he passes the Bar. Figueroa charged him
of gross immorality.
RULING: The facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting permanent exclusion of
Barranco from the legal profession. The Court dismissed the instant petition and Barranco
should be allowed to take his lawyer’s oath.

Figueroa v. Barranco
SBC Case No. 519, July 31 1997, 276 SCRA 445 (1997)
“Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of
gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child
with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion
of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the
same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension
or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.”

Pimentel v. Llorente
A.C. No. 4680, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 154 (2000)
DOCTRINE: Lawyers holding a government position cannot be disciplined as a member of the
bar for misconduct in his duties as a government official, unless the misconduct violates the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the lawyer’s oath or shows moral delinquency.
FACTS: Pimentel filed a complaint for disbarment against Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon,
officers of Pasig City Board of Canvassers, for alleged tampering of votes in the 1995 elections
and the commission of serious breach of public trust. IBP recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.
RULING: The petition should not be dismissed for being late. Delay may be overlooked since
disbarment proceedings are for public welfare; double jeopardy, prescription, and verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions do not apply to disbarment proceedings. IBP
recommendations are not required to be followed. Only clear preponderance of evidence is
required in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar to establish liability.

Pimentel v. Llorente
A.C. No. 4680, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 154
(2000)
“ By certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents

committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a
lawyer shall not engage in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to
lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated
their oath of office as lawyers to "do no falsehood."

Ventura v. Samson
A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012, 686 SCRA 430 (2012)
DOCTRINE: A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a
complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an
investigation into the acts but on one’s conduct as an officer of the court and one’s fitness to continue as
a member of the Bar.
FACTS: Samson, a married lawyer, raped, sexually abused, and threatened 13-year-old Ventura. She filed
a disbarment case after eleven years with the IBP, and the IBP punished Samson with a suspension.
Ventura filed a motion for reconsideration, saying that the penalty should be disbarment.
RULING: Samson’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee,
constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. He not only admitted he had sexual
intercourse with Ventura but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing
wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money. His act of having carnal knowledge of
a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his
own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman
with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and
the ethics of his profession. Samson has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by Ventura,
then a 13-year-old minor, who for a time was under his care.

Macarubbo v. Macarubbo
A.C. No. 6148, February 27, 2004
DOCTRINE: A person liable for concubinage is inconsistent with the good moral character that is
required for the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar.
FACTS: A verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Macarubbo was filed by his wife with
IBP for alleged bigamy. Atty. Macarubbo represented himself as a bachelor, with Florence
contracting marriage with him. He admitted that he was married to Helen, but succeeded in
convincing complainant that his previous marriage was void. Proof of the marriage with Florence
was found in the documentary evidence of the marriage contract and photos of their nuptials,
and their captured moments as a couple and a family. He also allegedly entered into a third
marriage with Josephine and abandoned Florence and their children without support.
RULING: Macarubbo is disbarred for gross misconduct since he entered into a marriage while his
first marriage was subsisting. He also entered into multiple marriages and lacked stable support
for his children.

People v. Tuanda
A.C. No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 18 SCRA 692 (1990)
DOCTRINE: Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provide that conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude may be grounds for the suspension of attorneys.
FACTS: Tuanda was convicted of violating Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22) after she issued three
checks representing the sale of several pieces of jewelry to Marquez which were eventually
dishonored. The Court of Appeals additionally imposed the suspension of Tuanda from the
practice of law. She now seeks to have the Court lift the penalty of suspension from the practice.
RULING: The Court affirmed Tuanda’s suspension from the practice of law. She was convicted of
a crime which the Court deemed as that involving moral turpitude since it deleteriously affected
public interest and public order. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provide that conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude may be grounds for the suspension of attorneys. Furthermore, Tuanda
violated her attorney’s oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, under both of which she
was bound to “obey the laws of the land.”

Castillo vda. de Mijares v. Villaluz
A.C. No. 4431, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 1 (1997)
DOCTRINE: The requirement of being a person of good moral character is not merely a condition for
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law. Alawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
FACTS: RTC Judge Mijares and former CA Justice Villaluz were married in 1994. However, after a heated
exchange on the same day, Mijares left and the two lived separately since. Months after, Mijares found
out Villaluz contracted another marriage and filed a disbarment case against him for gross immorality
and grave misconduct. Villaluz avers, his marriage with Mijares was itself void since he was actually
previously married when he contracted the marriage with Mijares, and that the annulment of that first
marriage had not yet attained finality at the time.
RULING: Villaluz was guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. Villaluz made a “mockery of marriage
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity” more so since he was a former judge of
Circuit Criminal Court and a former justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully
aware of the consequence of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites.” He has
dismally failed to meet the standard of moral fitness which is a requisite of membership in the legal
profession.

Stemmerik v. Mas
A.C. No. 8010, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 114 (2009)
DOCTRINE: The giving of legal advice to clients which are violative of the Constitution and basic law constitutes a
serious breach of one’s oath as a lawyer. By committing fraudulent and criminal acts, one i also guilty of culpable
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.
FACTS: Stemmerik, a Denmark national, came to the Philippines and became interested in buying real property.
He consulted Atty. Mas who advised him that he was able to acquire and legally own land in the country, even
suggesting an available property in Subic, Zambales. Stemmerik gave Mas P3.8 million for the purchase of the
Subic property as his representative, as well as P400,000 in legal and professional fees for the preparation of the
necessary documents. Mas eventually became more evasive until Stemmerik enlisted the services of another law
firm from which he learned his incapacity to own land in the country as well as the status of the Subic property as
actually inalienable. He filed for the disbarment of Mas.
RULING: Mas should be disbarred. Mas committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer when he gave his
client legal advice that was violative of the Constitution and basic law. He also prepared documents which he
knew were spurious, invalid, and illegal. By committing fraudulent and criminal acts, he was also guilty of culpable
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession. “Respondent spun
an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after unethical act, wantonly violating laws
and professional standards.”

Freeman v. Zenaida P. Reyes
A.C. No. 6246, November 15, 2011
DOCTRINE: In Velez vs. De Vera, the Court ruled that the relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in
nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
FACTS: Freeman’s husband, a British national, died in London. After being denied, she engaged the services of
Atty. Reyes to help her secure the VISAs and obtain the death benefits and other insurance claims. Despite
repeated follow-ups, she did not receive any news from Reyes. Reyes explained that she needed to go to London
to follow-up the insurance claims and warned her not to communicate with one named Grist who allegedly
pocketed the proceeds of her husband’s insurance policy. Reyes required Freeman to affix her signature in a SPA
to authorize Reyes to follow-up the insurance claims. However, a different SPA was notarized where Freeman’s
signature was forged. Reyes made representations that the installments due be placed in an account number that
Freeman was unaware of. IBP Investigating Commissioner found Reyes to have betrayed the trust of Freeman.
Reyes failed to secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that through deceitful means, she was able to
appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance policies of Freeman’s husband. IBP Board of Governors
ruled that Reyes should be disbarred.
RULING: Freeman sufficiently substantiated the charge of gross dishonesty against Reyes for appropriating the
insurance proceeds of her husband. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not to punish the individual
attorney, but to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of its officers.

Crisanta G. Hosoya v. Contado
A.C. No. 10731, October 5, 2021
DOCTRINE: A lawyer's failure to pay debts despite repeated demands constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct.
FACTS: Hosoya alleged that upon meeting Atty. Contado, he immediately courted her and represented that he
was already separated-in-fact from his wife. She agreed with Contado’s proposal to live together as husband and
wife. However, she discovered that Contado was cohabiting with and impregnated other women apart from her.
She continued living with him and their cohabitation resulted in two children. When they were having financial
problems, Contado left her alone and the parties terminated their relationship. Hosoya claimed that she and her
children no longer received support from Contado, alleging that these constituted violations of the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act; the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004, and carnapping.
RULING: The fact that Contado has not yet returned the subject vehicle to Crisanta despite demand bolsters this
disciplinary case against him. Refusal to return property despite lawful demand is akin to deliberate failure to pay
debt. Jurisprudence is clear that a lawyer's failure to pay debts despite repeated demands constitutes dishonest
and deceitful conduct — also a violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Prompt payment of financial obligations is one
of the duties of a lawyer; this is in accord with a lawyer's mandate to "faithfully perform at all times his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients."

Jaime Ignacio D. Bernasconi v. Atty. Belleza
A. Demaisip
A.C. No. 11477, January 19, 2021
DOCTRINE: The issuance of a bouncing check is an act which constitutes "willful dishonesty and immoral
conduct as to undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers.“
FACTS: Bernasconi engaged Atty. Demaisip’s legal services for the transfer of ownership of a parcel of
land, the latter estimating the cost of transfer at P2,960,000.00 which the former gave. However, Atty.
Demaisip was not able to deliver any transfer certificate of title to Bernasconi. Thus, he demanded
refund. Demaisip was not able to account for the remaining P1,638,000.00. Demaisip issued in favor of
Bernasconi a check in said amount, which was dishonored by the drawee bank upon presentment for
being drawn against a closed account. Despite several demands from Bernasconi, Demaisip still failed to
make good the check. Demaisip executed promissory notes where she undertook to pay Bernasconi. But
again, Demaisip failed to fulfill her promise. This led Bernasconi to file a criminal complaint for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 and estafa against her, aside from this administrative complaint.
RULING: Demaisip also blatantly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR when she issued checks that
were subsequently dishonoured for being drawn against a closed account. Demaisip issued a bouncing
check — an act which constitutes "willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in law and lawyers."

RULE 1.02
NO COUNSELING TO DEFY LAW OR ABET ACTIVITIES AIMED AT DEFIANCE OF
LAW OR LESSENING CONFIDENCE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM

In re Terrell
2 Phil 266 (1903)
DOCTRINE: The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or
the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
FACTS: Terrel is charged with suspension from the practice of law for (1) assisting in the
organization of the “Centro Bellas Artes” Club and (2) for acting as their attorney after being
notified with knowledge that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law.
RULING: Terrel should be suspended. The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their
objects, for the purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such
misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or
gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil
Procedure, Sec. 21).

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 159486-88, November 25, 2003, 416 SCRA 465 (2003)
DOCTRINE: Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on
similar conduct by others.
FACTS: In a petition for certiorari, the Court ruled that Atty. Paguia, Estrada’s attorney, has not limited his
discussions to the merits of his client’s case within the political forum and has repeated his assault on
the Court in both broadcast and print media. By his acts, Paguia posed a potentially dangerous threat to
the administration of justice. The Court ordered Paguia to show cause why he should not be sanctioned
for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court. Paguia however, in a display of defiance,
repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.
RULING: Atty. Paguia is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for conduct unbecoming a lawyer
and an officer of the Court. Through questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court, Atty. Paguia only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct, and pervert the
dispensation of justice. Paguia wrote in the Daily Tribune that Estrada vs. Arroyo was unconstitutional
and void, thereby violating Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a
member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.

Kupers v. Hontanosas
AC No. 5704 May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 325 (2009)
DOCTRINE: The preparation and notarization of illegal lease contracts are in violation of the
Attorney’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FACTS: A complaint was charged against Hontanosas for preparing and notarizing contracts
contrary to law. Hontanosas prepared a memorandum of agreement and a contract of lease
between the spouses Busse and Hochstrasser, a Swiss national wherein Hochstrasser would
lease Busse’s property for 50 years, renewable for another 50 years. He prepared a similar
agreement and lease contract between the spouses Busse and Emberger, another Swiss
national, over a parcel of land wherein the lease contract was for a period of 49 years,
renewable for another 49 years. He notarized all 4 documents.
RULING: Hontanosas prepared and notarized contracts that are both invalid and illegal as these
contracts violated the limitations of aliens leasing private lands. Hontanosas is found guilty of
violating the lawyer’s oath and gross misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for 6
months with a warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.

Coronel v. Cunanan
AC No. 6738, August 12, 2015, 766 SCRA 258 (2015)
DOCTRINE: The proposal of an act despite being fully aware that the same is intended to circumvent the
law constitutes malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct.
FACTS: Coronel initiated a disbarment case against Atty. Cunanan. She alleged that the latter advised and
convinced her to engage him for the transfer of Original Certificate of Title, which were registered in the
name of her deceased grandparents, to her name and to the names of her co-heirs by direct registration
in violation of the proper legal procedure. Following the engagement, he received 70,000 from her for
the payment of the transfer but had misappropriated the same; and that he had not returned such
money and the owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title.
RULING: Cunanan’s actions constitute malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct. Cunanan proposed the
option of “direct registration” despite being fully aware that such option was actually a shortcut
intended to circumvent the law, and thus patently contrary to law. He made the proposal despite its
patent illegality in order to take advantage of the complainant’s limited legal knowledge of the regular
procedures for the transfer of title under circumstances of intestacy.

RULE 1.03
NOT TO ENCOURAGE LAWSUIT OR PROCEEDINGS FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE
OR INTEREST OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE

RULE 1.04
ENCOURAGE CLIENT TO AVOID CONTROVERSY

Castaneda v. Ago
G.R. No. 28546, July 30, 1975, 65 SCRA 505 (1975)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.
FACTS: An action was being taken against Ago’s family house and lot due to the losses incurred
by the failure of his lumber business. He filed multiple suits to enjoin action against his property,
delaying the service of justice. His lawyer, Atty. Luison, carried this out for him, allowing the case
to last for fourteen years.
RULING: Luison allowed himself to be swayed by the whims of Ago, despite the fact that he has
a duty above his client. Lawyers are bound to serve as mediators between parties in a legal
action, not simply doing all their clients ask of them. They should advise their clients properly
regarding what actions they should take and knowing when to cease filing actions and the like.

In re Gutierrez
Adm. Case No. 363, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 661 (1962)
DOCTRINE: The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of
mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test
of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are
neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission; the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur
the risk of suspension or removal.
FACTS: Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar. CFI Oriental Mindoro convicted him of the murder of Samaco,
former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to death. Such was
affirmed upon review but the penalty was changed to reclusión perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence,
Gutierrez was granted a conditional pardon by the President. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." The widow of the
deceased Samaco filed a verified complaint praying that Gutierrez be removed from the roll of lawyers.
RULING: Pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which Gutierrez has been
convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers. Under section 5 of Rule 127 a
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral
turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

Cobalt Resources, Inc. v. Aguado
A.C. No. 10781, April 12, 2016
DOCTRINE: As vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal professor and to refrain from any act or omission which might
diminish the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.
FACTS: CRI concluded that Atty. Aguado prepared a fake mission order and masterminded a
crime and that it was he who recruited the armed men who actually executed the hijacking. The
IBP directed Aguado to submit his answer but, despite several extensions, he failed to do so. In
his Conference Brief, Aguado denied the allegations.
RULING: Clearly, Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was in
possession of a falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order
identifying him as the Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. Aguado has
committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable to faithfully discharge his bounden duties
as a member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting standards
demanded of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law.

Ecraela v. Pangalangan
A.C. No. 10676, September 8, 2015
DOCTRINE: The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only required for
admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity.
FACTS: Ecraela and Pangalangan were best friends and graduated from UP Law where they were
part of a barkada. After passing the Bar and being admitted as members, they were both
registered with IBP QC. Pangalangan was formerly married to Jardiolin with whom he has three
(3) children. Ecraela avers that while married to Jardiolin, Pangalangan had a series of adulterous
and illicit relations with married and unmarried women.
RULING: Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through
technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked
the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of
disbarment.

Cordova v. Cordova
A.C. No. 3249, November 29, 1989, 179 Phil 680 (1989)
DOCTRINE: An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed
of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for
membership in the Bar in good standing.
FACTS: Complainant charged her husband, Atty. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. Notwithstanding respondent's promises to
reform, he continued to live with Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his
legitimate family. Finally, the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant,
stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
RULING: The most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be
real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the latter carried out in
public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine
Bar itself. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its
elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.

Canon 2
PROVIDE EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT LEGAL SERVICES

RULE 2.01
NOT TO REJECT OR OPPRESSED DEFENSELESS OR OPPRESSED SERVICES

Ledesma v. Climaco
G.R. No. 23815, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 473 (1974)
DOCTRINE: The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called
upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of
justice due diligence is expected of him, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a
lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social
conscience and a little less of self-interest.
FACTS: Ledesma filed a motion to withdraw from a pending criminal case in view of his new
appointment as Election Registrar by the COMELEC which allegedly requires his full-time service.
RULING: The judge denied his plea as well as his motions for reconsideration.

RULE 2.02
NOT TO REFUSE TO GIVE LEGAL ADVICE

Atty. Rogelio S. Constantino v. Atty. Nemesis
Aransazo,Jr.
A.C. No. 9701, Feb. 10, 2021
DOCTRINE: A "lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a legal
concern. The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal concerns, or for representation of the
client in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that moment on, the lawyer is bound to respect the
relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of his client.“
FACTS: Atty. Constantino engaged the services of Atty. Aransanzo in a civil case involving a house and lot in
Aldaba’s name who previously obtained a loan from Tongco. In Aransazo’s sworn statement, he said that
Constantino visited him in his office and went on to say his dilemma pertaining to a lawyer who could appear in
his behalf on a possible legal proceeding. Aransazo said that Constantino pleaded that his law firm take over the
legal matter. Not long after that meeting with Constantino, Aransazo said that he came back again to his office
unannounced, this time holding several copies of “deed of assignment of real estate mortgage.”
RULING: The moment Atty. Constantino approached Atty. Aransazo to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the personal
relationship between Atty. Constantino and Atty. Aransazo. At this point, the relationship between them imposed
upon Atty. Aransazo certain restrictions circumscribed by the profession. Notwithstanding the fact that Atty.
Aransazo may have initially dispensed legal advice to Atty. Constantino as a personal favor, he was still duty-bound
to preserve and protect the personal, confidential and fiduciary relation established between them.

RULE 2.03
NO SOLICITATION

In re Tagorda
53 Phil 37 (1929)
DOCTRINE: The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The law is a profession and not a
business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do
so would be unprofessional.
FACTS: Tagorda advertised his services as a notary public and attorney by writing a card written
in Spanish and Ilocano and addressing a letter to a lieutenant offering his services as the same.
RULING: Tagorda should be suspended for advertising his services as a notary public and a
lawyer. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension.

Ulep v. Legal Clinic
B.M. No. 553, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents
or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The proscription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate
that the practice of law is a profession.
FACTS: Ulep prayed for the Court to order The Legal Clinic, Inc. from issuing advertisements
because these were champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive
of the confidence in the integrity of the members of the Bar.
RULING: The advertisements were for the practice of law and, taking into consideration the
advertisements’ nature and contents, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
The Legal Clinic, Inc. for services rendered, the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot
fall under any of the exceptions for the prohibition of advertising legal services.

Linsangan v. Tolentino
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 133 (2009)
DOCTRINE: The practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise
their talents as merchants advertise their wares.
FACTS: A complaint alleged that Tolentino, with the help of paralegal Labiano, convinced
Linsangan’s clients to transfer legal representation, resulting to solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. Tolentino promised financial assistance and expeditious
collection on their claims, persistently sending them text messages in order to induce them.
RULING: To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law,
degrade the profession in the public‘s estimation, and impair its ability to efficiently render that
high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. Use of “with financial
assistance” in card is an advertisement.

Villatuya v. Tabalingcos
A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012, 676 SCRA 37 (2012)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
However, an inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for
indirect solicitation on the lawyer's behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would
be regarded as the practice of law.
FACTS: Villatuya alleged that Tabalingcos engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases. It was alleged
that Tabalingcos set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and
Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases.
RULING: Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant,
was indeed a vehicle used by Tabalingcos as a means to procure professional employment;
specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.

RULE 2.04
NO RATES LOWER THAN CUSTOMARILY CHARGED UNLESS THE CIRCUMSTANCES
WARRANT

Canon 3
INFORMATION ON LEGAL SERVICES THAT IS TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED
AND OBJECTIVE

RULE 3.01
NO FALSE OR UNFAIR CLAIM RE: QUALIFICATIONS

Khan v. Simbillo
A.C. No. 5299, August 19, 2003 & G.R. No. 157053, 409 SCRA 299 (2003)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
FACTS: Atty. Simbillo was claimed as an expert in handling annulment cases and allegedly can
guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case would not involve
separation of property or custody of children. Said expertise was found on a paid advertisement
in an issue of PDI. Khan claimed that the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned.
RULING: Atty. Simbillo should be sanctioned for posting such advertisement on the newspaper.
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.

RULE 3.02
NO FALSE OR MISLEADING FIRM NAME

Dacanay v. Baker and McKenzie
A.C. No. 2131, May 10, 1985, 136 SCRA 349 (1985)
DOCTRINE: An alien firm cannot practice law in the Philippines.
FACTS: Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing under the
name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois, and thus cannot practice law in the
Philippines.
RULING: The use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that, being
associated with the firm, they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment” which is unethical
because Baker and McKenzie cannot practice law in the Philippines.

In re Petition of Sycip
G.R. No. X92-1, July, 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 1 (1979)
DOCTRINE: The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession.
FACTS: Partners of Sycip and partners of Ozaeta pray that they be allowed to continue using, in
the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
RULING: The Court denied both petitions. Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person
from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The
public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer may start from scratch or initially
ride with the reputation of the established firm’s name.

Nebreja v. Reonal
A.C. No. 9896, March 19, 2014, 719 SCRA 385 (2014)
DOCTRINE: The use of a fictitious office address to deceive a client is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to
do no falsehood.
FACTS: Nebreja alleged that she engaged in Atty. Reonal’s services to file her annulment petition. After
paying him, she did not receive any update regarding the status of her petition other than his claim that
they needed to wait for her psychologist appointment. When Nebreja asked for her case file copies,
Reonal said that his law office could not let her use the case pleadings. She asked for his office address
to appeal to his law partners, but Reonal refused. Nebreja found Reonal's demand letter bearing the
address of his claimed law office but when she tried to look for said office, she discovered that there was
no such building. She also found Reonal's calling card bearing his residential address.
RULING: Reonal used a fictitious office address to deceive Nebreja. He did not submit any proof that
such building existed or that he held office at said address. He also did not deny either the due
execution and authenticity of the letter with his printed office address. Such act was a violation of his
lawyer's oath to do no falsehood and which consequently rendered him administratively liable.
PENALTY: Suspension from the practice of law for one year.

Yu Kimteng v. Young
GR No. 210554, 05 August 2015
DOCTRINE: A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who appears under a firm name
that contains a disbarred lawyer's name commits indirect contempt of court.
FACTS: Petitioners are the majority stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation. The court previously ordered the
corporation’s liquidation and transferred the case to the appropriate RTC branch to supervise the liquidation. The
liquidation was raffled to RTC Mandaluyong, presided by Judge Calo. Atty. Young, Atty. Gambol, and Atty. Magat
are lawyers practicing under the firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat. They entered their appearance as counsels
for the liquidator. An Opposition was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat on the
ground that Revilla was already disbarred.
RULING: Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different from using a deceased partner's
name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased partner's name as long as there is an
indication that the partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the
retention of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead the public into believing that the lawyer is
still authorized to practice law.
PENALTY: “Respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are found in contempt of court for
using a disbarred lawyer's name in their firm name and are meted a fine of P30,000.00 each.

RULE 3.03
PARTNERS ASSUMING PUBLIC OFFICE

Samonte v. Gatdula
A.M. No. P-99-1292, February 20, 1999, 303 SCRA 756 (1999)
DOCTRINE: It is unlawful for a public official to engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with official functions.
FACTS: Atty. Samonte was representing her sister in an ejectment case. There was a typographical error
in the defendant’s address in the ejectment case while Atty. Gatdula was clerk of court in that RTC
branch. When questioned by Samonte, Gatdula blamed Samonte‘s lawyer for the typographical error. He
said that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law office
of Gatdula, at the same time giving his calling card.
RULING: Gatdula engaged in the private practice of law while serving as Branch Clerk of Court of the
RTC. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion or
retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713).
PENALTY: Reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that a repetition of
the same offense will be dealt with more severely. Further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in
the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.

RULE 3.04
NOT USE MEDIA TO ATTRACT LEGAL BUSINESS

Cruz v. Salva
105 Phil 1151 (1959)
DOCTRINE: The Court frowns upon undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the
authorities, even when it is being tried in court. But when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed,
even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by the tribunal, the whole
thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent.
FACTS: The fiscal was publicly censured for encouraging media coverage during a reinvestigation of a
case that was on appeal and pending consideration by the Court. The investigation of the killing Manuel
Monroy was highly publicized. He asked the media or press to give him questions for the investigation
which he held in the session hall of Pasay Municipal Court.
RULING: It is bad enough to have undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the
authorities even when it is being tried in court. But when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed,
even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by the tribunal, it becomes
inexcusable and abhorrent. The Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an
end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a
penalty to the one liable.
PENALTY:Respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled
for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his
investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that
a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty.

Canon 4
PARTICIPATE IN IMPROVEMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM: SUPPORT LAW
REFORMS AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Canon 5
PARTICIPATE IN LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAM

Rodriguez Manahan v. Flores
A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 297 (2013)
DOCTRINE: Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial
branch of the Government.
FACTS: Atty. Flores was counsel for the defendant in suit filed before a court presided by Judge
Rodriquez-Manahan. Judge Manahan voluntarily inhibited from hearing the case. OBC deemed
Judge Manahan’s pronouncements as a formal administrative complaint against Flores. In said
case, Flores filed his pre-trial brief without proof of MCLE compliance. The preliminary
conference was reset several times for failure of Flores to appear and submit his pre-trial brief
indicating his MCLE compliance.
RULING: Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court's order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him.
PENALTY: FINE in the amount of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Rivera-Pascual v. Spouses Lim
G.R. No. 191837, September 19, 2012, 681 SCRA 429 (2012)
DOCTRINE: It is the duty of every member of the Bar to comply with procedural rules. They are
not at liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their
omission by harking on liberal construction.
FACTS: Consolacion’s counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922.
RULING: CA committed no reversible error in dismissing Consolacion's petition before it on the
ground of petitioner's unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural requirements
attendant to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Consolacion
and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity afforded to them by the CA to
rectify their lapses. “This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It
is the duty of every member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to
seek exceptions should they fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking
on liberal construction. While it is the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this
unfortunate result, she is bound by such.”
PENALTY: Petition DISMISSED.

Ko v. Uy Lampasa
AC No. 11584, March 6, 2019
DOCTRINE: According to Bar Matter No. 850, an IBP member shall only be declared delinquent for
failure to comply with the education requirements “after the sixty-day period for compliance has
expired.” This 60-day period shall commence from the time such member received a notice of
non-compliance. Without the notice of compliance, a member who believes that the units he or she had
taken already amounts to full compliance may be declared delinquent without being made aware of
such lack of units and with no chance to rectify the same.
FACTS: Complainant averred that Uy Lampasa committed perjury and has filed pleadings in court
without the necessary MCLE compliance number, attaching to his complaint several pleadings and
manifestations in support of such.
RULING: Uy Lampasa eventually completed the required units within the Fourth Compliance Period.
Likewise, she was also issued Certificates of Exemption for the First, Second, and Third Compliance
Periods. Uy Lampasa manifested that the presiding judge of the RTC where the cases involved were
pending required her to submit her Certificates of Compliance. When she received said certificates, she
immediately submitted the same to the trial court.

Canon 6
CANONS APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Collantes v. Renomeron
A.C. No. 3056, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 584 (1991)
DOCTRINE: Acts of dishonesty and oppression committed as a public official demonstrates one’s
unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law.
FACTS: Renomeron, as Register of Deeds, suspended the registration of documents pending
Collantes’ compliance with the “special arrangement” between them, wherein V&G should
provide him with weekly round-trip tickets and P2,000 allowance.
RULING: Renomeron’s misconduct as Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies
to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official acts. The acts of dishonesty
and oppression, which Renomeron committed as a public official, have demonstrated his
unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law. He should be disbarred.
PENALTY: Disbarred from practice of law. Name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

Collantes v. Renomeron
“The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may
also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his
misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon
every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations
and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben
E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67)…. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and
papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a
financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars
them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of their office (Sec. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01,
Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule
1.03).
"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
(Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the
profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest
standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

Office of the Court Administrator v. Lagada
A.M. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001, 350 SCRA 326 (2001)
DOCTRINE: According to Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, “no officer or
employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department.”
FACTS: Lagada represented his cousin in a criminal case involving the falsification of public
document (birth certificate) because the latter had no resources to hire the services of a counsel
de parte. Despite Lagada’s failure to secure prior permission from the Court, he still represented
his cousin for their “close familial connection.”
RULING: Lagada did not violate the ethical code of conduct and ethical standards for public
officials. However, he was reprimanded for failure to secure the written permission of the Court
as this violates the Rules on the Revised Civil Service.
PENALTY: Reprimand.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Lagada
A.M. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001, 350 SCRA 326 (2001)
“Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.
The said section reads:
SECTION 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law
profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one's self to the public as a lawyer. …Nonetheless, while respondent’s isolated court appearances
did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from
the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules….”

Pimentel v. Fabros
A.C. No. 4517, Sept. 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 346 (2006)
DOCTRINE: Lawyers in the government service are under an even greater obligation to observe the basic
tenets of the legal profession because public office is a public trust.
FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed against Fabros et al. alleging that, as Chairman and
Vice-Chairman, they signed falsified documents which altered the results of the senatorial elections in
Isabela province, constituting gross violation of the Election Code and a serious breach of public trust
and Oath as members of the Bar. They authenticated the provincial certificate of canvass and signed
statement of votes as “true and correct.”
RULING: As public officers, Fabros et al. failed to live up to the high degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill required of them. As lawyers, they were found to have engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They also violated their oath as officers of the court
to foist no falsehood on anyone.
PENALTY: FINE in the amount of P10,000 each, with a WARNING that the commission in the future of a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Berenguer-Landers v. Florin
A.C. No 5119, April 17, 2013, 696 SCRA 589
DOCTRINE: If a misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer,
then a lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
FACTS: The Berenguers protested a notice of coverage issued by DAR and applied for exclusion of their
land. Upon denial, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal. While pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a
petition for the implementation of the Order before the RARAD. This was granted by Florin, as RARAD,
and eventually directed the full implementation of the writ of possession in spite of the Berenguers’
protestations. Upon denial of the motion to quash, the Berenguers filed a complaint for disbarment
against Florin et al.
RULING: Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions of
a RARAD that are akin to those of judges. While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment
absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice, the
facts prove otherwise. Florin ordered the issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with
the DARAB. Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of suspension.

Pelipel v. Avila
A.C. No. 7578, August 14, 2019
DOCTRINE: Lawyers serving in government must more conscientiously comply with ethical standards set for
lawyers. They are not merely engaged in legal practice, but occupy offices typified by public trust. Extortion and
receiving money in exchange for undue benefits reveal a predisposition that falls far too short of the lofty
standards of both public service and the legal profession.
FACTS: Pelipel alleged that a LTO team led by Atty. Avila impounded five out-of-line buses and were released only
upon Pelipel’s payment of the prescribed fees, as well as his accession to Avila’s insistence that he be paid a
weekly protection money of P3,000 and a one-time amount of P150,000 “to insure immunity from arrest of [PP
Bus Lines’] bus drivers and from [the] impounding of [its] buses.” After Pelipel stopped paying due to his
“worsening financial situation,” Avila insisted that the former pay lest his buses be impounded.
RULING: A lawyer's holding of public office does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to discipline and impose
penalties upon him or her for unethical conduct. On the contrary, holding public office amplifies a lawyer's
disciplinary liability. Avila’s actions are of such gravity that warrants the consummate penalty of disbarment. They
attest to a depravity that makes a mockery of the high standards of both public service and the legal profession.
The totality of what Avila did — from his initial inducements, to his intervening incessant importuning, and finally,
to his being caught in flagrante delicto — indicates a vicious predisposition to take advantage of his position for
personal gain, to dispense undue advantages, and to deny public benefits. It reveals his unfitness to enjoy the
privilege of legal practice.
PENALTY: DISBARRED. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Sismaet v. Cruzabra
A.C. No. 5001, September 7, 2020
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that "a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official." However, if the government official's misconduct "is of such a
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such ground.“
FACTS: Sismaet sought the registration of an affidavit of adverse claim on a TCT with the Registry of Deeds of General Santos City. The
adverse claim was annotated on the back of the TCT with the signature of Atty. Cruzabra, who was then the Registrar of Deeds of
General Santos City. A mortgage contract between China Banking and Co, Jr. (Co), who was one of the defendants in a civil case, was
annotated on the back of the TCT. Co sought the registration of an Affidavit of Cancellation for Adverse Claim, directed at the adverse
claim earlier filed by Sismaet. This Affidavit was likewise inscribed on the TCT, still with the signature of Cruzabra, effectively cancelling
Sismaet's adverse claim. Sismaet alleges that by reason of the annotation of the mortgage contract on the TCT, she and her
co-plaintiffs were forced to move for the amendment of their complaint to implead China Banking as additional defendant. She
further blames Cruzabra for allowing the annotation of the mortgage contract and the Affidavit of Cancellation of Adverse Claim
knowing full well that the property subject of the TCT is still under litigation.
RULING: Cruzabra was remiss in the discharge of her duties, not only as Register of Deeds, but also as an attorney and officer of the
court. While the registration of instruments and affidavits is a ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds, it has also been held that the
Register of Deeds may refuse registration of an instrument or affidavit when the ownership of the real property covered by such
instrument or affidavit is under litigation. Not only was Cruzabra fully aware of the pendency of the civil case wherein Co was a
defendant, she herself was likewise impleaded therein. Consequently, the more prudent course of action was for Cruzabra to refuse
the registration of Co's affidavit of cancellation, considering that Sismaet's adverse claim was still being litigated at the time Co filed
his affidavit. The inquisitorial power of the IBP over government lawyers is limited to cases of misconduct amounting to violation of
either the Lawyers' Oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, as the primary authority over
the Philippine bar, retains disciplinary jurisdiction over government lawyers.
PENALTY: Court SUSPENDS respondent Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra from the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon receipt of
this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Sismaet v. Cruzabra
A.C. No. 5001, September 7, 2020
“In Collantes v. Atty. Renomeron, 27 where this Court disbarred the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City
for refusing the registration of 163 deeds of assignment after applicant's counsel refused to buy him a
plane ticket, this Court held:
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may
also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his
misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon
every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his
obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks. Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public
officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously and prohibits them from directly
or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their
office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office, the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, or delay
any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest."

RULE 6.01
PRIMARY DUTY: THAT JUSTICE IS DONE

People v. Pineda
G.R. No. 26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748 (1967)
DOCTRINE: In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did,
or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should
normally prevail.
FACTS: The fiscal filed five separate charges against the accused for killing the victims. The Judge
directed the City Fiscal to unify the five criminal cases into a single information in order to
hasten the trial. The City fiscal balked at the forgoing order and sought reconsideration which
was later on denied.
RULING: The five charges should not be filed in one information. The question of instituting a
criminal charge is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal.

RULE 6.02
NOT TO USE PUBLIC POSITION FOR PRIVATE INTEREST

Vitriolo v. Dasig
A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 172 (2003)
DOCTRINE: Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer, then he may be disciplined by the Court as a member of the Bar.
FACTS: Dasig, in her capacity as CHED’s OIC of Legal Affairs Service, was alleged to have extorted
cash ranging from P5,000-P10,000 from teachers and students, filed eleven baseless suits, and
encouraged her son, a security guard, to shoot at other people.
RULING: Dasig should be disbarred. Dasig unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of CHED.
PENALTY: DISBARRED. Found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR.

Ramos v. Imbang
A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007, 530 SCRA 759 (2007)
DOCTRINE/RULING: Lawyers in government service cannot handle private case for they are
expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
FACTS: A lawyer accepted private cases despite being employed in PAO. He asked for money but
never proceeded with the case.
PENALTY: DISBARRED rom the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys.
“Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of
all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only
to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is
burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private
practice.”

Ramos v. Imbang
A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007, 530 SCRA 759 (2007)
“Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time
to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he
was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed
the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed
that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the
prohibition on private practice of profession.
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of
providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 14. . . .
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons
in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than
his salary.

RULE 6.03
NOT TO ACCEPT EMPLOYMENT AFTER GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio, Buffe
A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, Aug. 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 378 (2009)
DOCTRINE: The prohibitions in R.A. 6713 Sec. 7(b)(2) continue to apply for one year after the
public official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for
the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even
within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year
prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or
employee used to work with.
FACTS: Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of Romblon RTC. She resigned from her
position. However, within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned under R.A. 6713 Sec.
7(b)(2), she engaged in the private practice of law, appearing as private counsel in several cases
in the same court.
RULING: Atty. Buffe is guilty of misconduct for violating R.A. 6713. Sec. 7(b)(2) is not a blanket
authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law.
PENALTY: FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall
be dealt with more severely.

PCGG v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 526 (2005)
DOCTRINE: “Intervene” in Rule 6.03 only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings and it must not be insubstantial and insignificant.
FACTS: Since GENBANK failed to recover from financial difficulties and faced liquidation, Lucio Tan group
won the bid, in which former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation. PCGG filed motions to disqualify
Mendoza as counsel for Tan, et al. alleging that he “intervened” in the acquisition of GENBANK in his
capacity as then Solicitor General.
RULING: Mendoza did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The “matter” where he got
himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK
through the courts and in filing the necessary petition. However, the case does not involve the “adverse
interest” aspect. Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. What is prohibited is 'adverse-interest conflicts' where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.

Trovela v. Robles, et al.
A.C. No. 11550, June 4, 2018
DOCTRINE: IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate government lawyers charged with administrative offenses
involving the performance of their official duties.
FACTS: The complainant criminally charged Katigbak, Salonga, and Reyes with estafa. He stated that he became
Sky Cable’s Employee Relations Director and later received a termination letter signed by Salonga informing him
of his relief from work and of his compensation being paid until the effective date of his termination. He also
alleged that his payslips still reflected deduction of his savings contributions to the Meralco Employees Savings
and Loan Association but later discovered that such deductions were not remitted to MESALA when he closed his
account. Respondent as Prosecutor dismissed the complaint.
RULING: The acts complained of arose from Robles’ performance or discharge of official duties as prosecutors of
the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline Robles, Obuñgen, Ang and Arellano exclusively
pertained to their superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the authority to discipline
pertained to the President. In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which
similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1, of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). The accountability of Robles et al. as officials performing or
discharging their official duties as lawyers of the Government is always to be differentiated from their
accountability as members of the Philippine Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate them as such lawyers.

Ali v. Bubong
AC No. 4018, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 1 (2005)
DOCTRINE: Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may,
however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath as a member of
the legal profession.
FACTS: In a previous administrative case, Ali charged Bubong with illegal exaction; indiscriminate
issuance of TCT; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Bauidali Datu (Bubong’s relatives)
and others for violating the Anti-Squatting Law. Bubong was absolved of all charges brought against him.
However, upon review, DOJ Secretary Drilon found Bubong guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent
issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. As a result, he
recommended Bubong’s dismissal from service. In the now disbarment case, Ali claims that Bubong had
"proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney" and that he poses a
"serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession.”
RULING: Bubong’s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration
for the benefit of his relatives, Bubong had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar.

Huyssen v. Gutierrez
A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 244 (2006)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that while Gutierrez was still connected with BID, she and her sons, all American
citizens, applied for Philippine Visas. Gutierrez told Huyssen that in order that their visa applications will be
favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit money for one year which could be withdrawn after one
year. Believing that this was required by law, complainant deposited US$20,000. Gutierrez prepared
receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts but refused to give Huyssen copies of official receipts
despite demands. After one year, complainant demanded its return from Gutierrez. When Gutierrez failed to
return the sum, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a demand letter to
Gutierrez for the immediate return of the money. When Huyssen deposited postdated checks, these were
dishonored because Gutierrez stopped payment on the same. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was filed.
RULING: Said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his
office. Gutierrez’ conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
especially from one occupying a high public office.

PNB v. Cedo
A.C. No. 3701, March 28, 1995, 243 SCRA 1 (1995)
DOCTRINE: "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.“
FACTS: Complainant charged Atty. Cedo, former Assistant Vice-President of the Asset
Management Group of PNB, with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the CPR by appearing as
counsel for individuals who had transactions with PNB in which Cedo, during his employment
with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
RULING: Having been an executive of complainant bank, Cedo now seeks to litigate as counsel
for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he
formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests.
PENALTY: Suspension for 3 years.

THE LAWYER AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION

Canon 7
UPHOLD DIGNITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE PROFESSION

In re 1989 Elections of the IBP
B.M. No. 491, Oct. 6, 1989, 178 SCRA 398 (1989)
DOCTRINE: The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public’s esteem.
FACTS: The Supreme Court en banc suspended the oath-taking of the IPB officers-elect after
they received reports of electioneering and extravagance characterizing the campaign
conducted by the three candidates for presidency of the IBP after they gave free transportation,
food, lodging, and entertainment to delegates.
RULING: Atty. Drilon and others are guilty of vote-buying and/or bribing. The candidates and
many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the
ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to
obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal
processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system."

Fernandez v. Grecia
A.C. No. 3694, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 425 (1993)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice.” An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia
would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of justice.“
FACTS: Grecia is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft
pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients
against St. Luke’s and its doctors. Atty. Aves filed damages against the hospital after his wife’s
passing.
RULING: Grecia is guilty of grave misconduct. By descending to the level of a common thief,
Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral
unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his
membership in the Bar.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Arevalo
B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 209 (2005)
DOCTRINE: Membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer
continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the
IBP. Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt.
FACTS: Atty. Arevalo requested for the exemption from payment of the IPB dues, maintaining
that he cannot be assessed such dues for the years that he worked in the Philippine Civil Service
and neither can he be assessed for the years when he worked in the USA. He also claimed that
non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners nor to fellow lawyers in inactive status.
RULING: Atty. Arevalo is not entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time he
was inactive in the practice of law. Practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with
the regulations.

RULE 7.01
NO FALSE STATEMENT

In re Diao
A.C. No.244, March 29, 1963, 7 SCRA 475 (1963)
DOCTRINE: Passing the Bar examinations is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential.
FACTS: Diao was admitted to the Bar after passing the exam. However, he did not possess the
necessary qualifications, such as high school and college training. He claims that his joining the
US Army is equivalent to the completion of high school level.
RULING: Falsification of his college degree was evident. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it,
and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification
to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner
is equally essential.

RULE 7.02
NOT TO SUPPORT UNQUALIFIED BAR APPLICANT

RULE 7.03
NO CONDUCT ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE PROFESSION

Zaguirre v. Castillo
A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003, 398 SCRA 659 (2003)
DOCTRINE: Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the
standards of morality required of every lawyer.
FACTS: This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Castillo on the ground of
Gross Immoral Conduct. Castillo allegedly had an illicit relationship with a woman other than his
wife and sired a child with her. Castillo did not deny having an extra-marital affair with Zaguirre,
but argued that what happened between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire. He
claimed that he did not use any deception to win her affection.
RULING: Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of
morality required of every lawyer. Castillo repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman
not his wife and now refused to recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized
and promised to support. Clearly, he violated the standards of morality required of the legal
profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

Tapucar v. Tapucar
A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998, 293 SCRA 331 (1998)
DOCTRINE: Gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in one’s
character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the
integrity of the administration of justice in peril.
FACTS: Complainant sought the disbarment of her husband Atty. Tapucar on the ground of
continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Pena, with whom he begot 2
children and later on married.
RULING: Tapucar had already been charged four times previously for conduct unbecoming
despite being appointed as a CFI judge. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of time clearly
shows a serious flaw in respondent’s character, his moral indifference to scandal in the
community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the
need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.

Guevara v. Eala
A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007, 517 SCRA 600 (2007)
DOCTRINE: An illicit affair and sexual relations outside marriage manifests a deliberate disregard
of the sanctity and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. It is
a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics
of the legal profession.
FACTS: Atty. Eala had an adulterous relationship with Irene, Guevara’s wife. They were often
seen in public, exchanged love notes, had a child, and even lived together as husband and wife.
RULING: Eala should be disbarred. Since the illicit affair and sexual relations between Eala and
Irene was one that is outside marriage, it manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. It is a grossly immoral
conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of the legal
profession.

Advincula v. Macabata
A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 604 (2007)
DOCTRINE: For an attorney to be disbarred, he must commit a grossly immoral conduct. Mere
immoral conduct will only warrant a lighter penalty such as a reprimand.
FACTS: Atty. Macabata kissed Advincula on the cheek and hugged her tightly after a meeting. In
another instance, he allegedly forcefully held her, kissed her lips, and held her breast while
driving the complainant home. He immediately apologized to the complainant via text message
right after the incident.
RULING: Atty. Macabata is reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with
clients and is given a stern warning that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future. An immoral conduct is that which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Grossly immoral conduct, on the other hand, is an act that must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency.

Santos Jr. v. Llamas
DOCTRINE: Failure to pay IBP dues and misrepresentation in the pleadings filed in court violates the CPR.
FACTS: Atty. Santos alleged that Atty. Llamas for years had not indicated the proper PTR and IBP Official
Receipt Numbers and date and place of issuance in his pleadings. He only indicated "IBP Rizal 259060,"
but he had been using this for at least three years already. Rule 138, Section 1 qualifies that only a duly
admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law." Atty.
Llamas claimed that he publicly made it clear in his Income Tax Return that he had only a limited
practice of law and his principal occupation is farming. Being a senior citizen since 1992, he is legally
exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 in the payment of taxes. Thus, he honestly believed in
view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only a limited practice, the subsequent payment
by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. Nonetheless, despite such honest
belief, he was ready to tender such fulfillment on payment.
RULING: Llamas can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his
practice is "limited." However, by indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, Llamas is
guilty of violating the CPR.

Velez v. de Vera
A.C. No. 6697, B.M. No. 1227, A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 345
(2006)
DOCTRINE/RULING: Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not
prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly
legal acts in accomplishing such goal.
FACTS: Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. de Vera due to
the latter’s alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him
by the State Bar of California and his alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" when he
transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur. He claimed that the de Vera failed to meet the requirements in
the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the de Vera’s
transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Bar
Matter No. 1227 refers to de Vera's letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National
President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC is a letter-report of IBP President Cadiz removing de Vera as
member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the
IBP in general.

Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis
AC No. 10868, January 26, 2016
DOCTRINE/RULING: Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature
in a pleading merit the penalty of disbarment.
FACTS: Vasco-Tamaray filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the IBP, alleging that Atty. Daquis filed,
on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged
her signature on the Petition. She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray.
PENALTY: DISBARRED.

Tan v. Sabandal
B.M. No. 44, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 473 (1992)
DOCTRINE: Failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against a
lawyer during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration reveal one’s lack of
candor and truthfulness.
FACTS: The Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against Sabandal and denied
the latter’s petition to be allowed to take the oath and to sign the Rolls. Sabandal filed Motions for
Reconsideration and the Court allowed him to take the lawyer’s oath. However, before such oath-taking,
complainants objected and a Certification was made stating that there is a pending case before
Executive Judge Lachica’s Court involving Sabandal.
RULING: There are testimonials attesting to Sabandal’s good moral character, yes. But these were
confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously
made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the
Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of
dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

Tiong v. Florendo
A.C. No. 4428, December 11, 2011
DOCTRINE: Possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing
requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe
the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part
of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment.
FACTS: Tiong and his wife engaged Atty. Florendo’s services not only as legal counsel but also as administrator of their
businesses whenever Tiong would leave for USA. Tiong’s suspicion that Florendo and his wife were having an illicit affair was
confirmed when he chanced upon a telephone conversation between the two. When confronted, his wife initially denied any
amorous involvement with Florendo but eventually confessed to their love affair. Florendo likewise admitted the
relationship. Subsequently, Florendo and Tiong’s wife confessed anew to their illicit affair before their spouses. The parties
met again and, in the presence of a Notary Public, Florendo and Tiong’s wife executed and signed an affidavit attesting to
their illicit relationship and seeking their spouses' forgiveness. Notwithstanding, Tiong instituted the present suit for
disbarment charging Florendo of gross immorality and grave misconduct.
RULING: Florendo’s act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his
profession.
PENALTY: respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Immorality and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHSeffective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Canlapan v. Balayo
AC No. 10605, February 17, 2016
DOCTRINE: A lawyer’s display of improper attitude and arrogance toward an elderly constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the legal profession.
FACTS: Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference before Executive Labor Arbiter Del Valle in
connection with a money claim filed by Canlapan against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines —Mayon Council, Atty.
Balayo arrogantly threw his arm toward him while menacingly saying: "Even if you bring ten lawyers here, you will
not get what you want!" Balayo allegedly made this remark when Canlapan approached the Mayon Council
representatives and told them that he, not having been informed beforehand that Fajut, Chair of the Mayon
Council would bring a lawyer, was placed at a disadvantaged position because he had none. Canlapan was
allegedly taken aback and felt humiliated by Balayo’s actuation, which showed a blatant disrespect for the elderly
considering that Balayo was much younger.
RULING: Balayo violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins lawyers to uphold the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times.
PENALTY: Court finds Atty. William B. Balayo guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and violating Canon 1,
Canon 7, Rule 7.03, and Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month and WARNED that commission of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Canon 8
COURTESY, FAIRNESS, CANDOR TOWARDS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES

Bugaring v. Espanol
G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 687 (2001)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer’s primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct
which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty.
FACTS: In a hearing, Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his
documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to
submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the motion has so many ramifications and the
issues are complicated. While claiming that he was listening, Bugaring would speak up anytime he felt
like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Bugaring flared up and uttered
words insulting the Court, such as him being better than the Court.
RULING: Bugaring was properly cited in direct contempt of the Court for being rude and arrogant
towards the presiding judge. The Court noticed the sarcasm in Bugaring’s use of the phrase “your honor
please.” For, after using said phrase, he manifested utter disrespect to the Court in his subsequent
utterances. Surely, this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced if
proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings.

Bugaring v. Espanol
G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 687
(2001)
“Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case
of his client — by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge's
contrary order — he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the interest of his client to
the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA
645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed
under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons
of Professional Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He
should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon
10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons
(Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
such lawyer's duty."

Reyes v. Chiong
A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 212 (2003)
DOCTRINE: The bickering and the hostility of lawyers’ clients should not affect their conduct and rapport
with each other as professionals and members of the Bar.
FACTS: Atty. Reyes’ services were engaged by Xu who invested in a fishball business with Pan, another
Chinese-Taiwanese, who failed to establish the factory so Xu asked for his money back. Pan became
hostile, making it necessary for Xu to seek legal assistance. Pan did not attend any hearings, so Chiong
filed a case against him and his lawyer Reyes. Reyes alleged that there was no legal ground in impleading
him and that Chiong violated his oath of office and the CPR.
RULING: Chiong is found guilty and is suspended for two years from the practice of law. Lawyers should
treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of
their clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery.
PENALTY: Respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the
practice of law, effectively immediately.

RULE 8.01
NO ABUSIVE AND IMPROPER LANGUAGE

Dallong-Galicinao v. Castro
A.C. No. 6396, Octover 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 1 (2005)
DOCTRINE/RULING: Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to
uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each
other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.
“The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem
cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp
contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and
skills in the honorable performance of professional duty.”
FACTS: Atty. Castro hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court, declaring in Ilocano “Vulva of your mother! If
you are harboring ill feelings against my client, don’t turn your ire on me!” for not having been notified
of a requirement on a case in which he was not the counsel of record of either party.
PENALTY: Respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a
warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely.

Belo-Henares v. “Argee” Guevarra
A.C. No. 11394, 01 December 2016
DOCTRINE: When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the
reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but
also covers any misconduct, which — albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession — would show them to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.
FACTS: Guevarra wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account insulting and verbally abusing Belo-Henares. The complaint
further alleged that Guevarra posted remarks on his Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's
medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause.
Complainant likewise averred that some of Guevarra’s Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women.
RULING: Guevarra’s inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of
complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the provisions in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. That Belo-Henares is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who
is exposed to criticism does not justify Guevarra’s disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, Guevarra’s remarks against
Belo-Henares breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.
PENALTY: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Canlapan v. Balayo
A.C. No. 10605, 17 February 2016, 784 SCRA 135 (2016)
DOCTRINE: Ill feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed to influence counsels in their
conduct and demeanor towards each other or towards suitors in the case. As officers of the court and members
of the bar, lawyers are expected to be always above reproach.
FACTS: Complainant avers that at the mandatory conference before Executive Labor Arbiter Jose C. Del Valle, Jr.,
in connection with a money claim filed by complainant against the Boy Scouts of the Philippines — Mayon Albay
Council, Balayo arrogantly threw his arm toward the complainant while menacingly saying: "Even if you bring ten
lawyers here, you will not get what you want!“
RULING: Although the remark was allegedly made in response to undue provocation and pestering on the part of
complainant, Balayo should have exercised restraint. Notwithstanding his personal opinion on the merits of
complainant's claims (in light of the defective notarization in the Memorandum of Agreement), it was improper
for Balayo to state that even if complainant brought 10 (or as many) lawyers as he wanted, he would not prosper
in his claims against the Mayon Council. Careless remarks such as this tend to create and promote distrust in the
administration of justice, undermine the people's confidence in the legal profession, and erode public respect for
it.
PENALTY:court finds Atty. William B. Balayo guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and violating Canon 1,
Canon 7, Rule 7.03, and Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month and WARNED that commission of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

RULE 8.02
NOT TO ENCROACH ON PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT

Camacho v. Pangulayan
A.C. No. 4807, March 22, 2000, 328 SCRA 631 (2000)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but
should only deal with his counsel.
FACTS: A complaint was filed against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, herein
respondents. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and for Damages, charged that Pangulayan et al., then counsel for the
defendants, procured and effected, on separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise agreements with
four of his clients in a civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might had against
the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it.
Complainant averred that such an act of Pangulayan et al. was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession
warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
RULING: Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, Pangulayan proceeded, nonetheless, to
negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter of their lawyer,
Camacho, who was counsel of record in the case. Said failure of Pangulayan, whether by design or because of
oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to
a colleague. Pangulayan, according to the Court, fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and
member of the bar.
PENALTY: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS

Torres v. Javier
A.C. No. 5910, 21 September 2005, 470 SCRA 408 (2005)
DOCTRINE: In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language must be dignified and
choice of language is important in the preparation of pleadings. In the assertion of his client's rights, a
lawyer — even one gifted with superior intellect — is enjoined to rein up his temper.
FACTS: Charges stemmed from the statements/remarks made by Atty. Javier in the pleadings he filed in a
petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Association, as counsel for the therein
petitioners UEFA then Treasurer Laman, and his wife-former UEFA President Javier, before the BLR, DOLE
against herein complainants in an audit case, and from the pleadings filed by Javier in another labor case
as counsel for the one hundred seventy six faculty members of the University of the East complainants
against herein complainant Atty. Torres, et al. in an attorney's fees case.
RULING: Canon 8 of the CPR instructs that Javier’s arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both
the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman
to another. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

Alcantara v. Pefianco
A.C. No. 5398, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 247 (2002)
DOCTRINE: Canon 8 of CPR admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all
times.
FACTS: Atty. Alcantara, District Public Attorney of PAO in San Jose, Antique filed a complaint against Atty. Pefianco
for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and
attempting to assault complainant in the latter's office. In his Comment, Pefianco said that the sight of the crying
woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that
he resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee to put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys" from
hanging around in PAO.
RULING: Pefianco’s meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had
no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be settled.
Even so, Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to Pefianco, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
PENALTY: FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future
will be sanctioned more severely.

Sanchez v. Aguilos
AC No. 10543, March 16, 2016
DOCTRINE: In maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language — spoken
or in his pleadings — must be dignified.
FACTS: Sanchez sought Atty. Aguilos’ legal services to represent her in her marriage annulment. Aguilos
accepted the engagement was partially paid his fees. Aguilos told Sanchez that he would only start
working on the case upon her full payment. Sanchez learned that Aguilos contemplated to file for her a
petition for legal separation, not one for annulment of her marriage. Aguilos told her that she would
have to pay a higher acceptance fee for said annulment. Sanchez subsequently withdrew the case from
him and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had
already started working on the case.
RULING: Aguilos’ statement in his answer that the demand should be treated "as a mere scrap of paper
or should have been addressed by her counsel . . . to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may
service its rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct. He could have easily been respectful and
proper in responding to the letter.
PENALTY: FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client,
and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with
the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.

Sanchez v. Aguilos
AC No. 10543, March 16, 2016
“The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers
to use strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients. However, as members
of a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their clients'
cause, or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that
should not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language — spoken or in his pleadings —
must be dignified. As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the
administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his clients, the court
and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal Profession. AScHCD
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be
treated "as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel . . . to the urinal
project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct
that this Court cannot tolerate.”

Roque v. Balbin
A.C. No. 7088, December 4, 2018
DOCTRINE: “[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity[,] and
civility.”
FACTS: Complainant alleged that he was the plaintiff's counsel in a case. Shortly after securing a favorable
judgment for his client, Atty. Balbin — as counsel for the defendant, and on appeal — started intimidating,
harassing, blackmailing, and maliciously threatening complainant into withdrawing the case filed by his client.
According to complainant, Balbin would make various telephone calls and send text messages and e-mails not just
to him, but also to his friends and other clients, threatening to file disbarment and/or criminal suits against him.
Further, and in view of complainant's "high profile" stature, Balbin also threatened to publicize such suits in order
to besmirch and/or destroy complainant's name and reputation.
RULING: His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal processes available to him and his client, especially
considering that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass
them. The foregoing showed Balbin’s lack of respect and despicable behavior towards a colleague in the legal
profession, and constituted conduct unbecoming of a member thereof.
PENALTY: Atty. Rizal P. Balbin is found guilty of violating Canon 8, Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, Rule 12.04,
Canon 19, and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Roque v. Balbin
A.C. No. 7088, December 4, 2018
“Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute, and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the Bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. To this end, Canon 8 of
the CPR commands, to wit:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy,
dignity[,] and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon
their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must
treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence
counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified
recriminations[,] and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal
profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action."

Canon 9
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

Spouses Suarez v. Salazar
DOCTRINE: A person who misrepresents himself as a lawyer before the Court, appearing as
counsel despite not being a member of the Philippine Bar, is guilty of indirect contempt of Court.
FACTS: Manangan was found by the Court to be, in reality, Andres Culanag, who was not a
member of the Philippine Bar. Manangan appeared as counsel for Spouses Suarez in a case.
RULING: Manangan was guilty of indirect contempt of Court for misrepresenting himself as a
lawyer before the Court. He is sentenced to three months imprisonment.

Aguirre v. Rana
B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 342 (2003)
DOCTRINE: A Bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the Bar
examinations.
FACTS: It is alleged that Rana, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the
May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate.
RULING: Rana should not be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. Before one is admitted to the
Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal
learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit.
PENALTY: Respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

Alawi v. Alauya
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997, 268 SCRA 639 (1997)
DOCTRINE: While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney.“
FACTS: Alauya was the Executive Clerk of Court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City. Alauya,
through Alawi, had a contract with Villarosa & Co. for a purchase of a housing unit payable through
installments, for which Alauya obtained a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.
In all of his letters and correspondence, Alauya used the title “attorney.”
RULING: Alauya, as a member of the Shari’a Bar, cannot use the title of “attorney.” Alauya is
reprimanded. The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations.
PENALTY: REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e.,
language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any
similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

RULE 9.01
NOT TO DELEGATE WORK

RULE 9.02
NOT TO DIVIDE LEGAL FEES

Halili v. CIR
G.R. No. L-24864, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 113 (1985)
DOCTRINE: No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based
upon a division of service or responsibility. A lawyer shall not divide fees with non-lawyers.
FACTS: Atty. Pineda was one of the three counsels for the Halili case, wherein Union won against
Halili’s estate, which was handled by J.C. Espinas & Associates where Pineda was employed.
However, Pineda used the firm name B.C. Pineda & Associates, giving the impression that he was
principal counsel to receive a bigger share of the legal fees with the union heads.
RULING: Pineda should be cited for indirect contempt of court and is sentenced to
imprisonment.
PENALTY: SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT IN THE MANILA CITY JAIL UNTIL THE ORDERS OF THIS
COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 1 AND SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 ARE COMPLIED WITH.

Lijuaico v. Terrado
A.C. No. 6317, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 301 (2006)
DOCTRINE/RULING: A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.
FACTS: Complainant engaged Terrado’s services to recover P180,000 deposited in Planters
Development Bank and certain foreclosed properties for P70,000. Complainant alleged that
Terrado failed to appear before trial in court and did not protect her interests. Moreover, he
shared the legal fee with other non-lawyers as “referral fees.”
PENALTY:Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with
more severely.

THE LAWYER AND THE
COURTS

Canon 10
OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH

Ting Dumali v. Torres
A.C. No. 5161, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 108 (2004)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted
the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. He should make himself more an exemplar for
others to emulate. He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such unbecoming act or
conduct.
FACTS: Ting-Dumali charges Atty. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent
to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such
forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.
RULING: Torres’ acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the
legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended.
PENALTY: Respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer's
oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the
practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

RULE 10.01
TRUTHFULNESS TOWARDS THE COURT

Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis
AC No. 10868, January 26, 2016
DOCTRINE: For a lawyer to allow a forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and
notarized constitutes violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01.
FACTS: Vasco-Tamaray filed a Complaint-Affidavit before IBP alleging that Atty. Daquis filed, on
her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her
signature on the Petition. She also alleged thatDaquis signed the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray.
RULING: Daquis violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she allowed the use
of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and notarized. While there is no evidence to
prove that Daquis forged complainant's signature, the fact remains that Daquis allowed a forged
signature to be used on a petition she prepared and notarized.
PENALTY: The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis.

Young v. Batuegas
A.C. No. 5379, May 9, 2003, 403 SCRA 123 (2003)
DOCTRINE: While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. To knowingly allege an
untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn.
FACTS: Complainant is private prosecutor in a criminal case for murder pending before the RTC, while Atty.
Batuegas and Atty. Llantino serve as counsel for accused. Batuegas et al. filed a Manifestation with Motion for
Bail, alleging that the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and is now under detention.
Respondent Susa, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, calendared the motion despite irregularity and other formal
defects including lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and
failure to attach the Certificate of Detention.
RULING: Batuegas et al. are guilty of deliberate falsehood. They craftily concealed the truth by alleging that
accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. Such artifice was a
deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement
of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they
resorted to deception.
PENALTY: Respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing
deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

RULE 10.02
NOT TO MISQUOTE OR MISREPRESENT CONTENTS OF PAPER

Insular Life Employees Co. v. Insular Life
Association
G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244 (1971)
DOCTRINE: It is the bounden duty of courts, judges, and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same
word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark.
FACTS: A Judge misquoted a previous decision by paraphrasing the same.
RULING: The Court did not warrant an indictment against the Judge and Insular Life
Association’s counsels since the meaning is substantially the same.

Insular Life Employees Co. v. Insular Life
Association
G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244 (1971)
“Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and
rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same
word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and
salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all
other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions
referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only
those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs.
Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish
jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not
faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be
misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check
and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from
other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and
punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as
be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.”

Hipos, Sr. v. Bay
G.R. Nos. 174813-15, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 674
DOCTRINE: Putting the words "underscoring ours" after the text implies that, except for the
underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the original, in violation of Rule 10.02.
FACTS: In a petition for mandamus in hearings for the crime of rape, the counsel’s lawyer made
quotations that were intentionally altered by the counsel and Hipos to make it appear that the
denial by Judge Bay of the Motion to Withdraw runs counter to the abovementioned
precedents.
RULING: Counsel’s use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make
it appear that the passages are the exact words of the Court.
Atty. Beltran ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for his disquieting conduct as herein discussed.

Re: Letter of the U.P. Law Faculty, A.M. No.
10-10-4-SC
October 19, 2010, 633 SCRA 418 (2010); March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 543 (2011), June 7,
2011
DOCTRINE: When lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession,
and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered,
especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision's reconsideration.
FACTS: Members of UP College of Law faculty published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the
Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. While the statement was meant to reflect the educators' opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed
dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo's explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary
conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
RULING: The legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against
lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents' invocation of academic
freedom. It is precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mold the minds of young aspiring
attorneys that respondents' own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of
intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
PENALTY: These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to
observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

In the Matter of charges of Plagiarism
against Assoc. Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011, 642 SCRA 11 (2011)
DOCTRINE: Plagiarism is the "deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original
ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.“
FACTS: Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo is charged with a case of plagiarism for failing to
cite the foreign sources from which he derived lengthy passages in a case he penned (Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary).
RULING: Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition. To
plagiarize, says Webster, is "to steal and pass off as one’s own" the ideas or words of another.
Stealing implies malicious taking. Black’s Law Dictionary, the world’s leading English law
dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing
presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own."

Cf. Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
DOCTRINE/RULING: The Executive Department has the sole prerogative to decide matters with
regards to foreign relations. Thus, it is a political question.
FACTS: Vinuya et al. are members of the MALAYA LOLAS, an organization established to provide
aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World
War. Since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against Japanese officials and military officers.
However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist Vinuya et al. and took the
position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been
fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

RULE 10.03
OBSERVE RULES OF PROCEDURE

Cobb-Perez v. Lantin
24 SCRA 291, July 29, 1968 (1968)
DOCTRINE: It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the
law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden
duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.
FACTS: It was alleged that petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, abetted by their counsel, for
the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and
executory. Herein movants Atty. Baizas and Bolinao, counsels for Cobb-Perez et al., seek reconsideration of the
decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their “professional conduct” and condemns them to pay the treble
costs adjudged against their clients.
RULING: A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged
and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to
his client; its primacy is indisputable.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.

Masinsin v. Albano
G.R. No. 86421, May 31, 1994, 232 SCRA 631 (1994)
DOCTRINE: Any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for
both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power.
FACTS: Masinsin et al., with the assistance of counsel, tried for four times to nullify the same
MTC decision before different branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes.
RULING: The utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate
intent of Masinsin et al. to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long
become final and executory.
PENALTY: Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar
infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with most severely.

In re Lozano
A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC & 10-9-9-SC, March 20, 2012 (not in SCRA)
DOCTRINE: Professional misconduct involving the misuse of constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting
Members of this Court is a serious breach of the rigid standards that a member of good standing of the legal
profession must faithfully comply with. While this Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will not
prolong a penalty after it has been shown that the purpose for imposing it had already been served.
FACTS: Atty. Lozano and Atty. Lozano-Endriano were found guilty of grave professional misconduct when they
misquoted or misused constitutional provisions in their pleadings in order to impute unjust acts to members of
this Court. In our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we found Atty. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline Lozano-Endriano guilty
of grave professional misconduct when they misquoted or misused constitutional provisions in their pleadings in
order to impute unjust acts to members of this Court. Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension was imposed
RULING: In the past two years during which Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly expressed his
willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and standards in the practice of law, and to serve the ends of
justice if he should be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not been informed of any act that would
indicate that Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a member of the bar. LIFT the
indefinite suspension from the practice of law of Atty. Oliver Lozano is LIFTED and he is REINSTATED to the
status of a member in good standing in so far as the suspension imposed him by this Court is concerned.

Canon 11
RESPECT COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS

In re Sotto
82 Phil 595 (1949)
DOCTRINE/RULING: It is within the power of the courts to punish anyone who maligns the judiciary.
Being a member of the Bar, he had the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court, not
undermine it.
FACTS: Sotto made imputations of incompetence against the SC and said that the only way to remedy
such is to replace all its members.
PENALTY: Court find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the
above-quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the
promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show cause to this Court
why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this
Republic, for said publication and the following statements made by him during the pendency of the
case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.

Floran v. Ediza
A.C. No. 5325, 09 February 2016
DOCTRINE: Court resolutions should not be construed as mere requests from the Court. They should be
complied with promptly and completely.
FACTS: Spouses Floran filed a Complaint/Affidavit against Atty. Ediza for deceiving complainants when he
asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to him. When the sale of
complainants' land pushed through, Ediza received half of the amount of the proceeds given by the buyer and
falsely misled complainants into thinking that he would register, using the same proceeds, the remaining
portion of their land. More than four years since the Court promulgated its Decision, Ediza has yet to comply
with the Court's directives.
RULING: The intentional delay and utter refusal to abide with the Court's orders is a great disrespect to the
Court which cannot be tolerated. Ediza willfully left unheeded all the warnings imposed upon him, despite the
earlier six-month suspension that was meted out to him for his administrative liability. The failure of Ediza to
comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his character, but also disrespect for the Court's lawful orders
and directives.
PENALTY: respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza, having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN OFF
the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

PHILCONSAT Holdings Corp. v. Lokin, Jr. & Labastilla
AC No. 11139, April 19, 2016
DOCTRINE: As members of the Bar, respondents should not perform acts that would tend to undermine and/or
denigrate the integrity of the courts.
FACTS: The Senate conducted an investigation concerning the anomalies that plagued the PHILCOMSAT group of
companies, which includes complainant, particularly in its huge disbursements of monies and/or assets. The
Senate examined various financial records and documents of the company, which at that time, were under the
control and management of Atty. Lokin, Jr. and his co-directors. It was discovered that a check was issued in
connection with complainant's injunction case against Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
before the Sandiganbayan, which was filed by Atty. Lokin, Jr.'s group with Atty. Labastilla as its external counsel
(POTC case). As the investigation was publicized by the media, the Sandiganbayan learned about the subject
checkbook entry and, accordingly, motu proprio initiated indirect contempt proceedings against respondents,
along several others.
RULING: As members of the Bar, respondents should not perform acts that would tend to undermine and/or
denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as the subject checkbook entry which contumaciously imputed
corruption against the Sandiganbayan. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and officers of the court to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution;
without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.
PENALTY: Respondents Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. and Atty. Sikini C. Labastilla are found GUILTYof violating Canons 7
and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Sikini C. Labastilla is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon the receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

RULE 11.01
PROPER ATTIRE

Supreme Court Resolution in Falcis III vs.
Civil Registrar General
G. R. No. 217910, July 3, 2018
DOCTRINE: An officer of the court is duty bound to maintain towards this Court a respectful attitude essential to the
proper administration of justice.
FACTS: Considering that Atty. Falcis was attired with a casual jacket, cropped jeans and loafers without socks, Associate
Justice Leonen directed him to show cause why he should not be cited in direct contempt for his failure to observe the
required decorum during the preliminary conference which is a formal session of the Court.
RULING: Atty. Falcis is not an uninformed layperson. He has been a member of the Philippine Bar for a number of years. As
an officer of the court, he is duty bound to maintain towards this Court a respectful attitude essential to the proper
administration of justice. He is charged with knowledge of the proper manner by which lawyers are to conduct themselves
during judicial proceedings.
This Court finds petitioner Atty. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III, his co-counsels Atty. Darwin P. Angeles, Atty. Keisha Trina M.
Guangko, Atty. Christopher Ryan R. Maranan, as well as intervenor-oppositor Atty. Fernando P. Perito,
all GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Atty. Falcis is sentenced to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice. Atty. Angeles,
Atty. Guangko, Atty. Maranan, and Atty. Perito are REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be more circumspect of their
duties as counsel. They are STERNLY WARNED that any further contemptuous acts shall be dealt with more severely.

RULE 11.02
PUNCTUALITY

RULE 11.03
PROPER LANGUAGE AND BEHAVIOR

In re Almacen
G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562 (1970)
DOCTRINE: Unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts and subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
FACTS: After losing the appeal, Atty. Almacen wrote a petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title
to the court and likewise posted it in a newspaper. He stated that there was no point in becoming a
lawyer if the Supreme Court commits great injustice and that his clients had become one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy – that is, the Supreme Court.
RULING: Lawyers may feel frustrated by decisions of the Court, that is why lawyers are given 'wide
latitude to differ with, and voice out their disapproval. However, it is the cardinal condition of all
criticism that it shall be in good faith, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
PENALTY: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders,
the suspension to take effect immediately.

Baculi v. Battung
A.C. No. 8920, September 28, 2011, 698 SCRA 209 (2011)
DOCTRINE: Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and avowed duty to
the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule, demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he
represents.
FACTS: Judge Baculi claimed that during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of a civil case,
Atty. Battung was shouting while arguing his motion. Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but
instead, Battung shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct
contempt, the Battung shouted, "Then cite me!" Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine
of P100.00. Battung then left. While other cases were being heard, the Battung re-entered the
courtroom and shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of you!"
RULING: A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter's role, stature
and position in our justice system. When Battung publicly berated and brazenly threatened Baculi that
he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the Battung effectively acted in a
manner tending to erode the public confidence in Baculi's competence and in his ability to decide cases.
PENALTY: Atty. Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective
upon the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

Pantanosas, Jr. v. Pamatong
A.C. No. 7330, June 14, 2016
DOCTRINE: Lawyers have the right, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. 56
However, closely linked to such rule is the cardinal condition t hat criticisms, no matter how
truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
FACTS: Respondent Pamatong filed motion/demand for inhibition against Complainant Presiding
Judge with the remarks “I never encountered a Judge who appears to be as corrupt as you are,
thereby giving me the impression that you are a disgrace to the Judicial System of this land who
does not deserved (sic) to be a member of the Philippine Bar at all”. A disbarment case was later
filed against respondent for the language employed in the motion.
RULING: For inserting slanderous remarks in public record, respondent failed to conduct himself
with good fidelity towards the courts. Even granting that the bribery charges were true, such
personal attacks against the person of complainant Pantanosas should have been reserved for a
different forum and certainly not included in a motion filed before a court of law. Atty. Pamatong
is suspended from practice of law for two years.

RULE 11.04
NOT TO ATTRIBUTE TO JUDGE MOTIVES

Embido v. Pe, Jr.
A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013, 708 SCRA 1 (2013)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is
guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.
FACTS: Atty. Pe falsified the decision rendered by Judge Penuela in a Special Proceedings case in
favor of Quioyo. When the Solicitor of UK requested the RTC where the said case was
purportedly decided, the court discovered that the decision submitted to the UK court was
falsified. The real Special Proceedings case was entirely different.
RULING: Pe, Jr. was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the
decision in a non-existent court proceeding.

RULE 11.05
GRIEVANCES AGAINST JUDGE

Maceda v. Vasquez
G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)
DOCTRINE: Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.
FACTS: Abiera filed a case in the Ombudsman alleging that Maceda falsified his certificate of
service for January, which stated that all civil and criminal cases were decided, when there were
in fact no decision in fifteen cases, as well as for seventeen other months. The Ombudsman
denied Maceda’s motions to refer to the Court as well as his motion for reconsideration.
RULING: The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case, and should have deferred action to
the Court.

Pantanosas v. Pamatong
A.C. 7330, 14 June 2016
DOCTRINE: Lawyers should refrain from attributing to a judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to
the case. Lawyers must always remain vigilant against unscrupulous officers of the law. However, the purification of our
justice system from venal elements must not come at the expense of decency, and worse, the discrediting of the very system
that it seeks to protect.
FACTS: Pantanosas was the presiding judge of RTC Cagayan de Oro. Atty. Pamatong was the counsel of plaintiffs in a civil case
then pending before the RTC. During the hearing, Pamatong was allegedly asked by Pantanosas to remove his copia (a hat
worn by Muslims) in open court. Pamatong requested to be exempted allegedly due to religious grounds and
embarrassment towards his "bald pate." Pantanosas obliged with a caveat that at the next hearing, he would no longer
tolerate the wearing of the copia inside the courtroom. Pamatong filed an Extremely Urgent Motion/Demand for Inhibition
or Recusal. Pantanosas issued an Order refuting all allegations of abusive language and corruption and denying the Motion
for Inhibition for lack of basis while ordering respondent Pamatong to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt of
court. Pantanosas filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Pamatong for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct by
supposedly causing the publication of an alleged bribe in a local newspaper and maliciously imputing motives to
complainant Pantanosas, thereby casting dishonor to and distrust in the judicial system.
RULING: As counsel for the plaintiffs, it was incumbent upon Pamatong to observe and maintain respect towards the judicial
office then being occupied by Pantanosas. Instead of insisting on similar conduct from his clients, Pamatong was the first to
cast doubt on the impartiality and independence of the court. A news article detailing the events that precipitated the
bribery charge against complainant Pantanosas was published with the participation of Pamatong. Pamatong had no reason
to divulge his grievances before the public as he had already lodged a complaint against complainant Pantanosas with the
OCA.

A.C. 7330, 14 June 2016
RULING: As counsel for the plaintiffs, it was incumbent upon Pamatong to observe and maintain
respect towards the judicial office then being occupied by Pantanosas. Instead of insisting on
similar conduct from his clients, Pamatong was the first to cast doubt on the impartiality and
independence of the court. A news article detailing the events that precipitated the bribery
charge against complainant Pantanosas was published with the participation of Pamatong.
Pamatong had no reason to divulge his grievances before the public as he had already lodged a
complaint against complainant Pantanosas with the OCA.
PENALTY: SUSPENSIONfrom the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this
Decision with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more
severe sanction.

Guerrero v. Villamor
G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989, 179 SCRA 355 (1989)
DOCTRINE: Lawyers should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers and . . . (to) insist on similar conduct by others." This respectful
attitude towards the court is to be observed, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." And it is "through a scrupulous
preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance of the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers . . .“
FACTS: Guerrero et al. were found guilty of indirect contempt and sentenced to imprisonment and a fine
for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous
language before the court.
RULING: The statements are merely descriptive of therein plaintiffs cause of action based on his reaction
to what he perceived as a willful infliction of injury on him by therein defendant judge. Strong words
were used to lay stress on the gravity and degree of moral anguish suffered by petitioner Carlos as a
result of the dismissal of the subject criminal cases to justify the award of damages being sought.

Bueno v. Rañeses
DOCTRINE: The Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the
public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by
unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.
FACTS: Bueno hired and paid Atty. Rañeses to represent her. Rañeses asked an additional amount to be divided
between him and the judge hearing the case. After giving the same, Rañeses asked for another amount. Bueno
discovered that the trial court required Rañeses to comment on the evidence and to submit their memorandum, but
Rañeses failed to comply. Bueno asked Rañeses about what happened but the latter told her that he had not received
any decision. Bueno discovered that Rañeses actually received a copy of the decision. When she confronted Rañeses,
he simply denied any knowledge. Bueno related another instance where Rañeses asked his client for money to win a
case.
RULING: He extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is false because no
bribery apparently took place as Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the
exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression
that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means — a decidedly black mark against the
Judiciary. Last but not the least, Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary
proceedings.
PENALTY: Respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, ||| (Bueno v. Rañeses,
Adm. Case No. 8383, [December 11, 2012], 700 PHIL 817-828)

Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on
Corruption in the Judiciary
A.M. No. 13-11-09-SC, Resolution, dated 12 August 2014
DOCTRINE: As a member of the Bar, one is under the obligation to maintain at all times a
respectful attitude toward the courts.
FACTS: The Court required Atty. Kapunan to submit an explanation because, in an interview
before a nationwide television audience, she made unwarranted remarks which tended to erode
public trust and confidence in the judiciary. She made unfounded insinuations that some
members of the judiciary can easily be bribed at the expense of justice.
RULING: Kapunan should be reminded that comments made against the courts must not go
beyond the bounds of courtesy and fairness in order not to destroy the people's trust in the
judicial system.

Soriano and Padilla v. CA
G.R. No. 100633 and G.R. No. 101550, August 28, 2001, 363 SCRA 725 (2001)
DOCTRINE: Unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in the courts, or creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration is proscribed.
FACTS: Reyes filed a complaint against Soriano alleging two causes of action. RTC granted Socorro's motion to dismiss
with respect to the first cause of action because of the pendency of an ejectment case between the same parties, but
denied the same insofar as the second cause of action was concerned. It denied the motion to inhibit filed by Atty.
Padilla. It granted the "Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint" filed by the Reyeses. It denied the Motion to
Dismiss the Supplemental Complaint filed by Soriano. RTC ordered the Reyeses to pay the deficiency and it was
faithfully complied. Padilla filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration for Various Orders of the Trial Court," but it
was denied. During the pre-trial conference, Soriano and Padilla did not appear. Later, Soriano was declared in default
and Padilla was adjudged guilty of direct contempt. Thus, they filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
mandamus. The CA dismissed the petition except the Orders pertaining to the supplemental complaint.
RULING: Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of
chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language. While judges
must exercise patience, lawyers must also observe temperate language as well. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 20236, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the trial court's order finding Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr.
guilty ofdirect contempt of court and imposing on him imprisonment for five (5) days, and ordering him to pay a
fine of one hundred pesos (P100.00) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. With admonition to the trial court and counsel to
observe strictly the strictures of the ethics of the profession.

G.R. No. 100633 and G.R. No. 101550, August 28,
2001, 363 SCRA 725 (2001)
After a perusal of the charges of direct contempt of court, we find that Atty. Padilla's
innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court as to be considered contumacious. A
lawyer's remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do not necessarily assume
the level of contempt that justifies the court to exercise the power of contempt. Courts must be
slow to punish for direct contempt. This drastic power must be used sparingly in cases of clearly
contumacious behavior in facie curiae. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for
contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective
and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for
contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not
for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
Lawyers may not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment,
because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language. While judges must exercise patience, lawyers must also observe
temperate language as well.

G.R. No. 100633 and G.R. No. 101550, August 28,
2001, 363 SCRA 725 (2001)
A lawyer is an officer of the Court, bound by the law. It is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. It is peculiarly incumbent for
lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor."
It may happen that counsel possesses a greater knowledge of the law than the judge who presides over the court.
It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decision. Nevertheless,
discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly
administration of justice. Malicious attacks on courts have some cases been treated as libel, in other cases as
contempt of court, and as a sufficient ground for disbarment. However, mere criticism or comment on the
correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated.
This is not to say that courts are above criticism. As a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer may criticize
the court. He must do so in a bona fide manner, uberrima fides. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of the courts and of the judges thereof on the other. Unnecessary language
which jeopardizes high esteem in the courts, or creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration is
proscribed.

Lacurom v. Jacoba
A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 206 (2006)
DOCTRINE: Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to
promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.
FACTS: The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Veneracion in a civil case for unlawful detainer
against defendant Barrientos. MTC Cabanatuan ruled in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the RTC.
The case was raffled to the branch where Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge. Lacurom reversed the earlier
judgments in favor of Veneracion. Veneracion's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Lacurom
ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for
the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of such motion.
RULING: The language contained in the motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his
client's cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity,
horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial
process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created "a cacophonic picture of total and utter
disrespect.”
PENALTY: Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this
Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon
finality of this Decision.

Canon 12
ASSIST IN SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

RULE 12.01
& RULE 18.02
ADEQUATE PREPARATION

RULE 12.02
FORUM SHOPPING

RULE 12.03
NOT TO DELAY CAUSE

Chua v. Castro
AC No. 10671, November 25, 2015
DOCTRINE: "Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of
justice contravenes such lawyers['] duty.”
FACTS: Chua sought the disbarment of Atty. De Castro for his capricious and continuous unethical
practice of law in deliberately delaying, impeding and obstructing the administration of justice in his
strategy for the defense of his client. Chua alleged that, since the filing of the collection case, it took
more than five years to present one witness due to De Castro's propensity to seek postponements of
agreed hearing dates for unmeritorious excuses. When the trial court required De Castro to explain why
he should not be held in contempt for such delays, he belatedly made his explanation, further
contributing to the delay of the proceedings.
RULING: De Castro failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law and
justice. He showed his great propensity to disregard court orders. His acts of wantonly employing
dilatory tactics show an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession.
PENALTY: Atty. Arturo M. De Castro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE
(3) MONTHS effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.

Bergonia v. Merrera
A.C. No. 5024, February 20, 2003 (2003)
DOCTRINE: Those who file motions for extension in bad faith misuse the legal process, obstruct justice,
and thus become liable to disciplinary action. A lawyer who requests an extension must do so in good
faith and with a genuine intent to file the required pleading within the extended period.
FACTS: Atty. Merera is Bergonia’s counsel in a civil case appealed to the Court of Appeals. When required
to file appellant's brief, twice he motioned and twice he was granted extensions of time to comply with
the Order. Merera, however, failed to abide by the given deadline. Hence, as complainant's appeal was
dismissed, complainant filed the instant administrative case.
RULING: Merera was negligent in the performance of his duties as counsel for complainant, and his
negligence was inexcusable. Merera alleged that he found complainant's case futile. He should have
promptly informed and dissuade complainant, or withdraw the appeal instead of filing several motions
for extension of time to file the appellant's brief.
PENALTY: Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera is hereby found guilty of violating Canons 12 and 18 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
from receipt of this Decision.

RULE 12.05
TO RULE 12.07
PROPER BEHAVIOR

RULE 12.08
NOT TO TESTIFY ON BEHALF OF CLIENT

PNB v. Uy Teng Piao
57 Phil 337 (1932)
DOCTRINE/RULING: Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the
same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness
unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case.
FACTS: One of PNB’s attorneys testified that Uy Teng Piao renounced his right to redeem a
parcel of land because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it.

Saa v. IBP-CBD
G.R. No. 132826 September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 6 (2009)
DOCTRINE: The delay of the resolution of the case is a clear violation of the CPR.
FACTS: In a complaint for disbarment, Saa stated that Atty. Venida's act of filing two cases against him
was oppressive and constituted unethical practice. Despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, Venida
still did not file his complete comment within 10 days as required in the resolution. When Venida filed
his full comment, this was, without a doubt, a mere reiteration of his partial comment.
RULING: We strongly disapprove of Venida's blatant refusal to comply with various court directives. As a
lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders and processes. Yet, he disregarded this very
important canon of legal ethics when he filed only a partial comment 11 months after being directed to
do so. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on a little over three years after due date.
PENALTY: or violation of Canons 1 and 12 and Rules 1.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the lawyer’s oath, Atty. Freddie A. Venida is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is
further STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

Canon 13
REFRAIN FROM ACT GIVING APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCE

Nestle Phil. v. Sanchez
DOCTRINE: The Court will not hesitate to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt
those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending
before it.
FACTS: Contempt charges were filed against unions conducting pickets in front of the Supreme
Court building.
RULING: The Court ruled that the acts were contemptuous but accepted their apology and
dismissed the same. However, it warns that it will not hesitate in future similar situations to
punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other
in any case pending before it.

Perez v. Estrada
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001, 360 SCRA 248 (2001)
DOCTRINE: “A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of a public character.”
FACTS: The Secretary of Justice stresses the right of the people and the press to allow for a live
media broadcast of Estrada’s plunder cases before the Sandiganbayan.
RULING: The Court denies this motion with finality. However, considering the significance of the
trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the
records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the
proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary
purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have
promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be
deposited in the National Museum and in the Records Management and Archives Office for
historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.

RULE 13.01
NO EXTRAORDINARY ATTENTION

RULE 13.02
NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO MEDIA

Foodsphere, Inc. v. Mauricio
A.C. No 7199, July 22, 2009, 593 SCRA 367 (2009)
DOCTRINE: Every lawyer must act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, which confidence may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar.
FACTS: Despite the pendency of civil cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining or enjoining further publishing, televising, and broadcasting of any relative matter to
the complaint of CDO (Foodsphere, Inc.), Atty. Mauricio continued with his attacks against
Foodsphere and its products, following an incident of which he wasn’t part where worms were
found inside a can of liver spread produced by Foodsphere.
RULING: On reading the articles Mauricio published, not to mention listening to him over the
radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain
extent, have affected the sales of complainant.

RULE 13.03
NOT TO INVITE OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE

Maglasang v. People
G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990, 190 SCRA 306 (1990)
DOCTRINE: “While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the
maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and
innuendo.”
FACTS: Castellano was counsel for Magsalang. He filed for certiorari before the Supreme Court in
the case of Magsalang v. People but failed to comply with requirements regarding petitions sent
by mail. The Court denied the petition for certiorari. Aggrieved, Castellano wrote a
letter-complaint to the Office of the President claiming, in colourful language, that the Court
dismissed the case of his client unjustly.
RULING: Castellano should know that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the
records before it and not to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates. As an officer
of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of the Court
just to keep the confidence of his client.

In re de Vera
DOCTRINE: In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections,
the Court defines moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals." The determination of whether an act involves moral
turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation
of the statute.

In re de Vera
FACTS: Petitioner lawyers Garcia, Ravanera and Velez filed a petition seeking the disqualification of De Vera from
being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th IBP Regional Governor's Elections. Garcia is the
Vice-President of Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while Ravanera and Velez are the past president and the incumbent
President of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Petitioners contended that De Vera’s transfer from Pasay,
Parañaque, Las Piñas and Muntinlupa Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter is a brazen abuse and misuse of the
rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern Mindanao for it implied
that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP. Petitioners also submitted that De
Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude for the position. According to petitioners, De Vera was previously
sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the
deliberations of the plunder law. They further alleged that De Vera could have been disbarred in the United States
for misappropriating his client's funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law. De Vera
argued that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy contending that the election of the officers
of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely
an internal matter governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. De
Vera also averred that an IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter or transfer his chapter
membership under Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws. He also stressed that the
right to transfer membership is also recognized in Section 4, 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same
as the first of the above-quoted provision of the IBP By-Laws.

In re de Vera
RULING: De Vera was previously found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a
fine for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. De Vera
admitted to have made said statements but denied to have uttered the same "to degrade the
Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute." He explained that he was
merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech. The Court found
the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at influencing and
threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. The ruling
cannot serve as a basis to consider De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of
indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude. In this case, it cannot be said that the act of
expressing one's opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity. De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the
public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of De Vera's alleged immorality.

Cruz v. Salva
G.R. No. L-12871 105 Phil 115 (1959)
DOCTRINE: It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being
investigated by the authorities, even when it is being tried in court; but when said publicity and
sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this
Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a
deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to
the one liable.

Cruz v. Salva
G.R. No. L-12871 105 Phil 115 (1959)
FACTS: Persons were accused following the killing of Monroy. Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo and others
were found guilty of murder and were sentenced to death. Pending appeal, President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation.
Intelligence agents and Malacañang investigators obtained a confession pointing to other persons as the real killers. Counsel
for Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation on the basis of the affidavits and
confessions obtained by those who had investigated the case at Malacañang’s instance. The Secretary of Justice decided to
have the investigation results made available to appellants’ counsel. Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation. However,
the investigation was conducted not in Salva’s office but in the session hall of Pasay City Municipal Court evidently, to
accommodate the big crowd that wasted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of
microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures.
RULING: The newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation, and this
involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as
vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for
the killing of Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal
and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent placet and
complaisance of Salva.
PENALTY: Salva is publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had
given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court; and,
furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty.

THE LAWYER AND THE
CLIENT

Canon 14
SERVICE TO THE NEEDY

RULE 14.01
AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES REGARDLESS OF STATUS

RULE 14.02
PROVIDING COUNSEL DE OFICIO

RULE 14.03
VALID GROUND FOR REFUSAL

RULE 14.04
SAME STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR PAYING AND NON-PAYING CLIENTS

Canon 15
OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, LOYALTY

RULE 15.01
& RULE 15.03
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Hornilla v. Salunat
A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 220
(2003)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the
same corporation's board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them.
FACTS: Complainants, who are members of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA), filed a case against the members of its Board of Directors before the SEC. PPSTA
retained as counsel, the ASSA Law Firm, of which Atty. Salunat is the managing partner. Salunat
subsequently acted as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors of the PPSTA in
the said case.
RULING: Salunat was guilty of conflict of interest, which is prohibited by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the
PPSTA, filed suit.
PENALTY: ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.
Further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Gonzales v. Cabucana
DOCTRINE: A lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
FACTS: Gonzales won a civil case in which she was represented by the Cabucana, Cabucana, De Guzman, and
Cabucana Law Office. Gonzales filed an administrative complaint and criminal cases against Sheriff Gatcheco and his
wife for failure to implement the writ of execution and threats made against her. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.,
member of the law firm and brother of Atty. Edmar Cabucana, agreed to become the lawyer for the Gatchecos in the
administrative and criminal cases. This caused Gonzales to file a disbarment case against him.
RULING: The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at
the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow. Lawyers are expected not only to
keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation
would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
PENALTY:respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is FINED the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a
STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Gonzales v. Cabucana
A.C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 320
(2006)
“The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not
exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.
In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is
willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be instances where
lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest
between a present client and a prospective one. Granting also that there really was no other
lawyer who could handle the spouses’ case other than him, still he should have observed the
requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as
soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek
the written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. These respondent failed
to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.”

Heirs of Falame v. Baguio
A.C. No. 6876, March 7, 2008, 548 SCRA 1 (2008)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.
FACTS: Atty. Baguio represented two parties in two different cases. However, the party he represented in
the first case became the party he was opposing in the second case.
RULING: The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that
representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. The test is whether, on
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to contest for that which his duty to another client requires
him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will develop. The rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. The rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.
PENALTY: Respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and
meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in
the practice of his profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be

Heirs of Falame v. Baguio
A.C. No. 6876, March 7, 2008, 548 SCRA 1 (2008)
“The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be
directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a
client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. In the course
of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and
strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree.
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or
in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere
expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything
which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most unquestioned duty
is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does
not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civil
case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it was
only Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David tells us that it is immaterial whether such employment was
paid, promised or charged for.”

Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.
A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 77 (2012)
DOCTRINE: "The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action." The prohibition also applies
even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for
the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.”
FACTS: Aniñon related that she previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and
execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido
Caneja, Jr. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused
Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case.
RULING: Not only did Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; he also
accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a
property in which his legal services had been previously retained. Moreover, Sabitsana failed to obtain the written
consent of his two clients, as required.
PENALTY: Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in
violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1)
year from the practice of law.

Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.
A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 77 (2012)
“Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for
the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another
test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment. On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to support Atty.
Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule, as established by the following circumstances on record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the
legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainant’s favor.
Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point,
Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed with the complainant’s interests.
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.
Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed
a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the
case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; he also accepted a new
engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been
previously retained.”

Orola v. Ramos
AC No. 9860, September 11, 2013
DOCTRINE: A lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests
only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.
FACTS: Complainants are the children of the late Trinidad married to Emilio. In the settlement of Trinidad's estate, the
parties were represented by: (a) Atty. Villa as counsel for Heirs of Trinidad; (b) Atty. Azarraga as counsel the other Heirs
of Antonio, with Atty. Ramos as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Brotarlo as counsel for Emilio. Heirs of Trinidad and
Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and sought the appointment of the latter's son,
Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted. Ramos filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the
same case and moved for reconsideration. Due to Ramos’ new engagement, complainants filed a disbarment complaint
against him.
RULING: Ramos was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in
the special proceeding. Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for
having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when Ramos proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose
of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of
Antonio — particularly, Karen — in violation of the CPR.
PENALTY: respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of
Rule 15.03,Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be

RULE 15.02
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

Regala v. Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE: A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of
his client. However, 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing
the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3)
Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing
the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
FACTS: PCGG was compelling Regala et al. to divulge information regarding corporations alleged
to have been involved in the case involving ill-gotten wealth against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. by
naming them as co-defendants. Regala et al. were part of ACCRA Law Firm who assisted in the
legal matters of the companies named.
RULING: The information was within the ambit of attorney-client privilege.

People v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 115439-41, July 16, 1997, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)
DOCTRINE: Communications between attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal
acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and client.
FACTS: Paredes applied for a free patent over a lot of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application
was approved and an original certificate of title was issued in his favor. However, the Director of Lands filed an
action for cancellation since the land had been designated as a school site. The trial court nullified said patent and
title after finding that Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application.
Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, Sansaet
claimed that he filed falsified documents upon the inducement of Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for
his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases.
RULING: The confidential communications made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to
the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy
with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
PENALTY: The writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impugned resolutions and
ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given due course by
respondent SANDIGANBAYAN.

Castillo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 138231, February 21, 2002, 377 SCRA 509 (2002)
DOCTRINE: Co-principals may not be willing to testify and cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate
the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.
FACTS: A complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages was filed against
several persons one of whom is Castillo. After Castillo’s death, his lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for being one for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon; hence, it does not survive
Castillo’s death. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. Another motion to dismiss was filed by the heirs
of Castillo on the ground that the case against him is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege. The Sandiganbayan again denied the motion on the ground that Castillo is being sued as
principal defendant for being in conspiracy with other defendants in the commission of the acts
complained of. The motion for reconsideration filed was likewise denied, thus, this present petition.
RULING: The Court cannot compel Castillo to testify in view of his right against self-incrimination and his
fundamental right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.

RULE 15.04
MEDIATOR, CONCILIATOR OR ARBITER

Dee v. CA
G.R. No. 77439, August 24, 1989, 176 SCRA 651 (1989)
DOCTRINE: Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending
positions. However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer
may represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. A common representation
may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and
impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions, may well be better situated to work out
an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with
the cooperation and confidence of said parties.

Dee v. CA
G.R. No. 77439, August 24, 1989, 176 SCRA 651 (1989)
FACTS: Dee seeks reconsideration of the decision finding him liable to pay Atty. Mutuc fees for
legal services rendered after they contracted Mutuc because his brother Dewey had amassed
gambling debts at Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas, which allegedly had Mafia ties, and he feared for
his brother’s life. However, it was found that Dewey merely signed the chits for Ramon Sy, who
was actually responsible for the debts. Mutuc was successful in clearing Dewey’s debts, but then
Donald Dee refused to pay for the services rendered, saying that Mutuc did it as a family friend
and because he was also working for Caesar’s Palace.
RULING: It is not completely accurate to judge Mutuc’s position by Dee’s assumption that the
interests of Caesar's Palace were adverse to those of Dewey. True, the casino was a creditor but
that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey, since the latter was not the debtor. Mutuc’s
representations in behalf of Dee were not in resistance to the casino's claim but were actually
geared toward proving that fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor, Ramon Sy, from
whom payment was ultimately and correctly exacted. Even assuming that the imputed conflict of
interests obtained, Mutuc’s role therein was not ethically or legally indefensible.

RULE 15.05
CANDID, HONEST ADVICE

RULE 15.06
NOT TO CLAIM INFLUENCE

Mercado v. Security Bank
DOCTRINE: We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their
clients. A lawyer who guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy pressure
and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But when the case is lost, he will blame the
courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion.
FACTS: Because Atty. Villanueva revealed the name of the ponente in a pending case and
impliedly guaranteed to Mercado that the outcome of the case would be in his favor, Mercado
wrote a letter to the Chief Justice that lashed at his integrity as well as insinuating bribery in the
Supreme Court when his petition was denied.
RULING: Mercado and Atty. Villanueva are guilty of indirect contempt of court. In informing
Mercado that he was "a very very good, close and long-time friend" of the ponente, Atty.
Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can obtain a favorable disposition of his case.
PENALTY: Jose Marcado and Atty. Villanueva are declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court.
They are FINED P50,000 each and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more
severe penalty.

RULE 15.07
IMPRESS COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS

RULE 15.08
DUAL PROFESSION

Nakpil v. Valdez
A.C. No. 2040, March 4, 1998, 286 SCRA 758 (1998)
DOCTRINE: Generally, an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to
represent both sides of an issue. However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed
where the parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts.
FACTS: Nakpil entered into a trust agreement with Valdes – Valdes would buy the property in
Moran for Nakpil until the latter could buy it back. When Nakpil died, Valdes acted both as the
accountant and the legal counsel of Imelda Nakpil in the intestate proceedings.
RULING: Valdes is guilty of misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Valdes’ accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same
time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the
interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are
creditors of the estate.
PENALTY: The Court finds respondent Atty. Valdez guilty of misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt of this Decision, with a
warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

De Guzman v. de Dios
DOCTRINE: A lawyer is bound by her oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself
as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and
violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action.
FACTS: De Guzman engaged the services of de Dios in forming a hotel and restaurant business. Thereafter, Suzuki
Beach Hotel, Inc. came into being. De Guzman became the majority stockholder having subscribed to 29,800
shares equivalent to P2,980,000 and her paid subscription amounted to P745,000.00. de Dios, thereafter,
received a monthly retainer fee of P5,000 from the former whom she even represented in a case. The unpaid 745
subscribed shares of De Guzman was later declared delinquent, sold and acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of
the company's incorporators. Out of the 745 shares conveyed to Del Rosario, de Dios purchased 100 shares. She
later became the president of the company. de Dios denied the existence of attorney-client relationship between
her and De Guzman. The IBP ruled in her favor.
RULING: There was an attorney-client relationship between the parties and there was evidence of collusion
between the board of directors and de Dios in ousting De Guzman from the corporation. de Dios’ purchase of
shares of stock originally owned by De Guzman constitutes conflict of interest. de Dios as a lawyer is bound by her
oath to do no falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself according to the best of her
knowledge and discretion.

De Guzman v. de Dios
PENALTY: The Court finds respondent. Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios remiss in her sworn duty to her
client, and to the bar. The Court hereby SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for six (6)
months, with warning that a repetition of the charges will be dealt with more severely.

Perez v. de la Torre
A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 547 (2006)
DOCTRINE: There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. There is a
representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.

Perez v. de la Torre
A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 547 (2006)
FACTS: Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that
several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Ilo and Avila, were apprehended
and jailed by the police; that de la Torre went to the Calabanga municipal building where Ilo and Avila
were being detained and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the
prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, de la Torre was representing the
heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against
them, including Perez who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the
criminal activities for which they were being charged.
RULING: At the time de la Torre was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the
victim Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of
opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients.
PENALTY: Atty. de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice
of law effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

Nuigue v. Sedillo
AC No. 9906, July 29, 2013
DOCTRINE: Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate their client's confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged
to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.
FACTS: Sedillo was still the counsel on record of Kiyoshi and Estrelieta in the case against
Amasula at the time when he represented Estrelieta and Manuel in the complaint for
falsification filed by Kiyoshi. Further, Sedillo likewise appeared as counsel for Estrelieta and
Manuel in the case for accounting, sum of money and attachment that was filed by Kimura
Business Concepts, Inc., the assignee of Kiyoshi, despite being the counsel of Kiyoshi in the case
against Amasula.
RULING: Sedillo’s representation of Estrelieta and Manuel against Kiyoshi, notwithstanding that
he was still the counsel of Kiyoshi and Estrelieta in the case against Amasula, creates a suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of his duty towards his clients. Under the
circumstances, the decent and ethical thing which the respondent should have done was to
advise Estrelieta and Manuel to engage the services of another lawyer.

Nuigue v. Sedillo
AC No. 9906, July 29, 2013
PENALTY: The Court finds Atty. Eduardo Sedillo GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Medina v. Lizardo
A.C. No. 10533, January 31, 2017
DOCTRINE/RULING: A lawyer’s act of withholding the TCTs entrusted to him by his clients to protect
another purported client who surreptitiously acquired his services despite a conflict of interest is a clear
violation of several provisions of the CPR.
FACTS: Complainants allege that Silvestra Medina, because of her advanced age, entrusted the owner's
duplicates of TCTs to Lizardo. However, since complainants are not the only owners of the properties
covered, and other heirs were asking for the original duplicate copies, complainants went to Lizardo’s
residence and requested the return of said TCTs. Lizardo refused. Lizardo claims that Silvestra, Alicia
Medina and Martinez all engaged his services to file the partition case, but agreed that the named
complainants shall only be Silvestra and Alicia. As the share of Silvestra and Alicia were already sold to
Martinez, it was Martinez who shouldered the expenses and appeared in every hearing. According to
Lizardo, Silvestra, Alicia, and Martinez had the same interest in the filing of the partition case.
PENALTY: The Court finds respondent Atty. Rufino C. Lizardo GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17, and
Rules 15.03 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one year effective upon the finality of the decision. The Court ORDERS him to return the TCTs
and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealth with more severely.

Dalisay v. Mauricio
DOCTRINE/RULING: When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he
possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. A lawyer shall also
represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law.
FACTS: Dalisay engaged Mauricio’s services as counsel. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and
attorney's fees from complainant, Mauricio never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she
terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but
Mauricio refused. IBP recommended that Mauricio refund the amount to Dalisay. Upon learning of the
same, Mauricio learned of the Decision holding that "the tax declarations and title" submitted by
complainant "are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed." Mauricio filed
a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant charging her with violations of Article 171 and 172,
and/or Article 182 of the RPC. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence.
RULING: Instead of inaction, Mauricio should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her
fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her.

Dalisay v. Mauricio
PENALTY: The motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Atty. Mauricio is guilty of malpractice and
gross misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months.

Canon 16
HOLD IN TRUST CLIENT’S MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

RULE 16.01
ACCOUNT

Berbano v. Barcelona
DOCTRINE: The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts but also
mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them
pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.
FACTS: Berbano sought the disbarment of Barcelona for malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming a lawyer,
dereliction of duty and unjust enrichment. It was alleged that Berbano obtained the assistance of Barcelona for
the release of one Porfirio Daen who was arrested by the police authorities and that Barcelona collected money
from the complainant and the nephew of the detained person for the immediate release of the detainee through
his alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme Court. However, the detainee was never released from
incarceration. Consequently, Barcelona was found guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Barcelona was guilty of culpable violations of several Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts, but also mandates
the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to
their fiduciary relationship. Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal process, Barcelona callously
demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having connections with a
Member of this Court. Thus, for gross misconduct, Barcelona was disbarred from the practice of law. He was also
directed to return to complainant the amount he received from the latter.

Berbano v. Barcelona
PENALTY: Barcelona is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to return to complainant Felicitas Berbano the
amount of Sixty Four Thousand Pesos (P64,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice of this
Decision.

Sison, Jr. v. Camacho
AC No. 10910, January 12, 2016
DOCTRINE: A lawyer's failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality
as well as of professional ethics.
FACTS: Atty. Sison accused Atty. Camacho of failure to render an accounting of funds which were
supposed to be paid as additional docket fees.
RULING: Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt from the moment he received the amount. The
fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be
immediately returned.
PENALTY: Atty. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

RULE 16.02
KEEP CLIENT’S FUND SEPARATE

Hernandez v. Go
DOCTRINE: Lawyers’ acts of acquiring for himself complainant's lots entrusted to him are acts
constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent.
FACTS: Hernandez engaged the services of Atty. Go to pay off her creditors. Due to her trust in her
lawyer and out of fear of her properties getting foreclosed, she executed deeds of sale without
consideration in favor of Go, upon his persuasion. However, Hernandez later found out that Go didn’t
sell her properties to pay off her debts. Rather, he effectively sold it to himself, and used his own funds
to pay Hernandez’s creditors.
RULING: Go’s acts of acquiring for himself complainant's lots entrusted to him are acts constituting gross
misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Such conduct of Go degrades not only himself but also
the name and honor of the legal profession. He violated this Court's mandate that lawyers must at all
times conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.

Hernandez v. Go
PENALTY: Respondent Go is ound guilty of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice
of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY..

RULE 16.03
DELIVERY OF FUNDS; LAWYER’S LIEN

Businos v. Ricafort
A.M. No. 4349, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 40 (1997)
DOCTRINE: Dishonesty, grave misconduct, and grossly unethical behavior merits disbarment so
as to be consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards
of the legal profession, and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Bar.
FACTS: Businos charged Ricafort with estafa for having misappropriated P32,000, part of which
was intended to be deposited in her husband’s bank account while the sum of P2,000 was
supposedly for a bond required in a civil case. Ricafort returned the money during the trial which
led to the dismissal to the estafa case, but the administrative case was pursued. He also did not
comply with the Court resolutions requiring him to comment on the charge against him.
RULING: Ricafort’s transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to gross misconduct and
grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to him, but to the noble
profession to which he belongs. Ricafort forgot that by swearing the lawyer's oath, he became a
guardian of truth and the rule of law and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice. The Court resolved to impose the extreme penalty of disbarment.

Businos v. Ricafort
A.M. No. 4349, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 40 (1997)
PENALTY: The dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior in palpable disregard of
Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and
16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon
11 thereof, and consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high
standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of
the Philippine Bar, the Court Resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from
the practice of law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Rayos v. Hernandez
DOCTRINE: The fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for
his client does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his
failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.
FACTS: Atty. Hernandez was hired by Rayos as his lawyer against NAPOCOR for a civil suit for
damages. Due to the unexpected release of water of Angat Dam by NAPOCOR, casualties
occurred some of which were the destruction of Rayos’ properties and deaths of his family
members. Rayos was able to claim P1M worth of payment for damages from NAPOCOR but
Hernandez withheld the money alleging that it is the guarantee for the payment of his attorney’s
fees.
RULING: Hernandez was not justified to hold on the entire amount of award collected by him
until his fees had been paid and received by him.

Rayos v. Hernandez
PENALTY: Respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months. He is WARNED that
repetition of the same or similar offenses will be dealt with more severely.
He is entitled to Attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to 35% of the total amount awarded
to petitioner.
He is to return Php 290,109.21 which he retained in excess of what we declared as fair and
reasonable attorney’s fees plus legal interest from the date of finality of this judgment

RULE 16.04
NO BORROWING, LENDING

Barnachea v. Quicho
A.C. No. 5925, March 11, 2003, 399 SCRA 1 (2003)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer's failure to return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a presumption
that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a
lawyer of funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession.
FACTS: Despite not being in the practice of law for a while, Barnachea became Quiocho’s client.
Complainant engaged Quiocho’s services for transfer of title of a property previously owned by her
sister. Complainant paid for Quiocho’s legal services. However, despite the lapse of two months, Quiocho
failed to secure title over the property in favor of the complainant. Quiocho returned the documents
and issued a check as refund. Quiocho failed to fund the check despite demands.
RULING: Quiocho simply refused to adduce evidence to prove his allegations in his answer to the
complaint. What compounded his unethical conduct was the drawing of a personal check and delivering
the same to the complainant without sufficient funds in his bank account. He was suspended from the
practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. Quiocho was also ordered to restitute to the complainant the full amount of
P41,280.00.

Barnachea v. Quicho
A.C. No. 5925, March 11, 2003, 399 SCRA 1 (2003)
PENALTY: Atty. Quiocho is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 1 year with a stern warning
that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to
restitute to the complainant the full amount of P41,280.00 within ten (10) days from notice
hereof. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of said amount
within ten (10) days from said payment. If Respondent fails to restitute the said amount within
the aforesaid period, he shall be meted an additional suspension of three (3) months for every
month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall have paid the said amount in full. In case a
subsidiary penalty of suspension for his failure to restitute the said amount shall be necessary,
respondent shall serve successively the penalty of his one year suspension and the subsidiary
penalty. This is without prejudice to the right of the complainant to institute the appropriate
action for the collection of said amount.

Yu v. Dela Cruz
A.C. No. 10912, January 9, 2016
DOCTRINE: Lawyers are proscribed from borrowing money or property from clients, unless the
latter's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
FACTS: While the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting, Atty. Dela Cruz borrowed jewelry
from complainant and pledged the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. Dela Cruz
appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to facilitate the
redemption of the jewelry, Dela Cruz issued to complainant a check. Upon presentment,
however, the check was dishonored for the reason, “Account Closed.”
RULING: Dela Cruz used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself,
the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the trust and confidence reposed
upon him by his client. The borrowing of money or property from a client outside the limits laid
down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
PENALTY: He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 3 years with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Canon 17
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

Cantiller v. Potenciano
DOCTRINE: The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such
lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him.
FACTS: Atty. Potenciano was charged for deceiving, misrepresenting, mishandling and not fully
representing the cause of Cantiller’s sister ejectment case which resulted to the latter’s loss of the
property.
RULING: Potenciano failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Potenciano had
knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge to withdraw his appearance as
counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, Potenciano took no steps to find a
replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact. Even assuming that Potenciano had no previous
knowledge that he would be asked to withdraw, the record is clear that four days prior to the hearing of
the preliminary injunction, Potenciano already filed a motion therein withdrawing as complainant's
counsel interposing as reason therefor his frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this
void, he failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in his
stead.

Cantiller v. Potenciano
PENALTY: Atty. Potenciano is SUSPENDED for an indefinite period until such time he can
demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law.
He is to return P11,000 with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually
returned.

Solatan v. Inocentes
A.C. No. 6504, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 1 (2005)
DOCTRINE: Culpable acts which tend to degrade the profession and foment distrust in the integrity of
court processes merit the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.
FACTS: Solatan agreed to pay the judgment debts of his sister in order for him arrange a new lease
contract in the apartment he was staying in. However, he was not able to pay the full amount, and his
properties were levied. Atty. Camano negotiated with Solatan for release of levied properties, but did
not return a gas stove that belonged to Solatan.
RULING: The statement of Camano should not be construed as giving advice in conflict against the
interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest over the incorrectly levied properties.
The act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be returned to him upon showing
proof of his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest of the spouses Genito, but, in this
circumstance, lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal of the latter's confidence so as to
deserve outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his clients' cause.
PENALTY: He is ADMONISHED to monitor more closely the activities of his associates to make sure that
the same are in consonance with the Code of Professional Responsibility with the WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with more severely.

Angalan v. Delante
A.C. No. 7181, February 6, 2009, 578 SCRA 113 (2009)
DOCTRINE: Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court states that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Court for gross misconduct. A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his
illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.
FACTS: According to the heirs of Angalan, they engaged Atty. Delante’s services to recover their property
from Spouses Eustaquio. In violation of the trust and confidence they reposed in him, Delante
transferred the title over the property to his name. According to Delante, however, the heirs of Angalan
did not engage his services and that it was his client from New York who was the one who bought the
property from Spouses Eustaquio.
RULING: Delante should have held the transfer certificate title in trust and returned the property to
complainants upon demand. Delante should have been mindful of the trust and confidence
complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses
Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged Delante’s services in the hope that he would
help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, Delante took
advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name.
PENALTY: Atty. Delant is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is to be stricken from the roll
of Attorneys.

In re Maquera
B.M. No. 793, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 417 (2004)
DOCTRINE: The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one's good's standing in the legal
profession.
FACTS: The District Court of Guam informed the Court of the suspension of Atty. Maquera from the
practice of law in Guam for 2 years. IBP found that Maquiera was admitted to the Philippine Bar and was
later admitted to the practice of law in Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his client’s property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a
consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client’s case.
RULING: Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law
in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines.
PENALTY: Atty. Maquera is to SHOW CAUSE within fifteen days from receipt of the resolution why he
should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings against
him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction. Atty. Maquera is
suspended from the practice of law for 1 year or until he shall have paid his membership dues,
whichever comes later.

Somosot v. Pontevedra
A.C. No. 4285, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 416 (2006)
DOCTRINE: Lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and must therefore be always mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in them. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to
handle the legal matter. He must also give adequate attention to his legal work.
FACTS: Atty. Pontevedra is the counsel for Somosot in a civil case. He failed to file memorandum despite
repeated reminders by the Court and complainant. He then entered into an agreement with opposing
counsel not to file said memorandum, so the case was submitted for decision. He also received money
order from complainant’s daughter for the filing of memorandum, but since the period had lapsed, he
didn’t take any action. He failed to return said money order despite demands of complainant.
RULING: Pontevedra failed to exercise that degree of diligence required of him in the performance of his
duties. While it was impossible for him to prepare a memorandum without the transcripts of
stenographic notes and his case folder, and while he may have been constrained simply to enter into an
agreement with the opposing counsel to submit the case for decision without memorandum, he failed
to inform the trial court of said agreement. His omission not only gave complainant much anxiety, it also
needlessly compounded the long delay in the resolution of the 23-year-old case. Worse, Pontevedra did
not inform complainant that the case had been submitted for decision without memorandum despite
complainant's repeated requests for information regarding the status of her case.

Somosot v. Pontevedra
A.C. No. 4285, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 416 (2006)
PENALTY: Atty. Elias Pontevedra is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that the commission of
the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely. He is ordered to return
immediately the postal money order in the amount of P1,000.00 to complainant’s heirs.

Norma Nicolas v. Atty. Jose Laki
A.C. No. 12881, Feb. 9, 2021
DOCTRINE: A lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing
the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing
the required pleadings , prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
FACTS: Atty. Laki was referred by Atty. Umipig to handle the nullity of marriage case of Nicolas’ brother.
Laki said he will file the case in Bataan where he successfully handled a similar petition in only three
months. He charged a fee and assured her the annulment proceedings would be finished soon. Laki met
with complainant and, in the presence of Umipig, Nicolas gave Laki the initial payment. After requesting
for additional payment and guaranteeing that the case was almost done, Laki could no longer be
contacted. When Nicolas went to Bataan to check on the status of the case, she discovered that no case
was ever filed by Laki. Laki promised to return to money but never fulfilled the same.
RULING: Having received payment for services which were not rendered, Laki was unjustified in keeping
the money. His obligation was to immediately return the said amount. His refusal to do so despite
repeated demands constitutes a violation of his oath where he pledges not to delay any man for money
and swears to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients.

Licuanan v. Melo
DOCTRINE: The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain
he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
FACTS: Licuanan alleged that Atty. Melo, her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her
tenant, failed to remit to her the rentals collected by him on different dates over a twelve-month
period, much less did he report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after
approximately a year from actual receipt that Melo turned over his collections to Licuanan after
the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had demanded the
same.
RULING: Melo’s actuations in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the
amount received by him on behalf of his client Licuanan depriving her of its use, and withholding
information on the same despite inquiries made by her is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath
to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.
PENALTY: Atty. Melo is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Malangas v. Zaide
A.C. No. 10675, May 31, 2016
DOCTRINE: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable. A lawyer shall likewise keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
FACTS: Malangas engaged Atty. Zaide’s services for his complaint for damages. He paid an acceptance fee and
filing fees. Zaide made him believe that such amount was needed to commence a P5 million-damage suit covering
the accrued and anticipated damages. Zaide filed a complaint for damages and furnished Malangas with a copy of
said Complaint seeking to recover damages. The complaint was even stamped "received" by the RTC. Malangas
later discovered that his Complaint had been dismissed because of "failure to prosecute" since Zaide did not
attend two hearings and did not submit an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Malangas asked Zaide to file a
Motion for Reconsideration, only to find out later that, worse, Zaide instead filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as
counsel effectively leaving him without counsel to prosecute his case. He discovered that the amount of damages
sought in the Complaint filed by Zaide was only P250,000.00, and not P5 million, as stated in the copy of the
Complaint given to him.
RULING: By his deliberate failure to file a Comment on or Opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss and by his
failure to appear at the hearings, Zaide unduly delayed the case as the trial court had to postpone the hearings
thereon, and this, in turn, naturally arrested the progress of the case. RTC had to put off for 37 days its ruling on
NEMA's Motion to Dismiss because Zaide moved for time to oppose the same. Yet, despite the 10-day extension
given to him, Zaide still failed to appear at the hearings or file the appropriate pleading. These failings are clearly
offensive to Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR.

Malangas v. Zaide
A.C. No. 10675, May 31, 2016
PENALTY: Atty. Zaide is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 2 years effective immediately.
He is ORDERED to return to complainant the sums given to him as acceptance fee and docket
fees in the amount of P70,000.00, from which should be deducted the amount of P2,623.60 paid
as docketing fees.

Quilban v. Robinol
G.R. No. 83885, December 29, 1989
DOCTRINE/RULING: Clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time
(Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then
enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their
lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative.
FACTS: The Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" is an organization formed by squatters
living in the reserved area previously owned by a Jesuit corporation later sold to the Quezon City
Government. Its president, however, connived with Rivera, a realtor, to obtain the sale of such
land to the exclusion of the other members. Samahan families filed a case praying that Rivera et
al. be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of Quilban et al. after reimbursement of
the amount paid by Rivera. Since the CFI dismissed the case, the Samahan members hired Atty.
Robinol to prosecute the appeal before the CA. CA ordered an amount to be paid to Rivera, the
sum turned over to Robinol. It was discovered that no payment had been made by Robinol to
Rivera. The Samahan officers requested the investigation of Robinol for refusal to return the sum
ordered paid by the CA, as well as the expenses for ejectment of occupants of the property,
conveyance, documentation, transfer of title, etc.

Quilban v. Robinol
G.R. No. 83885, December 29, 1989
PENALTY: Atty. Robinol is DISBARRED. He is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to
attomey's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P 75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned Administrative Case.

Nocom v. Camerino
G.R. No. 182984, 10 February 2009, 578 SCRA 390 (2009)
DOCTRINE: A champertous contract, a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit whereby the
stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered
under the judgment, is void for being against public policy.
FACTS: Nocom gave Camerino et al. several Philtrust Bank Manager's Checks which the latter encashed,
representing the price of their "inchoate and contingent rights" over the subject lots which they sold to
him. Camerino et al., with the marital consent of their wives, executed an "Irrevocable Power of
Attorney" which was notarized by their counsel Atty. Santos. Camerino filed a complaint against Nocom,
seeking to annul said “Irrevocable Power of Attorney.”
RULING: The pleadings of the parties show that the same special power of attorney was executed by the
Nocom, et al. through the intercession of Santos and at the behest of Camerino. The contract brokered
by Santos has all the earmarks of a champertous contract which is against public policy as it violates the
fiduciary relations between the lawyer and his client, whose weakness or disadvantage is being
exploited by the former. The situation created under the given premises is a clear circumvention of the
prohibition against the execution of champertous contracts between a lawyer and a client.

Canon 18
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

RULE 18.01
CLIENT CONSENT WITH COLLABORATING COUNSEL

RULE 18.02
ADEQUATE PREPARATION

Sanchez v. Aguilos
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
DOCTRINE: Failure to live up to the standards imposed on an attorney by misrepresenting one’s professional competence
and skill to a client is a violation of the CPR.
FACTS: Sanchez charged Atty. Aguilos with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount she paid for his
professional services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services. She sought Aguilos’ legal
services to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband. After two months, she learned that
what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of her marriage. He
told her that she would have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage.
RULING: Aguilos misrepresented his professional competence and skill to Sanchez. The case contemplated by the parties and
for which his services was engaged, was an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the
intention of marrying her British fiancée. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still
render her incapacitated to re-marry. That Aguilos was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition for legal
separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore,
beyond comprehension and is a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
PENALTY: Atty. Aguilos is FINED P10,000 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him
for his use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the
offense shall be severely punished. Atty. Aguilos should RETURN the P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum
reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.

RULE 18.03
NOT TO NEGLECT LEGAL MATTERS

Legarda v. CA
G.R. No. 94457, June 10, 1992, 209 SCRA 722 (1992)
DOCTRINE: The moment a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort
for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or
abandons his client's cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.
FACTS: Atty. Coronel was negligent in handling his client’s case due to health reasons and heavy
workload. Court expected more from him, especially as he was a law school dean, and his
negligent conduct was occurring more frequently.
RULING: Legarda could not have gone through the travails attending the disposition of the case
against her not to mention the devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean
Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar. By negligence to file the
answer to the complaint against Legarda, Coronel set off the events which resulted in the
deprivation of Legarda’s rights over her house and lot.
PENALTY: Said counsel for petitioner is hereby required to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why he should not be held administratively liable for his acts and omissions hereinabove
described in this decision.

Endaya v. Oca
DOCTRINE: Every case a lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill, and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
FACTS: Atty. Oca represented Endaya in an unlawful detainer case, but the latter lost the case for
failure of the former to submit the required pleadings. This resulted in the eviction of Endaya’s
family from their house. Consequently, complainant filed the present administrative complaint
against Oca for professional delinquency.
RULING: Whatever the lawyer's reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to do his utmost
in prosecuting or defending it. When Oca was directed to file the required pleadings, he had no
choice but to comply. However, Oca did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court
orders. This constitutes negligence and malpractice.
PENALTY: Atty. Oca is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 2 months from notice, with
warning that a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

Carandang v. Obmina
A.C. No 7813, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 82 (2009)
DOCTRINE: The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the
need for the lawyer to inform timely and adequately the client of important developments
affecting the client's case. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer
is defending the client's interests.
FACTS: Atty. Obima failed to inform Carandang that he lost the said case and therefore lost the
opportunity to appeal the decision.
RULING: Carandang learned about the promulgation of the decision not through Atty. Obmina
himself, but through a chance visit to the trial court. Carandang lost his right to file an appeal
because of Atty. Obmina's inaction.
PENALTY: Atty. Obmina is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 1 year and is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

RULE 18.04
INFORM CLIENT ON STATUS OF CASE

Abay v. Montesino
DOCTRINE: All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause.
FACTS: Abay and Atty. Montesino disagreed on the legal course to be taken regarding the appealed case.
Montesino strongly advised Abay to abandon the appeal and to consider the other available remedies.
Abay, on the other hand, wanted to pursue it. Without informing Abay, Montesino abandoned the
appeal.
RULING: Montesino’s conduct shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that he had a cavalier
attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the former of the latter's cause made him
unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him. Even if Montesino was "honestly and sincerely"
protecting the interests of complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the
latter's knowledge and consent. If indeed Montesino felt unable or unwilling to continue his
retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to appoint
another lawyer.
PENALTY: Atty. Montesino is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months upon receipt of the
decision and is WARNED that repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Ramiscal v. Orro
A.C. No. 10945, February 23, 2016
DOCTRINE: As an essential part of their (attorney-client) highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and
full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case.
FACTS: Spouses Ramiscal engaged Atty. Orro’s services to handle a case where they were defendants seeking the declaration
of the nullity of title to a parcel of land. Upon receiving the acceptance fee, Orro handled the trial until RTC decided it in their
favor. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA, and they filed their appellants' brief. Orro requested an additional amount for the
preparation and submission of their appellees' brief. They obliged and paid. Later, the CA reversed. Orro did not inform the
Ramiscals of the adverse decision which they only learned from their neighbors. They wanted to communicate with Orro but
their efforts were initially in vain. When they reached him, he asked an additional amount as his fee in filing a motion for
reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such would already be belated. Even so, they paid. They discovered
that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained finality, eventually resulting in the loss of
their property.
RULING: Even if Orro could not guarantee to Spouses Ramsicals the favorable outcome of the litigation, he reneged on his
commitment because he did not file the motion for reconsideration despite receiving the amount he requested for that
purpose. He neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving
them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against their interest. Updating the clients could have
prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it
happened, his neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available.
PENALTY: Atty. Orro is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 2 years effective upon notice, with the STERN WARNING that
any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Agot v. Rivera
A.C. No. 8000, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 12 (2014)
DOCTRINE: Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence,
and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence
for which he must be held administratively liable, as in this case.
FACTS: Agot alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best friend's wedding at USA. To facilitate the
issuance of her visa, Agot sought Rivera’s services who represented himself as an immigration lawyer. They
entered into a Contract whereby Rivera undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in
Agot’s favor prior to the wedding. In consideration, Agot paid a downpayment and undertook to pay the balance
after the issuance of the visa. The parties likewise stipulated that should Agot’s visa application be denied for any
reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or any
court-issued hold departure order, Rivera is obligated to return the said downpayment. However, Rivera failed to
perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in
the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded, Agot filed a criminal complaint
for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against Rivera.
RULING: Rivera failed to perform his obligations under the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance
of a US visa in favor of Agot.

Agot v. Rivera
A.C. No. 8000, August 5, 2014, 732 SCRA 12 (2014)
PENALTY: Atty. Rivera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 2 years upon the finality of the
decision with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

Francisco v. Flores
A.C. No. 10753, January 26, 2016
DOCTRINE/RULING: Failure of counsel to act upon a client's case resulting in the prescription of available
remedies is negligence in violation of Canon 18 of the CPR. The general rule is that notice to counsel is notice to
client. This rule remains until counsel notifies the court that he or she is withdrawing his or her appearance, or
client informs the court of change of counsel. Untruthful statements made in pleadings filed before courts, to
make it appear that the pleadings are filed on time, are contrary to a lawyer's duty of committing no falsehood.
FACTS: Atty. Francisco alleged that he filed a Complaint for forcible entry against Rainier Fineza and his mother,
Teodora. The Finezas were represented by Atty. Flores. MTC ruled in favor of the Finezas. Francisco filed an appeal
before the RTC but was denied. Francisco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted. The Finezas were
then ordered to vacate the property and to pay rentals. Flores filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Francisco filed
an Opposition. In an Order, Judge Perez denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Flores. The registry return
receipt shows that Flores received a copy of the RTC Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration on April 3,
while the Finezas received their copy of the Order on April 7. The Finezas filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment
with application for temporary restraining order and injunction. The Petition was signed by the Finezas and not by
Flores. Francisco claims that the Petition, while not signed by counsel, "was ostensibly prepared by Flores[.]
Francisco filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed out of time.
PENALTY: Atty. Flores is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 2 years. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Blanza v. Arcangel
DOCTRINE: A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying
with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so
when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services.
FACTS: Blanza et al. complain that Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective pension
claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they
handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But
subsequently, they noticed that since then, Arcangel lost interest in the progress of their claims and
when they finally asked for the return of their papers six years later, Arcangel refused to surrender them.
RULING: Arcangel has not lived up to the ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait,
and hope, for six long years on their pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, Arcangel should
have forthwith terminated their professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely.
PENALTY: We vote that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel
of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of him.

Canon 19
REPRESENTATION WITH ZEAL

RULE 19.01
FAIR AND HONEST

Catolos v. Capacillo
A.C. No. 7950, March 13, 2019
DOCTRINE: Every lawyer is required to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client.
FACTS: Catolos was the lessee of Spouses Lim. Their lease contract covered a property where Catolos’
restaurant was located. However, six months after the lease contract was executed, Spouses Lim refused
to accept Catolos’ tender of payment of rent. This prompted Catolos to file a civil case for enforcement
or rescission of the contract before RTC QC. Capacillo and her father, Atty. Capacillo, allegedly acted as
counsels for Spouses Lim. Catolos claimed that Capacillo, accompanied by two policemen, forcibly
ejected her employees from the leased premises despite the absence of a valid court order. Additionally,
Catolos alleges that Capacillo led a team of men in removing the signage of her restaurant, again
without any court order.
RULING: Capacillo acted as counsel for Spouses Lim. Capacillo also had access to all documents,
including pleadings and letters, prepared or filed by the Capacillo Law Office on behalf of Spouses Lim.
Capacillo is enjoined to represent her clients with zeal but only within the bounds of the law. By forcibly
ejecting Catolos’ employees and removing the signage of Catolos’ business, Capacillo took the law into
her own hands.
PENALTY: Atty. Capacillo is SUSPENDED for a period of 1 year effective upon the finality of the Resolution
with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Enriquez v. Lavadia, Jr.
A.C. No. 5686, June 16, 2015
DOCTRINE: A lawyer's blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the Court's orders underscores her disrespect of the
Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
FACTS: Ouano filed a complaint for forcible entry against Enriquez before MCTC Bohol. Enriquez engaged the services of the
law office of Attys. Alo, Agapay, and Lavadia with Lavadia as the assigned attorney. In open court, Lavadia agreed to submit
their position papers and affidavits within 30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial order after which, the case would be
submitted for decision. However, Lavadia failed to file the position paper resulting in the defendants being declared in
default. MCTC decided in favor of the plaintiffs. Lavadia filed a notice of appeal with sufficient bond. In its Order, RTC Bohol
dismissed the appeal, stating that Lavadia failed to file the appeal memorandum after more than 71 days. Lavadia moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC, pointing out that it had granted four motions for extension and still no
appeal memorandum was filed. In this disbarment complaint, Enriquez alleged that in failing to file the necessary pleadings
before the court, Lavadia caused them great damage and prejudice. This constituted gross negligence and inefficiency in the
performance of his professional duties as a lawyer. Enriquez thus prayed that Lavadia be disbarred.
RULING: Enriquez paid fees relating to the preparation of pleadings for the case including the appeal. Lavadia however failed
to discharge his duties. He failed to file his client's position paper rendering his client in default. While he filed a notice of
appeal and several motions for extension of time to file the appeal memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower
court, he ultimately neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Thus, Lavadia has clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule
18.03 of the CPR thereby making him administratively liable.
PENALTY: Atty. Lavadia Jr. is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.

Chua v. De Castro
A.C. No. 10671, November 25, 2015
DOCTRINE: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following
grounds: (i) deceit; (ii) malpractice; (iii) gross misconduct in office; (iv) grossly immoral conduct; (v) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (vi) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (vii) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
and (viii) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.
FACTS: Chua alleged that his company, Nemar Computer Resources Corp. (NCRC), filed a collection case against Dr.
Concepcion Aguila Memorial College, represented by its counsel, Atty. De Castro. Since the filing of the collection case, it
took more than five years to present one witness of NCRC due to De Castro's propensity to seek postponements of agreed
hearing dates for unmeritorious excuses. De Castro's flimsy excuses would vary from simple absence without notice, to
claims of alleged ailment unbacked by any medical certificates, to claims of not being ready despite sufficient time given to
prepare, to the sending of a representative lawyer who would profess non-knowledge of the case to seek continuance, to a
plea for the postponement without providing any reason therefore. Chua averred that when the trial court required De
Castro to explain why he should not be held in contempt for such delays, he belatedly made his explanation, further
contributing to the delay of the proceedings.
RULING: De Castro clearly caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of justice
through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct. "Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to
practice law.
PENALTY: Atty. De Castro is SUSPENDED from the practice of law with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Harry Roque v. Balbin
A.C. No. 7088, December 4, 2015
DOCTRINE: A lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against
the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their
own cases against the lawyer's client.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that he was the plaintiff's counsel in a case before MeTC. Shortly after securing a
favorable judgment for his client, Atty. Balbin — as counsel for the defendant, and on appeal — started
intimidating, harassing, blackmailing, and maliciously threatening complainant into withdrawing the case filed by
his client. According to complainant, Balbin would make various telephone calls and send text messages and
e-mails not just to him, but also to his friends and other clients, threatening to file disbarment and/or criminal
suits against him. Further, and in view of complainant's "high profile" stature, Balbin also threatened to publicize
such suits in order to besmirch and/or destroy complainant's name and reputation.
RULING: Balbin’s aforesaid acts of threatening complainant with the filing of baseless administrative and criminal
complaints in an effort to strong-arm the latter and his client into submission not only contravened the Lawyer's
Oath, which exhorts that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same," but also violated Canon 19 and Rule 19.01 of the CPR.
PENALTY: Atty. Balbin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 2 years with a STERN WARNING that

RULE 19.02
RECTIFY CLIENT’S FRAUD

RULE 19.03
CONTROL PROCEEDINGS

Canon 20
ATTORNEY’S FEES

Quirante v. IAC
DOCTRINE/RULING: A counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very
action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first
alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the
minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to
recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been
rendered." It also rests on the assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree
already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. The rule against multiplicity
of suits will in effect be subserved.
FACTS: Atty. Quirante filed a motion for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to
him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his
attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow and the two
daughters of the deceased. The motion was filed pending the petition for review filed by
PHILAMGEN that may or may not ultimately result in the granting to his client, the Casasola
family, of the total amount of damages.

Tanhueco v. de Dumo
A.C. No. 1437 and A.C. No. 1683, April 25, 1989, 172 SCRA 760 (1989)
DOCTRINE: The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his
client, does not relieve him from his duty promptly to account for the moneys received; his
failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.
FACTS: Complainant filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. de Dumo for having violated the
Canons of Professional Ethics by his refusal to remit to her money collected by him from debtors
of the complainant and refusal to return documents entrusted to him as counsel of complainant
in certain collection cases.
RULING: When de Dumo withheld and refused to deliver the money received by him for his
client, he breached the trust reposed upon him. His claim that complainant had failed to pay his
attorney's fees, is not an excuse for his failure to deliver any amount to the complainant. What
de Dumo could have properly done was to make an accounting with his client, the complainant,
deduct his attorney's fees due in respect of the amount actually collected by him, and turn over
the remaining balance to the complainant.

Tanhueco v. de Dumo
A.C. No. 1437 and A.C. No. 1683, April 25, 1989, 172 SCRA 760 (1989)
PENALTIES: The respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months with a STERN
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
The attorney’s fees that respondent is entitled to in respect of the collection of case here
involved shall be an amount equivalent to 15% of the total amount collected by the respondent
from the debtors in those cases.
Respondent shall return forthwith to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco the P12,000.00
respondent received on behalf of his client less attorney's fees due to him in respect of that
amount.
Respondent shall return to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco any documents and
papers received by him from the deceased complainant in connection with the collection cases
for which he was retained. If he has in fact made any other collections from deceased
complainant's debtors, he shall promptly account therefor to complainant's estate and shall be
entitled to receive in respect thereof the fifteen percent (15%) attorney's fees provided for
herein.

Albano v. Coloma
A. C. No. 528 October 11, 196 21 SCRA 411 (1967)
DOCTRINE: Counsel, any counsel, if worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his
services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost
not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that his mother and he retained Coloma’s services as counsel. After the
Japanese liberation and after the reorganization of the courts, Coloma failed to expedite the case’s
hearing and termination. Thus, they were represented by another lawyer. However, Coloma intervened
collect her attorney's fees. During the hearing, they were surprised when Coloma presented a document
showing that they promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-1/3% of whatever could be recovered
whether in land or damages. The signature appearing, purportedly that of complainant’s, and the
writing after his mother’s name were not made by them.
RULING: Where, as in this case, the good name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in
reckless disregard of the truth, an action prompted by base ingratitude, the severest censure is called
for.

Metropolitan Bank v. CA
G.R. Nos. 86100-03, January 23, 1990, 181 SCRA 367 (1990)
DOCTRINE: A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees,
requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such
judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce
his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his
services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to
be paid.
FACTS: Atty. Alfariz and associates filed a motion to enter its charging lien in the civil cases
involving properties of Metrobank, their client.
RULING: A charging lien could not be enforced against Metrobank, as there was no judgment for
the payment of money rendered in their client’s favor.

Ramon Jacinto v. Atty. Benedict Littonjua
and Atty. Jose Ma. Rosendo A. Solis
G.R. No. 207675, January 20, 2021
DOCTRINE: Legal costs for the recovery of the subject properties, including attorney's fees, are expenses of
administration which lawyers could claim against the estate or in a separate action.
FACTS: An action for annulment of sale and mortgage was filed by Ramon, a legitimate child of decedent Spouses
Jacinto, against EPCIB and FPI. At the proceedings, the then administratrix of Spouses Jacinto’s estate intervened
and was represented by Attys. Litonjua and Solis. RTC ruled in favor of the Jacinto siblings. Respondents filed a
Notice of Attorney’s Lien claiming attorney’s fees in the amount pursuant to their engagement contract. However,
a Compromise Agreement was made and executed by and among Ramon, EPCIB, FPI, and the Estate of the
Spouses Jacinto. Respondents filed an Opposition to the Joint Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreement,
arguing that the agreement is violative of public order or public policy for failure to include the respondents’
attorney’s lien.
RULING: Notwithstanding their contingency fee agreement with the former administratrix of the Spouses
Jacinto's estate, respondents have no direct and preferential claim to the subject properties forming part of this
estate. Respondents' claim of attorney's fees over the recovered properties and the succeeding compromise
agreement cannot override Ramon's acts of administration over the decedents' estate consisting in opting to
settle. Respondents cannot then litigate and assert their claim of attorney's fees, actually evade payment of
proper filing fees, receive relief beyond what they prayed for, and that already adjudged with finality by the trial
court. Certainly, respondents are not preferred creditors of the estate of the Spouses Jacinto; they do not have a
preferential right or claim to a specific property thereof.

RULE 20.01
FEE GUIDE

Roxas v. de Zuzuarregui
DOCTRINE: In cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked
to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
FACTS: Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the
just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount
equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00.
RULING: Considering that there was no full-blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a
Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the
circumstances. Attorney's fees are unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the,
unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the
regulatory prerogative of the courts.
PENALTY: The amount of P17,073,224.84 must therefore be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor to the
Zuzuarreguis. They can take this out from the yield in the amount of P19,583,878.00 which they have
appropriated for themselves.

Masmud v. NLRC
DOCTRINE: There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On the other
hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be
paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, such that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award
can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer but
to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as
part thereof.
FACTS: Evangelina’s husband, the late Alexander Masmud, filed a complaint against First Victory Shipping Services
and Angelakos S.A. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Go as his counsel. Alexander agreed to pay attorney's
fees on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty percent of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an
additional ten percent in case of appeal. It was likewise agreed that any award of attorney's fees shall pertain to
respondent's law firm as compensation. Evangelina manifested that Go's claim for attorney's fees of 40% of the
total monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
RULING: Contrary to Evangelina's proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary concept
of attorney's fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by
and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the
lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered.

Aquino v. Casabar
DOCTRINE: The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role
in the administration of justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully
earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession.
FACTS: Atty. Aquino is claiming payment from Casabar for the successful outcome of the
agrarian case which he represented.
RULING: Casabar benefited from the said increase in the just compensation. Thus, considering
Aquino’s effort and the amount of time spent in ensuring the successful disposition of the case,
Aquino rightfully deserves to be awarded reasonable attorney's fees for services rendered.

Ignacio v. Alviar
A.C. No. 11482, July 17, 2017 (attorney’s fees and acceptance fee distinguished)
DOCTRINE: On one hand, attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary
concept. In its ordinary concept, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. While, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee
is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for
damages. On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for
mere acceptance of the case. The rationale for the fee is because once the lawyer agrees to
represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the
prohibition on conflict of interest. The opportunity cost of mere acceptance is thus indemnified
by the payment of acceptance fee. However, since acceptance fee compensates the lawyer only
for lost opportunity, the same is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services
rendered.

Ignacio v. Alviar
FACTS: Atty. Alviar agreed to represent Ignacio’s son for a stipulated acceptance fee of
Php100,000. After the initial payments of PhP20,000 and PhP30,000 were given to Alviar, the
latter visited Ignacio’s son at the PDEA detention cell and conferred with him there. Alviar
secured plain copies of the case records and verified twice if the case was already filed in court.
Alviar asked, and was paid, the remaining balance of PhP50,000. Subsequently, he filed his
notice of appearance as counsel for complainant's son. Since Ignacio wrote to Alviar informing
the latter that she decided to seek the intercession of another lawyer, Ignacio requested that
Alviar retain a portion of the Php100,000 to remunerate Alviar for the preparatory legal service
he rendered, but the latter denies having received such letter.
RULING: Alviar referred to the PhP100,000 as his acceptance fee while to Ignacio, said amount
answers for the legal services which Alviar was engaged to provide. Preceding from the fact that
complainant agreed to immediately pay, as she, in fact, immediately paid the sums of
PhP20,000, PhP30,000 and PhP50,000, said amounts undoubtedly pertain to Alviar’s acceptance
fee which is customarily paid by the client upon the lawyer's acceptance of the case.

Ignacio v. Alviar
PENALTY: Atty. Alviar is liable for violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby REPRIMANDED with a with a STERN WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to
RESTITUTE to complainant the amount of Php 97,000 out of the Php 100,000 acceptance fee.

RULE 20.02
CLIENT’S CONSENT OF FEES FOR REFERRAL

Urban Bank v. Peña
DOCTRINE: In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will
exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence.
FACTS: It was agreed that for the services rendered as its agent, complainant shall pay plaintiff a fee in
an amount equivalent to 10% of the market value of the property prevailing at the time of payment.
According to Urban Bank, the act of Peña in securing the letter of authority from complainant, ostensibly
for the purpose of convincing the occupants sought to be evicted that he was duly authorized to take
possession of the property and then using the same letter as basis for claiming agent's compensation,
expenses and attorney's fees from complainant, knowing fully well the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of said letter of authority, constitutes deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
RULING: Peña can hardly be faulted and accused of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct for
invoking the aid of the court in recovering recompense for legal services which he claims he undertook
for the complainant, and which the latter does not deny to have benefited from. Indeed, what he did
was a lawful exercise of a right.

In re S. Ct. Resolution dated April 28, 2003
in G.R. Nos. 145817 & 148822
A.C. 6332, April 17, 2012, 669 SCRA 530 (2012)
DOCTRINE: Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before
them.
FACTS: In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty. Peña attached to the subject Motion to Inhibit two
copies of the official Agenda which he claimed to have anonymously received through the mail. He also attached
a copy of the Court's internal Resolution regarding the transfer of the case upon the request of Justice Carpio, to
establish the latter's alleged special interest in the case. Peña was required to appear in the Executive Session, the
matters under inquiry being how Peña was able to obtain copies of the documents he used as annexes in his
motion to inhibit, and whether the annexes are authentic.
RULING: Peña has violated several canons of professional and ethical conduct expected from him as a lawyer and
an officer of the court. His conduct, demeanor and language with respect to his cause of action — in this Court,
no less — tend to undermine the integrity and reputation of the judiciary, as well as inflict unfounded accusations
against fellow lawyers. Most disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny ability to obtain confidential and internal
court records and to use them shamelessly in his pleadings in furtherance of his cause. The Court cannot just
make short shrift of his inclination towards casually moving for the inhibition of Justices of the Court based on
unfounded claims, since he has not shown remorse or contrition for his ways. Atty. Peña has shown and displayed
in these proceedings that he has fallen short of the ethical standards of the noble profession and must be
sanctioned accordingly.
PENALTY: Atty. Pena is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED to be STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Re Letter-Complaint Against Justices
Antonio Carpio and Ma. Lourdes Sereno
filed by Atty. De la Peña dated Sept. 16, 2001, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC, June 13, 2012
DOCTRINE: A mere rehash of allegations in the main cases which have already been decided merits dismissal for
lack of merit.
FACTS: Peña filed an action against Urban Bank and members of its Board of Directors for recovery of agent's
compensation and attorney's fees allegedly for services he rendered in evicting the occupants of a bank property.
RTC ordered defendants to pay Peña. The bank appealed. In the present complaint, Peña averred that Justice
Carpio, as Member-in-Charge of the consolidated cases, caused the issuance of the falsified resolution which
suspended and stayed the transfer of MSCI's club shares from Urban Bank to those who won them in the bidding.
Peña repeated his claim that the Court merely took note of Urban Bank's motion for clarification and did not
grant it. Peña also pointed out that opposing counsel, Atty. Singson, got an advance copy of the resolution, and
faxed it to him days before the Court released it for mailing. With respect to Justice Sereno, Peña alleged that, as
Member-in-Charge to whom the main cases were re-raffled, she unjustifiably refused to inhibit herself from the
case notwithstanding that Justice Carpio's former law office, the Villaraza Cruz Marcelo Angangco Law Office, had
a significant role in her appointment to the Supreme Court. Peña said that, because of this, Justice Sereno "will
attempt to protect Justice Carpio.”
RULING: Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the main cases. In fact, the allegations in the present
complaint are a mere rehash of the allegations in the main cases, which, in fact, have already been decided. With
regard to Sereno, the Court had already found in its per curiam decision that this charge has no "extrinsic factual
evidence to support it." The charge is purely conjectural.

RULE 20.03
CLIENT’S CONSENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF FEE

RULE 20.04
AVOID COMPENSATION CONTROVERSY WITH CLIENT

Corpus v. CA
G.R. No. L-40424, June 30, 1980, 98 SCRA 424 (1980)
DOCTRINE: “Whether the plaintiff 's services were solicited or whether they were offered to the
defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by the
latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the
services. This gives rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make
compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render service as interpreter, on the one
hand, and on the other to pay for the service rendered, is thereby incurred.”
FACTS: Corpus engaged his close friend Atty. David’s services, without a written agreement for
professional fees. After Corpus won his case, David claimed for payment but Corpus refused
saying his services were offered and rendered gratuitously.
RULING: There was at least an implied agreement for the payment of attorney's fees. Corpus’
act of giving the check through his letter to David indicates Corpus’ commitment to pay the
former attorney's fees.
PENALTY: Atty. David and Judge Tecson are declared guilty of contempt and are REPRIMANDED
with aWARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Canon 21
PRESERVE CLIENT’S CONFIDENCE

Hilado v. David
84 Phil 569 (1949)
DOCTRINE/RULING: It behooves attorneys not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. Professional confidence once reposed can never be divested by
expiration of professional employment.
FACTS: This is a case to disqualify Atty. Francisco for acting as counsel for the defendants on the
ground that the plaintiff had consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was
alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion.
Francisco admitted that she met the plaintiff but denied that an attorney-client relationship was
formed between them.
PENALTY: Motion for disqualification should be ALLOWED.

Genato v. Silapan
A.C. No. 4078, July 14, 2003 406 SCRA 75 (2003)
DOCTRINE/RULING: If an unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case the complainant's alleged
intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered
by the attorney-client privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally.
FACTS: Atty. Silapan, a tenant in Genato’s building who was also handling some of the latter’s
cases, borrowed money from Genato to help pay for a new car. In relation to the loan, a
postdated check was issued by Silapan for the interest and his house and lot was mortgaged to
the complainant without surrendering the title. Silapan failed to pay the amortization on the car
(which was registered in complainant’s name), and the check he issued bounced, so Genato filed
a B.P. 22 criminal case and a mortgage foreclosure civil case against Silapan. In the civil case,
Silapan made allegations pertaining to Genato’s illegal business practices and pending criminal
cases, which led to Genato’s present complaint for violation of the attorney-client privilege.
PENALTY: Atty. Silapan is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 6 months.

RULE 21.01
REVELATIONS OF CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS ALLOWED

RULE 21.02
USE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT ALLOWED

RULE 21.03
PROHIBITION TO GIVING OF INFORMATION TO OUTSIDE AGENCY

RULE 21.04
& RULE 21.05
PROTECTION FROM DISCLOSURE

RULE 21.06
PROHIBITION OF INDISCREET CONVERSATION

RULE 21.07
NOT TO REVEAL THAT LAWYER WAS CONSULTED

Canon 22
WITHDRAWAL OF SERVICES FOR GOOD CAUSE

RULE 22.01
GOOD CAUSES FOR WITHDRAWAL OF SERVICES

Domingo v. Aquino
G.R. No. 28078, April 29, 1971, 38 SCRA 472 (1971)
DOCTRINE/RULING: While Unson ceased as counsel for the estate and for the former
administrator, when the intestate court granted his motion to withdraw as counsel by virtue of
his appointment to and assumption of the public office of Assistant Administrator of the Sugar
Quota Administration, this was true only insofar as the case in the intestate court was
concerned. He continued on record in the appellate court as counsel for the estate as appellant
therein and did not file therein any withdrawal as counsel and neither did the petitioner inform
said court of any change of counsel or of party-administrator, as required by Rule 138, section 26
of the Rules of Court. More so, no appearance of any new counsel for the estate was ever filed
with the appellate court.
FACTS: The case deals with the contention of Atty. Unson that he did not receive the notice and
copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by registered mail, but the estate's attorneys
in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court were verbally informed by respondent's
counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court. In addition, it dealt with
who the counsel for petitioners really was because confusion had arisen from the changing of
the judicial administratrix of the estate.

Montano v. IBP
A.M. No. 4215, May 21, 2001, 358 SCRA 1 (2001)
DOCTRINE: A lawyer’s withdrawal of his services is unjustified when the complainant did not
deliberately fail to pay him the attorney’s fees.
FACTS: Montano hired Atty. Dealca but failed to pay the remaining P3,500 of the P15,000
attorney’s fees agreed upon, which was not yet due. Because of this, Dealca withdrew his
services.
RULING: The Court found his conduct unbecoming of a lawyer, because he withdrew just
because of Montano’s failure to pay, which was not deliberate, and the amount of money owed
is measly.
PENALTY: Atty. Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

RULE 22.02
DUTIES OF LAWYER WHO WITHDRAWS

Obando v. Figueras
DOCTRINE/RULING: At the discretion of the court, an attorney who has already been dismissed
by the client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the client's rights.
Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance
with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: Figueras, son of the spouses Figueras, assumed the administration of the joint estates of
the spouses upon their death. On the other hand, Obando was appointed as co-administrator
relying on the alleged Last Will and Testament of Alegria (his aunt). The will was later discovered
as fake; hence, Obando was convicted of estafa and was removed as co-administrator. Obando,
later, filed a petition to nullify the sale of two parcels of land executed by Figueras without court
authority. The RTC dismissed the case due to his lack of legal standing.

Chang v. Hidalgo
A.C. No. 6934, April 6, 2016
DOCTRINE: A lawyer cannot simply withdraw from a case without notice to the client and complying
with the requirements in Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: Chang alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Hidalgo as legal counsel to represent her in
several collection cases pending in various courts. Chang issued five checks in favor of Hidalgo totaling
P52,000.00. Hidalgo also collected P9,500.00 as "hearing fee." Chang claimed that despite receiving a
total of P61,500.00, Hidalgo did not attend any of the hearings in the collection cases and, instead, sent
another lawyer without her consent. The other lawyer failed to attend all hearings, which resulted in the
dismissal of the cases. Chang prayed that Hidalgo be administratively disciplined by this Court.
RULING: Hidalgo admittedly withdrew from the cases but he failed to provide any evidence to show that
complainant, his client, agreed to the withdrawal or, at the very least, knew about it. The offensive
attitude of a client is not an excuse to just disappear and withdraw from a case without notice to the
court and to the client, especially when attorney's fees have already been paid.
PENALTY: Atty. Hidalgo is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 1 year with a STERN
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to
return to complainant Helen Chang the amount of P61,500.00, with interest at 6% per annum from the
date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid.

Spouses Santuyo v. Hidalgo
DOCTRINE: The responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive; thus, one should be more
discreet and cautious in the execution of notarial duties and should not wholly entrust
everything to the secretaries.
FACTS: Sps. Santuyo claims that their Deed of Sale was notarized by Atty. Hidalgo. However, the
latter denies such claim but does not refute the possibility that one of the secretaries of his
former law office, without his knowledge, was responsible for the said notarization.
RULING: Hidalgo had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in
having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which
was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody else.
PENALTY: He is SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if
he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for
a period of two years from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar
negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.

Sicat v. Ariola
A.C. No. 5864, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 93 (2005)
DOCTRINE/RULING: Lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not authenticate
documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them
and personally appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.
FACTS: Complainant, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal, charged Atty.
Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the
notarization of a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by one Benitez. According to
complainant, Ariola made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001
when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.
PENALTY: Atty. Ariola Jr. is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Mondejar v. Rubia
A.C. Nos. 5907 and 5942, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 1 (2006)
DOCTRINE: One of the grounds for revocation of notarial commission is the failure of the notary to send a copy of notarized
documents to the proper clerk of court or Executive Judge (under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice) within the first ten
(10) days of the month next following.
FACTS: Contending that the January 9, 2001 document did not exist before she filed the criminal charge in 2002 before the
Prosecutor's Office, complainant, who was formerly an employee of Bamiyan, filed the first administrative complaint against
Rubia, as well as criminal complaints for falsification of public document and use of falsified public document before the
Prosecutor's Office also against Rubia, together with Marilyn, Nakayama, and the witnesses to the document Mona Liza
Galvez and John Doe. It appears that on April 20, 2001, Rubia notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land
purportedly executed by Lozada as vendor and Marilyn as vendee. Complainant alleged that Rubia falsified the document by
forging the signature of Lozada who has been staying in Maryland, U.S.A. since 1992. Hence, spawned the second
administrative complaint.
RULING: Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, thus rendering the document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. 18 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are thus
mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to their office, such duties being dictated by public policy
impressed with public interest. The document clearly appears to have been ante-dated in an attempt to exculpate Marilyn
from the Anti-Dummy charge against her in 2002.
PENALTY: Atty. Rubia is SUSPENDED for 1 month with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Lee v. Tambago
DOCTRINE: Notaries public must observe with utmost care 32 and utmost fidelity the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity
of notarized deeds will be undermined.
FACTS: Manuel Lee challenged the “spurious will” notarized by Atty. Tambago allegedly subscribed by his
father, Vicente Lee Sr., and allegedly witnessed by a Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo. Complainant
pointed out that the testator’s signature affixed in the will was different from that of another document
with the testator’s specimen signature, that the residence certificate of the testator was old and
therefore, could not be used for the will, that the addresses of the witnesses were missing and that
there was no copy of the said will in the NCAA files.
RULING: Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid.
This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will,
considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the
instrument and to confirm its contents. Tambago must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of
the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.
PENALTY: Atty. Tambago is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his notarial commission
REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as
an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.

Samson v. Caballero
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 423 (2009)
DOCTRINE: Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing
acts of deceit; otherwise, he may be suspended or disbarred.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that Caballero, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed
that he had pending administrative charges against him. At that time a public prosecutor,
Caballero allegedly committed certain improprieties and exceeded his powers by overruling the
Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.
RULING: Caballero’s dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his
moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
PENALTY: He is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except
accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Respondent is
likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Ko v. Uy-Lampasa
A.C. 11584, March 6, 2019
DOCTRINE: The Notarial Rules clearly mandate that before notarizing a document, the notary public should
require the presence of the very person who executed the same. The presence of the parties to the deed is
necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature.
FACTS: Ko claimed that Uy-Lampasa notarized two purported deeds of sale over a parcel of land despite knowing
that these two were spurious. The Deeds of Absolute Sale differ as regards the name of the vendors. Only eight of
the ten Sultan siblings are involved. Ko claimed that an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale
covering the same property was executed between his son, Jason, and all ten of the Sultan siblings. Complainant
calls the attention of the Court to the fact that in contrast with the deeds of sale notarized by Uy-Lampasa, this
Extra-judicial Settlement contains the signatures and thumbmarks of all the Sultan siblings.
RULING: When Uy-Lampasa affixed her signature and notarial seal on the deeds of sale, she led the public to
believe that the parties personally appeared before her and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents
thereof when in fact, they deny doing so. Her conduct is laden with dangerous possibilities, bearing in mind the
conclusiveness accorded to the due execution of a document. Her conduct did not only jeopardize the rights of
the parties to the instrument; it also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of
notarization.
PENALTY: She is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months. Her notarial commission is REVOKED. She is
PROHIBITED from being commission as a notary public for 2 years. She is WARNED That repetition of the same or

Rev. Fr. Jose P. Zafra Ii v. Atty. Renato B.
Pagatpatan
A.C. No. 12457
DOCTRINE: Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his
clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.
FACTS: While the criminal case was pending against Atty. Pagatpatan's clients, said lawyer wrote a letter to the
Bishop of the Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del Sur requesting an investigation of Fr. Zafra for his activities,
particularly, concocting stories against his clients, Buniel and Guirnalda, who were charged by Zafra of estafa; that
such action "was not only a sin but a MORTAL SIN." Zafra was embarrassed because of the "malicious" letter sent
by Pagatpatan. He was eventually investigated by the Board of Consultors with the Bishop, where he was able to
clear his name. Zafra filed a complaint against Pagatpatan with the IBP.
RULING: Pagatpatan had been representing party litigants in court from 2005 until the instant case was filed
before the IBP in 2016. Pagatpatan has made a mockery of this Court's authority by defying this Court's
suspension order for over eleven years. If Zafra had not filed the instant case, Pagatpatan would have continued
disregarding the suspension order of this Court. His actions clearly constitute gross misconduct as defined under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
PENALTY: He is FINED for Php 5,000 for his unethical behavior. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law.

LAWYER’S OATH

I, _________________, do solemnly swear
That I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the
same;
I will delay no man for money or malice,
And will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion,
With all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
And I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God.

SUSPENSION,
DISBARMENT AND
DISCIPLINE OF
LAWYERS
RULE 139; RULE 139-B

Yuhico v. Gutierrez
A.C. No. 8391, November 23, 2010
DOCTRINE/RULING: Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
FACTS: Atty. Gutierrez borrowed money from Yuchico on various instances. However, he kept
defaulting in his payment of loan. IBP-CBD recommended that he be disbarred.
PENALTY: He is ORDERED to pay the amount of Php 90,000 to the complainant immediately from
the receipt of decision with interest.

Maniago v. De Dios
A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010, 617 SCRA 142 (2010)
DOCTRINE/RULING: Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the
duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege. However, as much as the Court will not
hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may
not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.
FACTS: Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Miyata, a Japanese, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 603. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios.
Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that De Dios had an outstanding suspension order
from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court.
Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case and another case filed against Miyata before
the RTC where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel.

Maniago v. De Dios
A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010, 617 SCRA 142 (2010)
PENALTY: The Court shall render a decision imposing suspension. Respondent lawyer must be
able to file a motion for reconsideration within 15 days. The denial of said motion shall render
the decision final and executory. After suspension, respondent lawyer should file a Sworn
Statement with the Court stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law
and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension.

Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya
A.C. No. 8313, July 14, 2015, 762 SCRA 571 (2015)
DOCTRINE: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful
order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
FACTS: According to complainant, despite the Resolution and despite knowledge of her
suspension from the practice of law, the said resolution having been further posted in the
website of the Supreme Court and is available in CD Asia's Lex Libris, Paita-Moya continued to
practice law in willful disobedience of the Supreme Court's suspension order.
RULING: The Office of the Bar Confidant issued a Certification that the suspension of Atty.
Paita-Moya in A.C. No. 7494 had not yet been lifted.
PENALTY: Atty. Paita-Moya is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of 6
months from her 1 month suspension, totalling 7 months from service of this resolution with a
STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Re: In the matter of the Petition for Reinstatement of
Rolando A. Torres as a member of the Philippine Bar
A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015
DOCTRINE: Judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation
of public confidence in the courts. Thus, the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of
reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.“
FACTS: Torres was administratively charged by his sister-in-law, complainant Ting-Dumali, for "presentation of false
testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery."
According to the complainant, Torres took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to
deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act.
Despite being held guilty of gross misconduct and of violating the lawyer’s oath resulting in his disbarment, Torres wrote
letters to former Associate Justice Tinga and former Chief Justice Panganiban reiterating his pleas for compassion and mercy.
More than ten years from his disbarment, Torres filed the instant petition to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
RULING: While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers — may it be financial or reputational in
cause — it stands firm in its commitment to the public to preserve the integrity and esteem of the Bar. "In considering [a
lawyer's] application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has
established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity.”
PENALTY: Atty. Torres is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered to be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

Llunar v. Ricafort
A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015
DOCTRINE: A lawyer has committed dishonesty by not being forthright that he was under
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
FACTS: Llunar, as Bañez’ attorney-in-fact, hired Ricafort to file a case against father and son
Ricardo and Ard for the recovery of land allegedly owned by the Bañez family but was
fraudulently registered under Ricardo’s name and later transferred to Ard. Ricafort received
payments from Llunar; however, Llunar later learned that no case involving the subject property
was ever filed by Ricafort. Despite Llunar demanding Ricafort to return the sum paid, the latter
refused to return the whole amount. Llunar discovered that Ricafort had been suspended from
the practice of law.
RULING: Ricafort was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension imposed
on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed.
PENALTY: Atty. Ricafort is DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is ORDERED to RETURN the
amount of Php 95,000.

Belo-Henares v. Guevara
A.C. 11394, 01 December 2016
DOCTRINE/RULING: “Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their
private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a
good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of
Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, which — albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession — would
show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the
law invest in them.”
FACTS: Guevarra wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account insulting and verbally abusing
Belo-Henares. The complaint further alleged that Guevarra posted remarks on his Facebook
account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire
medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause. Complainant likewise
averred that some of Guevarra’s Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women.
PENALTY: He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 1 year with a STERN WARNING that

J. Caguioa Cases
339
A.C. 7330, 14 June 2016
DOCTRINE: Lawyers should refrain from attributing to a judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to
the case. Lawyers must always remain vigilant against unscrupulous officers of the law. However, the purification of our
justice system from venal elements must not come at the expense of decency, and worse, the discrediting of the very system
that it seeks to protect.
FACTS: Pantanosas was the presiding judge of RTC Cagayan de Oro. Atty. Pamatong was the counsel of plaintiffs in a civil case
then pending before the RTC. During the hearing, Pamatong was allegedly asked by Pantanosas to remove his copia (a hat
worn by Muslims) in open court. Pamatong requested to be exempted allegedly due to religious grounds and
embarrassment towards his "bald pate." Pantanosas obliged with a caveat that at the next hearing, he would no longer
tolerate the wearing of the copia inside the courtroom. Pamatong filed an Extremely Urgent Motion/Demand for Inhibition
or Recusal. Pantanosas issued an Order refuting all allegations of abusive language and corruption and denying the Motion
for Inhibition for lack of basis while ordering respondent Pamatong to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt of
court. Pantanosas filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Pamatong for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct by
supposedly causing the publication of an alleged bribe in a local newspaper and maliciously imputing motives to
complainant Pantanosas, thereby casting dishonor to and distrust in the judicial system.
RULING: As counsel for the plaintiffs, it was incumbent upon Pamatong to observe and maintain respect towards the judicial
office then being occupied by Pantanosas. Instead of insisting on similar conduct from his clients, Pamatong was the first to
cast doubt on the impartiality and independence of the court. A news article detailing the events that precipitated the
bribery charge against complainant Pantanosas was published with the participation of Pamatong. Pamatong had no reason
to divulge his grievances before the public as he had already lodged a complaint against complainant Pantanosas with the
OCA.

A.C. 7330, 14 June 2016
❏RULING: As counsel for the plaintiffs, it was incumbent upon Pamatong to observe and maintain
respect towards the judicial office then being occupied by Pantanosas. Instead of insisting on
similar conduct from his clients, Pamatong was the first to cast doubt on the impartiality and
independence of the court. A news article detailing the events that precipitated the bribery
charge against complainant Pantanosas was published with the participation of Pamatong.
Pamatong had no reason to divulge his grievances before the public as he had already lodged a
complaint against complainant Pantanosas with the OCA.
❏PENALTY: SUSPENSION from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this
Decision with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more
severe sanction.

Canete v. Puti
A.C. 10949, August 14, 2019
❏DOCTRINE: When "bakla" is used in a pejorative and deprecating manner, then it becomes derogatory.
Such offensive language finds no place in the courtroom or in any other place for that matter. Atty. Puti
ought to be aware that using the term "bakla" in a derogatory way is no longer acceptable — as it should
have been in the first place.
❏FACTS: Atty. Puti was complained of appearing in court while he was intoxicated and making
discourteous and inappropriate remarks against the public and private prosecutors as well as the judge.
In certain occasions, he called the complaint’s counsel “bakla” and made remarks against public
prosecutor saying “Malaki siguro bayad sa inyo.”. He even stated “I am going to think the Honorable
Court is bias[ed].
❏RULING: The TSN plainly show that Atty. Puti employed impertinent and discourteous language towards
the opposing counsels. The term "bakla”, while not by itself derogatory, was used pejoratively and in a
deprecating manner. Further, by nonchalantly accusing the prosecutors of having been bribed, he
overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness, and candor towards the opposing counsels. Finally, Atty.
Puti’s criticisms of the judge were not made respectfully and through legitimate channels. While Atty.
Puti is guilty of using inappropriate language against the opposing counsels and the judge, such
transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit his suspension.
❏Atty. Artemio Puti GUILTY of violating Canons 8 and 11 and Rules 8.01, 11.03, and 11.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court REPRIMANDS him with STERN WARNING.

Aguilar-Dyquiangco v. Arellano
A.C. 10541, July 12, 2016
❏DOCTRINE: Lawyers should refrain from obtaining loans from their clients, in order to avoid the
perils of abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him by such client.
❏FACTS: During the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them, Respondent
frequently borrowed money from Complainant and her husband. Apart from this, respondent
acquired merchandise from Complainant without paying for the same, induced Complainant to
open joint bank accounts, etc.
❏RULING: We have previously emphasized that it is unethical for a lawyer to obtain loans from
Complainant during the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent
even exacerbated her infractions when she issued worthless checks to pay for her debts.
Respondent also admitted that she commingled her money and those of the Complainant for
the bracelet business. Respondent has not shown that she had made any effort to separate her
funds from Complainant's money and properly account for the same.
❏Atty. Arellano is suspended from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) YEARS for violating
Rules 16.02, 16.04, among others.

Lopez v. Cristobal
A.C. 12146, October 10, 2018
❏DOCTRINE/RULING: Canon 18 clearly mandates that a lawyer is duty-bound to competently and
diligently serve his client once the former takes up the latter's cause. A lawyer who desires to retire from
an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court.
❏FACTS: Complainant Lopez alleged that despite knowledge of the lower court's directive, Atty. Cristobal
failed to file the position paper required by the lower court. He further averred that Atty. Cristobal
misrepresented to him that she already filed their position paper in court. Lopez informed Atty. Cristobal
of his decision to stop her engagement as his counsel but the latter did not file her withdrawal as
counsel.
❏RULING: Atty. Cristobal failed to live up to her duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of her
oath and the CPR. Her neglect of a legal matter entrusted to her amounts to inexcusable negligence for
which she must be administratively liable. The Court finds no credence to Atty. Cristobal's defense that
this was due to failure to pay attorney’s fee. A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the
written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court.
❏Atty. Milagros Isabel A. Cristobal LIABLE for violation of Canons 18 and 22 and Rules 18.03, 18.04 and
22.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and she is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six (6) months.

Reyes v. Gubatan
A.C. 12839, November 3, 2020
❏FACTS: Reyes secured the services of Atty. Gubatan who was also his friend. Atty. Gubatan
loaned money from Reyes several times. The said money was still unpaid as Atty. Gubatan
refused. He argues that such the load need not be paid as it is the compensation for his services.
❏DOCTRINE/ RULING: Atty. Gubatan violated Canon 16, Rule 16.04. He also abused the trust and
confidence given by his clients. In doing so he also violated Canon 7. Indeed, a lawyer is entitled
to protection against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment for legal services.
However, any disagreement as regards professional fees is not a matter that a lawyer could
simply take into his own hands, for there are proper legal steps to be followed in order to
recover his just due. Lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients' money for
themselves by the mere fact that the clients owe them attorney's fees.
❏PENALTY: Atty. Gubatan is SUSPENDED for 3 months from the practice of law with a STERN
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Ong v. Bijis
A.C. 13054, November 23, 2011
❏DOCTRINE: At the same time, notaries public who violate the Notarial Rules also fail to adhere to Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), which requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law
and legal processes. They also violate Rule 1.01 of the CPR which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral,
and deceitful conduct.
❏FACTS: This was a disbarment complaint against Atty. Bijis who was claimed to have notarized SPAs and a real estate mortgage where
some affiants were already dead. Ong loaned to a group of people who were believed to be registered owners of a certain property. In
return, she received 2 real estate mortgages which were notarized by Atty. Bijis. The payments for the loan became due but no payments
were made. Ong found out that the property was owned by a different person and that some affiants in the mortgage were already dead.
❏RULING: Atty. Bijis violated Section 1 Rule II, and Section 2b, Rule IV of the Notarial Rules. He did not know the persons whose names
appeared in the subject documents. As such he should have identified well the affiants through competent evidence. However, all he did
was look at their tax certificate which is not a competent evidence as it does not contain a photo and a signature of the person involved.
Furthermore, he also notarized the document knowing that the petitioner was not there. With this, he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct.
❏PENALTY: He is SUSPENDED for 6 months. His notarial commission is REVOKED. He is PROHIBITED from being commissioned as a notary
public for 2 years with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Monares v. Munoz
A.C. Nos. 5582, 5604, & 5652, January 24, 2017
❏ FACTS: Munoz was the counsel of the National Electric Administration which took over the
Albay Electric Cooperative (ALECO). He was retained as their counsel and at the same time he
was the Provincial Legal Officer. Munoz argues that he was given by the Governor an
authorization to engage in private practice.
❏ DOCTRINE/ RULING: The Court found that Munoz represented with conflicting interests. The
test of conflicting interest is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client. Also, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against
his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.

Monares v. Munoz
A.C. Nos. 5582, 5604, & 5652, January 24, 2017
❏ RULING: In this case, Munoz was the counsel for ALECO where he was seeking to stop the
election of the new set of Board of Directors. At the same time, he was also the counsel in a
petition to stop the scheduled election of the ALECO Board of Directors. Hence, the conflict
of interest is apparent.
❏ PENALTY: He is SUSPENDED for 3 years with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of any
violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Sioson v. Apoya Jr.
A.C. Nos.12044, July 23, 2018
❏ FACTS: Complainant secured the services of respondent to be the lawyer for an annulment of marriage. Two thousand
dollars was sent to the respondent as an initial down payment. After that, the complainant did not here from
respondent. She further found out that the respondent did not act on the case. So she terminated their contract. When
she asked for her money back, respondent told her that the money was spent and the half would be returned. However,
nothing was returned.
❏ RULING: The acts committed by Atty. Apoya, Jr. thus fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule
16.01 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of Canon 18. The respondents failure to file the civil case and failure
to return his client violated the Lawyer’s Oath, which mandates no lawyer shall delay any man for money or malice. He
violated Canon 1 because respondent employed devious conduct by manifestly delaying the return of complainant’s
money. He further violated Canon 16 which requires that a lawyer must account for the client’s money and promptly
return the same. The fact that he neglected a legal matter entrusted him shows a violation of Rule 18.04.
❏ PENALTY: He is SUSPENDED for 2 years with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt
with more severely. He is ORDERED to return the amount of $2000 dollars to complainant with interest 6% per annum
from the date of demand until full payment within 90 days from the Decision. He is FINED in the amount of P10,000 for
disobedience of the orders of the IBP. Failure to comply with the foregoing directives will warrant the imposition of a
more severe penalty.

Pabalan v. Salva
A.C. Nos.12098, March 20, 2019
❏ FACTS: Pabalan claimed that she and Salva were live-in partners. She alleged that 1) "with
sweet words and promise of marriage," Salva deceived her into taking him in her condo unit
and induced her to advance the funding for his proposed law office; 2) she and Salva entered
into an agreement wherein she would solicit clients for Salva and they would evenly divide
the attorney's fees paid by the clients, not knowing that a partnership between a lawyer and
non-lawyer was illegal; 3) Salva is a womanizer with children from different women, and he
faked a certificate of non-marriage (CENOMAR) in order to enter into a marriage for
convenience with a U.S. citizen in 2008; 4) Salva was her counsel in a case before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and he failed to represent her with zeal, even
withdrawing as counsel prior to his substitution; and 5) Salva neglected to return more than
P1 million she incurred in putting up his law office, including payment of her shares in the
solicitation of clients which she endorsed to him per their agreement.

Pabalan v. Salva
A.C. Nos.12098, March 20, 2019
❏ FACTS: Pabalan stated that she was a witness in another disbarment case filed by Benito
against Salva. She also claimed that she was emboldened to file a separate case when
Abastillas filed another disbarment case against Salva also.
❏ RULING: The Court dismissed the complaint because the cases in the disbarment complaints
were all the same. In another disbarment complaint filed by Benito, Salva was given the
punishment of suspension and so the Court is constrained to dismiss the complaint involving
the same set of facts.

Ready Form Inc. v. Castillon Jr.
A.C. No. 11774, March 21, 2018
❏ FACTS: Ready Form Incorporated (RFI) alleges that Atty. Castillon violated Rules 1.01, 1.02, 1.03 when he used
RFI’s Income Tax Return in filing a Petition for Blacklisting before the National Printing Office. RFI was one of
the companies who participated in a public bidding conducted by the NPO which required all bidders to
re-submit their eligibility documents. Their submission, led to NPO-BAC imposing upon them a suspension of
1 year due to the misrepresentation and misdeclaration it committed when it submitted alleged false ITRs
and financial statements of the calendar year 2007.
❏ RULING: The Court dismissed the complaint because what was mentioned in the ITRs were financial
statements filed with the SEC. An individual should not be allowed to claim relief just because a lawyer is
aiding or was hired by an opponent. While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary
punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, they will on the other hand, protect them
from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends most
entirely on his reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons and
particularly disgruntled opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through
which to vent their rancor on members of the Bar" (Santos vs. Dichoso, Adm. Case No. 1825, August 22,
1978).

Cabarroguis v. Basa
A.C. No. 8789, March 11, 2020
❏ DOCTRINE: Inasmuch as the Court has exhorted lawyers not to be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant
of criticisms (especially those which are fair or mild) against them as litigation is inherently a hostile endeavor
between adverse or contending parties, this has been weighed against an oft-repeated similar exhortation of
the Court to treat their opposing counsels with courtesy, dignity and civility.
❏ FACTS: Atty Cabarroguis, in his complaint, stated that he was the retained counsel of his friend who filed an
estafa case against his sister-in-law, Erlinda. Erlinda’s counsel was also her brother, Atty. Basa. He alleged that
Atty. Basa exhibited immaturity when he repeatedly spelled his name as HONESTo and Honest. Atty. Basa also
filed numerous administrative, civil, and criminal cases against him which were all malicious and unfounded.
❏ RULING: The Court finds that Atty. Basa violated the Lawyer’s Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.03, Canon 8, Rule 8.01,
Canon 12, Rules 12.02 and 12.04 when he (1) filed baseless criminal suits against Atty. Cabarroguis; (2) poked
fun at Atty. Cabarroguis by deliberately misspelling his name in an omnibus motion; and (3) caused delay in
the estafa case after moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge after eight years in trial. The Court
agrees with the original findings of the IBP that Atty. Basa employed harassing tactics against Atty.
Cabarroguis after he, on behalf of his client, filed an estafa case against Atty. Basa's sister in 2002.
❏ PENALTY: He is SUSPENDED for 6 months.

Macapagal v. Young
A.C. 9298, July 29, 2019
❏FACTS: The case stemmed from a letter sent by the respondent to complainant judge that an administrative and
criminal complaint will be filed against her if the writ of possession or demolition would be implemented. In the
proceeding Atty. Young said that she may be “stubbornly pursuing” the demolition operations because of her
desire to please and gratify the Mayor of Paranaque City. He also stated in his Comment that he sent the letter to
courteously warn and prevent Judge Macapagal from committing a judicial act which would be a transgression of
his clients’ rights to due process and which would make her “truly vulnerable to criminal and administrative
complaints.“
❏RULING: These statements, in the mind of the Court, indubitably demonstrate how Atty. Young had failed to
observe the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers. While he denied in his motion for reconsideration
that he criticized Judge Macapagal, the Court finds otherwise. In Pantanosas, Jr. v. Pamatong, the Court reiterated
that while lawyers have the right, both as officers of the court and as citizens, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges, such criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. He violated Canon 11.
❏PENALTY: He is REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.

Ko v. Uy Lampasa
AC No. 11584, March 6, 2019
DOCTRINE: According to Bar Matter No. 850, an IBP member shall only be declared delinquent
for failure to comply with the education requirements “after the sixty-day period for compliance
has expired.” This 60-day period shall commence from the time such member received a notice
of non-compliance. Without the notice of compliance, a member who believes that the units he
or she had taken already amounts to full compliance may be declared delinquent without being
made aware of such lack of units and with no chance to rectify the same.
FACTS: Complainant averred that Uy Lampasa committed perjury and has filed pleadings in
court without the necessary MCLE compliance number, attaching to his complaint several
pleadings and manifestations in support of such.
RULING: Uy Lampasa eventually completed the required units within the Fourth Compliance
Period. Likewise, she was also issued Certificates of Exemption for the First, Second, and Third
Compliance Periods. Uy Lampasa manifested that the presiding judge of the RTC where the cases
involved were pending required her to submit her Certificates of Compliance. When she
received said certificates, she immediately submitted the same to the trial court.

Ko v. Uy-Lampasa
A.C. 11584, March 6, 2019
DOCTRINE: The Notarial Rules clearly mandate that before notarizing a document, the notary public should
require the presence of the very person who executed the same. The presence of the parties to the deed is
necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature.
FACTS: Ko claimed that Uy-Lampasa notarized two purported deeds of sale over a parcel of land despite knowing
that these two were spurious. The Deeds of Absolute Sale differ as regards the name of the vendors. Only eight of
the ten Sultan siblings are involved. Ko claimed that an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale
covering the same property was executed between his son, Jason, and all ten of the Sultan siblings. Complainant
calls the attention of the Court to the fact that in contrast with the deeds of sale notarized by Uy-Lampasa, this
Extra-judicial Settlement contains the signatures and thumbmarks of all the Sultan siblings.
RULING: When Uy-Lampasa affixed her signature and notarial seal on the deeds of sale, she led the public to
believe that the parties personally appeared before her and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents
thereof when in fact, they deny doing so. Her conduct is laden with dangerous possibilities, bearing in mind the
conclusiveness accorded to the due execution of a document. Her conduct did not only jeopardize the rights of
the parties to the instrument; it also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of
notarization.
PENALTY: She is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months. Her notarial commission is REVOKED. She is
PROHIBITED from being commission as a notary public for 2 years. She is WARNED That repetition of the same or

Sorongon Jr. v. Gargantos, Sr.
A.C. 11326, June 27, 2018
❏FACTS: Complainant gave respondent lawyer a sum of money. It would cover the acceptance
fee, appearance fee, and other fees until the resolution of the case. They also agreed that the
complainant would be the one to pay for the necessary fees should they have hearings outside
Quezon City (travel, meal, and such). Respondent demanded additional pocket money to go see
his wife in the US or else he would not attend their hearings. Complainant did not give the
pocket money. This resulted to the respondent lawyer not attending the hearing.
❏DOCTRINE/ RULING: Respondent lawyer violated Canon 16, Rule 16.01 which provides that a
lawyer shall account for and hold in trust the money or property from the client. To add here
was the fact that he was paid, and still abandoned his client for not bringing the said pocket
money.
❏PENALTY: The penalty is tempered due to mitigating circumstance of age (the lawyer is 82 yo).
He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months. He is ordered to RETURN the 200,000
pesos within 90 days from the receipt of decision. Failure to return would warrant a more severe
penalty.

Zamora v. Mahinay
A.C. 12622, February 20, 2020
❏FACTS: Atty. Mahinay was alleged to have threatened the judge with an administrative complaint if he would not
grant the motion. This was assumed from the act of furnishing the Court Administrator with a copy of his motion
for reconsideration. Zamora filed a Complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mahinay before the IBP for a violation
of Canon 11, Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
❏ISSUE: Did the IBP correctly dismiss the complaint against Atty. Mahinay?
❏RULING: The Court dismissed the complaint. It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases
such as disbarment proceedings is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise. While Zamora is correct that the very pleading itself is the best piece of
evidence to prove whether Atty. Mahinay had, indeed, violated Canon 11, Rule 11.03 of the CPR, the Court finds
that this proffered evidence failed to reach the threshold of the quantum of proof required. The Court does not
find the language used in the subject motion for reconsideration to be offensive, abusive, malicious, or
intemperate in any way. It did not spill over the walls of decency or propriety.

Tantuico - Legal Ethics

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Tantuico - Legal Ethics

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

LEGAL ETHICS

2022 BAR SYLLABUS

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 1

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 2

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 3

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 4

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 5

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 6

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 7

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 8

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 9

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 10

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 11

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 12

“ By certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 13

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 14

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 15

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 16

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 17

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 18

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 19

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 20

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 21

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 22

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 23

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 24

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 25

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 26

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 27

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 28

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 29

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 30

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 31

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 32

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 33

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 34

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 35

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 36

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 37

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 38

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 39

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 40

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 41

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 42

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 43

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 44

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 45

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 46

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 47

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 48

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 49

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 50

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 51

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 52

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 53

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 54

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 55

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 56

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 57

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 58

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 59

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 60

ATTY. FINA DELA CUESTA-TANTUICO 61