others. On the ot ly objecti mnal content of practical judgment nents are brought scone. Thus in this point of view, objective merely rea: in their motivational content since they do not present values for particular agents; they rather present reasons for things to occur. In these tw s, Nagel observes that there is an essential parallel that exists between the two arguments. To him, each argument relies on a distinction between tw standpoints towards the world and oneself. To Na the first argument is aided by token-reflexives while the other is not. Further, Nagel asserts that the second argument pertains to temporal neutrality in the ‘prudence as it offers impersonality in the lism. However, Nagel is convinced timelessness and actions that they ics should struggle egoism or egocentrism in the same manner as reasoning should struggle against the the here-and-the-now. expressed by me "1, On the other hand, the impersonal standpoint provi ing one’s location in tes that from the context a view of the world Based on these meanings, Nagel EIHICS/Part One/Chapter One landpoint, the essence of personal judgments, tudes, and the like, refers to the world viewed vantage point of the viewer, Le. subject her hand, descriptions of the world from personal standpoint do not require the grammatical the locus of the vantage point. However, 1¢ impersonal standpoint of the world does not ical first person, yet, the impersonal accommodate all phenomena (as) describable from the personal standpoi includes) facts about the subject be the ease because the impersonal standpoint plays a role in the explication of the idea that one is just a person among other(s) (persons). This should come to the fore if we are interested of asking: What it is to regard others as persons in fully the same sense in which one is a person oneself? [Nagel brings home the point that one can only say (do) to other persons anything that he has said (done) to oneself. For Nagel, it must be possible to say of other perso anything which one can say of oneself. To Nagel, the difference between personal and impersonal standpoints is negligible, though such difference is significant. So, any type of thing which one can significantly assert of oneself - what th am amused.” In other word person, or by using different grammatical cluding shifts of tense, cannot modify the sense ‘of what is asserted about the circumstance, which is the subject of the statement. Hence, whether the case is one’s own or that of another, the same fact may be expressed though they may be done so from several points of view. say of myself in saying (thai ie shi ETHICS Part One/Chapter One *Nagel does not deny that distinct personal standpoints, towards the same circumstance yield judgments and expectations that are extremely different. To assert, however, of these differences is only necessary for purposes of needing evidence which are likely drawn from certain psychological (empirical) attributions, To Nagel, the difference between other standpoints and the first person standpoint makes the difference between needing evidence and needing none at all. ation) given any st For example: “If see someone angry and I say (On the other hand, I myself am also angry, s0 ments that pertai f grammatical persons, i. the angry). There may be other would depend on one’s an assertion. However, is difference does not obscut In Nage'’s analysis, despite the fact that one’s own experiences may be different compared to those of others such are still open to impersonal description, inasmuch as ‘one is just a person among others. This means that one’s unique grades of experiences can be singled out impersonally. The only personal residue, therefore, ie., one (is angry) and the difference to be drawn w preference of a grout is clear, Nagel Juded in the system of impersonal beliefs to which eee SHEE aaaireanbe 1am commited bya personal judg the basic same statement garding ang personal premise itself, the premise which locates “me” in ‘employed from appropriately different standpoints to say [pe wortd iach kay toon Caparpmaliy Gesetoe. something common about a given situation. po First-and Third-Person Claims Nagel asserts that when one regards himself as a rd oneself ‘Third-person claims have behavioristic meaning. On the other hand, first-person claims express psychological condition of the subject. The view that first-person psychological claims cannot be said of someone else refers to solipsism. Solipsism, as a metaphysical position, denies the supposition that there are other persons besides oneself. Thus, in solipsism, concepts applied by one to his own experiences, do not apply in the same sense to anything, which is not one’s experience. propose the following principle: Whoever makes any judgment from the personal standpoint, whether about himself or about others, is committed to two further judgments: (a) Animpersonal judgment to the same effect about the same situation and characters; Here, Nagel quotes Wittgenstein of the latter’s contention of what solipsism is: “If what I feel is always my pain only what can the supposition mean that someone else feels pain?” He makes it clear that to the solipsists, ‘one’s experience of pain, or whatev person who experiences it. So, (b) A basic personal statement saying who, in the! personally described scene, he is. Despite this differing judgments, however, Nagel maintains his stance that one is committed by a personal judgment to the acceptance of such beliefs, if one regards ofieself as merely a person among others. hold that I alone exist independently, and that what | ‘Enace/Pa One/Chopter On [EtHics/Part One /Chapter One 1rR governed by a belief that I should always act in my own terest? To Nagel, such principle cannot be applied to impersonal stand are applicabl les, however, must ‘idea of oneself and one’s own experiences as model, one may not have enough reason to infer from what is known to significant notion of other selves and their experiences. So to avoid solipsism, itis necessary that the conception of e oneself must be included in the idea of ing that 'm staying is burning? If I believe that I have to keep myself alive, then, I (as a perso Id h building.” This judgment, to Nagel, bears a 0 that it does not matter whether “I am Juan de la Cruz” or “Dr. Jose Rizal” or “somebody else.” What is necessary that the belief to leave the burning building quickly in order to keep oneself alive is applicable to any person who ing which is burning. Nagel, however, is not contended with the universality of ethical judgments. He is quick to reinforce his not ‘motivational content in ethical judgments. To Nagel, it is not enough that one is able to say of others what they should do based on impersonal grounds. {Person Practical Judgments and Moti one’s experiences, On the Issue of Dissociation This is a form of solipsism where claims have to be dissociated from the idea of oneself as merely a person among others. But to Nagel, this is again not a good method or adequate treatment to solve the problems in soli ‘The reason is that dissociation does not also give room for personal pra igments that could be applicable persons. For example, an announcement was made that a bomb is planted somewhere in the building. The sol meaning and vali and true onl ‘person practical judgments, ie, I's reason to do something, or the judgment that one has reason to do wwe the building before the bomb judgment or claim that is not assigned to the idea of oneself as a person among others. So, to somethi les the acce on for the problem, Nagel proposes that any personal prac refers to jonal content. judgment must carry with it a commi differently, the motivational content in first. person practical judgments pertains tothe acceptance of 3 ion for doing or ever, asserts that the m impersonal practical judgm effect of universality. This means that one’ action carties with it a principle that applies to all perso ss well. Hence, it is also applicable to judgments about what others should do. th a very simple e But why can’t we just setth id do should only b 2 [EIHICS/Pont One Chapter ‘thIes/pam One/Chapter One ”Nagel proceeds with his argument on the three possible views relative to the relation between first-person practical judgment and motivation. They are as follows: (1) Judgments about what one should do have no role in the justific practical because motives are herein not associated. For example, one may judge that he “should” do something. However, he often finds that he “wants” to do it. This does not give way for a rational assessment of motives. (2) Judgments about what one should do provide the premises for truly practical judgments (which are dependent on principles about what to do of wha one should do). Here, motivational content first-person can be included in the imper practical judgments. First-person practical judgments by themselves possess motivational content. Here first-person judgments about reasons are inherently relevant to decisions about wiat to do which provide the basis for justification of action. It is the third relation which Nagel maintains to be person acknowledgment of a ymething is at the same time an acknowledgment of a justification for doing it. Thus, first-person acknowledgment of such a reason has significant motivational content. for one to do an ‘confined to his own In sum, solipsism cannot qual altruistic act. A solipsist is diametr world, viz.: world of experienc A solipsist’s mode of action is always categorically egoistic and personal so that his actions cannot yield for impersonal practical reasons his acts. Thus in % ipsism, the essential person judgment, 1 cannot be correlated Solipsism, therefore, can never accommodate an tic act. Critique on Nagel's Theory of Altruism Nagel is a serious moral philosopher. He thinks deep in his moral teaching specifically on Altruism. ‘There is hardly any objections regarding his concept of prudence, reason (tim . theoretical, and practical) motivational conte iding his concept of self (personal, impersonal, tenseless) that led him to a discussion ‘on solipsism and dissociat We have to personally appreciate his way of developing his view of altruism especially in his way of establishing a parallelism of Prudence and Altruism with the Self in relation to Others in the context of the present and the future, Nagel's concept of altruism is a definite cure of a disease called selfishness, egoism, solipsism, or any theory that firmly embraces the self or the ego as its beholder’s only interest, preoccupation, and concern. Nagel’s view on altruism is never myopic nor parochial. Rather, it ears a success in smashing into pieces any interest that is devoted only to the self. It dissects down bones, the issues on: “How to be good?” “Why I should be good?” "What am T ought to do?” to a lucid primordial ground of mor: Nagel succeeds in casting away the limitation of the doing of an act in a specified duration of time. To him, do good to others” is not imprisoned in time, nor incarcerated in the context of affinity, sympathy. If one has to do good for should have no reason to postpone it, not to uphold a selfish. [ETMICS/Pait One/Chapler One 8jon that he has been good before and hy being one, so now he'll do the opposite. Altruism, therefore, cuts across time, space, and self-centered Nagel’s sharp advocacy of the impersonal self and the tenseless self are, enough antidote to soften, if not to mat, the bitter blow of egoism and solipsism, Objectively, we can infer that Nagel can help one ian. His radical view of Alt .”" among others. In this world of exaggerated or heightened ‘materialism, it is always easy to lose oneself in the eddy of selfishness and self-centeredness. But, here is Nagel's appeal to all of us to go back to the fold of our responsibility to others. L. Ralph Barton Perry's Concept of Value, Morality, and Moral Concepts Meaning of Value ‘To Perry values are primarily subjective. However he remarks that one must not be eroded to draw a conclusion that this giving of a certain meaning of value is an arbitrary matter which is dictated by caprice or by a mere personal ‘convenience of the proponent of said meaning, Perry is right with his view that even when a value is subjective, author must also consider the objecti ity which he values. This means that the is of less importance than the objectivity of trouble with Perry is his insistence that values are subjective, This is too dangerous if context of morality, because this would result to relativis Of the moral norms. If axiology must be related w’ %6 'EIHICS/Port One/Chapler One must be placed that moral values are morality is objective. Morality does of the whims and caprices of a person’s outlook that must conform to morality. lere, Perry is obvi values values or value being carried by morality, a huma undertaking which is interested of man’s actions. 1 then, any act which captures a man’s interest is valuable to that person. Clearly, this is a risky enterprise in that leads to utter moral subjectivism. ‘To reiterate the contention, morality does not depend on whatever interest does an agent have. It is not that ‘morality is the one to conform toa moral agent's interest, itis the other way around, Meaning of Morality Perry defines morality as man’s endeavor to harmonize conflicting interes event conflict when it threatens, to remove conflict and to advance from the negative harmony of ve harmony of cooperation. Mo lution of the problem created by conflict among the interests of the same or of different persons, In the foregoing lines, we read Perry advertising his moral theory called “interest theory of value.” If morality is equivalent to an establishment of harmony in the presence of antagonism, th ry which provides a set of n that are meant to resolve such ETHICS/Past One/Chapter One 7sm. Let us take a look at the issue of murder, 1 or of genocide, From the the murderers ing humans is good because such will ethics of war and destra beings presumably uphold the principles of the ethics of peace. Perry is so ambiguous with his understanding ‘morality. Morality cannot be quantified only from the amt indo . a married man may meet a young and dy who shows tempting affections to him. ‘This could provoke the married man to establish an relationship with the young lady. But if this fello committed to his marital vows with his wife he will sure the lady. In other words, moral lity requires a deeper interest if such is disastrous to the moral agent tis not hard to find Perry's contention of morality from the context of establishing, a harmony o mor so loosely anchored in shifting sands. Perry’s concept ‘morality does not stand on solid grounds. Interest has a of shades, textures, or nuances so that it could offer a devastating bl shall be embraced in the province of ‘morality specially if it is construed from the context of the subject Interpretation of Moral Concepts Perry sketches two meanings of good, viz. (1) general sense; and (2) special sense. Inthe former, Perry argues that ives from good is the character rmoniously organized. :, Perry says arted to objects by intere: Perry's definition of good ‘view isin harmony with Max Sch land Rath’s contention of value as good so the general point of enjoys, wills, and hopes for is always good. This ¢ good and value are convertible or Whatever is deemed value is good and whatever is considered good is value. This is the other version of the ton of good as that which wory of good. yyment, will, or hope is good inasmuch as the existing good in this regard may be good only on the part of the moral agent and not on the other. Rape, stealing, cheating, and the like are all good only on the part of the doer ~ the doers being s0 desirous, etc, in the performance of these acts, These are examples of the apparent goodness we mentioned. Now, Perry claims that an object is morally good in the special sense when the interest which makes it good satisfies the requirement of harmony. * EIHICS/Pest One/Chapler One ETHICS/Pest One Chapter One