AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

What is violent extremism? Violent extremism refers to:

● a person or group who is willing to use violence; or

● advocates the use of violence by others, to achieve a political, ideological or religious
goal

What is terrorism?

Terrorism is an act or a threat of violence that is intended to force the public or any government
by intimidation to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. It is illegal to commit or
support terrorism in Australia or overseas.

Empowering local communities

Community leaders and groups play an important role in preventing people from being drawn
into violent extremism. Here are some steps that community groups and organizations can take:

● promote social cohesion and participation through local community services and events
● identify and support vulnerable people through referral and counselling programs
● provide support programs for young people that build their resilience to harmful
influences, such as mentoring, training and education programs
● encourage positive and constructive participation in Australia's political processes; and
● support those affected by violence.

What is the Australian Govt. doing?

The Australian Government works with community organizations, state and territory
governments, law enforcement and academia to prevent and counter all forms of violent
extremism.

Since 2013, the Australian Government has invested over $50 million through the countering
violent extremism program to:
 ● build the resilience of communities to violent extremism
● reduce the spread of terrorist propaganda online; and
● divert and deradicalize at-risk individuals.

Rehabilitation programs

Rehabilitating individuals who have been charged with terrorism-related offences reduces the
risk of further violence and influencing others to do the same. The Australian Government works
closely with state and territory governments to deliver rehabilitation programs. The goal of these
programs is to help high-risk offenders successfully reintegrate into society. The Australian
Government also manages terrorist offenders who have not rehabilitated. A court may detain an
offender after their sentence has ended if they continue to pose an unacceptable risk to the
community.

Online engagement

The Australian Government is committed to keeping Australians safe online. Following the
March 2019 terrorist attacks in Christchurch, the New Zealand and Australian Government
established the Taskforce to Combat Violent Terrorist and Extreme Material Online. The
Taskforce made a number of recommendations to Government on practical, tangible and
effective measures and commitments to combat the upload and dissemination of terrorist and
extreme violent material.

The term ‘radicalization’ describes the process where a person becomes extreme in their thinking
and behavior. If you are aware that a person has radicalized to the point of promoting or
threatening violence, you have a responsibility to report it. Each person is unique and there is no
single pathway of radicalization towards violent extremism. However, there are a number of
behaviors that are commonly observed in people who are on a radicalization pathway.

Ideological changes

During radicalization, a person’s ideology will become increasingly extreme. People tend to
become less tolerant of other points of view and may vilify those who disagree with them.
Increasing religious devoutness or commitment to beliefs is not the same as radicalisation
towards violent extremism. Hateful ideologies might be disturbing or offensive, but if someone
has not advocated the use of violence or other unlawful activities, it is not considered violent
extremism. The use of the internet to view, download and spread violent extremist material is
often part of the radicalization process. Some people may occasionally view such material out of
curiosity, but people who are radicalising tend to collect and share this material with others.

Social changes

Many people join extremist groups for social reasons. As people start to radicalise, they will
often pull away from common, mainstream activities and friendship groups. They may argue
with family and friends over political or ideological views. Some people will start to interact
more often with smaller, tight-knit networks of people who share their beliefs. Some groups may
even require a person to go through an initiation or take an oath of allegiance to prove their
commitment. Recruitment into violent extremist groups may occur face-to-face or online.

Negative experiences

A significant negative incident, or a series of incidents, could trigger or accelerate an individual’s

radicalisation process, such as:

● exposure to hateful attitudes and actions, either as a victim or as an offender

● adverse changes in their living, education or employment situation
● overseas events that harm their community, family or friends
● personal issues such as health problems, addiction, anger or social problems
● breakdowns of friendships and/or personal relationships
● mental health issues; and
● the experience of discrimination.

People dealing with these issues will benefit from strong support from their family, friends and
community.

Criminal activity

During the radicalisation process, a person may start to ‘act out’ to draw attention to their beliefs
or send a message. These actions might include:

● vandalism
● minor property damage
● trespassing; or
● illegal protesting.
Radicalised individuals might try to influence a government or a section of the community by
making threats. Once a person commits to violence, an actual violent attack may take place very
quickly. They may also become increasingly suspicious or nervous about the activities of
governments or law enforcement.

Extremist material online could include:

● articles, images, speeches or videos that encourage hate or violence

● statements or posts made on social media, chat rooms or blogs that encourage hate or
violence
● content encouraging people to commit acts of terrorism
● websites created or hosted by terrorist organizations
● terrorist training materials
● suspicious content regarding use or sale of chemicals online
● videos or images of terrorist attacks

“Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses by

Chris Angus”

Radicalisation happens when a person's thinking and behaviour become significantly different
from how most of the members of their society and community view social issues and participate
politically.

In contrast, violent extremism occurs when “a person or group decides that fear, terror and
violence are justified to achieve ideological, political or social change, and acts accordingly”.
Violent extremism is an extension of radicalisation from a relatively benign expression of a
viewpoint to the use of violence to achieve a particular goal.

In short, radical individuals may hold hateful or anti-social ideas that many others might find
offensive or disturbing. Nevertheless, if their ideas do not extend to using violence or advocating
the use of violence, they should not be considered violent extremists.
Causes of radicalisation and violent extremism:

 Radical ideology, limited understanding

 Personal relationships and influence
 Identity and social exclusion
 Perceived injustice for a person’s community

GEDSI Approach and Action Plan

*Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)

*Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

*Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion (GEDSI)

“ADDENDUM TO THE GCTF GOOD PRACTICES ON WOMEN AND

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, WITH A FOCUS ON
MAINSTREAMING GENDER”

This Addendum updates the Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF) Good Practices on
Women and. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) to include a focus on mainstreaming gender,
based on new insights on gender-specific motivations and pathways of radicalization to violence.
It provides practical guidance to inform effective CVE policy and programming in light of the
evolving roles of women in violent extremist and terrorist organizations and the impact of
counterterrorism strategies on women's human rights and women's organizations.
Good Practices

Good Practice 1: Mainstream gender in CVE, including promoting policy coherence with WPS
frameworks

Good Practice 2: Build a stronger evidence base on gender and violent extremism, including
gendered aspects of men’s, women’s, boys’ and girls’ radicalization to violent extremism and
terrorism.

Good Practice 3: Ensure that CVE policies and programs recognize and involve women and girls
as critical stakeholders.

Good Practice 4: Risk assessment tools for violent extremism including FTFs and returning FTFs
should routinely consider gender norms and avoid stereotyping women as victims.

Good Practice 5: Ensure that CVE, including reintegration policies, are based on gender-
sensitive analysis of the conditions conducive to women and girls’ involvement in violent
extremism.

Good Practice 6: Develop a gender-sensitive approach to the handling of former FTFs (and their
families).

Good Practice 7: Design and Support Gender-Responsive Reintegration and Rehabilitation

Processes and Measures.
GOOD PRACTICES ON WOMEN AND COUNTERING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM

The inclusion of women and girls and gender mainstreaming are often overlooked in efforts to
counter violent extremism, despite the participation of women and girls in violent extremism and
terrorism, as well as their roles in prevention. This non-binding good practice document focuses
on women and gender aspects in the countering violent extremism (CVE) context.

Good practices

A. General Practices on Women and Gender in the CVE Context

Good Practice #1: Include women and girls and gender mainstreaming in the design,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all policies, laws, procedures, programs and
practices related to CVE

Good Practice #2: Ensure that CVE efforts counter women and girls’ involvement in violent
extremism, including by identifying gender dynamics in radicalization leading to terrorism and
preventing it among women and girls.

Good Practice #3: Recognize and promote the different roles of women and girls as critical
stakeholders in CVE, including in developing more localized, inclusive, credible, resonant, and
effective approaches.

Good Practice #4: Protect the human rights of women and girls, including their equality, non-
discrimination, and equal participation, and ensure that CVE efforts do not stereotype or
instrumentalize, women and girls.

Good Practice #5: Prevent and address the direct and indirect impacts of violent extremism and
terrorism on women and girls.
Good Practice #6: Involve men and boys in mainstreaming gender, advancing women and girls’
participation in CVE, and inclusive efforts to prevent and respond to violent extremism.

Good Practice #7: Include gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation in CVE policy and
programs to enhance effectiveness.

B. Countering Women and Girls’ Involvement in Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Good Practice #8: Build and use evidence-based approaches to identify and effectively address
the factors that lead to women and girls’ involvement in violent extremism and terrorism.

Good Practice #9: Ensure that CVE efforts, including alternative-narratives, address women and
girls’ involvement in violent extremism and terrorism.

Good Practice #10: Develop gender-sensitive disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration

programs that address the specific needs of women and girls on a path to terrorist radicalization
or involved in violent extremism.

C. Advancing Women and Girls’ Roles in CVE

Good Practice #11: Build the capacity of women and girls to contribute safely and productively
to CVE efforts in a manner tailored to local contexts.

Good Practice #12: Ensure the security of women and girls involved in CVE, including in civil
society, considering when labeling their efforts as such might be dangerous or counterproductive.

Good Practice #13: Engage women and girls at the local level as sources of influence within
families and communities to build resilience and localized, credible, and effective responses to
violent extremism.

Good Practice #14: Involve women and girls and mainstream gender in community engagement
and community-oriented policing efforts for CVE, through genuine partnerships based on trust
and the pursuit of common goals.
Good Practice #15: Engage and empower women in civil society and civil society actors working
in the field of women’s and human rights, especially women’s organizations, as critical CVE
stakeholders.

Good Practice #16: Prioritize engagement at the grassroots level with women in civil society and
civil society working in the field of women’s rights, to build upon local practices and support
local ownership.

Good Practice #17: Develop a framework that allows women in civil society and civil society
working in the field of women’s rights, especially women’s groups, to access resources and
undertake CVE activities.

Good Practice #18: Engage girls and young women through education and within informal and
formal educational environments to counter violent extremism.

Good Practice #19: Increase the participation of women at all levels, especially those
marginalized, and mainstream gender in the security bodies and other public authorities involved
in CVE.

Good Practice #20: Ensure the involvement of women and girls in developing and delivering
inclusive-narratives to violent extremism.

D. Women as Victims of Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Good Practice #21: Recognize and support women victims of terrorism, taking into account their
specific needs.

Good Practice #22: Highlight women victims of violent extremism and terrorism, including as
part of CVE efforts.
MISOGYNY & VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN BANGLADESH:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

KEY FINDINGS

1. Hostile sexist attitudes toward women and support for violence against women are the factors
most strongly associated with support for violent extremism. Individuals who support violence
against women are three times more likely to support violent extremism.

2. Misogyny is integral to the ideology, political identity, and political economy of current
violent extremist groups.

3. Religiosity, age, gender, level of education, employment, or geographic area are not
significantly associated with support for violent extremism.

Additional findings:

• The use of threats and violence to force women out of the public sphere is a significant part of
the way women’s behaviours and mobility are controlled, effectively precluding women from
meaningfully participating in leadership and decision-making roles.

• Women’s human rights are largely considered a threat in Bangladesh, and women human rights
activist are perceived to be seeking to give women power over men.

• Baseline attitudes towards women can be sexist, especially amongst men, and traditional
gender norms, including of the male breadwinner and female homemaker, are rigidly enforced.

• Veiling can be enforced through social pressure, threats of violence or outright violence. At the
same time, it can make women targets of violence.

• For women, education does not have any significant relationship with the other variables
included in the analysis—that is, greater education has little impact on their attitudes towards
violent extremism.
• Some politicians as well as extremist groups have been able to effectively mobilise around anti-
gender equal interpretations of issues such as inheritance laws, polygamy, divorce, alimony, and
female genital mutilation (FGM).

• Women’s use of the Internet and social media is policed as it is often perceived as a route
through which they might exercise greater freedom and, by extension, engage in licentious
behavior. However, women are more likely than men to identify online extremist material.

RECOMMENDATIONS

 Promote women’s participation in the public sphere and support women’s freedom of
movement.
 Presence of gender regressive views utilized as an early warning sign of violent
extremism.
 Further research is needed to understand the link between women supporting gender
regressive views and violent extremism.
 Promote and protect women’s human rights, and the space for women human rights
activists and civil society.
 Women identifying and preventing online recruitment by violent extremist organisations.
GOOD PRACTICES ON COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY-
ORIENTED POLICING AS TOOLS TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives tackle conditions conducive to radicalization

into violent extremism with the ultimate aim of denying terrorist groups new supporters and
recruits. The strategies and tools that governments and civil society organizations use to counter
violent extremism vary, reflecting differing conditions and settings.

The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) has addressed some of these strategies including:

1) focusing on prisons and delineating good practices on rehabilitating and reintegrating into
society violent extremist offenders who have disengaged from violent extremism;

2) enumerating good practices on working with victims of terrorism in the immediate aftermath
of a terrorist attack;

3) exploring the importance of multi-sectoral (i.e., government institutions, agencies, the private
sector, and civil society) approaches to CVE;

4) examining the methods of CVE communications most resonant with key audiences; and

5) measuring the effectiveness of CVE programming. Interwoven through CVE initiatives is the
need to develop solutions relevant to the audience being addressed.

Two key CVE tools that emphasize local strategies are community engagement and community-
oriented policing.

Good Practice Number 1: Approach community engagement and community-oriented policing

as long-term, sustained strategies, not short-term tactics, and do the requisite research in order to
understand local problems and grievances so that a local community is not targeted for security
reasons but is engaged for its own benefit.

Good Practice Number 2: Establish the methods with which to build trust in the community.
Trust is an integral part of community engagement and community-oriented policing, but one
that does not occur naturally and without concerted and sustained efforts.
Good Practice Number 3: Ensure that engagement efforts are broad based and fully inclusive, not
solely focused on one community or one specific ideology.

Good Practice Number 4: Take a holistic approach to community engagement and community-
oriented policing that involves all sectors of the society in order to find the right partners and
sustain the engagement.

Good Practice Number 5: Engage women as positive change agents in their communities.

Good Practice Number 6: Engage youth and leverage schools for positive messages.

Good Practice Number 7: Designate a specific individual to be the point person for engagement
with the community.

Good Practice Number 8: Empower communities to develop a counter narrative to the violent
extremist narrative and amplify the alternative message through all forms of media.

Good Practice Number 9: Engage both former violent extremists and victims of terrorism to
communicate counter narratives at both the local and national level.

Good Practice Number 10: Tailor community engagement and community oriented policing
trainings to address the issues and dynamics of the local community and to instill awareness of
potential indicators and behaviors.

Good Practice Number 11: Build assessment metrics into projects during concept development.

Good Practice Number 12: Recognize that community engagement and community-oriented
policing involve establishing, developing and sustaining enduring relationships.
A GENDER ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN
THE ONLINE SPACE IN BANGLADESH, INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND
THE PHILIPPINES

Summary:
The rise of social media and other platforms has changed the way these groups recruit members.
Terrorist groups can now tailor the content, style, and messaging of their propaganda to fit a
particular audience while achieving wide dissemination. This strategy has been particularly
useful in targeting women (Droogan et al 2018). In Asia, many governments, international
organizations, and even ASEAN2 have taken up the idea of online campaigns and digital
outreach. Over 215,000 searches for content related to terrorism and violent extremism were
made by women in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines over a two-month
period.

Overall, women performed 32% of all recorded searches. Analysis found men and women are
consuming gendered violent extremist and terrorist messaging via social media. For women,
these themes ranged from motherhood to combat; from freedom from secular States' 'restrictions'
on one's faith to finding true love.

ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND RADICALISATION: GENDER AND

VIOLENT EXTREMISM: AN ANALYSIS OF ONLINE BEHAVIOUR
ACROSS ASIA PACIFIC

Summary:
Moonshot CVE has been commissioned by UN Women to generate the first gender-
disaggregated study of support for violent extremism in the online space in Indonesia,
Bangladesh, the Philippines and Malaysia. The project also aims to highlight any potential
associations between rates of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) and support for violent
extremism in these countries. Data collection is currently underway using our interactive
monitoring tool, The Tracker, which maps appetite for violently extremist content on search
engines and social media platforms. The Tracker draws on two main sources of information to
analyses gender and violent extremism online: search traffic and Facebook data – each adding
different value to the overall analysis. Social media activities are often performative. As such,
data obtained from channels such as Facebook provides information about how people publicly
present themselves, including the opinions, interests, experiences and actions they wish to share.
Search engine queries, on the other hand, provide valuable information because they are
typically carried out with the expectation that they will not be seen or judged by others. Online
searches are thus a reliable method of understanding true levels of interest in, or support for,
activities, ideas and opinions which may be socially unacceptable. The results presented here are
preliminary and subject to change.

POLICY BRIEF ON MISOGYNY AS A DRIVER OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM.

JOHNSTON, M., & TRUE, J. (2019, OCT 14). MISOGYNY & VIOLENT
EXTREMISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVENTING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM. MONASH UNIVERSITY.

KEY FINDINGS

1. Hostile sexist attitudes toward women and support for violence against women are the factors
most strongly associated with support for violent extremism based on survey research in four
countries in 2018-19. In three countries in Asia (Indonesia, Bangladesh and the Philippines)
individuals who support violence against women are three times more likely to support violent
extremism.

2. There was no correlation at all between common factors thought to affect support for violent
extremism – such as the degree of religiosity, age, gender, level of education achieved,
employment, and geographic area.

3. Quantitative and qualitative analysis reveals misogyny to be integral to the ideology, political
identity, and political economy of current violent extremist groups.
 DISRUPTING THE RADICALISATION LIFECYCLE

THE LOS ANGELES FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT

EXTREMISM

The Los Angeles Framework consists of three pillars: prevention, intervention, and interdiction.

GCTF’s Radicalisation Lifecycle

The lifecycle is broken down into three categories: Prevention, Detection and Intervention,
Rehabilitation and Reintegration. However, the process of radicalization and deradicalization is
not necessarily linear in nature and many of the themes below are cross-cutting in nature.

Prevention

Prevention efforts must address both “push” and “pull” factors that create conditions for violent
extremism to take root and gain traction, as well as factors that allow for recruitment and facilitation.

Detection and Intervention

Law enforcement, legal and judicial actors and institutions play a key role not only in detecting
individuals who are at risk for radicalization to violence, but also in working with a range of other
governmental and non-governmental actors to intervene and deter these individuals from proceeding
down this path.
Rehabilitation and Reintegration

Integrating rehabilitative measures within and beyond custodial settings in order to assist the violent
extremists in dealing with the issues that propelled them to commit violent acts, to promote
disengagement from the violent extremist cause, and to aid in the re-entry into society as a law-
abiding citizen.

US GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: “STRATEGY FOR

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM”

Goal 1
Enhance understanding of the evolving violent extremism threat and develop effective ways to
counter the threat

Goal 2
Raise community awareness by disseminating information to community partners

Goal 3
Support community-based efforts to counter violent extremism

Goal 4
Enhance oversight and coordination of dhs cve activities
EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EX
TREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

GUIDING PRINCIPLES
➔ We must continually enhance our understanding of the threat posed by violent extremism
and the ways in which individuals or groups seek to radicalize Americans, adapting our
approach as needed.

➔ We must do everything in our power to protect the American people from violent
extremism while protect-ing the civil rights and civil liberties of every American.

➔ We must build partnerships and provide support to communities based on mutual trust,
respect, and under-standing.

➔ We must use a wide range of good governance programs—including those that promote
immigrant integration and civic engagement, protect civil rights, and provide social
services—that may help prevent radicalization that leads to violence.

➔ We must support local capabilities and programs to address problems of national

concern.

➔ Government officials and the American public should not stigmatize or blame
communities because of the actions of a handful of individuals.

➔ Strong religious beliefs should never be confused with violent extremism.

➔ Though we will not tolerate illegal activities, opposition to government policy is neither
illegal nor unpatriotic and does not make someone a violent extremist.
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND
PUBLICATIONS

“A NEW COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING

VIOLENT EXTREMISM”

The United States lost nearly 3,000 lives in the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. On that day, a problem that had been slowly festering and barely noticed in the West broke
onto the world stage in a forceful and heart-wrenching way.

Those events and many that would follow have prompted trillions of dollars to be poured into
military, law enforcement, and intelligence operations. Yet the problem of violent extremism has
grown more severe and urgent. Despite the many efforts to extinguish the flames of violence,
new and powerful extremist movements have taken root. Terrorist groups around the world have
used technology, the media, religious schools and mosques, and word of mouth to sell their
twisted ideologies, justify their violence, and convince too many recruits that glory can be found
in the mass murder of innocent civilians.

The Commission’s goal was to clearly articulate what the next U.S. administration, in close
collaboration with governmental and nongovernmental partners, must do to diminish the appeal
of extremist ideologies and narratives.

The plan has eight major components:

 Strengthening resistance to extremist ideologies
 Investing in community-led prevention
 Saturating the global marketplace of ideas
 Aligning policies and values
 Deploying military and law enforcement tools
 Exerting White House leadership
 Expanding CVE models
 Surging funding
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AMERICA: POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT

SUMMARY
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has spent many billions and mobilized thousands of employees
to thwart jihadi terrorist plots in America and abroad. Measured by American lives saved, the
U.S. government has had extraordinary success using all elements of its national security toolbox
to capture, arrest, and kill terrorists worldwide. Yet it is clear that kinetic operations alone will
not solve the problem.

The rise of the Islamic State has energized an estimated 27,000 jihadi foreign fighters from
around the world to travel to Iraq and Syria, and recent attacks in Paris, Brussels, San
Bernardino, Orlando, and Nice have demonstrated the organization’s reach and ability to both
inspire and guide homegrown violent extremists across the globe.

To confront and address the threat of homegrown violent extremism, the next administration will
need an innovative and refined agenda to counter domestic violence extremism—one that
focuses on individualized interventions—rather than a faith-based approach that targets
American Muslims writ large.
 UNITED NATIONS MATERIAL

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL COOPERATION TO PREVENT

AND COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SOUTH ASIA

Outcomes and Recommendations:

1. Strengthen regional and international CVE and counterterrorism cooperation.
2. Adopt a multisectoral, multidisciplinary, and inclusive approach to terrorism and violent
extremism
3. Promote the counterterrorism and CVE awareness and capacity building of media
practitioners.
4. Support evidence-based research to inform and improve the effectiveness of CVE strategies
and programs
5. Provide tailored and coordinated support to civil society to strengthen their involvement in and
impact on CVE efforts
6. Advance women’s participation and gender inclusivity in counterterrorism and CVE policy
and programming.
7. Facilitate counterterrorism and CVE training for frontline officials with a follow-up
mentorship program.
8. Develop national rehabilitation and reintegration strategies, interventions, and programs for
violent extremist offenders and returning FTFs.
 Bangladesh Articles

Islamist Cyber-Radicalisation in Bangladesh During COVID-

19
Bangladesh has seen a surge in Islamic radicalisation in the COVID-19 period as more terrorist
organisations take to the internet to propagate their cause. Surprisingly, it is the urban, educated
youths that are most drawn to militancy.

A survey conducted by the Bangladesh police on 250 extremists found that 82 percent of
extremists were inspired by social media propaganda and 80 percent use Thrima, Wechat,
Facebook Messenger, and other end-to-end encrypted apps for communication. Several recruiters
for extremist groups, when interviewed, said that they posted radical materials on social media
like, “Our Muslim brothers are getting killed in Myanmar, Jerusalem, Iraq and Syria; don’t we
have anything to do?” They then followed who liked and shared these posts and engaged with
those individuals with one-on-one communication. It was revealed that most of the followers of
this new wave of militancy come from well-educated, urban backgrounds because they are the
ones who have the greatest access to the Internet.

Online radicalisation has been a major challenge for Bangladesh since 2013, as militant
organisations have utilized cyberspace to promote their ideologies. Now, COVID-19 has created
the scope for terrorists to reach an even wider audience because the physical world has been
turned into a virtual world. Firstly, recruiters will be able to reach out to more people than
before, as many everyday activities have now been forced online. Almost all universities,
including the most prominent university of Bangladesh, Dhaka University, have started online
teaching. The massive increase in time online has left youths especially vulnerable to online
radicalisation. Secondly and more importantly, COVID-19 is going to create grievances and
frustration among young people, especially those who are educated. Unemployment,
underemployment, income inequality, endemic corruption, and deprivation have been an integral
part of the Bangladeshi society. Without a doubt, these vulnerabilities have been exacerbated by
COVID-19. Opportunistic terrorist organisations will capitalize on every issue or failure. They
will use this pandemic as well.

In Bangladesh, COVID-19 has already revealed the disparity in social structure in which the
poor and middle classes have no place. They have been leaving cities due to their inability to
cope with the cost of living in cities. The health sector has failed to ensure the availability of
necessary health facilities and the government has failed to provide the basic needs for citizens,
such as providing health and job security. Persistent social deterioration will aggravate young
people even more and create the perfect conditions for terrorist organisations to recruit them.

Unemployment has been a persistent problem for Bangladesh, and this will be further accelerated
by the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, a lack of recreational activities will leave young people
frustrated and bored. Together. these will increase grievances in a post-COVID-19 Bangladesh.
Bangladesh police has already raised a security alert about an impending terror attack by a
militant group in July 2020. This alert shows that militant organisations remain active as the
world has shut down.

The pandemic situation demands robust and nuanced policies from the government. On the one
hand, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism programs need to be strengthened. On
the other, the Bangladeshi government needs to address issues of youth vulnerabilities.

The Radicalization of Bangladeshi Cyberspace

At 8:45 pm, five gunmen stormed the Holey Artisan Bakery, an upscale establishment in Dhaka,
the capital of Bangladesh. The siege lasted more than 12 hours. By the time it was over, 22
people were dead, most of them foreigners. While other terrorist attacks have occurred in
Bangladesh since that fateful evening on July 1, 2016, the massacre at Holey Artisan is
considered the deadliest terrorist attack in the country’s history. It also triggered new thinking
about how to counter violent extremism and gave rise to efforts that can serve as a model for
other countries tackling similar problems.

In the months and years following the incident, Bangladeshi intelligence and police agencies
cracked down on sleeper cells and extremist networks. Their primary focus was on capturing or
killing high-profile targets associated with the Islamic State or a local Islamist terrorist network,
Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. Dozens of suspects were rounded up and arrested; 20 were
eventually charged. At least seven of them were sentenced to death in Nov. 2019. Another eight
suspects were killed during counterterrorist operations in different parts of the country.

To some observers, these heavy-handed operations appeared to be ruthlessly effective. Unlike

most of its neighbors, Bangladesh has avoided large-scale extremist violence over the past four
years. Yet beneath the surface, a different picture emerges. Online radicalization is widespread
and increasingly normalized. A network of violent Islamist extremist groups are spreading hate
speech and misinformation across the social media ecosystem. Bangladeshi police say that more
than 80 percent of the people arrested for terrorism in recent years were radicalized online and
almost 60 percent were university-educated.
There are fears that online rumors and misinformation could reignite a wave of extremism across
Bangladesh. In fact, there are worrying signs that it is already starting. In early November,
houses belonging to Bangladeshi Hindus were vandalized and torched after one of their
occupants was accused of supporting France and defaming Islam on social media. The previous
month, a librarian was lynched and killed after being accused of desecrating the Quran. The
Bangladesh Peace Observatory reported a disturbing increase in attacks, police raids, and arrests
in the first nine months of 2020 compared with the same period in 2019.

What Does COVID-19 Mean for Terrorism in Bangladesh?

How the pandemic intersects with challenges of Islamist radicalization for Bangladesh.

Islamist militancy is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh; rather it dates back to the early
1980s. Islamist militancy in Bangladesh, based on its evolution process and the range of
activities involved, can be divided into six phases. The first phase, the incubation period, covers
the period from the late 1970s to 1986, where there were no attacks and public activity. The
second phase, the formation period, starts with the formation of the Muslim Millat Bahini in
1986 and ends in 2001 with the introduction of Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) to Bangladesh. During this
formation period, many Islamist extremist groups including HT, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
Bangladesh (HUJIB) came into existence in Bangladesh. The third phase, the operational phase,
started in 2001 with the bombing of a Communist Party of Bangladesh rally and ends in 2007
with the execution of JMB and JMJB leaders. This phase witnessed the killing of 156 people —
cultural activists, renowned poets, judges, and secular voices. The fourth phase (2007-2013) is
called a “silent phase” because it was a quiet period in terms of militant activity. The “silent
phase” was followed by a “violent phase,” which began with the killing of blogger Rajib Haider
in 2013 and continued up to a 2017 suicide bombing in Sylhet. The 2018-onward phase is
definitely a dormant phase, which is usually used for recruitment and fund-raising

This is where there is a question mark: How efficiently and successfully are Bangladesh’s
security forces combating or tackling the militant issue? It is evident that so far the security
forces are relying mostly on kinetic responses to the issue. However, military responses can only
be a short-term strategy, because this cannot entirely rule out the root of extremism, which is
based on an uncompromising radical ideology.
What have we seen so far in Bangladesh? When the Islamic State (IS) Caliphate was declared in
2014, the IS-affiliated group Neo-JMB started gaining momentum in Bangladesh. IS recruited
from the al-Qaeda-affiliated group Ansar Al Islam (AAI), JMB, and also from other existing
extremist groups. This resulted in the growth of Neo-JMB, which finally staged the barbaric
Holey Artisan café attack in July 2016. Today, IS is suffocating after losing its ideological basis
— having a physical “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria. In Bangladesh, the IS-affiliated Neo-JMB
has also suffered a serious drawback owing to a military crackdown Nearly 70 Neo-JMB
members have been killed in around 30 operations.

On the other hand, the al-Qaeda affiliate AAI and JMB did not lose a large number of their
members in operations, nor did they lose their ideological bases. JMB, however, has been
suffering a leadership crisis since its leader Sheikh Abdrur Rahman and Bangla Bhai were
arrested in 2005. Although leadership was conferred to Maulana Saidur Rahman, he has also
been in jail since 2010. Other leadership did not get much attention, although JMB’s ambition of
becoming a transnational organization is evident from its inauguration of the Jamaat-ul-
Mujahideen India in 2017.

Surprisingly, AAI has remained comparatively unaffected since security forces started their anti-
extremist operation in 2016. AAI’s spiritual leader Rahmani and some members were sentenced
to imprisonment, but its military commander Major Zia, its spokesperson Abdullah Ashraf, and
Muhammad Miqdadd are still unidentified. Despite the recent series of operations aimed at
disrupting their networks, AAI’s continued online propaganda efforts have negative implications
for peace and security in Bangladesh. They remain active online, as evident from their online
statements, and publications of the group’s Bengali Journal Al Balagh.

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If we ask what the next big threat in Bangladesh extremism will be, then AAI can be the possible
answer. This group has not lost its ideological base, unlike IS; rather their ideological points
have been reinforced due to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, the anti-Muslim citizenship law in
India, and the fall of Neo-JMB in Bangladesh. AQIS has long been provoking the so-called
Gazwatul Hind and other apocalyptic ambitions for Muslims.

Worryingly, AAI is still active online. Bangladesh has nearly 90 million internet subscribers. A
2017 survey conducted by the Bangladeshi police with 250 extremists revealed that 82 percent of
them were originally inspired by social media propaganda and 80 percent of them used Thrima,
WeChat, Messenger, as well as other social media apps to communicate.

Another reason for concern is that Bangladesh’s security forces have shifted their focus from
jihadist militants to cracking down on drug trafficking networks, and now to countering COVID-
19.
The COVID-19 pandemic might contribute to the growth of radicalization in a number of ways
in Bangladesh. First, both radicalizers and their audience now have enormous time to spend
online, and have entered the cyber world with full capacity. This will definitely allow extremist
groups to reach people. Second, this pandemic might cause frustration to some youths, as it is
true with any crisis in life. These frustrated youths might easily fall prey to extremist narratives.
Finally, this pandemic might enhance the doomsday narratives provoked by extremist groups,
while some traditional scholars have already made references to this point. IS and al-Qaeda’s
propaganda about COVID-19 is opportunistic and they have been changing their narratives as
the pandemic evolves. They have so far termed COVID-19 as a “soldier of God.” Several news
outlets have already reported that racist and extremist organizations around the world have
ramped up recruitment efforts, encouraged attacks, and advanced hate-filled conspiracy theories
about COVID-19.

In short, AAI, taking advantage of the leadership crisis within JMB and ideological frustration of
IS, may come forward with a greater push on its agenda of Muslim India. Against this backdrop
of militant challenge, Bangladesh government needs to have a clear strategy toward Islamist
militancy. An ad hoc, reactive policy will not be helpful. This policy needs to address
cybersecurity issues, keep continuous eyes on the cyber world, counter the extremists’ meta-
narratives, create opportunities for youths, and adopt gender-specific deradicalization programs.
Traditional Islamic scholars can be used to counter the extremists’ narratives.

Shafi Md Mostofa is an Assistant Professor of World Religions, Culture, and Politics (with
special interests in Political Islam in Bangladesh) at Dhaka University’s Faculty of Arts. He is
about to complete his Doctor of Philosophy from the Social and Philosophical Inquiry (SPI)
Programme, University of New England, New South Wales, Australia.