Saudi Arabian Airlines v.

CA - Case Digest
Facts:

Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) hired Milagros Morada as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-over in Jakarta, Morada went to a disco with fellow crew members
Thamer & Allah, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their
hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. In which Allah left on some
pretext. Thamer attempted to rape Morada but she was rescued by hotel personnel when they heard
her cries for help. Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah, the latter as an accomplice.

Morada refused to cooperate when SAUDIA’s Legal Officer and its base manager tried to negotiate the
immediate release of the detained crew members with Jakarta police.

Through the intercession of Saudi Arabian government, Thamer and Allah were deported and,
eventually, again put in service by SAUDIA. But Morada was transferred to Manila.

One year and a half year later, Morada was again ordered to see SAUDIA’s Chief Legal Officer. Instead,
she was brought to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a blank document, which turned out to be
a notice to her to appear in court. Monada returned to Manila.

The next time she was escorted by SAUDIA’s legal officer to court, the judge rendered a decision against
her sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Apparently, she was tried by the
court which found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in
violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

After denial by SAUDIA, Morada sought help from Philippine Embassy during the appeal. Prince of
Makkah dismissed the case against her. SAUDIA fired her without notice.

Morada filed a complaint for damages against SAUDIA, with the RTC of QC. SAUDIA filed Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss which raised the ground that the court has no jurisdiction, among others which was
denied

ISSUE: Whether RTC of QC has jurisdiction to hear and try the case

HELD: YES. The RTC of QC has jurisdiction and Philippine law should govern.Its jurisdiction has basis on
Sec. 1 of RA 7691 and Rules of Court on venue. Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of
the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private
interest of the litigant. Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear
the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing Morada to
seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains
substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.

Continental Micro Asia vs. Basso

Facts:

Petitioner Continental Micronesia is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of and
domiciled in the United States of America. It is licensed to do business in the Philippines. Respondent, a
US citizen residing in the Philippines, accepted an offer to be a General Manager position by Mr. Braden,
Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines. On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine
operations of Continental, with respondent retaining his position as General Manager. Thereafter,
respondent received a letter from Mr. Schulz, who was then CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and
Sales, informing him that he has agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an “as needed basis.”
Respondent wrote a counter-proposal that was rejected by CMI.

Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner corporation. Alleging the
presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy.

The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US “since the
letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant was returned there.”
Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci contractus, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply Philippine laws.

The NLRC ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily
submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support of the
legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case and over the parties.

Issue:

Whether labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

Yes. The Court ruled that the labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of
the case. The employment contract of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that it
originated from and was returned to the US, do not automatically preclude our labor tribunals from
exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this case.

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive process of
service of summons. CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily
appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is
licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The purpose of the law
in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the
foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.

Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflicts-of-laws issue.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may assume
jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine
Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have power to enforce its decision. All these requisites are present here.
Hasegawa v. Kitamura Case Digest

FACTS:

Nippon, a Japanese consultancy firm entered into a one-year ICA contract with Kitamura, a Japanese
national permanently residing in the Philippines. On February 2000, Kitamura was informed that Nippon
is no longer renewing his ICA and his services would only be utilized until March 31, 2000. Aggrieved,
Kitamura now filed an action for specific performance and damages with the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon
filed a motion to dismiss. The trial and appellate court ruled in favor of Kitamura, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC of Lipa City has jurisdiction for contracts executed by and between two foreign
nationals in foreign country wholly written in a foreign language?

RULING:

Yes. In the judicial resolution of conflict problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice
of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two different
concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of
law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state a constitutional authority to apply forum law.

The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice of law rules as raised by the petitioner is inapplicable and
not yet called for. The petitioner prematurely invoked the said rules before pointing out any conflict
between the laws of Japan and the Philippines.
Raytheon international vs rouzie

FACTS

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized & existing under the laws of
Connecticut, &Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract

BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects
in thePhilippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.

Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt.Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.

Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International (Rust) for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment contract.

The Labor Arbiter order

ed BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s money claims.

Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed & dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La Union (where he was a resident) against
Raytheon International. He reiterated that he was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo
dredging project w/c hesecured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI, RUST and
Raytheon had combined & functioned as 1 company.

RAYTHEON SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS OF FAILURE TO STATE
ACAUSE OF ACTION & FORUM NON CONVENIENS & PRAYED FOR DAMAGES BY WAY OF COMPULSORY

COUNTERCLAIM. THE RTC DENIED RAYTHEON’S MOTION. THE CA AFFIRMED.

Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of law
clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also
mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the parties & witnesses involved
are American corporations & citizens & the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines,
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

ISSUES(a) W/N the RTC had jurisdiction.(b) W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
forum non conveniens.

RULING

(a) YES.

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court
and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can
proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law
& by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action for damages arising from an
alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed
are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court.

That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION THAT THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED BYTHE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT THE PHILIPPINE COURTS, OR ANY
OTHER FOREIGN TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED FROM HEARING THE CIVIL ACTION.

JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application
of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law
stipulation will be come relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is,
after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

(b) NO.

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A COURT, IN CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES, MAY

REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS NOT THE MOST “CONVENIENT” OR

AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.

Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over
the case and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is w/c the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.

HSBC VS. SHERMAN

FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (COMPANY), a company
incorporated in Singapore applied with and was granted by HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility
in the maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable
monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility.

As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by HSBC to it through the aforesaid
overdraft facility, in 1982, both private respondents and a certain Lowe, all of whom were directors of
the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private
respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY
to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:

This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and
determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We
hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this
guarantee. …

The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment and inasmuch as the private
respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint for collection of a sum of money against private
respondents Sherman and Reloj before RTC of Quezon City.

Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial
court denied the motion. They then filed before the respondent IAC a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the
RTC Quezon City from taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the
proper court of Singapore which is the proper forum. MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee stipulation regarding
jurisdiction?

HELD: YES

One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have
jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in
rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum
contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice

The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based
merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will
cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that
petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents.

**

In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the stipulation was “[i]n case of
litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City.” We held:
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to
venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b),
Rule 4, ROC, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that
the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the parties.

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of
Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to
divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a
State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions.
Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic
representatives of other States, and foreign military units stationed in or marching through State
territory with the permission of the latter’s authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the
concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent
to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over
all kinds of cases brought before them

BELLIS VS. BELLIS

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate
children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who
survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and
properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of
partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according
to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed
by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate
children’s successional rights
RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should
be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which
deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas
law, which is the national law of the deceased.

CADALIN ET AL VS. POEA ET AL

Facts:

Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment
corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign
corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims
arising from the unexpired portion of their employment contract which was prematurely terminated.
They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their
employment contract.

As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain: “a
claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the
date of the expiry of the contract,” it appears that their suit has prescribed.

Plaintiff contends that the prescription period should be 10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil
Code as their claim arise from a violation of a contract.

The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription should be applied but the NLRC
provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription
period should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the 1 yr period
provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.
Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a foreign procedural law will not be applied in our country
as we must adopt our own procedural laws.

EXCEPTION:

Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under the Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil
Procedure Rule stating “if by the laws of the State or country where the cause of action arose the action
is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines.” Thus, Bahrain law must be applied. However, the court
contends that Bahrain’s law on prescription cannot be applied because the court will not enforce any
foreign claim that is obnoxious to the forum’s public policy and the 1 yr. rule on prescription is against
public policy on labor as enshrined in the Phils. Constitution.

The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to the case should be Art 291 of the Labor Code
of the Phils with a 3 years prescription period since the claim arose from labor employment

Bank of America vs. American Realty Corp. 321 SCRA

659

Facts:

Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a property located
in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor who pledged its own
property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan.
Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage, which was
granted.
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for damages
against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate mortgages despite
the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.

Issue:

WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan
before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Held: Yes.

1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage
debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he
may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no
means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a
remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in
an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by
the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the
Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.

In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt.
Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt
to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil
suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages
constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover,
by filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in
effect transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our
statute books.

2. Conflicts of Law

Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the governing law
with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply
filing civil actions for sums of money.

We rule in the negative.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is
no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus,
if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign
law is the same as our local or domestic or internal

law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law,
or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

Dacasin v. Dacasin,

Facts: Petitioner Herald Dacasin, American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Filipino were
married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, who was born on September 21,
1995.

On June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial
Circuit, Lake County, Illinois. The Illinois court dissolved the marriage of the two and awarded the
respondent sole custody of Stephanie. It also retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
purposes.

On January 28, 2002, both the petitioner and respondent executed a contract for joint custody
over Stephanie in Manila. Later, on 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had
exercised sole custody over Stephanie contrary to their agreement. Sharon sought the dismissal of the
complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to
enforce the divorce decree.

On March 1, 2005, the trial court sustained the respondent's motion and dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit
considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order
awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner
following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction.

Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the
case.

In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the
case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's suit and enforce
the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties' child.

Held: Yes. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial
court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions.

Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court. Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain
petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois
court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court
retained was “jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its]
Judgment for Dissolution.” Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the
divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond
the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called “retained jurisdiction.”

Zapanta vs. Local Civil Registrar of

Davao
FACTS:

Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B. Zapanta. When Florencio died, the local civil
registrar of Davao City issued a death certificate. However, she found that the name appearing therein
was “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” albeit the date of death and all other circumstances and information
reflected therein clearly and conclusively revealed that the person referred to therein was no other than
her late husband, Florencio. Gliceria, therefore, filed a petition for correction of entry in the register of
death. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the correction of the name “Flaviano
Castro Zapanta” to “Florencio B. Zapanta” was not merely clerical but substantial in nature.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error

HELD:

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.

The general perception was that the judicial proceeding under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, implemented
by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or clerical errors
apparent on the face of the record and capable of being corrected by mere reference to it, such as
misspellings and obvious mistakes.

However, in later cases, the Court has held that it adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

Adversary Proceeding, defined

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it...”

Thus, provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel has been given opportunity to demolish the opposite
party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or
proceeding is “appropriate.”
Norma A. Del Socorro vs. Ernest Johan Van Wilsen
Shamille B. Gigantone JD-III NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO vs ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM G.r. No.
193707 December 10, 2014 I. Nature of the Case The case involves a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the dismissal of the criminal case against respondent for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262. II. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE Petitioner Del Socorro and
respondent Van Wilsem got married in Holland sometime 1990 and were blessed with a son. Five years
after they were separated by a divorce decree issued by the Court of Holland. Thereafter, petitioner and
her son came home to the Philippines. Petitioner alleged that since their arrival, respondent failed to
fulfil his promise to give monthly support for their son. Thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines,
remarried and established a business with his new wife in Cebu City. On August 28, 2009, petitioner
demanded for the above mentioned promise to support through a letter but the respondent refused to
receive the same. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E (2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Thereafter, a Resolution was issued recommending
the filing of an information at RTC-Cebu for the crime charged. III. ISSUE/S RAISED FOR PETITION ON
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI 1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law; and 2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child. IV. RULING OF RTC, CA, SUPREME
COURT RTC-Cebu dismissed the criminal case against respondent as well as the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the respondent who is an alien who is not subject to the Philippine law. The Supreme
Court took cognizance of the petition directly lodged to it without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts as the case involves issues which raised questions of law. Thus, the Supreme court ruled:

The petition was meritorious but the petitioner's contentions is not fully agreeable. V. REASON The
obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Thus, the
respondent is subject to the laws of his country which does not oblige him to support his son. However,
although the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code
as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland, this does not, mean that respondent is
not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether. In the instant case, the respondent failed to prove
the national law of the Netherlands in his favour. Thus, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Since the law of
the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents
to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. The court resolved further that
with regards to the second issue, the court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the
foreigner is living here in the Philippines and committed the offense here. Territoriality Principle under
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, which provides that: "penal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations." applies. The alleged continuing acts of respondent in
refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, the Philippine courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent.

Aznar vs. Garcia

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to
the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his
estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears
to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term
“national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But
HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of
the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question
of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In
re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow
the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law
is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only
within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California

Oil & Natural Gas vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26

Facts: The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while
the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. The present conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent has its roots in a
contract entered into by and between both parties on February 26, 1983 whereby the private
respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons
of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private respondent
the amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS
($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter.
The oil well cement was loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City,
Philippines for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between the
shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point
destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had already received payment and
despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private respondent failed to deliver the oil well
cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that the private
respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class “G” cement cost free
at the petitioner’s designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class “G” cement did not conform to
the petitioner’s specifications. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring
its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract. On July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator,
one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in petitioner’s favor setting forth the arbitral award.
Without responding to the above communication, the foreign court refused to admit the private
respondent’s objections for failure to pay the required filing fees, and thereafter issued an Order on
February 7, 1990.

Issue: Whether or not the foreign judgement may be enforced within the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by
the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs
from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has held that
matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if
under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by
adopting the arbitrator’s findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the
procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon
failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order
of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.

The private respondent claims that its right to due process had been blatantly violated, first by reason of
the fact that the foreign court never answered its queries as to the amount of docket fees to be paid
then refused to admit its objections for failure to pay the same, and second, because of the presumed
bias on the part of the arbitrator who was a former employee of the petitioner.

Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense or stated
otherwise, what is repugnant to due process is the denial of opportunity to be heard. Thus, there is no
violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance to
explain his side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so.
In the instant case, the private respondent does not deny the fact that it was notified by the foreign
court to file its objections to the petition, and subsequently, to pay legal fees in order for its objections
to be given consideration. Instead of paying the legal fees, however, the private respondent sent a
communication to the foreign court inquiring about the correct amount of fees to be paid. On the
pretext that it was yet awaiting the foreign court’s reply, almost a year passed without the private
respondent paying the legal fees. Thus, on February 2, 1990, the foreign court rejected the objections of
the private respondent and proceeded to adjudicate upon the petitioner’s claims. We cannot subscribe
to the private respondent’s claim that the foreign court violated its right to due process when it failed to
reply to its queries nor when the latter rejected its objections for a clearly meritorious ground. The
private respondent was afforded sufficient opportunity to be heard. It was not incumbent upon the
foreign court to reply to the private respondent’s written communication. On the contrary, a genuine
concern for its cause should have prompted the private respondent to ascertain with all due diligence
the correct amount of legal fees to be paid. The private respondent did not act with prudence and
diligence thus its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit
either approval or sympathy from this Court.

The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its enforcement,
despite the fact that the petitioner merely prays for the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and enforceability of the said foreign judgment in
this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the RTC for the reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no
longer necessary.

St. Aviation Services Co. vs. Grand International

Airways, 565 SCRA 30

Facts:

St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd., petitioner, is a foreign corporation based in Singapore. It is engaged
in the manufacture, repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. Grand International Airways,
Inc., respondent, is a domestic corporation engaged in... airline operations.

in January 1996, petitioner and respondent executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and
Modification of Airbus A 300 B4-103 Aircraft Registration No. RP-C8882" (First Agreement). Under this
stipulation, petitioner agreed to undertake maintenance and modification works... on respondent's
aircraft. The parties agreed on the mode and manner of payment by respondent of the contract price,
including interest in case of default. They also agreed that the "construction, validity and performance
thereof" shall be governed by the laws of

Singapore. They further agreed to submit any suit arising from their agreement to the non-exclusive
jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.

on January 12, 1996, the parties verbally agreed that petitioner will repair and undertake maintenance
works on respondent's other aircraft, Aircraft No. RP-C8881; and that the works shall be based on a
General Terms of Agreement (GTA). The

GTA terms are similar to those of their First Agreement.

Petitioner undertook the contracted works and thereafter promptly delivered the aircrafts to
respondent. During the period from March 1996 to October 1997, petitioner billed respondent in the
total amount of US$303,731.67 or S$452,560.18. But despite petitioner's... repeated demands,
respondent failed to pay, in violation of the terms agreed upon.

petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore an action for the sum of S$452,560.18,
including interest and costs, against respondent, docketed as Suit No. 2101. Upon petitioner's motion,
the court issued a Writ of Summons to be served... extraterritorially or outside Singapore upon
respondent. The court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay City to effect service of the summons
upon respondent. However, despite receipt of summons, respondent failed to answer the claim.

on motion of petitioner, the Singapore High Court rendered a judgment by default against respondent.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two grounds: (1) the Singapore High Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over its person; and (2) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for
having been rendered in violation of its right to due process.

the Court of Appeals issued its Decision granting the petition and setting aside the Orders dated October
30, 1998 and December 16, 1998 of the RTC
In the case at bar, the complaint does not involve the personal status of plaintiff, nor any property in
which the defendant has a claim or interest, or which the private respondent has attached but purely an
action for collection of debt. It is a personal action as... well as an action in personam, not an action in
rem or quasi in rem. As a personal action, the service of summons should be personal or substituted, not
extraterritorial, in order to confer jurisdiction on the court.

Issues:

(1) whether the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the
service of summons upon its office in the Philippines; and (2) whether the judgment by default in Suit
No. 2101 by the Singapore High Court is... enforceable in the Philippines.

Ruling:

The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our legal system are
contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a)

In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon
the title to the thing; and

(b)

In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fa

Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing
authority or by want of notice to the party against whom it... is enforced. The party attacking a foreign
judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity

Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum,[4] which in this case is the law
of Singapore. Here, petitioner moved for... leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons
outside Singapore. In an Order dated December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court granted "leave to
serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of
the

Philippines for service of any originating process issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC
Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines."[5]
This service of summons outside Singapore... is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules of Court
1996[6] of Singapore, which provides.

c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country for service of any originating process
issued by that country.

In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff,[7] his
deputy or other proper court officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant[8] or
by substituted... service.[9] In this case, the Writ of Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was
served upon respondent at its office located at Mercure Hotel (formerly Village Hotel), MIA Road, Pasay
City. The Sheriff's Return shows that it was... received on May 2, 1998 by Joyce T. Austria, Secretary of
the General Manager of respondent company.[10] But respondent completely ignored the summons,
hence, it was declared in default.

Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in accordance with our Rules,
jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment of default
rendered by that court against respondent is valid.

Principles:

in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, under the rules of comity, utility and
convenience, nations have established a usage among civilized states... by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.[1] Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long
ago accepted... into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of
foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines.
BANK OF AMERICA VS. AMERICAN REALTY
Facts:

Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As security, the latter mortgaged a property located
in the Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor who pledged its own
property in favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce the loan.
Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage, which was
granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action for damages
against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate mortgages despite
the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.

Issue:

WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan
before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Held: Yes.

1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:

In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage
debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he
may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no
means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a
remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in
an action for foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by
the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the
Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.

In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt.
Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt
to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil
suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages
constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover,
by filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing extra-judicially the mortgages, petitioner in
effect transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our
statute books.

2. Conflicts of Law

Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the governing law
with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply
filing civil actions for sums of money.

We rule in the negative.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is
no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus,
if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign
law is the same as our local or domestic or internal

law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law,
or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

Clearly then, English Law is not applicable

Continental Micro Asia vs. Basso

G.R. NOS. 178382-83 (Sept. 23,
2015

Facts:

Petitioner Continental Micronesia is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of and
domiciled in the United States of America. It is licensed to do business in the Philippines. Respondent, a
US citizen residing in the Philippines, accepted an offer to be a General Manager position by Mr. Braden,
Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines. On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine
operations of Continental, with respondent retaining his position as General Manager. Thereafter,
respondent received a letter from Mr. Schulz, who was then CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and
Sales, informing him that he has agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an “as needed basis.”
Respondent wrote a counter-proposal that was rejected by CMI.
Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner corporation. Alleging the
presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy.

The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US “since the
letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant was returned there.”
Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci contractus, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply Philippine laws.

The NLRC ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily
submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support of the
legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the case.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case and over the parties.

Issue:

Whether labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

Yes. The Court ruled that the labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of
the case. The employment contract of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that it
originated from and was returned to the US, do not automatically preclude our labor tribunals from
exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this case.

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive process of
service of summons. CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily
appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is
licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The purpose of the law
in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the
foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.
Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflicts-of-laws issue.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may assume
jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine
Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have power to enforce its decision. All these requisites are present here.

Wildvalley Shipping vs. CA, October

6, 2000

Facts: Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines,
Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the
completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano
Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to
navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel on
February 11, 1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m. The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas,
Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel’s third mate
(then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12,
1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way. The Philippine Roxas experienced
some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded on its way,
with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the
channel. Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations.These occurred at
4:12 a.m.It was then that the watch officer called the master to the bridge. The master (captain)
checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel. He then went to
confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief
Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks. At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine
Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River,thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of
the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd.,
was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd.
filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and
Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of
unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney’s fees, costs, and
expenses of litigation.

Issue: Whether or not the Venezuelan law should be applied.

Held: No. It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section
24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of
Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the
Republic of Venezuela.

The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio
de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as
evidence.

Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are
the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.

For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It
must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be
accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter
requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the
genuineness of a document in a foreign country.

It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is
the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of
the public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the case. With respect to
proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence.
According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires
that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.

vs. Guerrero, February 19, 2003

FACTS:

In 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero (“Guerrero” for brevity) filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank (“the Bank” for brevity) with the RTC.
Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests
on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature
verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. The Bank filed its Answer
alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and this law does
not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal,
temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on the same ground alleged in its
Answer. Guerrero opposed the motion.

The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit (“Walden affidavit” for brevity) stated that Guerrero’s New York
bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero’s
claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden
affidavit.

The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for reconsideration.
The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC
Orders. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Bank’s proof of facts to support its motion for summary judgment may be given by
affidavit.

HELD:

NO. There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material
allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.7 The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the
recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws
do not prove themselves in our courts.8 Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.9 Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law
or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can
be resolved only by a trial on the merits.

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Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may
be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may
be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals10 which held
that: “x x x:

Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however, the
Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 25, Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court does not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove
the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath of
an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code
and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient
evidence to establish the existence of said law.

The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal to support its cause. That
case involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the
particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken
abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered
as proof of New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not
state the specific New York law on damages.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence.
However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law
and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law
and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and
jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.

Edi-staff Builders International vs.

NLRC, October 26, 2007

FACTS:

After being terminated by OAB, his employer in Saudi Arabaia, Gran received from OAB the total
amount of SR 2,948.00 representing his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a
Declarationreleasing OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, he instituted a complaint and the Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal
was valid. Respondents Expertise Search International, Inc., EDI Staffbuilders Int’l., Inc. and Omar Ahmed
Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB) are ordered jointly and severally liable by the NLRC to pay the complainant
Eleazar Gran US$16,150.00r epresenting his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Declaration signed by Gran did bar him from demanding benefits to which he was
entitled.
RULING:

No. First, the salary paid to Gran upon his termination, in the amount of SR 2,948.00, is unreasonably
low which is lower than his monthly salary. Secondly, The Declaration reveals that the payment of SR
2,948.00 is actually the payment for Gran’s salary for the services he rendered to OAB as Computer
Specialist. Third, The factual circumstances surrounding the execution of the Declaration would show
that Gran did not voluntarily and freely execute the document. He was just forced as he was told to
leave the country and he needed the money. Fourth, the Declaration is a contract of adhesion which
should be construed against the employer, OAB. An adhesion contract is contrary to public policy as it
leaves the weaker party—the employee—in a “take-it-or-leave-it” situation. Certainly, the employer is
being unjust to the employee as there is no meaningful choice on the part of the employee while the
terms are unreasonably favorable to the employer.

Also, the Declaration purporting to be a quitclaim and waiver is unenforceable under Philippine laws in
the absence of proof of the applicable law of Saudi Arabia. In the absence of proof of the laws of the
foreign country agreed upon to govern said contracts, It is advisable that the stipulations be made in
English and Tagalog or in the dialect known to the employee. There should be two (2) witnesses to the
execution of the quitclaim who must also sign the quitclaim. The document should be subscribed and
sworn to under oath preferably before any administering official of the Department of Labor and
Employment or its regional office, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the NLRC or a labor attaché in a foreign
country

Exceptions: Norse Management Co.

vs. National Seamen Board,
September 30, 1982

Facts:

Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second
Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment
with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of
Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for compensation benefits filed before the National Seamen
Board, private respondent alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners should be
based on the law where the vessel is registered. Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should
not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore instead must be based on Board’s Memeorandum Circular No.
25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay jointly and severally the private
respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor but same decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.

Held:

The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of
cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of
employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. In Section 5(B)
of the Employment Agreement between petitioner and respondent’s husband states that In the event of
illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own
willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical attention. If such illness or injury
incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined
by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in
part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in
accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of
the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. Finally,
Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.

Asiavest Limited vs. CA, 296 SCRA

539

Facts:

1. The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said
defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment.
The action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal
guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.

2. The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given effect in
this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.

3. Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial costs and an
increase in attorney's fees with interest until full payment of the said obligations. On the other hand,
Heras no longer opposed the motion and instead appealed the decision to CA.

4. The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with Heras that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is
unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery. Summons should
have been personally served on Heras in Hong Kong,

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of
jurisdiction due to improper notice to the party

YES.

1. Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the time since the stipulated
fact that Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time
jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly, since Heras was not a
resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, ne in personam, summons should have been
personally served on him in Hong Kong.

The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong
court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force
and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

2. On the same note, Heras was also an absentee,hence, he should have been served with summons in
the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam.
Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is
temporarily absent from the country, because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong,
the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for good.

BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In
1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing
for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To,
or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected
as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner
Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that
Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen:

1. by naturalization,

2. by repatriation, and

3. by direct act of Congress.

**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;

3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,

4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and

5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11
months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in
1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition,
who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her
grieving mother and finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From
then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING
and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.
Djumantan vs. Domingo
Facts

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.He then embraced
and was converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines.
Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The latter made it
appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability
extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for
his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her
children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true
relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however,
subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez’
eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at
the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she
was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked
the visa previously granted to her.

Issue

Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary to
permanent resident legal.

Ruling

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country and
the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges
were obtained through misinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission
into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the
part of the government to permit them to stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not
withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her
extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. an alien
allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be admitted” as a permanent
resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a
Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter
of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens

Mercado vs. Manzano

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado
on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of
their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some
act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit..

VALLES vs. COMELEC Case Digest
FACTS:

Rosalinda Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. In 1949, at the age of 15, she left Australia and came to settle in Philippines. Then she later
married a Filipino. Ever since, she participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a
candidate as well. In may 1998 elections, she ran for Governor. Valles, an opposing candidate, filed a
petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an australian.

ISSUE:

Whether Rosalinda Ybasco is a Filipino citizen?

RULING:

Yes, The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed
to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalinda Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time
what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the US
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

FACTS:
Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he was
naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued Portuguese
Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular
Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate
Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus. An
internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court en banc
denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a Motion for
Clarification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship

HELD:

Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and
not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his
prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented
himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such
resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should
be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court,
no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not
petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required
and suppressed when convenient.
Board of Immigration
Commissioner vs. Go, 25 SCRA 890
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS v. GO CALLANO 25 SCRA 890 FACTS: On July 13, 1962, the
Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner of Immigration that, on the basis of the
findings made by the National Bureau of Investigation, the signatures of former Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain documents, amongst them authorizing the documentation of
Beato Go Callano and others, were not authentic. The Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant of
exclusion commanding the deportation officer "to carry out the exclusion of the above-named
applicants (the Go Callano brothers) on the first available transportation and on the same class of
accommodation in which they arrived to the port whence they came or to the country of which they are
nationals." The warrant of exclusion, for one reason or another, was not served immediately upon the
parties ordered deported, who, on November 16, 1962, filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an
action for injunction to restrain the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the Commissioner of
Immigration from executing the order. They based their action on the following grounds: (1) that the
Board had no jurisdiction to exclude them from the Philippines because they were not aliens but Filipino
citizens, and (2) that the order of exclusion was issued by the Board without due process and in violation
of the Constitution. Months later, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the respondents in the case from deporting the petitioners. After trial, the Court rendered
judgment finding that, according to petitioners' undisputed evidence, "the petitioners herein are the
illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her common-law husband — a Chinese
citizen," and concluding that "until the petitioners left for China in 1947, they must be considered as
citizens of the Philippines as they were born of a Filipino mother and an alien father who, however, was
not married to their mother." Notwithstanding the above finding and conclusion, however, the Court
dismissed the case holding that the petitioners are citizens of the Republic of China and not being
properly documented for entry into the Philippines as found by the Immigration Commissioner. The
grounds upon which the Court based its decision were:

Conflict of Laws (2012) Citizenship

MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, FEU – Institute of Law

(1) because petitioners stayed in China for a period of fifteen years before returning to the
Philippines, they must be considered as citizens of the Chinese Republic; (2) as petitioners were
recognized by their alien father as his children, they became Chinese citizens under the Chinese
law of nationality. While the Court also found that the cable authorization mentioned
heretofore was a forgery, it held that, for the purpose of the petition before it, "it was
immaterial to determine the genuineness or falsity of the cable authorization. For if the
petitioners are Filipino citizens, they are entitled to remain within the territorial jurisdiction of
 the Republic in whatever way they might have entered." After the denial of herein respondents'
motion for re-consideration, they appealed to the Court of Appeals. Like the court of origin, the
Court of Appeals found that herein respondents were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a
Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen. That Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and
Emilia Callano a Filipino, lived maritally in several municipalities of Leyte since 1934 and that out
of their union the four private respondents were born, are facts found, after appropriate
proceedings, first, by the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong; second, by the Board of
Special Inquiry who investigated their case in Manila upon their arrival thereat in 1961; third, by
the Court of First Instance of Manila, and lastly, by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether
respondents are Filipino citizens? HELD: Before it can be said that the questioned signature is a
forgery there must be competent proof that the specimens are the genuine signature of the
Secretary. Even if the competent proofs were presented showing that the questioned signature
is a forgery, the forgery of the signature on the cable authorization would not have nullified the
documentation of the petitioners by the consulate in Hongkong. It must be stated in this
connection that the petitioners became Philippine citizens because of their relation with their
mother who is a Filipino. Their status was conferred on them neither by the documentation by
the consulate in Hongkong nor by the finding of the Board of Special Inquiry in Manila.
Consequently, whatever defects there are in the proceedings before the consulate and the
board of inquiry cannot affect their status. Therefore, even assuming that the petitioners were
not properly documented, there is no basis for the finding of the respondent Board that they are
aliens who can be excluded. Conflict of Laws (2012) Citizenship

Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC

We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's cancellation of Ugdoracion's certificate of
candidacy for material misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petition must fail.

Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that the facts in the COC
must be true, and any false representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for cancellation
thereof, thus:

Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized
city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status;
his date of birth; residence; post office address for all election purposes; profession or occupation; that
he will support and defend the Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he
will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country that the obligation assumes by his oath is
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
COC are true to the best of his knowledge.

Section 78. Petitioner to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy- A verified petition to
deny due course or to cancel a COC may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the COC and shall be decided
after due notice and hearing not later than 15 days before the election.

The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code pertains to material fact, and is not
simply innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate's qualification for elective office such as
one's citizenship and residence.

Ugdogracion argued that his supposed involuntary acquisition of a permanent resident status in the USA
which he insists did not result in the loss of his domicile of origin.

We are not convinced. A Filipino's acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. In short, "green card" status in the USA is
a renunciation of one's status as a resident of the Philippines. Ugdogracion's acquisition of a lawful
permanent resident status in the US amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a
resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which is Bohol, to a new
domicile of choice, which is the USA.

TECSON VS. COMELECFACTS:

Facts:

Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural
Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that
Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

“Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or
“Vice-President”, of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
“candidates” for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death
certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other
evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan—respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935
Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus,
the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the
assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to
hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Jacot v Dal
FACTS:

FACTS:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the , affirming the
Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the
ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his US citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on
13 December 1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act.

He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with
the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June
2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006,
the Bureau of Immigration issued and Identification Certificate, recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the
Philippines.

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution11 disqualifying the
petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the
requisite renunciation of his US citizenship

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law for
persons seeking public office.

HELD:

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply
with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship, because these are
distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already
naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but
there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the
filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship

(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines,

to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an
authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.

Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections

FACTS: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
“Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.” The application was approved and the petitioner
took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her
bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis M. Bautista,
(private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto
questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s
disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed
to execute a “personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath” as imposed by Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be
an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5 (2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running
for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship

ISSUE: For purposes of determining the petitioner’s eligibility to run for public office, whether the
“sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” in Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma
requirement.|||

HELD: NO. Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already
deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.(Emphasis ours)

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court. DCTSEA

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign
law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an
attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of
the law and states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise,
in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on
reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice,
may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court
is “satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.” Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held
to be a competent proof of that law.

The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above methods.
As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of
the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government showing that petitioner already
renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in
disregarding the same.

We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence the said
letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers
(AASJS) Member v. Datumanong that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern
itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.

This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so
conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read
the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic. CcADHI

The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of
her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such
ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which
provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most
number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and
seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have re-
acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens
or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who
re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their
right to run for public office. The petitioner’s failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact
tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office.
Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and
hold any elective office in the Philippines.

MACQUILING V. COMELECFACTS:

FACTS: This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on May 10, 2013
and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2013.

We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 2010 elections has
already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has successfully finished his term of office. While
the relief sought can no longer be granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it
will either affirm the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for public
office.

Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of this Courts Decision
dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and reiterated that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be
stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of his foreign citizenship
and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his
accomplishments as mayor affect the question before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a local elective position?

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration denied.

REMEDIAL LAW: judicial notice of foreign laws

Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having
the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on
April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was
divested of all the rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport
after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,which must be presented as public documentsof a
foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof."Mere reference to a foreign
law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United States "providing that a
person who is divested of American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such
American citizenship by using a US Passport issued prior to expatriation."

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at the time Arnado filed his certificate of
candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is
the application of this law and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification
to run for any local elective position.

With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA) 9225 is that "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act."This policy pertains to the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. Section 5(2)requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who
seek elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.

This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read together with Section
40(d) of the Local Government Codewhich disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for any
elective local position, indicates a policy that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely
and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as
its national even after the Filipino has renounced his foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard
of this policy.

Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of doubt.
POLITICAL LAW: dual citizens ineligible for local public office

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual
citizenship from running for local elective positions.

There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the
country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes
the person named therein as its national.

It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship
by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of
Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that
after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.

If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American
citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be
complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath
emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has
sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to
do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere
ceremonial formality.

The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country".On the contrary,
this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that
Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another
citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with by the
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the
aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence.They are accorded not only great
respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative
body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado used his U.S.
Passport at least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This was debunked by the
COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed
with Arnados claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine
passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used
his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31
March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.

None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by the Bureau
of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the
Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is
USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14
April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24
November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.

The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his knowledge, his
Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use."This conclusion, however, is not supported by
the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that
he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnados
travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and
on 23 March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.

Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that the use of the
U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of
his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.

Arnado vs. COMELECFACTS:

FACTS:

Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was
naturalized as a US citizen.
Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied
for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul in San Francisco. He took the Oath of Allegiance and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections. However,
his co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that he continued to use his US passport for
entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation.

While the petition for disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded, wherein Arnado
garnered the highest votes and was proclaimed winner.

COMELEC 1st Division: Nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession.

Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2nd highest votes, contested to the application of the
rule on succession.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arnado was correctly disqualified from running for public office by virtue of his
subsequent use of US passport, which effectively disavowed or recalled his 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation.

RULING:

Yes, Arnado failed to comply with the 2nd requisite because as held in Maquiling, his 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Since
then up to the time he filed his COC in 2012, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification.

Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time he filed his
COC for the May 13, 2013 elections.

Under 4(d) of the LGC, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any elective local
position. This refers to dual allegiance. Consequently, congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization abroad to reacquire their
Philippine citizenship and enjoy full civil and political rights.
Hence, they may now run for public office provided they:

Meet the qualifications for holding such public office, and

Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath, prior to or at the time of filing their COC.

David vs. AgbayFACTS:

FACTS:

Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach in Oriental
Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion where they built their house
is public land and part of the salvage zone.

Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian
citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.
The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.

An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of arrest
was issued against the petitioner.

Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed
before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time
still a Canadian citizen.

Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. 9225.

RULING:
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he
was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into
force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens
as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at
the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen.

Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.
While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship
status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public
document under Article 172, paragraph
Marcos v COMELECFACTS:

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven
(7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and
also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as
she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner
of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in
the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for
actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications
for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different
places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as
required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim
Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Jalosjos v. COMELECFACTS:

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian
citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother
in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He
then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality
of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was
eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the
MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's
decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.
COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

https://25adcehfsgggwy7fr3-6senl06.hop.clickbank.net/

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that
domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely
been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion.
Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community
to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if
it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a
fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders,
including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of
Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this
does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or
wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The
Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his
qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

CABALLERO VS. COMELECFACTS:

FACTS: Petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero and private respondent Jonathan Enrique Nanud, Jr. were
both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes. Nanud
filed a Petition to the COMELEC to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy (COC) that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian
citizen and a non-resident thereof. During the conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that
he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and the petition was served by registered mail
not in his address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition
during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private
respondent’s substantial allegations in his petition.

The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material
misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan,
Batanes within one year prior to the election.

Without the COMELEC Resolution becoming final and executory, elections were subsequently held and
petitioner won. Petitioner then filed for a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which
denied the aforesaid motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC En Banc gravely erred in disregarding the clear import of procedural
rules provided for under COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.
HELD: NO. While private respondent failed to comply with the procedural requirements of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523 on the mode of service, the settled rule, however, is that COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to
suspend its own rules as provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. – In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all
matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission.

Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case without
further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired.

In Tolentino vs. COMELEC and De Castro vs. COMELEC the Court held that “in exercising its powers and
jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules I resolving election disputes.”

The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest
of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for
the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives – ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious,
and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC.

Caasi vs. CA, NovemberFACTS:

Facts:

Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988.
His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United
States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the
United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections, including the
plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the congressional
elections on May 18, 1987.

After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of a green card by the
respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines.

Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United
States such that it would disqualify him to run for any elective local position.

Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident
of the United States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" which Miguel filled
up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the
United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended
stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that
was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to
Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper
portion, the following information is printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this
card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States.”

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not go to the United States merely
to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with the intention to live there permanently
as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a
candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections, waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States

Held: No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent
of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he
was "disqualified to run for any elective office."

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a
green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S.
despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as
indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for
said public office.

Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

Held: Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or
immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had
waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.
We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election
was null and void.

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the
time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public
office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of
the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his
return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January
18, 1988.
● In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants
of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right
to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law
has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental
reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign
country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one
eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign
country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

● Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an
immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan.

Coquilla vs. COMELECFACTS:

FACTS:

Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up
and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized
as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S.
Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United
States.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although
he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and
lasted until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to
the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of
Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No.
115123 on November 13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His
application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001. On February 27, 2001,
he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar
for “two (2) years.”

His opponent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the
latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been
a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since
November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Coquilla can be considered to have resided in Oras, Eastern Samar for more than one (1)
year.

RULING:

No. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling”
or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).”

Coquillo lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in
1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, he was an
alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him
to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10,
2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
JAO VS. CA FACTS:
Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico V. Jao. Jao
denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the
NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and
Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared
the child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA, arguing that the blood grouping test could have
been conclusive and disputable evidence of his non-paternity, because there was no showing of
irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests. CA upheld Jao's contention and reversed the trial
court decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove paternity.

RULING:

Yes. SC denied the petition for review.

Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be
gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as
the 1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil. 188)

In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt with in
Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood
groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the
defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For
obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he
can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts and
circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant is the father of
the child."

Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity, rulings
have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing
in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure. There is now almost
universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of
the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if
the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the
alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-paternity has
already been passed upon in several cases. The positive results of blood tests excluding paternity, in a
case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were
recognized as final on the question of paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin). Evidence of non-paternity consisting of
the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited
with the mother within the period of gestation (Cuneo v. Cuneo). The Court said that the competent
medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be
tantamount to rejecting scientific fact.

San Luis v. San Luis

FACTS:

Felicisimo T. San Luis was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. He contracted three
marriages. His first was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, but
Virginia died on 1963. On May 1, 1968, He married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son. But on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce at State of Hawaii which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody of December 14, 1973. On June
20, 1974, He married Felicidad Sagalongos. He had no children but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate, filing a letter of administration
before RTC Makati. Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition
because she only a mistress of his father because at the time of death, he was still married to his second
wife. Felicidad presented the evidence that prove the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry lee had already
been dissolved. And she claimed that Felicisimo had the capacity to marry her by virtue of par. 2 Article
26 of the family code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Felicidad my file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s state.

HELD:
Yes, Felicidad has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise
from her status that as a surviving wife of Felicisimo or his co-owner under the Art. 144 of the Civil code.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry the respondent in 1974, the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as he may be considered the co-
owner of Felicisimo as regards that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.